May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW92
e People’s Protection
Units’ Branding Problem
Syrian Kurds and Potential
Destabilization in Northeastern Syria
Lt. Cmdr. Joshua M. M. Portzer, U.S. Navy
Kurdish-led militiamen ride atop military vehicles 17 October 2017 as they celebrate victory over the Islamic State in Raqqa, Syria. (Photo by
Erik De Castro, Reuters)
93MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
KURDISH PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNIT
T
he Syrian civil war has been one of the most de-
structive conicts in recent international histo-
ry. Hundreds of thousands of people have lost
their lives, and even more people have been displaced
from Syria. Amidst the tumult of violence, the Islamic
State (IS) emerged as the most vicious strain of Islamic
terorists to date. e IS and numerous armed faions
within Syria have taught the world a loody lesson in
the power of nonstate actors. Yet, ironicaly, a nonstate
actor largely led the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
in defeating the IS. Suported by the United States, the
Kurdish Yekîneyên Paraina Gel (People’s Protection
Units, or YPG) led Raqqa’s recapture, and in demol-
ishing the caliphate, the YPG reclaimed aproximately
a third of Syrian land known as the Rojava. e YPG
ghters arualy have been the unsung heroes in the
most recent international campaign against teror, as
told by many media outlets such as CNN and National
Review.
1
Unfortunately, these same media outlets now
tel of another latent maelstrom of destruction.
2
e
United States has steped aside, enaling Turkey to
invade the Kurdish Rojava region in northern Syria.
While the White House vacilates between a ful with-
drawal and a limited one to quel a potentialy resur-
gent IS, a secondary multination conict is unfolding
amid a wavering cease-re and a joint Turkish-Russian
agreement. Until the YPG satisfactorily distances
itself from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in
Turkey’s view, however, mediation eorts are almost
certainly doomed to fail. Shaping the YPG’s messaging
and dialoue with Turkey should be the Syrian Kurds’
main line of eort.
Who Are the People’s
Protection Units?
e YPG is the armed wing of the Syrian-based
Democratic Union Party (PYD). Ethnic Kurds
comprise most of its membership. Although the YPG
was founded in response to the 2004 riots that took
place in the Syrian city of Qamishli, the YPG gained
international recognition by ghting the IS during
the Syrian civil war.
3
In the process of ghting the IS
between 2014 and 2016, the YPG and the Kurdish
contingent writ large have come to dominate the
Rojava—an area largely bordered by the Euphrates,
extending through the northeastern portion of Syria
(almost one-third of the country). e Rojava is a
de facto autonomous region that has ealished a
nascent liberal democracy.
4
Turkey’s Issue with the
People’s Protection Units
e PYD’s founding philosophy hails from
Abdulah Öcalan, a Kurdish socialist-turned-federal-
ist who founded the PKK and who was imprisoned by
Turkey.
5
Turkey has designated the PKK a terorist
organization and so have the United States and the
European Union. e PKK’s violent separatist cam-
paign dates to the 1980s, and since 2015, Turkey has
dealt with a PKK-launched insurgency. PKK aacks
have kiled over forty thousand people to date.
6
e
common philosophical underpinnings of the PKK
and YPG as wel as Turkish Kurds ghting alongside
Syrian Kurds (abeit against the IS) make the YPG
and the PKK interchangeale in the eyes of Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In short, Erdoğan’s
government believes the YPG and PKK are one and
the same, and for Turkey, there is lile dierence
between “Kurdish terorists” and the IS. As Turkey’s
former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğl comment-
ed in 2015, “How can you say that [the YPG] organi-
zation is beer because it’s ghting [the IS]? … ey
are the same. Terorists are evil. ey al must be
eradicated. is is what
we want.”
7
e military oensive
that began 9 October
2019 is not the rst time
Erdoğan’s forces have
aed against the Syrian
Kurds. Despite the Kurds’
large stake in the Syrian
civil war, Turkey has
vetoed Kurdish participa-
tion in international taks
throughout the conict in
order to include Kurdish
membership in the High
Negotiations Commiee
(HNC)—the body
created to represent the
Syrian oposition in 2016.
Considering that the
Syrian Kurds comprise
Lt. Cmdr. Joshua M. M.
