The Ambitious Dragon: Beijing’s Calculus for Invading Taiwan by 2030

38 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

FEATURE

The Ambitious Dragon

Beijing’s Calculus for Invading Taiwan by 2030

MAJ Kyle AMonson, Us ArMy

CAPT DAne egli, Us CoAsT gUArD, reTireD

Abstract

Chinese president Xi Jinping has a strategic window, in the 2030 timeframe, when favorable condi-

tions exist to forcefully annex Taiwan if peaceful uniﬁcation is not achieved before then. is hypoth-

esis is based upon the fact that an emboldened China intends to fulﬁll its imperial—and geostrate-

gic—objectives through expansionist behavior against Taiwan. e three main factors examined are

(1) President Xi’s “cult of personality” as a totalitarian leader to support the why of the invasion

timeline, (2) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defense modernization as an enabling planning

factor, and (3) Chinese demographics against the backdrop of domestic election cycles and President

Xi’s life expectancy. ese three factors oﬀer a strategic harbinger that, if President Xi continues to

pursue annexation of Taiwan, the PLA will be prepared by 2027, and he will likely take steps to real-

ize these ambitions by 2030 as China’s population ages, while pursuing uniﬁcation to solidify his

historic legacy in his lifetime. is article will begin with an overview of the current geopolitical

tensions, provide an explanation for the fundamental factors contributing to President Xi’s window

of opportunity, and conclude by providing an integrated assessment of relevant global security.

***

Taiwan is China’s Taiwan. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a mat-

ter that must be resolved by the Chinese. We will continue to strive for peaceful reuniﬁcation

with the greatest sincerity and the utmost eﬀort, but we will never promise to renounce the

use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary . . . (emphasis added)

—Xi Jinping

n 23 October 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced

that Chinese President Xi Jinping would serve an unprecedented third

term leading the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is noteworthy

that during his speech to the 20th National Congress of the CCP, President Xi

repeatedly reinforced the narrative that “complete reuniﬁcation of our country

must be realized, and it can, without a doubt, be realized.”

He followed this bel-

licose statement by asserting that the PRC “reserves the option to take all mea-

sures necessary.”

e international community must not only assess if President

Low De Wei, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress,” Bloomberg. 18 October 2022,

https://www.bloomberg.com/.

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 39

e Ambitious Dragon

Xi will honor his commitment to his people of annexing Taiwan, but when the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will act on Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions to

invade Taiwan—if peaceful uniﬁcation is not possible on President Xi’s terms.

e thesis of this article is that President Xi has a strategic window, in the 2030

timeframe, when favorable conditions exist to forcefully annex Taiwan if peaceful

uniﬁcation is not achieved before then. is hypothesis is based upon the fact that

an emboldened China intends to fulﬁll its strategic intent and imperial objectives

through expansionist behavior against Taiwan. e three main factors examined

are (1) President Xi’s “cult of personality” as a totalitarian leader to support the

why of an invasion timeline, (2) the PLA’s defense modernization as an enabling

planning factor, and (3) Chinese demographics against the backdrop of domestic

election cycles and President Xi’s life expectancy.

ese three factors highlight geostrategically that, if President Xi continues to

pursue the annexation of Taiwan, the PLA will be prepared by 2027, and he will

likely take steps to realize these ambitions by 2030 as China’s population ages,

while pursuing annexation to solidify his historic legacy in his lifetime. ese

ﬁndings draw from an eclectic body of literature, including sources from English,

Mandarin, and CCP government documents, to holistically assess military, diplo-

matic, cultural, economic, and political factors. is article will begin with an

overview of the current geopolitical tensions, provide an explanation for the fun-

damental factors contributing to President Xi’s window of opportunity, and con-

clude by providing an integrated assessment of relevant global security. Figure 1

depicts a theoretical timeline overview.

Figure 1. Timeline overview

Critics will aver that China is not willing to incur the cost that the international

community will impose in response to an invasion because that action runs coun-

ter to China’s strategic intent and goals for a national transformation by 2049.

