Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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ENDNOTES
Alternative
Inuence:
Broadcasting the
Reactionary Right
on YouTube
Rebecca Lewis
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report identifies and names the Alternative Influence Network (AIN): an
assortment of scholars, media pundits, and internet celebrities who use YouTube to
promote a range of political positions, from mainstream versions of libertarianism
and conservatism, all the way to overt white nationalism. Content creators in the AIN
claim to provide an alternative media source for news and political commentary. They
function as political influencers who adopt the techniques of brand influencers to
build audiences and “sell” them on far-right ideology.
This report presents data from approximately 65 political influencers across 81 channels.
This network is connected through a dense system of guest appearances, mixing content
from a variety of ideologies. This cross-promotion of ideas forms a broader “reactionary”
position: a general opposition to feminism, social justice, or left-wing politics.
Members of the AIN cast themselves as an alternative media system by:
Establishing an alternative sense of credibility based on relatability,
authenticity, and accountability.
Cultivating an alternative social identity using the image of a social
underdog, and countercultural appeal.
Members of the AIN use the proven engagement techniques of brand influencers to
spread ideological content:
• Ideological Testimonials
• Political Self-Branding
• Search Engine Optimization
• Strategic Controversy
The AIN as a whole facilitates radicalization through social networking practices:
Audiences are able to easily move from mainstream to extreme content
through guest appearances and other links.
Political influencers themselves often shift to more radical positions
following interactions with other influencers or their own audiences.
When viewers engage with this content, it is framed as lighthearted, entertaining,
rebellious, and fun. This fundamentally obscures the impact that issues have on
vulnerable and underrepresented populations—the LGBTQ community, women,
immigrants, and people of color. And in many ways, YouTube is built to incentivize
this behavior. The platform needs to not only assess what channels say in their
content, but also who they host and what their guests say. In a media environment
consisting of networked influencers, YouTube must respond with policies that
account for influence and amplification, as well as social networks.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
CONTENTS 2
INTRODUCTION 3
METHODS 6
PART 1: THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK 8
PART 2: BUILDING AN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA 15
ALTERNATIVE CREDIBILITY 16
Relatability 17
Authenticity 18
Accountability 19
ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL IDENTITY 20
Social Underdogs 21
Countercultural Appeal 22
PART 3: PROMOTING IDEOLOGY THROUGH
INFLUENCER MARKETING 25
Ideological Testimonials 25
Political Self-Branding 28
Search Engine Optimization 30
Strategic Controversy 31
PART 4: FACILITATING RADICALIZATION THROUGH
SOCIAL NETWORKING 35
Audience Radicalization 36
Inuencer Radicalization 39
CONCLUSION 43
APPENDIX A: INDEX OF AIN INFLUENCERS 45
APPENDIX B: NETWORK VISUALIZATION 49
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 52
DATA & SOCIETY 53
ENDNOTES 54
This report is published under Data & Society’s Media Manipulation research initiative; for more
information on the initiative, including focus areas, researchers, and funders, please visit
https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
3
INTRODUCTION
For a short time on January 4, 2018, the most popular livestreamed video on YouTube
was a broadcast dominated by white nationalists. More specifically, it was a stream
by YouTubers Andy Warski and Jean-François Gariépy, facilitating a debate between a
white nationalist and a libertarian. The debate topic was scientific racism, which they
refer to as “race realism”—a contemporary incarnation of the long-standing claims
that there are measurable scientific differences between races of humans. Arguing
in favor of scientific racism was infamous white nationalist Richard Spencer, known
for having popularized the term “alt-right.”
1
Ostensibly on the other side was Carl
Benjamin, a YouTuber who goes by the pseudonym Sargon of Akkad. During the
broadcast, the debate became the #1 trending live video worldwide on YouTube, with
over 10,000 active viewers. The archived version of the broadcast has been viewed an
additional 475,000 times.
The four participants carried out their debate via Google Hangouts, and the video
lasted more than four-and-a-half hours; they were joined at various times by other
YouTubers. During the broadcast, participants debated a range of positions popular
in white supremacist communities, using academic terminology and treating the
topics as theoretical discourse. They discussed, for example, whether monogamy
was a development of “Western culture” and whether there are biological qualities
that constitute “whiteness.” Spencer has had years of experience arguing his racial
theories and spoke with more confidence than Benjamin. In the live comments and
through subsequent reactions on social media, many audience members responded
positively to Spencer’s performance. “I’ve never really listened to Spencer speak
before,” said one user with the pseudonym Nashmau. “But it is immediately apparent
that he’s on a whole different level.” More broadly, commenters praised the debate and
expressed excitement about its popularity. “Half a million views in only 3 weeks. I
honestly think this is a sign that people are hungry for what’s good for humanity,” one
commenter wrote. They followed it up by stating, “Ethnic nationalism is freedom for
everybody.”
This debate is part of a larger phenomenon, in which YouTubers attempt to
reach young audiences by broadcasting far-right ideas in the form of news and
entertainment. An assortment of scholars, media pundits, and internet celebrities are
using YouTube to promote a range of political positions, from mainstream versions
of libertarianism and conservatism, all the way to overt white nationalism. While
many of their views differ significantly, they all share a fundamental contempt for
progressive politics—specifically for contemporary social justice movements. For
this reason, I consider their collective position “reactionary,” as it is defined by its
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4
INTRODUCTION
opposition to visions of social progress.
2
United in this standpoint, these YouTubers
frequently collaborate with and appear with others across ideological lines. Together,
they have created a fully functioning media system that I call the Alternative
Influence Network (AIN).
The content creators in the AIN claim to provide an alternative media source for
viewers to obtain news and political commentary, outside of legacy news outlets such
as cable channels and print media. With this positioning, they are capitalizing on a
changing news and information environment. YouTube has become a crucial site for
broadcasting political and news-related content. A 2018 Pew Research Center report
found that 73% of US adults visit YouTube, with the percentage rising to 94% for 18-
to 24-year-olds.
3
As of 2017, YouTube fell behind only Facebook as the social network
most popular for viewing news stories.
4
Simultaneously, trust in mainstream media
outlets is continually in decline, with only 32% of Americans claiming to trust the
media in a 2016 Gallup Poll.
5
The AIN also relies on YouTube’s ability to support a type of “microcelebrity,” that is,
niche celebrities who are well-known within specific communities. The platform’s
motto, “Broadcast Yourself,” encourages individuals to build audiences and promote
themselves outside of the confines of legacy media outlets. YouTube also provides
financial incentives for individuals to broadcast and build audiences. Specifically,
YouTube has a Partner Program (the YPP) which is open to content creators who
have received 4,000 “watch hours” over the course of a year and have at least 1,000
subscribers. YouTube gives these content creators a small proportion of advertising
revenue for the videos they post (YouTube keeps the rest). Content creators can also
relay their popularity on YouTube into monetary gains on other platforms. One of
the most popular ways to do this is through fundraising website Patreon, where
fans make monthly donations for the content they support. As a result of YouTube’s
Partner Program and outside sources like Patreon, individuals can often turn content
creation on YouTube into lucrative full-time careers.
Because of their high visibility and marketing potential within communities on
social platforms, some content creators become influencers in their communities—
people who shape public opinion and advertise goods and services through the
“conscientious calibration” of their online personae.
6
Influencers often develop
highly intimate and transparent relationships with their audiences and then
“capitalize on their followers by inserting advertisements for products and services”
into their lifestyle content.
7
While the individuals of the AIN are not generally
selling goods or services, they adopt the techniques of influencers to build audiences
and “sell” them on far-right ideology. For this reason, I refer to these content creators
as political influencers.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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Digital media scholar Crystal Abidin has noted that celebrity and influencer
culture is often ascribed a presumed “frivolity” that leads to its underestimation
among academics and journalists.
8
However, she argues that online celebrities can
often convey deceptively subversive and powerful messages. Indeed, one reason
YouTube is so effective for circulating political ideas is because it is often ignored or
underestimated in discourse on the rise of disinformation and far-right movements.
Yet at the same time, the members of the AIN are experiencing great success,
with a countless number of their videos showing up in search results and video
recommendations. This means that, increasingly, understanding the circulation of
extremist political content does not just involve fringe communities and anonymous
actors. Instead, it requires us to scrutinize polished, well-lit microcelebrities and the
captivating videos that are easily available on the pages of the internet’s most popular
video platform.
Influence is not created in a vacuum—it occurs within, and propagates through,
social networks.
9
Part of the way influencers build followings is by becoming “nodes
around which other networks of opinions and influencers cluster.”
10
One of the most
effective ways to network on YouTube is by referencing and including other people
in video content.
11
In fact, how-to manuals for building influence on YouTube often
list collaborations as one of the most effective strategies.
12
These guides suggest guest
appearances, guest hosts, and collaborative
appearances as strategies for content creators
to grow exposure and multiply audiences.
This report documents the composition of the
AIN and analyzes the techniques used by its
members to build an alternative news media
system, repurposing influencer marketing
techniques to impart ideological ideas to
their audiences. In part 1, I diagram the AIN:
a loose set of approximately 65 YouTube influencers across more than 80 channels.
Among these channels, I document the thick network of guest appearances that
helps to build audiences and also to move those audiences between channels and
political positions. I also show how this networking is driven by, and results in, a set
of shared ideas about progressive politics and social justice. In part 2, I showcase how
this network provides audiences with an alternative media source meant to counter
the traditional news media. Specifically, I show how influencers reject traditional
journalistic credibility markers in favor of the intimacy of participatory media. I
also show how this alternative media system provides influencers and audiences
alike with an appealing, countercultural social identity. In part 3, I show how
political influencers have implemented the marketing tactics of brand influencers
INTRODUCTION
...increasingly, understanding the
circulation of extremist political content
does not just involve fringe communities
and anonymous actors. Instead, it
requires us to scrutinize polished, well-lit
microcelebrities and the captivating videos
that are easily available on the pages of the
internet’s most popular video platform.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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METHODS
to impart ideological content to their viewers. These practices include ideological
testimonials, political self-branding, search engine optimization, and the strategic use
of controversy. In part 4, I examine the practice of social networking among members
of the AIN, and how this social network of influencers enables various types of
political radicalization. This can include influencers radicalizing their audiences, each
other, or being radicalized by their own audience’s engagement. Finally, I conclude
by considering what steps could be taken to temper the harmful political effects of
the AIN. Specifically, I argue that YouTube should reassess both their monetization
incentive programs and their content moderation practices.
