3
the Great Recession and the 1980 to 1994 banking crisis.
7
Researchers have also found that
banks with heavy exposures to ADC loans were more likely to fail during both crises.
8
More
broadly, periods of real estate speculation have frequently contributed to financial crises around
the world.
9
Thus bankers need to approach ADC loans with appropriate caution and expertise,
and banking regulators need to set policies and procedures that suitably address the risk.
Unfortunately, there is much less information in the literature about what triggers losses for ADC
loans than for retail loans, corporate loans, or mortgages on existing residential and commercial
properties. Other types of loans often use nonbank financing, such as public debt markets or
securitization, that provide publicly available loan performance data for empirical studies.
10
ADC loans instead have, until recently, been limited to bank financing. As a result, data
availability has severely restricted research on ADC loan performance. In fact, we are unaware
of any empirical research that focuses on loss given default (LGD) for ADC loans, despite its
critical importance to the losses of this high-risk asset class.
This paper fills this hole in the literature by using a unique and proprietary set of loan-level data.
The goal of this paper is to learn about the factors that drive distressed LGD for ADC loans and
to explore the implications for lenders and regulators. We decompose LGD on ADC loans into
components that can inform bankers, investors, and regulators about risk exposures in actionable
ways. We then group the explanatory variables into loan, bank, and market characteristics, and
we examine the sensitivity of LGD to each group. Losses due to poor underwriting or poor bank
management can be mitigated through changes in lending policies and supervisory oversight.
Other factors that are not under direct control of the lender, such as losses tied to changes in
market conditions post-origination, are best addressed by loss reserves or capital requirements.
We analyze LGD for a sample of more than 15,000 loans from over 275 failed banks that were
resolved by the FDIC from 2008 to 2013. Most of these loans were originated during the boom
period in the mid-2000s, defaulted during the Great Recession, and were worked out during and
after the Great Recession. We acknowledge that this sample is hardly random: clearly we are
oversampling bad loans at bad banks during a very bad time.
11
However, we feel that this is
7
Author calculations using Call Report data. From 2008 through 2013, the noncurrent rate for ADC loans peaked at
16.8 percent, single-family peaked at 8.1 percent, and the others (C&I, multifamily, and other CRE) peaked below 5
percent. From 1991 to 1994, ADC loans peaked at 14.1, and the next highest loan type (other CRE) peaked at 5.5
percent. Data are not available for most loan types before 1991.
8
See GAO (2013) and Friend, Glenos, and Nichols (2013) for analysis of the Great Recession. See Fenn and Cole
(2008) and Collier, Forbush, and Nuxoll (2003) for analysis of the 1980 to 1994 crisis.
9
Both Kindleberger (2000) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) cite speculation in various forms of construction and
real estate as an underlying cause for many historical financial crises.
10
See, for example, Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2004) and Downs and Xu (2015).
11
We perform a benchmarking exercise in Appendix B, comparing our data against losses on construction loans
from a separate and independent supervisory data collection for large banks. We find differences between the two
samples, but we also find credible explanations for these difference that relate to the composition of the sample