40 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

Egli & Amonson

However, President Xi’s actions belie that argument, because he is already execut-

ing a genocidal campaign against the Uyghurs in western China with little appar-

ent international opposition or consequences, even from leading countries within

the Muslim world. Critics will also opine that President Xi’s statements are merely

harmless political rhetoric. However, in a society imbued with cultural pride and

history, dating back thousands of years, commitments such as these, to a popula-

tion of 1.4 billion citizens, cannot be taken lightly. International security and

diplomatic professionals as well as military planners must assess the risks associ-

ated with the “most dangerous course of action.” As indicators and warnings

across the global commons become more challenging to identify, a predictive ap-

proach must be taken, reinforced by a realistic analysis of China’s kleptocratic

ambitions. Ultimately, time will tell whether restraint will be exercised to enable

the ﬂourishing democracy of Taiwan, and its 23 million citizens, to avoid the fate

seen in Hong Kong and fall to oppressive communism.

Overview—Factors for Invasion

As the Chinese Government has successively resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong

Kong and Macao, the people of the whole of China are eager to resolve the Taiwan issue as

early as possible and realize the total reuniﬁcation of the country. ey cannot allow the

resolution of the Taiwan issue to be postponed indeﬁnitely. (emphasis added)

—PRC Taiwan Affairs Ofce and the Information Ofce of the State Council

During a May 2022 brieﬁng from the US Director of National Intelligence

Avril Haines to the Senate Armed Services Committee, she stated that “China is

watching how the nations of the world respond to Russia and considering a po-

tential invasion of Taiwan. And President Xi is scrutinizing Putin’s playbook in

the international response.”

While this could be cited as an example of “Ameri-

can strategic competition,” President Xi has also supported this narrative, stating

that he sees uniﬁcation as not only desired but also as an inevitable Chinese prob-

lem to solve.

It appears that the PRC is currently asserting and escalating eco-

nomic, military, and diplomatic pressure on the island as a precursor for future

intervention.

“HRN and SOS Release Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in Hong Kong since the

National Security Law’s Enactment” (joint statement, Human Rights Now and Sounds of the Silenced,

30 November 2022), https://hrn.or.jp/.

Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence Testimony on Global reats and National Security. Presented

at the Senate Armed Services Committee Brief, (Washington, DC, 10 May 2022).

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 41

e Ambitious Dragon

Figure 2. Southeast Asia geographic overview. (Source: Helen Davidson, “Japan Urg-

es Europe to Speak out against China’s Military Expansion,” The Guardian, 20 September

2021, https://www.theguardian.com/.)

e Taiwan Strait is not a novel area of contention. e First Taiwan Strait

Crisis occurred from 3 September 1954 to 1 May 1955 and revolved around

several small islands oﬀ the coast of mainland China in disputed control between

the PRC and the Republic of China. is conﬂict escalated to the point that the

US Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ recommended the potential use of nuclear weapons

against mainland China. e Second Taiwan Strait Crisis took place in 23 Au-

gust–2 December 1958 and was also an armed conﬂict surrounding several islands

oﬀ the east coast of mainland China. e ird Taiwan Strait Crisis (21 July

1995–23 March 1996) was precipitated by the Taiwanese president’s visit to the

United States in 1996 and involved a series of missile strikes from the PRC in the

waters surrounding Taiwan.

Based on the PRC’s historic One China principle, Beijing will only accept

uniﬁcation on its terms, a calculated demand that will likely involve similar

human rights violations already demonstrated in the PRC’s annexation of the

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).

Based on the PRC’s cur-

rent trajectory, the 2030 timeframe aligns with strategic variables pointing to-

Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

“HRN and SOS Release Joint Statement.”

42 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

Egli & Amonson

ward PRC intervention. With an expected looming Chinese threat to Taiwan,

this requires further analysis regarding when the invasion will happen, how that

invasion will manifest itself, and what the international response might be, es-

pecially within the context of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. ere

are three main points that highlight this fraught discussion within the interna-

tional security landscape.

Nation- State Ambiguity: Taiwan has a signiﬁcantly more complex set of inter-

national relationships than Ukraine. Speciﬁcally, the international community

varies—and is conﬂicted—in their position regarding Taiwanese independence.

Taiwan is typically recognized as an independent democratic territory—but not a

sovereign state. Even the United States remains in a position of strategic ambigu-

ity, still recognizing the One- China policy—that the Taiwanese society is a Chi-

nese culture, but the US does not recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.

is

should not be confused with the One China principle, the bedrock of the PRC’s

cross- straits policy, stating that there is only one China, that includes Taiwan, and

that any discussion of independence is based upon separatist movements against

China.