METHODS
To understand the AIN in-depth, I analyzed both the content of YouTube influencers
(that is, what they are saying) as well as their collaborations (who they are
broadcasting with). The latter presented a significant research challenge, as YouTube
does not provide metadata about guest appearances. To get around this, I manually
collected data from each influencer’s video titles, and at times, video content, to
determine each of the guests they hosted in their content between January 1, 2017
and April 1, 2018. I found new influencers through a snowball approach: for each
guest on an influencer’s channel, I would visit their own channel (if one existed) to
see who they, in turn, hosted.
Overall, I collected data for approximately 65 influencers across 81 channels. (While
there is often a one-to-one relationship between influencers and channels, this is not
always the case; some influencers maintain multiple channels, some share channels,
and some only appear as guests on the channels of others). I then gathered channel
subscriptions and video metadata. Subscriber counts ranged from about 10,000 (for
a “pro-white,” gender traditionalist woman who goes by the pseudonym “Wife with a
Purpose”) to about 2.5 million (for former reality television host and current YouTube
talk show host Joe Rogan). I watched content from each of these channels and
performed an in-depth content analysis on the transcripts for two of them. Overall, I
watched hundreds of hours of content from these 65 content creators.
At the time of data collection, this group of influencers was as close as I could get
to a snapshot of the Alternative Influence Network. However, the boundaries of this
network are loose and constantly changing. Since the time of my data collection,
newly popular influencers have begun to collaborate with others in the network,
and some of those I tracked in April have since deleted their channels or removed
their content. The data also does not represent the full extent of networking and
collaboration that occurs between influencers. Many of them, for example, comment
on each other’s videos; they reference each other’s ideas in their content; and they
interact on platforms like Twitter and Instagram in addition to YouTube. In other
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
7
words, the data I collected is illustrative, not comprehensive. For more detailed
descriptions of the influencers discussed in this report, see Appendix A. For a
comprehensive list of the influencers and channels included in analysis, see
Appendix B.
METHODS
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THE ALTERNATIVE
INFLUENCE NETWORK
The Alternative Influence Network is a coherent discursive system despite the
seeming variety and independence of its members. In this section I show how these
figures are connected by an interlocking series of videos, references, and guest
appearances. Within the AIN, a hodge-podge of internet celebrities claiming a
variety of political positions impart their ideologies to viewers and each other. The
boundaries between different political groups of influencers and the ideological
positions they promote are often slippery. Many identify themselves primarily
as libertarians or conservatives. Others self-advertise as white nationalists.
Simultaneously, these influencers often connect with one another across ideological
lines. At times, influencers collaborate to the point that ideological differences become
impossible to take at face value. For example, self-identified conservatives may
disavow far-right extremism while also hosting explicit white nationalists on their
channels. Within the AIN, this collaboration generates a cross-promotion of ideas
that forms a broader, intertextual common ground. Many of these YouTubers are less
defined by any single ideology than they are by a “reactionary” position: a general
opposition to feminism, social justice, or left-wing politics.
One primary example of a shared idea that exists across the network is the concept
of the “Social Justice Warrior” (or “SJW”). The term is used by influencers across
the network, from libertarians to white nationalists. It is strategically flexible: while
it was initially targeted at feminists, it is
often applied to any number of movements
advocating for social justice, including
Black Lives Matter, the LGBTQ movement,
Muslims, and immigrants. In some cases,
influencers use it to refer to a vague
conglomeration of these movements, or to
progressive ideas more generally (in one
video, the white nationalist vlogger Colin Robertson defines an “SJW” as an “empty-
headed transmitter of progressive ideology”).
13
Mapping the connections between influencers in the AIN results in a complicated
network diagram that demonstrates just how easily an audience member exploring
seemingly mainstream “conservative” content can be exposed to explicit white
Many of these YouTubers are less
defined by any single ideology than
they are by a “reactionary” position:
a general opposition to feminism,
social justice, or left-wing politics.
1
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
9
nationalism. To understand the dynamics of exposure requires first understanding
how members of this network espouse different views but are still part of a coherent
ideological network.
Among the 80-plus channels I catalogued for this research, I found a highly
connected network of influencers across numerous ideological positions. The
network includes media pundits with mainstream appeal, such as Jordan Peterson,
a professor of psychology at the University of Toronto with a best-selling self-
help book. It also includes self-identified white nationalists, such as Richard
Spencer. While Peterson and Spencer have never collaborated directly, they have
both collaborated with the same influencer, Carl Benjamin. In the introduction, I
described Benjamin’s debate with Spencer on scientific racism, which took place in
January 2018. In a live streamed video from less than a year before, in April 2017,
Peterson and Benjamin have a friendly conversation in which they promote gender
traditionalism, deny the existence of a gender pay gap, and claim that IQ is the
highest predictor of success.
14
Figure 1 highlights how tightly connected influencers in the AIN are. Each link
represents at least one collaboration between two influencers (in other words, one
or more instances in which one appeared in a video with another). The visualization
showcases the extent to which they create a broader, highly connected, symbiotic
media system.
PART 1_THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK
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PART 1_THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK
Fig. 1: A partial representation of the Alternative Influence Network, connected through guest
appearances on related channels from January 1, 2017 through April 1, 2018.
Black Pigeon Speaks
Candace Owens
Jeff Holiday
JF Gariépy
Andrew Klavan
Faith Goldy
Lana Lokteff
Tara McCarthy
Tim Pool
Kraut and Tea
Mike Enoch
Tree of Logic
Bre Faucheux
Mark Collett
Ben Shapiro
No Bullshit
James Allsup
Bunty King
Mundane Matt
Brittany Pettibone
Mouthy Buddha
Michael Knowles
Joe Rogan
Baked Alaska
James Damore
Vee
Styxhexenhammer666
Andy Warski
Computing Forever
Destiny
Nicholas Fuentes
Dennis Prager
James O'Keefe
Blonde in the
Belly of the
Beast
Stefan Molyneux
Gavin McInnes
Mike Cernovich
Jordan Peterson
Wife with a Purpose
Henrik Palmgren
Roaming Millennial
Chris Ray Gun
Colin Robertson
(Millennial Woes)
Coach Red Pill
Mister Metokur
Paul Joseph Watson
Braving Ruin
Dave Rubin
Milo Yiannopoulos
Owen Benjamin
Steven Crowder
Lauren Southern
Tommy Robinson
Richard Spencer
Carl Benjamin
(Sargon of Akkad)
Some Black Guy
Blaire White
Caolan Robertson
That Guy T
GUEST APPEARANCES ON THE NETWORK FROM
JANUARY 1, 2017 THROUGH APRIL 1, 2018
The graph is a partial representation of collaborative connections within the
Alternative Influence Network (AIN)–a network of controversial academics,
media pundits, and internet celebrities who use YouTube to promote a range
of political positions from mainstream versions of libertarianism and
conservatism to overt white nationalism. While collaborations can
sometimes consist of debates and disagreements, they more frequently
indicate social ties, endorsements, and advertisements for other
influencers.
Each line indicates that two connected influencers appeared
in the same Youtube video during the period of January 1,
2017 and April 1, 2018, serving as guests, hosts, or
collaborators. The size of nodes are determined by
the number of other influencers with whom
they connect–demonstrating how much a
given influencer serves as a conduit for
viewers to other influencers in the AIN.
The colors of nodes are determined
by their total connectivity within
the network, or how close the
influencer is to all other
influencers.
Size indicates how much an
influencer is a conduit to other
influencers in the AIN (between-
ness centrality)
Color indicates an influencer's total
connectivity within the network, or
how close the influencer is to all
other influencers (closeness
centrality)
KEY
THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE
NETWORK ON YOUTUBE
Fig. 1
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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Black Pigeon Speaks
Candace Owens
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Destiny
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Henrik Palmgren
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Paul Joseph Watson
Braving Ruin
Milo Yiannopoulos
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Steven Crowder
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Roaming Millennial
Colin Robertson
(Millennial Woes)
Dave Rubin
Richard Spencer
Carl Benjamin
(Sargon of Akkad)
AIN NETWORK PATHS
These graphs show examples of collaborative connections between influencers
of differing ideologies and how these collaborations can create pathways to
radicalization.
Network Path 1 illustrates how the "classical liberal" Dave Rubin and
the white nationalist Colin Robertson (Millennial Woes) are only
separated by two degrees, through the anti-feminist Carl Benjamin
(Sargon of Akkad), who has appeared on both of their channels.
Network Path 2 shows how conservative pundit Ben Shapiro
is connected to white nationalist Richard Spencer through
the vlogger and commentator Roaming Millennial; she
has appeared on Shapiro's YouTube show and has
hosted Spencer for an extended interview on
her channel. For more on how these
collaborations can create radicalization
pathways, see Section 4 (page 35).
Focus: Network Path for Dave Rubin,
Sargon of Akkad, and Millennial Woes
To read more about Network
Path 1, see page 12.
Focus: Network Path for Ben Shapiro,
Roaming Millennial, and Richard Spencer
To read more about Network
Path 2, see page 13.
Fig. 1 (detail)
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
12
PART 1_THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK
To understand the importance of links in this graph, consider the role that Dave
Rubin plays. Rubin is a comedian-turned-pundit who hosts a YouTube talk show
called The Rubin Report, which has over 750,000 channel subscribers.