Portzer, U.S. Navy, is
a politico-military mas-
ter’s scholar at Princeton
University and a student
Fellow at the Center for
International Security
Studies. He holds degrees
from the University of
Virginia and the University
of Arkansas. He has served
as a P-3C naval ight ocer
at Patrol Squadron Four, a
P-8A weapons and tactics
instructor at the Maritime
Patrol and Reconnaissance
Weapons School, and the
assistant navigator on the
USS George Washington
(CVN-73).
May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW94
a substantial portion of the anti-Syrian government
forces, their exclusion from the commiee has been
particularly prolematic for the negotiations process.
Why the United States Is Involved
In the summer of 2014, the U.S. government be-
gan aiding the YPG via air suport during the IS siege
of Kobani.
8
U.S.-led airdrops continued through 2015.
Vis-à-vis this partnership in the “global war on teror,” the
YPG became a nonstate proxy-extension of the U.S. ght
against the IS. President Barack Obama’s “Assad must go”
messaging helped elevate the YPG and its partnering con-
tingent, the SDF, to become a center of mass away from
the Alawite regime during the civil war.
9
As noted, the
YPG and Kurdish footprint in the Rojava autonomous
region also oered a smal-scale proof-of-concept that a
stale democratic government could persist in the Midle
East. As of 2019, the YPG’s anti-IS campaign arualy
has been the largest dividend derived from Capitol Hil’s
investment of YPG-armament and general funding.
What does Everybody Want?
Turkey, the YPG, and the United States have dier-
ing, oen conicting, aspirations for the fate of the YPG,
other Kurds in Rojava, and the region itself.
Turkey. As noted by Dr. Tim Cook and the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR), there are multiple items at
play concerning Turkey’s agenda.
10
Curently, there are
aproximately three milion refugees from the Syrian
civil war in Turkey.
11
Erdoğan is under a lot of domestic
pressure to act. Politicaly, the party is much weaker than
it has been in years past, having lost its majority in par-
liament for the rst time in 2015.
12
e ruling party also
suered an unanticipated loss in the summer of 2019 in
Istanbul’s mayoral election.
13
As mentioned, Turkey has
A U.S. military commander (second from right) walks with Kurdish
ghters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) 25 April 2017 at a
YPG headquarters that was hit by Turkish airstrikes in Mount Karachok
near Malikiya, Syria. (Photo by Rodi Said, Reuters)
95MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
KURDISH PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNIT
dealt with various and periodic domestic teror aacks
for decades to include a resurgent conict with the PKK
that has raged for the last four years. ese two issues
have resulted in two separate objectives. First, Turkey has
an interest in “freeing up” adjacent land to return Syrian
refugees in large numbers. Second, Turkey wants to
remove the threat of armed Kurdish forces on its south-
ern border. Both objectives led to the commencement of
Operation Peace Spring and subsequent military opera-
tions on 9 October 2019.
14
At the same time, Turkey feels betrayed by the United
States and its pulic backing of the YPG. Per the CFR,
there is no decisive evidence that Turkey has let go of the
possibility of deposing Bashar al-Assad.
15
To this end, it
is possile that Turkish forces wil try moving down the
Euphrates to enlist the previous members of the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) who have been trained by Turkey—
wel beyond the twenty-mile “safe zone” that Turkey and
the United States have previously discussed.
16
YPG/Kurds in Rojava. e CFR panel’s broadcast
on 10 October 2019 sugeed that what the YPG and
Syrian Kurds want may be straightforward enough
because they face an existential threat from Turkey.
17
Accordingly, the YPG and Syrian Kurds want stability
within their cities and a sense of security. is includes
alowing their children to aend school and not wory-
ing about eeing their homes.
18
As Cook notes, it is not
clear that the YPG (or the larger Kurdish contingent)
desires a nation-state per se.
19
It has been a “nation-state-
less” democracy and has functioned that way for several
years.
20
is is a complicated point though, considering
the various Kurdish groups that have diering interests;
for instance, the Iraqi Kurds under Masoud Barzani’s
leadership and the 2017 Independence Referendum.
21
e United States has long made clear that it wil
not intervene militarily on behalf of the Kurds, but that
does not lessen the sense of betrayal felt by the YPG.