How would this Chinese military aggression be viewed vis- à- vis the cur-

rent conﬂict in the Black Sea region?

It is unlikely that there would be a similar ardent public outcry following an

invasion of Taiwan as observed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. e in-

ternational community can expect to see President Xi continue to gather a

coalition behind his narrative that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan.”

As China

increases pressure on Taiwan and potentially transitions to armed conﬂict, the

PRC will leverage its growing number of economically dependent, less-

developed countries (Belt and Road Initiative–related) to support Beijing’s

objectives. is action will likely precipitate United Nation’s objections and

resolutions to counter malign inﬂuence and coercive actions that undermine

the international rules- based order. As an example of China’s international

economic ties compared to Russia’s, ﬁgure 3 highlights the major diﬀerences of

each country’s global economic inﬂuence.

Michael Green, “What Is the U.S. ‘One China’ Policy, and Why Does it Matter?,” Center for Strategic

and International Studies, 13 January 2017, https://www.csis.org/.

People’s Republic of China, “e One- China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (press release, Taiwan

Aﬀairs Oﬃce and the Information Oﬃce of the State Council, n.d.) http://www.china.org.cn/.

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 43

e Ambitious Dragon

Figure 3. Difference in import from Russia and China 2020. (Source: The Observatory of

Economic Complexity, “China/Russia,” https://oec.world/.)

As President Xi conducts the risk calculus for an invasion, there is already a

clear harbinger for how the international community will respond to China’s ex-

pansionist behavior and fail to hold Beijing accountable for its actions. Based on

multiple reports from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a multi-

tude of UN human rights experts, and the Human Rights Watch nongovernmen-

tal organization, the international community displays a clear reluctance to con-

demn China for its corrupt human rights violations against its own population in

Xinjiang, in a demonstration of genocide not seen since World War II and Rwan-

da.

Further, as China’s ubiquitous and predatory ﬁnancial tactics proliferate on

the world stage, Beijing’s soft power to leverage debt- trapped countries for diplo-

matic purposes will continue to increase in ﬁnancial and geographic impact.

Geopolitical Dynamics: When Taiwan is compared to Ukraine, the latter is a

sovereign state, a NATO non- member partner, and is in a geopolitical region with

existing forces in place to deter Russian aggression—i.e., NATO forces in neigh-

boring member states. ere is no comparable regional alliance to provide collec-

“HRN and SOS Release Joint Statement.”

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tive defense or integrated deterrence located in Southeast Asia to eﬀectively deter

Chinese aggression.

Regional Maritime Commons: While the international intelligence commu-

nity could identify key indicators and warnings associated with the massing of

troops on the Russia–Ukraine border, Moscow’s objectives spanned an entire

country. In this case, China only has to transit a 180-kilometer body of water, the

Taiwan Strait, to reach the island- nation of Taiwan, a much smaller military ob-

jective, and can still conduct exercises as feints as a precursor to operational execu-

tion, similar to Russian military warfare tactics.

Additionally, while partners willing to support Ukraine were staged on multiple

surrounding borders, Taiwan’s partners face the challenge of geographic distance

and barriers to deliver support in the form of security cooperation and operational

resources. Ultimately, Taiwan suﬀers the tyranny of distance with key partners as

a smaller military objective and has signiﬁcantly less measures to predict an inva-

sion than existed with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. ese are all key factors

contributing to a shorter kinetic timeline to transition from competition to crisis

and conﬂict.

Based on President Xi’s speech to the 20th Congress and extensive documents

and speeches captured on the PRC government website, President Xi’s current

stance portends that any option resulting in the status quo is unacceptable. How-

ever, the passing of President Xi, combined with a democratic election of a Tai-

wanese government more sympathetic to PRC ambitions could produce an alter-

native future compromise. e following statement from the PRC’s website

accurately depicts why the peaceful uniﬁcation option is unlikely in the current

security environment:

e Chinese Government advocates that the ﬁnal purpose of cross- Straits

negotiations is to achieve peaceful reuniﬁcation; and that to achieve this

purpose, talks should be held based on the principle of one China. However,

the proposals for “Taiwan independence, “two Chinas” and “two states,“

aiming for separation instead of reuniﬁcation, violate the One- China Prin-

ciple, and are naturally unacceptable to the Chinese Government.

e following section examines three primary imperatives that support the

hypothesis for a 2030 timeframe when PRC expansionist behavior will assert

Beijing’s dominance over Taiwan.