15
Rubin
describes himself as a “classical liberal,” a variation on a libertarian embrace of small
government and individual liberty. As the host of a number of public intellectuals
and influencers, Rubin has become a focal point in a community that calls itself the
“Intellectual Dark Web.”
16
Rubin describes this group not in terms of ideology, but
rather as an “eclectic mix of people” devoted to having “the important and often
dangerous conversations that are completely ignored by the mainstream.” His most
frequent guests are the other self-identified members of this “Intellectual Dark Web”
group, including the psychology professor Jordan Peterson and Ben Shapiro, a
conservative media pundit. However, Rubin also hosts a range of influencers outside
of this subcommunity, including those with more openly extremist views. These
guests include Stefan Molyneux, a talk show host who promotes scientific racism,
and Lauren Southern, a Canadian citizen journalist who has since been barred
from entering England because of her vehement anti-Islam and anti-immigration
activism.
Rubin has also hosted Carl Benjamin, himself a heavily connected node of the AIN.
Benjamin first made content in the early 2010s focused on criticizing feminist game
critics and feminism more broadly. He grew his popularity in 2014 by broadcasting
throughout Gamergate, a movement of coordinated harassment against women
game critics and designers.
17
Since then, he has continued to grow his following
with more anti-feminist, anti-social justice content; his main channel now has over
800,000 subscribers, and a secondary channel has an additional 250,000. Benjamin
calls himself a “skeptic,” a term originally used to refer to a group of YouTube
atheists. Like Rubin, Benjamin has also embraced the image of a “classical liberal,”
and often discusses his views in terms of social theory. Indeed, it is just as common
for Benjamin to partake in intellectual discussions with popular libertarians and
conservatives as it is for him to live stream himself “shooting the shit” and making fun
of feminists with other gamers.
At the same time, Benjamin frequently collaborates with openly white nationalist
YouTubers. In his video with Spencer, Benjamin was presumably debating against
scientific racism, a stance he frequently echoes. However, by participating in the
debate, he was building a shared audience—and thus, a symbiotic relationship—
with white nationalists. In fact, Benjamin has become a frequent guest on channels
that host such “debates,” which often function as group entertainment as much as
genuine disagreements.
Furthermore, Benjamin’s collaborations with white nationalists often eschew the
debate format entirely.
18
He has hosted Jared Taylor, the white nationalist founder
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
13
of the magazine American Renaissance, and he has appeared on the channel of Colin
Robertson, a white nationalist, “alt-right” vlogger who goes by the pseudonym
Millennial Woes.
19
In fact, Robertson was one of several influencers to join in on
Benjamin’s debate with Richard Spencer, arguing in favor of Spencer’s ideas of
scientific racism. While in that context, they were presumably on opposite sides of
the debate, Benjamin’s multiple guest appearances on Robertson’s channel reveal a
friendly working dynamic between the two.
20
Benjamin discussed this in one of his
conversations with Robertson, saying that even though he does not embrace white
nationalist ideas, “In many ways, we do have similar objectives. . . . We have the same
enemies, right? I mean, you guys hate the SJWs, I hate the SJWs. I want to see the
complete destruction of social justice. . . . If the alt-right took the place of the SJWs, I
would have a lot less to fear.”
21
Robertson’s collaborations reflect his own complicated views on conservatives and
libertarians. For example, every December he hosts a range of guests in an event
he calls “Millenniyule.” Most of his guests are fellow white nationalist YouTube
influencers, such as Jared Taylor.
22
However, he also hosts a number of “classical
liberal” YouTubers such as Carl Benjamin and
libertarian ones such as a vlogger who goes by
That Guy T.
23
This path, from Rubin through Benjamin
to Robertson and back again, is just one
example of the proximity of influencers
in the AIN. One could just as easily trace
between the conservative entertainer Steven Crowder and the “pro-white,” anti-
immigration advocates Brittany Pettibone and Martin Sellner, through the talk
show host and scientific racism proponent Stefan Molyneux (in the latter case,
Molyneux was interviewing the couple about getting barred from entering the
United Kingdom; they were attempting to enter the country in part to interview
Carl Benjamin and the anti-Islam advocate Tommy Robinson).
24
Or from the
conservative pundits Ben Shapiro and Michael Knowles, hosts on The Daily
Wire, to Richard Spencer, through the vlogger known as Roaming Millennial.
25
By connecting to and interacting with one another through YouTube videos,
influencers with mainstream audiences lend their credibility to openly white
nationalist and other extremist content creators. This is both driven by, and results
in, a shared set of ideas, which in turn helps create the potential for radicalization—
an idea I explore in more depth later in this report.
It is not only these guest appearances and viewpoints, however, that knit together
the AIN. They also collectively partake in certain participatory media practices.
As I will show throughout the rest of this report, the influencers all draw from a
By connecting to and interacting with one
another through YouTube videos, influencers
with mainstream audiences lend their
credibility to openly white nationalist
and other extremist content creators.
PART 1_THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
14
larger playbook of alternative media practices and influence-growing techniques.
To fully understand the role and the power of this network, it is necessary to
understand the strategies of alternative media outlets and the practices of building
influence online.
PART 1_THE ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE NETWORK
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
15
BUILDING AN
ALTERNATIVE MEDIA
Across the AIN, influencers express a distrust of the “mainstream” news media and a
desire to use YouTube to create a better, alternative media system. In some cases, they
refer to themselves collectively as the “alternative media.” This positioning may seem
counterintuitive, as much of their content—from educational videos to livestreamed
“hangouts” to personal vlogs—bears little resemblance to the traditional format of
news media. However, according to a 2017 study of youth views of news, young
people’s “concept of what constitutes ‘the news’ is amorphous and often extends well
beyond the content produced by traditional journalistic institutions.”
26
This finding
accurately represents the more flexible definition of “news” employed by those in the
AIN to describe their varied political content.
For the influencers in the AIN, distrust of the mainstream media often turns to
outright rejection and hostility. Various influencers decry what they feel is a liberal,
progressive, or SJW bias in the mainstream. Others point to cases of journalistic failure
and the economic challenges faced by media in digital environments. Some employ
antiestablishment reasoning to reject the corporate logics driving many mainstream
outlets. By creating an alternative media system on YouTube, influencers in the
AIN express a wish not only to provide an additional, alternative option for young
audiences, but also to replace their consumption of mainstream news entirely.
To do so, they can capitalize on the broader distrust of news media in the American
population. Indeed, among American audiences, only 14% of Republicans have
“a great deal” or “a fair amount” of trust in the mass media to “report the news
fully, accurately, and fairly.”
27
The 2017
study on youth views on the news found
that teens express “widespread skepticism”
about news media and “assume that much
of the information they encounter may be
inaccurate or biased.”
28
Based on this distrust,
disillusioned news consumers are turning
to alternative sources. In an extensive study
on the online news-sharing ecosystem in the
lead-up to the 2016 US presidential election, researchers found that conservatives
were opting out of media sources traditionally considered “mainstream,” such as
By creating an alternative media system
on YouTube, influencers in the AIN express
a wish not only to provide an additional,
alternative option for young audiences,
but also to replace their consumption
of mainstream news entirely.
2
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
16
ALTERNATIVE CREDIBILITY
The New York Times, and were instead sharing news from a range of hyper-partisan
websites such as Breitbart News.
29
The following sections outline two key ways the influencers in the AIN differentiate
themselves from mainstream news as a way to appeal to young, disillusioned media
consumers. The first way is by rejecting traditional news media norms for building
credibility and trust in favor of the norms of participatory culture. These influencers
explicitly reject the trappings of institutional prestige, adherence to objectivity
and neutrality, and the enforcement of gatekeeping mechanisms that dominate
mainstream news media. Instead, they build trust with their audiences by stressing
their relatability, their authenticity, and their accountability to those audiences.
The second way is by providing a specific social identity for themselves and their
audiences. Specifically, they provide a likeminded community for those who feel like
social underdogs for their rejection of progressive values, and they provide a sense of
countercultural rebellion for those same audiences.
With these approaches, the influencers of the AIN draw inspiration, approaches, and
tactics from alternative media systems of the past, and from the participatory practices
of social media platforms of today. The underground press of the New Left in the
1960s, for example, pioneered a journalistic approach that focused on storytelling
and authenticity rather than objectivity.
30
More recently, YouTube has broadly
positioned itself as a counterpoint to mainstream broadcasters and entertainment
juggernauts by highlighting the ability for individuals to broadcast on the platform.
This attitude often serves “in stark contrast to the production, content, and marketing
strategies of traditional media industries.”
31
The AIN influencers also draw from the
practices of news outlets like Fox News, which has for many years cultivated an
oppositional social identity against the “cultural elites” of liberal media, even as it
remains the most popular cable news outlet.
32
ALTERNATIVE CREDIBILITY
Many influencers in the AIN discuss their channels as new kinds of “experiments”
in relaying information in more meaningful and accurate ways than legacy media.
33
Specifically, this means they largely reject traditional modes of news media credibility,
such as institutional reputation and the ideal of objectivity. Instead, they build
trust with their audiences through participatory media practices. These techniques
are highly effective: social ties play a larger role in media trust than the reputation
of a specific media source, and when people see a news post from someone they
personally trust, they are more likely to recommend it to friends, follow it, or
sign up for news alerts from it.
34
A recent study on youth news consumers also
found that they trust “user-generated” content more than legacy media sources.
35
While political influencers adopt a range of strategies, they stress three qualities in
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
17
particular that differentiate them from mainstream media: relatability, authenticity,
and accountability.
Relatability
Legacy media “draws on the long-standing familiarity and reputation of their brand”
as a source of trust.
