This paper was written by a panel of
independent and academic human
rights researchers and activists
in the Philippines under the Civic
Futures initiative. It was supported
by the Fund for Global Human
Rights and Active Vista Center Inc.
and edited by Paulynn Sicam.
About the Authors
(in order of the chapters)
Marc Batac is a peacebuilder, organizer,
researcher, and political science graduate
of the University of the Philippines-Diliman.
He is currently aliated with Mindanao-based
Initiatives for International Dialogue and previously
with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of
Armed Conflict-Southeast Asia. He co-authored
“An Explosive Cocktail – Counter-terrorism,
militarization and authoritarianism in the
Philippines” (2021), and has written for Al Jazeera,
Just Security, and IPI Global Observatory.
The Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC) is a
Manila-based university institution engaged in
the promotion and protection of human rights.
Founded in 1986, its mission is to respect, protect
and promote human rights through engagement
with communities and partner organizations,
human rights training and education, research,
publication, curriculum development, legislative
advocacy, and policy initiatives on human rights.
Ray Paolo J. Santiago is the Executive
Director of the AHRC and the Secretary-
General of the Working Group for an ASEAN
Human Rights Mechanism. He is active in
litigation involving cases aecting vulnerable
groups, particularly women, children, urban
poor, and peasants. He has been a member
of the Ateneo Law Faculty since 2003.
Marianne Carmel B. Agunoy is the Internship
Director of the AHRC and coordinator for
student formation of the Ateneo Law School.
Maria Paula S. Villarin is a sta lawyer
at the AHRC and program manager of
the Working Group for an ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism.
Maria Araceli B. Mancia is a project
assistant at the AHRC.
Mary Jane N. Real is feminist and human rights
advocate. She was a founding Co-Lead of Urgent
Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights Asia and
Pacic (UAF A&P), and in various capacities,
she has been involved in setting up and running
initiatives and organizations to support activists
and their movements worldwide.
Jessamine Pacis is a researcher, writer, and digital
rights advocate. She works mostly in the areas of
privacy and data protection and has participated
in projects related to digital labor, cybercrime, and
freedom of expression. She has a bachelor’s degree
in Broadcast Communication and Juris Doctor
credits from the University of the Philippines.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following organizations, human rights defenders, and academe, including
those not listed for their safety and security, for their review and feedback on rst draft of the research:
Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA)
iDefend
KARAPATAN
Karl Arvin F. Hapal - Assistant Professor
College of Social Work and Community Development
University of the Philippines, Diliman
National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL)
No Box Philippines
Philippine Alliance of Human Rights advocate (PAHRA)
Resbak
Ria Landingin, Lunas Collective
Ritz Lee Santos III
The Women’s Legal and Human Rights Bureau, Inc., (WLB)
2 |
ACC ASEAN Coordinating Council
ACMM ASEAN Center of Military
Medicine
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AHW Alliance of Health Workers
AMLC Anti-Money Laundering Council
AML/CTF Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorist Financing
APG Asia/Pacic Group on Money
Laundering
ASEAN Association of Southeast
Asian Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ATA Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
ATC Anti-Terrorism Council
CA Court of Appeals
CAFGU Citizen Armed Force
Geographical Units
CBCP Catholic Bishops’ Conference
of the Philippines
CHED Commission on Higher Education
CHR Commission on Human Rights
COIN Counterinsurgency
COMELEC Commission on Elections
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPP Communist Party
of the Philippines
CSO Civil Society Organization
CT Counterterrorism
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
CTED Counter Terrorism Executive
Directorate
DDB Dangerous Drugs Board
of the Philippines
DDB-DIAL Dangerous Drugs Board Drug
Information Action Line
DepEd Department of Education
DFA Department of Foreign Aairs
DILG Department of Interior and
Local Government
DND Department of National Defense
DOH Department of Health
DOJ Department of Justice
DOLE Department of Labor and
Employment
DSWD Department of Social Welfare
and Development
ECQ Enhanced Community Quarantine
EJK Extrajudicial Killing
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FICS Funders Initiative for Civil Society
FGHR Fund for Global Human Rights
FLAG Free Legal Assistance Group
GCQ General Community Quarantine
GRP Government of the Republic
of the Philippines
GWoT Global War on Terror
HRC UN Human Rights Council
HSA Human Security Act of 2007
HVT High Value Target
IATF-EID Inter-Agency Task Force on
Emerging Infectious Diseases
ICAD Inter-agency Committee
on Anti-Illegal Drugs
ICC International Criminal Court
ICJ International Commission
of Jurists
Abbreviations and Acronyms
3 |
IDADIN Integrated Drug Abuse Data
and Information Network
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IHRL International Human Rights Law
IID Initiatives for International
Dialogue
IP Indigenous People
IS/ISIL Islamic State/Daesh
ISP Independent Service Providers
JTF Joint Task Force COVID-19
KWF Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino
LGU Local Government Unit
MAG Medical Action Group
MECQ Modied Enhanced Community
Quarantine
MGCQ Modied General Community
Quarantine
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
NADPA National Anti-Drug Program
of Action
NADS National Anti-Drug Strategy
NAP COVID-19 National Action Plan against
COVID-19
NAP P/CVE National Action Plan on
Preventing and Countering
Violent Extremism
NAF COVID-19 National Task Force Against
COVID-19
NBI National Bureau of Investigation
NDF/NDFP National Democratic Front
of the Philippines
NDRRMC National Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Council
NGO Non-Government Organization
NICA National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency
NPA New People’s Army
NPC National Privacy Commission
NPO Non-Prot Organizations
NSA National Security Adviser
NSC National Security Council
NTC National Telecommunications
Commission
NTF-ELCAC National Task Force to End Local
Communist Armed Conflict
NUPL National Union of
Peoples’ Lawyers
OHCHR Oce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights
OPAPP Oce of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process
OSG Oce of the Solicitor General
PAHRA Philippine Alliance of Human
Rights Advocates
PCO Presidential Communication
Oce
P/CVE Preventing and Countering
Violent Extremism
PDITR+V Prevent-Detect-Isolate-
Treat-Reintegrate plus
Vaccinate strategy
PNA Philippine News Agency
PNP Philippine National Police
PTV People’s Television Network
PWUD Persons Who Use Drugs
SC Supreme Court
SEC Securities and Exchange
Commission
TFPSA Terrorism Financing Prevention
and Suppression Act of 2012
TSP Telecommunications Service
Providers
UN United Nations
UNJP UN Joint Program
on Human Rights
UNODC UN Oce on Drugs and Crime
UNOCT UN Oce of Counter-Terrorism
WHO World Health Organization
4 |
Contents
5 |
6
Introduction
11
Counterinsurgency, Red-Tagging & The
‘War on Terror’: A War against Deliberation
and Dissent, A War with No End
61
The Eect of the Philippine
‘War on Drugs’ on Civic Space
122
Big Brother’s Grand Plan: A Look
at the Digital Security Playbook
in the Philippines
155
Conclusions: Redening Civic Space and
Building New Pathways of Resistance
85
Not Safe: Securitization of the
COVID-19 Crisis and its Impact
on Civic Space in the Philippines
Introduction
In May 2020, a global review of
the future of civic space
1
led by the
Funders Initiative for Civil Society
(FICS) found that over the last
two decades, a rapidly expanding
oppressive state and transnational
security interests and architecture,
characterized by three-fold
tactics of a “security playbook”
— the proliferation and misuse
of counterterrorism and security
laws, policies and measures;
communication and information
technologies; and toxic security
narratives – has emerged as a
dominant driver of shrinking civic
space in the decade ahead.
2
1 CIVICUS denes civic space as “the place, physical, virtual, and legal, where people exercise their rights to freedom
of association, expression, and peaceful assembly… A robust and protected civic space forms the cornerstone of
accountable, responsive democratic governance and stable societies”. On the other hand, FICS denes it as “the physical,
digital, and legal conditions through which progressive movements and their allies organize, participate, and create change”
and OHCHR denes it as “the environment that enables civil society to play a role in political, economic and social life. In
particular, civic space allows individuals and groups to contribute to policy-making that aects their lives, including how
it is implemented.” For a more critical discussion of the concept of shrinking space see the ‘Conclusions: Redening Civic
Space and Building New Pathways of Resistance’.
2 Ben Hayes and Joshi Poonam, ‘Rethinking civic space in an age of intersectional crises,’ Funders Initiative for Civil Society
(May 2020). https://global-dialogue.org/rethinking-civic-space/
3 For this paper, we use the OHCHR denition of civil society as “individuals and groups who voluntarily engage in forms of
public participation and action around shared interests, purposes or values that are compatible with the goals of the UN: the
maintenance of peace and security, the realization of development, and the promotion and respect of human rights”. This
denition goes beyond registered NGOs to encompass movements, unions, informal groups, journalists, bloggers, academics,
individual citizens engaging in participation or activism including through protest, on or oline dissent, and direct action.
Governments, at times aided by corporations,
far right, and religious conservative movements,
use this security playbook to create a hostile
environment for civil society actors working to
promote democracy and human rights and to
demand accountability from the most powerful
actors in our societies.
For the most part, civil society
3
and people’s
movements, and their supporters, have largely
taken a reactive and defensive posture that, while
critical to protect activists, has been insucient
to safeguard their civic space. There is huge space
for improvement of collaboration for a cohesive,
eective, and long-term response to counter this
trend at the transnational, regional, and domestic
levels. To address this gap, FICS and the Fund
for Global Human Rights (FGHR) launched Civic
Futures, an initiative to help tip the scales in favor
of civil society, by mobilizing the philanthropic
community to equip civil society and movement
actors to work together and across multiple issue
areas in pushing back against the overreach of the
powers of national security and counterterrorism.
by Marc Batac and the Civic Futures – Philippines Research Team
6 |
The Philippines was one of the areas identied
where the security playbook is used to restrict
civic space, suppress dissent, and target diverse
movements, and where opportunities may exist
to disrupt, reform, and—over the long-term—
transform the situation.
4
Independent and
academic human rights researchers and activists
in the Philippines, with the support of the Fund
for Global Human Rights and Active Vista,
formed a research team to better understand
how the transnational security architecture
and the use of the security playbook manifest
in the national context, and the kind of support
local and national civic actors need to address
this eectively.
Methodology and Limitations
The scope of this research is ambitious, so
a sequenced approach was envisioned. This
rst phase is a desk study that sets a baseline
of information and analyses on the dierent
aspects of this security architecture and its
impact in the Philippines. The research was
designed as a collaborative study among
a team of researchers, with each one focused
on specic and dierent aspects of the security
architecture and its impact in the Philippines.
The research team conducted an extensive
review of scholarly work and existing policy
documents, followed by a validation workshop
with various groups representing the diverse
geographic, sectoral, and ideological spectrum
of civil society in the Philippines.
4 Aries Arugay, Marc Batac & Jordan Street, ‘An Explosive Cocktail – Counter-terrorism, militarization and authoritarianism
in the Philippines’, Initiatives for International Dialogue and Saferworld (June 2021). https://iidnet.org/an-explosive-
cocktail-counter-terrorism-militarisation-and-authoritarianism-in-the-philippines/
A second phase will develop an approach to
engage and involve grassroots and local groups
in a follow-up process to ll in information gaps
in the rst phase, and to support a collective
and candid reflection and analyses of existing
civil society approaches to counter the closing
of civic space. This sequenced approach with
engagement among grassroots communities is
set to ensure that the research, its methodologies
and approaches, will not simply remain a scholarly
undertaking, but more importantly, contribute
directly towards strengthening movements and
nurturing civic space in the Philippines.
7 |
Scope
This study focuses on areas where the impact of
securitization on civic space are most apparent,
and where the Philippine government has waged
contiguous wars in the name of “security”: the
“War on Terror”, the “War on Drugs”, and the
“War on COVID-19”. This study primarily covers
the six-year administration of President Rodrigo
Duterte (2016-2022), but it also touches on
the administrations of previous presidents
and emerging developments under President
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. While President Duterte
played a key role in escalating the war rhetoric
and setting an atmosphere of impunity, this trend
preceded his administration, and the actors
that enabled this security playbook go beyond
Duterte. This inquiry is therefore relevant even
under the new Marcos Jr. administration which,
in many ways, has not altered the policies and
practices of the Duterte government that are
repressive of civic space. Rather, it has continued
the security playbook of its predecessor.
This study focuses on
areas where the impact of
securitization on civic space
are most apparent, and where
the Philippine government has
waged contiguous wars in the
name of “security”: the “War
on Terror”, the “War on Drugs”,
and the “War on COVID-19”.
Through a desk study, the research panel
aimed to provide an analysis of:
1. the nature and harmful impacts on civic
space of the misuse or abuse of security
laws and policy measures, information and
communication technologies, and narratives
used to justify repressive acts under the broad
mantle of national security in the Philippines;
2. the landscape of actors and initiatives
working at the intersection of security
and civic space; and
3. the outliers and new actors developing
alternatives, and potential entry points
and strategies for countering and reversing
these harms.
In the rst chapter on the “War on Terror”,
Marc Batac dives deep into the impact of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
on civic space across dierent presidential
administrations in the Philippines. The
chapter traces the long history of both the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
approaches, which have evolved and become
entangled with each other over the years.
These mixed militarized approaches to address
internal armed conflicts were wielded by
various administrations, including the Duterte
government, drastically contributing to the
shrinking of civic space in the country. It has
legitimized the practice of “red-tagging”,
which has become a serious threat to silence
civil society by labelling its members “enemies
of the State”. This chapter, as well as the other
chapters, demonstrates how the government
has employed legal means or subverted legal
norms to repress and undermine strategies of
dissent and deliberation, including human rights
activism, humanitarian work, and peace building.
8 |
In the second chapter, the Ateneo Human Rights
Center looks back at former President Rodrigo
Duterte’s “War on Drugs” and its detrimental
repercussions on the defense of human rights.
It provides a comprehensive account of how
the drug war, anchored on collective fear and
shame, harmed not only drug personalities
targeted for extrajudicial killings, but also human
rights defenders and activists who came to
their defense. The legal and moral space for
civil society to carry out its activism for human
rights has become much narrower in the context
of this drug war, normalizing the government’s
securitized response to the drug problem and its
consequent clamp down on civic space. As the
chapter describes, the popularization of Duterte’s
violent anti-drug rhetoric impacted civic space
through the “dangerous ction” that human rights
defenders are drug coddlers and crime enablers.
In the third chapter, on the “War on COVID-19”,
Mary Jane Real probes the securitized response
of the Philippine government to the COVID-19
health crisis. The chapter demonstrates the
links between the Philippine government’s
highly militarized and securitized pandemic
response and the shrinking civic space in
the country. In this context, the government
stretched what could be deemed acceptable
and non-acceptable by the public as far as the
curtailment of their fundamental freedoms is
concerned. The government stressed the need
to safeguard the public’s human right to health
and asserted that consequent violations of their
freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful
assembly, and other rights is essential for the
upkeep of civic space, and necessary to keep
the public safe. Further posing the pandemic
not only as a health risk, but also as a security
threat became a justication for the curtailment
of fundamental freedoms and a cover for
the persistent human rights violations being
committed with impunity in the country.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, Jessamine Pacis
focuses on securitization in digital spaces and
threats related to the use of information and
communications technology that crosscut
these “three wars”. The chapter on information
technology and the media describes the
Philippine government’s digital security
playbook, which uses legal and technical
structures to quell dissent through surveillance,
censorship, and securitized responses to
disinformation. It brings together analyses of the
war narratives peddled by the government that
paved the way for its increasing restrictions on
civic space as activism for human rights spread
rapidly into the digital terrain, especially during
the COVID-19 crisis. Through the proliferation
of the use of digital tools for surveillance and
censorship and attempts to silence independent
sources of information in traditional and social
media, President Duterte was able to control the
narrative that justied the vilication of activists
and those critical of the government.
The research team’s ultimate goal is to ensure
that civil society thrives in conditions that are
free from unjustied limitations brought about
by narrow and injurious concepts of “security”
as dened and weaponized by a few at the top—
by elites, governments and corporations—and to
nurture civic spaces in order to facilitate creative
and humane solutions to our common societal
problems. The team aspires to generate debates
to redene conceptions of “security” and “civic
space” to reflect the needs, potentials and
aspirations of all peoples, especially those
who are most aected.
Therefore, beyond naming the problem and the
incentives and motivations that underpin this
oppressive security architecture, the research
team aims for this study to inspire grassroots
organizations and their movements to deepen
and transform their strategies of resistance
against the government’s security architecture,
and create new pathways to protect and
expand civic space.
9 |
Towards this, all four chapters identify civil
society and community responses that point to
alternative and feminist practices and meanings
of security, and analyze potential challenges
and entry points under the new Ferdinand Marcos
Jr. presidency and beyond. Batac documents
alternative feminist and peacebuilding paths
to addressing the armed insurgency, such as
the indigenous people-led convergence Lumad
Husay, and other multi-sectoral initiatives for
independent spaces for deliberation and citizens’
agenda on peace and security. AHRC maps
various eorts to push back on the drug war,
such as RESBAK and Nightcrawlers, and their use
of their craft and art to shed light on and engage
the dehumanizing narratives underpinning the
drug war, and eorts on changing policy away
from approaches focused on incarceration,
and rehabilitation towards harm reduction and
public health. Real celebrates the emergence
of community platforms of care amidst the
pandemic, such as the tide of community
pantries and mutual aid, and the virtual-based
initiative Lunas Collective – both volunteer-
and women-driven. Finally, Pacis cites hashtag
campaigns reclaiming online spaces and
shedding light on misogyny and abuse, and
civil society-led cyber incident responses
to cyberattacks, among others.
Rather than being denitive and exhaustive,
this research from the rst phase is intended to
serve as a compilation of think pieces to inform
and prompt further analysis and strategizing.
There are more alternative pathways towards
change, and ideas and practices of security in
many activist and civil society spaces than the
research team could possibly map and document
in a few months. Ultimately, our hope is that
this study will be received within the Philippine
people’s movement and civil society, rst, as
a love letter for their courage, fortitude and
ingenuity; and second, as an invitation to join
and handhold in a shared and renewed journey
of hope, solidarity and reimagining.
Our hope is that this study
will be received within the
Philippine people’s movement
and civil society, rst, as a
love letter for their courage,
fortitude and ingenuity; and
second, as an invitation to
join and handhold in a shared
and renewed journey of hope,
solidarity and reimagining.
10 |
Counterinsurgency,
Red-Tagging & The
‘War on Terror’: A War
against Deliberation
and Dissent, A War
with No End
Marc Batac
11 |
I. Introduction
The Philippines has experienced decades of
armed conflict involving a number of dierent
movements with distinct grievances and
aspirations, including self-determination
struggles (notably the Cordillera and Moro
Muslim movements) and a long-running
communist armed insurgency. While the violence
peaked in the late 1960s and into the 70s and
80s, the underlying conflicts have deep-seated
causes going back to the Spanish colonial era
and continued by post-colonial, oligarchic
governments. Civilian approaches to internal
conflicts, such as peace agreements with some
armed groups, increased social services and
some structural and policy reforms, have been
welcome developments. However, the continuing
unequal access to development and socio-
economic and political life, the culture of impunity
within government and across society, and the
dominance of military and autocratic approaches
to quell grievances and dissent, undermine and
even reverse any incremental progress achieved
through peace talks and policy reforms.
This paper does not seek to delve into all existing
internal conflicts and counterinsurgency (COIN)
strategies in the Philippines, rather it is focused
on the evolution and mixing of the government’s
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (CT)
approach to the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). It is
focused on the conflict with the CPP-NPA as an
analytical jump-o point, for two reasons. First,
the repressive government policies, narratives
and behavior that animate and sustain recent
trends of red-tagging, political violence and
overall erosion of civic space in the country,
are underpinned, shaped and sustained by
pernicious security narratives about the
supposed threat from the so-called “communist-
terrorist groups.” And second, the fusion of COIN
and CT rhetoric can be better understood and
observed alongside the development of the
Philippine government’s relationship with
and reaction to the CPP-NPA.
Source: IndustriALL Global Union,
Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Philippines protests, Global Day
of Action against red tagging.
12 |
In this chapter, I argue, rst, that the long-
standing COIN framework has blurred the
distinction between combatants and non-
combatants; and that despite attempts at
peacebuilding and civilian approaches, the
government’s COIN approach has relegated
politically negotiated settlement as secondary
only to the military and war-making approach.
Second, despite the failure of COIN to nd
a resolution to the armed conflict, it has
been revived as a CT strategy due to the
confluence of interests among international
and domestic actors.
Third, mixed COIN-CT measures are then
wielded not only against combatants but also
against perceived supporters and sympathizers,
activists, legal cause-oriented groups, and the
broad civil society. This has led to sustained
state-enabled red-tagging, harassment and
various forms of violations of human rights
and freedoms of citizens and communities,
and the overall shrinking of civic, deliberative
and peacebuilding spaces in the country.
Fourth, I take special note of the invisible
impact of COIN-CT measures on feminist
peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches,
and humanitarian work in conflict areas.
I propose that there is a need to further unpack
and expand our understanding of civic space
to include peacemaking and peacebuilding
strategies. And nally, building on the call
of various critical scholars to go beyond
“human rights-compliant counterterrorism,” I
identify and analyze distinct but non-mutually
exclusive responses and forms of resistance and
alternatives from civil society and communities.
This research paper is not intended to be an
exhaustive mapping of pathways, but rather
an invitation for people’s movements, civil
society and allies to further discuss how else
we can make militarist, misogynistic COIN-
CT approaches superfluous and unneeded,
and reflect on what alternative and feminist
narratives and practices of safety and security
are there or are being born.
This undertaking will require us to take a
historical look at the interplay between the
military and the civilian leaders in shaping the
country’s security needs and approach. In doing
so, we will analyze how this dynamic aects the
ebbs and flows of the peace process and shapes
the government’s security playbook and military
strategy, and, in turn, how this security playbook
impacts two important elements of functioning
democracies — deliberation and dissent.
13 |
II. In Focus: the Philippine Government’s
Mixed Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism Approach
1 DSWD, ‘DSWD, AFP formalize partnership to strengthen delivery of programs and services for Filipinos in conflict areas,’
(19 July 2019).
2 See the next chapter on War on Drugs.
3 Rappler, ‘NTF-ELCAC releases P16 billion to 812 ‘NPA-free’ barangay’ (13 July 2021).
4 PNA, ‘Senate OKs nat’l budget including NTF-ELCAC’s P10.8-B’ (1 December 2021).
5 Karapatan, ‘“Military pork barrel:” Karapatan flags DILG’s funds for NTF-ELCAC,’ (10 November 2021).
At the outset, it is important to identify
and dene the core policy features
enabling the current government’s
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
approaches, particularly against the
CPP-NPA. Annex I maps the breadth
of the Philippines’ security policy
architecture and the various actors
involved, including those specic
to COIN and CT. For this section,
we will focus on two elements.
First, a core feature of the government’s
existing COIN and CT strategy is
the so-called “whole-of-nation
approach” to ending the communist
armed insurgency, instituted through
President Rodrigo Duterte’s Executive
Order No. 70 (EO 70) s. 2018. EO 70
also created the National Task Force to
End Local Communist Armed Conflict
(NTF-ELCAC). Operationally, what
this does is, rst, it formalizes and
integrates the AFP’s role in the delivery
of basic social services
1
and, second,
it mobilizes and provides incentives for
various government units, especially
local governments, to use the metrics
of military success rather than of
peace and prevention.
Similar to President Duterte’s Oplan
Tokhang
2
, the NTF-ELCAC’s Support
to the Barangay Development Program,
which grants aid or reward for local
government units (LGUs) that have
been “communist-cleared”, has
provided corrupt incentives for local
chief executives and local governments
to take short-cuts in addressing the
local dimensions of the armed conflict,
favoring primarily active warfare, lethal
force and punitive approaches over
peace and development approaches.
3
The NTF-ELCAC had an approved
budget of P19.1 billion in 2021, P622.3
million in 2020, and P522 million in
2019. For 2022, the NTF-ELCAC has
an approved budget of P10.8B, from
its proposed P29.2B budget.
4
According to the human rights
watchdog, Karapatan, Regions 7, 10, 11,
12, and 13 — which received the biggest
chunk of the fund for the NTF-ELCAC’s
Barangay Development Program,
were the same regions where the most
number of politically motivated killings
and arrests occurred from the start of
President Duterte’s term in July 2016
until June 2021. As many as 206 out of
the 414 cases of politically-motivated
extrajudicial killings transpired in these
regions, while 322 out of the 487
political prisoners who were arrested
during the Duterte administration
were arrested in these same regions.
5
Case study continued on next page >>>
14 |
The other important key feature is the
move from propaganda and labeling
of the CPP-NPA as ‘communist terrorist
groups’ to formal designation and
proscription. This reframing of the
CPP-NPA from ‘insurgents’ to ‘terrorists’
is important because it enables the
mobilization of the full extent of state
resources and power to undermine the
legitimacy and restrict the activities not
only of the armed movement but also its
perceived mass bases of support. In the
past decade, the Philippines adopted
two laws that are primarily aimed at
these: (1) the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)
of 2020
6
, which superseded the Human
Security Act (HSA) of 2007
7
, and (2)
the Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act (TFPSA) of 2012
8
.
6 Republic Act No. 11479 (3 July 2020).
7 Republic Act No. 9372 (6 March 2007).
8 Republic Act No. 10168 (18 June 2012).
9 Rappler. ‘DOJ formally seeks court declaration of CPP-NPA as terrorists,’ (21 February 2018).
10 Under the new counter-terrorism law, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), comprised of Cabinet ocials of mostly retired
generals, is empowered to unilaterally designate as ‘terrorists’ individuals and organisations, and to authorise the arrest
and detention of a person suspected of being a ‘terrorist’ – powers that are [ordinarily] reserved for the courts.
11 Rappler, ‘Supreme Court upholds with nality most of anti-terror law’ (26 April 2022).
In February 2018, the Department of
Justice (DoJ) sought to declare the
CPP-NPA as “terrorist” organizations
under the then operational HSA.
9
Following delayed progress in the courts
or, more accurately, the lack of sucient
proof for the legal designation of the
CPP-NPA as terrorists, the government
took a new tack: it changed the law. It
passed the ATA which transferred from
the judiciary to the executive branch
the power to designate individuals or
communities as “terrorists,” making
the latter immediately liable to be
arrested without warrant or charges
and be detained for up to 24 days.
10
In December 2020, the Anti-Terrorism
Council (ATC) designated the CPP-
NPA as “terrorist organizations,
associations or groups of persons.”
In June 2021, it also designated the
National Democratic Front (NDF), the
ocial representative of the CPP-
NPA to the peace talks, as a terrorist
organization. Despite an unprecedented
37 petitions against the ATA, in April
2022, the Supreme Court (SC) upheld
most of the new anti-terrorism law
as constitutional, including the ATC’s
power of designation.
11
15 |
III. The Evolution of
Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism in
the Philippines, and the
Confluence of Interests
of the Actors
While strategies and operation plans to address
internal security threats and insurgencies have
changed under each president — from Cory
Aquino and Fidel Ramos’ Oplan Lambat Bitag,
to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s Bantay Laya,
Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III’s Bayanihan, and
Duterte’s Kapayapaan and Kapanatagan — these
strategies have common features. Andreopoulos,
et al. enumerates common jargon and terms
used across administrations, such as “holistic,”
“whole-of-nation” or “people-centered”
approach, and identies a common claim of
purportedly “mobilising the entire governmental
bureaucracy” alongside various sectors and
stakeholders to transform provinces influenced
by the communist insurgency as “peaceful
and ready for further development” but are,
in fact, “designed as an ‘end-game strategy’
to denitively eradicate the insurgency.”
12
12 George Andreopoulos, Nerve Macaspac and Em Galkin, ‘“Whole-of-Nation” Approach to Counterinsurgency and the
Closing of Civic Space in the Philippines’, California: Global-e Journal, University of California Santa Barbara, 14 August
2020, Volume 13, Issue 54.
13 Ibid.
Due to the diculty in defeating guerilla-style
insurgencies, the government and its military have
targeted activists, people’s organizations and civil
society groups perceived to be providing forms
of support to the armed movement, regardless
of the existence of actual proof; labeled them
as communists and terrorists as part of a wider
“war of hearts and mind” to undermine the
legitimacy and movements of their “enemies”;
and in the process, made no distinction between
armed combatants and civilians.
13
This is how
the slippery slope or, more accurately, the logic
of COIN starts with targeting armed rebels, then
targeting activists and radicals, and eventually
leads to the repression of civilian spaces for
discourse and dissent.
…the logic of COIN starts
with targeting armed rebels,
then targeting activists and
radicals, and eventually
leads to the repression
of civilian spaces for
discourse and dissent.
16 |
A. The Conflict between the Philippine
Government and the CPP-NPA: From
Marcos to Aquino
Since 1969, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP), through the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), has been battling the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s
Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-
NDF or CNN), a clandestine movement waging
a guerrilla war “aiming to win the majority of the
population to seize state power and implement
a programme of reforms called ‘national
democracy with a socialist perspective.’”
14
The AFP, in particular, considers itself a
“vanguard of the modern state and a bulwark
against communist subversion.”
15
The Martial Law regime under the dictator
President Ferdinand Marcos was one of the
most vicious periods of counterinsurgency
and violence.
16
The declaration of martial rule
was, in fact, predicated on responding to the
rebellion of the CPP-NPA and the Mindanao
Independence Movement.
17
14 Jayson Lamchek, ‘Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism: Myth-making and Reality in the Philippines and Indonesia’,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2019), Eng, doi: 10.1017/9781108588836, p. 81. See also Dominique Caouette,
‘Persevering Revolutionaries: Armed Struggle in the 21st Century, Exploring the Revolution of the Communist Party of
the Philippines,’ Cornell University (2004); Armando Liwanag (Jose Maria Sison), ‘Brief Review of the History of the
Communist Party of the Philippines’; Kathleen Weekley, ‘The Communist Party of the Philippines, 1968–1993: A Story
of Its Theory and Practice,’ University of the Philippines Press (2001).
15 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, ‘Breaking With the Past?: Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging
Democracies of East Asia’, East-West Center, 2012.
16 Jubair Salah, ‘Bangsamoro, ‘A Nation Under Endless Tyranny’, Islamic Research Academy, 1st edition (1984). p. 134. The
Marcos dictatorship’s ill-treatment of the Bangsamoro people is highlighted by his encouragement of the creation of the
Ilaga, a Christian paramilitary group. Together with the Philippine Army, they were responsible for multiple massacres of
the Bangsamoro people, such as the Manili Massacre in 1971 and the Malisbong Masjid Massacre of 1974. It was also during
his term, particularly in 1968, that the infamous Jabidah Massacre occurred where at least 60 Muslim Filipinos undergoing
military training were killed.
17 Proclamation No. 1081, s. 1972.
18 Patricio N. Abinales, ed. ‘The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics after 1986’. 1st ed. Cornell University Press (1996).
The downfall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986
and the change in government headed by President
Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) saw the return of
formal democracy and the opening up of political
space. During that period, the CPP–NPA was split
between the ‘rearmists’ who insisted on pursuing
the Maoist principle of protracted war, and the
‘rejectionists’
18
who looked towards the non-
violent, political and legal contestation of power.
The Aquino administration introduced massive
constitutional reforms to democratize the political
space and introduce checks to state power,
including the founding of an independent National
Human Rights Commission. Aquino explored peace
negotiations with various armed groups, including
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army, and the CNN.
17 |
However, the Aquino administration was viewed
by many as “weak and fractious.” It was wracked
by several coup attempts staged by disaected
military ocers.
19
Peace talks with the CPP–NPA
collapsed in January 1987, and thereafter, the
Aquino government announced that it had given
the AFP “a free hand in waging all-out war”
against the NPA.
20
The subsequent COIN war was
underpinned by the US strategy of ‘low-intensity
conflict’, particularly its emphasis on civic action,
propaganda and psychological warfare.
21
Under
this framework, the AFP developed its “Broad
Front Strategy” that targeted the “mass base
support systems” of the CPP–NPA instead of
the regular NPA combatants which, in practice,
meant and included targeting legal, cause-
oriented organizations.
22
Despite the opening up
of political space, human rights violations soared,
especially those committed by the military and its
paramilitary forces — primarily the Citizen Armed
Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) — and the
vigilante groups they employed in the context
of COIN against the CPP–NPA.
23
19 US State Department, ‘Previous Editions of U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets/Background Notes - Philippines (10/00),’
archived content. Accessed 17 July 2022.
20 Justus M. Van der Kroef, ‘Aquino and the Communists: A Philippine Strategic Stalemate?’, World Aairs Vol. 151, no. 3
(1988): 117–29.
21 Lamchek (2019), p. 84.
22 McCoy A (2011), p. 239.
23 Anja Jetschke, ‘Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines’, University of Pennsylvania Press (2011),
pp. 171–98; David Kowalewski,‘Vigilante Counterinsurgency and Human Rights in the Philippines: A Statistical Analysis’
(1990) 12 Hum Rts , pp. 246–64; McCoy (2011), pp. 433–51.
24 Miriam-Coronel Ferrer, ‘Philippines National Unication Commission: National consultations and the ‘Six Paths to Peace’’,
Accord Issue 13 (December 2002). Accessed 17 July 2022.
25 Republic Act No 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); Republic Act No 7636 (repealing the Anti-Subversion Act).
26 Republic Act No 7941 (Party-List System Act).
B. Ramos Administration:
The Fork in the Road
The Ramos Administration (1992-1998) pursued
a major shift to politically negotiated settlements
with armed groups, along with a program of
“national reconciliation.” Ramos, a retired military
general, was Vice Chief-of-Sta of the AFP under
Marcos until 1986 when he joined rebel military
and police ocers in the attempted coup-d’état
that resulted in the People Power Revolution that
booted out the dictator.
The Ramos administration revived the peace
talks with the MILF, the MNLF and the CNN,
established a National Unication Commission
and the Oce of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process (OPAPP). It also signed into
law a general conditional amnesty covering all
rebel groups.
24
It was also under Ramos’ term
that Congress repealed the Anti-Subversion Act,
which had previously made mere membership
in the CPP illegal.
25
The Party List System Law
was also enacted, allocating 20 percent of
the seats in the House of Representatives to
representatives of marginalized sectors as
provided in the 1987 Constitution.
26
Moreover,
Ramos championed a 15-year AFP modernization
program that introduced security sector
reforms meant to transform the military
into a professionalized armed force.
18 |
During this period, there was a “dramatic decline
in military encounters between government and
rebel forces and a decline in casualties related to
COIN operations against the NPA, and although
human rights violations were still observed in
militarized zones, there was a notable decline
in most categories.”
27
The Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) cited “improved human
rights awareness in the military, which it attributes
to its human rights training programs for military
ocers and its practice of providing AFP
promotion panels with ‘certicates of clearance’
on ocers’ human rights performance.”
28
While the Ramos period was far from perfect,
it was a fork in the road in reimagining the
relationship between the Philippine state and the
communist armed movement, and in transforming
the Philippine security establishment towards
greater civilian oversight over the military.
This period allowed for “political space within
the state for left-wing activist organizations
sharing the ‘national democratic’ ideology
and programme of reforms of the NDF”
29
,
and for a real chance for a civilian approach
and a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict
through a politically negotiated-settlement.
27 Lamchek, J (2019), p. 62, citing Amnesty International.
28 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 - Philippines, published 30 January 1995.
Accessed 17 July 2022.
29 Lamchek, J (2019), p. 61.
In the next section, I will discuss two episodes in
the post-1986 era where COIN took ascendancy
over politically negotiated settlements and
peace processes. The rst was during the
Macapagal-Arroyo administration which
coincided with the Post-9/11 Global War
on Terror (GWoT); the second, the Duterte
administration which coincided with the rise
to global prominence of the Islamic State or
Daesh (IS/ISIL) and consequently, of the P/CVE
(Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism)
agenda. In both the Macapagal-Arroyo and
Duterte administrations, the counterterrorism
state was able to reframe “insurgents” as
“terrorists.” And in both cases, the ultimate
impact was felt most among actors, sectors and
communities whom the Philippine government
and security actors perceived to be ‘mass bases
of support’ of the CPP-NPA. My argument is
counterterrorism (CT) as the discourse was an
intervening opportunity for the military to tilt
the balance in its favor, frustrating healthier
civil-military relations from being fully born
and undermining a new and better relationship
between the Philippine state and the communist
armed movement, and, by extension, with other
dissenting groups.
19 |
C. Macapagal-Arroyo Administration:
The Post-9/11 GWoT and the
Philippines’ ‘War on Terror’
By 2001, under the Macapagal-Arroyo
administration (2001–2010), counterinsurgency
had gained ascendancy. According to Lamchek,
the brief peace negotiations under President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to a sudden
halt in 2001 “because the ‘war on terror’ made
the COIN campaign that replaced peace
talks materially attractive and normatively
plausible.”
30
Under President Arroyo, the
Philippines became one of the foremost
supporters of the Global War on Terror in
the region,
31
responding to the call for robust
counterterrorism measures through intelligence-
sharing, military and law enforcement
cooperation, and policy and legislation.
Some commentators have noted that the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) was the initial and main
excuse for introducing the “war on terror” to the
Philippines,
32
and as a justication for making
the country the “second front” of this war.
33
The kidnapping by the ASG of guests at the
Dos Palmas resort in Palawan, which killed three
Americans, coupled with allegations that the
ASG was linked to al-Qaeda, provided “the
casus belli for the U.S. military to re-engage
in the Philippines following the September 11,
2001 attacks by al Qaeda.”
34
30 Lamchek, J (2019), p. 88.
31 Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) or Operation Freedom Eagle was in place from 2002 to 2015 as part of
Operation Enduring Freedom and the US Global War on Terrorism.
32 Anja Jetschke (2011), ‘Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines’, University of Pennsylvania Press,
p. 233.
33 Walden Bello, ‘A “Second Front” in the Philippines’ The Nation (18 March 2002), p. 18.
34 Abuza, Zachary. ‘Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,’ Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
(1 September 2005), vii.
35 Ava Patricia C. Avila & Justin Goldman, ‘Philippine-US relations: the relevance of an evolving alliance,’ Bandung: Journal
of the Global South (29 September 2015), 2, Article No. 6.
36 Renato Cruz De Castro (June 2006), ‘21st Century Philippines-US Security Relations: Managing an Alliance in the War
of the Third Kind’, Asian Security, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 102–121.
37 George Radics, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US “War against Terrorism”’
(2004) 4 Stanford Journal of East Asian Aairs, pp. 115–27, 116–17; Herbert Docena, ‘Unconventional Warfare: Are US
Special Forces Engaged in an “Oensive War” in the Philippines?’ in Abinales and Quimpo (eds) pp. 46–83.
38 Robin A. Bowman, ‘Is the Philippines Proting from The War on Terrorism?’, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate
School (June 2004).
As the US identied terrorism as a common
threat, it renewed its political and security
relations with the Philippines, which had been
strained since the closure of the US military
bases in 1991.
35
From 1994 to 1998, the average
amount of US military aid was only US$1.6
million per annum, but in the aftermath of 9/11,
Washington gave Manila a ten-fold increase in
military assistance.
36
Support did not only come
in the form of a nancial military package, it also
included development assistance, especially
to Muslim Mindanao, and the deployment of US
forces for “joint military exercises” with Philippine
troops, including undisclosed numbers of US
Special Operations Forces since 2002.
37
One
commentator noted that “...instead of improving
the country’s CT capabilities to eradicate
terrorism, the GWOT and related US policy have
created a cyclical incentive structure [wherein]
certain actors within the government, military,
and insurgency groups in the Philippines prot
politically and nancially from US aid and the
warlike conditions,” and therefore “sustain, at
a minimum, a presence of conflict and terrorism
in order to continue drawing future benets.”
38
20 |
President Arroyo was interested in a closer
relationship with the security sector, seeking
to “strengthen her relationship with the military,
the institution from which she sought support
to bolster her shaky, increasingly unpopular
administration.”
39
Arugay et al. pointed out
that the increased influence of former military
generals “who had positioned themselves as
the necessary voices with the experience to
handle these security eorts”
40
and who “did
not hesitate to push for a heavily militarized
approach to deal with communist rebels and
Moro secessionists under the counterterrorism
framework” facilitated the civilian government’s
“new ‘all-out war policy’ in dealing with all non-
state armed groups.”
41
At one point, President
Arroyo would say, “The government will not
allow the peace process to stand in the way
of the overriding ght against terrorism.”
42
39 Lamchek, J (2019), p. 86.
40 Aries Arugay, Marc Batac & Jordan Street, ‘An Explosive Cocktail – Counter-terrorism, militarisation and authoritarianism
in the Philippines’, Initiatives for International Dialogue and Safer World (June 2021), p. 9; Arugay, Aries A. ‘The Military in
Philippine Politics: Still Politicized and Increasingly Autonomous, The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia:
Conflict and Leadership, edited by Marcus Mietzner’, London: Routledge (2011), pp. 85–106.
41 Arugay A, Batac M & Street J (2021), p. 9; Hutchcroft, David (2008), ‘The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines’,
Journal of Democracy, 19(1), pp 141–155.
42 Quoted in Soliman M. Santos Jr. ‘Counter-terrorism and peace negotiations with Philippine rebel groups’, Critical Studies
on Terrorism (2010), 3:1, pp. 114, DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594301.
43 Santos, S (2010), pp. 137-154.
44 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo. ‘Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace’, Journal of Asian Security and
International Aairs (2016), 3(1) p. 7.
45 Anja Jetschke (2011), Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines, University of Pennsylvania Press,
p. 233.
46 Lamchek, J (2018), pp 66-67, citing Anja Jetschke (2011), Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines,
University of Pennsylvania Press.
47 Alfred W McCoy, ‘Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State,’
(Ateneo de Manila University Press 2011), p. 499.
48 Walden Bello, Creating the Third Force: U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines (The Institute for Food
and Development Policy 1987) 55; Carolina Hernandez, Institutional Response to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of
the Philippines (2005) 5–10.
49 Lamchek, J (2019), p. 57.
Commentators argued that the Philippines’
security establishment caught the ‘anti-
terrorism syndrome – i.e., the supremacy of
counter-terrorism’
43
and applied it in their
approach to protracted conflicts with other
insurgent groups like the MILF
44
, and the CPP-
NPA.
45
Jetschke argued that the Philippine
government skillfully used these CT norms
“in constructing a domestic discourse on
terrorism that framed its adversaries as
terrorists or as being linked to terrorism.”
46
However, as McCoy pointed out, the dierence
between the MILF and the CPP-NPA is the
US was already invested in the Philippine
government’s COIN war with the CPP–NPA
long before 9/11, with the CT rhetoric merely
adding “another thread to this skein of historical
continuity.”
47
This is echoed by various
commentators who emphasized the US’ desire
to counter what it saw as a communist threat
to its interests in the Philippines
48
and “the
importance and persistence of Cold War
legacies in explaining the reframing of the
communist movement in terms of terrorism.”
49
21 |
Lamchek succinctly explained:
“[T]errorism was not a stand-alone
phenomenon to which the state responded
with counterterrorism policy; terrorism was
a discursive construction necessitated by
counterterrorism policy and was constituted
as counterterrorism policy was developed…
the Philippine government tried to conjure
an insecure environment abounding in threats,
plots and conspiracies, from the Abu Sayyaf
to the MILF, and on to the NPA and legal leftist
organisations. It was only by taking this specic
view of the security situation as reality, that the
specic counterterrorism measures promoted
made sense. Philippine counterterrorism was
not a necessity. It arose from the contingent
decision of the Arroyo government to align
the country with the ‘war on terror.’ This
aorded the government material and political
advantages against anti-government groups.
By overlaying counterterrorism rhetoric on pre-
existing counterinsurgency, old foes of the state
became terrorists. While espousing the new
terrorism discourse, the government continued
to pursue old counterinsurgency goals with the
increased resources aorded by partnership
with the United States.”
50
50 Lamchek, J (2018), p.89.
51 Ibid, p. 67.
52 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Philip Alston : addendum: mission to Philippines,’ (16 April 2008), A/HRC/8/3/Add.2.
53 Peter M Sales, ‘State terror in the Philippines: the Alston Report, human rights and counter-insurgency under the
Arroyo administration. Contemporary Politics, (2009) 15(3), pp 321–336.
The Philippine government “successfully
convinced the United States and other
Western governments to extend its material
and diplomatic support against its adversaries,”
which, “in turn, [made] it possible for human
rights violations to continue.”
51
Unsurprisingly,
with the adoption of the hard security and CT
approach, there was a massive increase in human
rights violations in the form of extrajudicial
killings targeting activists, organizers, journalists
and other civil society actors. Then UN Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions Philip Alston estimated that
as many as 800 people were executed between
2002 and 2008.
52
By 2005, this, together with
other authoritarian tendencies prevalent in the
Arroyo administration, led non-government
watchdog Freedom House to downgrade the
Philippines freedom status to “partially free”.
53
[T]errorism was not a stand-
alone phenomenon to which
the state responded with
counterterrorism policy;
terrorism was a discursive
construction necessitated
by counterterrorism policy
and was constituted as
counterterrorism policy
was developed…”
22 |
D. Duterte Administration:
The IS/ISIL Threat, P/CVE Agenda,
and Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
At the start of the Duterte administration
(2016–2022), the relationship between the
civilian government and the CPP-NPA began
on a positive and promising note, with an
expeditious peace process between the
parties. There was renewed hope among
many that a politically negotiated settlement
that would put an end to the longest-running
armed conflict in Asia, was within reach.
Sections of the military and intelligence
establishment were, of course, displeased
when President Duterte was more than
welcoming of the CPP-NPA and the Left.
During the rst two years of the Duterte
administration, they perceived as unwarranted
concessions, the appointment of Left figures
in the Cabinet and the release of high-value
political prisoners and key time CPP-NPA
leaders Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Tiamzon.
The military only had to wait for the right
opportunity to retake the upper hand.
54 Presidential Proclamation 360, s. November 23, 2017.
55 Rappler, ‘The Duterte administration led a petition seeking to declare the CPP-NPA ‘terrorist’
organisations under the Human Security Act,’ (21 February 2018).
56 Aljazeera, ‘Duterte: Shoot female rebels in their genitals’ (12 February 2018).
57 Aljazeera, ‘Rodrigo Duterte oers ‘per head’ bounty for rebels’ (15 February 2018).
The wedge between the Duterte government
and the CPP-NPA started widening as early
as the rst quarter of 2017. By 23 November
2017, after continued armed encounters
between the AFP and the NPA despite mutual
declarations of unilateral ceaseres, President
Duterte formally terminated the peace talks
with the NDF.
54
The Philippine government
has since escalated its labeling of the CPP-
NPA as a ‘communist terrorist group (CTG)’,
a branding used previously by the military but
not by the Duterte-led civilian government,
until the negotiations were terminated.
55
Duterte no longer held back in his escalatory
remarks inciting increased violence, such as
encouraging soldiers to shoot women rebels in
their vaginas,
56
and oering a bounty for each
communist rebel killed.
57
Within a few months,
the government policy quickly shifted from a
strategy of politically-negotiated settlement
and reforms to a strategy of COIN and CT,
primarily through active warfare, lethal force,
and a punitive approach.
It must be noted that alongside the roller coaster
of the peace process, there were three trends
happening in the global and the national arena
that could explain the shifts in perspective,
dynamics and motivations within the Philippine
government: the threat of the Islamic State or
Daesh (IS/ISIL) and the rise of the Preventing or
Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) agenda,
the Marawi Siege of 2017, and the militarization
of the civilian government.
23 |
1. The threat of ISIL/IS and the rise of the
P/CVE agenda
On the global level, IS/ISIL rose to prominence
as it seized large swathes of territory across
Iraq and Syria in 2014, and as a spate of
terror attacks from Paris to Istanbul alarmed
policymakers across the world, counterterrorism
was again catapulted as a top concern for
global policy. Thus emerged a new response to
terror attacks: the P/CVE agenda. P/CVE was
partly a response to the limited success of hard
security “war on terror” tactics.
58
It was designed
to take “proactive actions to counter eorts by
violent ‘extremists’ to radicalize, recruit, and
mobilize followers to violence and to address
specic factors that facilitate violent ‘extremist’
recruitment and radicalization to violence.”
59
58 Abu-Nimer Mohammed, ‘Alternative Approaches to Transforming Violent Extremism. The Case of Islamic Peace, and
Interreligious Peacebuilding’, in B Austin and H J Giessmann (eds.), Transformative Approaches to Violent Extremism.
Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 13 (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2018), pp 1–20; Larry Attree, ‘Shouldn’t YOU
be Countering Violent Extremism?’, Saferworld (March 2017).
59 United States Department for Homeland Security, ‘What is CVE?’ Accessed 12 July 2022.
60 US White House Oce of the Press Secretary (2015), ‘Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent
Extremism February 19, 2015’. Accessed 12 July 2022.
61 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Report of the Secretary-General’,
A/70/674, (24 December 2015).
62 Arugay, A, Batac, M & Street, J (2021), p. 16.
63 Naz Modirzadeh, ‘If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse: A Critique of the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent
Violent Extremism’, Lawfare (23 January 2016).
In 2015, the Obama administration held a
“Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Summit”
to mobilize global support for this approach
60
,
while the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon
issued a UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent
Extremism.
61
These became the basis for the
roll-out of national action plans around the
world, including in the Philippines, “with UN
agencies playing a central role supporting [and
funding] national governments to produce these
strategies.”
62
For those who rallied behind the
P/CVE agenda, it was promised to be a positive
move away from a security-focused to a more
preventative approach. Critical security scholars
and peacebuilders were not convinced and
warned that similar to the Global War on Terror
post-9/11, the P/CVE agenda could further
enable authoritarian regimes to “subsume
other legitimate interests under the banner
of suppressing ‘violent extremism’.”
63
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
View of ground zero of Marawi taken on August 21, 2019.
24 |
However, there was growing concern and
posturing that the collapse of the territorial
caliphate of IS/ISIL in Iraq and Syria would push
the group’s activities elsewhere to seek new
territory in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines.
64
This became the
jump-o point for massive capacity-building
assistance, technical support and equipment
to Southeast Asia, and soon P/CVE was the
catchphrase and programming lens across the
region. On the regional level, as early as 2015,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) either adopted or supported various
joint statements signifying a renewed attention
to terrorism and violent extremism, and support
for CVE.
65
In the Philippines, the government,
especially the AFP and the PNP, received support
on CVE and CT from a variety of governments
66
such as the US
67
, Australia
68
and Japan
69
, and even
international organizations such as the UN
70
and
the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.
71
64 Connor H. Berrier, ‘Southeast Asia: ISIS’s next front’ Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School (2017); Nathaniel
L. Moir, ‘ISIL Radicalization, Recruitment, and Social Media Operations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines,’ PRISM
Volume 7, No 1 (2017), pp. 91-107.
65 ASEAN member-states adopted or supported the Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of the Moderates in April
2015, Kuala Lumpur Declaration in Combating Transnational Crime in September 2015, East Asia Summit Statement on
Countering Violent Extremism in October 2015, Chairman’s Statement of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise
of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in October 2015 and Chairman’s Statement of the 2nd Special AMM on the Rise of
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. In September 2017, ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism and
Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism was adopted. In October 2017, Defense
Ministers across the region released a Joint Statement of Special ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting on Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE), Radicalization and Terrorism.
66 Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston & Gillian S. Oak, ‘U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,’ Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation (2016), p. xiv.
67 U.S. Department of State, “Building a Global Movement to Address Violent Extremism,” fact sheet, September 2015.
Accessed 12 July 2022.
68 Strait Times, “Australia Backs Philippine Campaign Against Terrorism,” (19 March 2018).
69 U.S. Department of State (2015).
70 Arugay A, Batac M & Street J (2021), p. 16.
71 U.S. Department of State (2018).
72 GMA News Online, ‘AFP Adopts New Security Plan Under Duterte’ (6 January 2017).
73 Ashley L. Rhoades & Todd C. Helmus, ‘Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: A Snapshot of Current Challenges
and Responses.’ Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020.
74 Japan Times. ‘Philippines adopts strategy against violent extremism’ (21 July 2019).
75 Aljazeera, ‘Mindanao: Churchgoers ‘taken hostage’ amid Marawi siege,’ (24 May 2017).
76 New York Times, ‘Duterte Says Martial Law in Southern Philippines Will End This Month,’ (December 10, 2019);
Al Jazeera, ‘Philippines’ Duterte to Lift Martial Law by Year’s End,’ (10 December 2020).