National Defense Strategy, 2022.

People’s Republic of China, “e One- China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.”

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e Ambitious Dragon

Cult of Personality—President Xi’s Leadership and Legacy

To examine China’s motivation to annex Taiwan in the next decade, the most

signiﬁcant factor impacting the probability of this action is its leader, President

Xi. At 69, and as the seventh president of the PRC, Xi recently began his unprec-

edented third term. In addition to serving as president, he also serves as the Gen-

eral Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. At

no time since the founding PRC Chairman, Mao Zedong (led from 1949–1976),

has power been more politically centralized with an authoritarian leader in China.

Following Chinese cultural ethos, President Xi is portrayed as a god, and he has

sought nothing less than to transform the CCP into the high church of a revital-

ized, Marxist–Leninist faith.

Kevin Rudd’s Foreign Aﬀairs article titled “e

World According to Xi Jinping” aptly stated:

Xi has pushed politics to the Leninist left, economics to the Marxist left,

and foreign policy to the nationalist right. e West ignores Xi’s ideologi-

cal messaging at its own peril. No matter how abstract and unfamiliar his

ideas might seem, they are having profound eﬀects on the real- world con-

tent of Chinese politics and foreign policy- and thus, as China’s rise con-

tinues, on the rest of the world.

As of 2018, the National People’s Congress passed a constitutional amendment

allowing the president to serve an unlimited number of ﬁve- year terms.

is

1982 constitutional limitation was instituted after Mao Zedong’s rulership to

prevent a leader from gaining absolute power. Immediately following the 2018

CCP term- limit announcement, the party employed mass censorship to suppress

public disapproval of the vote. Alongside the amendment, President Xi took the

opportunity to write his CCP- based political ideology into the constitution, titled

“Xi Jinping ought.” It was subsequently released as a smartphone application to

fully immerse the populace in this autocratic ideology. Xi Jinping ought is now

the most downloaded item on Apple’s App Store in China.

Kevin Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping,” Foreign Aﬀairs November/December 2022, https://

www.foreignaﬀairs.com/.

Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping.”

Associated Press, “China makes historic move to allow Xi to rule indeﬁnitely,” CBC News, 11 March

2018, https://www.cbc.ca/.

Zheping Huang, “China’s most popular app is a propaganda tool teaching Xi Jinping ought,” South

China Morning Post, 14 February 2019.

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China’s current average life expectancy is 78 years.

As President Xi’s longevity

is considered against the invasion opportunity timeline, it is important to recognize

that his legacy has a strong connection to his frequent commitments to annex Tai-

wan. To President Xi, annexing Taiwan would be particularly meaningful because it

is a feat Mao could not accomplish and would aﬃrm Xi’s reputation and iron grip

on state power. Xi has several key objectives as president, including completion of

the PLA modernization by 2027, the annexation of Taiwan, progress of the Belt and

Road Initiative, and most importantly, the National Rejuvenation by 2049 (the cen-

tenary of the PRC). e “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” has been the

ultimate goal for President Xi, marking the emergence of China as the leading

global power by 2049. In this era of strategic competition, no strategic goal is more

ambitiously anticipated, than the annexation of Taiwan. is feat would establish

President Xi’s standing in Chinese history and enable him to consolidate power as

a crucial element of the middle kingdom would be accomplished.

Deng Yuwen, a former editor of a CCP newspaper, who now lives in the United

States, said the country’s nationalists would be unable to accept inaction on the

Taiwan issue: “If Taiwan is not reunited, it shows that what he is doing now lacks

conviction. If Xi got a third term this year, he would have a deadline to achieve his

signature ‘Chinese Dream’—the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation—which in-

cludes Taiwan.”

Any indecisive shortfall that leads to failure is a strategic option

that President Xi cannot aﬀord and will not tolerate.

A critical view would suggest that President Xi is unwilling to endure the po-

tential international backlash on his reputation, in addition to the sanctions and

international response triggered by a violent annexation. However, this is the same

president who is currently waging a genocide in western China, imprisoning an

estimated 1 to 1.8 million Uyghurs in concentration camps with mass killings,

rape, and torture.