36
Outlets such as The New York Times and The Washington Post
have built credibility and trust over the course of decades. However, it is precisely
this institutional prestige that media creators of the AIN see as a problem. For
example, YouTuber and independent journalist Tim Pool argues that a media outlet’s
institutional reputation can actually act as a cover for bad journalism. “What ends up
happening,” Pool explains in one video, “is that being behind a brand gets people off
the hook for the things they do. A journalist could write something bad, but people
see Washington Post, they don’t see the individual. And if The Washington Post doesn’t
issue a correction then these individuals [readers] will leave with bad information and
believing some fake story.”
37
In an earlier video, Pool argued that now, “It’s about more
of a personal level of trust.”
38
Rather than stressing institutional credibility, political influencers highlight how
relatable and accessible they are to their audiences.
39
Indeed, as social media
scholar Brooke Erin Duffy describes: across communities on YouTube, influencers
often highlight their relatability and disavow “traditional markers of status by
casting themselves as people just like us.”
40
Political influencers treat it as a point
of pride to not be affiliated with larger,
legacy news institutions. In fact, some
influencers, including Pool, openly discuss
their departures from media and academic
institutions to highlight their outsider status as a source of credibility (Pool previously
worked at Vice Media and Fusion TV before striking out on his own).
These narratives, while compelling, often obscure the skills, capital, and networking
opportunities these influencers gained from previous institutional affiliations.
41
And many political influencers still maintain institutional affiliations to academic
institutions, think tanks, and media outlets. However, by broadcasting as individuals
on the platform, their connections to these institutions are often obscured.
This is the case, for example, with Dave Rubin, the talk show host who gives a
platform to many libertarian academics and anti-SJW YouTubers. Rubin has a
particular claim to individuality, having publicly showcased his departure from the
left-leaning alternative outlet The Young Turks. Because he frames his political views
in terms of his personal ideological journey and his increased media independence,
RELATABILITY
Rather than stressing institutional credibility,
political influencers highlight how relatable
and accessible they are to their audiences.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
18
AUTHENTICITY
Rubin is able to present his ideas as new and, in some cases, even revolutionary.
42
However, this framing obscures his partnership with a well-funded, highly influential
libertarian organization, which provides him with many of the speakers who appear
on his show. In 2016, he established a partnership with Learn Liberty, an initiative
housed in the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS) at George Mason University.
43
The
IHS is heavily funded by the billionaire Koch family and is chaired by Charles Koch;
its specific aim is to “cultivate and subsidize a farm team of the next generation’s
libertarian scholars.”
44
Thus, Rubin is able to position himself as a “freethinker” and
an “outsider” even as he is promoted by a well-funded organization with the explicit
aim of promoting libertarian ideals on behalf of wealthy donors.
Authenticity
In addition to institutional credibility, legacy news media outlets have traditionally
built trust through their adherence to the norms of objectivity and their devotion to
fact-checking.
45
The political influencers of the AIN, on the other hand, generally
make no such claims. Instead, they criticize the very concept of objectivity, as well
as the mainstream media’s claims that they adhere to it. Citizen journalist Lauren
Southern has claimed, “I would never pretend to be objective like you see CNN do
and Fox News do.” Instead she calls her approach “gonzo” and says she attempts to
convey a “Hunter S. Thompson kind of thing.”
Dave Rubin cites the incorrect media
predictions for the 2016 presidential election as evidence that mainstream institutions
“mask their opinions as facts.”
46
Influencers in the AIN instead adopt the strategies of microcelebrities—particularly
the cultivation of authenticity through transparency and responsiveness. For example,
microcelebrities commonly use the intimate
genre of “vlogging.”
47
Emerging from webcam
culture and personal blogging, vlogs adhere to
very different tropes than those of traditional
news outlets. They are often highly personal,
told through subjective storytelling and
affective cues, and take place over long
periods of time. The very setting of vlogging – traditionally filmed in bedrooms, at
kitchen tables, or in living rooms – makes the videos highly personal.
By adopting the practices of genres like vlogging, political influencers are able to
cultivate a sense of transparency that is often lacking from mainstream news outlets.
48
For example, they frequently reveal elements of the “backstage” or behind-the-scenes
processes at work to their audiences.
49
In one video, conservative vlogger Blaire White
starts by telling her audience, “Hey, guys. So if I look different, it’s because I have
different lighting, and it’s supposed to be like beauty lighting, but I feel like I just look
By adopting the practices of genres like
vlogging, political influencers are able to
cultivate a sense of transparency that is
often lacking from mainstream news outlets.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
19
ACCOUNTABILITY
so pale.”
50
Tim Pool often includes segments that feature him buying the electronic
recording equipment that he plans on using to film future events (he also films daily
vlog episodes in his living room and hosts a weekly group podcast around his dining
room table).
Detached from the cable news cycle, the content on YouTube also takes on a different
temporal rhythm from the mainstream news. As media scholars have noted for
decades, the television format often encourages shortened, simplified “sound bites”
that obscure the nuances of topics in the news.
51
In contrast, citizen journalists may
attend an event and livestream it in its entirety over the course of several hours.
Political conversations can last many hours as well, resulting in extremely in-depth
discussions of political theory and abstract ideology (this was the case with the debate
between Richard Spencer and Carl Benjamin, which lasted over four hours).
As social media scholars have noted, the very idea of cultivating authenticity is itself a
contradiction.
52
Authenticity has become such an effective way of building influence
that powerful media institutions, both progressive and conservative, have begun to
take notice. Recently, it has become a key topic at conservative media conferences like
RightOnline (also funded by the Koch brothers). The goal of the event is to teach a
new generation of media makers how to build influence and spread conservatism.
53
Attendees can find presentations and panels specifically on the topics of “being
authentic” and “being likable,” as well as “establishing a clear media persona and
story about oneself.”
54
In this way, the trappings of authenticity can be cultivated and
exploited by institutional power, even as political influencers use them to promise
freedom from that same power.
Accountability
The AIN engages directly with its audiences in a way that traditional news outlets do
not—through comments and social media posts, but also directly in video content.
Traditionally, legacy media outlets have used gatekeeping mechanisms and a level
of distance from their audiences as a way to establish expertise and authority. In
contrast, many political influencers explicitly court feedback in order to build trust
and rapport with their audience. Audience feedback is directly built into YouTube’s
interface: audiences react to content in the form of likes, dislikes, comments, and
channel subscriptions.
In keeping with vlogging genre norms, many influencers speak directly to their
audiences and ask them for their opinions and feedback in the comments section of
their videos. A common genre among the influencers is the “Q&A” video, in which
hosts answer viewers’ questions.
55
In some cases, they recruit their audience’s help in
covering issues. At the end of a video criticizing the mainstream media, Blaire White
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
20
ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL IDENTITY
told her audience to “make sure you comment below with some other examples of
mainstream media news outlets lying.”
56
In another case, White asked her viewers to
help keep her on schedule making videos. “In 2018, I’ll be uploading once a week
if not more. . . . If I mess up, scream at me, harass me, bombard me with comments
and messages and make me feel terrible about it.”
57
Ultimately, political influencers acknowledge their audiences as an important part of
their media community on YouTube, and they stress the importance of the audience’s
role in promoting their goals. Dave Rubin invoked this to his audience at the end of
one video about the so-called “Intellectual Dark Web”: “You, watching this right now,
are actually part of this Intellectual Dark Web. If you engage with these ideas, and
you’re trying to figure out what the hell is going on, then you are as much part of this
thing as I am.”
58
He then asked his audience to tweet and post about these same ideas,
to continue to promote his channel and his political causes.
ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL IDENTITY
The political influencers of the AIN use the media they create to establish a type of
alternative media community among their audiences. These content creators use
collaborations with other influencers and responses to audience feedback to cultivate
a sense of loyalty. In fact, media scholars have argued that information consumption
is less about factually correct or incorrect information than it is about rallying around
a collective social identity. Media scholar Daniel Kreiss, for example, argues that
Fox News and Breitbart News have been so successful in part because they provide
a metaphorical “family” to those who reject mainstream news.
59
This is powerful
from a political perspective because a family provides “a sense of identity, place, and
belonging; emotional, social, and cultural support and security; and gives rise to
political and social affiliations and beliefs.”
60
For contemporary news outlets, identity signaling can act as both a means of creating
strong viewer ties and a way of staking out their territory in a saturated attention
economy. Media scholar Reece Peck has documented this in the case of Fox News,
which uses “cultural referents,” like references to country music stars, to evoke a
specific class-based and racialized identity (specifically white, working class, and
male).
61
Peck calls this approach “cultural populism” and argues that Fox uses it to
rally their audiences in opposition to their competition, whom they brand as out-of-
touch, coastal “elites.”
62
The political influencers of the AIN also promote a social identity that helps them
build influence and attract audiences. Specifically, they signify an identity of both
social underdogs and a hip counterculture—courting young audiences looking for a
community with a level of rebellion.
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SOCIAL UNDERDOGS
Social Underdogs
The political influencers of the AIN consistently project the idea that nonprogressives
are “persecuted against” because of their beliefs. Sociologist Francesca Tripodi
observed this trend among conservative Christian news consumers, writing that while
none of the participants had personally been harassed or targeted for their beliefs,
they were collectively “galvanized by the overarching notion that the intolerant ‘Left’
was silencing conservative expression.”
63
One popular trope among conservative-identifying members of the AIN is the
embarrassment or shaming that comes along with admitting one’s political views
publicly. Conservative YouTube vlogger Candace Owens, who uses the pseudonym
Red Pill Black, launched her YouTube career with a facetious video about telling
her parents she’s conservative (Fig. 2). In the video, titled, “Mom, Dad….I’m a
Conservative,” Owens acts out two sketches about “coming out” in 2017.
64
In the
first, she comes out to her parents as gay and is greeted with love and support; in
the second, she “comes out” to her parents as conservative and is met with judgment
and concern.
Fig. 2: YouTube vlogger Candace Owens comes out to her parents that she’s conservative.
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COUNTERCULTURAL APPEAL
A similar sentiment has been circulated by James Damore, the Google engineer who
was fired in July 2017 after sharing a memo promoting biologically determinist
misogyny as an explanation for gender disparities within the company.