22
Curently, the Kurds are looking for anyone to defend
them, regarless of who. As of the week of 14 October
2019, the Kurds found a taker: Assad. rough a deal
brokered by Russia, Syria wil come to the Kurds’ aid,
though it wil likely cost the Kurds their autonomy. But
as the SDF’s commander in chief, Gen. Mazloum Abdi,
claimed, “If we have to choose between compromise and
genocide, we wil choose our people.”
23
e United States. e U.S. government’s interests
in the region are both complex and divergent. e YPG
has been an ecacious partner in ghting the IS. While
the United States inveed heavily in arming and train-
ing the YPG against the IS, it has suered fewer than ve
American combat deaths (eleven thousand people inter-
nationaly have died in the ght against the IS).
24
Despite
the low casualty ure, President Donald Trump seems
driven by a desire to make good on his promise to bring
back American troops from foreign wars. He believes
the regional countries should “ght their own wars.”
25
Weeks prior to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s recent demise,
Trump was wiling to accept Erdoğan’s message at face
value: “ISIS is defeated—leave the rest to us.”
26
It was
only aer Iraq reported that the United States could
not stay in the country for a prolonged period that a
smal number of U.S. troops uarded the Syrian oil elds
against a possile IS resurgence.
27
Yet Congress oposes the president’s decision and
does not agree with abandoning the Kurds (this includes
GOP lawmakers).
28
Congress does not want to repeat
what it believes has been a cardinal sin of presidents past:
puling out of a conict before the right moment only to
see the advancements gained crumle. Capitol Hil also
understands the importance of alies and the requisite
trust that folows. e image of Trump washing his hands
of the situation sends a dangerous signal to alied nations,
and it is not a good look for the United States regarding
countries like Israel.
29
Unintended Consequences
U.S. inaion coupled with Turkey’s continued for-
ward press into the Rojava region may result in various
unintended consequences for al parties involved.
A large-scale regional conict. If le unchanged,
these groups’ trajectories could cause many consequences.
On 16 October 2019, the Syrian army entered Kobani
to lock Turkish forces from advancing.
30
In the wake of
Trump’s declaration of Syrian withdrawal, Turkey and
Russia have come to a security agreement. e agreement
gave the YPG less than one week to withdraw from the
mandated safety zone, which Turkish forces now patrol.
Turkey, Russia, and Syria wil colectively oversee the
border region.
31
However, Assad has already declared
that he wil regain al lost teritory and has refered to
Turkey’s aions as an invasion. He has claimed that
he is ready “to suport any ‘popular resistance’ against
Turkey’s invasion ‘to expel the invader sooner or later.’”
32
While Damascus is determined to regain its teritory, it
May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW96
is not clear how Assad wil hanle his agreement with
the Kurds in the face of Turkey’s military aions. It
does not seem too far-fetched to think that there could
be a skirmish between Syrian and Turkish forces in the
future. Russia would likely play mediator but arualy
would back Assad before Erdoğan if it came down to
choice. While Turkey’s military may be one of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) larger forces, it
is not in top condition. us, the military aions against
the Kurds could be precarious for Turkey.
33
A protraed, uerila-based conict. As men-
tioned, it is not necessarily the goal of the YPG and
Kurdish within the Rojava to become a nation-state.
Turkey pulicly equates the YPG with the PKK as
terorists that want to harm Turkey. But if harm is the
YPG’s objective, then Turkey’s moves are strategicaly
questionale. e YPG would be beer positioned to
aack Turkey via uerila warfare—the YPG is in
fact more vulnerale to Turkey’s reprisals within its
own teritory.
34
Given this potential vulnerability, a
Turkish oensive may initialy push the Kurds further
from Turkey’s borders, but Turkey could initiate the
uerila war it seeks to avoid. Regarless, the oensive
would compel the Kurds to defend themselves in some
capacity. Considering the domestic pressures Erdoğan
faces, there is a high likelihood that the conict could
become protraed for Turkey; this is also not a desir-
ale outcome for its military.
35
A resurgence of radicals. Radicals gaining trac-
tion within Syria is a serious concern. is is not only
true of the IS but also within the Free Syrian Army
(FSA). Concerning the laer, according to Cook, there
are Turkish trained ghters within the FSA that the
Pentagon rejected as “alies” against the IS because the
FSA ghters themselves were extremist (and poorly
trained).