At this time, there is no signiﬁcant international objection to

this aggression, with several states even commending China’s treatment of the

“terrorist threat” in Xinjiang.

If genocide in China’s western provinces does not impose a cost through inter-

national condemnation, it is unlikely that an invasion of a territory on its eastern

border will incur harsh criticism from the international community. Diplomati-

State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s average life expectancy rises to 78.2 years,” https://

english.www.gov.cn/.

Bang Xiao, “Why is Taiwan so important to Chinese President Xi Jinping?,” Australian Broadcasting

Corps News, 23 August 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/.

“HRN and SOS Release Joint Statement.”

United Nations Human Rights Council, Letter - Agenda item 3, Forty- ﬁrst session, 24 June–12 July

2019.

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 47

e Ambitious Dragon

cally, the short- term consequences of a Taiwanese invasion would be worth the

long- term beneﬁt of gaining national honor and expanded sovereignty. China has

long since departed from any attempt to comply with the international rules-

based order. Instead of forging balanced partnerships, Beijing coerces and pres-

sures economically vulnerable nations to establish a relationship that results in

their subordinate position as dependent states. For decades China has underwrit-

ten its international engagements with formal long- term investments that are

linked directly to UN cooperation and economic and diplomatic alliances, in a

tactic known as “dollar diplomacy.” Additionally, since 1996, China has convinced

more than a dozen countries to change their diplomatic recognition from Taipei

to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with only 15 remaining allies.

In a departure from the

Chinese diplomacy of the past 35 years, the PRC now also encourages its diplo-

mats to routinely attack their host governments in the event they do not align

with Sino- communist values, in an ethos that has come to be known as “wolf

warrior diplomacy.”

Pragmatically, at 69, the international community can expect 10 more years of

President Xi’s rule, consisting of what will be his third and likely fourth terms.

During this timeframe, there will be a growing ambition for an expanded global

presence and willingness to accept greater risk to secure his legacy. And Taiwan

would be a crown jewel to secure a place of high honor nationally. Further, con-

sidering his family history, it is noteworthy that President Xi’s mother is 96 and

his father lived to age 89, in addition to the fact that he has better healthcare than

the average Chinese citizen, when compared to the 78 average life expectancy.

As President Xi takes comprehensive steps to achieve peaceful or forceful annexa-

tion, the next variable in the equation points to a timeline no- earlier- than date of

2027, based on PLA modernization.

Military Readiness—No Earlier Than 2027

By 2027, [the] Chinese military will have the ability to eﬀectively deal with threats brought

by the hegemonism and power politics in western paciﬁc region, including issues relating

to [the] Taiwan question and South China Sea, as well as border tensions between China

and India.

—Li Jie

Oriana Skylar Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Aﬀairs,

July/August 2021, https://www.foreignaﬀairs.com/.

Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping.”

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Beginning with the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, the year 2027 will mark the

centennial of the founding of the PLA.

During President Xi’s congressional

speech to the CCP, he stated that the PLA’s 2027 centennial modernization goals

are one of the PRC’s top eight priorities for the next ﬁve years and his third term:

Achieving the goals for the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army in

2027 and more quickly elevating our people’s armed forces to world- class

standards are strategic tasks for building a modern socialist country in all

respects. To this end, we must apply the thinking on strengthening the mili-

tary for the new era, implement the military strategy for the new era, and

maintain the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces.

In 2015, the PRC’s State Information Council published a white paper titled

China’s Military Strategy, replacing its 1993 Military Strategy Guidelines for a New

Era. In this publication, the PRC takes a realistic approach to closing capability

gaps and modernizing outdated equipment and processes.

Speed, deception,

and coercion will be critical to China’s strategy for a forceful uniﬁcation. China

will need a swift seizure of Taiwan to decrease the potential of foreign interven-

tion, avoid engagement with international forces, and introduce both a logistical

and diplomatic dilemma for other countries poised to aid Taiwan with coopera-

tive security in the form of military resources. If China cannot achieve a rapid

seizure of Taiwan, its forces run the risk of a prolonged armed conﬂict playing out

on the world stage, a cost that will cause a severe impact economically and cer-

tainly put China in direct conﬂict with the United States. To mitigate this risk,

China will need to delay as long as possible until its defense modernization and

strategic economic goals are achieved.