65
Both as
part of the memo and in subsequent media appearances, Damore has expressed
concern that he was being discriminated against at Google for being conservative; he
claimed Silicon Valley is an “ideological echo chamber” that needs more “ideological
diversity.”
66
While many in the AIN criticize and mock progressive social movements
for what they see as a “victim mentality,” they also simultaneously position themselves
as the genuine victims in society.
Some political influencers have tied this “social underdog” position to the idea
that YouTube is attempting to “de-platform” them—in other words, kick them
off the platform. In early 2018, YouTube changed its monetization policies as a
way to prevent “spammers, impersonators, and other bad actors” from exploiting
the system.
67
The changes were described as a reaction against a series of videos
targeted at children that imparted highly disturbing content. However, these policies
have also affected several political influencers platforming the AIN. Many of them
have expressed anxieties about their ability to continue making a living off of
videos. These influencers are far from the only content creators affected (those in
LGBTQ communities, for example, have also experienced challenges).
68
However,
demonetization continues to fuel their specific narrative that major institutions –
including technology platforms – have a
liberal bias.
The “social underdog” may be appealing to
some, but it also erases a number of systemic
power differentials in society and connects to
even more extremist ideas. For example, the
position of “social underdog” is also reflected in white nationalist and supremacist
discourse. These groups often describe themselves as victims of racial, gender,
and class oppression posed by the gendered, sexualized, and racialized “other”—
specifically, women, LGBTQ, African Americans, and Jews.
69
The nature of this
connection is discussed in more detail later in this report.
Countercultural Appeal
Many of the political influencers of the AIN attempt to appeal to young, tech-savvy
audiences. To do so, they purposefully craft a shared identity based on hipness and
edginess, and they signify a countercultural identity that largely draws from youth
movements of the past. An editor of the conspiracy theory media outlet Infowars, Paul
Joseph Watson, made a video explicitly stating these appeals, called “Conservatism
is the New Counter-Culture.” In the video, he draws comparisons to the New Left
...they purposefully craft a shared identity
based on hipness and edginess, and they
signify a countercultural identity that largely
draws from youth movements of the past.
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countercultural activists of the 1960s and the punk rock scene of the 1980s (Fig. 3).
70
While the members of the AIN espouse drastically different political views than either
of the countercultures they draw from, they use their avowed populism to align with
the antiestablishment sentiment of both past movements.
Richard Spencer strategically capitalized on this countercultural positioning when
he promoted the “alt-right” throughout the 2016 election, describing the movement
as “edgy and dangerous, it’s cool and hip. It’s that thing our parents don’t want us
to do.”
71
This positioning has also been used explicitly to excuse the seriousness of
the racism and sexism associated with “alt-right” positions like Spencer’s. Notorious
provocateur Milo Yiannopolous and his co-author Allum Bokhari wrote an article
about the “alt-right” claiming that those who identified with the term were no more
bigots than “death metal devotees in the 80s were actually Satanists. Just as the kids
of the 60s shocked their parents with promiscuity, long hair and rock’n’roll, so too do
the alt-right’s young meme brigades shock older generations.”
72
Political influencers in the AIN have also built on their opposition to “PC culture”
and the “language police” by co-opting one of the fundamental political causes
of the New Left in the 1960s: the Free Speech Movement. The original Free
Speech Movement was a long-term student protest that took place at University
of California, Berkeley throughout 1964 and 1965. Now, many of the political
influencers in the AIN call “political correctness” a “suppression of free speech” and
claim that policies implemented by social platforms and colleges alike are a threat
to the First Amendment.
There are genuine conversations to be had about free speech online and on college
campuses, and legal scholars have argued that we need to reassess our understandings
Fig. 3: Paul Joseph Watson video from February 2017.
COUNTERCULTURAL APPEAL
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COUNTERCULTURAL APPEAL
of the First Amendment in the contemporary information environment.
73
However,
the positioning of those in the AIN as defenders of free speech is laden with
contradictions. Influencers in the AIN often bully and make fun of other influencers
they disagree with and sometimes encourage their viewers to do the same.
74
Because
they sit at the intersection of ideological disagreements and personal conflict, the
influencers can often criticize social justice by targeting individuals and treating them
as proxies for progressive ideology. They can then trivialize this approach by referring
to it as “drama” or political debate.
75
Indeed, the entire countercultural positioning is misleading: these influencers
are adopting identity signals affiliated with previous countercultures, but the
actual content of their arguments seeks to reinforce dominant cultural racial and
gendered hierarchies. Their reactionary politics and connections to traditional
modes of power show that what they are most often fighting for is actually the
status quo—a return to traditional gender and racial norms, or a belief in the
individual over an understanding of group oppression. In this way, they can
paradoxically align hyper-traditional ideals with the rebellious positioning of past
countercultural movements.
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Content creators of the Alternative Influence Network use the techniques of online
influencer culture not only to gain trust with their audiences but also explicitly
to promote reactionary ideology. This reflects the larger phenomenon of online
influencer marketing: microcelebrities on social media develop highly intimate
relationships with their followers before inserting advertisements and marketing
items into their content. As outlined in the introduction, the influencers in the AIN
adopt the techniques of influencer marketing, but instead of selling products or
services to their audiences, they sell political ideology (hence my use of the term
“political influencers”).
These strategies reveal a tension underlying the content produced by these
influencers: while they present themselves as news sources, their content strategies
often more accurately consist of marketing and advertising approaches. These
approaches are meant to provoke feelings, memories, emotions, and social ties. In
this way, the “accuracy” of their messaging
can be difficult to assess through traditional
journalistic tactics like fact-checking.
The following sections outline some of
the major techniques political influencers
adopt from influencer marketing to promote
reactionary ideologies to their followers. Specifically, they recount ideological
testimonials that frame ideology in terms of personal growth and self-betterment.
They engage in self-branding techniques that present traditional, white, male-
dominated values as desirable and aspirational. They employ search engine
optimization (SEO) to highly rank their content against politically charged keywords.
And they strategically use controversy to gain attention and frame political ideas as
fun entertainment.
IDEOLOGICAL TESTIMONIALS
Many political influencers of the AIN frame political issues in terms of personal
stories. These stories operate as ideological testimonials akin to product testimonials
in advertising. One popular testimonial trope among right-wing political influencers
is the transformation from “leftist” to a member of the political right. Many of these
3
PROMOTING IDEOLOGY THROUGH
INFLUENCER MARKETING
...the influencers in the AIN adopt the
techniques of influencer marketing, but
instead of selling products or services to
their audiences, they sell political ideology
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parables center on specific moments of change, often phrased as “awakenings” in
which influencers were confronted with the “fallacies” of “the left” and saw a better
path forward.
This is how Dave Rubin describes his own political transformation. He frequently
discusses a political awakening he had in 2014, after watching an episode of The Bill
Maher Show featuring the philosopher and “Horseman of Atheism” Sam Harris.
76
In
his appearance on the show, Sam Harris got into an argument with fellow panelist
and guest Ben Affleck about contemporary Islam. In the clip, Harris criticizes modern
liberalism for its unwillingness to condemn aspects of Islam. After Affleck calls these
comments “gross” and “racist,” Harris responds that “we have to be able to criticize
bad ideas” and that “Islam at this moment is the motherload of bad ideas.”
77
Rubin
claims that after the episode was aired, the onus was put on Harris and Maher to
prove that they weren’t bigoted, and he says the event illustrated “lazy thinking” on
the part of progressives. The incident led to Rubin’s falling out with The Young Turks,
after which he began producing content independently and moved more and more
toward libertarianism.
These testimonials frequently, perhaps counterintuitively, come from influencers who
are women, people of color, and/or members of LGBTQ community. In these cases,
the influencers often reframe progressive issues of social justice into conservative
narratives of individual self-betterment. These testimonials fundamentally deny
systemic oppression of vulnerable populations by positioning oppression and victimhood
as a choice that can be overcome.
This is the case with the conservative, anti-SJW influencer Blaire White. White is an
out trans woman whose videos often consist of her making humorous and snarky
responses to feminist and social justice content. White differentiates her personal
experiences as a trans woman from what she sees as the “victim mentality” of the
groups she derogatorily calls “SJWs.” In contrast, she positions her own coming out
and transitioning experiences in terms of the conservative ideals of individualism and
personal betterment. She even says that before her transition, she was herself an SJW
and adopted the victim mentality, but that through her personal experiences, she was
able to take control of her life and eschew that “toxic” approach: “If there was ever
a point where I was prone to being a stereotypical trans victim and just perpetually
offended,” she said in one video, “it died off when I started taking my life into my
own hands and realizing that I am capable of overcoming things.”
78
In this sense,
she positions her coming out as the moment of awakening in which she gave up the
“victim mentality” of “the left.”
Influencer Antonia Okafor used a similar strategy when she appeared in a video for
conservative media nonprofit Prager University (known colloquially as PragerU). In
IDEOLOGICAL TESTIMONIALS
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the video titled “Black, Millennial, Female and…Conservative,”
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Okafor talks about
how she used to be an Obama-supporting Democrat before she “decided to start
asking questions.” She reframes her conservative belief in individual responsibility
under the guise of “female empowerment,” by saying, “I decided that the very
definition of empowerment required me to take responsibility for my own life. I
wasn’t going to be anyone’s victim.” She argues that she started voting Republican
because it is the party that views her “as an empowered individual, able to shape
my own destiny, not as a member of a victim group.” Overall, as with any effective
testimonial, she claims the transformation has made her a happier and more fulfilled
person: “The more questions I asked, the less popular I became. But here’s the funny
thing. I started feeling better about myself.”