36
If Turkey reenergizes these extremist ghter
groups as they continue down the Euphrates, that energy
could create more chaos and could potentialy fuel
renewed multiparty conict within Syria. Concerning
the IS, although it has lost its caliphate and its original
A convoy of U.S. military vehicles arrives near the Iraqi Kurdish
town of Bardarash in the Dohuk Governorate 21 October 2019
aer withdrawing from northern Syria. (Photo by San Hamed,
Agence France-Presse)
97MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
KURDISH PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNIT
caliph, the IS stil exists (reportely as many as fourteen
thousand ghters remain).
37
e U.S. withdrawal further
heightens the risk of resurgence as IS forces move to
exploit a power vacuum.
38
e YPG has been a major
buering force up to this point, holding aproximately
eleven thousand IS ghters in detention.
39
However,
between Turkey conducting an oensive and the YPG
focused on asking Assad for sanctuary (and eeing), it
cals into question who wil be le to target the IS head
on. It is possile that Syria could take on the role of the
United States as nancier for the YPG’s anti-IS cam-
paign but that is far from certain.
Declining partnerships and emboldened compet-
itors of the United States. In the short run, the moves
thus far by the United States have strained relations with
both its nonstate and major alies. e United States
arualy abandoned the YPG for sake of a NATO part-
ner. In the process of Turkey’s escalating aions toward
the Kurds, the United States then threatened Turkey
with economic sanctions, puing serious strain on the
relationship between the two countries. Seemingly, the
United States has damaged both relationships and gained
lile in return (the fractured cease-re does not instil a
sense of hope or goodwil).
e long run could have more trouling strategic
implications. For instance, ocials such as Ambassador
Dan Shapiro have already questioned whether the
decision to withdraw from Syria and stand aside while
Turkey crushes the Kurdish forces wil weaken Israel’s
condence in its longtime Weern partner.
40
e
question stands for other U.S. alies as wel.
41
Abruptly
announcing U.S. withdrawal from Syria has been one of
many moves on behalf of Trump’s “America First” strat-
egy. It is possile that the Trump administration is ex-
pending unrenewale social capital vis-à-vis NATO and
other U.S. alies. Announcing a withdrawal from Syria
accompanies other relatively recent U.S. “back outs” such
as the exiting the climate accords and the Trans-Pacic
Partnership. One cannot help but wonder if this signals
to U.S. alies that America no longer honors its word as
it once did. Such a signaling of unreliability is bad for
business. Concomitantly, the more the United States
withdraws from international agreements/partnerships
and weakens relationships with other states, the stronger
strategic rivals like Russia and Iran (and China) become.
Multiple Compatible Interests;
One Major Nonstarter
Examining the interests of Turkey, the United
States, and the YPG more closely reveals that they are
not mutualy exclusive.
•
Turkey (Erdoğan) wants to quel terorism, transfer
Syrian refugees back to Syria, and be seen domesti-
caly as aively promoting Turkish interests.
•
e YPG and Kurds want security and stability
under their own autonomy (though they are wil-
ing to compromise autonomy for security in the
face of genocide).
•
e U.S. government wants to please the American
pulic by making good on bringing troops home and
“geing out of foreign wars.”
•
Congress wants to honor the treaty between
NATO partners but does not want to abandon
the in-country aly that has been most eective
at defeating the IS (nor alow for the IS’s resur-
gence). Capitol Hil is also very sensitive to strained
tensions between the United States and its alies
abroad. Finaly, the United States does not want to
continue alowing Syria and Russia to come away
as the sole “winners” in the region.
None of these interests are necessarily mutualy ex-
clusive. Some require a good deal of compromise (largely
from the Kurds), but the Kurds are at a point where com-
promise is favorale to destruction. As Abdi stated, aly-
ing with Assad is a strong signal from the YPG that it is
wiling to do whatever is necessary to prevent destruction
of the Kurds.
42
However, as mentioned earlier, Turkey
does not dierentiate between the YPG and PKK. Until
Erdoğan’s party has a politicaly acceptale o ramp to
e more the United States withdraws from interna-
tional agreements/partnerships and weakens relation-
ships with other states, the stronger strategic rivals like
Russia and Iran (and China) become.