77 Georgi Engelbrecht, ‘Resilient Militancy in the Southern Philippines,’ International Crisis Group (17 September 2020).
78 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 98% of residents were displaced at the height of the siege.
‘International Agency Update,’ UNHCR (October 2017).
As announced in January 2017, the AFP’s top
priority was the eradication of any terrorist group
operating within the Philippines.
72
Simultaneously,
the Philippine government endeavored to increase
the role and improve the capabilities of the PNP
in CT and CVE eorts.
73
The Philippines began
developing its National Action Plan on P/CVE
(NAP P/CVE) in July 2017 and adopted it in mid-
2019
74
, making it the rst country in Asia to do so.
2. The Marawi Siege
The second parallel event was the rise of terror-
related violence in Mindanao. On 23 May 2017, the
city of Marawi, the country’s only Muslim-majority
city, was the scene of the most prominent CT
campaign in the country’s history when the AFP
raided a suspected hideout of the Abu Sayyaf Group
leader Isnilon Hapilon in Marawi City. In response,
Hapilon sought reinforcements from members of the
armed Maute Group that had pledged allegiance
to the ISIL, leading to sporadic reghts with the
military in various parts of the city.
75
Later that day,
President Duterte declared Martial Law throughout
Mindanao, and did not lift it until 31 December
2019.
76
The military proceeded to air bomb the city
to flush out the rebels. The battle for Marawi lasted
ve months until the city was declared liberated
in October 2017.
77
Six years after its destruction,
many Marawi residents remain displaced.
78
25 |
The Marawi Siege was used as justication for
taking a tougher stance against violent groups,
or for bringing terrorism back as a primary
security agenda. It also contributed to the belief
that the Philippines is the second frontier of IS/
ISIL’s global jihad and provided an opportunity
for the government to step on the gas of CT
in the country. Coincidentally, the process of
developing the NAP P/CVE began at around
the time of the Marawi siege.
79
3. Militarization of the Civilian Government
At the start of his administration, President
Duterte was dead set on wooing the military,
immediately doing the rounds of 14 military
camps in less than a month, promising to
strengthen the armed forces and increase
the soldiers’ salaries and benets.
80
Although there were issues where the President
and sections of the security sector did not see
eye-to-eye, like the initial peace talks with the
CPP-NPA and his non-confrontational stance on
the maritime conflict with China, Duterte knew he
had to secure the support of the armed forces to
ensure the stability and survival of his government.
81
At one point, he expressed his fear of a military
coup
82
, which could explain the change in his
stance on the CPP-NPA. As fractures appeared
in the initial relationship between Duterte and the
Left, ex-generals were appointed to top cabinet
posts replacing Left-leaning ocials.
83
79 Arugay A, Batac M & Street J, (2021), p. 16.
80 Rappler, ‘Why has Duterte visited 14 military camps in less than a month?’ (20 August 2016).
81 GMA News, ‘Duterte and the Left: A BROKEN RELATIONSHIP,’ (27 December 2020).
82 Aljazeera, ‘‘Kill them’: Duterte wants to ‘nish o’ communist rebels,’ (6 March 2021).
83 GMA News, ‘Duterte and the Left: A BROKEN RELATIONSHIP,’ (27 December 2020).
84 Aries Arugay, ‘The Generals’ Gambit: The Military and Democratic Erosion in Duterte’s Philippines,’ Heinrich Böll Stiftung
Southeast Asia (18 February 2021).
85 DBM, ‘President Duterte fullls campaign promise, doubles salaries of cops, soldiers,’ created 10 January 2018, last
updated 11 January 2018.
86 PNA, ‘Strong support for AFP, one of Duterte’s legacies,’ (19 July 2021).
87 Inquirer, ‘Duterte hires 59 former AFP, PNP men to Cabinet, agencies’ (27 June 2021).
88 ABS-CBN News, ‘Duterte’s Generals: Revolving doors and how they lead military men back to government,’ (5 February 2021).
89 The General in-charge of the Marawi Siege was appointed its Secretary when he retired.
90 Rappler, ‘Duterte to appoint AFP chief Galvez as OPAPP chief,’ (5 December 2018).
91 Sunstar, ‘Militarization? Correct, says Duterte’ (1 November 2018).
Arugay argues that “no president in the country’s
post-martial law history has favored the military
[more] than Duterte.”
84
In 2018, realizing his earlier
promise, President Duterte doubled the salaries
of military and police ocers.
85
By the end of
the Duterte administration, new equipment and
facilities under the AFP Modernization Program
(that was started by previous administrations
but delivered under Duterte) amounted to around
PhP125 billion in appropriated funds.
86
By 2017,
Duterte had the most number of retired generals in
any presidential Cabinet in the post-dictatorship
period, with 59 former military and police generals
leading various civilian agencies.
87
He appointed
generals to head department portfolios that
deal not only with national defense but also
civilian concerns
88
such as interior and local
government, information and communications,
the environment, social welfare and development,
89
housing, and indigenous people’s (IP) concerns.
He even appointed an outgoing AFP Chief of
Sta to lead the agency in charge of the peace
processes,
90
signaling his dependence on the
military to accomplish the country’s peace
and security goals. By 2017, the military and
intelligence actors had gained the upper hand in
the Cabinet and had the ears of President Duterte.
In October 2018, he defended the appointment of
former military ocers in civilian positions saying
that they are more ecient and always follow
his orders, even admitting to the “militarization”
of the government.
91
26 |
This dependence on former-military generals and
the armed forces created an imbalance in civil-
military relations, enabling the shift to securitized
military-rst policies and violence on a number
of fronts. The COIN-CT approach to the ongoing
internal conflicts is but another phase of the
militarist and macho rhetoric already apparent
since the beginning of the Duterte administration,
which the country rst witnessed in his bloody
“War on Drugs” that led to thousands of
extrajudicial executions across the country.
92
92 Mark R. Thompson, ‘Bloodied democracy: Duterte and the death of liberal reformism in the Philippines’, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Aairs (2016) 35(3), pp. 39–68.
This dependence on former-
military generals and the
armed forces created an
imbalance in civil-military
relations, enabling the
shift to securitized military
rst policies and violence
on a number of fronts.
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Members of the Philippine National Police force their way inside an abandoned
house in search of loose rearms and ammunition in Marawi on June 7, 2017.
27 |
IV. Resetting
Counterinsurgency
as Counterterrorism, and
the Confluence of Interests
As we trace the development of the peace
process, COIN and CT across dierent
administrations, especially the Arroyo and
Duterte administrations, it becomes apparent
that CT is not merely a reaction to terrorism,
but that its motivations (or convergence of
motivations among dierent actors) preceded
the latter.
93
In the Philippines, the longstanding
COIN strategy was reset as a CT approach.
Additionally, CT did not only revive, it bolstered
COIN. Jetschke argued that a key opportunity
it presented for national actors was to reframe
old ”enemies” such as the Moro and communist
“insurgents” as “terrorists”, thereby acquiring
both political capital and material resources to
achieve decisive military victory over them.
94
While Lamchek added that this reframing of
insurgents as terrorists prevented further scrutiny
of the causes and dynamics of the conflicts, it
also resulted in violations of human rights and
the denial of freedoms that were perceived
as mere unfortunate excesses or mistakes in
policy implementation by a few bad apples in
government, rather than a systematic and logical
eect of the government’s own policies (on
internal conflicts and political contestation).
95
93 Lamchek (2018), p. 55.
94 Jetschke (2011), pp. 232-233.
95 Lamchek (2018), p. 56.
96 Ibid, p.55.
In sum, the country’s CT agenda/framework
evolved as a response to the political realities,
material benets and opportunities oered by the
post-9/11 Global War on Terror and its subsequent
permutations, including the P/CVE agenda.
96
There were, of course, particular focal
motivations among dierent actors. The
Philippines’ strategic partners and Western
governments believed Southeast Asia and the
Philippines would become the second front
of global jihad. While the heads of the civilian
government, Macapagal-Arroyo and Duterte,
saw an opportunity to form closer relations
with the armed forces, in order to ensure the
eciency and stability of their administrations.
On the other hand, military and intelligence actors
saw the realities, benets and opportunities
to boost moral justication, political capital,
and material and technical resources to gain
the strategic upper hand against its old foes,
particularly the CNN.
In the end, in both Macapagal-Arroyo and
Duterte administrations, the confluence of
interests and opportunities brought by global
and national events and actors enabled the
resurgence and application of CT to COIN,
and in turn facilitated the direct and systematic
attack on dissenting groups, civil society, and
civic space, in general.
28 |
An important note, however, is that while in
this section we attempted to look into the
assumed rational logic and material interests
of policy actors, there is another area of
inquiry that may be needed beyond this
research to complete the mapping of the web
of motivations and factors. On an abstract
level, we need to nd the right balance or link
between, on the one hand, assuming rationality
that the behavior of policy actors is directly
the product of a set of interests or logical
reasoning, and on the other, psychologism,
that individuals are not usually fully aware of
their interests and intentions but are subject
to groupthink and institutional bias.
Further inquiry is needed into how leadership
sets the tone of, influences, and shapes
organizational thinking and behavior, and
how groupthink within the security sector
shapes an encompassing paranoia that feeds
the irrational belief that all forms of dissent
and resistance are part of the communist
conspiracy, leading to harmful effects to
rights and civic space.
Further inquiry is needed
into how leadership sets
the tone of, influences,
and shapes organizational
thinking and behavior,
and how groupthink within
the security sector shapes
an encompassing paranoia
that feeds the irrational
belief that all forms of
dissent and resistance
are part of the communist
conspiracy, leading to
harmful eects to rights
and civic space.
97 Amnesty International, ‘Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process,’ (15 August 2006); Karapatan,
‘Submission to the Universal Periodic Review,’ (May 2012); Karapatan, ‘Alternative Report on the Philippines for the 27th
Session of the Universal Periodic Review in the United Nations Human Rights Council,’ (May 2017); UN Human Rights
Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston,’ 18 June 2010;
29 April 2009; 15 March 2007; 12 March 2007; 27 March 2006; 17 March 2005. Accessed 17 July 2022.
V. Impact of
Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism on Human
Rights and Civic Space
Across dierent administrations, the
counterinsurgency reset as counterterrorism
has been used to delegitimize, harass, and
repress a wide range of sectors suspected
to be supporters and sympathizers of the
CPP-NPA, or perceived as the civilian base or
“front organizations” of the communist rebels.
Reminiscent of McCarthyism in the United States
in the 1950s, the Philippines is again undergoing
a Red Scare that has resulted in a slew of
extrajudicial killings of activists, militarized rural
and indigenous communities, a censored press,
and restricted space for dissent and political
participation. Repression begins with so-called
“red-tagging” or “red-baiting,” the seemingly
innocuous and often unfounded accusations of
one’s alleged links to the CPP-NPA. This rhetoric
has come side-by-side with increased violence
in the country. In the last two decades, local and
international human rights organizations have
documented thousands of cases of extrajudicial
executions, including state-sanctioned and
death squad-style killings of activists, forced
disappearances, illegal detention, gender-based
violence, and torture.
97
29 |
The Duterte administration, in particular, saw
the rise of repression and violence. Rights group
Karapatan documented 2,758 activists and
grassroots organizers arrested, with 1,126 of
these detained, while 414 were killed between
July 2016 and June 2021.
98
The UN Human Rights
Oce has documented at least 248 human
rights defenders, legal professionals, journalists
and trade unionists killed between 2015 and
2019 in relation to their work.
99
According to the
National Union of Journalists of the Philippines, at
least 22 journalists were killed during the Duterte
administration.
100
Moreover, peace consultants
of the NDF, the ocial representatives of the
CPP-NPA to the talks, were targeted and killed.
In August 2020, Randall Echanis became the
fourth NDF political consultant killed,
101
following
the killings of Sotero Llamas,
102
Randy Malayao
and Julius Giron. This trend of politically-
motivated killings is on top of the thousands
of civilians killed under the War on Drugs.
103
98 Karapatan, ‘Karapatan Monitor May-Aug 2021’ (13 November 2021).
99 OHCHR, ‘Philippines: UN report details widespread human rights violations and persistent impunity’ (4 June 2020).
100 Newsweek, ‘22 Journalists Killed in Philippines Since Rodrigo Duterte Became President,’ (9 December 2021).
101 Inquirer, ‘NDFP’s Echanis tortured to death, says CHR,, (21 August 2020).
102 While Sotero Llamas was not killed during the current administration, his death is still part of a wider trend of killings of former
peace consultants of the NDF, which ocially represents the CPP and NPA in the formal talks with the Philippine government.
103 Rappler, ‘Six years of blood and violence: People we lost under Duterte,’ (24 June 2022).
104 Dr. Nymia P. Simbulan, ‘Red Baiting: A Tool of Repression, Then and Now,’ Observer: A Journal on Threatened Human Rights
Defenders in the Philippines (December 2011), Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 12-15.
105 Justice Marvic Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, Zarate v. Aquino III, GR No. 220028 (10 November 2015).
106 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Preliminary Note on the Visit of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions to the Philippines, Philip Alston’ (12-21 February 2007), par. 8, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/4/20/Add.3 (22 March
2007). Accessed 12 July 2022.
A. Red-tagging, Enforced
Disappearances and Extrajudicial
Killings Across Administrations
1. What is red-tagging and why is it dangerous?
In his dissenting opinion in Zarate vs. Aquino III,
Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic Leonen
cited Dr. Nymia Simbulan
104
who dened red-
baiting as the “act of labelling, branding, naming
and accusing individuals and/or organizations of
being left-leaning, subversives, communists or
terrorists (used as) a strategy … by State agents,
particularly law enforcement agencies and the
military, against those perceived to be ‘threats’ or
‘enemies of the State’,” whereby “[t]hese groups
are stereotyped or caricatured by the military as
communist groups, making them easy targets of
government military or paramilitary units.”
105
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions Philip Alston
described red-tagging as: “‘vilication’,
‘labelling’, or guilt by association. It involves the
characterization of most groups on the left of
the political spectrum as ‘front organizations’ for
armed groups whose aim is to destroy democracy.
The result is that a wide range of groups –
including human rights advocates, labor union
organizers, journalists, teachers’ unions, women’s
groups, indigenous organizations, religious groups,
student groups, agrarian reform advocates,
and others – are classied as ‘fronts’ and then
as ‘enemies of the State’ that are accordingly
considered to be legitimate targets.”
106
30 |
In June 2020, United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, posited
that red-tagging “may have incited violence
and may have had the eect of encouraging,
backing or even ordering human rights violations
with impunity” and “has been a persistent and
powerful threat to civil society and freedom
of expression” in the Philippines.
107
On numerous occasions, the Duterte administration
and high-ranking government ocials have
made unsubstantiated allegations about the links
between the CPP-NPA and various human rights
and humanitarian organizations,
108
the political
opposition.
109
Current and former government
ocials and security forces have also red-tagged
journalists
110
and independent media outlets,
111
community pantry organizers,
112
and LGBTQI
activists.
113
There are also incidents where unknown
assailants vandalized and red-tagged bookstores
and publishers.
114
In March 2018, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) led a petition before the courts
seeking to declare 648 people with the CPP-NPA,
including the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz,
115
before admitting that the “[DoJ] itself did not have
any personal verication of any connection by
these individuals with the CPP-NPA” and that the
names and aliases came from raw data provided
by the intelligence units of the AFP and the PNP.
116
107 Michelle Bachelet, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights
in the Philippines,’ A/HRC/44/22 (4 June 2020). Accessed 12 July 2022.
108 Philstar, ‘‘We are a humanitarian organization,’ Oxfam stresses after AFP labels them terrorist front,’ (6 November 2019);
Rappler, ‘In House brieng, AFP, DND accuse Gabriela of being ‘communist front’,’ (6 November 2019).
109 Interaksyon, ‘For the nth time: Duterte claims opposition, Liberal party, communists planning to oust him,’ (12 September 2018).
110 Rappler, ‘Tacloban journalist Frenchie Mae Cumpio still hopeful a year after arrest’ (9 February 2021); Inquirer, ‘Cops
behind red-tagging of Baguio journalist – CHR,’ (13 April 2022).
111 Philstar, ‘Journalists demand Parlade apology for threat to reporter over story he disputes,’ (4 February 2022).
112 Philstar, ‘PNP apologizes for community pantry red-tagging,’ (20 May 2021); Rappler, ‘Red-tagging of community pantry
sparks uproar online,’ (20 April 2021).
113 Manila Bulletin, ‘CHR takes up cudgels for LGBTQI leader ‘red-tagged as CPP member’ in Iloilo City,’ (28 October 2022).
114 Manila Times, ‘Red-tagging publishers and bookstores,’ Editorial (17 May 2022).
115 Reuters, ‘Worried for safety, says U.N. special rapporteur on Philippine “hit list”,’ (10 March 2018).
116 Rappler, ‘DOJ didn’t verify before seeking terrorist tag for 649 people,’ (6 August 2018).
117 GMA News Online, ‘Parade says top universities among 18 schools NPA recruitment is taking place,’ (23 January 2021).
118 Inquirer, ‘Elago les raps vs NTF-ELCAC top brass at Ombudsman,’ (7 December 2020).
119 CNN Philippines, ‘Government not engaged in red-tagging but ‘truth-tagging,’ says OSG,’ 4 May 2021.
120 ABS-CBN News, ‘Guevarra on NTF-ELCAC red-tagging: ‘Don’t just label, le legal action if you have evidence,’ (15 June 2022).
121 Rappler, ‘New war: How the propaganda network shifted from targeting ‘addicts’ to activists,’ (3 October 2022).
Under Duterte and up to the present Marcos Jr.
regime, the NTF-ELCAC has been the vanguard
of red-tagging, public vilication and counter-
propaganda against the CPP-NPA, as well as
activists, journalists and government critics.
On several occasions, the NTF-ELCAC has
tagged schools and colleges as hotspots for
communist recruitment,
117
raising fears of a
crackdown on universities and student activists.
Its top ocials currently face administrative
complaints,
118
but they argue that they are merely
“truth-tagging.”
119
Yet, even the DoJ Secretary
has challenged the NTF-ELCAC to le legal
action if they have evidence.
120
2. Online Disinformation and
Propaganda Network
In its October 2018 investigative report,
independent media Rappler found that the
government’s counter-insurgency campaign
was complemented by intensied information
operations, and that the focus of the
propaganda network shifted from targeting
‘drug pushers and addicts’ to “branding activists
as “terrorists” and exaggerating the communist
threat.”
121
They reported notable increase in
online red-tagging posts starting the end of 2017
around the termination of the peace talks and in
2018 around the release of the DoJ’s list of 648
individuals allegedly linked to the CPP-NPA and
the formation of the NTF-ELCAC under EO 70,
and identied the “biggest surge” in 2020 during
the deliberation and eventual passage of the ATA.
31 |
Moreover, their analysis of clusters of online posts
revealed that “at center of the campaign” are
content from the ocial Facebook pages of NTF-
ELCAC, other state media like the Philippine News
Agency (PNA) and Peoples Television Network
(PTV), conservative and pro-administration SMNI
News, and ocial military channels like the AFP’s
Civil Relations Service, and that these narratives
are “seeded through a mix of old and new bloggers
and “alternative” news sources, with dierent
clusters focused on either funneling to the general
public (through hyperlocal and political pages),
or niche but engaged communities (e.g., military,
police, and their supporters), which become
vectors for distribution.”
122
While in a study released January 2023, Internews
researchers documented cases of online red-
tagging under Duterte, tracing how these resulted
in oline harms to the life and liberty of activists,
journalists and other civil society actors. The
researchers pointed out that by allowing red-
tagging to “fall between the cracks of platform
content policies, without being classied as
harassment or hate speech” and argued that
“[b]y allowing the practice to continue largely
unchecked, online platform companies, including
Meta, have signicantly contributed to an
enabling environment for violence, reinforced
the lack of public accountability of government
institutions, and ultimately led to the killing of
red-tagged people.”
123
3. How is red-tagging linked to EJKs
and summary killings?
Ultimately, red-tagging is a tool widely and
consistently used to smear, discredit, and
incite violence and hate, particularly against
those from the ranks of progressive groups and
critics of the sitting government. Extrajudicial,
summary and arbitrary executions arise from
the government’s COIN-CT campaign targeting
above-ground legal organizations and activists.
The labeling could mean one’s death sentence.
122 Ibid.
123 Internews, ‘Meta’s Amplication of Persecution: Red-Tagging in the Philippines,’ (January 2023).
124 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Final warning: death threats and killings of human rights defenders - Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor,’ (24 December 2020), A/HRC/46/25, p.11.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights Defenders Mary Lawlor stated in
her December 2020 report that “being ‘tagged’ as
‘red’, or communist”, is “one example of context-
specic death threats,” and that “some defenders
who have been so tagged have been murdered.”
124
Public vilication and disinformation usually
precede and lay the groundwork for actual attacks
against the intended targets. Generally, these
attacks take the form of harassment (surveillance,
threats, arbitrary arrest and detention,
conscation of properties, and other human
rights violations), criminal prosecution based on
fabricated evidence, enforced disappearances,
summary executions, and other forms of state-
sanctioned violence. With the Anti-Terrorism Act
(ATA) of 2020 and the subsequent designation
of the CPP-NPA-NDF as terrorist organizations,
the government and its security forces have a
legal cover to frame activists and the Left as
sympathizers and supporters of “terrorists”. This
manufactured narrative has made the prevention
of human rights violations and access to legal and
other remedies all the more dicult.
The clear link between red-tagging, on one hand,
and harm to life and limb, on the other, cannot
be denied.
Ultimately, red-tagging is a
tool widely and consistently
used to smear, discredit,
and incite violence and
hate, particularly against
those from the ranks of
progressive groups and critics
of the sitting government.
…The labelling could mean
one’s death sentence.
32 |
First, the correlation across dierent
administrations demonstrates that individuals,
sectors and communities that are red-tagged
soon become subjects of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances. After 2001 and
following the adoption by the Arroyo government
of CT rhetoric in its COIN campaign, a wave of
extrajudicial killings targeting left-wing activists
swept the country. The Duterte government’s
own War on Drugs and COIN-CT campaign
bears a huge resemblance to this era.
In April 2008, then UN Special Rapporteur Philip
Alston issued a report on extrajudicial killings
in the Philippines over a period of ve years,
recording over 800 cases of killings of members
of mass-based organizations, workers’ unions,
peasant organizations, and Left-oriented
groups.
125
Alston found that unarmed civilians
engaged in parliamentary struggle or open
democratic politics were evidently “carefully
selected and intentionally targeted” and that
“[t]he aim has been to intimidate a much larger
number of civil society actors, many of whom
have, as a result, been placed on notice that
the same fate awaits them if they continue
their activism.”
126
During the Arroyo administration, human rights
organization Karapatan documented 1,188
killings of human rights defenders and 205
enforced disappearances from 21 January 2001
to 31 December 2009.
127
Under the Aquino III
presidency, it documented 307 extrajudicial
killings of human rights defenders and 30
enforced disappearances from July 2010 to
December 2015
128
. Under Duterte, Karapatan
documented 427 extrajudicial killings of human
rights defenders, at least 537 cases of frustrated
killings, and 19 enforced disappearances from
July 2016 to December 2021.
129
125 UN Human Rights Council (16 April 2008), A/HRC/8/3/Add.2.
126 Ibid, p. 6.
127 Karapatan, ‘2009 Year-end Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines,’ (2009).
128 Karapatan, ‘2015 Year-end Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines,’ (2015).
129 Karapatan, ‘2021 Year-end Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines,’ (2021).
130 Arugay A, Batac M & Street J, (2021), p. 24.
131 Inquirer, ‘‘Undas’ 2021: Red-tagging as death warrant,’ (2 November 2021).
132 Nicole-Anne C. Lagrimas, ‘Tagged, You’re Dead,’ GMA News Online (13 October 2020).
133 Senate Bill No. 212 -, Proposed Bill Dening the Crime of Red-Tagging, led 24 March 2021. Accessed 5 October 2022.
Under Duterte, human rights defenders,
journalists, labor and peasant group members,
indigenous peoples, environmental and IP rights
activists, lawyers, doctors and priests received
death threats, were summarily killed, or died
in police operations, after being red-tagged
by the government for their alleged communist
sympathies.
130
Some of the persons who were
red-tagged and became victims of extrajudicial
killing or attempted killing were Glenn Ramos,
Alberto Tecson, Obello Bay-ao Atty. Benjamin
Ramos, Bernardino Patigas, Atty. Angelo
Karlo Guillen, Zara Alvarez, and Dr. Mary Rose
Sancelan.
131
Zara Alvarez was included in a
list of over 600 individuals the DoJ had earlier
wanted the courts to declare as terrorists, and
was included in a tarpaulin the police put up
bearing the faces of around 60 individuals who
are alleged “communist personalities”.
132
Dr.
Sancelan was the 6th person to be killed in
a hit list of 15 people who were alleged CPP
members in Negros Occidental.
133
33 |
Second, there are noticeable similarities in the
tactics employed in the use of red-tagging and
extrajudicial killings under COIN-CT campaigns
across administrations. These include the
policing and harassment of communities through
so-called “NPA/terrorist lists”, direct and indirect
threats to activists and organizers preceding
their deaths, the use of anonymous assailants or
death squads that result in ocial deniability, and
the usual excuse of the police or military ocers
when deaths occur in their operations that the
victims fought back (“nanlaban”) or were NPA
combatants killed in the crossre.
One key tool is an “order of battle,” a military
intelligence document that lists individuals
believed to be NPA ghters, and the local
organizations and individual members believed
to be actively supporting rebels as ‘fronts’ of the
CPP–NPA, to be targeted for “neutralisation.”
134
In their research, the Initiatives for International
Dialogue (IID) and Saferworld found that these
continue to happen across administrations.
An IP organizer shared that several times, from
the Arroyo and Aquino III administrations to
the Duterte administration, he was included in
a so-called “NPA/terrorist list” posted in their
community and was summoned by the military
135
along with other young community organizers.
134 UN Human Rights Council (2008), A/HRC/8/3/Add.2.
135 See Arugay, A, Batac, M & Street, J, (2021), p. 33.
136 Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation, ‘Facts to Action: Report on the Attacks against Filipino Lawyers and Judges’
(2006), p. 23; Human Rights Now, ‘Report on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances in the Philippines’ (2008),
pp. 22–23.
137 Lamchek (2018), p. 64.
138 UN Human Rights Council (2020), A/HRC/46/25, p. 12.
139 Rappler, ‘Human rights activist shot dead in Bacolod City’ (17 August 2020).
140 Aljazeera, ‘Human rights leader killed in Philippine ‘war against dissent’’(19 August 2020).
Another similarity is that those who were killed
had earlier received threats, whether direct
messages or symbolic actions or gestures,
as a warning to stop working for their legal
organizations or pursuing their activities or
risk losing their lives.
136
During the Arroyo
administration, they received threats “through
cellphone messages and calls, letters and
parcels (for example, flowers for a funeral), or by
being stalked by anonymous motorcycle-riding
men.”
137
Under the Duterte administration, those
killed received symbolic threats such as a bullet
left on the dining room table in their home; a
con delivered to the oce of an NGO; edited
pictures posted on Twitter, showing them being
attacked with axes or knives; and an animal head
tied to the door of their organization’s oce.
138
Sometimes the threats are direct, such as a
July 2019 anonymous text message containing
a death threat against Zara Alvarez, a staff
member of Karapatan. In August 2020, she
was gunned down on the street in Bacolod
City.
139
She was also one of the more than
600 people the DoJ petitioned the courts to
declare as terrorists in February 2018, and the
13th member of Karapatan killed since Duterte
assumed the presidency.
140
34 |
Another common element is the predominance
of shootings and vigilante killings by anonymous
perpetrators usually “riding in tandem”, even
in broad daylight and in public spaces.
141
Amnesty International reported that under
the Arroyo administration, the “predominant
method of attack [were]… shootings by
unidentied assailants, mostly riding tandem
on a motorcycle, who often obscure their
identity with ‘bonnet’ face masks or helmets…
supported by other men on motorcycles nearby,
or using an unmarked van.”
142
Lamchek points
out that “while the identities of the assailants
are hidden, the act of killing itself often will
be put on display, consistent with the goal
of communicating the message that grim
consequences will attend not ‘surrendering’”.
143
Under Duterte, at times, the body of the
disappeared would turn out days after with
a cardboard sign saying that the deceased
should not be emulated (“Wag tularan!”)
indicating that they are either implicated in
the drug trade
144
or are communists/NPA rebels.
Lamcheck argues that these killings are
part of a concerted eort to instill fear, to
harass, and to weed out legal organizations
and activists from localities that are targets
of COIN-CT operations, by pushing targeted
individuals “to ‘surrender’ or go into hiding”, and
targeted legal organizations “to close shop.”
145
In his 2008 report, Alston found that the
“counterinsurgency focus on civil society leads
to extrajudicial killings and tempts commanders
to make such abuses routine and systematic.”
146
141 Inquirer, ‘Almost 37K crimes involving ‘riding-in-tandem’ hitmen recorded since 2010, says Gordon,’ (5 February 2021).
142 Amnesty International, ‘Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process’ (2006), p. 23.
143 Lamchek (2018), p. 64.
144 Nixcharl C. Noriega and Larah Vinda Del Mundo, ‘Duterte’s drug war killings rise in Year 2 of the pandemic’ Vera Files
(20 January 2022).
145 Lamchek (2019), p. 65.
146 UN Human Rights Council (2008), A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, p. 10.
147 Rappler, ‘‘Nanlaban sila’: Duterte’s war on drugs’ (23 August 2016).
148 Inquirer, ‘‘Nanlaban’ in Cotabato: 3 suspected Reds killed after resisting arrest, say cops,’ (8 February 2021).
Placed in such context, the red-tagging,
harassment and killings of activists, and other
human rights violations discussed in the latter
section, are a component of the government’s
COIN-CT program operations, shaped and
implemented by the armed forces and the
NTF-ELCAC and designed to counter what
is perceived to be the influence and network
of the communist armed movement. Since
government actors, especially the military,
see the conflict with Leftist groups as an
extension of the war with the CPP-NPA,
this leads to the blurring of the distinction
between combatants and civilians.
4. Atmosphere of Impunity
Justice remains elusive for the victims and the
families left behind. In most of these instances
of harassment and killings, the police and the
military continue to deny allegations of soldiers’
involvement, despite evidence to the contrary.
Due to the anonymity of the perpetrators of
extrajudicial killings, government and security
actors are able to deny responsibility and even
point to an internal purge in the communist party
as an alternative theory. This happens even in
cases of supposed legitimate police or military
operations, whether for anti-drug
147
or for
COIN,
148
where, when suspects end up dead,
the ocers use “nanlaban” (they fought back)
as the usual narrative.
35 |
Most of those responsible for the politically-
motivated killings against activists and Left
gures, particularly under Duterte, have not
been brought to justice. Witnesses to cases
under investigation, including their families, are
particularly vulnerable to intimidation, reprisals
and, at times, even death. It is almost impossible
to imagine a fair and swift administration of justice
when lawyers and judges are also targets of red-
tagging and killings, which the Supreme Court itself
has condemned as “no less than an assault on the
judiciary.”
149
In March 2021, it was reported that
local courts in Samar, Northern Luzon, and Central
Luzon separately received letters essentially
requesting “alias warrants”;
150
or for names of
lawyers representing “Communist Terrorist Group
(CTG) personalities” along with the names of
their clients, and “mode of neutralization”.
151
Also in March, a judge was red-tagged through
a tarpaulin with a photo of her face posted along
Metro Manila’s major road after she ruled on the
release of two activists.
152
The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines recorded the killings of 63 lawyers,
judges and prosecutors under Duterte.
153
These incidents must be situated in the overall
environment of impunity in the country, where the
President was a primary source of disinformation
and messages inciting violence and abuses,
ordering law enforcers to “forget about human
rights”
154
and to “kill” and “shoot them dead”;
155
repeatedly encouraged and promised to defend
police and military ocers amid allegations and
evidence of abuse;
156
and refused to cooperate
with and even blocked independent investigations
including by UN Special Rapporteurs
157
and the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
158
149 APNews, ‘Philippine Supreme Court slams killings of lawyers, judges,’ (24 March 2021).
150 Inquirer, ‘PNP digging up archived cases, unserved warrants vs suspected communist rebels,’ (14 March 2021).
151 Amnesty International, ‘Surge in killings of lawyers and judges shows justice system “in deadly danger”’ (26 March 2021).
152 PhilStar, ‘Mandaluyong judge red-tagged after freeing two activists,’ (17 March 2021).
153 Inquirer, ‘Number of lawyers killed since 2016 soared 500% – IBP,’ (27 July 2021).
154 Aljazeera, ‘‘Kill them’: Duterte wants to ‘nish o’ communist rebels,’ (6 March 2021).
155 Inquirer, ‘‘Kill, kill, kill’: Duterte’s words oer evidence in ICC,’ (17 September 2021).
156 PhilStar, ‘Duterte to PNP: Kill 1,000, I’ll protect you,’ (2 July 2016).
157 Reuters, ‘Philippines cancels visit by U.N. rapporteur on extrajudicial killings,’ (14 December 2016).
158 South China Morning Post, ‘Philippines will not cooperate with ICC ‘war on drugs’ probe, Duterte lawyer says,’
(16 September 2021).
159 Philippine News Agency, ‘IPs most vulnerable to CTGs recruitment: ex-NPA cadre,’ (27 May 2021).
160 CNN Philippines, ‘Duterte threatens to bomb Lumad schools,’ (25 July 2017).
161 CNN Philippines, ‘DepEd shuts down 55 lumad schools in Davao’ (13 July 2019).
162 Arugay A, Batac M & Street J (2021), p. 26.
163 Inquirer, ‘Why we must defend ‘lumad’ schools,’ (14 October 2019).
B. Indigenous Peoples and Rural
and Conflict Areas
Indigenous communities are often perceived
by the government and the military as main
targets of NPA recruitment and are targeted
by the military under its low-intensity
conflict strategy.
159
They are often subject to
discrimination and threats, legal harassment and
trumped-up charges, or violence and summary
killings. The rise of COIN and CT approaches
also means increased violence and displacement
in communities located in, believed to be, or
identied NPA areas, that mostly overlap with
the IPs’ ancestral domains.
In February 2017, President Duterte threatened
to bomb indigenous schools in IP territories,
claiming they were operating illegally, without
government permits, and were training grounds
for communist rebels.
160
And in July 2019, the
Department of Education (DepEd) ordered
the closure of 55 IP schools, following the
recommendation and allegations in an NTF-
ELCAC report that such schools are communist
propaganda sites and rebel fronts.
161
Arugay,
et al. argued that this “disenfranchised young
indigenous students whose only access to
education is often through these schools… [and]
threatened the communities’ abilities to preserve
their cultural traditions, something upon which
such schools were founded.”
162
One commentator
remarked, “McCarthyism witch hunt has again
reared its ugly head. [And] the victims are…the
indigenous peoples.”
163
36 |
It, therefore, did not come as a surprise that
the rst case under the new Anti-Terrorism Act
of 2020 was led against two members of the
indigenous Aeta community in Central Luzon,
who alleged that they were tortured by soldiers
for several days to force them to confess
to being members of the NPA.
164
The court
dismissed the charges against the two IPs
as a case of mistaken identity.
This dominant narrative of the need for IPs to
be “saved,” while subjecting them to policing
and to harassment, demonstrates deep-
seated discrimination against IPs. They are not
recognized as autonomous citizens who can,
on their own, perceive and oppose injustice
done to them; instead, NPA ‘front’ organizations
are merely coercing or manipulating them.
This is apparent in the conduct of a February
2021 operation where security forces raided
a temporary school for displaced indigenous
children and detained 26 people, including 19
children, alleging that they were “rescuing”
them from being trained to become “armed
combatants” of the NPA.
165
A social welfare
ocer present during the raid, however,
belied the claim of the police.
166
164 Inquirer, ‘Anti-Terror Law’s rst hit: Two Aetas from Zambales – group,’ (18 November 2020).
165 Inquirer, ‘Police ‘rescue’ lumad kids from priests, educators in top Cebu university,’ (15 February 2021).
166 Philstar, ‘‘Rescued’ Lumad children said they were taught reading and writing, not ‘warfare training’ — Cebu DSWS,’
(16 February 2021).
167 Rappler, ‘Groups seek justice for red-tagged Tumandok IPs killed in police operation,’ (31 December 2020).
168 Philstar, ‘CHR to look into killing of 3 Lumads, including minor, in Surigao del Sur,’ (18 June 2021).
169 Rappler, ‘9 red-tagged IPs killed, 17 others nabbed in police ops on Panay Island,’ (31 December 2020).
170 Inquirer, ‘Key witness in Tumandok killings in Capiz shot dead,’ (2 March 2021).
171 Philstar, ‘Tumandok land defenders’ lawyer stabbed in Ilolilo,’ (4 March 2021).
172 Carolyn O. Arguillas, ‘The IP struggle continues as NCIP red-tags and bans use of “Lumad,” the collective word for
Mindanao IPs since the late 1970s,’ MindaNews (20 March 2021); Dr. Augusto Gatamaytan, ‘ANALYSIS: Notes on the NCIP
resolution on ‘Lumad’,’ MindaNews (25 March 2021).
Moreover, extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary
executions of indigenous peoples and IP rights
activists are also often either preceded by
red-tagging,
167
or are justied by the police as
another case of “nanlaban” (they fought back) or
as NPA rebels who engaged them in a reght.
168
In December 2020, nine indigenous leaders of the
Tumandok community were killed and 17 others
were arrested in simultaneous police operations
in Panay province. The local police said they
were communists and that they fought back.
169
Two months after, in February 2021, unknown
assailants assassinated a witness in the case
170
,
and the following month, masked assailants
stabbed and seriously injured the lawyer of
the Tumandok community leaders.
171
Even the very body formed to advocate for the
respect and promotion of the ways and culture
of IPs is, at times, also a source of intimidation,
discrimination and conflict. In March 2021, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) was called out for contributing to the
red-tagging of indigenous peoples.
172
Notably,
the NCIP’s current Chair is former military Col.
Allen Capuyan, who was previously chief for
operations of the Intelligence Service of the
AFP and former Executive Director of the
NTF-ELCAC.
37 |
C. Other Forms of Repression
The application of CT to COIN also takes the
form of harassment and public vilication of
Left-oriented party list and opposition ocials,
the censorship of books and of independent
and alternative media, and the freezing of bank
accounts and nancial assets of targeted civil
society organizations and individuals.
1. Harassment of Left-leaning party lists and
opposition politicians
In particular, NTF-ELCAC ocials have been
relentless in their propaganda against opposition
party-list politicians, especially from the
national democratic Left. In their social media
posts and media pronouncements, they allege
that the party-list coalition of ve Makabayan
bloc party list, namely Kabataan, Anakpawis,
Bayan Muna, Alliance of Concerned Teachers
and Gabriela, whom they dub as “KABAG”
(stomach pain), is an important element in the
propaganda and recruitment of “communist
terrorists”.
173
Both the NTF-ELCAC and even
President Duterte claimed that the Makabayan
bloc is “made up of high-ranking members of
the CPP-NPA-NDF that are out to destroy the
government”
174
and are “legal fronts” of the CPP-
NPA to “inltrate Congress.”
175
173 PNA, ‘Ex-rebels conrm Makabayan bloc CPP-NPA-NDF operatives,’ (7 February 2022).
174 Philstar, ‘NTF-ELCAC wants Makabayan bloc out of Congress,’ (6 June 2021).
175 Inquirer, Duterte backs Badoy, links Makabayan bloc to communists,’ (30 March 2022).
176 ManilaNews.net, ‘NTF-ELCAC renews call for zero vote vs. left-leaning party-lists,’ (24 March 2022).
177 Rappler, ‘Which party-list groups is NTF-ELCAC trying to get disqualied?,’ (11 September 2021).
178 Inquirer, ‘NTF-Elcac insists Robredo-CPP collusion despite VP’s stand vs violence,’ (13 April 2022).
179 Inquirer, ‘Makabayan party list groups targeted by dirty tricks, again,’ (9 May 2022).
180 Inquirer, ‘Cops proling Makabayan voters – Gabriela,’ (20 June 2022).
181 Rappler, ‘SC justices warn vs red-tagging, hit shallow understanding of ideologies,’ (11 May 2021).
182 Rappler, ‘Esperon orders Parlade, Badoy to stop commenting on community pantries,’ (25 April 2021).
183 Inquirer, ‘Parlade’s social media posts an exercise of freedom of expression – gov’t lawyer,’ (12 May 2021).
184 PhilStar, ‘SC: Petitioners constantly red-tagged alleged ‘credible threat of injury’ vs anti-terror law,’ 16 February 2022).
Leading up to and during the 2022 May
elections, the NTF-ELCAC campaigned against
the ve Left party-lists,
176
ling several cases
before the Commission of Elections (COMELEC)
seeking cancellation of their registration or
their disqualication due to their alleged links
to the communist rebels.
177
They also alleged
connivance of the then sitting Vice President
Leni Robredo with the CPP-NPA in light of the
endorsement of her candidacy for president by
the Makabayan bloc.
178
Posters, newsletters and
SMS blasts from anonymous parties and security
forces discouraging voters from supporting the
Makabayan bloc due to its alleged links to the
CPP-NPA circulated days before the election.
179
More worrisome is that even after the elections,
the police continued conducting community
proling in barangays “with a high number of
votes for the Makabayan bloc.”
180
In the hearings of petitions against the ATA, the
SC Justices chastised government ocials on
the risks of red-tagging and terrorist labeling
without basis and evidence, and quizzed
them for not disowning statements of certain
NTF-ELCAC ocials.
181
While at one point, the
National Security Adviser (NSA) and National
Security Council (NSC) Director-General issued
gag orders on two NTF-ELCAC ocials,
182
there has been no ocial disavowal of their
statements arguing that these are made in
their private capacity in their personal social
media accounts.
183
Ruling on legal standing,
the SC found basis in the petitioners’ fears of
the injury that red-tagging could cause and
that red-tagging could come about from the
implementation of the ATA.
184
38 |
Numerous administrative complaints have
been lodged against former and current NTF-
ELCAC ocials for their accusations that are
“unsupported by credible, competent and
admissible evidence.”
185
These were led not
only by Left-oriented and opposition ocials,
but by doctors, health workers, journalists,
community pantry organizers, human rights
organizations, and ordinary citizens.
186
The brazen red-tagging by government ocials
and their uneven targeting of Left-leaning and
opposition groups demonstrate the malleable
and political nature of terrorist labeling. It also
shows the power that terrorist labeling oers
to legitimize extraordinary acts of harassment
and repression.
2. Censorship and Restrictions to Academic
Freedom and Journalistic Expression
Even history and children’s books about the
Martial Law period were tagged as part of
a communist plot to radicalize the youth.
187
As part of the “whole-of nation approach,”
government agencies, such as the Commission
on Higher Education (CHEd), the Komisyon
sa Wikang Filipino (KWF), and the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) with
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
(NICA), ATC and NTF-ELCAC, took steps to
censor supposed “subversive” books and other
educational materials, for which they were
criticized as attacks on academic freedom
and scholarship.
185 Manila Bulletin, ‘Solcom chief slapped with graft charges,’ (1 July 2020); GMA News Online, ‘Ombudsman orders Esperon,
Badoy, Parlade to answer admin complaint led in 2020,’ (2 July 2022).
186 Rappler, ‘LIST: Complaints led against red-tagger Lorraine Badoy,’ (21 April 2022).
187 PhilStar, ‘Kids’ books about dictatorship, Martial Law spook Philippine intel chief,’ (12 May 2022).
188 Inquirer, ‘CHEd memo on purging of ‘subversive’ books an ‘attack on academic freedom’ – groups,’ (28 October 2021).
In October 2021, a CHEd regional oce issued
a memorandum urging public and private higher
education institutions to remove “subversive”
materials from their libraries and online
information services, and to surrender these
to the NICA. The memorandum described these
materials as “literatures, references, publications,
resources and items that contain pervasive
ideologies of the communist-terrorist groups.”
188
Among the books removed from libraries
were those related to the peace negotiations
between the government and communist rebels,
demonstrating how even the civilian approach
to peace has become a victim of the shift to
a military approach.
The brazen red-tagging by
government ocials and
their uneven targeting of
Left-leaning and opposition
groups demonstrate the
malleable and political
nature of terrorist labeling.
It also shows the power that
terrorist labeling oers to
legitimize extraordinary acts
of harassment and repression.
39 |
Months after, in August 2022, the KWF ordered
the pull-out and stopped the printing of
ve books it deemed to contain “political,
subversive and creative literary works with
subliminal ideologies that encourage to ght
the government (sic),” citing a possible violation
of the provision on incitement to commit to
terrorism in the ATA.
189
The books covered by
the ban include collections of literary works by
renowned writers during the martial law period.
In follow-up statements and interviews, the KWF
commissioners admitted that they “consulted”
with the NICA and NTF-ELCAC, and alleged
that the materials contain “explicit Anti-Marcos
and Anti-Duterte contents” and “subversive
themes” due to citations of the CPP-NPA. The
KWF commissioners also criticized their own
Chairman “for inciting rebellion” in allowing
their publication.
190
The government also tried to censor the
websites of independent media organizations.
Acting on the request of the NSC, the NTC
ordered private independent service providers
(ISPs) to block 26 websites allegedly found
to be “aliated to and are supporting” the
CPP-NPA.
191
In particular, the alternative media
organization PinoyWeekly was tagged by the
outgoing NSA and NSC Director-General, who
alleged that editorials on social ills, reporting
on historical events, and quoting ocial
pronouncements of the CPP-NPA amount
to recruitment and incitement to terrorism.
192
189 CNN Philippines, ‘KWF stops distribution of ‘subversive’ books,’ (12 August 2022).
190 OneNews, ‘Purge of KWF Books Slammed,’ (12 August 2022).
191 OneNews, ‘NTC Blocks 25 ‘Red’ Websites Upon The Request Of Esperon,’ (23 June 2022).
192 Rappler, ‘What does it signal when Esperon goes after news sites before vacating his post?,’ (22 June 2022).
193 CNN Philippines, ‘KWF stops distribution of ‘subversive’ books,’ (12 August 2022).
194 OneNews, ‘Purge of KWF Books Slammed,’ (12 August 2022).
In these cases, state actors have interpreted
and used “incitement to terrorism” beyond
situations where the evidence shows that
the speaker clearly intends to provoke the
audience to commit acts of terror-related
violence. This has resulted in a chilling eect on
academic freedom and journalistic expression
and opened the floodgates to its unrestrained
application to any dissenting or unwanted
speech. Months after, in August 2022, the KWF
ordered the pull-out and stopped the printing
of five books it deemed to contain “political,
subversive and creative literary works with
subliminal ideologies that encourage to
fight the government (sic),” citing a possible
violation of the provision on incitement to
commit to terrorism in the ATA.
193
The books
covered by the ban include collections of
literary works by renowned writers during the
martial law period. In follow-up statements
and interviews, the KWF commissioners
admitted that they “consulted” with the
NICA and NTF-ELCAC, and allegedthat the
materials contain “explicit Anti-Marcos
and Anti-Duterte contents” and “subversive
themes” due to citations of the CPP-NPA. The
KWF commissioners also criticized their own
Chairman “for inciting rebellion” in allowing
their publication.
194
40 |
The government also tried to censor the websites
of independent media organizations. Acting on
the request of the NSC, the NTC ordered private
independent service providers (ISPs) to block 26
websites allegedly found to be “aliated to and
are supporting” the CPP-NPA.
195
In particular, the
alternative media organization PinoyWeekly was
tagged by the outgoing NSA and NSC Director-
General, who alleged that editorials on social
ills, reporting on historical events, and quoting
ocial pronouncements of the CPP-NPA amount
to recruitment and incitement to terrorism.
196
In these cases, state actors have interpreted and
used “incitement to terrorism” beyond situations
where the evidence shows that the speaker
clearly intends to provoke the audience to
commit acts of terror-related violence. This has
resulted in a chilling eect on academic freedom
and journalistic expression and opened the
floodgates to its unrestrained application
to any dissenting or unwanted speech.
3. Financial and NGO Registration Regulations
Another method by which the stifling of dissent
occurs is through abuse of the anti-money
laundering and registration regulations by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and various other government agencies, in
coordination with NICA, the ATC, and the DoJ.
In November 2018, President Duterte’s Executive
Order 68 laid out a new anti-money laundering
and counter-terrorist nancing (AML/CTF)
strategy for the Philippines, requiring the
AMLC to investigate, freeze, and institute civil
forfeiture procedures against “properties or
funds that are in any way related to terrorism
or [terrorist nancing].”
197
195 OneNews, ‘NTC Blocks 25 ‘Red’ Websites Upon The Request Of Esperon,’ (23 June 2022).
196 Rappler, ‘What does it signal when Esperon goes after news sites before vacating his post?,’ (22 June 2022).
197 Anti-Money Laundering Council, “2018 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known
as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as Amended” (November 22, 2018).
198 Rappler, ‘How Duterte gov’t froze assets of religious group as it worked on anti-terror law,’ (19 November 2020).
199 Anti-Money Laundering Council, ‘Notice of AMLC Resolution Nos. TF-40 and 42, series of 2021’ and ‘Notice of AMLC
Resolution Nos. TF-50 and 55, series of 2022,’ accessed 17 July 2022; Rappler, ‘Church group condemns freeze order on
UCCP Haran bank accounts,’ (2 April 2021); Inquirer, ‘Freezing of NDFP consultant’s deposits shows impact of terror law –
Karapatan,’ (9 June 2021); Inquirer, ‘AMLC freezes bank accounts of red-tagged farmers’ group,’ (12 June 2021).
200 Rappler, ‘AMLC begins freezing accounts ‘related’ to National Democratic Front,’ (20 July 2021).
In 2019, even before the passage of the new
ATA, bank accounts of the Catholic Church-
based Rural Missionaries of the Philippines
(RMP) were frozen by the AMLC, ex parte, and
without a direct designation or proscription
of the RMP as a terrorist group.
198
Under the
Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression
Act (Republic Act 10168), the AMLC can freeze
assets ex parte for 20 days and can petition for
an extension with the Court of Appeals (CA).
After the designation of the CPP-NPA and NDF
as terrorist organizations under ATA 2020,
more bank accounts and assets of organizations
and individuals, including a faith-based
humanitarian organization, the NDF peace
consultants, and a peasant group, were tagged
as “related accounts of the CPP-NPA” and
slapped with preemptive freeze orders based
on alleged witness accounts.
199
These did not
go through an independent examination by the
courts or, as in the case of RMP, without notice
or opportunity for the accused to challenge
such testimony.
200
41 |
The transfer of the power to designate
terrorist groups and individuals from the
courts to the ATC, has made it easier to freeze
assets. The designation is done on the ATC’s
own determination with no notifications of
hearings. The principal effect of designation
is to signal the AMLC to issue the preemptive
freezing of bank accounts and assets related
to designated groups and individuals. While
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that designation by the ATC does not
automatically result in the AMLC’s freezing of
assets as determination is still within AMLC’s
authority, in practice, the freezing of assets
has immediately followed the designation.
201
The problem, therefore, lies in the broad and
unchecked powers of the Executive, which
acts as both the judge. through the ATC. and
the executioner, through the AMLC.
202
Parties
aggrieved by the designation and the freeze
may file a petition with the CA to question
both. The burden is therefore shifted to the
accused to move for delisting and for the
lifting of freeze orders. Activists and human
rights defenders and their organizations are
then saddled in these legal and administrative
knots, even without judicial determination and
proscription of their alleged terrorist links.
201 Ibid.
202 The process and power of designation of the ATC is distinct from the power of proscription of the courts, which it does
through a full trial and examination of evidence.
203 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Guidelines for the Protection of SEC Registered Non-Prot Organizations from
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Abuse. Memorandum Circular No. 15 s. 2018.’ (7 November 2018).