The ideological testimonial is also popular among more extremist influencers. Among
these YouTubers, many refer to the process of abandoning older, progressive politics
as “taking the red pill.” This was the case, for example, for the YouTuber who goes
by the pseudonym Blonde in the Belly of the Beast, who posted a video called “My
Red Pill Journey.” In her case, she began getting “redpilled” because she felt the black
students at her high school “self-segregated” and had different “demeanors” than the
white students. These included, as she describes, more dropouts, teen pregnancies,
and physical fighting—three tropes that are common among white supremacist
IDEOLOGICAL TESTIMONIALS
Fig. 4: YouTuber who goes by “Blonde in the Belly of the Beast” uses personal stories to frame her
political ideology in terms of personal growth and self-betterment.
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POLITICAL SELF-BRANDING
depictions of black people.
80
She then discusses going to university and reading
Western classics, which led her to develop a “deep, lasting reverence and loyalty to
Western civilization” and “a sense of pride for being descended of Western people.”
As with the conservative testimonials, Blonde describes how her “redpilling” made
her life better; she says she became better educated, ate well, exercised, and took care
of herself. This includes acting “more feminine” and smoothing out relationship issues
she had because she was previously “too dominant.”
These personalized stories are particularly powerful when they come from influencers
who have built affective relationships with their audiences. Often told through highly
detailed and personal narratives, these testimonials cannot be fact-checked because
they speak to “lived experiences.” At the same time, they support larger narratives of
racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry.
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POLITICAL SELF-BRANDING
“Self-branding” is an extremely important part of influencer culture. It refers to
a conscious impression management strategy that deploys “cultural meanings
and images drawn from . . . the mainstream culture industries.”
82
By creating a
“publicizable personality,” influencers are better able to appeal to a market of
potential viewers.
83
Just as with advertising
more broadly, there are politics inherent in
self-branding: in order to build followings,
influencers across industries and platforms
often appeal to tropes that reinforce
traditional gender and racial roles. For
political influencers of the AIN, the political
ideals implicitly embedded in advertising
become explicit. Blending the “glamour” of
celebrity with the intimacy of influencer culture, they broadcast gender traditionalism
and performed “whiteness.” In this way, influencers display the way they live their
politics as an aspirational brand.
For example, white nationalist women influencers often use self-branding strategies
to highlight traditional, white notions of femininity. These influencers call themselves
“trad” wives (with “trad” acting as a shorthand for “traditionalist”). “Trad” women
create content about the ideals of staying at home, supporting their husbands, and
raising children. One example is the influencer Ayla Stewart, who runs a channel
called Wife with a Purpose. In her channel description, she writes: “Ayla, is a stay-
at-home, homeschooling, home birthing, mother of six children . . . #TradLife
#WhiteCulture.”
84
Blending the “glamour” of celebrity
with the intimacy of influencer culture,
they broadcast gender traditionalism
and performed “whiteness. In this way,
influencers display the way they live
their politics as an aspirational brand.
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POLITICAL SELF-BRANDING
Meanwhile, some male political influencers brand themselves as hypermasculine. The
Golden One, for example, is a unique blend of men’s rights activist, white nationalist,
self-help guru, and fantasy enthusiast (Fig. 5). He fashions his politics around hyper-
traditional gender roles, commitment to physical fitness and martial arts, and a self-
aggrandizing mythology drawn in part from The Lord of the Rings and the tabletop
miniature wargame Warhammer 40,000. In addition to political commentary, he
posts advice on eating and fitness. The Golden One is heavily influenced by a “live
your life like an RPG” (short for “role-playing game”) mentality, a sentiment that has
grown in some gaming communities since the release of popular digital RPG Skyrim
in 2011. His branding not only reflects hyper-traditional gender roles and archetypes
from Nordic mythology; it also taps into the self-branding strategies that appeal to
gaming and bodybuilding communities.
AIN influencers also extend their personal brands beyond the confines of YouTube,
often maintaining profiles on multiple platforms, including Instagram, Twitter, and
Discord. In these cases, they adapt their personal branding strategies. For example,
on Instagram, a number of political influencers in the AIN “emulate the tropes and
symbols of traditional celebrity culture, such as glamorous self-portraits.”
85
Martin
Sellner and Brittany Pettibone – a “pro-white,” anti-immigration “celebrity couple”
– use Instagram and YouTube to showcase their relationship as the embodiment of
“trad” relationships and gender performances (Fig. 6). While Pettibone and Sellner
may appear like many other good-looking young people posting flattering images
on Instagram, on YouTube they openly advocate a total end to immigration.
86
By
emulating techniques used by mainstream celebrities and fashion bloggers on
Fig. 5: The Golden One showcases his muscular body alongside superimposed Western
mythological figures.
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Instagram, they minimize the significance of their racist views.
SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION
By promoting testimonials and partaking in self-branding, political influencers are
able to use the visual and narrative capabilities of digital media. Political influencers
are also able to strategically use politicized keywords for marketing purposes.
Specifically, the influencers in the AIN try to get their content highly ranked in search
results. Businesses have devoted significant marketing resources toward this process,
calling it search engine optimization (SEO). Some political influencers in the AIN
use SEO strategies to exploit “data voids,” or search terms that lack robust results.
87
In this way, they use SEO to “hijack” certain issues and provide specific messages to
potential new audiences.
In a 2018 study of YouTube’s search algorithm, researchers Bernhard Rieder, Ariadna
Matamoros-Fernández, and Òscar Coromina document how this phenomenon looks
in practice.
88
For automated searches conducted over the course of the summer of
2016, they found that the query “Gamergate” consistently brought back content
from figures who supported the event and its harassment campaigns, such as Milo
Yiannopoulos and Carl Benjamin. They also found that the term “refugees” brought
back content specifically from anti-Islamic immigration YouTube influencers,
including Black Pigeon Speaks and the outlet Rebel Media.
89
When I made the same
searches in the spring and summer of 2018, I found that very little had changed since
the time of the previous study; influencers of the AIN had highly ranked results for
both search terms (see Fig. 7).
THE SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION
Fig. 6: YouTubers Martin Sellner and Brittany Pettibone use
the self-presentation strategies common among Instagram influencers.
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STRATEGIC CONTROVERSY
In my searches, I also found that
influencers are explicitly using
terminology affiliated with progressive
social justice movements and are
therefore appearing in search results
for those terms. A number of popular
videos from conservative influencers
use the terms “social justice,” “liberal,”
and “leftist” in their videos titles,
as well as more specific terms like
“intersectionality.” Currently, a YouTube
search for any of those terms will bring
back content from conservative and
libertarian political influencers within
the top 10 YouTube search results. The
search results for “social justice,” for
example, include a video from PragerU
entitled “What is Social Justice?” hosted
by Jonah Goldberg, a fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute.
90
In the
video, he echoes libertarian critiques
of social justice in the format of an
educational video (Fig. 8). Other results
include a video from the libertarian
YouTube channel ReasonTV titled
“Stossel: Jordan Peterson vs. ‘Social
Justice Warriors’” and a video from anti-
SJW influencer Roaming Millennial titled
“Why Social Justice is CANCER.” In fact,
all of the top 10 video results for “social
justice” are criticisms of social justice
from reactionary channels (Fig. 9).
STRATEGIC CONTROVERSY
As with established news outlets, political influencers are competing in an “attention
economy” in which “the most valued content is that which is most likely to attract
attention.”
91
As a result, many influencers seek to gain attention by capitalizing on
controversy. For example, Jordan Peterson, a professor of psychology at the University
of Toronto, has strategically relayed a moment of controversy into high levels of
influence (as well as monetary reward). In 2016, Peterson was at the center of a
controversy because of his outspoken opposition to Canada’s proposed Bill C-16,
Fig. 7: The top results for a search of “Gamergate” made in
incognito mode on July 12, 2018 include many perpetrators
of harassment and conspiracy theories, including
mundanematt, Sargon of Akkad, Milo Yiannopolous, and
Internet Aristocrat.
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STRATEGIC CONTROVERSY
which sought to add gender expression and gender identity as protected identities
under the Canadian Human Rights Act. Peterson claimed it would force him to use
certain gender pronouns and would thus infringe on his freedom of speech. (Others
have said his claims fundamentally misrepresent the nature of the bill.)
92
By strategically taking a
public stance on a hot-
button issue, Peterson was
able to use the backlash to
his advantage on YouTube,
where his channel now
has over one million
subscribers. Peterson
identified this strategy
when, in an interview, he
said that he had “figured
out how to monetize social
justice warriors.”
93
In
another video, he makes a
similar claim, saying that
his audiences “came for the
scandal and stayed for the
content.”
94
Others generate controversy
directly within their
content through filmed
counterprotests, which
borrow from the genre of
YouTube stunt videos. One
prominent example is the
far-right citizen journalist
and activist Lauren
Southern. In one instance,
Southern crashed an anti-
rape activist event called
SlutWalk with a poster
that read “There Is No
Rape Culture in the West.”
(Fig. 10).
95
More recently,
Southern’s demonstrations
have become increasingly
Fig. 9: YouTube search results for “social justice” (Google Chrome,
Incognito in the US, June 19, 2018).
Fig. 8: A screenshot from a PragerU video criticizing social justice; the video
appeared as the first result on YouTube for the search term “social justice” (Google
Chrome, Incognito in the US, June 19, 2018).
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focused on her anti-immigration, anti-Islam stances. In 2017, Southern filmed
her participation in an anti-immigrant action alongside a group far-right European
activists (including Martin Sellner). The group boarded a boat, set off flares,
and held up an anti-refuge banner while attempting to hinder a ship rescuing
stranded refugees.
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Some political influencers generate controversy by broadcasting debates between
other influencers. In early 2018, an entire debate-focused genre emerged on YouTube
called “Internet Bloodsports.” Many of these “Bloodsport” debates featured political
influencers of the AIN and blurred entertainment, political discourse, and far-right
ideology. A number of influencers used this media to build their own followings
and name recognition on YouTube. Nowhere was this a clearer case than with Andy
Warski, the YouTuber who hosted the scientific racism debate between Richard
Spencer and Carl Benjamin (Fig. 11). At the time, debates and “drama” had been
taking place between AIN influencers for months, related to the topic of scientific
racism. Because of the relative influence of the participants, Warski advertised this
specific debate as the ultimate showdown on the topic, a spectacle worth viewing
regardless of the outcome.