During President Xi’s congressional speech, he not only highlighted that he

will “intensify military training under combat conditions, laying emphasis on joint

training, force- on- force training, and high- tech training” but also that the PLA

will “intensify troop training and enhance combat preparedness across the

board.”

An emboldened posture of force projection and combat lethality is re-

ﬂected in a number of ways leading up to the 2027 mark. e Taipei- based Insti-

tute for National Defense and Security Research recorded that the People’s Lib-

eration Army Air Force (PLAAF) ﬂew within the Taiwanese air defense

identiﬁcation zone more than 91 days with 380 sorties during an 11-month pe-

Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping.”

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

State Information Council, China’s Military Strategy, 2015.

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 49

e Ambitious Dragon

riod in 2020.

Along with the development of new capabilities and force mod-

ernization, the PLA is continuing to pursue commercial upgrades that will ac-

celerate its deployment capabilities to support an invasion of Taiwan. For example,

China Central Television (CCTV) released video footage in 2021 of various

commercial shipping vessels conducting drills and exercises with PLA units to

validate agile and advanced amphibious maritime capabilities.

China has also employed deception and disinformation campaigns with politi-

cal military messaging, including stating that “after [US Speaker of e House

Nancy] Pelosi’s reckless Taiwan visit, the PLA launched large- scale military exer-

cises around the island, including launching conventional ballistic missiles over

it.”

As the frequency and intensity of military exercises and missile launches

increase in the maritime region and air space of Taiwan, there will be more op-

portunities for military observers and intelligence analysts to detect and monitor

strategic threats and incursions that precede military action. ese strategic indi-

cators will provide Taiwanese armed forces timely warnings and enable opera-

tional readiness to actively defend the island nation’s sovereignty.

Since President Xi has been in oﬃce, the PLA has conducted large- scale, live-

ﬁre missile strikes around the Taiwanese coast, simulating a maritime and air

blockade of the island—an operational strategy designed to prepare its forces for

seizing Taiwan. Additionally, China has embarked on a series of island “reclama-

tions” in the South China Sea and turned these into garrisons, ignoring earlier

guarantees that it would not do so.

ese actions are consistent with Xi’s state-

ments at the National Congress of the Communist Party and is a reﬂection of

China’s intent to take aggressive military action, in direct violation of international

law, to expand Beijing’s regional sovereignty through illegal use of force in the

global maritime commons.

In the RAND report titled Factors Shaping China’s Use of Force Calculations

Against Taiwan, Mark Cozad conducts a poignant assessment of the PLA’s grow-

ing capabilities and Beijing’s risk assessments that reﬂect China’s accelerated force

and military modernization. A premature invasion could result in failure at the

tactical, operational, and strategic levels, while patience will allow time to build

William Langley, “PLA warplanes made a record 380 incursions into Taiwan’s airspace in 2020,” South

China News, 6 January 2021.

Andrew Tate, “Chinese military using commercial Ro- Ro shipping to enhance its amphibious capa-

bilities,” Janes Defence News, 23 August 2021. https://www.janes.com/.

Liu Xuanzun, “Red line over Taiwan question reiterated in talks between Chinese, US defense chiefs,”

Global Times, 22 November 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping.”

50 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

Egli & Amonson

eﬀective military capabilities and concurrently take diplomatic steps to soften

anticipated international criticism.

Population Demographics—Window Closes in 2030s

An unfolding population crisis could be a catalyst for changing of public atti-

tudes toward the Taiwan issue. e proposed no- later- than date is based on sev-

eral factors. First, President Xi reaches the average Chinese life expectancy of 78

during the summer of 2031. Second, the 22nd Nation Congress will take place

October 2032, and Xi will seek to demonstrate results to solidify a ﬁfth term at

that point. ird, and arguably the most signiﬁcant factor, China has an extant

working- class population bubble—caused by their previous One- Child policy,

introduced in 1979, which has yielded an ever- increasing average age—and rela-

tive shortage of working- and military- age citizens.