204 Andreopoulos G, Macaspac N & Galkin E (2020). See also Manila Bulletin, ‘Makabayan Bloc moves to scrutinize SEC
memorandum on NPOs/NGOs,’ (17 January 2019); Rappler, ‘‘Chilling eect’: Groups slam new SEC guidelines for
nonprots,’ (9 February 2019); FORUM-ASIA, ‘The Philippines: Immediately rescind SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15
(s. 2018),’ (26 February 2019).
205 Asia/Pacic Group on Money Laundering (APG), ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist nancing measures –
Philippines. Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report,’ (October 2019), p. 99.
The mobilization of various departments
for non-government organization (NGO)
regulation expanded under President Duterte.
First, in November 2018, the SEC expanded
the regulation of Non-Profit Organizations
(NPOs), through Memorandum Circular No.
25 (SEC 2018 NPO Guidelines),
203
requiring
NPOs to file detailed disclosures about their
membership, the sources of their funds and
their intended usage. Various groups raised
the alarm on the possible “chilling effect on
civil society organizations, due to the SEC’s
essentially unlimited discretion in determining
what constitutes criteria for blacklisting,
and its unlimited power to compel disclosure
of information from civil society groups
without a court order.”
204
Yet even the Asia/
Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG),
in its Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-
mandated evaluation of the Philippines’ AML/
CTF regime, has questioned the need for an
excessive and untargeted measure, noting that
such requirements “may discourage or disrupt
legitimate NPO activities” and recommended
a review of the said guidelines.
205
42 |
Then in August 2018, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DWSD) required
non-state social welfare and development
agencies to “submit detailed information on
their operations…and to undergo certication
and licensing before they are allowed to
operate.”
206
In 2019, the SEC reported to
the NTF-ELCAC that six NGOs “reportedly
supportive and sympathetic” to the CPP-
NPA had pending revoked or suspended
registrations, and that ve entities that are
“alleged legal front organizations of the CPP-
NPA’” were not registered. Among those red-
tagged by the SEC are some well-established
human rights organizations and known mass-
based organizations.
207
The SEC maintained
that these organizations cannot raise funds
or enter into contracts. In early 2021, the
Department of Foreign Aairs (DFA) informed
all diplomatic missions in the Philippines
to declare foreign government funding for
NGOs “regardless of mode of disbursement,
transfer or download of funds” for appropriate
clearance, purportedly to regulate NGO
funding to prevent financing of terrorism.
208
Then Foreign Aairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin
Jr later claried that “this doesn’t aect legit
[sic] NGOs” since “it is how a responsible
government monitors where money comes
from and goes to in the face of insurgent
and terrorist-secessionist threats.”
209
This narrative of “good/legitimate” versus
“bad/illegitimate” NGOs is one method
through which the government not only
erodes solidarity across civil society but also
restricts and controls civil society spaces.
206 Andreopoulos G, Macaspac N & Galkin E (2020). See also Department of Social Welfare and Development, ‘Revised
Guidelines Governing the Registration, Licensing of Social Welfare and Development (SWD) Agencies and Accreditation
of SWD Programs and Services, Memorandum Circular No. 17 s. 2018,’ (29 August 2018).
207 Some of the organizations were such as Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Karapatan, Concerned
Artists of the Philippines, Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas, Kadamay, the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), Suara Bangsamoro, ANAKPAWIS, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), New Patriotic Alliance, and May First
Movement Labor Center.
208 Department of Foreign Aairs, DFA Note Verbale No. 2021-0592 (5 February 2021).
209 PNA, ‘Directive on foreign funding won’t aect ‘legit NGOs’: Locsin,’ (24 February 2021).
210 Lamchek (2018), p. 280.
4. Harm on Peacebuilding and Humanitarian
Work, and Redening ‘Civic Space’
Often missed and therefore requiring special
mention is the impact of COIN-CT measures on
spaces for feminist and civilian approaches to
security, through peacemaking, peacebuilding
and humanitarian work. The passage of the ATA
2020 paved the way to the formal designation of
the CPP-NPA and the NDFP as terrorist groups.
As Lamchek explains: “Terrorist listing operates
like a taboo. While apparently designed only to
combat the nancing of terrorism, terrorist listing
seriously restricts the possibilities of peacefully
resolving concts through negotiations and, more
generally, of simply listening to ‘terrorists.’”
210
Terrorist listing, and the CT approach in general,
eectively takes out the option of negotiation
and any form of dialogue between government
ocials and armed groups. This labeling does
not only aect the armed rebel movement but
also impedes the ability of peacebuilders and
humanitarian workers to bridge divides or to
provide direly needed aid for conflict-aected
communities. More directly, on civic space,
it causes a chilling eect on civilians and
organizations doing mediation, de-escalation
and reconciliation work and other peacebuilding
approaches, as well as emergency aid response.
43 |
Designation casts doubts among mediators,
community organizers, and even humanitarian
aid workers whether or not, in a highly polarized
context, their actions can be interpreted or
framed as ”incitement to terrorism” or as
“providing aid to terrorists.” Ultimately, it
restricts the environment and conditions for
civilian actors in conflict and fragile contexts,
especially aected local communities and IPs, to
eect desired social justice and political change.
In her report to the 75th General Assembly in
September 2020, the UN Special Rapporteur
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin posed her concerns about
the application and conflation of CT measures in
the context of non-international armed conflicts
involving non-state armed groups, arguing that
often this leads to the “weakening” of rights,
duties and protections under international
humanitarian (IHL) and human rights law
(IHRL).
211
She further denounced the “attacks
on the integrity, independence and operational
capacity of organizations [working in fragile,
conflict and post-conflict settings], whether
directly or indirectly, by States through the prism
of counter-terrorism rhetoric or regulation” and
underscored their critical role in “the protection
of humanity and the dignity of the most
vulnerable and, thus, to conflict resolution.”
212
Taken in this context, the impact of CT is even
deeper, disguised, and therefore more pernicious
than restricting civic space. As dened by Civicus,
civic spaces are those that aect the exercise of
“rights to freedom of association, expression, and
peaceful assembly.”213 On the other hand, the
Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) denes civic space broadly
as “the environment that enables civil society to
play a role in political, economic and social life.” The
Funders Initiative for Civil Society (FICS) denes
it as “the physical, digital, and legal conditions
through which progressive movements and their
allies organize, participate, and create change.”
While these are comprehensive denitions, I would
emphasize that there are fundamental contentions
on what civil society’s role is or should be.
211 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin,’ (3 September 2020), A/75/337, p. 5.
212 Ibid, p. 2.
213 CIVICUS denes civic space as “place, physical, virtual, and legal, where people exercise their rights to freedom
of association, expression, and peaceful assembly.” CIVICUS, ‘Guide to Reporting Civic Space: Media Toolkit,’
p. 4. Accessed 5 October 2022.
Terrorist listing, and the CT
approach in general … impedes
the ability of peacebuilders
and humanitarian workers to
bridge divides or to provide
direly needed aid for conflict-
aected communities. More
directly, on civic space, it
causes a chilling eect on
civilians and organizations
doing mediation, de-escalation
and reconciliation work
and other peacebuilding
approaches, as well as
emergency aid response.
44 |
Given attempts by governing elites to define
and restrict the political participation of
“legitimate’ citizens,”
214
there is value in
appreciating and unpacking these different
strategies through which the governed use this
civic space to participate in political life and
affect their desired change. We need to move
away from simply listing rights and freedoms,
towards appreciating the vast universe of
strategies employed by citizens, movements
and organizations in aecting political change.
I would, therefore, propose an alternative
definition of civic space as the place,
environment or conditions, physical,
virtual, and legal, where citizens, people
and communities can realize their
desired political, economic and social
change, through different but often not
mutually exclusive strategies of reform,
confrontation, mediation and transformation.
Different strategies include constructive
engagement and citizenship; protest and
dissent; peacekeeping, peacemaking and
peacebuilding; and feminist and queer
activism, organizing and care.
214 See literature on civic engagement and political participation, such as Almond and Verba on ‘civic culture’ (1963);
Sherry Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ (1969); and categories of political participation by Opp et al. (1981), Verba
and Nie (1987), Parry et al (1992), Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007), Ekman and Amnå (2012), and Lamprianou (2013),
among others.
I would, therefore, propose
an alternative denition of
civic space as the place,
environment or conditions,
physical, virtual, and legal,
where citizens, people and
communities can realize
their desired political,
economic and social change,
through dierent but often
not mutually exclusive
strategies of reform,
confrontation, mediation
and transformation.
Dierent strategies include
constructive engagement
and citizenship; protest
and dissent; peacekeeping,
peacemaking and
peacebuilding; and feminist
and queer activism,
organizing and care.
45 |
D. The Global Trend of Security Playbook
The use and creep of CT narratives and tools into
other forms of conflict and political violence is not
unique to the Philippines. UN Special Rapporteur
Ní Aoláin identied a “profoundly” worrying
pattern whereby governments increasingly billed
emergency security measures as CT, and under
such guise, applied these to address domestic
strife, to restrict civic space and to crack
down on those engaged in perceived or actual
dissent.
215
She also pointed to how CT and CVE
acceleration gives “the State considerable and
unprecedented access to the home” and enables
“the legal regulation of family life in the name of
national security,” with distinct negative impact
on women and girls.
216
This trend is happening both in authoritarian
regimes or restricted democratic spaces, like the
Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Venezuela and Russia,
and in supposedly more open societies, like Austria,
France, Spain, Belgium, the European Union, and
the United Kingdom.
217
The strategies include the
introduction of overly-broad terminology into CT
legislation, leading to a chilling eect on freedom
of information especially for journalists, and to the
criminalization of legitimate human rights work.
Other eects include enforced disappearances
and arbitrary arrests and detentions, the
adoption of far-reaching surveillance laws and
measures to extensively gather personal data
and other forms of violations of the people’s
right to privacy, and the use of counter-terrorist
nancing laws and policies to crack down on
freedom of association.
218
A global network of
human rights defenders concluded that: “[m]
any of the restrictions to civic space… have been
enabled, and sometimes encouraged, by the
international community’s[including the UN’s,]
stance on counter-terrorism”, and called on the
international community “to take responsibility for
the detrimental eect counter-terrorist policies
have on civil society.”
219
215 UN News, ‘Misuse of terrorism laws during conflict creates ‘unmitigated calamity’ (16 October 2020).
216 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Human rights impact of counter-terrorism and countering (violent) extremism policies and
practices on the rights of women, girls and the family, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism Fionnuala Ní Aoláin,’ (22 January 2021), A/HRC/46/36.
217 Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, ‘UN Member States urged to ensure counter-terrorism policies
do not negatively impact civil society and human rights defenders,’ Open Letter To Permanent Missions of UN Member
States (25 May 2021).
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Larry Attree, Celia McKeon and Konstantin Bärwaldt, ‘‘The International Security Echo-Chamber: Getting Civil Society
Into the Room,’ (31 July 2019).
While there is a growing realization in the
international community and security policy
spaces that external interventions carried out
in the name of security often end up worsening
the conflicts they are supposed to stop or
prevent, many have not changed course to
refocus on addressing root causes, and instead
continue their investments in military and
hard approaches that perpetuate cycles
of violence.
220
46 |
VI. Community Responses,
Forms of Resistance, and
Alternative Narratives
of Security: Beyond
‘Human Rights-Compliant
Counterterrorism’
Within the international human rights movement,
critical scholars have observed that the
dominant response to global trends and policies
on CT tends to focus on a strategy to “synthesize
human rights [law] and counterterrorism”
221
through the messaging and framing of
“countering counterterrorism while respecting
human rights” or “human rights-compliant
counterterrorism.” Meanwhile, the strategies of
national and local advocates, including in the
Philippines, tend to “directly confront the local
terrorism discourse” and not only seek to reform
CT approaches.
222
While recognizing the value
of tactical engagements on IHRL compliance,
Lamchek ultimately calls for the disentanglement
of the human rights advocacy from the
counterterrorism agenda which he deems
is “problematic” in and of itself:
221 Lamchek (2018), p. 275.
222 Ibid, p. 91.
223 Ibid, pp. 275-276.
224 David Kennedy, ‘International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights J,
pp. 101, 108.
225 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006); Mark Goodale and
Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local (CUP 2007);
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance
(CUP 2003).
“[T]he discourse of terrorism… promotes
dichotomous thinking in which terrorism always
emanates from the irrationality of non-state
actors who pose the original threat, while
state counterterrorism is always rational, and
a mere reaction to terrorism. The rhetoric of
counterterrorism is state-arming; it creates
a bias in favour of state action, including the
use of lethal force, against those deemed to
be terrorists, who are always non-state actors.
Attaching a legal and human rights language to
counterterrorism, while aspiring to restrain the
state in its response to terrorists, echoes and
reinforces these dichotomies, identifying the
original threat to human rights with terrorists
and the defence of human rights with state
counterterrorism… [W]e have seen how this
binary is a false one, and how terrorism is
often not a threat but a boon to the state or
traditionally powerful groups. Moreover, the
discourse of terrorism itself can facilitate or
form part of conditions that generate human
rights abuses.
“Counterterrorism rhetoric has exacerbated
conflict situations, and there is much to be gained
in terms of improving respect for human rights by
understanding and addressing conflict situations
using lenses other than terrorism. The vision
of human rights-compliant counterterrorism
serves to obfuscate and disserve human rights
by side-stepping the need radically to question
the discourse of terrorism.”
223
This critique of a human-rights compliant CT
agenda should be understood and situated within
a bigger critique that human rights law has been
perceived to have dominated, displaced or
“crowded out” other languages within the human
rights movement,
224
and the call for developing
meanings of human rights as “resistance
from below.”
225
47 |
A. International Level
In the past years, there has been an increased
shift among various international civil society
organizations to go beyond a human rights-
compliant CT response and to reverse the CT
agenda itself. A number of platforms have
emerged seeking to change dominant global
narratives and policies on CT and rewind the
web of processes and bodies that support and
perpetuate CT and hard security approaches
within international bodies such as the UN. Some
of these organizations are the CSO Coalition
on Human Rights and Counterterrorism,
226
the Security Policy Alternatives Network,
227
and the Global NPO Coalition in FATF.
228
The emerging analysis is that the exponential
and parasitic growth of policy-making,
programming and nancing for CT and CVE
within the UN system, from New York and
Geneva to the national level, has been at the
expense of the eorts in human rights and
peacebuilding.
229
Therefore, there is a need to
confront, expose and transform power structures
and incentives that allow security cooptation
even among civil society actors and supposed
allied government and UN actors. Finally, there
must be a commitment to reclaim how security
policy and narratives are shaped and made,
starting with reimagining, articulating and
showcasing alternatives to hard and militarized
security approaches and drawing from initiatives
and learnings on conflict transformation and
peacebuilding already on the ground.
226 https://charityandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Statement-on-7th-GCTS-CSO-coalition-on-CT-and-
human-rights-30-June-2021.pdf
227 https://www.justsecurity.org/65243/the-international-security-echo-chamber-getting-civil-society-into-the-room/
228 https://fatfplatform.org/about-us/
229 Saferworld, ‘A fourth pillar for the United Nations? The rise of counter-terrorism,’ (June 2020); Saferworld and Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, ‘The rise of counter-terrorism at the United Nations: two decades later,’ (September 2021); Jordan Street,
‘UN Budget vs. Rhetoric: Touting “Agenda for Peace” But Investing in Counterterrorism Instead?,’ Just Security
(1 December 2022).
The challenge remains, however, in surfacing,
documenting and substantiating alternatives
that are beyond piece-meal legal and policy
reforms, and that reflect radical rethinking of
security grounded on evidence and practice.
For this, even the international platforms
look towards national and local movements
and peacebuilding and (human) security
practitioners for guidance and leadership.
B. National Level
On the national level, responses to the
government’s CT approach can be grouped
into three distinct but non-mutually exclusive
strands: legal support, advocacy and reform;
anti-militarization campaigns; and the push for
politically-negotiated settlements with armed
groups and an inclusive peace process. Often,
groups involved in one strategy also share
platforms and participate in campaigns of
the other groups.
48 |
1. Legal Support, Advocacy and Reform
Alternative law groups, local human rights
advocacy groups, and international human
rights organizations
230
have long been involved
either in monitoring violations of rights and
other forms of harassment and abuses related to
COIN and CT, in assisting victims through direct
legal aid, or in broader legal advocacy such as
challenging the legality or constitutionality of
certain charges in or of the anti-terrorism laws
themselves, or raising these issues to the United
Nations, including the Human Rights Council
(HRC)’s Universal Periodic Review and the Global
Counterterrorism Strategy Review. Following
an HRC Resolution, a three-year Philippines-
UN Joint Programme on Human Rights was
established in July 2021 to improve the capacity
of Philippine institutions to protect human
rights.
231
Various human rights organizations have
criticized the HRC for settling on mere technical
cooperation and capacity building instead of
“creating a commission of inquiry to investigate
the thousands of extrajudicial killings,”
232
and
for “allowing the Philippines to… window-dress
its appalling human rights record without any
tangible progress or scrutiny.”
233
230 Some of the groups involved in these are the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal
(SALIGAN), the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL), KARAPATAN, Philippine Alliance for Human Rights Advocates
(PAHRA), Philippine Human Rights Information Center (PhilRights), Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), Medical
Action Group (MAG), Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc., In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDefend),
ALISTO! Citizen’s Monitoring, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), Ateneo Public Interest and Legal Advocacy
(APILA), Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw (BALAOD Mindanaw), Lanao Alliance of
Human Rights Advocates (LAHRA), Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC), and Amnesty International (AI) - Philippines,
among many.
231 See UN Human Rights Council, ‘Technical cooperation and capacity-building for the promotion and protection of human
rights in the Philippines,’ A/HRC/RES/45/33 (7 October 2020); United Nations Philippines, ‘PHL, UN and partners endorse
roadmap to accelerate implementation of human rights joint programme’ (20 December 2021).
232 Human Rights Watch, ‘Philippines: UN Rights Body Fails to Act,’ (5 October 2022).
233 International Service for Human Rights, ‘HRC51: Civil society presents key takeaways from Human Rights Council,’
(7 October 2022).
234 Inquirer, ‘Makabayan reles own version of bill protecting human rights defender,’ (1 August 2022).
235 Rappler, ‘Abante grills PNP, AFP over opposition to human rights defenders bill,’ (29 November 2023); PNA,
‘HR Defenders bill ‘dangerous’: NTF-ELCAC,’ (20 January 2023).
In the 17th and 18th Congress under President
Duterte, a Human Rights Defenders Protection Bill
was rst led to address harassment, summary
killings and enforced disappearances of rights
workers, by establishing a Committee nominated
by right groups and mandated to investigate and
pursue proper action on violations by military
and civilian ocials.
234
The proposed measure
was approved in the third and nal reading in
the Lower House but was not acted upon by the
Senate. It was re-led in the 19th Congress under
President Marcos Jr, but has faced opposition
from the NTF-ELCAC, AFP and PNP.
235
Generally, the local human rights movement has
been tactical in using human rights law to engage
the abuses and harms from CT measures and has
generally gone beyond the “human rights while
countering terrorism” discourse by adopting
broader anti-militarism messages or by being
part of broader networks working on anti-war,
anti-militarism and anti-imperialism advocacies.
49 |
2. Anti-Militarization Campaigns
Rooted in a long history of anti-dictatorship,
anti-militarism and anti-imperialism, the human
rights movement in the Philippines has resisted
the escalation of military operations and sought
to deconstruct and challenge claims of national
security by the government and the armed forces.
Immediately in the post-9/11 period, the local
human rights movement opposed the global CT
agenda and its extension to the Philippines. Some
of the campaigns waged post-9/11 onwards
were mimicked in recent years during the Siege
of Marawi and the passage of the ATA 2020;
the opposition to foreign military bases, joint
military exercises, and the involvement of foreign
troops; fact-nding and exposition of military
abuses, killings and torture of suspects, and of
displacement due to military operations; and
even solidarity with other nations impacted
by militarism or foreign military interventions.
Human rights advocacy groups have joined Left-
oriented political groups as well as anti-war,
peace, feminist and environmental organizations
in these anti-militarism campaigns.
236
Exposing the human rights violations and
massive costs of militarism has helped
strengthen resistance eorts. However, this
approach is not enough to fully rebut the core
argument of the militarist, COIN-CT approach:
that there is ongoing violence or armed conflict,
hence, the necessity to confront or resolve this.
236 Some of the groups involved or new formations closer to this strategy are the broad Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN) alliance, Manggagawa para sa Kalayaan ng Bayan (MAKABAYAN), BISIG-Akbayan, Alliance of Progressive
Labor (APL), SANLAKAS, Partido Lakas ng Masa (PLM), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), Kilusan para sa Pambansang
Demokrasya (KPD), STOP The War Coalition Philippines, Focus on the Global South, Mindanao People’s Peace Movement
(MPPM), KAISA KA, Pambansang Koalisyon ng Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (PKKK), Peace Women Partners, Piglas
Kababaihan, SARILAYA, Woman Health, Women’s Legal Bureau (WLB), Youth for Nationalism and Democracy (YND),
Konsensya Dabaw and the Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW), among many. The groups named in the earlier section
would also generally share the same platforms and join campaigns of these advocacy groups.
237 Some of those long involved in pushing for the peace talks are the CBCP (Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines),
NCCP (National Council of Churches in the Philippines), and the Coalition for Peace. Another major platform is the
Citizens Alliance for Just Peace (CAJP), an alliance of four major peace networks in the country (the Philippine Ecumenical
Peace Platform (PEPP), Pilgrims for Peace, Sulong Peace or formerly Sulong CARHRIHL, and Waging Peace Philippines.
Other groups involved are the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI), the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID),
Generation Peace Youth Network (GenPeace), Peacebuilders Community, Inc, (PBCI), Balay Mindanaw Foundation,
Inc (BMFI), and Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst e.V (forumZFD), Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS), the Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and Conciliation Resources (CR), among others.
238 Center for International Security and Cooperation, ‘Prole: Communist Part of the Philippines - New People’s Army,’
Stanford University-Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Accessed 5 October 2022.
3. Push for an Inclusive
Politically-Negotiated Settlement
The direct response comes from peace
groups advocating for civilian approaches to
resolving the armed conflict.
237
The argument
is that the military approach and war come
not only with immense economic costs and
harm to human rights, it is also ineective and
counterproductive to long-term peace and
security. The alternative being pushed is that
the two parties should nd and build creative
solutions through a process of dialogue and
problem-solving.
Unfortunately, of these three strands of response,
there are not a lot of organizations involved in
peace advocacy and peacebuilding—either
due to the lack of transparency and sucient
space for participation in the formal process,
the complexity of working on peace and
security issues, or the misunderstanding of and
therefore bias against peace advocacy as simply
pacication, and thus not radical enough.
Moreover, the peace process itself has been
faced with perennial challenges, leading to a
dominant belief that it is hopeless. The GRP,
under six presidents starting from Corazon
Aquino to Rodrigo Duterte, and the NDF, formally
representing the CPP-NPA, have been engaged in
protracted, on-and-o negotiations for around
33 years, from 1986 until its latest termination in
2019, to put an end to the world’s longest running
communist armed rebellion which has been going
on for almost 54 years.
238
50 |
Within the government, it does not help that
many of the previous presidents and elected
civilian leaders have been beholden to the
military, which has led to the appointments of
former generals to civilian posts. In the end,
this made the military agenda ascendant in the
government’s analysis and direction, crowding
out other critical voices, broader analysis and
alternative approaches to achieving peace and
security and, in the end, undermining civilian
approaches to the resolution of the conflict.
Engagement towards security sector reform is
perceived as directed towards the rehabilitation
of the image of the armed forces, rather than a
sincere overhaul of the broken civilian-military
relations, especially eective civilian oversight.
Meanwhile civil society groups engaged with
the military are often seen as being co-opted
into apologizing for or are unwittingly used for
window-dressing of the armed forces, rather
than critically pushing the envelope on
needed reforms.
239 Soliman M. Santos Jr., ‘Rethinking and renewing the GRP-NDFP peace talks in 2022,’ Rappler (22 March 2022).
240 Maria Karina Africa Bolasco, ‘The GRP-NDFP Peace Talks: Tactical Discontinuities in a Shared Narrative,’
Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia Issue 31. Accessed 15 December 2022.
The formal negotiations have also been
undermined by the disconnect between the
ceasere agreements among the negotiating
panels and the continuing armed operations and
clashes among ground troops; the continuing
lack of inclusivity and transparency in the formal
peace process which has led to a lack of broad
public awareness, support and ownership; the
continuing social injustices and human rights
abuses outside the negotiations; and the doubts
on the sincerity of both parties to commit to the
primacy of a politically-negotiated settlement
over the military approach and war-making.
239
On the last point, Bolasco concluded that
“both Parties have looked at negotiations as
opportunities that allow both sides to secure
economic and political benets, gain some kind
of respite from the ghting, be visible in the
public consciousness, have a voice in a public
conversation that engages a sizeable intellectual
audience, and lastly, and interestingly, as a
way to actually still wage war, physically and
symbolically, from both ends of the negotiating
table.”
240
Both continue to see the talks as an
extension of broader political contestation,
including the “war of hearts and minds.” It is
therefore not that the peace process is hopeless.
It is ultimately because the two parties, who
both claim to represent the aspirations of the
people, have not given peacemaking enough
chance to succeed.
51 |
Given these, our popular understanding of the
peace process has to change. Determining the
country’s peace and security needs has to be
expanded beyond the two principal parties. While
a new peace strategy should continue to support
the push for a negotiated settlement., it also needs
to go beyond this. It should be owned across
movements and sectors, not only by mediators and
peace advocates. And it should be integrated with
the other strategies mentioned above: restoring
accountability and ensuring support for victims,
pushing for legal reforms and broader structural
transformation, countering the rise of militarism
and pushing for eective civilian oversight over the
military, and supporting dialogues and problem-
solving across sectors and society.
What should be clear from the past ve decades
of violence and abuses rooted in this protracted
conflict is, rst, that there are no shortcuts and,
second the need to transcend the orthodoxies
and our respective silos in the broad peace
and human rights movement. The question
is where do we start, and what is or are our
leverage point(s)?
241 PNA, ‘Marcos vows to protect human rights,’ (10 June 2022).
242 PhilStar, ‘Incoming NSA chief on ‘unproductive’ practice of red-tagging: Let’s stop doing that,’ (24 June 2022).
243 BusinessWorld, ‘Analysts: Red-tagging continues with Marcos,’ (21 August 2022); Manila Times, ‘Red-tagging
still threat to Church,’ (14 January 2023).
244 PhilStar, ‘SC issues show cause order vs. Lorraine Badoy for red-tagging, threatening judge,’ (4 October 2022).
245 Rappler, ‘Broadcaster Percy Lapid killed in Las Piñas, 2nd under Marcos,’ (4 October 2022); Danilo Araña Arao,
‘Press freedom under Bongbong is fake news,’ East Asia Forum (10 October 2022).
VII. Challenges and
Pathways: Resistance,
Reimagination and
Transformation from Below
The prospects for human rights and for a
transformative approach to peace and security
under the new Marcos Jr. administration are
dim. While Marcos Jr. assured the international
community of its commitment to human
rights
241
and his (former) national security
adviser publicly expressed her opposition to
red-tagging and preference to address root
causes,
242
the same practice of repression and
killings of activists and Church leaders,
243
law
practitioners
244
and journalists
245
continues.
Source: Shutterstock, Luis Dela Cruz
Quezon City, Philippines – September 21 2022: Religious groups participated in the protest in
University of the Philippines to mark the 50th anniversary of declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines.
52 |
President Marcos Jr. himself rarely made specic
pronouncements on red-tagging and the armed
conflict and stalled talks with the CPP-NPA and
often only expressed support for the programs of
the NTF-ELCAC and AFP on counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency.
246
There is also no indication
that national peace talks will be reopened soon
as Cabinet members and military generals
expressed their preference to continue with local
peace engagements through the NTF-ELCAC.
247
With security and anti-terrorism as her primary
agenda,
248
Sara Duterte, the Vice-President
and Education Secretary and the daughter of
former President Rodrigo Duterte, has been more
direct and vocal on her “hardline” stance against
“criminals and terrorists”
249
She championed the
return of mandatory Reserved Ocers Training
Corps (ROTC) in schools,
250
and the creation of
condential funds under the Education department
to pursue “peace and order and national security”
and to support “intelligence and surveillance”
targeting, among many, “recruitment [of children
and youth] in terrorism and violent extremism.”
251
The recent reshuling of military leadership
252
and the continued appointments of former
generals in the civilian government
253
suggest
that the current administration will continue to
appease the military and take a business-as-
usual, hard security approach.
246 Manila Bulletin, ‘Marcos lauds NTF-ELCAC, LGUs’ peace eorts,’ (28 October 2022); GMA News,
‘Marcos: Imperative to empower Philippines vs. terrorism, external threats,’ (8 November 2022).
247 CNN Philippines, ‘Marcos admin won’t revive peace talks; Calos rejects red-tagging,’ (10 June 2022);
Rappler, ‘NTF-ELCAC not recommending CPP-NPA peace talks under Marcos,’ 15 July 2022.
248 Inquirer, ‘VP Duterte tells US counterpart Harris: Security is my ‘rst love’,’ (21 November 2022).
249 PNA, ‘VP Sara reiterates ‘no mercy’ stance vs. criminals, terrorists,’ (5 September 2022).
250 Manila Bulletin, ‘VP Duterte tackles ‘ways forward’ for mandatory ROTC,’ 5 September 2022).
251 PhilStar, ‘Sara getting separate condential funds as Vice President, DepEd chief,’ (16 September 2022).
252 Nikkei Asia, ‘Marcos sacks Philippine military chief in surprise move,’ (8 January 2023).
253 Manila Times, ‘Marcos likely to appoint more retired generals,’ (19 January 2023); Rappler,
‘Marcos: No one plotted to oust Clarita Carlos as national security adviser,’ (21 January 2023).
Ultimately, the fundamental challenge before
us is the lack of broad public ownership and the
marginalization of aected communities, not
only in the peace process but also and more
importantly, in our overall ways of shaping our
common security needs and approach. With the
continuing lack of paradigm change among the
two principal parties to the GRP-CNN armed
conflict, the needed reimagination will have
to come from the people themselves.
Lumad Husay. IPs have been caught not only
in the crossres in armed clashes within their
ancestral domains, but also in the propaganda
warfare on who are the legitimate voices of IPs
and who are not.
Framed as either government IPs or as NPA
IPs rather than rst and foremost indigenous
communities with the capacity and agency
to think and decide for themselves, indigenous
communities are being divided and polarized
and, in the process, denied their own unique voice
to their distinct experiences and aspirations.
Framed as either government
IPs or as NPA IPs rather
than rst and foremost
indigenous communities
with the capacity and
agency to think and decide
for themselves, indigenous
communities are being divided
and polarized and, in the
process, denied their own
unique voice to their distinct
experiences and aspirations.
53 |
IP groups, particularly the Lumads,
254
have been
trying to carve out a space for themselves to
dialogue among themselves, build a common
agenda with regard to the peace process, and
to develop and assert their own peacemaking
and peacebuilding practice, including the use of
“alternative modes of dispute resolution that are
conciliatory rather than adversarial.”
255
A stream of this IP-centered peacemaking has
adopted the term “husay justice,” or husay
256
for short. Within this stream, an IP-CSO
convergence
257
led to the founding of Lumad
Husay Mindanaw
258
, an inter-tribal alliance or
convergence that “sees itself oering husay as
a locally-grounded indigenous peace platform
supporting ’culturalized‘ peacebuilding with,
and in, formal government and rebel groups’
peace processes (or lack there-of), and
related government programs serving Lumad
communities.” It is guided by the overarching
principle of restoration (“pagpasig-uli”),
articulated as:
“We are not against anyone, as long as we are
standing together for the rights of IP; this is the
idea of all IP for the benet of all IP. Therefore,
people don’t have to abandon their group or
agenda, as long as their sense of identity is
claimed and asserted.
254 Lumad (plural Lumadnon) is a collective term of self-ascription used by some members of approximately 18 and 24
non-Islamized tribes, and numerous additional sub-tribes, that claim portions of Mindanao as their ancestral domain.
255 Pacico Agabin, ‘The Influence of Philippine Indigenous Law on the Development of New Concepts of Social Justice,’
In V. V. Palmer, M. Y. Mattar, & A. Koppel (Eds.), Mixed Legal Systems, East and West. Surrey, England (2015)., p.170.
256 Simons (2021) cites Sidney, Edgerton, Gonzalo and Saway in his dissertation “Lumad Husay (Indigenous Conciliation):
Decolonizing Justice & Re-storying Culture in Mindanao, Philippines”: “In Bisayan, husay is understood as follows: Used as
a noun, husay refers to a “hearing” or a “settlement of accounts”; as a verb, husay means “to be peaceful,” “put in order,’’
‘’untangle, “ or ‘’unsnarl”; and as an adjective, it is translated as “orderly,’’ “without confusion,” or “well arranged with
everything put in its place.” (G Sidney Silliman, 1982, p. 237) Edgerton (2008), in a tidy description of Bukidnon Lumad
conflict resolution processes (pp. 40-44) describes husay’s core meaning as “orderly and without confusion” and “avoiding
conflict or bad feelings through the mediation of disputes” (p. 40); such that paghusay simply means “mediation sessions”
(p. 41). In the most recent research… conducted by Tagakaolo anthropologist Matet Gonzalo with her own community
in Davao Occidental Province, the word used is nearly identical – pag-usay - meaning a “process of restoring positive
relations or goodwill between two people who are conflicting/ghting” (“pamaagi sa pagbalik sa maayong relasyon
o kabubut-on sa duha ka tawo nga nagbangi/nag-away”) (Gonzalo, 2018, p. 7, n. 14). Further, the title for Bukidnon,
Talaandig and Higaonon mediators is “balaghusay” meaning those who are responsible for the husay session (A. L. Saway
et al., 2017).” See Jeremy L. Simons, ‘Lumad Husay (indigenous conciliation). Decolonizing justice & re-storying culture in
Mindanao, Philippines,’ (Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy), University of Otago, (June 2021), p. 137. Accessed 5 October 2022.
257 Groups involved in an indigenous peoples-centered reimagining is the IP-CSO convergence, composed of the Mindanao
Indigenous People’s Peace Forum (MIPPF), Lumad Mindanaw Peoples Federation (LMPF), and the Katawhang Lumad
(Lumad Peoples) sector of the Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement (KL-MPPM), supported by the IID and several units
within Ateneo de Davao University (ADDU), including the University Community Engagement and Advocacy Council
(UCEAC), the Mindanawon Centre for Inter-cultural Dialogue, and the Ateneo Institute of Anthropology.
258 Davao Today, ‘IP leaders advocate IP inclusion in peace talks,’ (23 June 2018).
259 Luman Husay Minadanaw Conference Notes, 18 August 2016, cited by Simons (June 2021).
“The mandate comes from the ground, we have
to make our own structure and formula to use,
so it will not be opposed, everything has to be
organized at the ground. Pasiguli sa relasyon
(Restoration of Relationships) needs to start at
the community level, there is a need to prepare
the ground, cleanse, deal with the damage.”
259
Simons wrote about this in his dissertation
entitled “Lumad Husay (Indigenous Conciliation):
Decolonizing Justice & Re-storying Culture in
Mindanao, Philippines”:
54 |
“Using husay as an umbrella term for (at least)
the fteen dierent customary justice and
peacemaking traditions that form core elements
of each group’s identity who were present at
the meeting… their focus, as revealed in their
comments and discussions, was primarily
outward-facing towards non-Lumad who had
a dicult time understanding their cultures and
therefore intervened violently in their culture and
communities; and upward-facing in relation to
higher level peace processes negotiators and
actors whom they believed had the power and
capacity to restrain those fomenting the various
forms of violence. In terms of a legal culture
framework, husay represented a cultural motif or
form that could be easily comprehended as the
external face of Lumad justice advocacy, thus
raising the legal consciousness of non-indigenous
actors and allies who could support its use and
help create spaces for Lumad legal mobilization
asserting their cultural agenda in the
peace process…
“...as well as a generic term for indigenous
peacemaking and customary justice in
Mindanao. This consists of practices of relational
conciliation (pasiguli sa relasyon), holistic
restoration expressed locally and metaphorically
as ‘hugasan ang yuta aron matamnan pagusab’
(cleansing the land in preparation for replanting),
and narrative justice of the ancient peace pacts
and traditional precedents found in various epics
across the island, particularly the Mamalu-
Tabunaway narrative.”
260
260 Simons J (2021), pp. 139-141.
Source: Shutterstock, Luis Dela Cruz
Philippines – July 25, 2022: Filipino people
staged a protest against Marcos-Duterte.
55 |
Lumad Husay, therefore, constitutes a political
assertion among IP groups that aected
communities are not mere subject to denitions
of security and safety dened and negotiated
from the top, rather, they are catalysts able to
shape meanings and lead in crafting solutions.
While they recognize the value of the formal
negotiations between the GRP and the NDF, such
“political settlement is not the only expression
of a peace process” and, therefore, regardless
of the termination or future resumption of
such formal talks, they will “independently as
indigenous peoples talk to both the government
and rebels on [their] own terms” and will continue
to build solutions to conflict and insecurity in
their own communities, based on their multiple
customary justice concepts and internal
legal cultures.
261
Independent Citizen’s Spaces for Deliberation
and Agenda on Peace and Security. In the
end, robust and cross-sector dialogical spaces
building towards an independent citizen’s
agenda on peace and security are needed to
break the deadlock, and to infuse political will,
accountability and creativity into the peace
process. Judge Soliman Santos, one of the
leading legal and peace scholars working on
the intersection of human rights and conflicts
involving non-state armed groups, posited that
“A critical mass of local community-based peace
constituencies—in other words, a local mass base
for peace—should also be able to help push the
talks to move...”
262
261 Lumad Husay Mindanaw. “Among Hunghong alang sa Kalinaw” An Open Letter to the Filipino People
from the Stewards of the Lands, Mountains, Forests, and Rivers in Mindanao. March 29, 2019. On le.
262 Soliman M. Santos Jr., ‘How Do You Solve a Problem Like the GPH-NDFP Peace Process:
Paradigm Shifts for 2016 & Beyond,’ Siem Reap, Cambodia: Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (May 2016).
Notably, there are ongoing eorts to further
broaden the GRP-NDF peace constituency and
to strengthen the community and citizens’ voices,
with the aim of lifting fundamental material and
political barriers to a political settlement. For
one, the Initiatives for International Dialogue
(IID) and Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute
(GZOPI) have been involved in convening, on the
one hand, GPPAC Working Group on Enabling
Collaboration/WGEC, an international solidarity
and support group of peacebuilders, mediators
and conflict experts to accompany and interface
with local peacebuilders; and on the other,
the National Civil Society Peace Dialogue/s,
a dialogue platform across various regions of
the country and across peacebuilding, human
rights, community-based organizations and even
international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs) to map, discuss and problem-solve the
web of issues driving the GRP-NDFP conflict,
ranging from economic development, agrarian
reform, militarism and impunity, to often
forgotten and critical issues like gender and
feminist conceptions of security, and indigenous
people’s rights and domain. These are just two
of the many spaces for rethinking peace and
security and for bridging expertise and energy
across international, national and local levels.
However, long-term support, investment and
commitment are needed to carve out and nurture
a civic space that allows for this broad societal
reflection and deliberation—what do safety
and security mean to each of us and all of us
especially the most marginalized, and what steps
should we take to build and nurture societies
where the well-being, dignity and autonomy
of the many and not the few is at the center?
56 |
Annex:
The Philippine Government’s Counterterrorism
and Counterinsurgency Architecture
The 1987 Constitution is the
fundamental law of the land in the
Philippines, which establishes the
structure, policies, roles and duties
of the Philippines’ government and
which contains the Bill of Rights.
The President is the Head of State
and Head of Government, and
functions as the commander-in-
chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP).
Except under the martial rule of the dictator
Ferdinand Marcos Sr.(1972-1986) the post-
colonial Philippines has a tradition of democratic
and civilian control over the military. In principle,
civilian authorities formulate the national
security policy – through a ve-year National
Security Policy – and determine the functions
of the armed forces in its implementation.
1 The Council was created during the Quirino Administration through Executive Order (EO) No. 330, dated 01 July 1950.
It was last reorganized by virtue of EO No. 34, series of 2001. The Council’s Executive Committee is composed of the
President and at least nine others: the Vice President; the AFP chief of sta; National Security Council director; the
Executive Secretary; and the Secretaries of Foreign Aairs, National Defense, Interior and Local Government, Justice,
and Labor and Employment.
2 Every President is empowered to reorganize their Cabinet according to their priorities. Under President Duterte,
the Security, Justice and Peace Cabinet Cluster (SJPCC) was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 24 s.2017.
The NSC was the Secretariat of the SJPCC.
Supporting the President on national security
issues are two bodies: the National Security
Council (NSC)
1
and the Cabinet Security
Cluster
2
. The NSC comprised of, on one hand,
a collegial and advisory body, chaired by the
President, composed of concerned ocials of
the Cabinet and Congress and other government
ocials and private citizens who may be invited
by the President; and a permanent Secretariat,
which provides technical support to the former
and which is headed by a Director-General /
National Security Adviser. On the other
hand, Cabinet Security Cluster members are
exclusive to the President’s Secretaries, and
cabinet clustering serves as a mechanism for
coordination among dierent departments.
In principle, Cabinet secretaries act as mere
alter egos of the President.
57 |
Key bodies and actors involved in peace and
security policy-making and implementation are:
• The Philippine National Police (PNP)
reports to the Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG) and is
charged with maintaining internal security
in most of the country. On the other hand,
the AFP reports to the Department of
National Defence (DND) and is responsible
for external security but also carries out
domestic security functions in regions
where the government assesses a high
incidence of terrorist or separatist insurgent
activity, particularly the Mindanao region.
The two agencies share responsibility for
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations. The PNP’s Special Action
Force (SAF) is responsible for urban
counterterrorism operations.
• Governors, mayors, and other local
government ocials have considerable
influence over local police units, including
the appointment of top provincial and
municipal police ocers and the provision
of resources.
• The government also continues to
support and arm civilian militias. The
armed forces control the Civilian Armed
Force Geographical Units (CAFGU),
while the national police commands the
Civilian Volunteer Organizations. These
paramilitary units often receive minimal
training and are poorly monitored and
regulated. Some political families and clan
leaders, particularly in Mindanao, maintain
private armies and, at times, recruit CAFGU
and Civilian Volunteer Organization members
into those armies. Civilian control over some
security forces is not fully eective.
3
3 U.S. State Department, ‘Philippines 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices,’ (12 April 2022).
Accessed 17 July 2022.
4 The agency was created through Executive Order No. 125, s. 1993, later amended through Executive Order No. 3,
s. 2001 and re-organized through Executive Order No. 158, s. 2021.
• The Oce of the Presidential Adviser
on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity
(OPAPRU), formerly called the Oce of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP),
4
was rst established in 1993
and is responsible for “the coordination and
implementation of all components of the
comprehensive peace process.” Under the
agency, there are several government peace
panels (or implementing panels, in the case
of a nal peace agreement) established
to conduct negotiations with rebel groups,
such as the MILF, MNLF, CPP-NPA-NDF,
CBA-CPLA and RPM-P/RPA/ABB. The
government peace panel for the GRP-NDF
was dissolved following the termination of
the talks in November 2017.
• President Duterte issued Executive Order
70 s. 2018 which, among others, formed
the National Task Force to End Local
Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-
ELCAC) to lead the implementation of the
government’s “Whole-of-Nation approach”
and formulation and coordination of a
National Peace Framework, including
a “mechanism for localized peace
engagements or negotiations”.
58 |
In the past decade, the Philippines adopted
two laws that are primarily aimed at
counterterrorism: (1) the Anti-Terrorism
Act (ATA) of 2020
5
, which superseded the
Human Security Act (HSA) of 2007
6
, and
(2) the Terrorism Financing Prevention
and Suppression Act (TFPSA) of 2012
7
.
Expanding on the executive branch’s power, the
ATA also allows state security forces to arrest
suspected terrorists and detain them for up to
24 days without charge and without sucient
judicial oversight. Another controversial
provision is one referring to “material support”
(to an activity that is deemed a terrorist act)
which may have a chilling eect on agencies
delivering humanitarian aid. The June 2020
communication of the Mandates of the
Special Rapporteurs to the government of the
Philippines, including by the Special Rapporteur
on the protection and promotion of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism Fionnuala Ni Aolain, has expressed
concerns that the law’s denition of terrorism
and terrorist acts (including ”incitement” and
“encouragement, praising, glorication or
justication”) is “overbroad and vague”, does not
fall within agreed international law boundaries
of terrorist acts, and may curtail freedom of
opinion, expression and right to privacy.
8
Prior to the ATA, the prosecution has to prove
elements of terrorism with the courts in order
to designate an organisation or an individual
as terrorist. Due to diculty in doing this, law
enforcement would usually use provisions
of rebellion or insurrection
9
, or more often,
on common crimes, such as murder or illegal
possession of rearms, under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws to run after alleged
insurgent rebels or terrorists.
5 Republic Act No. 11479 (3 July 2020).
6 Republic Act No. 9372 (6 March 2007).
7 Republic Act No. 10168 (18 June 2012).
8 OHCHR, ‘Comments on the pending legislation ‘The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020’’, (29 June 2020). OL PHL 4/2020.
9 Republic Act No. 6968 (24 October 1990).
10 Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, (23 July 2021).
11 Asia/Pacic Group on Money Laundering, ‘APG History and Background,’ accessed 17 July 2022.
Key governmental bodies, including private
actors, are involved in implementing and oversight
on counterterrorism laws and measures, and their
mandates are described below:
• The Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) was
rst established under the HSA 2007
and was further empowered through the
ATA 2020. The ATA granted the ATC the
power to determine probable cause and
to unilaterally designate individuals or
organizations as terrorists, including
to authorize their arrest without a
judicial warrant.
• The National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency (NICA) serves as the Secretariat
of the ATC.
• The Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) created by the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001
10
has the authority
to investigate allegations of and to freeze
property or funds believed to be linked
to terrorist nancing. AMLC represents
the Philippines in the Asia/Pacic Group
on Money Laundering (APG), an inter-
governmental/regional organisation
consisting of 41 member jurisdictions and
the largest Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body (FSRB) in the
world. APG’s objective is “to ensure that
individual members eectively implement
the international standards against
money laundering, terrorist nancing
and proliferation nancing related
to weapons of mass destruction.”
11
59 |
• Law enforcement and military personnel
have to le for an order from the Court
of Appeals (CA) to surveil any suspects
and their communications, and to compel
Telecommunications Service Providers
(TSP) and Internet Service Providers (ISP)
to produce any suspects’ customer
information and identication records, call
and text data records, content and other
cellular or internet metadata. The CA has
the power to hear applications to proscribe
an individual or groups as terrorists upon
giving due notice and opportunity to be
heard to those about to be proscribed,
and to hear any appeal against or any
application for extension for actions made
due to terrorist designations. The courts
and the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) have to be immediately notied
of the detention of suspects without a
warrant of arrest. The CHR has the mandate
to investigate violations of human rights,
including those in relation to the ATA.
• The United States, Japan, and Australia
are the Philippines’ three most important
security partners, especially on
counterterrorism and P/CVE initiatives.
12 National Security Council, ‘The National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP P/CVE),’
(July 2022). On le.
13 Lynch C (2017), ‘U.N. Seeks More Than $100 Million to Tackle Violent Extremism’, Foreign Policy, 8 March
(https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/u-n-seeks-more-than-100-million-to-tackle-violent-extremism/)
Aside from the ATA and the TFPSA, another
key measure is the National Action Plan on
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
(NAP P/CVE) adopted in mid-2019.
12
Ostensibly,
it was designed to broaden counterterrorism
strategy from an exclusively kinetic, military
approach to include and complement a “soft
approach that addresses the underlying
conditions that drive individuals to support
and join violent extremist groups”. Moreover,
it is aimed to elicit a new ‘whole-of-society’
approach to tackling the threat posed by
violent groups, by engaging a wide range of
stakeholders including communities, prisons,
religious leaders, learning institutions, social
media users, and Filipinos working and
studying overseas.
The creation of the Philippines’ NAP P/CVE
followed the development and adoption of
action plans to prevent or counter ‘violent
extremism’ in the past years — by the United
Nations Secretary-General (in 2016), the UN
Oce of Counterterrorism (in 2017), the ASEAN
(in 2018) and several countries (Albania, Burkina
Faso, Denmark, Finland, France, Kenya, Kosovo,
Mali, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway,
Somalia and Switzerland). The NAP was an
inter-agency United Nations and government
eort, spearheaded by UNDP Philippines and
supported by the government of Japan. On the
government side, it was led by the National
Security Council and the Anti-Terrorism Council
(ATC). UNDP, not having previously been involved
in counter-terrorism eorts, was now leading the
UN charge on P/CVE as part of the development
agency’s global shift in priorities.
13
To mainstream and coordinate the P/CVE eorts
of the government, a new unit called Preventing
and Countering Violent Extremism and
Insurgency – Project Management Oce
under the DILG was formed.
60 |
The Eect of the
Philippine ‘War
on Drugs’ on
Civic Space
Ateneo Human Rights Center
(Ray Paolo J. Santiago, Marianne Carmel
B. Agunoy, Maria Paula S. Villarin,
Maria Araceli B. Mancia)
61 |
I. Context
A Rappler article
1
published at the beginning
of the year 2016, a few months before the
presidential election that catapulted Rodrigo
Duterte to the presidency, painted a picture of
the crime situation in the Philippines. It stated
that “[t]he number of reported crimes has been
rising, while the ability of the police to solve
crimes has decreased.” The years 2012 to 2014
showed that serious crimes, such as murder,
rape, robbery, and carnapping, rose by 300%;
“[i]n 2012, 129,000 index crimes were reported.
In 2013, they shot up to 458,000, while in 2014,
the number rose slightly to 493,000.”
1 Pia Randa, A look at the state of crime, drugs in the Philippines, Rappler, January 5, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/118004-crime-drugs-philippines/
It also gave a glimpse of the illegal drug situation
in the country, saying that according to the
United Nations World Drug Report [2012],
“the Philippines has the highest rate of shabu
use in East Asia” although it claried that the
Aquino administration “reported the decline of
industrial-size meth labs” which the US State
department attributed to the “45% increase in
anti-drug operations.”
It was no surprise then that the idea of a leader
with a “strong hand” or an “iron st” resonated
among the Filipino electorate.
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Families of drug war victims carry a banner from artists’ group RESBAK and join the protest ahead of President Rodrigo
Duterte’s fth and nal State of the Nation Address (SONA) along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, July 26, 2021.
62 |
Prior to his election as the 16th President of the
Republic of the Philippines, Duterte vowed to
campaign against illegal drugs and that it would
be bloody. He said he would order the killing
of all criminals and drug lords, including their
dependents.
2
In fact, even before Duterte was
sworn in as President on 30 June 2016, there had
already been a rise in drug-related killings.
3
This position emboldened the already lopsided
view that the drug problem in the Philippines
is primarily an issue of law enforcement and
criminality, rather than of health.
4
Duterte’s
campaign promise paved the way for a
securitized approach to the drug problem by
putting emphasis on punitive measures and
the major role he gave the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in the so-called “war on drugs”.
Its intensied implementation heavily limited
the civic space on drug-related matters and
concerns, not only with regard to the health
policies that should go hand-in-hand with t
law enforcement, it also discouraged, in fact,
blatantly intimidated, any opposition to the
policies set by the Duterte administration.
This research paper explores the impact that
Duterte’s securitized approach to the drug
problem had on the civic space of those who
advocate against the drug policy and document
abuses under it, and concerned citizens who
organize and speak out against the human rights
abuses wrought in their communities under the
guise of public security. It documents how a
national health problem was reframed as a security
threat, fueling a moral panic that helped Duterte
justify and popularize the security-rst approach
to the nation’s drug problem. At the core of it, the
“war on drugs” was characterized by initiatives
meant to incite fear and shame, to dissuade people
from engaging and exercising their rights, thus
eectively shrinking the civic space.