97
The debate was marketed for its entertainment value,
despite the academic and frequently pedantic tone of the conversation, as well as its
extremely long run time. Because of the video’s high viewership, Spencer subsequently
dubbed the debate the “Unite the Right of YouTube,” likening its significance to the
march that took place in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017.
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Fig. 10: Lauren Southern creates controversy at an anti-rape event in a video
posted to Rebel Media’s channel on June 9, 2015.
STRATEGIC CONTROVERSY
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STRATEGIC CONTROVERSY
The implications of this strategy go beyond the fact that they capitalize on
controversies in order to bring in viewers. It also means that, when viewers actually
engage with the content, they see it framed as lighthearted, entertaining, rebellious,
and fun. This can be highly effective for young audiences embracing a countercultural
identity, but it fundamentally obscures the impact that issues have on vulnerable
and underrepresented populations—in Peterson’s case, the LGBTQ community; in
Southern’s case, rape victims and immigrants; and in Warski’s case, people of color.
Fig. 11: Andy Warski hosts a debate between Richard Spencer and Carl Benjamin, streamed
live on January 4, 2018.
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FACILITATING RADICALIZATION
THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKING
The Alternative Influence Network provides a pathway for the radicalization of
audience members and content creators alike. “Radicalization” is a fraught term,
and in a contemporary US context is most often affiliated with Islamic extremism.
While members of the AIN do not use the term “radicalization,” they do often
discuss their own processes of destabilization from previous worldviews. In some
cases, once their previous worldview is dismantled, they embrace alternative
frameworks for understanding the world, such as white nationalism (see, for
example, Blonde in the Belly of the Beast describing her shifting understanding of
the world in “Ideological Testimonials”).
They refer to this process as “taking the red pill,” an allusion to a scene in the movie
The Matrix when the protagonist sees truths about the world that have previously
been hidden from him. White nationalists often describe this as a stepwise process.
For example, in one possible pathway, they may start by rejecting the mainstream
media and “PC culture”; then embrace anti-feminist ideas; then embrace scientific
racism or the idea that racial oppression is not real; and then finally, the idea that
Jewish people wield positions of influence and harbor malicious intents against white
people. (They often refer to these processes
as addressing the “woman question,” the
“race question,” and the “Jewish question,” or
alternatively as “getting redpilled” on any of
these individual issues.)
The previous two sections have begun to
show how the influencers of the AIN take part
in this stepwise radicalization. For example, influencers often encourage audience
members to reject the mainstream media in favor of their content, thus priming
their audiences for a destabilized worldview and a rejection of popular narratives
around current events. Then, when libertarian and conservative influencers invite
white nationalists onto their channels, they expose their audiences to alternative
frameworks for understanding the world. Thus, audiences may quickly move from
following influencers who criticize feminism to those promoting white nationalism.
This is why the high concentration of the networking between influencers can prove
so powerful.
...when libertarian and conservative
influencers invite white nationalists
onto their channels, they expose their
audiences to alternative frameworks
for understanding the world.
4
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AUDIENCE RADICALIZATION
Several critics have written about the role of the YouTube recommendation algorithm
in this radicalization process. They have demonstrated how the algorithm can nudge
viewers into accessing extremist content through recommended videos. In an op-
ed for The New York Times, technology scholar Zeynep Tufekci called YouTube “The
Great Radicalizer,” showcasing the ways the algorithm drove her to more and more
extremist content during an experiment.
99
Another article from an ex-YouTube
employee argued a similar case, claiming that “fiction is outperforming reality” in
large part because of the thumbnail video recommendations on the platform.
100
While
these articles identify a real problem, they treat radicalization as a fundamentally
technical problem. What the section below showcases is that radicalization on
YouTube is also a fundamentally social problem. Thus, even if YouTube altered or
fully removed its content recommendation algorithms, the AIN would still provide a
pathway for radicalization.
AUDIENCE RADICALIZATION
Because of the overlapping pattern of guest appearances in the AIN, it is remarkably
easy for viewers to be exposed to incrementally more extremist content. However,
many influencers fundamentally deny that their collaborations serve as endorsements
or even amplifiers of other influencers’ content. This is the case, for example, with
Dave Rubin. While Rubin himself mainly espouses support for small government and
criticizes social justice in broad terms, he sometimes hosts guests who are openly anti-
immigrant, espouse scientific racism, or directly identify with the “alt-right.” Rubin
claims that hosting these guests is not an endorsement of them or their positions.
Rubin says that he thinks it is necessary to expose his audiences to dangerous ideas
so they can make fully informed decisions for themselves. He argues that “good
ideas always beat out bad ideas if you let
the light shine on both of them.”
101
This
reading of the situation treats his show as a
journalistic endeavor and endorses the view
that “sunlight is the best disinfectant.” This
interpretation has been challenged by media
scholar Whitney Phillips, who has shown
the damaging impact that exposure to extremist ideas can have. In a recent report on
media coverage of white nationalists, Phillips argues coverage of extremist content is
more likely to be like giving oxygen to a fire.
102
Because the AIN is a social network as much as a professional one, collaborations
can carry more weight than they would in a traditional news media environment.
Influencers often introduce their guests as friends and describe their personal
relationships to the audience. This type of social networking between influencers
...social networking between influencers
makes it easy for audience members to be
incrementally exposed to, and come to trust,
ever more extremist political positions.
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AUDIENCE RADICALIZATION
makes it easy for audience members to be incrementally exposed to, and come to
trust, ever more extremist political positions.
In one illustrative example of this process, Dave Rubin hosted the Canadian right-
wing influencer Stefan Molyneux for an interview (Fig. 12). Molyneux is a libertarian
YouTuber and the host of Freedomain Radio, a call-in talk radio show. In his YouTube
videos, Molyneux openly promotes scientific racism, advocates for the men’s rights
movement, critiques initiatives devoted to gender equity, and promotes white
supremacist conspiracy theories focused on “White Genocide” and “The Great
Replacement.” When Molyneux appeared on Rubin’s show, Rubin did not directly
endorse his views, but the host also did not challenge them in any substantive
way. Rubin largely let Molyneux dominate the terms of the conversation. Take, for
instance, this clip from the interview, when Rubin first brings up Molyneux’s beliefs
about IQ:
Rubin: People think that there is somehow a racist element to it. . . .
Do you want to make your basic argument around race and IQ?
Molyneux: It’s like saying ‘do you want to make your argument
that the sun is the center of the solar system?’ It’s like, well it’s not a
personal thing, like this is not an idea I have come up with.
Rubin: I’m glad you countered with that, because in a way my
question accidentally was almost a setup.
103
Later in the interview, Molyneux claims to be “heartbroken” about race and IQ,
saying, “This is one of the most difficult facts I’ve had to absorb in my life.” Rather
than challenging Molyneux’s racist claims, Rubin continues to take him at his word
and treat his racism as fact:
Rubin: But is there evidence that it’s genetic?
Molyneux: Yes.
Rubin: Genetic in what regard? I mean if we took the brain of a
25-year-old black man and the brain of a 25-year-old white man, what
is it that they’re doing that…
Molyneux: They’re different sizes.
Rubin: Yeah?
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AUDIENCE RADICALIZATION
Molyneux: Yeah.
Molyneux then goes on to argue that IQ remains stable for ethnicities across
environmental factors. Rubin follows up with a question about these factors without
ever addressing Molyneux’s claims about brain sizes. Throughout the interview,
Molyneux promotes ideas of scientific racism that have been used to justify racial
hierarchies and oppression for centuries. In fact, many of the arguments are exactly
the same as those made by Richard Spencer in his debate about “race realism” with
Carl Benjamin two months later. By letting him speak without providing a legitimate
and robust counterargument, Rubin provides a free platform for white supremacist
ideology on his channel.
Further, in the video description, Rubin posts a number of links to resources
“provided by Stefan’s team” about race and intelligence and encourages viewers to “do
more research on your own.” Among other promotional materials, Rubin lists Stefan
Molyneux’s Twitter account as well as the name of his book. This directive to audience
members to learn for themselves is particularly troubling when put into context by
recent research on information-seeking habits. For example, Tripodi has shown that
Google returns radically different results based on small differences in search queries
for controversial topics—a process which often reaffirms the bias of the searcher.
104
This is precisely the experience that political influencers support with the search
engine optimization techniques described above. For example, at the time of writing,
searching for the term “IQ” on Google returns videos featuring Stefan Molyneux
on the first page. In a search for “IQ” on YouTube specifically, five of the top seven
results are from political influencers in the AIN, including Molyneux and Jordan
Peterson. Similarly, the first result for “race realism” in YouTube search results is from
the white nationalist publication American Renaissance. Therefore, those doing their
own research on the terms and topics introduced by Molyneux are likely to discover
content supporting the same racist arguments.
Fig. 12: Stefan Molyneux promotes scientific racism on The Rubin Report in a video posted
on November 9, 2017.
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INFLUENCER RADICALIZATION
It would take more empirical research to determine the extent to which guest
appearances like Molyneux with Rubin effectively radicalize viewers. However,
some user comments suggest the videos they watch have indeed influenced them,
given them justifications to support their views, or convinced them to subscribe to
a new influencer’s channel. Take, for example, the following comment made about
Molyneux’s appearance on The Rubin Report:
I never heard of this guy before & they started off talking about how
he is super controversial & hated but I watched the whole thing & I
didn’t hear anything that I would consider controversial. He seems to
be extremely intelligent . . . I’m going to subscribe to his channel &
check him out.