May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW98
make such a distinction, many of these compatile inter-
ests are moot points because they are not compatile with
Turkey, thus equating the YPG to a terorist organiza-
tion. Understanding why this is the case requires a deeper
understanding of how Kurdish issues have become an
existential threat for Erdoğan.
e Kurdish Issue: A Closer Look
at Erdoğan’s Existential reat
Between 2013 and 2015, the Turkish-PKK conict
had reached a pseudo-abeyance. Erdoğan’s administra-
tion hosted the PYD in Turkey’s capital to discuss border
stability and court as an aly against Assad.
43
However,
this signaling toward a truce did not last. As Max
Homan from the Center for American Progress (an
independent policy institute) highlights, several mani-
feed factors led Erdoğan into an intraale position on
the Kurdish issue.
44
First, the more powerful the U.S.-
suported YPG became, the more the PYD became a
threat in Erdoğan’s view. At the same time, the Kurdish
People’s Democratic Party within Turkey (HDP) was
ale to beer mobilize toward the end of this two-year
respite.
45
e HDP platform includes stark oposition
to the power-monopolized presidency Erdoğan has been
engineering for himself. is gave Erdoğan not only a
growing concern across the border but also two concerns
domesticaly—the HDP and the PKK. ese concerns
compounded with a lack of Turkish suport toward
the YPG, and violence soon erupted once more within
Turkey due to Kurdish protests.
46
Erdoğan is up for reelection in 2023 and needs to
consolidate his coalition to ensure reelection. With these
recent moves, Erdoğan may be reaching out to right-
wing nationalists who hold strong anti-Kurdish views.
47
Equating the People’s Democratic Party to the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party gives Erdoğan’s government two political
dividends. First, linking terorism to political expression
permanently sidelines the Kurdish eort, which in part
strengthens Erdoğan’s suporters’ platform. Second, if
Erdoğan’s suporters are strengthened, then so too are
Erdoğan’s proects of reelection. is point is worth
considering further because it sugests that there are
other political motivations that explain Erdoğan’s gov-
ernment’s “inability” to make a distinction between the
PYD and PKK. Political stability and regional stability
are of equal import for Erdoğan. Moreover, internal state
stability likely requires Erdoğan “to manage faions
within the state security aparatus that favor a harline
response” against any of the Kurdish contingents that are
within Turkey’s realm.
48
Separatism continues to be a concern for Ankara. It is
a phenomenon the Turkish government feels transcends
borders. On 22 October 2019, Erdoğan gave the Syrian
Kurds a nal warning to vacate prior to the end of the
cease re, refering to them as “separatists.”
49
e United States fails to properly understand these
issues between Turkey and the Kurds. e United States
has not acknowledged that the Kurds, both domesticaly
and across the border, are an existential threat to Erdoğan’s
government. Accordingly, the likelihood is smal that
Turkey ceases hostilities even if the “safe zone” is vacated.
Changing the Tide
It may not be too late to stop the unfolding conict
in its tracks. However, it almost certainly requires the
PYD and YPG to do some unsavory politicking. Ankara
has been wiling to sele peacefuly before, but now the
government is backed into a corner in a ght for political
suport toward 2023. Erdoğan needs an o-ramp that
alows his party to court the Nationalist Movement Party
and maintain a hard line against the PKK. e PYD and
YPG contingents need to completely and unequivocaly
sever ties with the PKK. Disavowing any association or
suport of the PKK and pulicly labeling it as a terorist
organization may give Erdoğan the room he needs to ma-
neuver in order to de-escalate the situation. Consider that
in 2017, the United States entreated the YPG to change
its name and branding because of its assumed close asso-
ciation with the PKK.
50
While this branding change did
e United States fails to properly understand these is-
sues between Turkey and the Kurds … the Kurds, both
domestically and across the border, are an existential
threat to Erdoğan’s government.
99MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
KURDISH PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNIT
not go far, it does show that the YPG’s “branding issue”
has been identied as a prolem before. Of course, this
time there is now a lot more at stake.
e entire situation discussed thus far puts the Syrian
Kurds in a hard place, though. To ask one group of
Kurds to forsake another is a tal order. However, given
the dire nature of the Syrian Kurds’ situation and their
curent wilingness to treat with Assad’s government (of
al entities), they may be wiling to compromise. ey
too are facing their own
existential threat. Prior
to Trump’s withdrawal
announcement, the U.S.
administration may likely
have been in an opor-
tune place to pressure the
Syrian Kurdish leadership
toward eschewing al asso-
ciation with the PKK in a
rebranding eort. While
this is no longer the case,
U.S. forces stil have close
ties with YPG leaders,
and a credile oer of U.S.
assistance to help medi-
ate an o-ramp from the
curent conict might be
accepted, if not welcomed.
e United States also has
the advantage of playing
interlocutor with Ankara.
Russia is another possile
mediating entity, but it
is in the United States’
best interest to make the
rst aempt at starting
a dialoue and to stymie
further Russian inuence
in the region.
Even if al the Syrian
Kurds vacate the safety
zone, the most fundamen-
tal and underlying issue is
not adressed. So long as
the PYD and PKK are one
and the same in Ankara’s
pulic view, Turkey’s
political objective to eradicate them is not so easily
extinuished. By pulicly renouncing the PKK (and
perhaps leveraging backdoor taks through the United
States), the PYD puts Turkey in an interesting political
position. Erdoğan has been spared a large amount of
domestic ridicule within Turkey concerning the Syrian
Kurds because he has been ale to color the Kurds in
terms of terorism and insurgency (and thus downplay
Turkey’s aions against them). But if the Syrian Kurds
Areas of control in Syria
(as of 17 October 2019)
Kurdish forces and allies GovernmentTurkish forces Opposition
Idlib
Mediterranean
Sea
Damascus
Homs
Deir al-Zor
Palmyra
Raqqa
Manbij
Aleppo
M4 highway skirts the
southern fringe of the zone
TURKEY
IRAQ
JORDAN
LEBANON
SYRIA
Planned “safe zone”
to extend 32km into
Syria between Tel
Abyad and Ras al
Ain, and extend
30km for the rest of
the expanse
between the
Euphrates river and
the Iraq border
Turkey's military incursion has
given it control of two cities
Planned 10km patrol zone for
Turkish and Russian forces
*beginning Oct 28*
ISRAEL
Euphrates
Al Hasakah
Qamishli will be
under Syrian control
Ras al Ain
Tel Abyad
Kobane
Hama
Daraa
Area of detail
(Figure by P. K. Dua and B. Simon, 23 October 2019; sources: Carter Center, Natural Earth, and Reuters)
Turkey’s Incursion in Northeastern Syria
Turkey aims to establish a “safe zone” along most of its southern border that runs roughly 30 km
into Syria so that it can sele up to two million Syrian refugees there. Under its “Operation Peace
Spring,” Turkey struck a deal with Moscow to clear the area of Syrian Kurdish YPG militia, which
were long U.S. allies but which Ankara deems a terrorist group.
May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW100
take the initiative and force an internationaly acknowl-
edged schism with the PKK, Erdoğan may not be ale
to deal with them so draconicaly. e curent interna-
tional narative has focused more on the United States
abandoning the Kurds as former alies—not that the
Syrian Kurds are wrongfuly pursued as a terorist orga-
nization. ose two naratives are importantly distinct.
For the Syrian Kurds’ dilemma, the laer is much more
important than the former. However, if a protraed re-
gional conict results, then the increase of international
coverage ensues. at is a bad headache for Erdoğan,
and the Turkish people may not have an apetite for
that media-induced stress, given the internal stress
already caused by the Syrian civil war.
It is prudent to mention that there is a line of think-
ing within some policy circles that are somewhat in tune
with Erdoğan’s accusations of YPG terorism. Some com-
mentators at both the Carnegie Endowment for Peace
and the International Crisis Group claim that the PKK
and YPD/YPG are more closely aligned than other schol-
ars and commentators describe.
51
is includes claims
that the PYD was ealished by PKK members in 2003
(coming from the Qandil Mountains), northern Syria is
a “recruiting ground” for the PKK, and the decision-mak-
ing contingent of the PYD (and thus, the YPG) are in fact
inuenced and consulted by PKK members.