2 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “Duterte Admits to ‘bloody’ Presidency If He Wins,” The Philippine Star, February 21, 2016,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/21/1555393/duterte-admits-bloody-presidency-if-he-wins
3 Mara Cepeda, “Drug Suspect Killings Rise after Duterte Victory,” Rappler, June 24, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/137528-rise-drug-suspect-killings-duterte-presidency
4 Nymia Simbulan, Leonardo Estacio, Carissa Dioquino-Maligaso, Teodoro Herbosa and Mellissa Withers,
The Manila Declaration on the Drugs Problem in the Philippines, Annals of Global Health, March 5, 2019,
https://annalsofglobalhealth.org/articles/10.5334/aogh.28/
A national health problem was
reframed as a security threat,
fueling a moral panic that
helped Duterte justify and
popularize the security-rst
approach to the nation’s
drug problem. At the core
of it, the “war on drugs” was
characterized by initiatives
meant to incite fear and
shame, to dissuade people
from engaging and exercising
their rights, thus eectively
shrinking the civic space.
63 |
II. The ‘War on Drugs’
Duterte’s “war on drugs” ocially started
immediately upon his assumption of oce, when
his Chief of the PNP, Director General Ronaldo
dela Rosa, issued Command Memorandum
Circular No. 16-2016, a.k.a “Project: Double
Barrel”. The circular stated that there were
around 1.8 million drug users in the Philippines,
38.36% of whom are unemployed. Project:
Double Barrel had a two-pronged approach
— Project TOKHANG and Project HVT (High
Value Target). The circular provided the
“general guidelines, procedures and tasks” to
be followed by all police personnel “in support
of the Barangay Drug Clearing Strategy of the
government and the neutralization of illegal
drug personalities nationwide.”
The approach was unique in itself. The term
Tokhang comes from the words “Toktok” and
“Hangyo.” Toktok means “to knock” while the
Visayan word Hangyo means “to make an appeal
or plead”. In short, Tokhang refers to knocking on
the doors of the houses of suspected drug users
or peddlers and appeal to them to surrender
and change their ways.
5 Euan McKirdy, “‘Knock and Plead’ – On Night Patrol with Philippines Police,” CNN, August 25, 2016,
https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/25/asia/philippines-police-knock-and-plead-drug-operations/index.html
6 Lara Tan, “No More ‘Oplan Tokhang’: Police Suspends All Anti-Drug Operations,” CNN Philippines, October 12, 2017,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/12/pnp-oplan-tokhang-project-double-barrel-suspended-bato-dela-
rosa.html
7 Zacarian Sarao, “Total Drug War Deaths at 6,235 as of February 2022, Says PDEA,” Inquirer.net, March 30, 2022,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1575931/total-drug-war-deaths-at-6235-as-of-feb-28-says-pdea
8 Franco Luna, “New PNP Chief Promises ‘Finale Version 2022’ in ‘War on Drugs,’” The Philippine Star, November 15, 2021,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/11/15/2141486/new-pnp-chief-promises-nale-version-2022-war-drugs
On paper, Project Tokhang had ve stages: (1)
the collection and validation of information,
(2) coordination by the PNP with the local
government ocials of the barangay, (3)
house-to-house visitation, (4) processing
and documentation of the surrenderer, and (5)
monitoring and evaluation of the persons on
the list of suspected drug personalities.
Tokhang, however, is an aberration of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure since it requires neither
a criminal complaint that is actually led
against suspected drug personalities, nor an
arrest or search warrant when the house-to-
house visitation is conducted.
5
Yet, hundreds of
thousands of drug users surrendered due to the
climate of killings that came simultaneously with
what is now known as the “war on drugs”. Once
a suspected drug personality surrenders, he or
she has to accomplish an adavit with no choice
but to claim that the surrenderer is a “user, drug
dependent, or pusher.”
From July 1, 2016 to September 26, 2017, the PNP
conducted 76,863 anti-drug operations that
resulted in the death of 3,906 drug personalities
and the arrest of 113,932 others. The drug war
was criticized by opposition lawmakers, the
United Nations, and local and international
human rights groups for extrajudicial killings
allegedly committed by police ocers.
6
As of February 2022, the drug-related killings
in the country totaled 6,235, according to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
7
However, the actual gure could go as high
as 30,000, according to human rights groups
monitoring the situation.
8
The anti-drug campaign was much dierent
before Duterte.
64 |
III. The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002
The Philippine legislature passed the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
9
which repealed the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The current law provides that “the government
shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign
against the tracking and use of dangerous
drugs and other similar substances through an
integrated system of planning, implementation
and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs, and projects” with the “aim to achieve
a balance in the national drug control program
so that people with legitimate medical needs are
not prevented from being treated with adequate
amounts of appropriate medications...”
9 Republic Act No. 9165 “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”.
10 Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines, “Major Programs & Projects,” Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines,
at https://ddb.gov.ph/major-programs-projects/, last accessed 17 January 2023.
The law retained the Dangerous Drugs Board
(DDB) of the Philippines which is the policy-
making and strategy-formulating body on drug
prevention and control, and is responsible for
developing and adopting a comprehensive,
integrated, unied and balanced national drug
abuse prevention and control strategy. The DDB
recognizes that“[t]he drug issue is undoubtedly
a public health challenge that must be prioritized
because it creates complex health and social
problems,” and recommends a “rigorous anti-
drug cleansing through the shared eorts of
national government agencies, non-government
organizations, faith-based groups and the
private sector.”
10
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
A wreath adorns the site where 17-year-old Kian
delos Santos was shot and killed by three police
ocers during the rst anniversary of his death
in Caloocan, Metro Manila, on August 15, 2018.
65 |
In 2002, the DDB adopted a National Anti-Drug
Strategy (NADS) with a three-pronged approach
to the anti-drug campaign: a supply and
demand reduction campaign; a development/
reform package; and a people empowerment
campaign.
11
To operationalize the NADS, the
National Anti-Drug Program of Action (2002
NADPA) was developed.
12
Over a decade later,
the 2002 NADPA was re-examined and updated
to include and consider changes to the evolving
campaign against drugs.
13
This led to the
development of the National Anti-Drug Program
of Action 2015-2020 (NADPA 2015-2020).
The DDB led the drafting of the NADPA 2015-
2020, which provided for a broad framework
to address the drug problem in the Philippines.
It listed ve strategies, namely:
14
a. Drug Supply Reduction Strategy that aims
to remove drugs from the public for the
purpose of abuse, through market denial
operations and prevention of diversion
from the licit to the illicit markets. Programs
under this strategy involve law enforcement,
regulatory compliance, and judicial and
legislative measures designed to stop
the production, processing, tracking,
nancing and trade of dangerous drugs.
b. Drug Demand Reduction Strategy takes
people away from abusing dangerous
drugs and controlled substances and
aims to reduce their desire to abuse drugs.
Programs under this strategy cover the
formulation of policies in accordance
with RA 9165; the development and
implementation of preventive education
programs for dierent target groups;
adoption and utilization of eective
treatment and rehabilitation and after-
care programs; and the continuous
conduct of research on vital aspects
of the drug abuse problem.
11 Dangerous Drugs Board. n.d. “National Anti-Drug Plan of Action 2015-2020.” Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines.
https://nia.gov.ph/content/plan-action-2015-2020
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
c. Alternative Development Strategy which
has the objective to reduce the production
of marijuana and eventually eliminate
its cultivation through sustainable
rural development and alternative
livelihood programs.
d. Civic Awareness and Response Strategy
that aims to increase community
awareness and social responsibility on the
ill eects of dangerous drugs by promoting
the non-use of dangerous drugs through
community information and development
activities; publication and distribution of
IEC materials; implementation of public
communication strategies through
press conferences, press releases,
media guesting, and community/
family participation.
e. Regional and International Cooperation
Strategy that focuses on forging and
fostering cooperation with regional and
international agencies and counterparts,
as well as participating in drug-related
international eorts.
Under each of these strategies are detailed
programs with their corresponding objectives,
points of action, and performance measures.
66 |
The anti-drug advocacy programs of the DDB
encouraged public participation. It created the
DDB Drug Information Action Line (DDB-DIAL)
to receive reports and complaints related to
drug abuse and to provide relevant information
and assistance to the public. The DDB also set
up an online drug data pooling and collection
system, Integrated Drug Abuse Data and
Information Network (IDADIN), that allows better
management and assessment of the overall drug
demand and supply reduction eorts undertaken
by the government. There is also the Barkada
Kontra Droga, the DDB’s flagship program, a
peer-based program designed as a preventive
education and information strategy to counter the
dangers and disastrous eects of drug abuse.
15
In 2015, former President Benigno “Noynoy”
Aquino III issued Memorandum Circular No. 89
directing all government oces, departments,
bureaus, agencies, oces and government-
owned or controlled corporations to implement
the NADPA.
16
The circular instructed the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
to ensure the implementation of a drug-free
workplace policy and program.
17
It also enjoined
local government units and NGOs, CSOs, and the
private sector to actively assist and participate
in the implementation of the NADPA.
18
Moreover,
implementing agencies were given authorization
to include the necessary funding in their
respective budgets.
19
15 Dangerous Drugs Board. n.d. “History.” Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines,
https://ddb.gov.ph/ddb-history/
16 Memorandum Circular No. 89, “Implementation and Institutionalization of the National Anti-Drug Plan of Action”.
17 December 2015.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Robert Vergara, “Ex-PDEA Chief Says ‘Oplan Tokhang’ Should Be Renamed,” CNN Philippines, November 12, 2019,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/11/12/dionisio-santiago-oplan-tokhang-rename.html
21 Manuel Mogato and Karen Lema, “Crime-Buster the Man to Beat on Eve of Philippines Election,” Reuters, May 8, 2016,
https://www.reuters.com/article/philippines-election-idINKCN0XZ037
22 Anna Tasnim Basman and Rood Basman, “Philippine Elections: Politics and Peace Make Strange Bedfellows,”
The Asia Foundation, May 18, 2016, https://asiafoundation.org/2016/05/18/philippine-elections-politics-peace-make-
strange-bedfellows/
23 Emmanuel Tupas, “PNP: Crimes Drop by 64% in Duterte’s Term,” The Philippine Star, July 11, 2021,
https://www.philstar.com/nation/2021/07/11/2111641/pnp-crimes-drop-64-dutertes-term
IV. Enter Project:
Double Barrel
However, in 2016, and without prior consultation,
the PNP’s Command Memorandum Circular on
Project Double Barrel, with its notorious Tokhang
approach which, to the public, was synonymous
to killing, became the primary policy of Duterte’s
“war on drugs”.
20
There were tell-tale signs during the presidential
campaign of how deadly Duterte’s anti-drug
campaign could be. He was known for his
no-nonsense approach in addressing the
problem when he was mayor of Davao City.
He made it clear during his campaign to use his
unconventional ways of addressing drugs and
criminality, which alarmed his fellow candidates
who warned voters about the deadly measures
promised by Duterte, should he win.
21
His deadly rhetoric secured the presidency
for Duterte.
22
And his approach to criminality
through his “war on drugs” was brandished by
his administration, with the PNP claiming that
immediately, the crime rate dropped by at
least 64% compared to his predecessor.
23
67 |
The policy pronouncements on the “war on
drugs” “point to a war waged mainly as a police
operation with accomplishment/success pegged
on an ever-lengthening trail of bodies and
victims.”
24
It is evident that it was more of
a police or law enforcement operation rather
than an integrated or wholistic approach,
which should have included the health aspect.
The lack of understanding of the drug problem,
even the populist approach to it, “used the
literature on ‘moral panic’ to explain the
long-standing vilication of drugs in the
country. Drawing on the literature on penal and
medical populisms, more recent scholarship
has implicated political actors in reflecting
and reinforcing public attitudes about drugs,
portraying these actors as ‘moral entrepreneurs’
who simplify, spectacularize, and forge divisions
between ‘addicts’ and the virtuous public.”
25
To further add to the “moral panic,” Duterte
not only called the drug problem a crisis, he
even referred to it as a national security threat,
“an invasion of a new kind.”
26
And indeed, with
overwhelming public support, Duterte was
successful in securitizing the drug problem in the
Philippines as a criminal rather than a health issue,
emphasizing that “the smugglers to the dealers to
the end users [who] seek to destroy the fabric of
society... forfeit their very right to live.”
27
24 Clyde Ben Gacayan, “Till Death(s) Do Us Part?: Policy ‘Design Trace’ of the Philippine Anti-Illegal Drug Campaign,” n.d.
University of the Philippines - Center for Integrative and Development Studies. https://cids.up.edu.ph/wp-content/
uploads/2020/10/Article_Gacayan.pdf
25 Gideon Lasco and Lee Edson Yarcia, “The Politics of Drug Rehabilitation in the Philippines.” Health and Human Rights 24
(1): 147–58, July 2022, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2022/06/the-politics-of-drug-rehabilitation-in-the-philippines/
26 Camille Diola, “How Duterte’s Drug War Can Fail,” The Philstar, September 19, 2016, https://newslab.philstar.com/war-
on-drugs/policy
27 Henry Pope, “Philippines’ Duterte Says He Will Never Apologize for Drug War Deaths.” Organized Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project, January 6, 2022, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/15739-philippine-s-duterte-says-he-will-never-
apologize-for-drug-war-deaths
28 Roy Panti Valenzuela, Glimmers of Hope: A Report on the Philippine Criminal Justice System, International Review of the
Red Cross, 2018, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/les/irrc-903-8.pdf
29 Senate of the Philippines: Press Release: De Lima Introduces Bill to Address Slow, Ineective Justice System in the PH,
Senate of the Philippines Website , July 4, 2019, https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2019/0704_delima2.asp
30 Ayee Macaraig and Agene France-Presse, “Slow Justice in Philippines as Drug War Rages,” ABS-CBN News,
September 5, 2017, https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/09/05/17/slow-justice-in-philippines-as-drug-war-rages
It was more of a police or law
enforcement operation rather
than an integrated or wholistic
approach, which should have
included the health aspect.
The idea of “speedy justice” also added to the
appeal of Duterte’s “war on drugs”. As noted by
the International Committee of the Red Cross,
“[t]he perception of a continuing failure of the
Philippine criminal justice system to deliver fast
and ecient justice has inevitably led to the
erosion of public trust in the government. As a
consequence, citizens are laden with anxiety
because of unabated criminality and violence
in their communities.”
28
The current state of
criminal investigation in the country has been
described as “slow and ineective in prosecuting
criminal cases and securing convictions in
court.”
29
Consequently, as observed by criminal
justice system expert Raymund Narag,
“[e]xtrajudicial killings (EJKs) are justied for
Filipinos because of the failure of the criminal
justice system. It becomes a vicious cycle.”
30
68 |
This has also been the pattern within the ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
31
A research
32
by the International Drug Policy
Consortium, stated that drug policies in the
region are usually made with a social context
that disapproves of illicit drug use, constructing
both intoxication and dependence as socially
undesirable and a sign of moral weakness.
This is a view that drugs diminish a person’s
social responsibility and it becomes a law
and order issue – with drug use equated with
criminal activity. Thus, drug laws focus on
harsh punishment, allowing it to be, more or
less, exclusively dominated by law enforcement
agencies, with limited input from social and
health disciplines. This point of view is evident
in the “Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit
of a Drug-Free ASEAN” adopted by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2018.
31 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “ASEAN Good Practices and New Initiatives in HIV and AIDS,”
ASEAN Website, 2014, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/63-2.pdf
32 Simon Baldwin, “Drug Policy Advocacy in Asia: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects,” International Drug Policy
Consortium, 2013, https://idhdp.com/mediaimport/43513/idpc-report-drug-policy-in-south-east-asia.pdf
33 The Guardian, “‘If It’s Drugs, You Shoot and Kill,’ Duterte Orders Philippine Custom Chief,” The Guardian, September 1,
2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/01/if-its-drugs-you-shoot-and-kill-duterte-orders-philippine-
custom-chief - “I told him straight, ‘Drugs are still flowing in. I’d like you to kill there … anyway, I’ll back you up and you
won’t get jailed. If it’s drugs, you shoot and kill. That’s the arrangement,”
34 Megan Trimble, “9 of Rodrigo Duterte’s Most Controversial Quotes,” U.S. News, December 19, 2019, https://www.usnews.
com/news/best-countries/slideshows/philippine-president-rodrigo-dutertes-9-most-controversial-quotes?slide=2
35 Jim Gomez, “Philippine President Duterte Unabashedly Threatens to Kill Drug Dealers,” Thediplomat.com, July 27, 2021,
https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/philippine-president-duterte-unabashedly-threatens-to-kill-drug-dealers/
36 Sebastian Strangio, “Duterte Says He Will ‘Never Apologize’ for Drug War Deaths,” Thediplomat.com, January 6, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/duterte-says-he-will-never-apologize-for-drug-war-deaths/
37 Lim, Frinston and Nawal, Allan. 2018. “Duterte to Cops: Kill Criminals If You Have to, I’ll Protect You.” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 18, 2018. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/961396/duterte-to-cops-kill-criminals-if-you-have-to-ill-
protect-you
38 Id.
V. Duterte Administration’s
Anti-Illegal Drug Policy:
The Political Message
and High-level Rhetoric
The “war on drugs” was heavily enabled by the
high-level rhetoric from no less than President
Duterte himself. In many of his statements, he
ordered law enforcement to “shoot and kill”
drug smugglers and users.
33
In his early days
as president, he made a controversial remark
comparing himself to Adolf Hitler, saying,
“Hitler massacred three million Jews ... there
are three million drug addicts. I’d be happy
to slaughter them.”
34
President Duterte also made direct threats
against drug users, saying in one speech, “Those
who destroy my country, I will kill you. And those
who destroy the young people of our country,
I will kill you”.
35
On the eve of his 2016 election
victory, he directly addressed drug pushers and
users, saying, “If I make it to the presidential
palace, I will do just what I did as mayor. You
drug pushers, hold-up men, and do-nothings,
you better get out because I’ll kill you.”
36
On his second day as President, Duterte gave the
following order to the Philippine National Police:
“Do your duty and if in the process you kill 1,000
persons because you were doing your duty, I will
protect you.” Again and again, Duterte committed
his full backing to the police force, reiterating the
promise that he would take care of them,
37
and
allowing them to go all-out in the ‘“war on drugs”,
even if it meant “destroying human life”.
38
69 |
The President’s statements were also addressed
to the public, inciting public outrage against
drug users and gaining support for his anti-drug
policies. He went as far as saying that he would
have his own son killed if the latter was involved
in the drug trade.
39
This statement conrmed
his commitment to go all out, sparing no one in
the interest of the public. It is noted that many
of his speeches circled around the narrative
that drug users and trackers are “destroying
the country”, and that the “war on drugs” is
needed “to save the country”. The drug war was
also enabled by the rhetoric that criminals can
be humiliated and killed in order to protect law-
abiding and god-fearing Filipinos.
40
Such statements could have been interpreted as
a “license to kill”, by both law enforcement and
vigilantes.
41
The repeated verbal encouragement
by the President, together with the promise of
impunity, popular support, and enabling policies,
paved the way for government-orchestrated
violence in the form of red-tagging, arbitrary
arrests and detentions, and documented
widespread and systematic killings.
Many of his speeches circled
around the narrative that
drug users and trackers
are “destroying the country”,
and that the “war on drugs” is
needed “to save the country”.
39 The Guardian, “Duterte Says His Son Will Be Killed If He Is Involved in Drugs,” The Guardian Website, September 21, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/21/philippines-duterte-son-will-be-killed-if-he-is-involved-in-drugs
40 Danilo Andres Reyes, “The Spectacle of Violence in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Aairs 35
(3): 111–137, https://d-nb.info/1124904387/34
41 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Situation of Human Rights in the Philippines.”
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/les/Documents/Countries/PH/Philippines-HRC44-AEV.pdf
42 Senate of the Philippines, “Press Release: Hontiveros: Harm Reduction Is the Most Eective and Compassionate Response
to the Drug Problem,” Senate of the Philippines Website, September 15, 2016, https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_
release/2016/0915_hontiveros1.asp
43 Armando F. de Jesus, Minerva P. Calimag, Maria Carinnes A. Gonzales and Fredrick I. Rey, “Unsafe Injecting Drug
Use, a Growing Source of HIV Transmission in the Philippines: Implications to Policy: Policy Brief,” United Nations
Development Programme, December 2012 https://www.undp.org/sites/g/les/zskgke326/les/migration/
ph/11fd23d4859b9152e57c6b78a26c13129ab1d8d9dc9f9a903f1e288bbd048037.pdf
VI. Civil Society
Engagement on Harm
Reduction
Despite the popularity of Tokhang in Duterte’s
“war on drugs”, there have been eorts, though
low in support and popularity, to push for
harm reduction strategies as a response to the
country’s drug problem emphasizing “not only
a compassionate response, [but] also the most
eective response.”
42
Senator Risa Hontiveros,
a staunch advocate of harm reduction,
emphasized that “[i]n order for our government
to succeed in its campaign against illegal
drugs and tracking, we must also respond
to the health and social issues that lead to
drug dependence.”
The concept of harm reduction is not new in the
Philippines. It has been used in addressing the
spread of HIV-AIDS and has been advocated in
the past by some civil society groups as well.
43
As
explained by Senator Hontiveros, “Harm reduction
strategies will allow the creation of friendly,
community-based drop-in centers and outreach
services, encourage the uptake of health services
through improved peer education and support, and
spend resources on sustainable, evidence-based
policies and interventions at the community level.”
70 |
At present, the closest and most recognizable
medical approach to the drug problem is
rehabilitation. However, as observed in a paper
44
,
“[t]here is a dangerous tendency for reform
advocates to condemn extrajudicial killings and
due process rights violations as human rights
concerns, while supporting rehabilitation as an
acceptable alternative.” It emphasized that “the
motivations behind gross human rights violations
and forcing people to treatment are the same:
the dehumanization of people who use drugs
and the removal of their autonomy to decide
on the treatment approaches that respond to
their felt needs.” Clearly, this is an avenue for
civic engagement.
Further, the DDB recognizes that “[t]he drug
issue is undoubtedly a public health challenge
that must be prioritized because it creates
complex health and social problems”, and
recommends a “rigorous anti-drug cleansing
through the shared eorts of national
government agencies, non-government
organizations, faith-based groups and
the private sector.”
45
Even the UN Resident Representative to the
Philippines emphasized that “[b]reaking the
cycle of drugs, marginalization and poor
socioeconomic prospects requires programs
that link ‘science-based drug use prevention
and treatment’ as well as ‘policies that prevent
individuals and communities from participating
in drug tracking and production’, with ‘eorts
to improve public health, increase economic
development and public security, and reduce
socio-economic inequalities’.”
46
The UN Oce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
further explained that “[p]eople who use drugs
are a heterogeneous population who may
experience multiple and complex diculties”
and “problems may arise from a number of
patterns of drug use and not just because
someone is dependent on a drug.”
47
44 Gideon Lasco and Lee Edson Yarcia, “The Politics of Drug Rehabilitation in the Philippines.” Health and Human Rights 24
(1): 147–58, July 2022, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2022/06/the-politics-of-drug-rehabilitation-in-the-philippines/
45 Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines, “Major Programs & Projects,” Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines, n.d.
https://ddb.gov.ph/major-programs-projects/
46 United Nations, “UN Philippines Chief Calls for Science-Based Prevention and Treatment to Break Cycle of Drug Abuse,”
United Nations Website, June 16, 2021, https://philippines.un.org/en/131561-un-philippines-chief-calls-science-based-
prevention-and-treatment-break-cycle-drug-abuse
47 United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crimes, “Guidance for Community-Based Treatment and Care Services for People
Aected by Drug Use and Dependence in Southeast Asia,” United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crimes, April 2014,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/UNODC_cbtx_guidance_EN.pdf
The health aspect of the drug problem has been,
and continues to be, one of the clear spaces
for civic engagement in addressing the drug
situation in the Philippines. But what are the
consequences on peoples’ civic freedoms of this
rhetorical and policy reframing of a health crisis
as a security crisis and its manifestation in state
violence and crackdown on civil society?
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Mothers of extrajudicial killing victims join thousands of
protesters along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City as
President Rodrigo Duterte delivered his fourth State of the
Nation Address on July 22, 2019.
71 |
VII. Eect of the ‘War on
Drugs’ on Civic Space
In the simplest sense, civic space is the space
“where people come together to exercise their
human rights and core freedoms.”
48
This space
is important as it helps shape policies and
governance. How big and conducive this space
is to allow participation and debate depends
on a set of legal conditions and governmental
response that enables an environment for people
to be active, participate, and speak out – for
people to act.
49
Freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed
by the Philippine Constitution which mandates
that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of
grievances.”
50
Furthermore, the Constitution
recognizes the people’s right to “eective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making” and
mandates “the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms.”
51
48 Lydia Cocom and James Savage, “What is Civic Space?”, The Fund for Global Human Rights, July 26, 2021,
https://globalhumanrights.org/commentary/fund-101-what-is-civic-space/
49 Id.
50 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 4.
51 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 16.
52 Asian Development Bank, “Civil Society Briefs: Philippines,” February 2013.
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/les/publication/30174/csb-phi.pdf
53 Id.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) noted
that “civil society organizations (CSOs) in the
Philippines engage in a broad range of activities,
the most common being in (i) education, training,
and human resource development; (ii) community
development; (iii) enterprise development
and employment generation; (iv) health and
nutrition; (v) law, advocacy, and politics; and
(vi) sustainable development.”
52
To highlight how
influential CSOs are, the ADB mentioned their
“major roles in achieving Filipino independence
from the Spanish and the Americans, in
toppling the Marcos regime, and in ending the
administration of President Joseph Estrada.”
The ADB emphasized that “the government
has always maintained some openness to
civil society. However, the democratic space
for CSOs has been expanded or constricted
through the years depending on the inclinations
of those in power (both elected and appointed
leaders and bureaucrats), the general political
conditions, and the positioning of CSOs
with the incumbent political leaders,
among other factors.”
53
72 |
A. Civic Space Before the ‘War on Drugs’
Although there are groups that have been
engaging the government regarding the drug
problem in the country, particularly on harm
reduction, such as NoBox Philippines, CSO
participation in drug policymaking was pretty
much undocumented before Duterte’s “war
on drugs”. Prior to the “war on drugs”, there
were neither attacks nor vilication of groups
working on drug policy issues. Generally,
the shrinking of civic space amid attacks or
vilication of human rights advocates and
groups, has been connected to the government’s
counterinsurgency campaign.
54
But Duterte’s “war on drugs” raised barriers to
the expansion or even the maintenance of civic
space. One barrier is ocial bullying. Ideally, the
approach of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
involved an unrelenting campaign, an integrated
system, a balance in the national drug control
program addressing the legitimate medical
needs of drug users, and working towards
their reintegration into society. However,
immediately upon the assumption of the Duterte
Administration, when the heavy-handed Tokhang
approach was employed, those who dared
question the policy set down by the president
faced dire consequences.
Immediately upon the
assumption of the Duterte
Administration, when the
heavy-handed Tokhang
approach was employed,
those who dared question
the policy set down by
the president faced
dire consequences.
54 Center for International Human Rights, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, University of New York,
“The Closing of Civc Space in the Philippines: Submission the OHCHR for HRC Report 41/2.”
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/sites/default/les/News/cihr_report_to_ohchr_on_the_philippines.pdf
55 Jodesz Gavillan, “Duterte ‘Fires’ DDB Chair: You Do Not Contradict Your Own Gov’t.” Rappler, May 24, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/170839-duterte-res-ddb-benjamin-reyes-contradict-government/
56 Pia Ranada, “DDB Chief Dionisio Santiago Asked to Resign.” Rappler, November 7, 2017.
https://www.rappler.com/nation/187586-ddb-chief-dionisio-santiago-resignation/
57 Lara Tan, “PNP Relaunches ‘less Bloody’ Oplan Tokhang.” CNN Philippines, March 7, 2017.
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/03/06/Oplan-Tokhang-Part-2-war-on-drugs-PNP.html
For instance, Duterte red the chairperson of
the DDB when the latter said that his agency’s
estimate of the number of drug users in the
country was only 1.8 million, much lower than
the 3 million gure often cited by the President
to justify his “war on drugs”.
55
The same fate
happened to his successor when he voiced out
in media that the mega drug rehabilitation
facility in Tarlac being bannered by Duterte
as an accomplishment, was actually ineective,
a mistake.
56
Rather than basing his statements, gures and
decisions on empirical data coming from the
specialized government agencies, the President
forced the agencies to follow and support
what he said, even if his perception and data
were questionable.
Another is Duterte’s skill in sizing up public
opinion and his flexibility to adjust. There were
two signicant events that reshaped Duterte’s
“war on drugs” in response to public opinion that
shook his presidency. The rst was in March 2017
when Tokhang was suspended for two months
after rogue police ocers used Oplan Tokhang
to kidnap and kill Korean entrepreneur Jee Ick-
joo. The crime happened right inside the National
Headquarters of the Philippine National Police.
57
73 |
The second incident that negatively aected the
“war on drugs” was the killing of a minor, 17-year-
old Kian delos Santos, in August 2017 by police
ocers in Kalookan City in Metropolitan Manila.
Despite self-serving claims by the police that Kian
was a drug mule who shot it out with them, closed-
circuit television footage revealed that Kian was
escorted and shot to death by two police ocers.
The damning evidence led to the rst and only
conviction, thus far, related to the “war on drugs.”
58
After the killing of Kian, an independent survey
showed a decline in Duterte’s satisfaction
ratings. This led to the transfer of the
government’s anti-drug operations from
the PNP to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), at least publicly.
59
But despite Duterte’s popularity with the public
and his control of the government, many civil
society groups struggled to push back. Among
these are groups advocating for more humane
drug policies, and human rights groups working
on a vast array of civil and political rights, such
as the iDefend Movement (In Defense of Dignity
and Human Rights)
60
, the Philippine Alliance of
Human Rights Advocates
61
, KARAPATAN
62
, and
the movement Rise Up for Life and For Rights
63
,
among others. These groups have actively
campaigned against impunity and for justice
for all the victims of the “war on drugs”.
58 CNN Philippines Sta, “What We Know so Far about Kian’s Death.” CNN Philippines, August 24, 2017.
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/08/24/timeline-kian-delos-santos-death.html
59 Frances Mangosing, “PNP Ocially Terminates Oplan Tokhang.” Inquirer.Net, October 12, 2017.
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/937482/pnp-ocially-terminates-oplan-tokhang-pnp-oplan-tokhang-pdea
60 https://www.idefend.ph
61 https://philippinehumanrights.org/about/
62 https://www.karapatan.org
63 https://www.facebook.com/RiseUpForLifeAndRights/
64 Triciah Terada, “Five Vows, Five Years Later: A Lookback into Duterte’s Major Campaign Promises.” CNN Philippines, July
22, 2021. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/7/22/SONA-2021-Duterte-presidential-campaign-promises.html
65 Ariel Paolo Tejada, “Duterte Vows to End Criminality in 3 Months.” The Philippine Star, February 20, 2016.
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/20/1555349/duterte-vows-end-criminality-3-months
VIII. The Shrinking of
Civic Space: Threats
and Challenges
“If I become president, there’s no such thing as
bloodless cleansing.”
64
Duterte said during his
campaign for the presidency. He added that
he would not hesitate to use “all forces of the
government” in his “all-out war” against drugs.
65
Despite earning the ire of human rights
defenders for the violent and bloody fulllment
of his campaign promise, Duterte maintained his
popularity with the masses. His approach posed
layers of problems for human rights advocates that
resulted in the shrinking of civic space. Some of
these were more direct, such as the government-
orchestrated violence and attacks against justice
actors and human rights defenders. Others
are challenges in public perception and penal
populism, as well as gaps in policy and access
to justice mechanisms.
But at the core of these is the shrinking of civic
space in the context of the “war on drugs” which
was characterized by initiatives meant to incite
fear and shame, to eectively dissuade groups
and individuals from engaging and exercising
their rights, as discussed below.
74 |
A. Human Rights Defenders
and Justice Actors
Even during his time as the long-term mayor of
Davao City, the human rights community was
critical of Duterte’s “war on drugs”. His drug
war and the infamous “Davao Death Squad”
were the subject of numerous national and
international calls for investigation, even before
he was elected president of the Philippines.
When the drug war became a matter of national
policy, the human rights community was vocal
in its opposition and came together to help its
victims obtain justice, both in the domestic and
international fora, particularly the families of
those who were killed.
The President lost no time sending the message
that if they stand in the way of his “war on
drugs”, human rights activists would be killed
together with the drug addicts.
66
In a speech,
he blasted the human rights community’s
condemnation of the drug war saying, “Human
rights defenders said I ordered the killings
so I told them, ‘Okay, let’s stop and let [drug
users] multiply so when it’s harvest time, there
will be more deaths. I will include you because
you let them multiply’.”
67
In another speech, he
instructed the PNP to “shoot those who are part
of [drug activity]. If they [members of human
rights organizations] are obstructing justice,
you shoot them.”
68
Since the “war on drugs” began, human
rights defenders have reported a surge of
attacks, extrajudicial killings, surveillance,
defamation campaigns, and unfounded terrorist
accusations against them. In particular, human
rights defenders who have exposed the killings
resulting from the Duterte administration’s “war
on drugs” have been accused of working against
the interests of the country.
69
66 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community,” August 17, 2017.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/18/philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-community.
67 Jodesz Gavilan, “CHR in 2016: ‘We Are Not Enemies of the Fight against Drugs.’” Rappler, December 3, 2016.
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/154217-2016-chr-human-rights-duterte-drugs-war/.
68 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Threatens Human Rights Community,” August 17, 2017.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/18/philippines-duterte-threatens-human-rights-community.
69 The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, “‘I’ll Kill You Along with Drug Addicts’
President Duterte’s War on Human Rights Defenders in the Philippines.”
https://www.omct.org/les/2019/02/25257/philipppines_hrd_report_2019.pdf
Since the “war on drugs”
began, human rights defenders
have reported a surge
of attacks, extrajudicial
killings, surveillance,
defamation campaigns,
and unfounded terrorist
accusations against them.
75 |
The Observatory for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders, in documenting and assessing
the massive deterioration of the situation of
human rights defenders under the Duterte
administration, stated in a report that numerous
CSOs reported “increased surveillance,
intimidation, threats, and harassment from local
authorities”.
70
There was also a proliferation
of suspected fake accounts or bots on social
media, which were used to send death threats
and other malicious messages to them
Moreover, “At least ve members of iDEFEND
reported they had been listed as ‘persons of
interest’ on PNP and AFP watch lists. Social
workers assisting drug war victims’ families
were warned by police against intervening in
cases where people have been killed in the “war
on drugs”. Several NGOs reported decreased
cooperation from various government
departments while trying to access information
and public records on the “war on drugs”.
71
B. Church Groups
Among the drug war’s most vocal critics are
the Catholic Church and related faith-based
organizations. It is no secret that the Church has
operated a network that hides the targets and
aids widows and orphaned children, serving as a
refuge for victims of Tokhang and their families.
72
This invited a number of tirades from President
Duterte, who made remarks such as, “Who is
this stupid God?”
73
and calling bishops “sons of
bitches”, “homosexuals”
74
, and “useless fools”.
He even called on the community to “kill them”.
75
70 Rappler, ‘Demonizing’ human rights in the rst year of Duterte, Rappler Website, June 26, 2017.
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/171558-demonizing-human-rights-rodrigo-duterte-rst-year/
71 Supra note 69.
72 Poppy McPherson, “‘Open the Doors’: The Catholic Churches Hiding Targets of Duterte’s Drug War.” The Guardian,
February 28, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28/catholic-churches-hiding-targets-of-dutertes-
drug-war
73 Dan Manglinong, “Duterte Has Been Seen Praying and Kneeling. But He Calls God ‘Stupid.’” Interaksyon, June 25, 2018.
https://interaksyon.philstar.com/breaking-news/2018/06/25/129336/duterte-complicated-relationship-with-god-
catholic-church/
74 Reuters Sta, “Philippine President Renews Attack on Catholic Church,” Reuters, January 10, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-church-idUSKCN1P41JH
75 Ted Regencia, “Philippines’ Duterte: ‘Kill Those Useless Bishops.’ Aljazeera. December 5, 2018,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/5/philippines-duterte-kill-those-useless-bishops
76 Supra note 72.
77 Dan Manglinong, “Duterte Trading Barbs with Bishop Months after Repairing Ties with Church,” Interaksyon, November 27,
2018, https://interaksyon.philstar.com/politics-issues/2018/11/27/139168/church-and-state-duterte-trading-barbs-
with-bishop-months-after-repairing-ties-with-church/
At the height of the drug war, several pastoral
letters issued by the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) labeling
the anti-drug crusade a “reign of terror” were
read during Sunday Mass.
76
President Duterte
responded to this by addressing the Catholic
community, saying: “You Catholics, if you believe
in your priests and bishops, you stay with them.
If you want to go to heaven, then go to them.
Now, if you want to end drugs ... I will go to hell,
come join me.”
Church leaders were included by the President
in his so-called “narco-list” which identied
high level personalities allegedly involved in
the drug trade. In one speech, President Duterte
explicitly addressed Bishop Pablo Virgilio
David of Kalookan, a consistent drug war critic,
saying: “I am puzzled why you always go out
at night. I suspect, son of a b****, you are into
illegal drugs”. The allegation came with a threat:
“Bishop, ask someone to buy drugs for you.
I will decapitate you.”
77
76 |
Accompanying these attacks by the President,
was a series of death threats against church
leaders who are vocal critics of the drug war.
Though not proven to be directly linked to the
drug war, there have been three documented
killings of priests. That two out of the three
killings were committed right at the altar
shows how strong the culture of impunity is.
78
The killings got the attention of the Senate as
Senator Risa Hontiveros led a resolution urging
the Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs to conduct an investigation of
the attacks that “came on the heels of continued
verbal attacks by President Rodrigo Duterte on
the Catholic Church and its religious leaders.”
Senator Hontiveros added: “These verbal attacks
as well [as] the dismissive attitude towards the
killings may result in even more priest-murders
and other acts of violence against members of
religious communities.”
Hontiveros added, “Given this current political
climate, these killings further reinforce the culture
of impunity to silence valid Church-led criticisms
on state policies, particularly those with respect
to human rights and due process”.
79
C. Lawyers and Judges
President Duterte also issued threats addressed
to lawyers whom he accused of employing
circuitous judicial processes to enable their
clients to continue their involvement in the drug
trade. He ended his statement with a warning
that, “Even their lawyers, I will include them.”
80
78 Rappler.com, “Suspect in Killing of Father Richmond Nilo Arrested in Quirino.” Rappler, October 6, 2018,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/213678-suspect-bernie-limpio-arrested-richmond-nilo-murder/
79 Camille Elemia, “Senate to Investigate Killings of Priests,” Rappler, June 13, 2018,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/204821-senate-investigate-killings-lipino-priests/
80 Marlon Ramos, “Duterte Warns Drug Lords’ Lawyers,” Inquirer.net, October 13, 2017,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/852028/duterte-warns-drug-lords-lawyers
81 Carlos Conde, “Record High Killing of Philippine Lawyers.” Human Rights Watch, March 15, 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/15/record-high-killing-philippine-lawyers
82 Mike Navallo, “UN Rapporteur Urged to Probe Attacks on Philippine Lawyers.” ABS-CBN News, March 15, 2021,
https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/15/21/un-rapporteur-urged-to-probe-attacks-on-philippine-lawyers
83 Id.
84 Rappler.com, “The Duterte List: Judges, Mayors, Police Ocials Linked to Drugs.” Rappler, August 7, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/142210-duterte-list-lgu-police-ocials-linked-drugs/
85 Jerald Ulep, “13 ‘Narco-Judges,’ Nais Imbestigahan Ng Supreme Court.” Bombo Radyo Philippines, April 1, 2019,
https://www.bomboradyo.com/13-narco-judges-nais-imbestigahan-ng-supreme-court
As of March 2021, the number of lawyers killed
under any presidential administration had
reached a record high – with 61 lawyers down
ve years into Duterte’s term.
81
The National
Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) states that
of the 61 incidents, 54 were work-related; the
victims of the attacks were either defense
lawyers who handled drug cases or were involved
in human rights and public interest lawyering.
82
NUPL further said, “These attacks produce a
chilling eect which aects the performance
of their sworn duties to the courts, their clients,
their colleagues and the society. Filipino lawyers,
right now, fear that they might be the next
victims of these attacks.”
83
Judges were not spared inclusion in Duterte’s
narco-list, where he named more than 150
ocials from the judiciary, police, and local
governments allegedly involved in the drug
trade. Upon checking, it was found that the
list included a judge who has been dead for
almost ten years, a judge who was dishonorably
discharged in 2007, a judge who has already
retired, and judges who have no jurisdiction over
drug cases.
84
The initial narco-list released in
2016 was followed by another list in 2019 that
allegedly involved 13 other judges.
85
77 |
The inclusion of judges in the narco-list triggered
a reaction from then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno, who wrote a letter to the President
reminding him that the Supreme Court is the sole
entity tasked to discipline judges. She lamented
that the President’s public announcement could
jeopardize court proceedings and the safety
of the entire judiciary. She wrote: “Moreover,
because of the extrajudicial killings, which you
had spoken out against, perpetrated by persons
and groups that remain unidentied, our judges
may have been rendered vulnerable and veritable
targets for any of those persons and groups who
may consider judges as acceptable collateral
damage in the ‘war on drugs’.”
86
In response, the President unleashed a series
of attacks against the Chief Justice, calling her
“ignorant”, “dumb”, and a “coward”. She was
eventually removed from the Supreme Court by
her colleagues through a quo warranto action.
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers Diego
García-Sayán observed, “The unprecedented
decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
seems directly related to the threats made
against the Chief Justice in relation to her
professional activities in defense of the
independence of the judiciary.”
87
86 Rappler.com, “FULL TEXT: Sereno’s Letter to President Duterte,” Rappler, August 8, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/142329-full-text-sereno-letter-duterte-judges/
87 Judicial Independence in Philippines Is under Threat, Says UN Human Rights Expert,” OHCHR, Accessed February 1, 2023,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/06/judicial-independence-philippines-under-threat-says-un-human-
rights-expert
88 Carolyn O. Arguillas, “De Lima: CHR Will Prove There Is a Davao Death Squad,” MindaNews, April 17, 2009, https://www.
mindanews.com/c166-the-davao-killings/2009/04/de-lima-chr-will-prove-there-is-a-davao-death-squad/
89 Diane Louys, I’ll Kill You Along with Drug Addicts: President Duterte’s War on Human Rights Defenders in the Philippines
(Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2019), https://www.omct.org/les/2019/02/25257/
philipppines_hrd_report_2019.pdf
90 Bea Cupin, “Dela Rosa to Senate: We Are Not Butchers,” Rappler August 23, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/143942-pnp-ronald-dela-rosa-illegal-drugs-butchers/
91 Trisha Macas, “Duterte to a Critic: ‘I Will Destroy Her,’” GMA News Online, August 12, 2016
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/577315/duterte-to-a-critic-i-will-destroy-her/story/
92 Glee Jalea, “Robredo, Opposition Members Cleared, Trillanes Charged with Sedition,” CNN Philippines, February 10, 2020,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/10/trillanes-robredo-sedition.html?fbclid=IwAR0QHgdjAiNQMmA4wWR
sExbsiJsYWs0F6RmtOLdJhN9PgCH-VmzEzRjHH_w
D. Lawmakers and the
Political Opposition
President Duterte also launched his attacks
against members of the political opposition who
are critical of the drug war. The one who has
borne the brunt of his ire is former Senator Leila
de Lima, a long-time critic of President Duterte,
who investigated the drug-related killings in
Davao when Duterte was Mayor, in her capacity
as the Chairperson of the Commission on Human
Rights.
88
An incumbent Senator, she has been
detained on unsubstantiated drug charges since
2017. The attacks against Senator de Lima
began after she led a resolution in the Senate
on July 13, 2016, to investigate the “rampant
extrajudicial killings and summary executions of
suspected criminals.”
89
In August 2016, as Chair
of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, de Lima convened hearings on the killings
of hundreds of victims that were carried out in
Davao City as part of then Mayor Duterte’s “war
on drugs”.
90
Making no secret of his personal
vendetta against de Lima, President Duterte
pledged to “destroy her in public.”
91
Also at the receiving end of Duterte’s attacks
were Senator Risa Hontiveros, former Senator
Antonio Trillanes, and former Vice President
Leni Robredo. In 2019, the three were charged
with the crimes of Sedition, Inciting to Sedition,
Cyberlibel, Libel, Estafa, Harboring a Criminal,
and Obstruction of Justice, together with
activist lawyers, private citizens, and
members of the clergy.
92
78 |
It is worth mentioning that in response to Vice
President Robredo’s public statements critical
of the “war on drugs”, Duterte appointed her
as co-chair of the Inter-agency Committee on
Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD), only to remove her
less than three weeks later, when she proved to
be too focused and conscientious on the job.
93
E. Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
After his second State of the Nation Address,
President Duterte declared that he wanted the
CHR, a constant and persistent critic of the drug
war, abolished for “obstructing justice.” The
Congress immediately heeded his call and gave
the CHR an unrealistic budget of Php 1,000 (less
than 20 USD) for the year 2018.
As the CHR probed deeper into the drug war, its
attempts to conduct investigations were blocked
by government agencies that refused to give
the agency access to crucial documents.
94
CHR
Commissioners reported diculty in obtaining
detailed documentation from the PNP of cases
where victims were killed in connection with the
“war on drugs”.
95
At one point, the PNP agreed to
provide the CHR with case les of deaths involving
police operations as part of the “war on drugs”,
but this was taken back when Duterte declared
that “all investigations to be conducted on police
and military actually pertaining to human rights
violation[s]” had to be cleared with him.
96
93 Ina Andolong and Xave Gregorio, “Duterte Fires Robredo from Anti-Drug Czar Post,” CNN Philippines, November 24, 2019,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/11/24/Rodrigo-Duterte-Leni-Robredo-red-ICAD.html
94 Supra note 89.
95 Jodesz Gavilan, “CHR in 2016: ‘We Are Not Enemies of the Fight against Drugs,’” Rappler, December 3, 2016, https://
www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/154217-2016-chr-human-rights-duterte-drugs-war/; Jodesz Gavilan, “‘Puro
Dribble’: CHR Hits PNP for Not Cooperating in Drug War Probes,” Rappler, August 24, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/
nation/179928-chr-hits-pnp-failure-cooperate-probes-drug-war-killings/
96 Rambo Talabong, “Duterte Ordered Police Not to Share Files with CHR – DILG,” Rappler, September 8, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/181519-duterte-order-pnp-chr-refuse-share-case-folders/
97 Supra note 89 citing Karlos Manlupig and Tarra Quismundo, “Duterte Calls CHR Chair Idiot,” Inquirer.net, May 27, 2016,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/787771/duterte-calls-chr-chair-idiot; The Philippine Star, “Duterte Slams CHR Chief: Are
You a Pedophile?” The Philippine Star, September 16, 2017, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/09/16/1739962/
duterte-slams-chr-chief-are-you-pedophile; Pia Ranada, “Duterte Warns He’ll Order Shooting of Human Rights
Advocates,” Rappler, August 16, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/178968-duterte-probe-shoot-human-rights-
advocates/
98 Supra note 89.
99 The Philippine Star. “Duterte Slams CHR Chief: Are You a Pedophile?” The Philippine Star, September 16, 2017, https://
www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/09/16/1739962/duterte-slams-chr-chief-are-you-pedophile
100 Carlos Conde, “[OPINION] A New Weapon against Press Freedom in the Philippines,” Rappler, December 6, 2018, https://
www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/218315-court-cases-new-weapon-against-press-freedom-philippines/
101 CNN Philippines Sta, “TIMELINE: Rappler-SEC Case,” CNN Philippines, June 30, 2022,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/6/30/Rappler-SEC-case-timeline.html
102 Heather Chen, Kathleen Magramo, and Angus Watson, “Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa Cleared by Philippine Court of Tax
Evasion,” CNN, January 18, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/17/asia/maria-ressa-court-verdict-acquittal-intl-
hnk/index.html
103 Id.
Attempts to discredit the CHR included making
personal attacks against its Chair, the late Jose
Luis Martin ‘Chito’ Gascon, publicly calling him
an “idiot” and a “fair-skinned fool.”
97
In another
instance, Duterte asked Gascon if he was “gay”
or “a pedophile” after the CHR voiced concern
over the alleged killing by police of teenagers
in the “war on drugs”.
98
Members of the CHR
also reported receiving harassment and threats
online from the public, accusing them of being
protectors of criminals, and for allegedly not
taking action on human rights violations of
past administrations.
99
F. Media.
Two major media – Rappler, the on-line news
outlet, and the ABS-CBN radio and television
network – faced dire consequences for their
critical reporting on the drug war. Rappler was
charged in a string of cases
100
– one led by
the Solicitor General before the Securities and
Exchange Commission that led to the revocation
of its certicate of incorporation, which is still
being legally contested by Rappler;
101
a criminal
case for tax evasion against Rappler founder,
the Nobel peace laureate Maria Ressa, that she
recently won when she was acquitted by the
Court of Tax Appeals;
102
and a cyber libel suit led
against Ressa that led to her conviction, and is
currently on appeal before the Supreme Court.
103
79 |
ABS-CBN, on the other hand, was denied the
renewal of its congressional franchise when it
expired during the incumbency of the Duterte
administration. Various unfounded issues were
hurled against the network to justify the denial
of the franchise — from alleged tax evasion to
alleged violations of labor laws.
104
As the Human Rights Watch researcher in the
Philippines put it, “[W]hat’s being done to
Rappler reflects the Duterte administration’s
wider confrontational attitude toward the
media. Through social media, the President’s
oce has unleashed its attack dogs on news
organizations and journalists who report
critically on the drug war.”
105
G. Public Perception
Some sectors perceived the “war on drugs”
as one backed by “popular justice”, which
meant that the support for EJKs was a “form
of communal self defense” when the legal system
was perceived as being too slow, ineective,
and dysfunctional in addressing crimes. The
political rhetoric generated by President Duterte
in his speeches and other communications using
exaggerated stories and threats to kill, evoked
public rage to act on this perceived threat. This
“moral panic” made more acceptable, even
desirable, the framing of the “heroic saga”
of the “war on drugs”.
106
104 Eimor Santos, “House Panel Denies ABS-CBN’s Bid for Fresh Franchise,” CNN Philippines, July 10, 2020,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/7/10/abs-cbn-franchise-denied-.html
105 Carlos Conde, “[OPINION] A New Weapon against Press Freedom in the Philippines,” Rappler, December 6, 2018, https://
www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/218315-court-cases-new-weapon-against-press-freedom-philippines/
106 Jon Fernquest, “State Killing, Denial, and Cycles of Violence in the Philippines,” Philippine Sociological Review 66: 5–34,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26905842
107 Trisha Macas, “Duterte Threatens to Behead Human Rights Advocates,” GMA News Online, May 18, 2017, https://www.
gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/611343/duterte-threatens-to-behead-human-rights-advocates/story/
108 Delfo C. Canceran, “ ‘We are Humans’: Counternarratives of Drug Users in a Philippine Rehabilitation Facility,” Philippine
Sociological Review 66: 91–110, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26905845
109 Id.
To illustrate, President Duterte said in one of his
speeches: “Kaya ang sakit talaga ng loob ko na
makita ko ang sakripisyo nila, binababoy nitong
durugista. If you know better, huwag ka talagang
magkumpiyansa diyan sa human rights na iyan,
kay pati iyan sabayin ko kayo putulan ng ulo.
Hindi ako madala ng ganoong takot. Ikulong mo
ako eh di ikulong mo ako.” (“That’s why I feel bad
when I see that the sacrices of the people are
simply disregarded by these drug addicts. If you
know any better, you will not depend too much
on human rights, because if you do, I will behead
you. I do not fear them. If you will jail me, then
jail me.”)
107
This illustrates Duterte’s use of a justication
strategy, which claims that an alleged instance
of illegitimate state killing was actually legitimate
and within acceptable norms, and that is, to
preserve the peace and the Filipino family.
Another strategy he used is othering, which
identies persons who use drugs as “non-human”
in order to fuel and make palatable his violent
policies. In a public address, Duterte rhetorically
questioned the humanity of drug users: “Are they
human? What is your denition of a human being?
Tell me.”
108
In eect, people see persons who use drugs
as non-human, assuming that criminality has
taken away their humanity, and it also puts in
a negative light those who see drug users as
human, regardless of their criminal activities and
behavior. This othering strategy creates an illusion
of us-versus-them, and regards persons who use
drugs and those who care for them as excluded
from humanity.