Further, China has one of the fastest aging populations in the world, with the

World Health Organization predicting that 28 percent of China’s population will

be over the age of 60 by 2040.

is 28-percent ﬁgure equates to more than 402

million people, inducing a signiﬁcant demographic burden on Chinese society.

Also, as of 2019, roughly 75 percent of China’s population older than 60 had

noncommunicable diseases, requiring medical support from the state. As the

number of elderly increases, so will the requisite healthcare requirements. Figure

4 depicts the current bubble residing in the 45–49 and 50–54 age ranges. Addi-

tionally, since 2020 the COVID-19 virus pandemic has imposed a medical crisis

on the national population due to widespread resurgence, adding pressure to the

existing population and healthcare challenges.

President Xi is currently enacting a variety of policies to boost China’s birth

rate. ese incentives include tax deductions, housing subsidies, medical insur-

ance, and longer maternity leave.

However, even with an increase in China’s

birth rate will not remedy the nation’s current working- class transition to state-

sponsored support. Politically and demographically, China’s aging population will

create internal dilemmas and will adversely impact economic growth. One of

China’s greatest strengths—economically and militarily—is its size and scale.

However, this aging generation that has brought the country strength will require

a holistic solution to address pressures on the national healthcare system and

management of a burgeoning elderly population.

World Health Organization, “Aging and Health in China,” n.d., https://www.who.int/.

Low, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress.”

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 51

e Ambitious Dragon

Figure 4. Age pyramid of China, 2020. (Source: “Population Pyramids of the World from 1950

to 2100: China,” Population Pyramid.net, 2023, https://www.populationpyramid.net/.)

In his 2019 Foreign Aﬀairs article, Nicholas Eberstadt stated “[China’s]

working- age population has already been shrinking for the past ﬁve years, and it

is set to decrease by at least 100 million between 2015 and 2040. e country will

see a particularly large decline in its working- age population under 30, which may

plunge by nearly 30 percent over these years.”

While the 28 percent over 60

metric is extrapolated to 2040, once paired with the ﬁrst and second factors, 2030

Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Aﬀairs, July/August

2019, https://www.foreignaﬀairs.com/.

52 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

Egli & Amonson

will be the most likely end of the optimum window of opportunity before Xi is at

risk for leadership succession. And China will need to place a national focus on

the support of domestic economic and social welfare programs, rather than on an

invasion of Taiwan.

While many often cite China’s vast population and geographic size as the

country’s strength, Xi realizes that dynasties—and public opinion—change over

time, and the will of the people may turn away from taking military action to

acquire Taiwan. For example, if Beijing is unable to resolve vexing domestic issues

surrounding healthcare and garner support for a growing elderly population, pub-

lic support may be lost for the annexation of Taiwan under the great rejuvenation

campaign—turning a populace of 1.4 billion against the CCP.

Impact Considerations

After reviewing the primary factors contributing to the anticipated window

for a Chinese invasion, observers must consider the impacts surrounding a

forced uniﬁcation and why the Taiwan challenge is so globally signiﬁcant. e

most noteworthy challenge is the long- term economic impact for China. Tai-

wan produces 63 percent of the world’s semiconductors.

As seen during CO-

VID-19, a supply- chain disruption to semiconductors is felt worldwide because

of the complex interdependencies of the computer industry and cascading im-

pact on a production center like Taiwan. Considering maritime trade in the re-

gion, if China controlled the Taiwan Strait, shipping traﬃc would shift to the

nearby Luzon Strait. However, if the PRC is also able to control these water-

ways, China would be able to signiﬁcantly impede Japan’s international trade

and critical sea lines of communication.

Taiwan’s fate would likely be similar

to what happened in the Hong Kong SAR, with the PRC enacting policies

“which violated China’s international legal obligations and imposed severe re-

strictions on civil and human rights in the autonomous region,” as described by

the UN Human Rights Oﬃce.

ere would also be serious geopolitical impacts, as an invasion would drasti-

cally increase tension in the region and likely drive additional counter- PRC coali-

tions to form as regional states anticipate what the PRC’s next expansionist ambi-

Yen Nee Lee, “2 charts show how much the world depends on Taiwan for semiconductors,” CNBC,

15 March 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/.

Scott Cheney- Peters, “Navigating the Black Ditch: Risks in the Taiwan Strait,” Center for Interna-

tional Maritime Security, 25 December 2014, https://cimsec.org/.