52
If these are wel-founded facts, then simply exchang-
ing one name tag for another may not be enough to do
the trick for the Syrian Kurds. However, there are two
major counterpoints to these assertions. First, some
aects of these assessments are based o a relatively
smal sample of interviews.
53
While information from
an interview is a valid data point, there are other data
points from other scholars’ research that dier in mes-
saging (for instance, at the Council on Foreign Relations
as referenced earlier).
54
Greater curent ties to PKK
founder Abdulah Öcalan’s ideology may not be al that
prolematic, considering that Öcalan no longer suports
a central nation-state (as Elizabeth Tsurkov and Esam
al-Hassan of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Turkish-backed Syrian rebels and Turkish soldiers watch 12 October
2019 as smoke billows from the border town of Ras al-Ain as Turkey
and its allies continued their assault on Kurdish-held border towns in
northeastern Syria. (Photo by Nazeer Al-khatib, Agence France-Presse)
101MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
KURDISH PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNIT
Peace discuss).
55
What these interviews ilustrate is
that opinions vary on how the Kurds should aproach
governing within the Rojava region. While there may
be some elements of discord between the PYD and the
Arabs who live in the Rojava region, such disagreements
are not necessarily leading to large-scale repression (e.g.,
antibigamy laws are not enforced in regions that include
an Arab majority).
56
Scholars like Tsurkov and al-Hassan
do make a valid point though: the PYD should empower
not only the Kurdish contingents within the Rojava but
also the Arabs to folow self-administration. Explicit
cooperation across ethnicities can only strengthen the
PYD’s and YPG’s marketing eorts.
Second, even if at one time there were closer ties
between the PKK and PYD than originaly thought, it
does not change the fact that the Syrian Kurds should
drasticaly change their platform and messaging now.
Even authors at the International Crisis Group and
Carnegie Midle East Center who group the PYD close
to the PKK recommend that the Syrian Kurds should
avoid suporting PKK violence and note that the Iraqi
Kurdish contingent has no apetite for PKK-aliated
groups spiling over into their teritory.
57
ere is no dis-
agreement here. In fact, these sugestions are completely
in line with the recommendations of this article.
Concluding oughts
It is ultimately in Erdoğan’s interest to nd a more
moderate aproach to the Kurdish issues. Erdoğan wants
a powerful regional foothold for Turkey in adition to
a powerful presidency. Yet, there is precedent for both
regional and international pressure toward Turkey vis-à-
vis the PKK.
58
e PYD is fast becoming a contender for
inclusion as a regional chess piece in protraed conict. If
the PYD grants Erdoğan a politicaly acceptale o-ramp
concerning hostilities that Ankara can take, then Syria
(and Russia) lose out on a lever to potentialy manipulate
Turkey. at also gives Erdoğan a win.
e boom line is that a drawn-out conict with
the YPG prolongs the duration of border instability.
Stabilizing the border wil alow the three milion
refugees (arualy a greater strain on Turkey than
the Kurds) to return to Syria more quickly—a larger
political win for Erdoğan. But that conict cannot
be queled until Turkey no longer has the excuse to
equate the PYD with the PKK. Admiely, it de-
lays solving the conict with the PKK, which needs
a peaceful solution as wel. However, the PKK issue
does not have the regional spilover that the PYD
conict does. erefore, Ankara should aim to solve
the Syrian-based one rst.
Notes
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2. Jim Geraghty, “We Betrayed the Kurds. Now Captured ISIS Fight-
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4. “YPG: People’s Protection Units,” e Kurdish Project, accessed 7
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May-June 2020 MILITARY REVIEW102
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10. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
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11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. “Erdogan’s Party Suers Blow aer Istanbul Re-run Poll Defeat,” BBC
News, 24 June 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-48739256.
14. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Octo-
ber 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/
syrian-conict-consequences-us-withdrawal; “Erdogan’s Party Suers Blow
Aer Istanbul Re-run Poll Defeat,” BBC News, 24 June 2019, accessed 7
January 2020, hps://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-4873925615;
Max Homan, “e State of the Turkish-Kurdish Conict,” Center for
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www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/08/12/473508/
state-turkish-kurdish-conict/.
15. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Octo-
ber 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/
syrian-conict-consequences-us-withdrawal.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Campbell MacDiarmid, “Masoud Barzani: Why It’s Time
for Kurdish Independence,” Foreign Policy (website), 15 June 2017,
accessed 7 January 2020, hps://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/15/
masoud-barzani-why-its-time-for-kurdish-independence/.
22. Karen DeYoung, Souad Mekhennet, and Louisa Loveluck, “U.S.
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eort-to-stop-turkish-invasion-of-northeast-syria/2019/08/04/3b0fd5a8-
b55f-11e9-8949-5f3692706e_story.html; “Turkey Launches Airstrikes on
Northern Syria Aer Trump Pulls Back U.S. Troops,” CBS News, 9 October
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vades-syria-turkish-president-Erdoğan-announces-military-operation-to-
day-2019-10-09/.
23. Arwa Ibrahim, “Syria’s Kurds Forge ‘Costly Deal’ with al-Assad as US
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sad-191015122222288.html.
24. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
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25. Robert Burns, “Trump Dismisses Syria Concerns; Dems Walk out
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26. Ibid.
27. Lolita C. Baldor and Robert Burns, “Esper: US Troops,
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com/334caccc941b40c99f0a6b9c40cd66cc.
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ia-pull-out-n1063251.
29. Josef Federman, “As Trump Abandons Kurds, Israel Worries How
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ary 2020, hps://apnews.com/a211f69f41834851900b25dd6d5e2a28.
30. Elena Becatoros and Bassem Mroue, “Syrian Forces En-
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1f69e48442a3452d85914d0db917632a.
31. Suzan Fraser and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Turkey
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com/185d5d93b4d747dd63e60f296d4b1e.
32. Ibid.
33. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Octo-
ber 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/
syrian-conict-consequences-us-withdrawal.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ellen Ioanes, “Here’s What’s Le if ISIS—and Why ey Still Pose
a Major reat,” Business Insider, 27 August 2019, accessed 7 January
2020, hps://www.businessinsider.com/trump-said-isis-was-nished-
threat-2019-8.
38. Ibid.
39. Charlie Savage, “e Kurds’ Prisons and Detention Camps for
ISIS Members, Explained,” New York Times (website), 13 October 2019,
accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/
isis-prisoners-kurds.html.
40. Josef Federman, “As Trump Abandons Kurds, Israel Worries how
Dependable He Is,” Associated Press, 10 October 2019, accessed 7 Janu-
ary 2020, hps://apnews.com/a211f69f41834851900b25dd6d5e2a28.
41. Steven A. Cook and Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “e Syrian Conict:
Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Octo-
ber 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/
syrian-conict-consequences-us-withdrawal.
42. Arwa Ibrahim, “Syria’s Kurds Forge ‘Costly Deal’ with al-Assad as US
Pulls Out,” Al-Jazeera, 15 October 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/pullout-syria-kurds-costly-deal-as-
sad-191015122222288.html.
43. Max Homan, “e State of the Turkish-Kurdish Conict.”
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Suzan Fraser and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Turkey Seal
Power in Northeast Syria with New Accord,” Associated Press, 22
MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2020
October 2019, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://apnews.
com/185d5d93b4d747dd63e60f296d4b1e.
50. Phil Stewart, “U.S. General Told Syria’s YPG: ‘You Have
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51. Elizabeth Tsurkov and Esam Al-Hassan, “Kurdish-Arab
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52. Elizabeth Tsurkov and Esam Al-Hassan, “Kurdish-Arab
Power Struggle in Northeastern Syria,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 24 July 2019, accessed 7 January 2020,
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middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/176-
pkk-s-fateful-choice-northern-syria; “Flight of Icarus? e
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hps://carnegieendowment.org/sada/79542.
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57. “e PKK’s Fateful Choice in Northern Syria,” Internation-
al Crisis Group, 4 May 2017, accessed 7 January 2020, hps://
www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediter-
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Governance in Northeastern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center,
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org/2017/03/23/how-regional-security-concerns-uniquely-con-
strain-governance-in-northeastern-syria-pub-68380.
58. Julia Maenza, “e Kurdish Struggle for Autonomy from
the 1970s to the Present,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
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article/2019/07/the-kurdish-struggle-for-autonomy-from-
the-1970s-to-the-present/; Max Homan, “e State of the
Turkish-Kurdish Conict.”
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