109
80 |
By dening persons who use drugs (PWUD) as
non-human, Duterte employed a strategy which
allowed greater acceptance of the denial of their
human rights, and the increasing complacency/
acceptance of the public when police authorities
“neutralized” them.
The Duterte administration intentionally
demonized human rights defenders to the public
which led to a distortion of human rights and
the public image of its advocates. On August
16, 2017, Duterte alleged that human rights
organizations criticized the “war on drugs” to
protect drug criminals saying, “When it comes
to criminals, you [human rights organizations]
will proclaim, ‘human rights violations’ [to
protect them].”
110
The government went even
a step further, tagging human rights groups as
drug coddlers. Then Presidential Spokesperson
Harry Roque stated that the government did not
discount the possibility that some human rights
groups had become “unwitting tools of drug lords
to hinder the strides made by the administration.”
The statement was issued after then-Foreign
Aairs Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano claimed
that some human rights groups were being
“unwittingly used by drug lords” to destabilize the
government and discredit its “war on drugs”.
111
Even the CHR was not spared from being
demonized for criticizing the drug war and
invoking the rights of persons who use drugs.
The attacks against the Commission sought to
diminish its credibility, undermine public trust
in the body, and threaten its ability to full its
mandate. The Duterte administration vilied
the CHR for defending the rights of those killed
in the drug war, alleging that it put more weight
on the rights of the persons who use drugs over
the rights of their actual victims.
110 Pia Ranada, “Duterte Warns He’ll Order Shooting of Human Rights Advocates,” Rappler, August 16, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/178968-duterte-probe-shoot-human-rights-advocates/
111 Nestor Corrales, “Palace Insists: Rights Groups ‘Unwitting Tools of Drug Lords,’” Inquirer.net, March 27, 2018,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/978431/palace-insists-rights-groups-unwitting-tools-of-drug-lords
112 Social Weather Stations, “Second Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey: Net Satisfaction with Anti-Illegal Drugs
Campaign at ‘Excellent’ +70,” Social Weather Stations, September 22, 2019, https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/
artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20190922154614
113 Social Weather Stations, “Third Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey: Families victimized by common
crimes subside to 5.6%,” Social Weather Stations, October 30, 2019, https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/
artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20191030164733
Duterte alleged that “most of the time, the
Commission on Human Rights defends criminals.”
This started the trend on-line, “Nasaan ang
CHR?” (Where is the CHR?) that questioned the
Commission’s supposed inaction on other human
rights issues. This was addressed by the CHR
which reminded the public that its mandate is
to ensure respect of human rights by the State,
rst and foremost. However, the damage had
been done after the disinformation campaign
against it went viral in social media.
In the meantime, the satisfaction rating on
the anti-illegal drugs campaign of the Duterte
Administration remained excellent.
112
There was
a public perception that families were much
safer because of it.
113
The slow justice system
described earlier, further supported the idea that
indeed the “war on drugs” was the right way to
go. This also shrank the public space for critical
dissent and dialogue over the “war on drugs”.
81 |
IX. The Eect of the
‘War on Drugs’ on
Public Engagement
The atmosphere for dialogue has been damaged
by the hate and intolerance that has dominated
social media. Hateful and abusive statements
from top level ocials has trickled down to the
masses, inciting rage and even violence against
persons who use drugs and the organizations
that care for them.
This environment of hate and intolerance is
further enabled by the slow and dysfunctional
justice system, the gaps in drug policies, and the
narrowing avenues for public participation. As it
stands, the policy emanating from the top, and
the policy as applied in the streets, are grounded
on the use of violence and humiliation, which
incites fear and shame on those whose rights
are trampled upon.
In summary, the shrinking of civic space due to
the drug war has been brought about by: (i) fear
of attacks against life and liberty; (ii) fear of
social exclusion; (iii) shame caused by the stigma
on a person who uses drugs or by association
with them; (iv) the slow justice system; and (v)
the inaccessibility of accountability mechanisms.
114 “A/HRC/51/58: Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolution 45/33 and on the Progress and Results of Technical
Cooperation and Capacity Building for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Philippines,” OHCHR,
September 13, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5158-implementation-human-rights-
council-resolution-4533-and-progress
X. Eorts to Maintain
the Civic Space
Aside from the pushback and protests mounted
by various human rights groups, the following
tracks are being used to resist the shrinking of
civic space:
A. Access to Justice and
Human Rights Compliance
The Philippines is currently engaged in a
technical cooperation and capacity building
program with the United Nations called the
UN Joint Program on Human Rights (UNJP).
This was brought about by UN Human Rights
Council Resolution 45/33 “[c]ondemning all
acts of intimidation and reprisal, both online and
oline, by State and non-State actors against
individuals and groups working to promote and
protect human rights and those who seek to
cooperate or have cooperated with the United
Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in
the eld of human rights.”114 Through the UNJP,
there are opportunities to engage in six focus
areas: (i) Accountability; (ii) Improved data
of human rights violations by the police; (iii)
Strengthened engagement with international
human rights mechanisms; (iv) Strengthened
human rights capacity of civil society and
broader human rights engagement on critical
areas; (v) Human rights based approach to drug
control; and (vi) Counter-terrorist legislation.
82 |
B. UN Joint Program on Human Rights
Although the UNJP is only a three-year program,
there are opportunities to open up spaces for
engagement due to civil society membership
in the Steering Committee and the dierent
technical working groups.
C. International Criminal Court
Another avenue to push back and press for
accountability is the current situation in the
Philippines that is being considered by the
International Criminal Court. Currently, the
Philippines is under investigation for crimes
against humanity through murder “allegedly
committed on the territory of the Philippines
between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019
in the context of the Government of the
Philippines’ ‘war on drugs’ campaign.”
115
D. Narrative Change
Alternative forms of resistance have also been
taken to counter the negative narratives used
by the Duterte administration. Groups such
as RESBAK and Night Watch or Nightcrawlers
have used their respective crafts to change the
narratives and make the public more aware of
the true eects of Duterte’s drug war.
E. Harm reduction and public health
Continued engagement on harm reduction and
public health is an avenue worth pursuing. If
there is any indirect benet that can be cited
from Duterte’s “war on drugs”, there is now
more heightened awareness of the health
aspect of the drug problem. There are
opportunities present to promote policies that
go beyond incarceration and rehabilitation.
115 “ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Authorises Prosecutor to Resume Investigation in the Philippines,” International Criminal
Court, January 26, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-authorises-prosecutor-resume-
investigation-philippines
XI. Reclaiming Civic
Spaces
In the end, it is the attraction of populism and
overwhelming state violence perpetrated in the
name of public security, that perpetuates a weak
and disempowered civil society base and shrinks
civic space.
The pushback from civil society, limited as it is,
has shown how civic space can be reclaimed
through a multifaceted strategy that centers on
humanity, health, and respect for human rights.
The pursuit of the following actions has worked
to repel the forces of violence, and reclaim civic
spaces, one step at a time.
The pushback from civil
society, limited as it is, has
shown how civic space can
be reclaimed through a
multifaceted strategy that
centers on humanity, health,
and respect for human rights.
83 |
A. Humanize the victims by presenting
their narratives
With the thousands killed and the regularity
of the killings in the name of the drug war, the
public has, unwittingly, been numbed to the
violence. Humanizing the victims stirs a feeling
of connectedness among the public. The story
of Kian as a minor and a student who pleaded for
his life saying that he had an exam the next day
116
humanized him to the public and resulted in a
public outcry that made President Duterte
rethink his strategy for his drug war.
B. Use technology to aid in
documentation of violations
and for prosecution
It helped that in the case of Kian, there was
a closed-circuit television footage that was
used by the media to make the public realize
what actually happened. This same footage
was used to help secure the conviction of
the perpetrators. This highlights the need
for improving technological capacity in the
Philippines, including forensics capability,
to successfully prosecute crimes, since vast
numbers of prosecutions still rely merely on
witness testimony.
C. Use the justice system
There is a need to earnestly seek justice
and use the justice system, domestically
or internationally. Only through the use of
accountability mechanisms can impunity
for human rights violations be addressed.
116 Edu Punay, “‘Kian Begged for His Life before Cops Shot Him,’” The Philippine Star, October 3, 2017,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/10/03/1745309/kian-begged-his-life-cops-shot-him
D. Continued advocacy for good
governance and local engagement
It helped that in the case of Kian, the local
government of Kalookan City was proactive in
addressing the damage wreaked by Duterte’s
drug war. This highlights the importance of
working towards good governance by public
ocials, and working with local government
ocials as part of the checks and balances
to national policies that may be detrimental
to human rights and civic spaces.
E. Creative communications
Lastly, there must be eorts to counter populist
approaches that abound in many social media
platforms. These compete with and overwhelm
legitimate and traditional media which follows
strict ethical conduct in its reporting. As such,
there must also be communication strategies
employed to deliver legitimate and credible
news to the public.
84 |
Not Safe: Securitization
of the COVID-19 Crisis
and its Impact on Civic
Space in the Philippines
Mary Jane N. Real
85 |
I. Summary
This research focuses on the
response of the administration
of President Rodrigo Duterte
to the COVID-19 health crisis.
Specically, it probes the central
role of the national government in
declaring a “war against COVID-19”
as it rolled out a national action
plan that resulted in a securitized
approach to the pandemic.
It examines the domestic translation of global
and regional imperatives to manage the spread
of the COVID-19 virus. While the activism of
civil society against securitization in the context
of the internet is discussed in another paper in
this series, this research closely documents the
experiences of civil society – specically the
impact on civic space – and their strategies of
resistance to push back the government’s heavy-
handed approach to the health emergency. It
foregrounds possibilities for more inclusive and
expansive expressions of activism to counter
the shrinking civic space central to upholding
democracy in the country. Informing this research
are the contestations between upholding the
human right to health, and the consequent
violations of fundamental freedoms.
Source: ILO/Minette Rimando Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
Groceries operate and implement safety measures during COVID-19 in the Philippines.
86 |
II. Global Directives and
Securitized Concept
of ‘Safety’
On 30 January 2020, The World Health
Organization (WHO) declared the virus
outbreak in China a global health emergency,
1
and thereafter named the new disease
COVID-19, short for Coronavirus Disease 2019
2
.
At around the same time, the Department of
Health (DOH) in the Philippines conrmed the
rst COVID-19 case in the country — a female
Chinese national who travelled to the Philippines
from Wuhan, China via Hong Kong.
3
On 2 February
2020, the DOH conrmed the second case,
another Chinese national who was the companion
of the Chinese woman from Wuhan who travelled
to the country. The patient died following
admission at a hospital the day before. According
to WHO, this was the rst reported case of
a COVID-19 related death outside China.
4
By 11 March 2020, WHO Secretary-General
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared
the spread of the COVID-19 virus a global
pandemic.
5
For over two years since then,
COVID-19 cases spread throughout the country.
As of 12 December 2022, the total of reported
cases reached over four million.
6
1 “Archived: Who Timeline - Covid-19.” 2023. World Health Organization. World Health Organization, accessed 18 May
2022, https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19
2 “Novel Coronavirus(2019-NCoV) - World Health Organization.” 2023, accessed 18 May 2022, https://www.who.int/docs/
default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200211-sitrep-22-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=fb6d49b1_2
3 “Doh Conrms First 2019-NCOV Case in the Country; Assures Public of Intensied Containment Measures: De-partment
of Health Website.” 2023. DOH Conrms First 2019-NCOV case in the country, assures public of intensi-ed containment
measures Department of Health (website), https://doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/doh-conrms-rst-2019-nCoV-case-
in-the-country
4 Neil Arwin Mercado, “DOH Conrms 2nd Case of NCoV in Ph, Says Patient Died Saturday.” Philippine Daily In-quirer
(website), 10 February 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1222873/doh-conrms-second-case-of-ncov-in-ph
5 “Archived: Who Timeline - Covid-1927.” 2020. World Health Organization. World Health Organization. April 27, accessed 5
May 2022, https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19
6 Mathieu, Edouard, Hannah Ritchie, Lucas Rodés-Guirao, Cameron Appel, Charlie Giattino, Joe Hasell, Bobbie Macdonald,
et al. “Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19),” Our World in Data, 5 March 2020, accessed 14 July 2022,
https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus
7 “Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan for the Novel Coronavirus.” World Health Organization. 4 February 2020,
accessed 14 July 2022, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/strategic-preparedness-and-response-plan-for-the-
new-coronavirus
8 “National Action Plan against Covid-19 - Ndrrmc.gov.ph.” National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Oce of Civil Defense. National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Oce of Civil De-fense, 2020,
accessed 10 June 2022, https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/index.php/2014-09-05-06-17-43/2014-10-27-08-59-42/s-2014/9-
ndrrmc-advisory/4148-national-action-plan-against-covid-19.html
9 “Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan for the Novel Coronavirus.” World Health Organization, accessed 11 June 2022,
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/strategic-preparedness-and-response-plan-for-the-new-coronavirus
10 Ibid.
The WHO released its 2019 Novel Coronavirus
(2019-nCoV): Strategic Preparedness and
Response Plan on 4 February 2020 to guide
countries in developing their own national and
regional operational plans. The global plan
explicitly requires that member states “must take
a whole-of-society and whole-of government
approach” in scaling up their respective country
readiness and response operations.
7
The Philippine
government, in drafting its National Action Plan
against COVID-19 (NAP COVID-19), reiterated
this directive. At least on paper, the National
Task Force against COVID-19 (NTF-COVID-19)
mandated to implement the plan characterized it
as “people-centered, local government unit-led,
and nationally-enabled” in its approach.
8
As the outbreak of the virus worsened, the
WHO COVID-19 Strategy Update released on
14 April 2020 acknowledged that countries
“with explosive outbreaks that grow at an
exponential rate...must immediately adopt and
adapt population-level distancing measures
and movement restrictions in addition to other
public health and health system measures”.
9
However, it cautioned that such measures often
referred to as “shutdowns” or “lockdowns” could
have a profound negative impact on societies,
and disproportionately aect disadvantaged
groups.
10
Such adverse consequences became
evident especially in its eects on the civic space
as the Philippines imposed one of the longest
lockdowns in the world, lasting over a year.
87 |
The Philippine government’s eorts to contain
the COVID-19 pandemic was also influenced by
directives at the global level that tie together
a securitized approach to counter terrorism
and the COVID-19 crisis. In June 2020, the
Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED)
launched a report on the convergences between
COVID-19 and counter terrorism. On the one
hand, it suggests that the COVID-19 emergency
may exacerbate the terrorist threat; on the
other hand, it proposes that counter terrorism
expertise and programming are relevant to
public health responses in the context of the
pandemic. In eect, this approach has led to
the “ever increasing securitization of diverse
elds of practice previously outside the scope
of counter terrorism” with far-reaching adverse
consequences for human rights and civic space.
11
Such securitized measures, including those derived
from counterterrorism strategies, became apparent
as the Duterte government rolled out its approach
to control the COVD-19 pandemic. Contrary to the
caution raised by the WHO in its directives, “safety”
or what it means to keep the populace safe from
the virus, primarily centered on measures to control
the population through the increased involvement
of security forces to maintain safety and security.
Consequently, human rights abuses abound such
as the prolonged suspension of fundamental
freedoms under extended lockdowns, arbitrary
arrests and detention of alleged violators, including
activists, and expanded surveillance practices
drawn from technological measures to combat
counterterrorism. The right to peaceful assembly
was among the rights curtailed, a harbinger of
the constriction of civic space in the country.
11 Gavin Sullivan and Chris Jones, “Is the counter-terrorism agenda shrinking civic space?” Funders Initiative for Civ-il
Society, accessed 5 May 2022, https://www.fundersinitiativeforcivilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Is-CT-
shrinking-civic-space-FICS-May-2022.pdf
12 “Press Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Coordinating Council,” ASEAN Coordinating Council. ASEAN (website), 2
February 2020, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Press-Statement-of-the_Special-ACC-20.2.2020.pdf
III. A Key Role for Defense
Establishments in ASEAN
At a regional level, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which the Philippines
is a member, issued several statements and
convened several meetings to try to stem the
spread of the virus. As early as 20 February
2020, the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC)
held a Special Meeting in Vientiane, Lao PDR
to discuss follow-up actions to the ASEAN
Chairman’s Statement on ASEAN Collective
Response to COVID-19 issued on 14 February
2020.
12
On 9 April, the ASEAN foreign ministers
held an ASEAN Coordinating Council Meeting
and called for a Special ASEAN Summit and the
ASEAN Plus Three (China, Republic of Korea,
Japan) on COVID-19, which was held on 14 April
via video conference. ASEAN member-states
issued a statement from the summit that called
for a post-pandemic recovery plan and proposed
the establishment of the COVID-19 ASEAN
Response Fund. ASEAN pronouncements during
the pandemic centered on strengthening public
health cooperation among member states, and
keeping markets open for trade and investments
to stabilize the economy.
88 |
Many of the ASEAN member-states have a long
history of the politicization of its military, and
in the last decade, there has been a revival of
military dominance and control against the
backdrop of rising authoritarian or autocratic
rule in Southeast Asia. Today, armies are in direct
control in two countries – Myanmar and Thailand.
In other ASEAN countries such as Cambodia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines, the armed forces
have continued to play a dominant role in
civilian aairs. In coping with the challenges of
the pandemic, ASEAN and its member-states
rearmed this pivotal role of the military,
and explicitly carved out a key role for the
defense establishments.
Ratied on 14 April 2020, the 2019 Declaration
of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus
Disease explicitly commends “the eorts to
enhance practical cooperation among ASEAN
defense establishments to organize information
and best practice sharing activities,...”
13
The
Declaration further arms the need to leverage
“the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological
and Radiological Defense Experts in promoting
scientic cooperation and enhancing professional
linkages” as agreed upon by the ASEAN Defense
Ministers in their Joint Statement on Defense
Cooperation against Disease Outbreak issued
on 19 February 2020.
13 “Declaration of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).” ASEAN Summit, ASEAN (website),
2020, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FINAL-Declaration-of-the-Special-ASEAN-Summit-on-
COVID-19.pdf
14 “Phnom Penh Vision on the Role of Defense ... - ASEAN Main Portal,” ASEAN Organization (website), 22 June 2022,
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/JS_PNH-Vision_on_COVID_19_Recovery_Adopted-by-the-16th-
ADMM-22-June-2022.pdf
15 Ibid.
The key role of defense establishments in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic was
conrmed in the Phnom Penh Vision on the
Role of Defense Establishments in Support of
COVID-19 Recovery, which was adopted at the
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting convened
on 22 June 2022. According to the statement
adopted at the meeting, the Defense Ministers
resolved to “strengthen defense cooperation
between ASEAN defense establishments
to enhance our militaries’ capabilities to
respond swiftly and eectively to the
COVID-19 pandemic”.
14
The Defense Ministers commended the eorts
of the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological
and Radiological Defense Experts in convening
a virtual workshop on “Promoting Scientic
Cooperation to Manage Infectious Disease
Outbreaks”. They encouraged the eorts of the
ASEAN Center of Military Medicine (ACMM) to
strengthen cooperation among military medicine
experts by organizing workshops on quarantine
camp management, COVID-19 management in
a disaster area, medical logistics management
in a pandemic, among others.
15
89 |
IV. The Government’s
Response of Control
The politicization of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), like in many other ASEAN
member-states, has a long history that traces
back to the post-war politicization of the
country itself, and was accelerated during
the years following former President Ferdinand
Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 1972. The
AFP, together with other auxiliary security forces
in the country, became the chief implementer
of martial law, subverting the constitutional
practice of civilian control of the military. Since
then, the military has played an expanded role
in political rule, especially in the context of the
growing inability of the civilian government to
perform its basic functions of governance.
16 Republic Act 10121 Philippine Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, Ndrrmc.gov.ph, 2023. National Dis-aster Risk
Reduction and Management Council (website), accessed 13 July 2022, https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/45/
Republic_Act_10121.pdf
17 “NDRRMC Resolution No. 02, s. 2020 Resolution Recommending the Declaration of a State of Calamity Throughout the
Philippines due to the Corona Virus Disease 2019,” National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (website),
2020, https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/4143/NDRRMC_Resolution_No_02_s_2020.pdf
18 Priam Nepomuceno, “NTF Covid-19 transfers functions to NDRRMC,” Philippine News Agency Website. 20 July 2022,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1179393
19 “NDRRMC Resolution No. 02, s. 2020 Resolution Recommending the Declaration of a State of Calamity Throughout the
Philippines due to the Corona Virus Disease 2019,” National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (website),
2020, https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/4143/NDRRMC_Resolution_No_02_s_2020.pdf
Among other examples, the politicized role
of the AFP has been institutionalized in the
civilian-military coordination mandated to be
carried out under the National Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)
constituted in 2010. The NDRRMC, which is at the
helm of disaster risk reduction and management
in the country, is chaired by the Secretary of
National Defense and its operating arm is the
Oce of Civil Defense under the Department
of National Defense
16
. During the COVID-19
pandemic, the NDRRMC recommended to the
President to declare a state of calamity as
early as 16 March 2020, to mobilize resources
and enjoin its member agencies to support the
Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious
Diseases (IATF-EID) in the management of the
disease.
17
The initial role that NDRRMC played
in the government’s response to the pandemic
was subsequently armed on 20 July 2022 when
the IATF-EID announced its dissolution, and the
transfer of its functions to the NDRRMC.
18
Under this backdrop, it becomes a foregone
conclusion that the government will default into
a securitized approach and rely on its security
forces to control the spread of the virus. Already,
the military and the police were mandated by
law, and allocated resources under the Philippine
Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 to
directly intervene in a state of calamity, in this
case, the COVID-19 pandemic.
19
Except that
under these circumstances, the central role of
the security forces in punitively enforcing the
government’s wars against terrorism and illegal
drugs has been further enhanced by extending
them a legitimate role in humanitarian assistance.
Source: ILO/Minette Rimando Flickr,
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
People wait in line and maintain physical distance
before entering the public market to reduce the
spread of COVID-19, Muntinlupa City, Philippines.
90 |
In the end, the government’s overriding securitized
approach to curb the disease became evident
even in its handling of humanitarian aid during
the pandemic. Activists involved in humanitarian
missions were arrested. For example, seven
activists involved in food distribution in Bulacan
province were charged with violating the
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act and inciting to
commit sedition after police found newspapers
and magazines with anti-government content
in their vehicle.
20
As discussed in succeeding
sections, organizers of humanitarian eorts,
including those who mobilized to set up
community pantries, have been red-tagged
and targeted by security forces.
A. Heightened role of the
security forces
The IATF-EID, in place since 2014 to coordinate
the government’s response to any potential
epidemic in the country, was convened on
28 January 2020 to address the emerging
pandemic.
21
The IATF-EID, composed of dierent
executive departments and agencies of the
government, took on the role of “the policy-
making body” in addressing the threat of the
virus while the NTF COVID-19, which it set up,
assumed “the operational command headed
by the Secretary of the National Defense”.
22
20 Carlos Conde, “Philippine Activists Charged with Sedition, ‘Fake News’: Government Misusing Covid-19 Law Against its
Critics,” Human Rights Watch (website), 22 April 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/22/philippine-activists-
charged-sedition-fake-news
21 Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolution No. 01 series of 2020,
“Recommendations for the Management of Novel Coronavirus Situation,” Department of Health (website),
https://doh.gov.ph/sites/default/les/basic-page/IATF%20Resolution.pdf
22 Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolution No. 15 series of 2020,
“Recommendations Relative to the Management Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation,” Department of Health
(website) 24 March 2020, https://doh.gov.ph/sites/default/les/health-update/IATF-RESO-15.pdf
23 Ibid.
24 Philippine News Agency, “Gov’t boosts response, contingency ops vs. COVID-19 variants,” Philippine News agency
(website), 7 August 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1149681
25 JC Gotinga, “In this order: Lorenzana, Aňo, Galvez to lead task force vs coronavirus,” Rappler (website), 27 March 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/256136-lorenzana-ano-galvez-lead-task-force-coronavirus/
The National Action Plan COVID-19 (NAP
COVID-19) approved by the IATF-EID through
a resolution passed on 24 March 2020 presents
the government’s general approach to address
the pandemic.
23
It details the “Prevent-Detect-
Isolate-Treat-Reintegrate plus Vaccinate
(PDITR+V) strategy”, and a “four-door
strategy of stricter border control, heightened
surveillance, quick response, and focus and
expand mass vaccination” to contain the spread
of the virus in the country.
24
But contrary to the
stated intent of the NAP COVID-19 to carry out a
“people-centered” approach, early on, it became
apparent that the government viewed the
pandemic as a public order and law enforcement
crisis, rather than a public health emergency.
Like in most of ASEAN, the key role of the security
forces in managing the pandemic in the country was
clear from the start. President Duterte appointed
military generals instead of public health experts at
the helm of the NTF COVID-19, the body mandated
to implement NAP COVID-19 with the IATF-EID. Of
the members of the Cabinet at that time, Defense
Secretary Deln Lorenzana was appointed as chair
of the task force; Interior Secretary Eduardo Aňo
who also had supervision over the police as the vice
chair; and Peace Process Secretary Carlito Galvez,
Jr as chief implementer to manage the day-to-day
operations of the task force. All three are retired
army generals.
25
91 |
The government’s declaration of war against
COVID-19 led by its security forces, in effect,
became a battleground between upholding the
public’s right to health vis-a-vis the overall
health of the country’s democracy. Put in
charge of managing the pandemic, the military
and police enforced strict compliance with
the public health protocols and community
quarantine guidelines to safeguard public
health with detrimental consequences to the
exercise of fundamental freedoms. Abuses
committed against human rights defenders
have had serious implications in sustaining
a robust civic space, essential to upholding
the country’s democracy.”
B. A series of lockdowns
and restrictions
President Rodrigo Duterte signed on 8 March
2020, Proclamation No. 922, Declaring a State
of Public Health Emergency Throughout
the Philippines.
26
On 16 March 2020, he
signed Proclamation No. 929 that placed
the Philippines under a State of Calamity for
six months, Section 4 of which specifically
directed “all law enforcement agencies, with
the support from the AFP” to “undertake all
necessary measures to ensure peace and
order in aected areas”.
27
Through subsequent
proclamations, President Duterte extended
the State of Calamity for a total of two
years, ending on 12 September 2022. These
proclamations ushered in the President’s full
use of his police powers based on an exception
provided for in the 1987 Constitution.
26 Proclamation No. 922, s. 2020, Declaring a State of Public Health Emergency Throughout the Philippines, accessed 11 June
2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/02feb/20200308-PROC-922-RRD-1.pdf
27 Proclamation No. 929, s. 2020, Declaring a State of Calamity Throughout the Philippines Due to Corona Virus Disease 2019,
accessed 11 June 2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/03mar/20200316-PROC-929-RRD.pdf
Pursuant to such exercise of police powers,
the national and local governments in the
country followed suit imposing travel bans and
community quarantines since 10 March 2020.
A restriction policy declared by the President,
community quarantines are a series of stay-at-
home orders and other restrictions implemented
through the IATF-EID and the NTF COVID-19.
The policy has four levels: enhanced community
quarantine (ECQ), modified enhanced
community quarantine (MECQ), general
community quarantine (GCQ), and modied
general community quarantine (MGCQ). ECQ
is the strictest of all levels, while MGCQ is the
most lenient.
The government’s declaration
of war against COVID-19
led by its security forces,
in eect, became a
battleground between
upholding the public’s
right to health vis-a-vis
the overall health of the
country’s democracy.
92 |
28 Nick Aspinwall, Coronavirus Lockdown Launches Manila into Pandemonium, Dispatch, Foreign Policy (website). 14 March
2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/14/duterte-quarantine-philippines-coronavirus-lockdown-launches-manila-
into-pandemonium/
29 Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolution No. 10 series of 2020,
Recommendations for the Management of Novel Coronavirus Situation, Freedom of Information (website), 9 March 2020,
https://efoi-ph.appspot.com/downloads/IATF_Resolution_No._10.pdf
30 Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolution No. 11 series of 2020
Recommendations for the Management of Novel Coronavirus Situation, Department of Health (website), 12 March 2020.
https://doh.gov.ph/sites/default/les/health-update/IATF-RESO-11.pdf
31 Interagency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolution No. 12 series of 2020
Recommendations for the Management of Novel Coronavirus Situation, Department of Health (website), 13 March 2020
https://doh.gov.ph/sites/default/les/health-update/IATF-RESO-12.pdf
32 Krissy Aguilar, “Luzon now under ‘enhanced community quarantine’ – Palace,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (website), 16 March
2020 https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1243036/luzon-island-now-under-enhanced-community-quarantine-palace
33 Nick Aspinwall, “Philippines Extends Lockdown in Manila and Other High-Risk Areas to May 15,” The Diplomat (website),
24 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/philippines-extends-lockdown-in-manila-and-other-high-risk-
areas-to-may-15/
Issued on 12 March 2020, the IATF-EID
Resolution No. 11 recommended putting the
entire Metro Manila under ECQ. President
Duterte adopted the recommendation and,
flanked by army and police ocials, announced
the strictest of lockdowns to be imposed
in Metro Manila from 15 March to 14 April
2020.
28
Explicitly, the resolution prohibited
mass gatherings dened as “a planned or
spontaneous event where the number of
people attending could strain the planning
and response resources of the community
hosting the event”.
29
The IATF-EID called on
coordination with the police and military “to
ensure eective and orderly implementation”
of the measures.
30
IATF-EID Resolution No. 12
issued March 13, 2020, which dened the new
alert level system used in the country, clearly
stated “the heightened presence of uniformed
personnel to enforce quarantine procedures”
under ECQ. Even in the more lenient GCQ, the
IATF-EID decreed that “uniformed personnel and
quarantine ocials shall be present at border
patrol”.
31
On 16 March 2020, the President
extended the ECQ to cover the entire Luzon,
32
and extended it in certain areas, including
the capital until May 15.
33
Source: Photo by Vincent Go
A village watchman in orange vest, monitors the
entry and exit of residents at Barangay 151, Caloocan
City during the Enhanced Community Quarantine.
Only one person from each family was granted a
quarantine pass to go out and purchase basic goods
and supplies as schools and work were all suspended
during the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak.
93 |
By the last week of April 2020, ECQ covered
92% of the top 300 cities and municipalities in
the country. Thereafter, several congurations
of community quarantines have been enforced
in dierent parts of the country, in the attempt
to curb the spread of the disease. During
the rst half of May 2020, 60% of the cities
and municipalities remained under ECQ.
Subsequently, 70% of these shifted to GCQ
in the second half; whereas Metro Manila and
other high-risk areas were in and out of MECQ
until August 2020.
34
The United Nations (UN) Oce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
described the extended lockdowns in the
Philippines as indicative of a “highly militarized
response” to the pandemic. Then OHCHR head
Michelle Bachelet explained that respect for
people’s rights cover their inherent freedoms
“across the spectrum, including economic, social
and cultural rights, and civil and political rights.”
She added that protecting these rights was
“fundamental to the success of the public health
response and recovery from the pandemic”.
35
34 Yi Jiang, Jade R Laranjo and Milan Thomas, “COVID-19 Lockdown Policy and Heterogenous Responses of Urban Mobility:
Evidence from the Philippines.” ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 659, Asian Development Bank, May 2022,
accessed 13 June 2022, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/les/publication/798546/ewp-659-covid-19-lockdown-
urban-mobility-philippines.pdf
35 UN News. “Toxic lockdown culture’ of repressive coronavirus measures hits most vulnerable” (website), 27 April
2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062632?fbclid=IwAR3XlWVpwLY9c5ZWZRjSuo5s6IHKiHpG32W-
brlSScOrXdKvowRFu0K1YZ0
36 Reuters Sta, “Shoot them dead’ - Philippine leader says won’t tolerate lockdown violators,” Reuters (website),
2 April 2020 https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-philippines-duterte-idINKBN21K0AQ
37 Michael Yusingco & Angelika Pizarro, Ateneo Policy Center, “Philippines: An Escalating Threat to Human Rights” IACL-AIDC
(blog), 18 June 2020, https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/6/18/the-militarized-response-to-the-covid-19-
pandemic-in-the-philippines-an-escalating-threat-to-human-rights
C. Sowing a narrative of fear and terror
President Duterte’s pronouncements following
the full implementation of stringent lockdowns
and the heightened presence of the military and
police throughout the country, clearly conveyed
the government’s securitized response to the
pandemic. Many of the public addresses made
by the President added to sowing a climate of
fear. Several of his tirades were directed at
those who were critical of his administration as
well as those demanding for their basic rights
that were unmet by the government grappling
with the pandemic.
As ECQ was enforced in Metro Manila, residents
of San Roque village in Quezon City demanding
food and medical aid were arrested on 1 April
2020 for staging a rally without government
permit. That evening, after the arrests,
President Duterte said: “My orders to the police
and military...if there is trouble and there’s an
occasion that they ght back and your lives are
in danger, shoot them dead.” He added, “Is that
understood? Dead. Instead of causing trouble,
I will bury you.”
36
There was such a strong social media backlash
from President Duterte’s public address that
the head of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
at that time was compelled to clarify that the
President’s statement was just a hyperbole, and
that no police personnel has adopted a shoot-
rst mindset in enforcing the lockdown orders.
37
Activists criticized the President’s erce rhetoric,
and accused him of authorizing violence and
vigilantism as demonstrated during his anti-
terrorism campaign and his war against
illegal drugs.
94 |
In another televised speech, President Duterte
warned the public that a martial law-style
enforcement would be implemented if they do
not comply with the lockdown. “I’m just asking
for a little discipline. If not, if you do not believe
me, then the military and police will take over,”
he said. “The military and police will enforce
social distancing and curfew. They will. It is just
like martial law too. You choose,” added the
President. Then AFP spokesperson Brigadier
General Edgardo Arevalo assured that there was
no cause to be “alarmed”, that it is only natural
for the military to prepare for a possible “martial
law-like lockdown”. He claried that “when he
says martial law, it means the President would
like to emphasize that we would really make
some arrests.”
38
Upon declaring the enforcement of ECQ in Luzon
and other high-risk areas until 15 May 2020,
President Duterte was also quoted as saying
that he had a standing order for security forces
to “kill all” members of the communist New
People’s Army (NPA), and its “legal fronts”. He
accused guerrillas of attacking aid deliveries,
derailing the government’s relief operations.
39
Such accusations made by the President
and the security forces reinforced the red-
tagging of leftist activists deemed associated
with the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPA) and the NPA, congruent with the
administration’s anti-terrorism propaganda (See
‘Counterinsurgency, Red-Tagging & The ‘War On
Terror’: A War against Deliberation and Dissent,
A War with No End’ by Marc Batac).
38 Athira Nortajuddin, “Martial Law-Like Lockdown for The Philippines?” The ASEAN Post (website), 23 April 2020,
https://theaseanpost.com/article/martial-law-lockdown-philippines
39 Luis Liwanag and Froilan Gallardo, “Duterte Threatens to Declare Martial Law; Accuses Rebels of Disrupting Aid
Deliveries,” Benar News (website), 24 April 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/philippines-
coronavirus-04242020145436.html
40 Aie Balagtas See, “Rodrigo Duterte Is Using One of the World’s Longest COVID-19 Lockdowns to Strengthen His Grip
on the Philippines,” Time (website), 15 March 2021 https://time.com/5945616/covid-philippines-pandemic-lockdown/
41 Maria Ela L. Atienza, Aries A. Arugay, Jean Encinas-Franco, et al. “Constitutional Performance Assessment in the Time of
a Pandemic: The 1987 Constitution and the Philippines’ COVID-19 Response” International IDEA Discussion Paper 3/2020,
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, accessed 10 July 2022, https://www.idea.int/sites/
default/les/publications/constitutional-performance-assessment-in-the-time-of-a-pandemic.pdf
Despite the counter statements made by
government ocials to tone down President
Duterte’s strongman rhetoric in handling the
pandemic, the climate of fear had become
undeniable among the populace as reports
of killings, arrests, detention and excessive
punishment of violators proliferated. Upholding
the rule of law and human rights, which were
already threatened during Duterte’s anti-
terrorism campaign and war on drugs, has
become more precarious. Human rights lawyer
Jose Manuel Diokno warned that under the cover
of the coronavirus, “there is a clear eort to
shrink the democratic space, and free discussion
that is essential to a democracy.”
40
D. Consolidation of executive power
As in the past, during emergencies or crises in
the country, there has been greater consolidation
of power in the executive during the COVID-19
crisis. This was not the rst time that Congress
granted special emergency powers to the
President and to the executive branch of
government to address a crisis under the 1987
Constitution. For example, President Corazon
Aquino was granted emergency powers by
Congress after a coup attempt in 1989 damaged
the economy. In the 1990s, Congress granted
President Fidel Ramos emergency powers to
privatize water companies in the country.
41
95 |
More than a week after the declaration of a
COVID-19 health emergency, President Duterte
also asked Congress for emergency powers.
The President certied as urgent the passage
of the proposed Bayanihan Heal as One bill
that would grant him emergency powers to
implement measures to curb the spread of the
virus. The abbreviated procedures for passing
urgent legislation, and the support of blocs
allied with the President in both Houses of
Congress assured the swift passage of this
Act and subsequent related laws.
And while this law required the President to
submit reports on its implementation, Congress
has not taken deliberate measures to exercise
its oversight functions over the executive,
including scrutinizing these reports. Both houses
of Congress have not directed any specic
concerns to the President and IATF-EID regarding
their performance. In 2020, the Supreme Court,
now dominated by Duterte appointees, denied
a petition seeking to declare the Bayanihan Heal
as One Act unconstitutional on the ground that
it failed to show grave abuse of discretion.
42
42 Maria Ela L. Atienza, “The Philippines a Year under Lockdown Continuing Executive Dominance, Threats to Democracy, and
Unclear Pandemic Response,” Verfassungblog (website), 26 April 2021, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-philippines-a-
year-under-lockdown/
43 Republic Act No. 11469, An Act Declaring the Existence of a National Emergency Arising from the Coronavirus Disease
2019 Situation. Ocial Gazette, Congress of the Philippines, accessed 27 June 2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.
ph/downloads/2020/03mar/20200324-RA-11469-RRD.pdf
44 Republic Act No. 11494, An Act Providing for COVID-19 Response and Recovery Interventions and Providing Mechanisms
to Accelerate the Recovery and Bolster the Resilience of the Philippine Economy, accessed 27 June 2022, https://www.
ocialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/09sep/20200911-RA-11494-RRD.pdf
45 Christopher Lloyd Caliwan, “PNP nabs 47 Covid-19 fake news peddlers,” Philippine News Agency (website) 15 April 2020,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1099910
46 Mariejo S. Ramos, “Rights groups wary as NBI summons 17 for ‘fake news’,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (website), 4 April 2020,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1253684/rights-groups-wary-as-nbi-summons-17-for-fake-news
E. Laws restraining defenders’
human rights
The Bayanihan Heal as One Act (Republic Act
11469) was enacted into law on 24 March 2020.
Among its many provisions, the law penalized
individuals or groups “creating, perpetrating
or spreading false information regarding the
COVID-19 crisis on social media and other
platforms”.
43
Eective for only three months,
the law was repealed by the enactment on 11
September 2020 of Republic Act No. 11494
or Bayanihan to Recover As One Act, which
was in eect until 19 December 2020.
44
In less than a month after the enactment of this
law, which further criminalized the spreading
of fake news, 47 persons were apprehended
for alleged violations of this provision. They
were charged under Article 154 of the Revised
Penal Code on the “unlawful use of means of
publication and unlawful utterances” in relation
to Republic Act 10175 or the Anti-Cybercrime
Law.
45
In a news report dated 4 April 2020,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) also
summoned at least 17 individuals for allegedly
spreading false information online.
46
96 |
On 3 July 2020, President Duterte signed into law
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
47
which raised the
question, how a controversial non-health related
legislation was passed during the pandemic. In
a study on the securitization of the COVID-19
crisis in the country, researchers noted that this
became possible because of two processes: the
repositioning of the ongoing serious problem
of terrorism within the pressing problem of the
COVID-19 pandemic, which brought legitimacy
to the need to urgently address the issue of
terrorism despite it being a non-health concern;
and the second process is the securitization of
the government’s response to the pandemic,
which eventually provided a favorable political
environment for the enactment of the new law.
The President played a powerful role in bringing
about this shift in policy.
48
The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
in the midst of the pandemic points to the
success of the government’s eorts to securitize
its approach to curb the COVID-19 disease at
the same time that it has portrayed terrorism
as a continuing threat. Aside from calling
attention to acts of terrorism committed during
the outbreak of the virus, government ocials
pointed out that terrorist activities, such as
alleged armed assaults by NPA members against
security ocers distributing relief goods, are
disruptive of the country’s eorts to contain
the pandemic, and warrant counter terrorism
maneuvers by the police or the military.
49
In
effect, the President and his administration
jointly framed terrorism and the COVID-19
pandemic as pressing threats to national
security equally necessitating immediate
attention and a continuing securitized response.
47 Republic Act No. 11479, An Act to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalise Terrorism, Thereby Repealing Republic Act No. 9372,
Otherwise Known As the Human Security Act of 2007, Ocial Gazette, Congress of the Philippines, accessed 27 June
2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/06jun/20200703-RA-11479-RRD.pdf
48 Shivanee Dolo, Crisha Mae DG. De Vera, Zhenia Flores, et al., “Eecting a Shift in State Policy during the COVID-19
Pandemic: The Case of the Philippines’ Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,” Philippine e-Journal for Applied Research and
Development Research and Development, 11, 55 – 68, 28 June 2021, accessed on 2 August 2022, https://pejard2.slu.edu.
ph/wp-content/uploads/2021.12.16.pdf
49 Philippines Submission for the High Commissioner’s Oral Updates on Covid-19,” Oce of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (website), 31 May 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/les/2022-03/Philipppines.pdf
50 Maria Ela L.Atienza, Aries A. Arugay, Jean Encinas-Franco, et al. “Constitutional Performance Assessment in the Time
of a Pandemic: The 1987 Constitution and the Philippines’ COVID-19 Response,” International IDEA Discussion Paper
3/2020, accessed 2 August 2022, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/les/publications/constitutional-performance-
assessment-in-the-time-of-a-pandemic.pdf
In a study undertaking a constitutional
performance assessment of the Philippines’
COVID-19 response, the researchers concluded
that there is a marked weakening of the
constitutional provisions for separation of
powers essential to governmental checks and
balances in a democracy. They pointed out that
civilian supremacy over the military as envisioned
by the 1987 Constitution has become a mere
formality as the coercive power of the security
forces largely informed the government’s response
to the pandemic. “In other words, the response
was not only securitized in its approach, but
also heavily militarized in its implementation”,
the study emphasized.
50
In a study undertaking a
constitutional performance
assessment of the Philippines’
COVID-19 response, the
researchers concluded that
there is a marked weakening
of the constitutional
provisions for separation
of powers essential to
governmental checks and
balances in a democracy. “…
the response was not only
securitized in its approach,
but also heavily militarized
in its implementation”,
the study emphasized.
97 |
V. The Repressive
Impact on Civic Space
Juxtaposed with the continuing urgency to
combat terrorism and continue its war against
illegal drugs, the government throughout the
leadership of President Duterte viewed the
pandemic as a security concern and painted
a war-like scenario to curb it. For instance,
the DOH in its press releases described the
COVID-19 situation as “World War C”.
51
With
COVID-19 identied as an unseen enemy, the
government pushed for extraordinary measures
to combat it. This justified the extensive
authority granted to the police and the
military, and their full deployment to enforce
stringent quarantine measures that curtailed
fundamental freedoms.
As President Duterte declared in one of his
public speeches: “We are in the ght for [our]
lives. We are at war against a vicious and
invisible enemy, one that cannot be seen by
the naked eye. In this extraordinary war, we
are all soldiers....” At the end of his address,
he issued a warning: “Obey the police and the
military....You can be arrested.”
52
This war-
like narrative echoed the expansion of the
government’s police powers, and its reliance on
security forces to enforce punitive public health
protocols to eliminate the virus as the perceived
enemy. The securitization of COVID-19 has
legitimized the draconian measures employed
by the government to control it.
51 Department of Health Press Release, “Honouring Nurse’s Day: DOH Calls for More HCWS to be Heroes of World War C,”
Department of Health (website), 13 May 2020, https://doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/HONORING-NURSE%e2%80%99S-
DAY:-DOH-CALLS-FOR-MORE-HCWS-TO-BE-HEROES-OF-WORLD-WAR-C
52 Presidential Communications Operations Oce, “Guidance of President Rodrigo Duterte During the Inter-Agency Task
Force Meeting on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” Presidential News Desk (website), 16 March 2020,
https://mirror.pco.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/20200316-Guidance-of-President-Rodrigo-Roa-Duterte-
on-the-Coronavirus-Disease-2019-COVID-19.pdf
53 Karl Hapal, “The Philippines’ COVID-19 Response: Securitizing the Pandemic and Disciplining the Pasaway,” GIGA Journal
of Current Southeast Asian Aairs Vol. 40 (2) 224 – 244 18 March 2021, accessed 30 June 2022, https://journals.sagepub.
com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1868103421994261
54 Lade Jean Kabagani, “Galvez cites strategies for 2nd phase of gov’t plan vs. Covid-19,” Philippine News Agency (website),
8 July 2020, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1108322
In an article explaining the securitization of
COVID-19, Karl Hapal pointed out that the
securitization of an issue consists of three main
processes: the production of existential threats,
emergency actions, and breaking free of rules.
President Duterte’s securitizing act, according
to him, relied on framing the pandemic as a ght
for the nation’s survival, which requires swift,
decisive action, and a wide latitude of powers
lest the nation is destroyed. Once such discourse
is accepted, emergency actions or measures
beyond the ordinary take eect and are then
rendered legitimate. In this case, the acceptance
of the President’s populist rhetoric justied the
militarist response by the government through
the active deployment of its security forces
to suppress the spread of the virus.
53
In the implementation of the government’s NAP
COVID-19, chief implementer Carlito Galvez
reiterated the call of the President that the rst
imperative of the NAP COVID-19 is on “changing
[the people’s] mindset....” He pointed out that
“the success of our campaign is basically
anchored on the people’s support and active
participation and vigilance to strictly observe
and promote the minimum health standard and
disease prevention.”
54
But to secure people’s
compliance, the government has criminalized
non-compliant behavior through the coercive
powers of the military and the police. This
has resulted in violations of civil liberties,
including the suppression of the rights of
human rights defenders.
98 |
The focus on national security threats – real
and inflated – through the extension of President
Duterte’s war against terrorism, and the war
against illegal drugs to a war against COVID-19
has led to serious human rights violations.
Human rights defenders have been among those
under attack as the government justied the
criminalization of dissent and delegitimized
their activism under these war narratives. In the
context of the COVID-19 emergency, however,
the abuses perpetuated by the government
continued not only against those who self-
identify or are identied by state agents as
activists, but now extend to citizens who are
non-compliant or complain of the government’s
inadequate eorts to address the pandemic,
as well as to defenders of rights who are critical
of the government’s crackdown on the exercise
of their fundamental freedoms during the
health emergency.
A. Curtailment of freedom
of peaceful assembly
As the government enforced stringent social
distancing measures to curb COVID-19, it
suppressed the exercise of the freedom of
association and peaceful assembly, which
constitutes an essential element of civic
space. The prohibition on protests to stem the
spread of the disease has led to the silencing of
critics, and the stifling of criticism. Converging
for demonstrations during the height of the
pandemic became a challenge as freedom of
movement was also curtailed with enforced
travel bans, and restrictions on gatherings in
public places. Demonstrators critical of the
government and its policies during the COVID-19
emergency were arrested, in eect, extending
President Duterte’s unrelenting campaign to
eliminate dissent that began with his war against
terrorism and illegal drugs.
As the government enforced
stringent social distancing
measures to curb COVID-19,
it suppressed the exercise of
the freedom of association
and peaceful assembly,
which constitutes an
essential element of civic
space. The prohibition on
protests to stem the spread
of the disease has led to the
silencing of critics, and the
stifling of criticism … in eect,
extending President Duterte’s
unrelenting campaign
to eliminate dissent that
began with his war against
terrorism and illegal drugs.
99 |
In Cebu City, the police arrested and detained
protesters on 5 June 2020 allegedly for violating
pandemic protocols during a rally against
the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Bill;
55
16
students in Iligan City were also arrested and
detained under the same charges for a similar
protest on 12 June 2020.
56
Despite the ban
on demonstrations because of the COVID-19
disease, protesters also rallied on 27 July 2020
during President Duterte’s fth State of the
Nation Address. A total of 141 protesters were
arrested nationwide, including four urban poor
women who were jailed for joining an online
protest. Some 64 individuals were also arrested
on their way to attend the demonstrations in
Cavite province.
57
On 1 April 2020, two weeks after ECQ was
enforced in Metro Manila, the police dispersed
with brute force close to a hundred urban poor
settlers from San Roque village in Quezon City,
and arrested 21 protesters who were demanding
food and medical aid.
58
On 2 June 2020, six
jeepney drivers, members of the transport group
Piston, were arrested for rallying to resume
their routes to earn a living, having not received
any assistance from the government since the
lockdown.
59
In eect, prohibiting the exercise
of the freedom of assembly infringed on their
exercise of other fundamental rights, such as
their right to food and livelihood.
55 Beatriz Marie Cruz, “Reign of Terror: Activists in the Philippines arrested for questioning COVID-19 protocols and more,”
The Gish (website), 10 June 2020, https://medium.com/the-gish/reign-of-terror-activists-in-the-philippines-arrested-
for-questioning-covid-19-protocols-and-more-e48e8a22c57b
56 Rambo Talabong, “16 students arrested in Iligan City during Independence Day protest,” Rappler (website), 12 June 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/263623-arrested-protesters-iligan-city-independence-day-2020/
57 Karlo Mongaya, “Amid threats of mass arrest, Filipino protesters rally during Duterte’s State of the Nation Address,”
Global Voices (website), 3 August 2020, https://globalvoices.org/2020/08/03/amid-threats-of-mass-arrest-lipino-
protesters-rally-during-dutertes-state-of-the-nation-address/
58 CNN Philippines Sta, “21 protesters demanding food aid arrested in Quezon City,” CNN Philippines (website),
1 April 2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/1/quezon-city-protesters-arrested-.
html?fbclid=IwAR24UXDVPhHzPveZpDuaHKEDIzEqm3MeM4C7dtaXpSbk_rLzAh7vB8zZqL0
59 Beatriz Marie Cruz, “Reign of Terror: Activists in the Philippines arrested for questioning COVID-19 protocols and more,”
The Gish (website), 10 June 2020, https://medium.com/the-gish/reign-of-terror-activists-in-the-philippines-arrested-
for-questioning-covid-19-protocols-and-more-e48e8a22c57b
60 The News Lens, “Philippine LGBT Activists Fight Duterte’s Machismo with Solidarity,” TNL Media Group (website), 1 July
2020, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/137151
61 UN General Assembly, Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,
A/75/258, United Nations, 28 July 2020, accessed 18 August 2022, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N20/197/62/PDF/N2019762.pdf?OpenElement
On 26 June 2020, LGBTIQ activists who
marched to mark Pride Month and express their
opposition to the Anti-Terrorism bill were met
with police violence, and 20 were arrested
for illegal assembly. The protesters explained
that Pride demonstrations are occasions for
protests as they are not only concerned with
personal coming-out narratives, but also
with demonstrating their solidarity with the
experiences of oppressed Filipinos.
60
Thee then
Independent Expert on sexual orientation and
gender identity pointed out that such pride
marches are critical in instilling public awareness
and increasing visibility of LGBTIQ identities
and issues. Given such importance, he argued
for greater access to public space for LGBTIQ
people and warned that that “dilemmas created
by the pandemic in relation to public space are
particularly grave”.
61
B. Suppression of freedom
of expression
As mentioned previously, the enactment of
the Bayanihan Heal as One Act, which included
a provision criminalizing the spread of false
information, triggered successive arrests of
individuals charged under Article 154 of the
Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Cybercrime
Law for spreading false information online. An
emergency legislation, the Cybercrime Law
led to suppression of the freedom of expression
during the COVID-19 crisis.
100 |
Among those arrested was Cebu-based artist
and scriptwriter, Maria Victoria Beltran, for
her satirical post on COVID-19 in social media.