United Nations Human Rights Oﬃce of the High Commissioner, “UN experts call for decisive mea-

sures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” 26 June 2020.

JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023 53

e Ambitious Dragon

tions would be. e international impact would initially depend upon how quickly

the PRC could establish land, air, and sea superiority to prevent the inﬂux of in-

ternational support. As discussed previously, when comparing the international

response to that for Ukraine, the global condemnation would likely be smaller by

comparison, as China’s international relationships increase the complexity of, and

probability for, a majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly follow-

ing a Security Council veto. e greatest international impact would come from

the demonstrated commitment to the global rules- based order and principles

embraced by concerned nations around the world—and how they choose to re-

spond, or not respond, diplomatically, militarily, and economically. A forceful and

coercive PRC annexation of Taiwan would be a Chinese demonstration of “might-

makes- right” nationalism, as a socialist state engulfs a thriving democracy.

Conclusion

Whether compelling airlines to take Taiwan oﬀ their maps or pressuring Paramount Pic-

tures to remove the Taiwanese ﬂag from the Top Gun hero Maverick’s jacket, China has

largely succeeded in convincing many countries that Taiwan is an internal matter that they

should stay out of.

—Oriana Skylar Mastro

It is expected that President Xi will seek to solidify his historic legacy and

achieve the central goal of uniﬁcation and consolidation of the middle kingdom

in the 2030 timeframe. According to a survey by the state- run Global Times, 70

percent of mainlanders strongly support using force to annex Taiwan to the main-

land, and 37 percent think it would be best if the war occurred in three to ﬁve

years.

As a 69-year- old president, Xi has a limited timeline to execute. At the

2027 PLA Centennial, a President Xi in the ﬁnal year of his third term will be 73

years old. He will likely be voted into a fourth term at the age of 74, with a mili-

tary capable of a swift overpowering invasion. e international community will

likely fail to hold China accountable for its actions. is is already reﬂected in the

global states’ inability, or unwillingness, to hold China accountable for its ongoing

human rights violations in Xinjiang and further supported by the shift of China’s

economic partners to the PRC’s view on Taiwan in formal recognition and United

Nations resolutions.

e “Taiwan problem” is a security challenge that has signiﬁcant geostrategic

and global power implications for the international order, as the PRC is viewed

Wang Mouzhou, “What Happens After China Invades Taiwan?,” e Diplomat, 24 March 2017,

https://thediplomat.com/.

Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation.”

54 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS  MARCHAPRIL 2023

Egli & Amonson

as the major “pacing threat” in the US National Security Strategy and US Na-

tional Defense Strategy. Critics will often state that the engagement between

China and countries like the United States is regional hegemonic competition

and not an existential threat to the world order. However, the safety and security

of Taiwan would not only be a casualty of PRC’s regional ambitions but also

represent a loss of independence and freedom for a thriving democracy of 23

million people. Xi and his increasingly strident PRC have made clear that

China’s goal is to establish a “fairer and more just” global political system based

in Marxist–Leninist values. According to Xi, a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis is

eminent as he seeks to consolidate power to achieve the Chinese Dream and

national rejuvenation.

Finally, as Oriana Skylar Mastro’s Foreign Aﬀairs article

“e Taiwan Temptation” depicted, “e most eﬀective way to deter Chinese

leaders from attacking Taiwan is also the most diﬃcult: to convince them that

armed uniﬁcation would cost China its rejuvenation.”

Only time will tell if

China considers the strategic risk of forceful annexation too great or if Presi-

dent Xi will exercise his leadership as a rising global power and mobilize for an

invasion of Taiwan. Either way, the actions of an ambitious dragon are catalyzing

historic changes in the twenty- ﬁrst–century security environment that must be

understood and countered with active defense and deterrence. µ

MAJ Kyle Amonson, US Army

Major Amonson is an Army Aviation officer currently completing a tour as the US Army representative at the Ca-

nadian Forces College–Joint Command and Staff Program.

CAPT Dane Egli, US Coast Guard, Retired

Dr. Egli is a career Coast Guard officer currently serving as a senior military advisor for the Ministry of Defense in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Rudd, “e World According to Xi Jinping.”

Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation.”

Disclaimer

e views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the

oﬃcial sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command,

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.