After she was threatened by the city mayor, she
took down her post, and said that she had no
intention of “spreading confusion and fear”. Her
statement added that the law prosecutes fake
news purveyors only when they “promote chaos,
anarchy, fear, or confusion”. Nevertheless, she
was detained, and had to post bail.
62
In a news report dated 4 April 2020, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) explained that it
had stepped up its investigation of fake news
on the internet, particularly those relating to
the pandemic, as this “could endanger public
order”.
63
However, the securitized response to
disinformation instilled fear that has precluded
healthy dialogue among the citizenry. In
denouncing the arrests, the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) asserted: “A fully functional
democratic society should be able to allow
the reasonable exercise of free speech and
expression as a means to participate in matters
concerning public life. Arrests should never
be made as a default response to dissent.”
64
62 Coconuts Manila, “Writer arrested for allegedly spreading fake news about COVID-19 cases in Cebu City,” yahoo!news
(website), 20 April 2020, https://ph.news.yahoo.com/writer-arrested-allegedly-spreading-fake-013806267.html
63 Mariejo S. Ramos, “Rights groups wary as NBI summons 17 for ‘fake news’,” Inquirer.Net (Philippine Daily Inquirer (website),
4 April 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1253684/rights-groups-wary-as-nbi-summons-17-for-fake-news
64 Llanesca T. Panti, “CHR decries warrantless arrest of Cebu-based writer over satirical COVID-19 post,” GMA News
(website), 22 April 2020, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/735177/decries-warrantless-arrest-
of-cebu-based-writer-over-satirical-covid-19-post/story/
65 World Health Organization, “International health regulations — 2nd edition”, 2005, Reprinted 2008, accessed 14 July 2022,
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf?sequence=1
66 World Health Organization, “Ethical considerations to guide the use of digital proximity tracking technologies for
COVID-19 contact tracing,” WHO, 28 May 2020, accessed 14 July 2022 https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-
2019-nCoV-Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1
67 World Health Organization, “International health regulations — 2nd edition”, 2005, Reprinted 2008, (accessed 14 July
2022) (https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf?sequence=1
68 World Health Organization, “Ethical considerations to guide the use of digital proximity tracking technologies for
COVID-19 contact tracing,” 28 May 2020, accessed 14 July 2022, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-
nCoV-Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1
C. Surveillance and encroachment
on the right to privacy
Aside from the freedom of expression and the
right to association and peaceful assembly,
the right to privacy is among the fundamental
freedoms essential to sustain a free and open
civic space in society. Already, as discussed
in another research in this series, human rights
defenders have reported numerous incidents
of surveillance, particularly through the use
of digital technology, in the context of the
government’s campaigns against terrorism
and illegal drugs that continued during
the pandemic (See ‘Big Brother’s Grand Plan:
A Look at the Digital Security Playbook in
the Philippines’ by Jessamine Pacis).
Hence, there have been continuing legitimate
concerns of the challenges to civic space
that surveillance poses in the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
The WHO generally denes public health
surveillance as “the continuous, systematic
collection, analysis and interpretation of
health-related data needed for the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of public health
practice, and
65
member-states are obliged under
its International Health Regulations to set up these
systems.
66
The WHO adopted its own guidelines
on ethical issues in public health surveillance
67
,
and in light of the pandemic, issued an interim
guidance on ethical considerations to guide the
use of digital proximity tracking technologies
for COVID-19 contact tracing.
68
101 |
However, it remains to be seen if any of
these guidelines have been followed in the
implementation of the Philippines’ public health
surveillance systems. For example, while the
WHO guidelines suggested that such public
health surveillance system to be time-bound
and temporary in nature, there is no clarity
when such surveillance in the country will be
lifted, and what will be done with the collected
data thereafter. There are no expressed
guarantees from the administration that the
data collected for COVID-19 will not be used
for other undisclosed purposes. While its actual
occurrence in the country is dicult to prove at
present, public health surveillance systems in the
context of COVID-19 could easily cross over to
mass surveillance of the population, or targeted
surveillance of specic individuals.
With the securitization of COVID-19 embedded
in the country’s response to the pandemic, as
the Funders Initiative for Civil Society (FICS)
pointed out in its strategic review, health has
now become a national security concern that
warrants the government’s intrusion further into
the lives of the population during emergencies.
The mass collection and surveillance of individual
health data can readily enable the proling
of individuals and groups at a scale that was
unimaginable pre-COVID-19. Institutionalizing
such flagrant forms of surveillance can lead
to discrimination and dierential treatment
violative of human rights.
69
69 Ben Hayes and Poonam Joshi, “Rethinking civic space in an age of intersectional crisis: a brieng for funders,” Funders
Initiative for Civil Society, May 2020, accessed 15 July 2022, https://www.fundersinitiativeforcivilsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/01/FICS-Rethinking-Civic-Space-Report-FINAL1.pdf
70 Loreben Tuquero, “Almost 8 months of voter registration lost in some areas due to lockdowns,” Rappler (website), 24 August
2021, https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/months-voter-registration-lost-some-areas-due-covid-19-lockdowns/
71 Hannah So, “COVID-19 is Already Negatively Impacting Election Integrity in the Philippines,” International Republican
Institute (website), 16 July 2021, https://www.iri.org/news/covid-19-is-already-negatively-impacting-election-
integrity-in-the-philippines/
72 Dwight de Leon, “Comelec extends voter registration, October 11 to 30,” Rappler (website), 29 September 2021,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/comelec-extension-voter-registration-october-31-2021/
D. Derailment of the right to vote
in national elections
The securitized approach to the pandemic
centered on enforcing extended lockdowns also
had adverse eects on the conduct of the May 9
national elections in the country. In March 2020,
rising COVID-19 cases prompted the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) to close its oces
throughout the country, and suspended voter
registration for 148 days from 10 March until
31 August 2020. While registration resumed in
September, it was suspended again specically
in Metro Manila and neighboring provinces for
about two weeks from 4–18 August 2020, and
again for 28 days from 29 March to 14 May 2021
due to the successive imposition of lockdowns
in these localities.
70
This resulted in an overflow of Filipinos trying to
register within the deadline set on 30 September
2021. To address this, the COMELEC set up
an online booking system, but it did not work.
By the rst week of June, appointment slots in
some localities were already completely booked
through the deadline.
71
Despite these setbacks,
the COMELEC was initially reluctant to extend
the period for voter registration citing a short
timeframe between the deadline and election
day. With pressure from Congress, however, it
subsequently agreed to a one-month extension.
72
102 |
On election day, the COMELEC declared that
COVID-19 patients who are isolating in their
homes or in facilities would not be allowed to
break their isolation hence were precluded from
casting their vote. COMELEC Commissioner
George Garcia asserted then that this was in
accordance with the IATF-EID guidelines and
resolutions.
73
However, he said those that came
to the polling places and tested positive under
the COVID-19 symptom checking process set
up by local government units during election
day would be led into isolation polling places
and allowed to vote.
74
These mixed directives
precipitated confusion among potential voters.
The right to vote, which is directly related
to the citizens’ direct participation in public
decision-making is one of the fundamental
rights necessary to maintain a robust civic
space essential to uphold democratic
governance in the country. Preoccupied
with enforcing stringent security protocols,
the government erred against ensuring
the full exercise of this right during the
recent elections.
73 Xave Gregorio, “COVID-19 patients under isolation won’t be able to vote,” Phil Star Global (website), 29 April 2022,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/04/29/2177636/covid-19-patients-under-isolation-wont-be-able-vote
74 Christopher Lloyd Caliwan, “Those with Covid-19 symptoms still allowed to vote: DILG,” Philippine News Agency (website),
29 April 2022, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1173305
75 Anti-Terrorism Council Resolution no. 12, “Designating the Community Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army
also known as Bagong Hukbong Bayan (CPP/NPA) as Terrorist Organisations, Associations, and/or Groups of Persons,”
Ocial Gazette, Congress of the Philippines, 9 Dec. 2020, accessed 2 September 2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.
ph/downloads/2020/12dec/20201209-ATC-12-RRD.pdf
E. Virulent red-tagging of
government critics
(See ‘Counterinsurgency, Red-Tagging & the
‘War On Terror’: A War against Deliberation
and Dissent, A War with No End’ by Marc
Batac). While already practiced even before
the COVID-19 pandemic in line with the
government’s ongoing anti-terrorism campaign,
red-tagging intensied with the enactment
of the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2020. The
Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) established to
implement this law, followed the President’s
lead and issued Resolution No. 12 on 9 December
2020 designating the CPP and the NPA as
terrorist organisations,
75
and thereafter, the
NDF. This further justied the widespread use of
red-tagging by the National Task Force to End
Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELAC),
the government’s anti-communist task force.
It has become prolic online as security forces
have weaponized social media in pursuit of the
government’s counterinsurgency campaign.
103 |
Among those red-tagged were human rights
defenders perceived by state authorities to be
members of the CPP-NPA-NDF or supportive
of their ideology. In a Facebook post on 30 April
2020, the AFP 303
rd
Infantry Brigade based in
Negros Province linked civil rights organizations,
including the Philippine Alliance of Human
Rights Advocates (PAHRA) and the Medical
Action Group (MAG) to the CPP-NPA-NDF. The
APF labelled these organizations as “terrorist
viruses” to be avoided.
76
In June 2020, a member
of PAHRA and Executive Director of BALAOD
Mindanao, Ritz Lee Santos III, was accused online
of being a member of a local communist group
because he organized a rally to denounce the
Anti-Terrorism Law of 2020. Religious leader
Sister Mary John Mananzan has been repeatedly
accused by then NTF-ELAC spokesperson
Lorraine Badoy of being a high-ranking member
of a terrorist organization.
77
Some women celebrities were also among those
red-tagged, regardless of whether they identify
as activists or not. In November 2021, Lt. General
Antonio Parlade Jr. who was then the head of
the NTF-ELAC, posted warnings on Facebook
against Filipina actors Angel Locsin and Liza
Soberano, and Miss Universe 2018 Catriona Gray
who had expressed their support for Gabriela,
a left-leaning women’s alliance associated
with networks considered as legal fronts of the
CPP-NPA-NDF. Parlade discouraged them from
having links with leftist groups warning that it
could cost them their lives.
78
76 In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND), “An appeal to the Human Rights Council for a strong
resolution that addresses the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in the Philippines,” iDEFEND (website), 24
September 2020, https://idefend.ph/news/statements/appeal-human-rights-council-strong-resolution-addresses-
rapidly-deteriorating-human
77 In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND), “Red tagging of human rights defenders distracts from
government accountability- iDEFEND/PAHRA ,” iDEFEND (website), 23 June 2020, https://idefend.ph/news/statements/
red-tagging-human-rights-defenders-distracts-government-accountability-idefendpahra
78 Aie Balagtas See, “Rodrigo Duterte Is Using One of the World’s Longest COVID-19 Lockdowns to Strengthen His Grip
on the Philippines,” TIME (website), https://time.com/5945616/covid-philippines-pandemic-lockdown/
79 Imelda Deinla, “Red-tagging” and the Rule of Law in the Time of COVID-19,” Australian Institute of International Aairs
(website), 1 April 2021, https://www.internationalaairs.org.au/australianoutlook/red-tagging-and-the-rule-of-law-
in-the-time-of-covid-19/
80 Christine Deiparine, “Health workers’ and teachers’ groups latest to be red-tagged by NTF-ELCAC,” Philstar Global
(website), 11 April 2021, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/04/11/2090405/health-workers-and-teachers-
groups-latest-be-red-tagged-ntf-elcac
81 Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos, “Community pantries welcome but Reds taking advantage: NTF-ELCAC,” Philippine News Agency
(website), 20 April 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1137446
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, security
forces have cast a wider net in their red-tagging
to include not only activists or those associated
with leftist causes, but more extensively,
to target those who complain or criticize
government measures and policies in light of the
pandemic. This has included academics, doctors,
artists, and lawyers and ordinary citizens as they
try to inform the public, defend those who have
been arbitrarily charged, or provide humanitarian
assistance during the pandemic.
79
On 11 April 2021, the Alliance of Health Workers
(AHW) expressed alarm at being red-tagged in
a column written by NTF-ELAC spokesperson
Lorraine Badoy, after it called for increased
government support and better response to
the pandemic.
80
Likewise, Ana Patricia Non
who started a community pantry that quickly
caught the imagination of the public and
became a nationwide initiative to provide basic
goods to those in need during the enforced
quarantine, was also red-tagged. The NTF-ELAC
commented on their social media account that
such community pantries were being used to
spread communist propaganda.
81
104 |
Red-tagging has become “a swift and deadly
means” to silence members of civil society
who continue to denounce and expose the
ineectiveness of the government’s securitized
approach to the pandemic. “Many of those red-
tagged by state authorities are subsequently
killed or injured by unidentied assailants, similar
to some of the killings arising from Duterte’s war
on drugs,” stated the International Commission
of Jurists (ICJ) in a legal brief. “There is no
signicant progress on eective investigation
and accountability for such killings.”
82
This
practice has further jeopardized the remaining
mechanisms of accountability and rule of law
that were already eroded as the administration
clamped down on fundamental freedoms during
the health emergency.
83
82 International Commission of Jurists, “Danger in Dissent: Counterterrorism and Human Rights in the Philippines,”
international Commission of Jurists (website), January 2022, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ICJ_
PhilippinesRedTagging_270122.pdf
83 Imelda Deinla, “Red-tagging” and the Rule of Law in the Time of COVID-19,” Australian Institute of International Aairs
(website), 1 April 2021, https://www.internationalaairs.org.au/australianoutlook/red-tagging-and-the-rule-of-law-
in-the-time-of-covid-19/
84 AFP, “COVID-19: Philippine President Duterte orders arrest of mask violators,” WION news (website), 6 May 2021,
https://www.wionews.com/world/covid-19-philippine-president-duterte-orders-arrest-of-mask-violators-383222
85 AP News, “Duterte threatens to arrest Filipinos who refuse vaccination,” AP News (website), 22 June 2021
https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-arrests-health-feeb885f996b2a6f0f425a315c6c5ed9
86 Agencia EFE, “Duterte orders arrest of unvaccinated flouting stay-at-home orders,” EFE News (website), 7 January 2022,
https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/duterte-orders-arrest-of-unvaccinated-flouting-stay-at-
home/50000262-4712549
87 Rambo Talabong, “Over 100,000 quarantine violators arrested in PH since March,” Rappler (website), 8 September 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/arrested-quarantine-violators-philippines-2020/
88 Tony La Vina, “Warrantless arrests in a pandemic,” Manila Standard (website), 2 June 2020, https://manilastandard.net/
opinion/columns/eagle-eyes-by-tony-la-vina/325003/warrantless-arrests-in-a-pandemic.html
F. Massive arrests of violators
and activists
Arrests of a massive number of violators
occurred during the pandemic as directed
by President Duterte. The President issued his
threats and ordered the police to arrest the
following: those not wearing a mask properly
84
;
those who refuse vaccination
85
; and those
unvaccinated who flout quarantine protocols
86
.
And so, the police went ahead to execute his
orders during the enforced lockdowns. As of
6 September 2020, close to six months after
the punitive imposition of social distancing
measures, over 100,486 alleged quarantine
violators were arrested, and 1,735 were still
detained in police stations, according to
data from the JTF COVID Shield.
87
Most of
these arrests were warrantless, their legality
questioned, whether or not the police complied
with the requirements of warrantless arrests
prescribed by law.
88
Such wanton conduct of the police and the
alarming number of arrests made has provoked
fear and anxiety especially among the poor
who have been penalized simply for attempting
to survive.
105 |
Already conjured during Duterte’s campaign
against illegal drugs, the poor, who comprised
most of those arrested violators, have been
lumped into the pejorative concept of ‘pasaway’,
which loosely refers to a person who is obstinate,
lacks discipline, and violates COVID-19
regulations. (See ‘The Eect of the Philippine
‘War on Drugs’ on Civic Space’ by Ateneo
Human Rights Center)
Despite President Duterte’s anti-elite rhetoric,
and especially in the context of the bungled
disbursement of the government’s COVID-19
emergency subsidies for the poor authorized
under the Bayanihan laws
89
, the targeting of the
poor – the ‘pasaway’ – betrays the deep-seated
class prejudices of his administration.
90
The state’s coercive power used to produce,
maintain and reinforce social divides evident
during its war on illegal drugs spilled into control
over civic space during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Arresting the ‘pasaway’ has the numbing eect
of silencing dissent. Those arrested without
due process were unable to question the
legality of their arrests, or the reasonableness
of stringent health restrictions that infringe on
their fundamental rights. Under the cover of the
crisis, there has been little room to question the
President’s directives that smack of violence and
vigilantism, or investigate the abuses committed
by the security forces.
89 Michelle Abad, “What went wrong in 2020 COVID-19 ‘ayuda,’ lessons learned for 2021,” Rappler (website), 8 April 2021,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/explainers/coronavirus-ayuda-government-aid-what-went-wrong-2020-
lessons-learned-2021/
90 Karl Hapal, “The Philippines’ COVID-19 Response: Securitising the Pandemic and Disciplining the Pasaway,” GIGA
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Aairs Vol. 40 (2) 224 – 244, 18 March 2021, accessed 30 June 2022
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1868103421994261
91 Jodesx Gavilan, “Lives in danger as red-tagging campaign intensies,” Rappler (website), 20 February 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/252028-lives-in-danger-duterte-government-red-tagging-campaign/
92 Nick Aspinwall, “Philippines: brutal crackdown on activists and environmental defenders amid spread of Covid-19,”
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (website), 6 April 2020, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-
news/philippines-brutal-crackdown-on-activists-and-environmental-defenders-amid-spread-of-covid-19/
93 Pola Rubio, “NDFP consultants missing after arrested by police at vaccination site,” Yahoo news (website), 11
April 2022, https://ph.news.yahoo.com/ndfp-consultants-missing-after-arrested-by-police-at-vaccination-
site-094458042.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RhcnRwYWdlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_
sig=AQAAANsmDGHLtV2zs08_TosuB8WB3L6dntvI1fL52xpnRJtqXVurKqfWlsANjLRJeQAJbyge8zGiQoTMMXSaQl_4IWu2
kpP_0wnrdeeBxJe-OfxbYHTaZ_y2CdAxcEi-sWhE_YLbmzfwbVTgtksKdBsTISN4gn2_k9PXDUZqy8QKEYfX
Aside from the poor, among those arrested
during the pandemic were activists caught
in the military’s continuing counterinsurgency
campaign targeting the CPP-NPA. President
Duterte’s declaration of an “all-out war” against
communist rebels following the breakdown
of peace talks in 2017 has resulted in a raft of
arbitrary arrests and detentions of activists
deemed critical of the government on allegations
that they are members or supporters of the CPP-
NPA-NDF. The administration continued with its
war on terrorism side by side with its declared
war against COVID-19.
Leaders of left-leaning organizations caught
during the Bloody Sunday and Tumandok raids
that also killed activists accused of being
communist rebels or sympathizers, were arrested.
In addition, ve people, including an Altermidya
Network correspondent, were arrested during
a raid conducted by the military on “identied
Communist Terrorist Group safe houses” in
Tacloban City, Leyte province on 7 February
2020.
91
On 19 March 2020, Gloria Tumalon, a
Manobo indigenous activist and opponent of
mining projects, was arrested in Surigao del Sur
on suspicion of being an NPA member.
92
Arrests
and abductions of NDF consultants and aides
were reported on 11 April 2020.
93
106 |
Close to Labor Day, the human rights NGO
Karapatan claimed in a press release issued
on 2 May 2020 that at least 76 individuals were
arrested throughout the country, among them,
10 women’s rights advocates, teachers, and relief
volunteers who were organizing a community
kitchen in Marikina City. Around 14 residents
and four volunteers from Quezon City were also
arrested after organizing a community kitchen
for poor residents in the area.
94
Assisting in
the relief eorts did not spare them from the
administration’s wrath as government ocials
tried to connect their acts to communist tactics
and undermined the legitimacy of their activities.
G. Killing of human rights defenders
Alongside its campaign to curb COVID-19, the
government continued its vicious campaign
against terrorism. Hinged on the raging global
war on terror post 9/11, previous administrations
assimilated the long drawn-out ght against
counterinsurgency into a globally supported
counterterrorism campaign. With the breakdown
of the peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF
during the Duterte administration in 2017, these
organizations were subsequently designated
as terrorist organizations and all communist
insurgents as terrorists. Caught in the crossre
are activists associated with these organizations
who are now considered legitimate targets by
the security forces in the government’s extended
militarized conflict with civil society. (See
‘Counterinsurgency, Red-Tagging & the ‘War On
Terror’: A War against Deliberation and Dissent,
A War with No End’ by Marc Batac)
94 Karapatan Press Release, “Instead of addressing mass poverty and hunger on Labor Day, Duterte unleashes mass arrests
and fascism,” Karapatan organization (website), 2 May 2020, https://www.karapatan.org/media_release/instead-of-
addressing-mass-poverty-and-hunger-on-labor-day-duterte-unleashes-mass-arrests-and-fascism/
95 “Proclamation No. 374, s. 2017, Declaring the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-New People’s Army (NPA as a
Designation/Identied Terrorist Organisation Under Republic Act No. 10168,” Ocial Gazette, Congress of the Philippines,
2017, accessed 12 September 2022, https://www.ocialgazette.gov.ph/2017/12/05/proclamation-no-374-s-2017/
96 Mongabay, “Deaths, arrests and protests as Philippines re-emerges from lockdown,” Mongabay (website), 21 May 2020,
https://news.mongabay.com/2020/05/deaths-arrests-and-protests-as-philippines-re-emerges-from-lockdown/
97 Nikko Dizon, “Randall ‘Ka Randy’ Echanis: Lifelong reform advocate,” Rappler (website), 10 August 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/randall-echanis-lifelong-reform-advocate/
98 Marchel P. Espina, “Human rights activist shot dead in Bacolod City,” Rappler (website), 17 August 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/activist-zara-alvarez-shot-dead-august-17-2020/
Among the activists targeted and killed during
the pandemic were those suspected of being NPA
rebels or communist sympathizers, or working
with organizations considered as legal fronts
of the CPP-NPA, which were declared terrorist
organizations pursuant to President Duterte’s
Proclamation No. 374 signed on 5 December
2017.
95
Leaders or members of organizations in
their alliance, including representatives of the
Makabayan party list in Congress, that have
been tagged as communists-terrorists by
government authorities were among those killed.
On 30 April 2020, Jory Porquia, a founding
member of Bayan Muna, a left-leaning
organization belonging to the Makabayan bloc
that held a seat in Congress, was shot dead
by unidentied assailants in his rented home
after providing relief assistance to urban poor
communities,.
96
Then on 10 August 2020, Randall
Echanis, a political consultant of the NDFP and
a former chair of Anakpawis, another party list
organization aliated with Makabayan, was
tortured to death inside a rented house in Quezon
City.
97
One week later, on 17 August 2020, Zara
Alvarez, former campaign and education director
of Karapatan in Negros Occidental was killed by
an unidentied assailant in Bacolod City.
98
107 |
Their deaths are controversial and have remained
unresolved; hence, it cannot be ascertained if
they were killed by state-commissioned death
squads. However, speculations abound that
their deaths were extrajudicial executions,
considering that the victims were threatened
by government authorities prior to their deaths.
Porquia was red-tagged and was in a “hit list”
in 2018, and a week before he was shot, he and
Bayan Muna personnel were harassed by Iloilo
city police while on their way to conduct relief
operations.
99
Both Echanis and Alvarez were also
previously red-tagged. They were included in
a list of 656 people that the government sought
to designate as terrorists in a court petition
led by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on
21 August 2018, although their names were
subsequently removed.
100
On 30 December 2020, nine indigenous
Tumandok leaders were killed, and 17 others were
arrested in an operation conducted by the police
and military in various Tumandok communities
in the provinces of Capiz and Iloilo. The leaders
were known in their villages for ghting against
land-grabbing and the construction of the
Jalaur Mega Dam in Calinog, Iloilo province.
The authorities claimed, however, that they
were rebel sympathizers, and the raid was part
of the government’s campaign against the rebels.
A month before the raids, the Tumandok leaders
were told by the military to surrender their
membership in the NPA, and when they refused
to surrender, they were warned that they could
be charged under the new anti-terrorism law.
101
99 Davao Today (website), “Groups condemn brutal killing of Bayan Muna coordinator in Iloilo,” 1 May 2020
http://davaotoday.com/main/human-rights/groups-condemn-brutal-killing-of-bayan-muna-coordinator-in-iloilo/
100 UN News 21, “UN rights oce ‘appalled’ at violence against human rights defenders in the Philippines,” United Nations
(website), August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070752
101 Indigenous Peoples Rights International, “9 Indigenous Tumandok killed, 17 others arrested in police ops in Panay,”
Indigenous Peoples Rights International (website), 8 January 2021, https://www.iprights.org/news-and-events/
news-and-features/philippines-9-indigenous-tumandok-killed-17-others-arrested-in-police-ops-in-panay; Krixia
Subingsubing, Nestor Corrales, Nestor P Burgos Jr., “Justice sought for 9 slain in Panay raids,” Philippine Daily Inquirer
(website), 8 August 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1378106/justice-sought-for-9-slain-in-panay-raids
102 CNN Philippines Sta , “9 dead as police crackdown vs activists in Southern Tagalog,” CNN Philippines (website), 7
March 2021, updated 8 March 2021, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/regional/2021/3/7/pnp-operations-southern-
tagalog-karapatan.html; Ted Regencia, “Nine killed after Duterte’s order to ‘nish o’ communists,” Aljazeera organization
(website), 7 March 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/7/philippines-deadly-operation-after-order-to-
kill-communists
103 CNN Philippines Sta , “9 dead as police crackdown vs activists in Southern Tagalog,” CNN Philippines (website),
7 March 2021, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/regional/2021/3/7/pnp-operations-southern-tagalog-karapatan.html
The rhetoric of the President had been harmful
and dangerous, with some statements directly
inciting to violence, especially against his
perceived enemies. On 7 March 2021, referred
to as “Bloody Sunday”, nine activists were killed
following simultaneous police raids in northern
Philippines. The bloody assaults took place just
two days after President Duterte appeared on
television saying, “I’ve told the military and the
police, if they nd themselves in an encounter
with the communist rebels and you see them
armed, kill them.” The police said they had arrest
warrants against 18 individuals, adding that
some resisted arrest, resulting in their deaths.
102
Emboldened by the President’s pronouncements,
security forces resorted to killings in carrying
out what they claimed to be “legitimate
operations”, given that they had valid arrest
warrants against those shot and arrested. In
the Bloody Sunday raid, the spokesperson of the
police admitted that they had not yet properly
established whether the suspects could be linked
to previous crimes and if they were aliated
with any groups.
103
Yet, like in the killing of the
Tumandok leaders, raids were conducted based
on questionable warrants that by-passed
the constitutional right to due process, and
disregarded the non-derogable right to life.
108 |
The frontline defenders reported killed were
mostly men, a reflection of the prevailing
dominance of male leadership in social
movements in the country. Among the
marginalized groups attacked, a signicant
number were indigenous peoples based in rural
or remote places whose communities bear the
brunt of the government’s counterinsurgency
operations. Their unwarranted deaths, in
eect, deprived marginalized communities
of representation, and further derailed their
advocacy for human rights and social justice.
The killing of Echanis within the urban capital
of Metro Manila, however, marked a turning
point in the government’s campaign to eliminate
dissent. Any pretense that killings resulted from
local conflicts and rural struggles was gone
104
as
the government ramped up its counterinsurgency
operations even during the pandemic and pursued
“high-value” dissidents in the capital city.
Some of those killed were involved in carrying
out humanitarian assistance to ease the
adverse consequences of the health crisis
on their communities. They were targeted by
government authorities precisely because they
were red-tagged, having played a critical role
as advocates for the rights of peasants, urban
poor, and labor, and led campaigns against
large-scale mining, extractive projects, and
encroachment in ancestral domains. In eect,
their acts of extending humanitarian help have
been redeployed by government authorities in
its securitized approach to the public health
emergency, as part of communist propaganda.
104 Nick Aspinwall, “The killings in the Philippines grow more brazen,” The Interpreter (website), 25 August 2020,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/killings-philippines-grow-more-brazen
105 Amnesty International 2020 “My Job is to Kill”: Ongoing Human Rights Violations and Impunity in the Philippines,
accessed 20 September 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa35/3085/2020/en/
106 Human Rights Council 4 June 2020 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in the Philippines A/HC/44/22, accessed 18 September 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/les/
Documents/Countries/PH/Philippines-HRC44-AEV.pdf
In addition to activists, journalists were also
among the human rights defenders slain by
security forces as the pandemic raged in the
country. Ronnie Villamor, a freelance journalist,
was shot dead by soldiers manning a military
checkpoint in Masbate province on 14 November
2020. Previously, on 5 May 2020, radio
broadcaster Cornelio Pepino was shot dead
by unidentied men in Dumaguete City. A radio
commentator who tackled illegal mining, graft
and corruption, and poor governance in his daily
program, his colleagues presumed his killing was
politically motivated as he might have hit a raw
nerve in some political actors.
105
Killing members of
the media has also had a chilling eect in shrinking
the space for discursive processes essential to
uphold civic space and generate an informed
public health response to the COVID-19 crisis.
In conclusion, as the war against COVID-19
has been made contiguous to the government’s
decreed wars against terrorism and illegal drugs,
the health crisis has allowed President Duterte
and his administration to consolidate power and
descend further into authoritarian rule. Security
forces were granted extensive authority to instill
discipline during the pandemic even if this led to
abuse of power and violations of human rights,
especially of the poor and the political dissidents.
There is “a serious lack of due process in police
operations, and near-total impunity for the use
of lethal force by the police and the military”,
then High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet, noted in her report on the Philippines’
response to the pandemic. Given such dismal lack
of accountability for abuses committed against
activists and other human rights defenders, she
sounded the alarm that “vilication of dissent is
being increasingly institutionalized and normalized
in ways that will be very dicult to reverse”.
106
109 |
VI. Resistance Amidst
a Climate of Fear
and Impunity
Populist leaders like President Duterte thrive on
the control of narratives. This entails establishing
that the state is in control, and those who criticize
or oppose the state are labelled as communists,
terrorists, ‘pasaway’, detractors, or opposition
out to grab power from the incumbent.
107
With
the government taking control of the ascent
of fear narratives, over time, the securitized
implementation of NAP COVID-19 was
legitimized by the conflux between the public’s
fear of the virus, and the fear drilled by the
President in his rhetoric and his command over
the security forces to enforce punitive measures
to control the pandemic.
With the securitization of the pandemic in place,
a national mood took shape characterized by a
public, fearful of the potential life-threatening
eects of the pandemic, conditioned towards
obedience to government control. The chief
executive, through his acts and pronouncements,
latched onto this collective fear and strongly
asserted his authority as the one in charge, exacting
strict compliance from the general population.
The executive, represented on the ground by the
uniformed personnel, was in full control, while the
citizens fearful for their lives, were fully expected to
be obedient and submissive, like disciplined soldiers
taking orders from their superiors.
108
107 Soa Tomacruz and Don Kevin Hapal, “Coronavirus response: Online outrage drowns out Duterte propaganda machine,”
Rappler (website), 24 April 2020, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/coronavirus-response-online-
outrage-drowns-duterte-propaganda-machine/
108 Shivanee Dolo, Crisha Mae DG De Vera, Zhenia Flores, et al. “Eecting a Shift in State Policy during the COVID-19 Pandemic:
The Case of the Philippines’ Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,” Philippine e-Journal for Applied Research and Development
11(2021) 55 – 68, accessed on 2 August 2022, https://pejard2.slu.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021.12.16.pdf
109 Active Vista. (no date or author specied) Strengthening Human Rights-Based Response of Civil Society in the
Pandemic (internal document)
110 Iya Gozum, “Red-tagging of community pantry sparks uproar online,” Rappler (website), 20 April 2021,
https://www.rappler.com/moveph/philippine-government-red-tagging-community-pantry-sparks-uproar-online/
But far from simply acquiescing to the curtailment
of their fundamental freedoms and abstaining
from questioning the abuses committed by the
government, an analysis of social media data
reveals peaks of dissatisfaction expressed by
citizens regarding the mismanagement of the
health crisis by President Duterte’s administration.
An organic groundswell of discontent from the
public was evident based on social media feeds.
109
At one point, #OustDuterteNow topped Philippine
Twitter trends on a Tuesday as the public’s uproar
against the red-tagging of community pantries
and their organizers went viral on social media.
As one post said: “That the state can arbitrarily
tag people, organizations and movements as Red
is a reminder that it conflates... the assertion of
basic human rights with sedition and rebellion
against the government”.
110
As the public in general expressed discontent,
human rights defenders, in particular, braved
the risk of the virus, and the wrath of the state to
demand from the government, as the duty bearer,
accountability for the fulllment of fundamental
freedoms integral to upholding the safety of
citizens. Many were killed, arrested and detained,
harassed. Yet, the abuses did not stop them from
protesting the derogation of rights — in the streets
or through other means — at the risk of their
lives. Clearly, these are courageous acts
of resistance to reclaim the shrinking civic
space and hold the government accountable
for human rights violations.
110 |
Given the crippling eects on civic space with
the securitization of the COVID-19 crisis, there
were not many avenues available for human
rights defenders at local or national levels to
counter the state’s denial of the people’s rights.
Among the options that remained was lodging
litigation in the courts against the perpetrators
or pursuing strategic litigation. For example, on
14 January 2022, murder complaints were led by
the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL)
against 17 police ocers for the murder of the
Evangelista couple who were killed during the
Bloody Sunday raids on 7 March 2021.
111
There have been more chances of obtaining
favorable rulings in ling these cases with the
lower courts where it appears that individual
judges have retained their independence. On
3 August 2022, for instance, NDF peace talks
consultant Renante Gamara was cleared of
charges of illegal possession of rearms and
explosives by the Regional Trial Court in Marikina
City. At that time, he was the 27
th
activist cleared
of any charges by the lower courts in 2022.
112
Many of the countersuits led on behalf of
activists to refute baseless accusations against
them, however, remain pending in the courts.
111 Marlon Ramos, “17 more cops charged for ‘Bloody Sunday’ slays,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (website), 15 January 2022,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1540675/17-more-cops-charged-for-bloody-sunday-slays
112 Lian Buan, “NDF consultant is 27th activist cleared by court in 2022,” Rappler (website), 4 August 2022,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/national-democratic-front-consultant-activist-cleared-by-court-august-2022/
113 Ed G Yu, “Court declares 2 ‘eSalvar’ sections unconstitutional but rest of ordinance legal,” Bicol Mail (website), 8 April 2021,
https://www.bicolmail.net/single-post/court-declares-2-esalvar-sections-unconstitutional-but-rest-of-ordinance-legal
114 Jomar Canlas, “Court summons parties in suit vs mandatory vaccination,” The Manila Times (website), 9 December 2021 in
https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/12/09/news/court-summons-parties-in-suit-vs-mandatory-vaccination/1825319
The regional trial court in Naga City, the
metropolitan capital of the province of Camarines
Sur, declared the Digital Contact Tracing System
Ordinance of Naga City unconstitutional on 8 April
2021. In a landmark decision, the court ruled that
the “No QR Code, No Entry” policy and mandatory
registration to the contract tracing application
set up by the local government was violative
of constitutional rights, and the collection of
personal information pertaining to birth dates and
sex of registrants was also declared invalid. This is
a signicant victory in the defense of human rights
that have been abrogated by the government
in pursuit of its militarized implementation of
COVID-19 protocols.
113
Strategic litigation therefore is another important
strategy to push back the government’s
encroachment on rights. On 31 December 2021,
a court hearing was set before the Regional
Trial Court in Manila for a petition to question
the administration’s enforcement of mandatory
vaccination against COVID-19.
114
A similar
petition was led before the Supreme Court
subsequently to also assail the constitutionality
of local ordinances that restrict the right to
work, the right to privacy, and other fundamental
freedoms of residents. These lawsuits have
posed a counter-narrative that challenges the
government’s securitization of the COVID-19
emergency. Collectively called the “anti-vaxers”,
the petitioners rebuked the administration’s
disproportionate use of force in containing
the disease and asserted the pre-eminence
of upholding their fundamental rights.
111 |
With the exercise of the freedom of movement
constrained and the freedom of assembly
curtailed during the pandemic, civil society
actors have ramped up their sites of resistance
online and engaged a broader audience. Public
campaigns on social media such as those run by
Active Vista has expanded public participation
to include “critics, activists, Lumads (i.e.,
indigenous peoples in Mindanao), students and
others” to widely talk about extrajudicial killings
in the context of the Duterte administration’s
war against illegal drugs and its relation to the
securitization of the COVID-19 crisis. Strategies
for action were also discussed in these fora such
that “resistance is not just a matter of going to
the streets, it has to start at home”.
115
Such forms of on-line resistance to shrinking
civic space are discussed in more detail in the
research on securitization in the context of
internet included in this series (See ‘Big Brother’s
Grand Plan: A Look at the Digital Security
Playbook in the Philippines’ by Jessamine Pacis).
115 Active Vista, Twitter, 19 September 2020, https://mobile.twitter.com/ActiveVistaPH/status/1307224213187473410
116 Reuters, “Coronavirus: Dozens of local food banks spring up in Thailand as virus hits incomes,” The Strait Times Asia
(website), 13 May 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/coronavirus-dozens-of-local-food-banks-spring-
up-in-thailand-as-virus-hits-incomes
117 “Ana Patricia Non: Her foodcart pushed back vs apathy,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (website), 23 January 2022,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1543751/ana-patricia-non-her-foodcart-pushed-back-vs-apathy
VII. Lessons of Resistance
from Community Pantries
Community pantries, local food banks intended
to help the poor, have existed prior to the
COVID-19 emergency. Known as soup kitchens
or food pantries, they have flourished in other
countries such as in the United States during the
crippling debt crisis in 2013. During the pandemic,
community pantries were also set up in other
countries. For example, Thailand’s community
pantry project – Too Pan Sook or Pantries of
Sharing – was launched in early May 2020 and
immediately spread to at least 44 provinces
in the country.
116
In the Philippines, the rst community pantry
established during the COVID-19 pandemic was
initiated by Ana Patricia Non, a local entrepreneur,
in her neighborhood in Quezon City on 14 April
2021. She placed a single bamboo cart containing
food items and other necessities along Maginhawa
Street with the sign for people to “give according
to your ability; take according to your need”.
The initiative immediately went viral on social
media and within a few weeks, as many as 6,700
community pantries sprouted in various cities and
provinces nationwide.
117
112 |
Beyond civil society actors, citizens from dierent
walks of life mobilized to establish their own
community pantries.
118
These eorts, including
programs rolled out by the Oce of then Vice
President Leni Robredo to alleviate the hardships
brought about by the crisis, were propelled by a
collective spirit of volunteerism among citizens,
referred to as the distinct Filipino value of
‘bayanihan’. This term, however, was eventually
co-opted by the administration, and used to
obscure its inability to meet the basic needs of the
Filipinos during the pandemic. Then Presidential
spokesperson Harry Roque remarked that setting
up community pantries “is not a condemnation
of the government, but a showcase of the best
in the Filipino character” — their own capacity
to help themselves.
119
118 Julie Suazo, “What the community pantry movement means for Filipino,” CNN Life, CNN Philippines (website), 19 April
2021, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/life/culture/2021/4/19/community-pantry-lipinos-pandemic.html
119 Alexis Romero, “Palace On Community Pantries: Bayanihan, Not Gov’t Condemnation,” One News (website), 20 April 2021,
https://www.onenews.ph/articles/palace-on-community-pantries-bayanihan-not-gov-t-condemnation
120 Josephine Dionisio, Arnold Alamon, Dakila Yee et al. “Contagion of Mutual Aid in the Philippines,” Philippine Sociological
Society, 19 April 2021, accessed 10 November 2022, http://philippinesociology.com/contagion-of-mutual-aid-in-the-
philippines/
The pantries set up spontaneously in communities
throughout the country had one clear purpose:
to provide basic goods to the public that were
rendered inaccessible due to poverty and the
pandemic. Subsequently, they evolved into
information centers disseminating information
about free COVID-19 mass testing and other
public health announcements. Other pantries
eventually adopted issue-based slogans such as a
critique on the inadequacy of government aid, and
a call to report violence against women displayed
in signages on site or in social media posts. Human
rights activists and their organizations, including
a labor group that mobilized a petition for more
nancial assistance to the unemployed, were
among those that participated in these
community pantries.
120
Source: A photo of the community pantry
organized by BTS’ fans in Cavite
© ARMY Cavite Fanbase/Facebook.
113 |
Given that they served multiple purposes,
community pantries could oer valuable insights
into reconguring civil society activism in the
context of shrinking civic space under a repressive
government. Communities, which have proven to
be the rst line of defense in the outbreak of the
pandemic, can be strengthened as “home fronts”
for spreading awareness, deepening connections,
and cultivating creative and transformative
initiatives among citizens that may not be directly
or formally involved in civic action, but nonetheless
have stakes in the issues debated in the civic
space.
121
Community pantries thus oer a useful
leitmotif within which to explore ways to engage
the citizenry, and reshape the forms of resistance
carried out by civil society actors that have become
life-threatening in the context of authoritarian rule.
Consciousness-raising based on mutual aid.
Responding rst and foremost to the basic needs
of communities is a reiteration of a key principle in
community organizing that has been eclipsed by
existing organizing approaches that have revolved
only around political discussion sessions, human
rights trainings, or consciousness-raising cells.
Putting this principle into practice underscores the
importance of meeting an expressed, immediate
need — e.g., for food — with a direct, concrete
response as the critical touchpoint between
the organizers and those being organized.
Through demonstrated empathy, it establishes
a foundation of trust between them upon which
to ground consciousness-raising eorts.
Some of the community pantries established
to meet basic needs evolved into platforms for
consciousness-raising, including an advocacy
against gender-based violence, for example. This
phenomenon relates the necessity of meeting both
practical and strategic gender needs that Caroline
Moser and other feminist scholars identied
years ago in strategizing towards the attainment
of gender equality.
122
Practical needs are needs
for survival that are immediate and material,
such as food or shelter. These needs must be
met, otherwise, it will be a challenge to engage
communities in eorts to address strategic
needs, which are longer-term and seek to change
structural concerns such as gender inequality.
121 DAKILA-Active Vista. (2020) The Philippine Pandemic: A Tale of Two Viruses, Strengthening Human Rights-Based
Response of Civil Society in the Pandemic.
122 Candida March, Ines Smyth and Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, “A Guide to Gender-Analysis Frameworks,” Oxfam Publication,
1999 (reprinted 2005), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/les/Guide%20to%20Gender%20Analysis%20Frameworks.pdf
The split in the advocacy for human rights
into a prioritization of civil and political
rights over economic, social and cultural
rights has contributed to major drawbacks
in the advancement of rights at present. This
split, evident in many campaigns and other
fora worldwide, reinforces the decreasing
relevance of human rights in the lives of
many who are increasingly burdened with
pressing economic and social needs that
remain grossly unaddressed. Hence, rather
than dismiss the relevance of service delivery
initiatives and completely do away with
needs-based approaches, civil society
organizations that have focused solely on
rights-based approaches would do well to
reconsider exploring collaborations of mutual
aid to broaden and deepen their outreach to
marginalized communities.
Rather than dismiss the
relevance of service delivery
initiatives and completely
do away with needs-based
approaches, civil society
organizations that have
focused solely on rights-
based approaches would
do well to reconsider
exploring collaborations of
mutual aid to broaden and
deepen their outreach to
marginalized communities.
114 |
Organized around mutual aid, the community
pantries are intended to encourage community
engagement where all members are accorded
equal treatment. As Non expressed, “Eorts like
these give us hope that we can come together
and help each other out....This initiative does not
discriminate against gender, class, aliation,
religion or anything else. It’s just based on our
capacity to help.”
123
Acknowledging the capacity
of the marginalized to both receive and give
mutual aid, community pantries oer potential
platforms of consciousness-raising. Such
collaborations can transform as communicative
and participatory platforms of democratizing
the social setting where the muted voices of the
marginalized, e.g., the hungry or the poor, are
heard, their articulated practical needs given
paramount consideration and addressed
together with their strategic needs.
Non explained that community pantries are
intended “not as charity, but mutual aid”.
124
The
community pantries refrain from stigmatizing the
poor in their dependency. While most donations
come from the rich and the middle class, the
pantries also take in contributions from people
who are struggling nancially but contribute
food or whatever they can share. Dispensing with
hierarchies between donors and beneciaries
implicit in charities, the pantries engage with the
marginalized as empowered citizens with agency
to give mutual aid. “Emergent agencies”, or the
capacity of individuals or groups on their own to
eect change in their situation, is foregrounded
in these community pantries.
125
Changing narratives, such as the narrative of the
state on securitization, requires a key strategy of
raising the consciousness of a critical mass to think
critically in order to develop and deploy counter-
narratives, and eventually become active actors
in keeping a vibrant and discursive civic space.
123 The News Lens, “How a Community Pantry Sparked Movement of Mutual Aid in the Philippines,” TNL Media Group
(website), 21 April 2021, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/149976
124 Gretchen Malalad, “Coronavirus Pandemic: Community pantries pop up in Philippines after delay in government aid,”
CGTN (website), 24 April 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-04-24/VHJhbnNjcmlwdDU0MjA2/index.html
125 Josephine Dionisio, Arnold Alamon, Dakila Yee et al. “Contagion of Mutual Aid in the Philippines,” Philippine Sociological
Society, 19 April 2021, accessed 10 November 2022, http://philippinesociology.com/contagion-of-mutual-aid-in-the-
philippines/
Changing narratives, such
as the narrative of the state
on securitization, requires
a key strategy of raising the
consciousness of a critical
mass to think critically in
order to develop and deploy
counter-narratives, and
eventually become active
actors in keeping a vibrant
and discursive civic space.
115 |
Human rights activists who have engaged in
community pantries could draw from experiences
of mutual aid and alter these processes into
open and democratic dialogues wherein the
marginalized, treated as equals, are allowed to
voice their needs and concerns from the margins,
surface discourses that lie outside the dominant
ones of the elite, and in the process, subvert their
own marginality.
A. Fostering co-responsibility
for human rights
Aside from challenging the government
through litigation or other forms of resistance
directly confronting the state, the emergence
of community pantries presented a dierent
expression of activism during the pandemic.
Non explained the motivation behind her initiative:
“I thought this might be just a small step, but we
need to take action, because government aid
has not been enough.”
126
As many others followed
her example and organized community pantries
throughout the country, an alternative form of
activism took shape: to recognize the human
right to food as well as acknowledge each one’s
responsibility to fulll it.
The government has not been absolved of
this duty; it retains full accountability for the
realization of human rights. Just as Non inferred
in her criticism that the government has not done
enough, the proliferation of pantries was an
articulation of the peoples’ growing frustration
over the administration’s incompetence
in responding to the crisis. But rather than
confront the state directly, the community
pantries deflected antagonism against the
administration, and relied on unleashing the
latent agency of the people to help themselves
and each other. With each bundle of goods
handed out, the connection between people has
been revitalized, and a new identity for collective
action has been forged around a shared culture
of co-responsibility for human rights.
126 Barnaby Lo, “COVID food pantry operators draw accusations of communism in the Philippines,” CBS News (website) 26
April 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-covid-community-food-pantry-accusations-communism-
red-tagging/
127 Czarina Medina-Guce and Ana Martha Galindes, “Democratic Backsliding & Shrinking Civic Spaces: Problematizing the
Strengthening of Philippine Democratic Institutions,” Academia (website) 2018, https://independent.academia.edu/
AnaMarthaGalindes
“This community pantry became a way to prove
to ourselves that we can help one another, and
we are able to organize ourselves,” Non added
in one of her interviews. As a modality for self-
organizing, the existence of community pantries
has pointed to possibilities of growing activism
for human rights that is motivated by fostering
co-responsibility for realizing each other’s
rights. This form of activism is an alternative that
complements the activism of confronting the
state on its accountability. Other studies point
out that indirect resistance that does not overtly
confront the regime and is less threatening,
such as the provision of charity, can also open a
space for community involvement and collective
civic action.
127
There is a growing awareness among social
movements to break the silos created by
organizing activism for human rights around
identity politics. Quoting from the Combahee
River Statement issued by a group of Black
lesbian socialists formed in the 1970’s,
Philosophy professor Olứfémi O. Táíwò in his
recent book Elite Capture: How the Powerful
Took Over Identity Politics acknowledged that
“the most profound and potentially most radical
politics come directly out of [one’s] identity,
as opposed to working to end somebody else’s
oppression”. However, over time, this has led to
a compartmentalization of the struggle for rights
wherein, for example, women’s rights activists do
not necessarily take on campaigns regarding the
rights of trans people.
116 |
Táíwò observed that this form of organizing
centered on identity politics is losing its potency,
and is now at risk of “elite capture”: the way
socially advantaged people within these identity
formations tend to gain control over benets
meant for everyone in the collective, and how this
cadre of elite then ends up simply maintaining
the status quo.
128
Given these apparent pitfalls
of continuing to anchor social movements on
identity politics, it would be worthwhile for civil
society actors to take the lesson from community
pantries of mobilizing around a call for co-
responsibility in the fulllment of rights to break
the silos among social movements, and avoid
the peril of elite capture.
Shifting the focus on co-responsibility of rights
will drive social movements: to seriously put into
practice the concept of intersectionality or the
intersections of privilege and discrimination that
underpin the advocacy for rights; and pursue
cross-movement alliance-building as a core,
not a supplemental, strategy to address these
intersecting forms of oppression. It holds the
promise of expanding the shrinking civic space
in the country by bringing in new advocates
for human rights beyond the usual civil society
actors who risk their lives to stand up against
the atrocities of the government.
128 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, “The Defeat of Identity Politics,” The New Yorker (website), 21 September 2022,
https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/the-defeat-of-identity-politics
129 Alma Espartinez, “Emerging Community Pantries in the Philippines during the Pandemic: Hunger, Healing, and Hope,”
Religions 12: 926, Molecular Diversity Preservation International (website), 2021, https://mdpi-res.com/d_attachment/
religions/religions-12-00926/article_deploy/religions-12-00926.pdf?version=1635151788
Further, fostering co-responsibility debunks
the prevailing perception that engagement in
the civic space is a monopoly of activists or
defenders of human rights, excluding a wider
public who also has a stake to claim these rights
and a co-equal responsibility to fulll them. It
presents the civic space as a communal space
for engagement not only for activists, but
for many other actors who do not in any way
identify as human rights defenders, but, as they
have demonstrated in the phenomenon of the
community pantries, are also invested in the
fulllment of fundamental rights. Claiming for
rights based on identity politics alone is no longer
sucient. It has become imperative for human
rights advocates to deliberately reach out to
many other actors whose oppression is linked to
theirs yet have previously been excluded or have
not been involved in the defense of rights.
The co-responsibility for the fulllment of
each other’s fundamental rights does not
emanate from the legalistic framework of state
accountability for human rights. It is drawn from
the realm of ethics, wherein “the ethical relation
between the community and the self, demands
to always think of the self with the insistence and
persistence of one’s unlimited responsibility for
the other”, as Alma Espartinez discussed in her
critical reflection on community pantries from
a theological and philosophical perspective.
129
This inescapable responsibility for the other is
at the heart of the pursuit of social justice. It is
an activism grounded on an ethical framework
of establishing a relationship of mutual care for
each other as a stance of resistance against the
structures and relations sustained by the state’s
indierence to the plight of the marginalized.
117 |
B. Engaging in political contestation
and civic space activism
The phenomenon of community pantries
brought to the fore a broad spectrum of civil
society actors that soon became embroiled in
the government’s campaign against advocates
and defenders of human rights. As the number
of community pantries grew eightfold almost
overnight,
130
organizers quickly became
targets of red-tagging, and were linked to the
communist movement in the Philippines. Then
NTF-ELAC’s head Lt. General Antonio Parlade
Jr. accused Non of deceiving the people: “Same
with Satan. Satan gave Eve an apple. That’s
where it all started.” After she was red-tagged,
police ocers showed up in Non’s neighborhood
with assault rifles and asked for her personal
details. Parlade admitted that the police were
proling pantry organizers, whom they accused
of spreading propaganda, and turning people
against the government.
131
130 Josephine Dionisio, Arnold Alamon, Dakila Yee et al., “Contagion of Mutual Aid in the Philippines,” Philippine Sociological
Society, 19 April 2021, accessed 10 November 2022, http://philippinesociology.com/contagion-of-mutual-aid-in-the-
philippines/
131 Andrea Chloe Wong, “The politicization of community pantries in the Philippines,” ASEAN Today (website), 29 May 2021,
https://www.aseantoday.com/2021/05/the-politicization-of-community-pantries-in-the-philippines/
132 Atty. Jacqueline Ann de Guia, Commission on Human Rights (CHR), “ Statement of CHR Spokesperson, Atty. Jacqueline
Ann de Guia, on the community pantry initiative and proling of its volunteers,” Commission on Human Rights (website),
20 April 2021, https://chr.gov.ph/statement-of-chr-spokesperson-atty-jacqueline-ann-de-guia-on-the-community-
pantry-initiative-and-proling-of-its-volunteers/
133 Raymund Enriquez Liboro “On the Alleged Proling of Community Pantry Organizers,” National Privacy Commission (website),
20 April 2021, https://www.privacy.gov.ph/2021/04/on-the-alleged-proling-of-community-pantry-organizers/
134 JC Gotinga, “Food pantries for hungry Filipinos get tagged as communist,” Aljazeera (website), 24 April 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/24/food-pantry-for
135 Esperon orders Parlade, Badoy to stop commenting on community pantries,” Rappler (website), 25 April 2021,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/esperon-imposes-gag-order-red-tagging-parlade-badoy/
Fearing for her life and the lives of other
volunteers, Non closed the pantry for a day,
and reopened only after getting assurances for
her safety from the mayor of Quezon City, and
the head of Department of Interior and Local
Governments (DILG). The pantry’s red-tagging
and temporary closure generated a strong public
backlash. Many Filipinos expressed their support
for Non and the community pantries on social
media. Several civil society organizations issued
statements of support. The CHR, in a statement,
disclosed reports of police ocers handing out
forms for pantry organizers to ll out with their
personal information, and urged them to protect
themselves against proling and surveillance.
132
The head of the National Privacy Commission
(NPC) at that time, Raymund Liboro, also
advised against the unjust proling of community
pantry organizers, and reminded the police to
respect the safeguards on the right to privacy
in carrying out their duties.
133
The government did not expect the public
outrage and was caught off-guard when
its red-tagging of the community pantry
organizers backfired. Within days, it shifted
from warning that community pantries are
linked to communism, to voicing support for
them. “Kindness is everyone’s color. Whatever
one’s convictions are, if they’re sincerely helping
others, we will support them,” then Defense
Secretary Deln Lorenzana said in a statement.
134
Subsequently, former National Security Adviser
Hermogenes Esperon Jr. imposed a gag order
on Parlade and NTF-ELAC spokesperson
Lorraine Badoy to desist from issuing further
statements on community pantries.
135
This was
one rare instance where the government actually
retracted on its red-tagging rhetoric in the face
of sweeping public outcry.
118 |
As a consequence of red-tagging the community
pantries and their organizers, the administration
publicly politicized the initiative, and made it
a venue of political contestation. Government
ocials, even from the defense establishments,
countered the accusations made by the
NTF-ELAC and the police. The President’s
Communication Oce issued a statement in
support of community pantries. Quezon City
Mayor Joy Belmonte declared support for Non
and “colorless and apolitical community pantries”,
and several mayors appealed to the public not
to promote their ideologies and exploit these
initiatives “that are put up for purely humanitarian
objectives”. One of the labor groups suspected of
distributing anti-government pamphlets in their
pantry explained that they were advocating for
nancial assistance for the poor, an issue they
have been vocal about so “there is no hidden
agenda”.
136
The public joined in with supportive
posts on social media.
The confluence of these contesting voices into
the discursive fray demonstrates the possibilities
for discursive processes to take place even
within the severely constricted civic space
during the pandemic. What is noteworthy is
that the government was not able to silence the
dissenting voices that organized the pantries.
In fact, the government’s attacks against them
precipitated more public indignation, particularly
on social media, in spite of the imminent threat of
criminal action against dissenting voices alleged
to be spreading “fake news”.
136 Andrea Chloe Wong “The politicization of community pantries in the Philippines”, ASEAN Today (website) 29 May 2021,
https://www.aseantoday.com/2021/05/the-politicization-of-community-pantries-in-the-philippines/
137 Jeannette I. Andrade, “Red-tagged? Community pantries get military help,” Inquirer.net ,23 April 2021
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1422736/red-tagged-community-pantries-get-military-help
138 PNP launches own community pantries,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (website), 15 May 2021,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1432051/pnp-launches-own-community-pantries
As protests mounted from the public, government
authorities were eventually forced to retract
their statements vilifying community pantries.
Then AFP Chief of Sta Gen. Cirilito Sobejana
even said that he was “contemplating convincing
members of the AFP” to donate their subsistence
allowance and support these humanitarian
efforts.
137
On 25 May 2021, it was reported
that the PNP eventually came up with its own
version of food aid stations when it launched
the “Barangayanihan” Help and Food Bank in
police oces nationwide.
138
This initiative hints
of spreading propaganda through humanitarian
assistance that the police have accused
activists of doing.
It is apparent that these new solidarities among
the public to defend community pantries have
the potential to disrupt and transform narratives
that enabled the securitization of the COVID-19
health emergency. The community pantries had
such broad support from the public because
they responded to the basic need for food and
other essentials as well as became a common
rallying platform to express their discontent over
the government’s handling of the crisis. They
represent new solidarities of activism for human
rights forged out of the people’s collective
trauma of the pandemic.
119 |
C. Addressing the ‘private’ and
the centrality of care
The phenomenon of community pantries
underscores the importance of not simply
focusing on curbing the spread of the virus,
but also the need to extend care and support
to those in need during the pandemic. This
centrality of care in responding to the pandemic
is exemplied in the initiative, Lunas Collective,
a virtual chat service that provides support to
victims of gender-based violence. Women and
LGBTQI+ defenders who are sexually harassed
for their online activism, are also among the
victims. Akin to the spirit of community pantries,
such an initiative demonstrates the possibility
of creating community platforms, not only on
the ground but even virtually, to respond with
care and foster support and solidarity amidst
the government-imposed isolation to control
the pandemic.
These examples of community platforms of
care illuminate the centrality of care not only
in addressing the COVID-19 health crisis, but
also in sustaining activists and their social
movements that keep civic space alive. They
point to the need to draw attention to the
feminist call to break the articial separation of
the public-private spheres that many activists
have also internalized in their lack of concern
for self and collective care as integral to
movement-building. These examples challenge
the current conceptualization of civic space
only as a discursive platform lodged in the
public sphere to also incorporate the private
sphere and meet the requirement of care
necessary for actors engaged in the civic space
to sustain themselves and their movements.
139 DAKILA-Active Vista. (2020) The Philippine Pandemic: A Tale of Two Viruses, Strengthening Human Rights-Based
Response of Civil Society in the Pandemic.
To conclude, the pandemic was a threat of
“two viruses”: the spread of COVID-19 virus;
and the proliferation of the government’s
narrative of securitization, a ‘virus’ whose core
DNA has become embedded in the decline of
democratic rule, hosted in the weakening of
governmental checks and balances essential
to good governance. What was at stake during
the pandemic was not only the right to health
of citizens, but also the health of democracy
in the country.
139
Posing the pandemic not only
as a health risk, but also as a security threat
became a justication for the curtailment of
fundamental freedoms, and a cover for the
persistent impunity for human rights violations
in the country.
President Duterte’s deployment of his “war
against COVID-19” wrapped in a narrative of
fear, has normalized government control and
coercion as “common sense” – the sensible thing
for the public to concede to in the face of the
pandemic. The rise of the community pantries,
however, turned this narrative on its head. This
phenomenon oers a counternarrative asserting
that a dierent response — centered on the
security of human beings, not the nation state’s —
makes more sense in addressing this crisis.
As the emergence of community pantries attests,
specically in the context of a health emergency
such as a pandemic, people feel safe and secure
when their basic needs are met, and their
fundamental rights, including their right to food
and adequate standard of living, are fullled.
120 |
Besides the pandemic, the Philippines will
encounter other crises in the future in which, on
one hand, the government might simply rely on
the might of its security forces and again roll out
a securitized approach to national emergencies
with consequent negative impacts on civic
space in the country. On the other hand, the
phenomenon of community pantries points to
the possibility of an alternative approach of
mobilizing civil society and the public, and for the
government to carry out a response to the crisis
centered on the fulllment of human rights.
However, civil society actors should be wary
of reifying this phenomenon into replicable
and scalable initiatives and transplanting them
into xed and permanent entities that need
to be sustained with funding. The dynamism
of community pantries is inherent in its nature
as temporary ad hoc mutual aid networks
resourced organically through contributions
from a wide range of civil society actors. Rather
than institutionalize community pantries per se,
human rights defenders could draw from the
valuable lessons they oer as examples of “a
new narrative of civic participation, integrating
political, economic, and socio-cultural exercises
in a democracy”.
140
140 Alyssa Mariel Suico, “The Magic of the Maginhawa Community Pantry” DAKILA-Active Vista Report 2020.
121 |
Big Brother’s
Grand Plan: A
Look at the Digital
Security Playbook
in the Philippines
Jessamine Pacis
122 |
I. Summary
The Philippines is a highly connected nation.
Previously known for its high SMS use and
now for its high social media use, the role of
digital spaces in Filipinos’ exercise of their civic
freedoms is undeniable. However, numerous
governance structures, laws and policies, and
government activities pose threats to these
civic freedoms in the digital environment. In
the Philippines, surveillance, censorship, and
disinformation are some of the most pressing of
these threats. These were reinforced further by
the unexpected massive shift to digital modes
of public participation during the COVID-19
pandemic. Philippine civil society is pushing
back against this digital security playbook
through strategies, both old and new, asserting
their own visions of safety and security in both
oline and online spaces.
II. Introduction
On 10 October 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos
Jr. signed into law Republic Act No. 11934 or the
SIM Card Registration Act, the rst law passed
after he assumed oce as the President of
the Philippines. The law requires all Filipinos to
register their SIM cards in an eort to combat
SMS-based scams and other forms of fraud.
Marcos Jr. also had an unlikely solution to the
rising prices of petroleum — to implement the
country’s new national ID system. These measures
might seem oddly placed in the eyes of an
outsider, but they give an accurate indication of
the Philippine government’s attitude towards the
internet and other data-intensive technologies.
This research paper looks at the current state
of Philippine digital spaces, how State and non-
State actors have shaped denitions of and
narratives about “cybersecurity,” and how human
rights gure into such denitions. It also looks at
current threats on civic space, particularly those
that take place in digital spaces. Finally, the
paper investigates how civil society actors have
resisted these through creative and innovative
strategies and alternative narratives of security.
Source: Keith Bacongco, Flickr, CC BY 2.0
‘Useless’.
123 |
By way of limitation, while we look at the broader
developments in cybersecurity and internet
governance across history, this research is
focused on the links between digital technologies
and shrinking civic space in the Philippines during
the Duterte administration (2016-2022).
The rst part of this paper describes the global
governance structures that aect security in
cyberspace, and how the characteristics of
Philippine internet and local policies shape
the relationship between cybersecurity and
civic space. The second section zeroes in on
three major threats to civic space in relation
to technology: surveillance, censorship, and
disinformation. The last section highlights the
forms of resistance and alternative meanings
and manifestations of security that we have
seen among local communities and lists several
possible points of entry towards a new strategy
of resistance. Weaved through all these sections
is a probe into the dierent actors that drive
key policies and programs related to internet
governance and cybersecurity, and their
respective motives and narratives.
1 Institute of Development Studies, “Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries,” February
2021, https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15964/Digital_Rights_in_Closing_Civic_
Space_Lessons_from_Ten_African_Countries.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y
2 Raul Pertierra, “The New Media, Society & Politics in the Philippines,” 2012, https://library.fes.de/pdf-les/bueros/asia-
media/09241.pdf
3 Emil Tapnio and Steven Rood, “Social Media in the Philippines is Widespread, but what is its Impact?,” October 12, 2011,
https://asiafoundation.org/2011/10/12/social-media-in-the-philippines-is-widespread-but-what-is-its-impact/
4 Pauline Macaraeg, “LOOK BACK: The ‘Hello, Garci’ scandal,” Rappler, January 5, 2021, https://www.rappler.com/
newsbreak/iq/look-back-gloria-arroyo-hello-garci-scandal/
III. History and Evolution
of the Philippine Internet
The internet and other digital technologies
have revolutionized the ways by which people
participate in civic space.
1
Further, people’s
relationship with the internet varies across
cultures, and Filipinos, in particular, have a very
unique perception and use of the internet, which
rst needs to be examined before we look at
what civic space looks like online.
Even prior to the boom of social media, Philippine
civil society was already making use of ICTs to
build social movements and amplify protests. SMS
played a very important role in the mobilization
of the Filipino public for the removal of former
President Joseph Estrada in 2001 in what some
writers referred to as a “coup d’text.”
2
So high
was the SMS usage of Filipinos in the late 1990s
to 2000s that, for several years, the Philippines
was known as the “texting capital of the world”.
3
Technology also played an important role
in the massive call for the ouster of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2005,
which stemmed from a leaked recording of
Arroyo’s conversation with Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, a member of the Commission on
Elections, which revealed a plan to rig the results
of the 2004 presidential elections in favor of
President Arroyo. Part of the leaked conversation
was made into a mobile phone ringtone that was
downloaded 350,000 times and was reportedly
used by one million Filipinos during the height of
the controversy.
4
124 |
The Philippines connected to the internet for the
rst time in March 1994. The country was a late
adopter to the internet compared to its Asian
neighbors, and internet access in the country
took a long time to develop due to a conflation
of factors, such as the challenge of distributing
equal infrastructure to dierent parts of the
country, and corruption in the government.
5
But today, almost 30 years after the Philippines
rst went online, Filipinos have come to be known
as the biggest social media users in the world.
The penchant of Filipinos for social media began
in the early 2000s when the social networking
website Friendster was introduced. At one point,
Friendster became the most-visited site in the
Philippines and eventually, in other Southeast
Asian countries.
6
What was once the texting
capital of the world, is now the social media
capital of the world.
7
We Are Social’s Digital 2022 report says that
Filipinos are the second biggest internet users
in the world in terms of the average amount of
time spent daily using the internet. This may not
be surprising to most people, as the Philippines
has been known for its widespread use of social
media for years. What might be surprising to
some, however, is the fact that based on the
same report, in January 2022, there were only
76.01 million internet users but 92.05 million social
media users in the country. There were even more
Facebook users (83.85 million) than internet users
in the Philippines in the same period.
8
5 Center for Information & Society, “Philippines – Public Access Landscape Study,” archived September 27, 2013 at the
Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20130927181734/http:/faculty.washington.edu/rgomez/projects/
landscape/country-reports/Philippines/1Page_Philippines.pdf
6 Sasha Lim Uy, “Did Filipinos Literally Love Friendster to Death?,” Esquire, June 15, 2018, https://www.esquiremag.ph/
culture/tech/lipinos-killed-friendster-a00204-20180615-lfrm
7 Janvic Mateo, “Philippines still world’s social media capital – study,” The Philippine Star, February 3, 2018,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/03/1784052/philippines-still-worlds-social-media-capital-study
8 Digital 2022: The Philippines,” DataReportal, last modied February 15, 2022,
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-philippines
9 Sheera Frenkel, “This Is What Happens When Millions Of People Suddenly Get The Internet,” BuzzFeed News, November
20, 2016, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sheerafrenkel/fake-news-spreads-trump-around-the-world#.
ca8ZvKzrQ
10 Davey Alba, “How Duterte Used Facebook To Fuel The Philippine Drug War,” BuzzFeed News, September 4, 2018,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/facebook-philippines-dutertes-drug-war
This “Facebook-rst” internet access may have
been a product of various reasons, but it is clear
that such behavior is further encouraged by
the way internet access is made available and
accessible to Filipinos. In 2015, the Free Basics
program was introduced by Facebook in the
Philippines through the country’s two major telco
companies, Smart and Globe. The service allows
users to load certain websites featured by Free
Basics without incurring mobile data charges.
This includes Facebook Free, which allows users
to browse and post on Facebook for free without
seeing photos or videos (i.e., free users can only
view the text in Facebook posts). Users of this
service are not able to access external content
either. Hence, when viewing a posted link on their
newsfeed, they can only read the headline, but
they cannot view the thumbnail image or click on
the link to read the full content. This phenomenon
is widely known as a “walled garden,” a limited
and curated space that users may confuse to
be the entirety of the internet. Proponents of
similar services argue that it is a way to make
the internet more accessible and aordable to
people in countries with a great digital divide,
but the negative eects of reliance by users on
a single platform has been documented all over
the world.
9
Such selective accessibility, and the
dependence of a large sector of the population
on this more aordable alternative, is believed
to have facilitated the successful propagation
of Duterte’s anti-drug and anti-crime rhetoric,
10
along with other strategies such as the
deployment of paid troll armies and social media
influencers that consistently and strategically
pushed Duterte’s narratives on how the war
against drugs is a pressing security concern.
125 |
IV. Cyber Policy and
Governance
Since the early iterations of what we now know
as the internet began to be developed in the
1960s, digital and virtual spaces have become
major platforms where people all over the
world exercise their civic freedoms, regardless
of whether the same freedoms are respected
or restricted in the state they reside in. Because
the internet is a network of networks with no
real center of power, there is no single entity
that controls or governs it. Instead, internet
governance involves various stakeholders such
as governments, intergovernmental organizations,
the private sector, the technical community, and
civil society. Still, there are international treaties
and cyber norms that serve as frameworks for
acceptable behavior in digital spaces.
A. Global Cyber Policy
The most relevant international agreement
in this area is the Convention on Cybercrime,
also known as the Budapest Convention.
11
The
Philippines’ own cybercrime law is based in
the Budapest Convention, albeit with several
controversial additions.
11 “The Budapest Convention (ETS No. 185) and its Protocols,” Council of Europe, accessed December 15, 2022,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention
12 Deborah Brown, “Cybercrime is Dangerous, But a New UN Treaty Could Be Worse For Rights,” Human Rights Watch, August
13, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/13/cybercrime-dangerous-new-un-treaty-could-be-worse-rights
13 Katitza Rodriguez and Meri Baghdasaryan, “UN Committee To Begin Negotiating New Cybercrime Treaty Amid
Disagreement Among States Over Its Scope,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, February 15, 2022, https://www.e.org/
deeplinks/2022/02/un-committee-begin-negotiating-new-cybercrime-treaty-amid-disagreement-among
14 Sheetal Kumar, “The missing piece in human-centric approaches to cybernorms implementation: the role of civil society,”
Journal of Cyber Policy 6, no. 3 (2021): 375-393, https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2021.1909090
At the time of writing, the United Nations is
in the process of discussing a new cybercrime
treaty that can completely change the way
states behave in relation to each other in
cyberspace. The treaty, rst proposed by
Russia, is presumably set to replace the Budapest
Convention, which the Philippines’ own cybercrime
law is based on. The proposed treaty has been
widely opposed since the beginning by digital
rights organizations because of its treatment
of cybercrime being extremely vague and
open to abuse.
12
A key point of contention in
these deliberations is the very nature of what
constitutes a cybercrime. Cybercrime policy
makes a distinction between “cyber-dependent”
and “cyber-enabled” crimes. There is also
concern among some states that the treaty
might end up breaching the issues of national
security, cybersecurity, or cyberwarfare on top
of cybercrime.
13
Cyber norms, on the other hand, come
in the form of multilateral documents,
multistakeholder statements, and outcome
documents of multilateral forums. On top
of being rare, international processes for
setting cyber norms such as the Open Ended
Working Group on security of and in the use of
information and communications technologies
(OEWG) of United Nations (UN) member states
and the UN Group of Governmental Experts also
remain largely inaccessible to and exclusive of
civil society voices.
14
126 |
There is no universally accepted denition
of cybersecurity. Unlike cybercrime, which is
addressed by an international treaty called the
Budapest Convention, there is no international
instrument that governs matters relating to
cybersecurity. States, therefore, are given free
rein on how they dene cybersecurity, as well
as the structures and mechanisms they create to
ensure it. Most cybersecurity policies follow the
denition by the International Communications
Union as “the collection of tools, policies, security
concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best
practices, assurances and technologies that can
be used to protect the cyber environment and
organization and users’ assets.”
15
However, human rights advocates and civil
society groups all over the world raise the
danger of this systems-centric approach to
cybersecurity being used to justify policies
and protocols that are repressive and violative
of civic freedoms. A recent joint civil society
statement to the UN General Assembly’s First
Committee on Disarmament and International
Security raised concern over the increase in
oensive cyber capabilities and the use of cyber
mercenaries among states. The statement points
to the rising “toll of unrestrained cyber operations
on human security” that makes it necessary for
relevant UN processes to be guided by human-
centric and rights-based approaches rather than
securitized approaches that abuse cybersecurity
laws, policies, and practices to violate human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
16
15 Tim Maurer and Robert Morgus, “Compilation of Existing Cybersecurity and Information Security Related Denitions,” New
America, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/policy-papers/compilation-of-existing-cybersecurity-
and-information-security-related-denitions/
16 “Joint civil society statement on cyber peace and human security,” Association for Progressive Communications, last
modied October 17, 2022, https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/joint-civil-society-statement-cyber-peace-and-human-
security-0
17 Why Do We Need a New Denition for Cybersecurity?,” Freedom Online Coalition, last modied September 2015, https://
freedomonlinecoalition.com/blog/why-do-we-need-a-new-denition-for-cybersecurity/
An alternative definition of cybersecurity
proposed by the Freedom Online Coalition
uses the same core principles as the one
used by the International Organization for
Standardization but puts the rights and safety of
people at the forefront of cybersecurity, thus:
“Cybersecurity is the preservation — through
policy, technology, and education — of the
availability, confidentiality, and integrity of
information and its underlying infrastructure
as to enhance the security of persons both
online and oline.”
17
127 |
B. Philippine Cyber Policy
In the Philippines, the Department of Information
and Communications Technology (DICT) was
created in 2016 by virtue of Republic Act No.
10844. Included in the law is the creation of
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordination
Center (CICC), which is tasked to formulate the
National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP), which shall
set the direction for cybersecurity in the country
for a period of ve years. What is curious,
however, is that although the CICC is named as
a cybercrime center, the law makes no mention
of cybercrime when describing the mandates of
the oce, but instead refers to cybersecurity.
These are two entirely dierent things that are
often interchanged. While cybercrime is dened
as a computer-enabled or -facilitated oense
punishable by law, cybersecurity refers to the
tools and practices used to protect the cyber
environment and organization and users’ assets
from threats and cybercrimes.
18
The DICT launched the rst NCSP in 2017, to
cover the period 2017-2022. The NCSP 2022
denes cybersecurity as “the protection of
information systems [...], the data within these
systems, and the services that are provided by
these systems from any unauthorized access,
harm or misuse, whether it includes intentional
or accidental, or from natural disasters.”
19
This
follows the denition of cybersecurity as the
“preservation of condentiality, integrity, and
availability of information in the Cyberspace”
used both by the ISO and the ITU. As stated in
the previous section, this approach has long
been criticized by civil society groups for being
focused on the security of systems over the
security of persons.
18 Republic Act No. 10175, An Act Dening Cybercrime Providing for the Prevention, Investigation, Suppression and the
Imposition of Penalties Therefor and for Other Purposes.
19 National Cybersecurity Plan 2022,” Department of Information and Communications Technology, May 2, 2017,
https://dict.gov.ph/national-cybersecurity-plan-2022/
20 “Freedom on the Net 2022: Philippines,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-
net/2022
21 “Freedom on the Net 2017: Philippines,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-net/2017
22 “Mass Surveillance,” Privacy International, https://privacyinternational.org/learn/mass-surveillance
V. Digital Threats to Civic
Space in the Philippines
The Freedom on the Net Report, an annual
assessment of individual countries’ internet
freedom published by Freedom House, gave the
Philippines a score of 65/100 in 2022, deeming
it “partly free.”
20
The last time the Philippines
was marked “free” was in 2017, when it scored
72/100.
21
The country’s performance went on a
downward spiral since, scoring 69/100 in 2018,
66/100 in 2019, and 64/100 in 2020. The annual
report is based on combined scores in three
areas: Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content,
and Violations of User Rights. Similar to Freedom
House’s framework, this paper zeroes in on three
of the most pressing threats to civic space in the
Philippines, particularly with regard to the use
of technologies for surveillance, censorship,
and disinformation.
A. Surveillance
Surveillance, especially as it relates to civic
space, can generally be divided into two
categories: mass surveillance and targeted
surveillance. While we use the general term
“surveillance” in this section, we refer largely to
the mass surveillance architecture built by the
Philippine government that is designed to cover
the entire population. Here we refer to the kind
of surveillance dened by Privacy International
as that which involves “the acquisition,
processing, generation, analysis, use, retention
or storage of information about large numbers
of people, without any regard to whether they
are suspected of wrongdoing.
22
128 |
Instances of targeted surveillance that leads
to the arrest and/or killing of journalists and
activists will be covered in the next section
on censorship.
1. The Philippine Surveillance Architecture
We begin by looking at the framework that allows
the conduct of surveillance under Philippine
law. Generally, the right against unlawful
surveillance is protected by Article III Sections 2
and 3 of the Philippine Constitution.
23
There are,
however, specic cases where communications
surveillance is allowed by law, subject to certain
conditions and processes. The Anti-Wiretapping
Act, passed almost six decades ago in 1965,
prohibits the covert interception or recording
of any private communication or spoken word
of another person or persons without the
authorization of all parties to the communication.
The law carves out an exception for law
enforcement in specic instances such as in
cases involving treason, espionage, provoking
war and disloyalty in case of war, inciting to
rebellion, sedition, and kidnapping, among others.
The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 originally
provided authority for law enforcement to
conduct real-time collection of trac data, but
the provision was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court for giving law enforcement
surveillance powers that are “too sweeping and
lack restraint.”
24
A bill led by Senator Imee
Marcos, a sister of President Ferdinand Marcos
Jr., in the 18th Congress aimed to reinstate this
section in the cybercrime law, arguing that there
is “a dire need to put order to the tremendous
activities in cyberspace for public good.”
25
23 Article III, Sec. 2. states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable [;]” whereas Sec. 3
provides that “(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law [.]”.
24 G.R. No. 203335, Disini v. Secretary of Justice.
25 Senate Bill No. 1905, “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 10175 Otherwise Known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, and For Other Purposes”.
During the Duterte administration, what used to
be a very small and specic niche of exemptions
where surveillance may be authorized, was
expanded through the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)
of 2020. The ATA repealed the previous Human
Security Act and carved out certain instances
where surveillance may be done on judicially
declared or suspected terrorists as dened
by the same law. With the new surveillance
powers granted by this law, the importation
of surveillance technology, the creation of a
massive database through the recently launched
Philippine Identication System (PhilSys), and
a highly militarized cybersecurity architecture,
it is clear that the Duterte government had an
agenda to build a surveillance state.
Indeed, cyber securitization is closely connected
with securitization in the guise of other concepts
such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
and Duterte’s War on Drugs. Notable in the
National Cybersecurity Plan is the message from
former Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity
and Enabling Technologies of the Department of
ICT, Allan Cabanlong, which points to “policing
the cyberspace” as necessary to protect
Filipinos from “certain groups whose ideology
is to destroy the order of our nation and are now
using advanced and sophisticated technologies
to carry out their plans.” In his own message,
former National Security Adviser Hermogenes
C. Esperon Jr. said that cybersecurity is an
important part of national security.
129 |
It is noteworthy that among many instances
of harassment and killing of journalists and
activists, there were reported accounts of the
victims being surveilled or followed by suspicious
actors before the attacks. Zara Alvarez, an
activist,
26
and Dr. Mary Rose Sancelan, a
municipal health ocer,
27
who were both red-
tagged as alleged terrorists, both reported being
tailed and threatened through SMS before they
were slain on separate occasions during the
pandemic. In July 2022, a military ocer was
caught conducting surveillance by taking photos
and recording conversations during the wake of
a former journalist and activist who was among
those killed in a clash with the military.
28
These point back to the argument that the right
to privacy is inseparable from the freedoms of
speech, association, and assembly. Surveillance
and other forms of privacy violations are usually
a precursor to other human rights violations,
especially for targeted groups such as activists
and journalists.
The right to privacy is
inseparable from the freedoms
of speech, association,
and assembly. Surveillance
and other forms of privacy
violations are usually a
precursor to other human
rights violations, especially
for targeted groups such as
activists and journalists.
26 Lian Buan, “Zara Alvarez asked for protection, but she died before the court could give it,” Rappler, August 20, 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/zara-alvarez-petition-writ-amparo-habeas-data-court/
27 Catherine Gonzales, “Murder of Red-tagged doctor, husband could be related to work, NPA – police,” Inquirer.net,
December 21, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1374430/murder-of-red-tagged-doctor-husband-could-be-related-
to-work-npa-police
28 John Sitchon, “What we know so far: Nikka dela Cruz, the Cebuana killed in Negros Occidental encounter,” Rappler, July
20, 2022, https://www.rappler.com/nation/visayas/what-we-know-so-far-nikka-dela-cruz-cebuana-killed-negros-
occidental-encounter/
29 State of Privacy Philippines,” Privacy International, January 26, 2019 https://privacyinternational.org/state-
privacy/1009/state-privacy-philippines
2. Surveillance Actors
Mapping the surveillance infrastructure in the
Philippines is an arduous task, mainly because
of the opaque and confidential nature of State
surveillance. Based on their legal mandates,
the following are the intelligence and
security agencies that may be engaged
in surveillance activities:
29
1. National Security Council
2. Oce of the National Security Adviser
3. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
4. National Intelligence Committee
5. National Intelligence Board
6. Philippines
7. Directorate for Intelligence,
Philippine National Police
8. Police Intelligence Group, Philippine
National Police
9. Anti-Cybercrime Group,
Philippine National Police
10. Oce of the Deputy Director for
Intelligence Services, National Bureau
of Investigation
11. Cyber Crime Division, National Bureau
of Investigation
130 |
Under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, law
enforcement agents or military personnel may,
upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
conduct communications surveillance (a)
between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization; (b) between
members of a designated person; or (c) any
person charged with or suspected of committing
any of the crimes dened and penalized under
the same law. Other special laws that allow the
conduct of surveillance by law enforcement
include the Expanded Anti-Tracking in Persons
Act and the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
3. Use of Technology for State Surveillance
A 2015 report by the Foundation for Media
Alternatives outlined some of the surveillance
technologies that were reported to have been
acquired by the Philippine government. The
report shows that over the years, the Philippine
government had acquired or, at the very least,
expressed an intention to acquire, technologies
such as a border control software that may be used
to quickly retrieve information on persons who may
be trying to leave the country after committing
a crime, a social media intelligence solution, an
intrusion technology that allows its operator to
bypass any encryption technology installed on
a device, and radio frequency test equipment.
30
30 Foundation for Media Alternatives, “TIKTIK: An Overview of the Philippine Surveillance Landscape,” September 2015,
https://www.fma.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Brieng-Paper-1-DRAFT-1.pdf
31 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Britain sold spying gear to Philippines despite Duterte’s brutal drugs war,” The Guardian, February
21, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/21/britain-sold-spying-gear-to-philippines-despite-dutertes-
brutal-drugs-war
32 George Joseph, “Inside the Video Surveillance Program IBM Built for Philippine Strongman Rodrigo Duterte,” The Intercept,
March 20, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/03/20/rodrigo-duterte-ibm-surveillance/
33 Foundation for Media Alternatives, “A Pandemic as Vector for State Surveillance and Other Abuses,” September 2021,
https://fma.ph/2021/09/13/a-pandemic-as-vector-for-state-surveillance-and-other-abuses/
34 “Pasig village boosts measures to mitigate spread of Covid-19,” Philippine News Agency, March 30, 2020,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1098189
35 Christia Marie Ramos, “11 drones now in Cebu City to monitor quarantine compliance – Eleazar,” Inquirer.net, June 28,
2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1298698/11-drones-now-in-cebu-city-to-monitor-quarantine-compliance-eleazar
Acquisition of surveillance technologies
continued during the Duterte administration,
where about PhP10 million worth of spyware was
reported to have been acquired from the British
government. According to reports, the sale
included International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) catchers, which are used to eavesdrop
on telephone conversations, as well as tools to
monitor internet activity.
31
This was especially
alarming given Duterte’s history of using
surveillance mechanisms for his drug war even
when he was still the mayor of Davao City.
32
Several surveillance technologies were acquired
and used during the COVID-19 pandemic, most
of which were justied by the government with
the need to monitor public places for quarantine
monitoring.
33
These include the installation of
surveillance camera networks, some equipped
with articial intelligence technology to detect
real-time movement of residents,
34
and the
deployment of camera drones by police to detect
quarantine violations.
35
Not much is known about
when these COVID-specic technologies will
cease to be used, making them susceptible
to misuse as tools for the unlawful monitoring
of vulnerable groups and ordinary citizens.
131 |
4. Surveillance through “Smart Cities”
The policing of physical spaces through the use
of technology was a recurring theme throughout
the Duterte administration. This is most evident
in the multitude of “smart city” or “safe city”
projects that cropped up during this period. One
such initiative is Safe Philippines, a surveillance
system project that aims to install high-denition
and advanced CCTV cameras in selected cities
in Metro Manila to supposedly curb crime and
improve emergency response time. Majority of
the P20.31Billion project is funded through a soft
loan from China Eximbank, and the contractor
is the China International Telecommunication
Construction Corporation, with some equipment
provided by Huawei, another China-based tech
giant.
36
This, despite allegations of espionage
against Huawei that caused it to be banned
in several countries, and evidence of the
company’s involvement in domestic surveillance
activities in China.
37
This is not Huawei’s rst
foray into a safe city initiative in the Philippines.
The company previously piloted its Safe City
project in Bonifacio Global City. This involved
the installation of high-denition surveillance
cameras connected to a command center
through wi-. The technology was supposedly
able to “detect crime and criminal intrusions.”
38
36 Loreben Tuquero, “Año says China-funded Safe Philippines project will be ‘all-Filipino’,” Rappler, November 22, 2019,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/245529-ano-china-funded-safe-philippines-project-all-lipino/
37 Eva Dou, “Documents link Huawei to China’s surveillance programs,” The Washington Post, December 14, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/14/huawei-surveillance-china/
38 “Transforming Bonifacio Global City into a Safe City with Huawei,” Huawei,
https://e.huawei.com/topic/leading-new-ict-ua/safe-city-case.html
39 George Joseph, “Inside the Surveillance Program IBM Built for Rodrigo Duterte,” The Intercept, March 20, 2019,
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/20/rodrigo-duterte-ibm-surveillance/
40 Ibid.
The branding of “safe cities” ts well within
Duterte’s anti-crime rhetoric, which he seemed
to have already gured out years before he
was elected President. In 2012, IBM announced
the establishment of an Intelligent Operations
Center (IOC) in partnership with the Davao
City government, which was then headed by
Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter, Sara who is now
vice-president of the country. The IOC became
operational in 2013, just in time for the father’s
return to the mayoral seat.
39
In an interview with
The Intercept, a former sales ocer who worked
with the project to improve Davao’s Public
Safety and Security Command Center revealed
that the technology deployed under the project
was “probably the rst-ever video analytics
surveillance that was done in Asia.”
40
These
multiple projects by Huawei and IBM demonstrate
how easy it is for foreign companies to import
surveillance technologies into the Philippines, and
they don’t even need to call it surveillance. They
only need to call it a “smart city” or “safe city”
project and it will fly under the radar, lumped with
the plethora of other initiatives posing as part of
the country’s digital transformation.”
132 |
This reflects the creeping global concern over
China’s exportation of surveillance technology
through smart cities.
41
It’s worth noting, however,
that China is not the only state that exports
surveillance technology. Leaked documents
show that past administrations were in talks with
several surveillance equipment manufacturers
for technologies such as border control and
monitoring software, social media intelligence,
and intrusion technology that can collect data
from a device undetected.
42
5. Surveillance through Digital Identity
and Proling
A more seemingly innocuous threat than blatant
surveillance is proling through digital identity.
As noted in the Funders Initiative for Civil Society
(FICS) report on the global counter-terrorism
agenda and civic space,
43
there is an increasing
convergence of digital identity systems, which
usually include biometric data, and the push
for nancial inclusion. This has created an
“unprecedented global drive for high-tech national
ID systems” that come with massive risks of abuse
by oppressive actors to conduct mass or targeted
surveillance and harassment of activists and other
vulnerable groups. In the Philippines, this comes in
the form of PhilSys, or the Philippine Identication
System, a national ID system created in 2018 after
decades of attempts and failures by both the
legislative and executive branches.
41 James Kynge, et al., “Exporting Chinese surveillance: the security risks of ‘smart cities’,” Financial Times, June 9, 2021,
https://www.ft.com/content/76fdac7c-7076-47a4-bcb0-7e75af0aadab
42 Foundation for Media Alternatives, “TIKTIK: An Overview of the Philippine Surveillance Landscape,” September 2015,
https://www.fma.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Brieng-Paper-1-DRAFT-1.pdf
43 Dr Gavin Sullivan and Chris Jones, “Is the global counter-terrorism agenda shrinking civic space?,” Funders Initiative
for Civil Society, May 2022, https://www.fundersinitiativeforcivilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Is-CT-
shrinking-civic-space-FICS-May-2022.pdf
44 Center for Human Rights & Global Justice, “Paving a Digital Road to Hell? A Primer on the Role of the World Bank and
Global Networks in Promoting Digital ID,” June 2022, https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Report_Paving-a-
Digital-Road-to-Hell.pdf
45 Beatrice Laforga, “World Bank approves $600-million loan for PHL 4Ps program,” Business World, September 30, 2020,
https://www.bworldonline.com/economy/2020/09/30/320062/world-bank-approves-600-million-loan-for-phl-4ps-
program/
Like most national ID systems all over the world,
the PhilSys has been closely backed by the
World Bank since its development phase until
its implementation at the time of writing.
44
This
support includes both technical and nancial
assistance, with a $600 million loan to support
the PhilSys’ rollout.
45
And like the smart city
projects, this national ID agenda is usually lumped
under the broad goal of “digital transformation”.
But the Philippine government’s obsession with
identity systems and massive identity databases
does not stop with the PhilSys. Local governments
have been establishing their own localized ID
systems. These local ID systems became even
more popular during the pandemic, as they were
meant to facilitate distribution of nancial aid
and other government services as part of COVID
response. Contact tracing systems that were
established during the pandemic became sources
for massive databases as well, most of which
were created and held separately (i.e., not in a
unied national database) by local governments
or private contractors.
133 |
Having surprisingly eluded both congressional
and presidential approval for decades, the SIM
card registration law seems to be the last piece
of the puzzle, the last tool needed to complete the
government’s surveillance arsenal. The last version
of the bill that almost passed in 2022 just before
the end of Duterte’s term, was especially reflective
of this vision. The bill proposed that apart from
requiring the registration of all SIM cards, all social
media account providers shall require the real
names and phone numbers of users to be registered
upon account creation. According to the version
of the bill passed by both houses of Congress, this
is to “deter the proliferation of SIM card, internet or
electronic communication-aided crimes, such as,
but not limited to: terrorism; text scams; unsolicited,
indecent or obscene messages; bank fraud; libel;
anonymous online defamation; trolling; hate
speech, and the spread of digital disinformation
or fake news as dened under pertinent laws.
(Emphasis supplied)” The inclusion of terrorism
and disinformation in the bill demonstrates how
surveillance measures – or at least, attempts to
expand the surveillance powers of government –
are intricately linked with the other threats to civic
space described in this paper.
46 Electronic Frontier Foundation and Article 19, “Necessary & Proportionate: International Principles
on the Application of Human Rights Law to Communications Surveillance,” May 2014,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/les/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf
47 Evelina Manukyan and Joseph Guzzetta, “How function creep may cripple app-based contact tracing,” International
Association of Privacy Professionals, May 27, 2020, https://iapp.org/news/a/how-function-creep-may-cripple-app-
based-contact-tracing/
48 Christine Cudis, “Nat’l ID system to help ease delivery of social services: DSWD,” Philippine News Agency, June 11, 2020,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1105656
49 Ted Cordero, “NEDA oers use of nat’l ID for COVID-19 vaccine distribution,” GMA News Online, December 16, 2020,
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/768208/neda-oers-use-of-nat-l-id-for-covid-19-vaccine-
distribution/story/
50 Benjamin Pulta, “PNP eyes linking police database to nat’l ID system,” Philippine News Agency, August 7, 2018,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1043966
The use of surveillance measures – in this case, a
massive database of citizen data – to supposedly
address a sweeping list of crimes, is against
the principles of necessity and proportionality
as envisioned in the International Principles
on the Application of Human Rights Law to
Communications Surveillance.
46
Furthermore,
the erosion of anonymity oered by mandatory
identity registration, especially in social media, is
disproportionately dangerous for women and the
LGBTQ community, whose self-expression is usually
tied to their lived identities rather than their legally
recognized ones.
“Function creep” is a major concern in most ID
systems, including national ID systems, mandatory
SIM card registries, and contact tracing systems.
It refers to the phenomenon where information
collected for one specied purpose tends to
be used for ever-expanding and undisclosed
purposes.
47
The narratives used by proponents in
government to defend the PhilSys and SIM card
registration point to the risk of function creep.
The PhilSys alone is a favorite talking point of
government ocials when speaking about almost
any issue. It has been named as a possible tool
for aid distribution during the pandemic by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development,
48
for vaccine distribution by the National Economic
Development Authority,
49
and, unsurprisingly, for
law enforcement by the Philippine National Police.
50
134 |
This narrative of the PhilSys as a magic pill for
every ill of Philippine society is likely to continue
during Marcos Jr.’s presidency. In his rst month
as president, Marcos Jr. temporarily assumed
leadership of the Department of Agriculture.
When asked about immediate measures to assist
sectors aected by the food crisis, Marcos was
quick to point to the issuance of national IDs to
facilitate aid distribution, saying that “[it] all
really depends on everyone having their national
ID. It’s a good database that the government
should have.”
51
51 “Marcos To Head DA ‘For Now’,” Page One.PH, June 21, 2022, https://pageone.ph/marcos-to-head-da-for-now/
52 Norman Bordadora, “Sotto admits he proposed online libel provision,” Inquirer.net, October 2, 2012,
https://technology.inquirer.net/17718/sotto-admits-he-proposed-online-libel-provision
B. Censorship
1. Censorship through Libel and Attacks
on Freedom of the Press
A unique feature of the Philippines’ Cybercrime
Prevention Act (CPA) is that it includes the
crime of cyberlibel, which is not included in the
Budapest Convention, from which the CPA was
supposedly patterned. This, despite the fact that
Filipino journalists and activists have long been
calling for the decriminalization of (traditional)
libel under the Revised Penal Code. The cyberlibel
provision was a last-minute insertion by Senator
Vicente Sotto III following a spate of criticism
hurled against him in social media earlier that
year. Sotto, of course, vehemently denied this.
52
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Employees, journalists, celebrities, and supporters of media network
ABS-CBN show their dissent a week after Congress rejected their
franchise renewal with a noise barrage and motorcade outside the
ABS-CBN compound in Quezon City on July 18, 2020.
135 |
Today, cyberlibel has become the weapon of
choice by politicians and celebrities against
their critics and opponents. It was also a critical
weapon of the Duterte regime against a free and
independent press, as evidenced by the stack of
cyberlibel cases (and convictions) against the
news organization Rappler and its reporters,
along with other means of regulatory harassment.
The rst round of harassment against Rappler
came in December 2016, just a few months
into the Duterte regime, when the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) requested
the Philippines’ Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to investigate the news
platform’s issuance of PDRs (Philippine
Depositary Receipts) to foreign investors. The
OSG alleged that this was in contravention of
the constitutional restriction against foreign
ownership of Philippine media. The case
eventually resulted in the revocation of Rappler’s
license to operate in 2018. After a few more
years of litigation, the SEC in June 2022 armed
its decision to revoke Rappler’s certicate of
incorporation, eectively “conrm[ing] the
shutdown of Rappler.”
53
Cyberlibel … was also
a critical weapon of the
Duterte regime against
a free and independent
press, as evidenced by the
stack of cyberlibel cases
(and convictions) against
the news organization
Rappler and its reporters,
along with other means of
regulatory harassment.
53 “TIMELINE: Rappler-SEC case,” CNN Philippines, June 30, 2022,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/6/30/Rappler-SEC-case-timeline.html
54 TIMELINE: Rappler’s cyberlibel case,” Rappler, February 14, 2019,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/223460-timeline-cyber-libel-case/
55 Lian Buan, “When CA upheld Rossa’s conviction, it extended cyberlibel shelf to 15 years,” Rappler, July 12, 2022, https://
www.rappler.com/nation/when-court-appeals-upheld-maria-ressa-conviction-made-cyber-libel-shelf-life-longer/
Meanwhile, in October 2017, the rst of a long
series of cyberlibel cases was led against
Rappler’s CEO and founder Maria Ressa
and Reynaldo Santos, Jr. a former Rappler
researcher, over an article originally published
in May 2012, four months before the enactment
of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. While the
complaint was initially junked for being past
the prescriptive period, the dismissal was
eventually reversed and a warrant of arrest was
served.
54
After more than a year of trial and legal
proceedings, the Manila Regional Trial Court
found Ressa and Santos guilty of cyberlibel. The
Court of Appeals upheld this conviction, ruling
that the prescriptive period of cyberlibel is 15
years, compared to ordinary libel that prescribes
in only one year.
55
This is a dangerous precedent
that makes cyberlibel an even more powerful
weapon in the harassment of journalists and
even ordinary citizens.
136 |
The cyberlibel cases against Rappler were just
the beginning of a long line of cases against
journalists and citizens who expressed their
discontent with the Philippine government during
the Duterte and early Marcos Jr. administrations.
In fact, ocial gures from the Department of
Justice Oce of Cybercrime reveal that 30%
of cyber cases led (1,131 of 3,770 cases) have
been dismissed. Of the 3,770 cases of cyberlibel
led, there have been 12 convictions and four
acquittals. Three of these convictions are of
journalists, including Maria Ressa. Meanwhile,
data from the Philippine National Police shows
that cyberlibel cases make up 20% of all
cybercrimes they investigate.
56
In August 2022, well-known activist and
academic Walden Bello was arrested on charges
of libel by a former information ocer for the
then-newly elected Vice President Sara Duterte.
The complaint stemmed from a Facebook post
by Bello alleging that Duterte’s former employee
was involved in illegal drugs after a party that
he attended was raided by the police for drugs.
57
As highlighted in the boxed section below, the
weaponization of libel and cyberlibel against
government critics became more prominent
during the COVID-19 crisis under the guise of
the government’s campaign against COVID-
related disinformation.
56 Lian Buan, “Decriminalize libel: PH junked one-third of cyberlibel cases led since 2012,” Rappler, July 20, 2022,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/decriminalize-philippines-junked-cyber-libel-cases-since-2012/
57 Carlos H. Conde, “Philippine Activist Arrested for Cyber-libel,” Human Rights Watch, August 9, 2022
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/09/philippine-activist-arrested-cyber-libel
58 Mark Ernest Amratian, “Duterte admits using presidential powers to target ABS-CBN,” Yahoo News, June 28, 2022,
https://ph.news.yahoo.com/duterte-admits-using-presidential-powers-to-target-abs-cbn-032708317.html
59 Jason Gutierrez, “Duterte’s Shutdown of TV Network Leaves Void Amid Coronavirus Crisis,” The New York Times, May 14,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/world/asia/duterte-philippines-tv-network-ABS-CBN.html
60 Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, “Closing down ABS-CBN and its impact on free speech in the Philippines,”
IFEX, May 7, 2020, https://ifex.org/closing-down-abs-cbn-and-its-impact-on-free-speech-in-the-philippines/
Parallel to this barrage of libel cases, a key
tactic in censorship during Duterte’s term was
the targeted harassment of established news
outts and the erosion of trust in the media as
a whole. From a legal and regulatory standpoint,
there isn’t much room for prior restraint in the
Philippines. But with what limited toolbox was
available, government forces were able to
wield political power against the free press. In
a government-mandated shutdown, as publicly
admitted by Duterte himself right before his term
ended,
58
what used to be one of the longest
running and major broadcast networks in the
country went permanently o-the-air in 2020
for the technical reason that its congressional
franchise had expired and was not renewed.
The removal of ABS-CBN and its regional
channels from public television was a huge
setback to the dissemination of critical
information during the COVID-19 pandemic,
especially for those living in far-flung areas and
low-income households whose main source of
information and entertainment were traditional
radio and television channels like ABS-CBN.
59
This points to another fundamental right that is
often overlooked in denitions and discussions of
civic space – the right to access information. The
ABS-CBN closure removed one of the biggest
spaces for discursive practices in the country.
The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
(CMFR) highlighted that, especially during the
pandemic, a giant nationwide network like
ABS-CBN is valuable to “air timely warnings of
imminent public danger, to disseminate crucial
information in times of emergency, saving lives
and mitigating the impact of calamity and
disaster with appropriate assistance,” as well
as providing political information that fuels
civic engagement and political participation.
60
This, along with the targeted harassment of
Rappler, demonstrates the Duterte government’s
intention of dissolving platforms and quashing
opportunities for critical discourse.
137 |
2. Censorship through Cyberattacks
As red-tagging from both government and
non-government actors ramped up, distributed
denial of service (DDoS) became a common
attack tactic on progressive groups, particularly
on alternative and independent media groups.
DDoS attacks are not an uncommon form of
cyber-attack, but what made them notable
during the Duterte administration was their sheer
frequency and scope, and the specic network
of media organizations targeted across several
instances. The rst major attack happened in
December 2018,
61
and another three-month long
series of attacks was observed in December
2021.
62
A Facebook page called “Pinoy Vendetta”
claimed that one of its members conducted the
December 2021 attacks. Pinoy Vendetta had
earlier been vocal in its support for the NTF-
ELCAC and its “mission to bring down and end
the CPP-NPA-NDF.” The group was subsequently
publicly endorsed by the NTF-ELCAC, with its
spokesperson calling its members “computer
geniuses.”
63
Both attacks were investigated by the
Swedish digital forensics non-prot Qurium Media
Foundation, who assessed that although three
separate media organizations were targeted in
December 2021, similar attack signatures suggest
that they were done by the same perpetrator.
64
Further, upon investigation of a series of DDoS
attacks in 2021, some of the attacks were found
to have originated from IP addresses that are linked
to the Department of Science and Technology and
the Philippine military.
65
61 “Alternative media groups le civil case amid cyberattacks,” Rappler, March 29, 2019,
https://www.rappler.com/technology/226968-alternative-media-groups-le-civil-case-cyberattacks-march-2019/
62 Alyssa Mae Clarins, “Cyberattacks traced to PH hackers hailed by gov’t as ‘computer geniuses,’ probe shows,” Altermidya,
March 15, 2022, https://www.altermidya.net/cyberattacks-traced-to-ph-hackers-hailed-by-govt-as-computer-
geniuses-probe-shows/
63 Galo Gonzales, “Hacker group mounts DDoS attacks vs PH news outlets, hailed by gov’t,” Rappler, February 24, 2022,
https://www.rappler.com/technology/ntf-elcac-ddos-attacks-endorsement/
64 Alyssa Mae Clarine, “Cyberattacks traced to PH hackers hailed by gov’t as ‘computer geniuses,’ probe shows,” Altermidya,
March 15, 2022, https://www.altermidya.net/cyberattacks-traced-to-ph-hackers-hailed-by-govt-as-computer-
geniuses-probe-shows/
65 Gelu Gonzales, “Military, DOST links found in DDoS attacks on media – report,” Rappler, June 23, 2021,
https://www.rappler.com/technology/qurium-links-dost-military-found-ddos-attacks-altermidya-bulatlat/
66 Vittoria Elliott, “A Sprawling Bot Network Used Fake Porn to Fool Facebook,” Wired, September 26, 2022,
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-bots-ddos-attack/
Qurium’s investigation of the DDoS attacks
on Bulatlat, an independent media outlet, in
November 2021 showed that the attacks were
coming from thousands of Facebook accounts.
Further investigation showed that this was
done through an elaborate operation where
a Vietnamese troll farm used malicious links
disguised as links to pornography to capture
the credentials of Facebook users and redirect
the trac to Bulatlat. Qurium also found that
this operation went largely undetected as
the operators used a “bouncing domain” and
“residential proxies” to circumvent Meta’s
mechanisms to detect phishing scams and
malicious links.
66
138 |
Red-tagging and attacks on journalists – especially
those from independent media groups – have
continued through the Marcos Jr. administration.
In June 2022, the National Telecommunications
Commission ordered the blocking of 26 websites,
alleging that the websites are “aliated to and are
supporting terrorists and terrorist organizations”
designated as such by several resolutions of the
Anti-Terrorism Council. The blocked websites
included those of independent media groups,
such as Bulatlat and Pinoy Weekly, as well as
those of the Save Our Schools Network of NGOs
advocating for the right to education, and the Rural
Missionaries of the Philippines, a group of priests,
nuns, and laypeople.
67
67 Raymond Carl Dela Cruz, “NTC orders ISPs to block terror group-related sites,” Philippine News Agency, June 22, 2022,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1177276
68 Span dāna Singh, “Everything in Moderation: An Analysis of How Internet Platforms Are Using Articial Intelligence to
Moderate User-Generated Content,” New America, July 22, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/everything-
moderation-analysis-how-internet-platforms-are-using-articial-intelligence-moderate-user-generated-content/
case-study-facebook/
69 Vittoria Elliott and Devendra Pamar, “The despair and darkness of people will get to you,” Rest of World, July 22, 2020,
https://restofworld.org/2020/facebook-international-content-moderators/
3. Censorship through Content Moderation
Social media platforms, each with their own legal
terms and policies, are another battleground
when it comes to regulation of speech, which
comes in the form of content moderation. Over
the years, social media content moderation
has been the subject of too many controversies
– from the use of machine learning to make
takedown decisions,
68
to labor issues involving
third-party content moderators mostly from
countries like the Philippines.
69
But for this paper,
it is crucial that we look at the content policies of
social media platforms – particularly Facebook –
as it will give us a good idea of how the concepts
of “safety” and “security” are operationalized in
the digital spaces that host a signicant chunk
of Filipinos’ lives.
Source: Cottonbro studio, Pexels
Hands on a Laptop Keyboard.
139 |
In the general section of Facebook’s Community
Standards, it denes safety as “[removing]
content that could contribute to a risk of harm
to the physical security of persons” as well
as content that “threatens people [and] has
the potential to intimidate, exclude or silence
others.”
70
Its specic denitions of terms such
as hate speech and terrorism, however, leave
much to be desired.
71
Despite these policies,
Facebook remains a breeding ground for all
forms of harassment, including gender-based
harassment and violence, that have been shown
to have a chilling eect on the online speech
of women and other vulnerable groups, and
democratic discourse as a whole.
72
Figures about
online gender-based violence in the Philippines
show Facebook as the top platform where
various forms of online gender-based violence
were perpetrated during the pandemic.
73
The
fact is that although Meta supposedly has local
policy oces, the directives and key decisions
still come from its American headquarters, and
therefore reflect the largely white, male, and
libertarian corporate ethos of the company.
74
70 “Facebook Community Standards,” Meta Transparency Center, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards
71 Article 19, “Facebook Community Standards: Analysis against international standards on freedom of expression,” July
30, 2018, https://www.article19.org/resources/facebook-community-standards-analysis-against-international-
standards-on-freedom-of-expression/
72 Duna Mijatović, “No space for violence against women and girls in the digital world,” Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, March 15, 2022, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/no-space-for-violence-against-women-
and-girls-in-the-digital-world
73 Foundation for Media Alternatives, “Submission on domestic violence in the context of COVID 19 to the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences,” June 30, 2020,
74 Ysabel Gerard, “Social media content moderation: six opportunities for feminist intervention,” Feminist Media Studies 20,
no. 5 (June 2020): 748-751, https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2020.1783807
75 “Net Neutrality,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.e.org/issues/net-neutrality
76 Pia Ranada, “Duterte says online defenders, trolls hired only during campaign,” Rappler, July 25, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/176615-duterte-online-defenders-trolls-hired-campaign/
Given Facebook’s massive user base in the
Philippines, the lack of involvement of Filipino
stakeholders in its decision making deserves to
be questioned. It is also important to investigate
and question the involvement of Facebook and
other foreign technology companies in providing
internet access to Filipinos. Ultimately, the issue
of net neutrality – which is the principle that
internet service providers (ISPs) should treat
all data that travels over their networks fairly
and without discrimination in favor of particular
apps, websites, or services
75
– is an issue of
censorship and the right of people to access
information necessary to participate in civic
space freely and meaningfully.
C. Disinformation and Securitized
Responses
Rodrigo Duterte became the 16th President of the
Philippines on June 30, 2016. Duterte’s campaign
and eventual success was a turning point in
Philippine history due to his team’s use of digital
tactics on social media platforms. Trolls and
volunteers were hired to bolster support for his
election in which they would spread information
to promote and defend him against critics.
76
140 |
The disinformation-marred campaign and
election period made the Philippines known
as “Patient Zero,” the rst nation where an
election is shown to be heavily influenced by
disinformation on online platforms.
77
Coordinated
disinformation and online propaganda continued
throughout Duterte’s six-year term, which was
also marked by human rights violations. Various
digital tactics were used to attack critics of
Duterte and his administration. Independent
media, opposition politicians, and fact-checking
organizations were targeted while disinformation
and misinformation that espoused Duterte’s
authoritarian rhetoric were allowed and even
encouraged to spread in online and oline
channels.
78
Troll armies were also employed
during the COVID pandemic to defend the
Philippine government’s COVID response and
drown out criticism.
79
The meteoric rise of disinformation and
propaganda online was further bolstered by the
erosion of public trust in traditional media as the
fourth estate. In fact, according to research by
the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
social media is now the biggest source of news
by Filipinos (72%), overshadowing traditional
platforms like television (61%) and print (16%).
Among social media and messaging platforms,
Facebook, YouTube, and Facebook Messenger
rank as the biggest sources of news.
80
77 Ronald Mendoza, Imelda Danila, and Jurel Yap, “Philippines: diagnosing the infodemic,” The Interpreter, December 1, 2021,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/philippines-diagnosing-infodemic
78 Samantha Bradshaw and Philip Howard, “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media
Manipulation,” Oxford Internet Institute, July 17, 2017, https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/troops-trolls-and-
troublemakers-a-global-inventory-of-organized-social-media-manipulation/
79 Lynzy Billing, “Duterte’s troll armies drown out Covid-19 dissent in the Philippines,” Coda Story, July 21, 2020,
https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/philippines-troll-armies/
80 Yvonne Chua, “Digital News Report: Philippines,” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, June 23, 2021,
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021/philippines
81 Jonathan Corpus Ong, Ross Tapsell, and Nicole Curato, “Tracking Digital Disinformation in the 2019 Philippine Midterm
Election,” New Mandala, August 2019, https://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Digital-
Disinformation-2019-Midterms.pdf
82 Adrian Shahbaz, Allie Funk, and Kian Vesteinsson, “Freedom on the Net 2022: Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul of the
Internet,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2022/countering-authoritarian-overhaul-internet
A study on digital disinformation during the
2019 midterm elections noted that micro-media
manipulation, which refers to micro-targeting
seeded specic political propaganda at discrete
groups, had become a new insidious strategy
to disseminate propaganda while evading fact
checkers and content moderators.
81
This means
that disinformation now thrives at the level of
small communities and private groups. This trend
is noteworthy because while Facebook can
penalize accounts and pages for hate speech or
inauthentic coordinated behavior, it is unable to
do the same for closed groups and communities
because of privacy protections. The only actors
who can take down or control the content
in a closed group are its administrators or
moderators. As the report notes, closed groups
often operate as echo chambers or lter bubbles
that communities of the same inclinations,
whether political or otherwise, go to in order
to arm each other’s beliefs.
Indeed, the rise of disinformation in social media
also highlights the closing of digital spaces
for discourse through the fragmentation of
the internet and platforms that encourage the
creation and sustenance of echo chambers.
The 2022 Freedom on the Net report speaks
of a global trend of authoritarian governments
pushing to “divide the open internet into a
patchwork of repressive enclaves” by blocking
foreign websites, hoarding personal data, and
centralizing their technical infrastructures under
an internet governance model that promotes
“cyber sovereignty.”
82
141 |
The Philippines is believed to be Patient Zero in
the global disinformation crisis, but equally or
perhaps even more alarming are the solutions
proposed to address it. Just within Duterte’s
term, several bills were led to counter “fake
news” with the proposed measures ranging
from mere fact-checking to the regulation of
and imposition of penalties on social media
companies, to mandatory registration of social
media accounts in a government-held database.
Securitized responses look at disinformation, hate
speech, targeted harassment, and even gender-
based violence as one massive, homogenous
security threat – which they’re not – and the
proposed solutions are not at all nuanced.
The perfect illustration of this is the country’s
cybercrime law, which looks at all oenses done
through the use of ICTs on the same level. Apart
from cyberlibel, Section 6 of the cybercrime
law, which categorizes as cybercrime all crimes
covered by the Revised Penal Code and by special
laws when committed with the use of ICTs, has
also been used to increase penalties for online
speech purported to be disinformation.
83 The Freedom Online Coalition’s submission to the OHCHR regarding the practical application of the UNGPs in the global
technology sector (A/HRC/RES/47/23),” Oce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 11,
2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/les/2022-03/Freedom-Online-Coalition.pdf
84 Paige Occeñola, “Exclusive: PH was Cambridge Analytica’s ‘petri dish’ – whistle-blower Christopher Wylie,” Rappler,
September 10, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-media/239606-cambridge-analytica-philippines-
online-propaganda-christopher-wylie/
This tendency of the government to impose
a securitized response to disinformation is not
unique to the Philippines. The Freedom Online
Coalition, in its submission to the Oce of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights regarding the practical application of
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights in the global technology sector,
warns against the tendency of governments to
“unduly restrict, moderate, or manipulate online
content or disrupt networks to deny users access
to information, contrary to their international
obligations and often under vague justications
of ‘security’, ‘public order’, or the false pretention
of combating ‘fake news’.”
83
It is highly ironic that the Philippines appears
to foreign actors as a fertile testing ground for
disinformation tactics because of its “relatively
underdeveloped regulatory infrastructure,”
84
because technically speaking, there are
regulatory structures in place that are supposed
to counter such activities. Unlike most of its
Asian neighbors, the Philippines has had both
data protection and competition laws in place
since 2012 and 2014, respectively. It has a
functioning National Privacy Commission and
a Philippine Competition Commission that each
have the power to hold social media companies
accountable to the Filipino people. Yet neither
of these government agencies has made a
signicant eort to penalize or even investigate
mammoth platforms such as Facebook for the
harms their technologies have facilitated and
their undue influence on Philippine democracy.
142 |
VI. In Focus: Securitized COVID-19
Response with the use of ICTs
85 Pasig village boosts measures to mitigate spread of Covid-19,” Philippine News Agency, March 30, 2020,
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1098189
86 Christia Marie Ramos, “11 drones now in Cebu City to monitor quarantine compliance – Eleazar,” Inquirer.net, June 28,
2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1298698/11-drones-now-in-cebu-city-to-monitor-quarantine-compliance-eleazar
87 The Joint Task Force COVID-19 Shield is composed of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Fire Protection. It serves as the enforcement arm of the national government
in implementing quarantine rules and protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic.
88 JC Gotinga, “Police to ‘regularly monitor’ social media for quarantine violations,” Rappler, September 5, 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/police-regularly-monitor-social-media-quarantine-violations
89 Lian Buan, “Bayanihan Act’s sanction vs ‘false’ info the ‘most dangerous,’” Rappler, March 29, 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/256256-sanctions-fake-news-bayanihan-act-most-dangerous/
With most transactions and everyday
activities including school and work
moving online, so have most eorts
to restrict civic space and human
rights. In the case of the Philippines,
the threats and attacks on civic
space that we identied earlier (i.e.,
surveillance, censorship, and securitized
disinformation response), were amplied
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
As highlighted by another report
in this series (See ‘Not Safe:
Securitization of the COVID-19 Crisis
and its Impact on Civic Space in the
Philippines’ by Mary Jane N. Real), the
Duterte government’s approach to
the COVID-19 response was highly
securitized and militarized, and key to
this strategy was the implementation
of various levels of “community
quarantine” or lockdowns. Several
technologies were employed for
quarantine enforcement, including the
installation of surveillance cameras, the
use of articial intelligence to monitor
the movements of residents in high-
risk areas in real time,
85
and the use of
camera drones by the police to detect
quarantine violations.
86
In September
2020, the government task force
charged with implementing community
quarantine protocols
87
directed the
national police to monitor social media
for accounts of quarantine violations.
88
Complementing these surveillance
measures were attempts of the
government to control online speech,
particularly social media content
that are critical of the Philippine
government’s COVID-19 response.
The Bayanihan to Heal as One Act, the
law that declared a national emergency
arising from the COVID-19 pandemic,
included a provision that penalizes
COVID-related disinformation. The
penalized acts were dened as follows:
(f) Individuals or groups creating,
perpetrating, or spreading false
information regarding the COVID-19
crisis on social media and other
platforms, such information having
no valid or benecial eect on the
population, and are clearly geared to
promote chaos, panic, anarchy, fear,
or confusion; and those participating
in cyber incidents that make use or
take advantage of the current crisis
situation to prey on the public through
scams, phishing, fraudulent emails,
or other similar acts;
Rights advocates vehemently opposed
this particular provision, asserting that
the language is vague enough to allow
possible abuse and misuse by State
actors and suppress free speech.
89
Case study continued on next page >>>
143 |
A few days after the law was signed, there
were 32 arrests related to “fake news”
90
proving that the fear of the fake news
provision being used to suppress free
speech was not unfounded. Interestingly,
many of these arrests did not make use
of the Bayanihan law but were still based
on violations of the Revised Penal Code
(i.e., “Unlawful Use of Means of Publication
and Unlawful Utterances”). The provision
on false information was omitted in the
subsequent versions of the Bayanihan law.
Most of these arrests were those of
ordinary citizens airing their complaints
on social media. These citizens were
arrested either for charges of cyberlibel
or under the justication of spreading
“fake news.” For instance, a public school
teacher from General Santos City was
arrested without a warrant after venting
that people from her city were going
hungry and encouraging people with
nothing to eat to raid the local gym,
where undistributed food packs meant
for them were stocked. Her son was also
arrested for trying to stop the police from
taking his mother without a warrant. The
teacher was charged with inciting to
sedition in relation to the cybercrime law,
as she posted her rant on social media.
91
Human rights groups immediately
opposed this arrest, calling it an overkill
as the teacher was simply airing her
90 32 arrested over ‘fake’ COVID-19 news,” CNN Philippines, April 6, 2020,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/6/arrests-over-coronavirus-fake-news.html
91 “Teacher, son arrested without warrant in GenSan over Facebook post,” Rappler, March 28, 2020, https://www.rappler.
com/nation/256157-teacher-son-arrested-without-warrant-general-santos-city-facebook-post-coronavirus/
92 “Human rights group calls for release of teacher arrested over ‘seditious’ Facebook post,” CNN Philippines, March 29, 2020,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/3/29/karapatan-teacher-arrest-sedition-charges-coronavirus.html
93 “Chilling eect: NBI going after netizens for social media posts on COVID response - Diokno” ABS-CBN News, April 2,
2020, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/02/20/chilling-eect-nbi-going-after-netizens-for-social-media-posts-
on-covid-response-diokno
94 “Salesman arrested for social media post against Bong Go, Duterte,” CNN Philippines, May 14, 2020,
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/5/14/Duterte-cyberlibel-arrest-Agusan-del-Norte.html
95 “Palace defends socmed monitoring,” Manila Standard, September 8, 2020,
https://www.manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/333555/palace-defends-socmed-monitoring.html
96 Consuelo Marquez, “CEGP condemns alleged ‘red-tagging’ of campus journalist,” Inquirer.net, April 5, 2020,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1254285/cegp-condemns-alleged-red-tagging-of-campus-journalist
97 Delta Dyrecka Letigio, “CEGP cries foul over Gwen’s reply to school pub’s statement,” Cebu Daily News, March 25, 2020,
https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/296967/cegp-cries-foul-over-gwens-reply-to-school-pubs-statement
legitimate grievances over her local
government’s unsatisfactory COVID
response that led to mass hunger.
92
In
another instance, a private individual
was subpoenaed for a post made about
the misuse of local government funds for
COVID relief.
93
A salesman was arrested
in Agusan del Norte for calling then-
President Duterte “stupid” and “crazy”
in his local language in his Facebook
comments. In the same week, at least
four arrests were made against social
media users who posted comments
critical of Duterte.
94
The then-Secretary
of Interior and Local Government led
charges against an administrator of
a Facebook page for attributing a
false quote to him regarding physical
distancing measures.
95
Even campus journalists were not
spared from intimidation. An editor of a
college publication was red-tagged and
threatened by the police after publishing
critical opinions on the Duterte
administration’s COVID-19 response.
The campus journalist’s Facebook
account was also probed by the
police.
96
Another campus publication
in Cebu was publicly called out – via
Facebook – by the Cebu governor after
it criticized her creation of a special unit
specically tasked to trace individuals
who post negative criticisms about the
government’s COVID-19 response.
97
144 |
VII. Analysis
A. The Right to Privacy and Right
to Information are Essential to
a Comprehensive Denition of
Civic Space
CIVICUS denes civic space as “the place,
physical, virtual, and legal, where people
exercise their rights to freedom of association,
expression, and peaceful assembly.”
98
In this initiative, we propose a more
comprehensive denition of civic space that
includes not just the freedom of association,
expression, and assembly, but also the right to
privacy and access to information. Apart from
being fundamental rights recognized by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the rights to privacy and information are
essential for people to participate in civic space
fully and meaningfully. The right to privacy gives
people the autonomy and agency over their
bodies, their possessions, and their data, and
therefore gives them the freedom to speak out
on issues of public concern and participate in
public decision making.
Discussions on shrinking civic spaces must
also address the fact that many cases of state
violence against journalists and activists are
preceded by privacy violations such as stalking,
monitoring, and unauthorized use of personal
information. Thus, attacks on privacy and
anonymity must be interrogated for more than just
their virtual harms but must be seen as attempts
to stifle civic freedoms in physical spaces.
98 “Guide to Reporting on Civic Space: Media Toolkit,” CIVICUS, https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/
resources/toolkits/2746-guide-to-reporting-civic-space
…the rights to privacy and
information are essential for
people to participate in civic
space fully and meaningfully.
The right to privacy gives
people the autonomy and
agency over their bodies,
their possessions, and their
data, and therefore gives
them the freedom to speak
out on issues of public
concern and participate
in public decision making.
Source: Jurgen Jester, Pexels
Surveillance Cameras on a Metal Post.
145 |
B. Modern Surveillance is Exercised
through the Erosion of Anonymity
Traditionally, the notion of surveillance pertains
to the activity of active monitoring. However,
another aspect of surveillance is the chilling
eect that is caused by its mere presence. In
explaining Panopticism, Foucault discusses how
the constant monitoring and examination of
activities becomes a means by which power is
exercised and self-censorship is encouraged. In a
Panopticon, it doesn’t matter whether the actual
exercise of surveillance is a continuous one; it
only matters that the surveillance apparatus
is in place. Hence, “a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power.”
99
In the modern age,
this is manifested in the mere establishment
of surveillance measures and legislation,
notwithstanding the implementation or the
eectiveness of such measures, as their mere
existence pushes people to self-regulate for fear
of being apprehended. This includes measures
that place citizens’ identities on such close view
by the State, such as real-name policies, SIM card
and social media registration, and the continuous
collection of personal data and creation of
databases through ID systems like the PhilSys.
In online spaces, the most common manifestation
of this panopticon-esque model of surveillance
is the erosion of anonymity, which forces people
to self-regulate as their identities are always
on display. Certain sectors of civil society such
as queer activists are in higher danger of being
disenfranchised by these surveillance measures
due to their reliance on anonymous platforms to
express their lived identities, as opposed to the
legal identities that real-name policies force on
internet users.
99 Michel Foucault, “”Panopticism” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,” Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global
Contexts 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): 1-12, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/252435
C. The Propensity of Social Media
Algorithms towards Creating and
Maintaining Echo Chambers and Filter
Bubbles are Shrinking Spaces for
Deliberative Discourse Online
Disinformation research has shown that the niche
communities and lter bubbles encouraged by
the way social media platforms like Facebook
are designed, contribute to the rapid spread
of disinformation and even hate speech in the
same platforms. The closed and private nature
of these groups also often make it close to
impossible for those outside them to report
violations, and for the platforms to monitor
and regulate activity within the groups. This
raises the need to question whether companies
like Meta are genuinely expanding spaces for
discourse and increasing people’s means of
political participation through products such as
Free Facebook. We make the case that contrary
to their claims, platforms like Facebook are,
in fact, shrinking the spaces for deliberation
and discourse because of how their algorithms
are designed to encourage polarization and
maintain the existence of lter bubbles and echo
chambers. This is especially critical in the case
of the Philippines due to the increasing reliance
of Filipinos on social media, particularly on
Facebook, for news and knowledge that inform
their political participation.
146 |
D. Digital Technologies Blur the Line
between Public and Private, thus
bringing to Question Traditional
Notions of Safety and Security
One of the oldest debates about online
platforms, especially social media networks,
is whether social media platforms are public or
private spaces. Existing Philippine jurisprudence
leans towards the former. In the landmark
case of Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, the
Philippine Supreme Court ruled that a reasonable
expectation of privacy cannot be automatically
assumed in online social networking platforms
such as Facebook. The decision states that for
one to have an expectation of privacy when using
social networking platforms, “it is rst necessary
that said user […] manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment
of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility.”
100
Simply put, prevailing local
jurisprudence says that social media platforms
are public platforms by default, and it is only
by utilizing the platform’s privacy settings that
users can assert a reasonable expectation of
privacy over their activity and the content that
they upload in the platform. However, vulnerable
groups such as victims of domestic violence
and the LGBTQ community often take to online
spaces to nd refuge and safety.
This blurring of lines became even more evident
during the COVID-19 pandemic, when restrictions
to mobility forced everyone to shift into online
modes of public participation. This also meant
that physical spaces and communities that used
to be safe spaces for women to speak out against
abuse were dissolved and shifted to digital
channels of communication.
100 G.R. No. 202666, Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, September 29, 2014, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/
showdocs/1/57754
E. In the Philippines, Threats to Civic
Space are Reinforced by Poor Quality of
Internet and Weak Internet Governance
Disinformation and the lack of access to diverse
and factual information are exacerbated by the
fact that internet quality remains dismal in many
parts of the country.
Lack of quality internet access pushes people
in far-flung areas and low-income communities
to rely on aordable platforms such as free
television for news and for the exercise of their
civil and political rights. However, the attacks
on traditional media have decreased both trust
and access to a major provider such as ABS-
CBN, thus leaving some demographic groups
with little to no sources of credible and accurate
information. The longstanding market capture
of two major telecommunications and internet
service providers in the country has hampered
improvement on the quality, speed, and
aordability of Philippine internet, thus leaving
some users with no other choice than to rely on
aordable “mobile internet bundles” that limit
their access to one or a few social media sites
such as Facebook and YouTube.
147 |
The systems-rst approach to cybersecurity
(i.e., one that prioritizes the security of systems
over the security of persons) is a threat to
civic space as it can be used by governments
to justify measures that violate civic
freedoms under the guise of securing
critical information infrastructures.
This is complemented by the fact that discussions
on ICT-related policies in the Philippines remain
mostly exclusive to government and private
sector voices, leaving marginalized sectors and
communities unheard and disempowered by
treating them as passive consumers.
The problem with cybersecurity, as with other
forms of security, is that it is often regarded as
a panacea to every problem in cyberspace. But
not all cyber threats are cybersecurity threats.
Information disorders are not necessarily security
threats (although they can eventually be so).
What is therefore crucial for both policymakers
and civil society is to build a more nuanced
understanding of digital issues and their
links to offline ones. Moreover, to counter
securitization as a knee-jerk response to
disinformation, information disorders must
be viewed not as mere cybercrimes, but as a
systemic disease that goes beyond the online
realm and plagues many, if not all, facets
of democracy. This should involve a holistic
approach and more inclusive policy making
processes, even in areas that are usually deemed
too technical for open public consultations.
The systems-rst approach
to cybersecurity (i.e., one
that prioritizes the security
of systems over the security
of persons) is a threat to
civic space as it can be
used by governments to
justify measures that violate
civic freedoms under the
guise of securing critical
information infrastructures.
To counter securitization
as a knee-jerk response to
disinformation, information
disorders must be viewed
not as mere cybercrimes,
but as a systemic disease
that goes beyond the online
realm and plagues many, if
not all, facets of democracy.
148 |
VIII. Strategies of
Resistance and Levers
of Change
Online platforms have been powerful tools for
resistance against repressive laws and policies.
When the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2020 was
approved on nal reading despite numerous
concerns about both its content and the way it
was railroaded in the House of Representatives,
Filipinos took to the streets and to social media
to call on lawmakers to scrap the bill using the
hashtags #junkterrorbill and #junkterrorbillnow.
Online signature campaigns were launched, and
online users were urged to send emails to their
respective representatives for the same purpose.
The calls soon garnered international attention,
with then-United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet issuing a
warning against the dangers of the legislation,
and international pop star Taylor Swift sharing
a link to the online petition against the proposed
law.
101
The public clamor against the bill was so
loud that some lawmakers eventually withdrew
their authorship of the bill, while some who
were originally named as co-authors denied
their involvement.
102
101 Barnaby Lo, “Protest against ‘urgent’ anti-terror bill in Philippines gets a boost from Taylor Swift,” CBS News, June 4, 2020,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/protest-against-urgent-anti-terror-bill-in-philippines-gets-a-boost-from-taylor-swift/
102 Catalina Ricci S. Madarang, “These lawmakers withdrew support for Anti-Terror Bill after initially backing it,” Interaksyon,
June 4, 2020, https://interaksyon.philstar.com/politics-issues/2020/06/04/169972/these-lawmakers-withdrew-
support-for-anti-terror-bill-after-initially-backing-it/
103 Verónica Ferrari and Sheetal Kumar, “A human centric approach to international cybernorms: Civil society feedback on
the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs proposals,” Association for Progressive Communications, December 1, 2020,
https://www.apc.org/en/news/human-centric-approach-international-cybernorms-civil-society-feedback-un-open-
ended-working
104 Edoardo Celeste, “Digital constitutionalism,” International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 33, no. 1 (2019): 76-99,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2019.1562604
Philippine civil society has utilized various
strategies to push back against the digital
threats to civic space, as identied earlier in
this paper. Most importantly, alternative visions
and denitions of safety and security are
cropping up in several pockets of civil society,
both globally and in the Philippines. This last
section looks at these alternative strategies and
counter-narratives that could be considered
as new pathways for the preservation of a free
civic space.
A. Global Movement for People-centric
Cyber Policy
In the international arena, civil society has
been pushing back against the creation of
oppressive and exploitative global norms by
building alliances and making concerted eorts
to increase civil society participation in spaces
that are traditionally exclusive to State and
corporate actors. One such space is the UN
Open Ended Working Group on security of and
the use of information and communications
technologies. Through active participation by
digital rights groups and networks such as the
Association for Progressive Communications, the
global human rights movement has repeatedly
raised the need for the inclusion of human rights
and marginalized voices in cyber norms.
103
There is also a growing global movement for
digital constitutionalism, which is comprised
of “constitutional counteractions against the
challenges produced by digital technology,”
described as “the ideology that adapts the
values of contemporary constitutionalism
to the digital society.”
104
149 |
B. Local Initiatives for Inclusive and
Civil Society-led Internet Governance
The global call for a multistakeholder approach to
internet governance is reflected in local initiatives
like the Philippine Declaration on Internet Rights
and Principles and the Magna Carta for Philippine
Internet Freedom, which both stem from the
dissatisfaction of Philippine civil society with
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Recognizing the growing threats to digital
rights and the lack of civil society voices in
internet governance, various stakeholders
created the Philippine Declaration on Internet
Rights and Principles in 2015. It presents an
alternative vision of the internet – one that puts
the rights and needs of the Filipino people at
the center.
105
The Declaration was a product of
collective drafting and consultations with civil
society internet rights groups and the ICT policy
community and was largely inspired by similar
initiatives such as the Marco Civil da Internet in
Brazil (Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the
Internet). Apart from its progressive approach
to internet governance in that it lays down as
bases the rights of users instead of focusing
on the interests of internet companies or law
enforcement, the Marco Civil is known to have
gone through a thorough public consultation
process, including online forms of consultation.
106
105 “The Philippine Declaration on Internet Rights and Principles,” Foundation for Media Alternatives,
https://fma.ph/ph-declaration-internet-rights-principles/
106 Mariana Valiente, Dennys Antionialli, and Francisco Brito Cruz, “Marco Civil 5 Years Special: Why should we celebrate?,”
Internet Lab, April 3, 2019, https://internetlab.org.br/en/news/marco-civil-5-years-special-why-should-we-celebrate/
107 Jonathan De Santos, “The Wisdom of Crowds: Crowdsourcing Net Freedom,” Vera Files, January 21, 2013,
https://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/wisdom-crowds-crowdsourcing-net-freedom-042242158.html
108 “Magna Carta for Internet Freedom to Replace Anti-Cybercrime Law — Miriam,” Senate of the Philippines, November 30,
2012, https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2012/1130_santiago1.asp
Similarly, the Magna Carta for Philippine Internet
Freedom (MCPIF), which was rst led as a
Senate Bill during the 15th Congress in 2012, was
designed as a rights-based replacement to the
Cybercrime Prevention Act. Like the Marco Civil
da Internet, the MCPIF bill was “crowdsourced”
in that the drafting process was made accessible
to the public through ocial online platforms.
107
Unlike the existing cybercrime law, the MCPIF
treats libel as a civil liability rather than a
criminal act and guarantees the right against
illegal searches and seizures by providing strict
guidelines for any collection of data.
108
C. Rights-based Strategic litigation
When the cybercrime law was rst passed in
2012, it caused a massive uproar among the
Filipino public because of its controversial
provisions that restrict free speech and infringe
on the constitutional right to privacy. A partial
victory was achieved by the movement when
in the case of Disini v. The Secretary of Justice,
the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
some of the provisions that were questioned by
human rights advocates, namely:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175
that penalizes the posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or
recording of trac data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 that authorizes the Department
of Justice to restrict or block access to
suspected Computer Data.
150 |
Although contentious provisions such as the
criminalization of cybersex and cyberlibel were
upheld, the decision is key to ensuring that the
surveillance powers of law enforcement are kept
within the bounds of the Philippine Constitution.
The recent case led by independent media
organizations over the DDoS attacks on their
websites was a powerful statement against the
excessiveness of the cybercrime law. Instead of
ling a criminal case based on the Cybercrime
Prevention Act, the parties opted to le a civil
complaint against the IT companies named in
the digital forensics report. The complaint was
based on Article 32(3) of the Civil Code, which
protects the freedom of Filipinos to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical publication.
109
In the succeeding year, Altermidya network
members led another complaint, this time
against the National Task Force to End Local
Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) for
multiple instances of red-tagging.
110
These legal
actions are valuable because they demonstrate
that cyberlibel is extremely redundant and
unnecessary, especially at a time when libel
(online or otherwise) has become a political
weapon more than anything else.
109 “Alternative media groups le civil case amid cyberattacks,” Rappler, March 29, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/
technology/226968-alternative-media-groups-le-civil-case-cyberattacks-march-2019/
110 Kristine Joy Patag, “Alternative media groups sue NTF-ELCAC over continued red-tagging,” Philstar.com,
December 18, 2020.
111 “After denying TRO, what’s next in the ght to #UnblockBulatlat?,” Bulatlat, July 14, 2022, https://www.bulatlat.
com/2022/07/14/after-denying-tro-whats-next-in-the-ght-to-unblockbulatlat/
112 “Philippines: Court orders NTC to unblock Bulatlat website,” International Federation of Journalists, August 16, 2022,
https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/philippines-court-orders-ntc-to-
unblock-bulatlat-website.html
113 Jairo Bolledo, “Bulatlat asks QC court: Hold NTC in contempt for delaying unblocking of site,” Rappler, August 25, 2022,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/bulatlat-asks-court-hold-ntc-contempt-not-immediately-unblocking-website/
This case is also an exemplary demonstration
of the value of global solidarity among civil
society in countering oppressive governments.
The alternative media organizations were able to
mitigate the cyber-attacks and produce a digital
forensics report that became the basis of their
civil complaint through the assistance of Qurium
Media Foundation, the non-prot organization
based in Sweden.
When the National Telecommunications
Commission ordered the blocking of several
websites that, according to them, were linked
to terrorist groups, the order was immediately
assailed in court by the independent media
groups unduly included in the block list.
Independent media outlets Bulatlat and Pinoy
Weekly were not notied in advance that their
websites would be blocked. Bulatlat’s petition
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
against the NTC memorandum was originally
denied by the Regional Trial Court on the basis
that Bulatlat could still publish online and that
the inconvenience caused by the blocking is
“of no moment” and “irrelevant.”
111
However,
Bulatlat’s petition for a preliminary injunction
against the blocking order was eventually
granted by the court upon nding that a 44%
drop in monthly site trac meant that readers,
writers, and contributors were denied access to
information which amounted to a restriction of
the constitutionally protected right to freedom
of speech.
112
When, despite the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction that ordered the
unblocking of Bulatlat’s sites, NTC still continued
to block the website, Bulatlat asked the court
to hold the NTC in contempt. Throughout this
lengthy process, Bulatlat was represented by
lawyers from the National Union of People’s
Lawyers, a voluntary association of human
rights lawyers in the Philippines.
113
151 |
D. Civil Society-led Cyber
Incident Response
The experience of Philippine alternative media
groups in responding to cyberattacks on their
websites is demonstrative of the lack of local
capacity for cyber incident response. In most,
if not all of the cyberattacks described in this
paper, local groups have had to rely on foreign
entities such as the Qurium Media Foundation
to conduct digital forensics and emergency
response to secure their websites and systems.
While global non-prots such as Qurium and
Access Now provide digital security resources
for activists, it is critical to build the internal
capacity of local organizations and strengthen
their rst line of defense against attacks on their
digital assets.
E. Feminist and Queer Approaches
to Safety and Security
As frequent targets of harassment, abuse,
misogynistic remarks and other forms of
gender-based violence, women and queer
persons are often disenfranchised by lacking or
disproportionate responses to online threats. But
feminist movements are replete with alternative
visions of a safe and free internet. In the
Philippines, the Safe Spaces Act, passed in 2018,
aims to prevent and penalize gender-based
harassment in both physical and online spaces.
As frequent targets
of harassment, abuse,
misogynistic remarks and
other forms of gender-
based violence, women and
queer persons are often
disenfranchised by lacking or
disproportionate responses
to online threats. But feminist
movements are replete
with alternative visions
of a safe and free internet.
152 |
It denes gender-based online sexual
harassment as:
acts that use information and communications
technology in terrorizing and intimidating
victims through physical, psychological,
and emotional threats, unwanted sexual,
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic,
and sexist remarks and comments online
whether publicly or through direct and private
messages, invasion of victim’s privacy through
cyberstalking and incessant messaging,
uploading and sharing without the consent
of the victim, any form of media that contains
photos, voice, or video with sexual content, any
unauthorized recording and sharing of any of
the victim’s photos, videos, or any information
online, impersonating identities of victims
online or posting lies about victims to harm
their reputation, or ling false abuse reports
to online platforms to silence victims.
114
114 Republic Act No. 11313, Safe Spaces Act, https://pcw.gov.ph/republic-act-11313/
115 Cody Cepeda, “Lunas Collective: Keeping the distance that COVID-19 social distancing removes between abuser,
abused,” Inquirer.net, April 3, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1253503/lunas-collective-keeping-the-distance-
that-covid-19-social-distancing-removes-between-abuser-abused
By specically naming misogynistic, transphobic,
homophobic, and sexist remarks as forms of
online harassment, the law becomes inclusive
not just of the experiences of women, but also
those who identify as part of LGBTQ.
Filipino feminist and queer organizations also
operationalize their own narratives and visions
of safety through initiatives such as the Lunas
Collective, a Facebook-based chat service
providing support for those who experience
gender-based violence.
115
By carving out safe
spaces for themselves and for women, these
organizations are able to turn the community
features of platforms such as Facebook
into spaces of solidarity and support rather
than breeding grounds of disinformation
and misogyny.
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Employees, journalists, celebrities, and supporters of media network ABS-CBN show their dissent a week after Congress rejected
their franchise renewal with a noise barrage and motorcade outside the ABS-CBN compound in Quezon City on July 18, 2020.
153 |
Women journalists who, as the case of Maria Ressa
demonstrates, are particularly vulnerable to online
violence – are also coming together to create
their own virtual safe spaces. A few days after the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Anti-Terrorism Law, the International Association
of Women in Radio and Television launched
Digital Safe House, an online platform where
women journalists can report cases of attacks,
harassment, abuses, and other gender-based
violence, and access resources and services
such as legal and medical assistance.
116
Women and girls in the Philippines have been
reclaiming online spaces as safe spaces for telling
their stories and demanding accountability from
abusers and sexual predators, mostly through
hashtag campaigns.
At the height of the pandemic in 2020, the
hashtag #HijaAko (“I am hija”) became a trending
topic after a young female celebrity spoke out
against TV host Ben Tulfo for saying that the way
women dress invites sexual oenders to commit
crime.
117
Shortly after this, students and alumni of
Miriam College took to social media to share their
personal accounts of sexual harassment by faculty
members of the said school, using the hashtag
#MCHSdobetter.
118
This triggered a chain of similar
hashtags by students and alumni from other
schools exposing patterns of sexual misconduct by
teachers and holding perpetrators of sexual assault
to account.
Women and girls in the
Philippines have been
reclaiming online spaces
as safe spaces for telling
their stories and demanding
accountability from abusers
and sexual predators, mostly
through hashtag campaigns.
116 Group launches ‘Digital Safe House’ for Filipino women journalists,” Bulatlat, December 13, 2021,
https://www.bulatlat.com/2021/12/13/digital-safe-house-for-lipino-women-journalists-launched/
117 Pilar Manuel, “#HijaAko trends after Frankie Pangilinan hits back at Ben Tulfo for victim-blaming women,” CNN Philippines,
June 14, 2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/entertainment/2020/6/14/Frankie-Pangilinan-Ben-Tulfo-victim-
blaming-women.html
118 “#MCHSdobetter: Groups condemn sexual misconduct of teachers, call for justice,” Rappler, June 26, 2020,
https://www.rappler.com/moveph/264962-groups-condemn-sexual-misconduct-teachers-call-justice/
Other strategies that could be explored
to resist the Philippine government’s digital
security playbook are breaking the monopoly
of Facebook by migrating into other secure
online platforms; investigating surveillance trade
and the use of surveillance technologies by the
Philippine government; and pushing for oversight
and accountability both by state actors and
global tech companies that wield so much
unregulated power over cyberspace.
Finally, there is a need to debunk the image of
the Philippines as being a suitable “petri dish”
for the abuse of technology by businesses and
governments. While the Duterte administration
attempted to build an arsenal of repressive laws,
practices, and technologies, democracy also
has its own toolbox in the form of regulations
and mechanisms, as well as emergent innovative
strategies by civil society that are designed
to protect citizens in their use of digital
technologies. The challenge is now in wielding
these tools to uphold a free civic space.
154 |
Conclusions: Redening
Civic Space and
Building New Pathways
of Resistance
by Jessamine Pacis and
Mary Jane N. Real
155 |
These conclusions draw from the research and
its four chapters that look into the current state
of civic space in the Philippines, the landscape
of actors working at the intersection of national
security and civic space, and the harmful
impacts of securitization on civic space. Based
on the ndings of the research, these conclusions
summarize an updated concept of civic space
drawn from a nuanced understanding of civic
engagement. These conclusions also highlight
promising approaches to broaden constituencies
for human rights activism, and pathways to
recongure forms of resistance carried out
by civil society actors that have become life-
threatening in the context of authoritarian rule.
Lastly, these conclusions oer areas for
further study.
Each of the four chapters describe dierent
aspects of the security playbook deployed by
the government of President Rodrigo Duterte,
comprised of laws and policies, narratives, and
practices used to justify repressive acts that led
to the closing of civic space under the broad
mantle of “national security.” This research
documents the contiguous wars waged by the
government: the “war against terror”, the “war
against illegal drugs” and the “war against
COVID-19” that severely constricted democratic
space and hastened the country’s descent into
authoritarian rule.
Source: Photo by Ray Lerma
Various groups commemorate the 36th anniversary of People Power, an uprising that toppled
the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the People Power Monument on February 25, 2022.
156 |
As illustrated in all the chapters of this research,
this shrinking civil space in the country is
characterized by: the government’s harsh
curtailment of the citizens’ fundamental
freedoms, particularly those essential to
sustaining a vibrant and discursive civic space;
the crackdown by the State and its apparatus
especially on human rights defenders through
killings, including extrajudicial executions, and
other serious human rights violations, to stifle
their activism; the suppression of dissent as
evident in the mass arrests and vilication of
those who have been critical of the government,
regardless of whether they self-identify or are
identied by state actors as activists.
Although the freedoms aspired for by activists
are timeless and unchanging, the platforms and
means by which such freedoms are fought for and
articulated are constantly evolving. Particularly
in recent years, global events such as the
COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence of new
technologies have transformed the way people
interact with civic space and their freedoms.
The concept of civic space, thus, is one that
demands occasional revisiting.
Throughout the chapters and in these
conclusions, this research pieces together a
concept of civic space that takes into account
a broader vision of what enables public
participation. The notion of civic engagement
includes several levels of engagement of the
public in democratic governance. The rst level
is political participation which, among others,
includes exercising the right to vote. The second
level consists of demanding state accountability
through resistance and dissent by citizens and
civil society. The last and fullest level of civic
engagement is deliberative and discursive
participation in public decision-making.
Employing these dierent levels of engagement
by the public as the basis of imagining what
is free “civic space”, the essential rights that
must be upheld to protect civic space must
be expanded as well. Apart from the rights to
freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, which are the rights
most commonly included in existing denitions
of civic space, the authors propose the inclusion
of the following rights: the right to vote; the right
to freedom of movement; the right to dissent; the
right to privacy; and the right to access accurate
and truthful information.
The phenomenon of red-tagging, described
in all the chapters but with most detail in the
chapter on counter-terrorism, is one of the
most pervasive new forms of curtailment of the
freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful
assembly and association carried out by the
Duterte administration.
The chapter (See ‘Counterinsurgency, Red-
Tagging, and the War Against Terror: A War
against Deliberation and Dissent, a War with No
End’ by Marc Batac) describes how red-tagging,
which refers to the practice of spuriously linking
various civic actors to the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the New Peoples’ Army, ultimately
harms civic space as it “feeds the irrational belief
that all forms of dissent and resistance are part
of the communist conspiracy”. With dissenters
tagged as terrorists, the government is able to
deploy the pursuit of national security as the
rationale for the infringement of their rights
as human rights defenders.
157 |
The right to vote is necessary for the rst level
of civic engagement. The chapter on COVID-19
(See ‘Not Safe: Securitization of the COVID-19
Crisis and its Impact on Civic Spaces in the
Philippines’ by Mary Jane Real) describes how
the Duterte government’s highly militarized and
securitized approach to pandemic response
derailed the right to vote of Filipinos in the
national elections held on 9 May 2022. As the
chapter also demonstrates, the right to freedom
of movement is necessary for the second level
of civic engagement, which aims to exact state
accountability for human rights violations. The
imposition of extended lockdowns in the country,
some of the longest in the world, curtailed
the freedom of movement. Consequently, this
infringed upon the defenders’ right to peaceful
assembly as travel bans and restrictions on
gatherings in public places were enforced, and
violators were arrested.
The chapters on information technology and the
media (See ‘Big Brother’s Grand Plan: A Look at
the Digital Security Playbook in the Philippines’
by Jessamine Pacis) and the war against
COVID-19 (See ‘Not Safe: Securitization of the
COVID-19 Crisis and its Impact on Civic Spaces
in the Philippines’ by Mary Jane Real) elaborate
on the right to privacy as an essential right to
a free civic space. The chapters reiterate that
the concept of privacy goes beyond simply the
freedom to safeguard personal information but
extends to freedom from active monitoring by
State actors through established systems of
surveillance that encourage self-regulation and
self-censorship. By institutionalizing surveillance
measures (e.g., contact tracing systems, ID
systems, CCTV networks), the government builds
a modern Panopticon, “a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power.”
1
Privacy therefore
becomes a critical tool for surveillance subjects
to resist this form of control, and assert their
autonomy and agency over their assets and
their own personhood.
1 Michel Foucault, “”Panopticism” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,” Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global
Contexts 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): 1-12, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/252435
2 Bernice Fisher and Joan Tronto, “Towards a Feminist Theory of Caring,” Circles of care: Work and identity in Women’s
Lives: 35-62 (1990).
If the element of deliberation and discursiveness
necessary for the highest level of civic
engagement is taken into consideration, the
right to access to truthful information becomes
an indispensable right. The role of access to
truthful and timely information in upholding a
free civic space was clearly demonstrated by
the impact of the closure of ABS-CBN, one of
the biggest media networks in the Philippines
during the COVID-19 pandemic. This politically
motivated move by Congress not to renew the
broadcast franchise of ABS-CBN had harmful
eects not only on the general population
that needed crucial information during the
COVID-19 pandemic, but also on civic space,
which necessitates timely and wide-reaching
dissemination of political information that fuels
civic engagement and political participation.
Another element that crosscuts these levels
of civic engagement and is necessary for the
sustainability of any social movement is the
practice of collective care. In Toward A Feminist
Theory of Caring, Fisher and Tronto argue that
caring “crosscuts the antitheses between public
and private”.
2
According to the authors, it
covers all aspect of human life, from the private
connes of the household to social institutions
and structures of the bureaucracy. Although
not often seen as central to activism, caring
for the welfare of human rights defenders is
increasingly being seen as a priority area. This
is most often practiced in feminist movements,
as seen in the care work of the Lunas Collective
among activists and victims of gender-based
violence, which is described in chapters of
this research. In other case studies such as the
grassroots movements against Duterte’s bloody
drug war, there is the same emphasis on care for
both victims of State violence and activists that
continuously voice opposition to it.
158 |
The four chapters of the research also highlight
movements and initiatives in the Philippines that
present alternative and transformative visions of
safety and security. These alternatives present
pathways to reshape activism for human rights
and oer possible levers of change that donors
and other stakeholders can pay attention and
direct resources to in the next few years. These
case studies are also meant to provide lessons
on resistance and movement-building and inspire
new initiatives to regenerate the closing civic
space in the Philippines.
In the face of misogynistic and sexist narratives
based on the pronouncements of President
Duterte himself as part of the populist rhetoric
of his administration, the chapter on information
technology and the media presents (See ‘Big
Brother’s Grand Plan: A Look at the Digital
Security Playbook in the Philippines’ by
Jessamine Pacis) several hashtag campaigns
innovated by Filipino women and girls. These
campaigns strategically reclaim online platforms
as a safe space to tell their narratives of
abuse and sexual harassment and demand
accountability from powerful personalities and
institutions complicit in such violations. These
online movements are a perfect example of
some issues traditionally relegated as a “private
matter” being brought into public and civic
space. However, this shift from private to public
also exposes the owners of the narratives to the
plethora of safety risks and threats present in
mostly unregulated online platforms that have
become part of civic space.
The pivotal role that communities played as the
rst line of defense during the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic discussed in that chapter
(See ‘Not Safe: Securitization of the COVID-19
Crisis and its Impact on Civic Spaces in the
Philippines’ by Mary Jane Real) point to the
possibilities that organizing community pantries
provide a reliable safety net to meet basic needs
and could serve as a platform to expand the base
for human rights activism. These community
pantries have proven to be sites for spreading
awareness, deepening connections, and
cultivating creative and transformative initiatives
among citizens that may not be directly or
formally involved in civic action, but nonetheless
have stakes in the issues debated in civic space.
The exposition on the phenomenon of community
pantries under the COVID-19 chapter also brings
to fore lessons on consciousness-raising through
mutual aid; co-responsibility for human rights to
complement demands for state accountability;
new solidarities through political contestation in
discursive civic space; and the centrality of care
in sustaining activism for human rights.
Like the other chapters, the chapter on the
“war on drugs” (See ‘The Eect of the “War on
Drugs” on Civic Space’ by the Ateneo Human
Rights Center) pinpoints the central role of care
in social movements and draws attention to
dehumanization, as one of the government’s
tactics against activists and human rights
advocates. The chapter draws a parallel
between this, and the removal of autonomy
from people who use drugs to decide on
treatment approaches that respond to their felt
needs. Instead, as the chapter emphasizes, the
government’s approach has been predominantly
punitive and violative of human rights. The
chapter further describes how serious gaps in
access to justice have fed penal populism and
are therefore among the root concerns that must
be addressed to counter the shrinking of civic
space in relation to addressing the drug problem
in the country.
159 |
The chapter on the war against terrorism
(See ‘Counterinsurgency, Red-Tagging, and the
War Against Terror: A War against Deliberation
and Dissent, a War with No End’ by Marc Batac)
highlights the initiative of Lumad Husay, an inter-
tribal convergence among indigenous peoples
in Mindanao “to carve out a space to dialogue
among themselves, build a common agenda
with regard to the peace process, and develop
and assert their own peacemaking and peace-
building practices.” The initiative constitutes a
political assertion among indigenous peoples
that aected communities are not merely subject
to notions of security and safety dened and
negotiated by the government; rather, they
are catalysts able to shape meanings and lead
in crafting solutions for peace. It brings home
the point that peace activists are legitimate
defenders of human rights critically engaged in
deliberative and discursive political participation,
the fullest level of civic engagement.
Given the scope and limitations of this research,
there are many avenues to explore for further
study. The concept of civic space itself merits
further clarication as it still appears nebulous
to many, and is dicult to translate, especially
in local languages and dialects. Does “space”
refer to a denite area or expanse, a platform,
or a plethora of processes? If the denition of
civic space is expanded as proposed above,
other key players and new or unexplored
terrains in the activism for human rights must
be identied and included as subjects of
further study. For example, participatory action
research into local initiatives such as the Lumad
Husay could reveal insights into transformative
strategies to mobilize grassroots support that
could help counter the global backlash on
human rights. And while the research features
many courageous acts of resistance initiated
by activists to push back the closing civic
space, there is room to consider other new and
innovative forms of resistance not documented
in this report.
Hopefully, this research and its four chapters will
be instructive to activists in the Philippines who
are thinking of new and innovative strategies to
sustain their movements amid the shrinking civic
space in the country, and to other stakeholders,
including donors wishing to support such
endeavors. In sum, the research challenges
these stakeholders to consider a more nuanced
understanding of civic engagement and a
broader denition of civic space to cover other
fundamental freedoms not commonly included
in existing denitions of the concept.
Further, this research advocates for expanding
the circle of human rights defenders to include
peace activists, and as the phenomenon of
community pantries demonstrates, also citizens
that may not be directly involved in civic action
but participate actively in deliberative and
discursive processes of civic engagement for
the advancement of human rights. Civil society
actors can build on the painstaking work they
have already done, as illustrated in the chapters
of this research, and challenge themselves and
the State to develop a concept of civic space
that is more robust, more inclusive, and lowers
barriers for broad participation in the eorts to
strengthen democracy, peace, and human rights
in the Philippines.
160 |
About Civic Futures
Civic Futures is a philanthropic initiative
conceptualised and launched by the
Funders Initiative for Civil Society (FICS)
which acts as its secretariat and the
Fund for Global Human Rights (FGHR)
which is a founding member. Civic
Futures exists to mobilize the funding
community working across multiple
issue areas to equip civil society to push
back against the overreach of national
security and counter-terrorism powers,
increasingly used by governments
around the world to harm civic space.
Copyright
The authors, FICS, and FGHR welcome
and encourage the use and dissemination
of the material included in this publication
as licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0):
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-sa/4.0
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7789243
civicfutures@global-dialogue.org
civic-futures.org