INFLUENCER RADICALIZATION
So far, this report has focused on the strategies political influencers use to persuade
their audiences of their reactionary viewpoints. However, political influencers also
attempt to persuade each other. This can be a particularly effective tactic for those
who hope to spread extremist ideology; if they radicalize another influencer, their
message can have access to an entirely new audience. Another factor that influences
the political commitments of influencers is that the AIN has an active and responsive
audience. This audience enforces a type of accountability on influencers, and this
accountability means that audiences can push influencers toward more extremist
viewpoints—in other words, radicalization can happen in reverse.
We can see this process at work within another Rubin Report segment, one that took
place long before Rubin hosted Stefan Molyneux in late 2017. At the beginning
of 2016, Rubin hosted an interview with the libertarian and conservative radio
commentator Larry Elder.
105
During the segment, Elder (who is African American)
tries to convince Rubin that racism does not exist in contemporary society. Rubin
initially pushes back, citing police brutality as an issue that affects black communities.
In response, Elder lists a number of statistics meant to debunk the claim, arguing that
if anything, white cops are less likely to shoot black citizens for fear of being labeled
racist. Rubin then backs off, saying he thinks racism is still a problem but that it “may
not be systemic . . . in the macro sense.”
Among the comments on Rubin’s videos, there are many posts which celebrate this
segment for being the moment Larry Elder “redpilled” Dave Rubin on systemic
racism. A number of users have posted segments of the interview to their own
YouTube channels with titles like, “The moment LARRY ELDER changed DAVE
RUBINS Mind Forever” [sic]. Rubin himself has talked about the impact this
conversation had on him. In the spring of 2018, he had Elder back on his show and
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INFLUENCER RADICALIZATION
told him:
That moment where you really beat me senseless about systemic
racism . . . I view it as my best moment and my worst. It was my worst
because I came to an intellectual fight without the proper equipment,
and it was my best because . . . it was a learning moment for me and
for everyone else.
106
Additionally, audience feedback can drive political influencers to produce more
extremist content. The easy feedback systems on YouTube lead to discursive loops, in
which influencers build audiences that ask for, or reward, certain types of content.
For many of the political influencers in the AIN, the more extremist content they
make, the more of an extremist and dedicated audience they build. Such audiences
can, in turn, drive political influencers to deliver ever more extreme content.
Blaire White’s channel began with videos recounting personal stories and experiences
that made her question the maxims she had learned from popular feminism. “I do
concede that certain situations may lend certain privileges or benefits towards men,”
she said in her channel’s first video, posted in December 2015.
107
“However, I feel
like these instances are very much overstated.” In her fifth video, posted January
2016, she answered questions submitted by her viewers. One of them asked, “Would
you ever do a video with Sargon of Akkad?”
108
At this point, White was still building
a following, and Carl Benjamin (Sargon of
Akkad) had already built a following based
on his anti-feminist content in gaming
communities. She responded by saying a lot
of people had asked for this, but her fans
needed to ask him. She directs them to tweet
at and message him. The very next video she posted, a week later, takes a much
harder line against feminism—titled “Feminism Is Pointless,” it begins with White
calling feminism “cancer” and showing how it spreads “like a virus.”
109
Over time, White also began incorporating the slang used on the anonymous message
boards 4chan and 8chan, where discourse is often openly racist, sexist, and anti-
Semitic. For example, “trap” is a term used widely in such spaces to refer to trans
women who “trick” cisgender, straight men into sleeping with them. The LGBTQ
media advocacy group GLAAD has listed the term as an example of defamatory
language, writing “such descriptions are inaccurate, defamatory, and insulting.”
110
Nevertheless, in a 2017 video, White opened her video with, “Congratulations, you
degenerates. You finally got me to make the video. We’re finally going to address the
question that’s as old as 4chan. . . . Are traps gay?”
111
She overlaid the video with
images of tweets, comments, and posts asking her the same question. Over time,
...audience feedback can drive
political influencers to produce
more extremist content.
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INFLUENCER RADICALIZATION
then, her content has moved from general critiques of social justice to explicitly
offensive content targeted directly at audiences known to be openly bigoted.
The ideological loops between influencers and audiences can also take place within
the course of a single video. Many of the YouTubers in the AIN make use of YouTube
live stream, broadcasting to their followers in real time (users can later archive these
videos so they remain accessible). In these cases, viewers can comment on influencer’s
videos in real time, and the influencers often respond within the video.
YouTube monetized these interactions with the introduction of Super Chat in 2017.
Super Chat is a feature that allows users to pay money to have their comments
highlighted and pinned on a comment stream.
112
Super Chat is a particularly
appealing feature for content creators because it is another way to monetize their
content, even if their videos overall have been demonetized by the platform. A recent
article in Buzzfeed News counted the Super Chat intake from two far-right videos,
finding they each brought in $4,000 (of which YouTube takes a cut).
113
In these contexts, viewers often purposefully make shocking or offensive comments in
an attempt to get the influencers to read them on screen (Fig. 13). In one particularly
disturbing video from March 15, 2018, political influencers Andy Warski and Baked
Alaska, along with live streamer Asian Andy, filmed themselves wandering around Los
Angeles for five hours.
114
They called the event the “IRL Bloodsports” (“IRL” refers to
“in real life”), and they set up a speaker with an automated voice that read Super Chat
comments as text-to-speech. Within minutes, offensive comments were automatically
being read out loud in front of their Uber driver. In many cases, these comments were
specifically crafted to avoid any keyword filters or censorship attempts set up ahead
of time from the live streamers or from YouTube. See, for example, the following
comment which was read in full during the video: “Hey Baked, remember that time
Fig. 13: The YouTubers Andy Warski, Baked Alaska, and Asian Andy respond to offensive
user comments in real time, in a video streamed live on March 15, 2018.
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INFLUENCER RADICALIZATION
we tag teamed a 12-year-old virgin? Good times!!”
115
Overall, this system is one in
which both individual influencers and YouTube as a corporate entity are incentivized
to draw in money through extremist and/or offensive audience-driven content.
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CONCLUSION
This report has shown how a particular network of political influencers perpetuates
far-right ideology on YouTube and other social media platforms. Specifically,
individuals from academic and media institutions and reactionary or extremist
movements have used participatory digital media to broadcast to new audiences and
rebrand old, often bigoted and discriminatory ideas. Content creators have employed
the tactics used by brand influencers, along with social networking, to establish an
alternative to mainstream news, convey their ideas to audiences, and monetize their
content. As a result, audiences and influencers alike are accessing, producing, and
supporting extremist and often harmful content.
There is an undercurrent to this report that is worth making explicit: in many
ways, YouTube is built to incentivize the behavior of these political influencers. YouTube
monetizes influence for everyone, regardless of how harmful their belief systems are.
The platform, and its parent company, have allowed racist, misogynist, and harassing
content to remain online – and in many cases, to generate advertising revenue – as
long as it does not explicitly include slurs. YouTube also profits directly from features
like Super Chat which often incentivizes “shocking” content. In other words, the type
of content and engagement
created by the AIN fits neatly
into YouTube’s business
model.
Political influencers often
fundamentally understand
this. While they posture as
being underground and facing
censorship from YouTube,
they also know they are being
given a major platform from
which to broadcast their
views. On May 23, 2018,
Paul Joseph Watson tweeted
a photo of himself holding
up a plaque YouTube sent
to him for surpassing one
million subscribers (Fig. 14).
He added a caption, “YouTube
secretly loves me.”
Fig. 14: Paul Joseph Watson displays a plaque given to him by YouTube.
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CONCLUSION
Internet scholar Tarleton Gillespie has written that websites such as YouTube advertise
themselves as “open, neutral, [and] egalitarian.”
116
The term “platform” itself has
helped YouTube position itself as a neutral utility that helps facilitate “free speech” and
“openness.” The website similarly seeks policies that offer it protection for hosting
user-generated content while simultaneously facing minimal liability for what those
users say. This report has shown how these attempts at objectivity are being exploited
by users who fundamentally reject objectivity as a valid stance. As a result, platforms
like YouTube have an imperative to govern content and behavior for explicit values,
such as the rejection of content that promotes white supremacy, regardless of whether
it includes slurs.
While much more research is needed to investigate the effectiveness of specific
responses, Paul Joseph Watson’s tweet suggests one concrete step YouTube can take
in response. The platform currently provides Silver, Gold, and Diamond awards for
content creators who have reached 100,000, 1 million, or 10 million subscribers,
respectively. At this point, the platform reviews channels to make sure they do not
have copyright strikes and do not violate YouTube’s community guidelines. At these
junctures, the platform should not only assess what channels say in their content,
but also who they host and what their guests say. In a media environment consisting
of networked influencers, YouTube must respond with policies that account for
influence and amplification, as well as social networks.
Discussing images of the “alt-right” or white supremacism often conjures a sense
of the “dark corners of the internet,” filled with “anonymous commenters” who
don’t dare show their faces, operating on forums like 4chan, in the comments
sections of YouTube, or behind “egg avatars” on Twitter. In fact, much extremist
content is happening front and center, easily accessible on platforms like YouTube,
publicly endorsed by well-resourced individuals, and interfacing directly with
mainstream culture.
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APPENDIX A:
INDEX OF AIN INFLUENCERS
(written with Brian Friedberg)
The following Appendix introduces the influencers who are explicitly named in this
report; it does not include all of the influencers analyzed in this research, nor all of
those listed in the data visualization in Fig. 1.
Internet Aristocrat (now known as Mister Metokur) is an unidentified YouTuber
who posted influential conspiracy theories during the Gamergate events in 2014. He
now goes by the pseudonym Mister Metokur and appears in “Bloodsports” debates
alongside openly far-right guests.
Carl Benjamin (Sargon of Akkad) is a British vlogger and “anti-SJW” content
creator. Throughout the Gamergate movement, he posted content critical of feminist
game critics and academics. He has since become a prominent member of the skeptic
community and promotes “classical liberalism.” In January 2018, he appeared in a
debate with Richard Spencer on the topic of scientific racism.
Taleed Brown (That Guy T) is a libertarian vlogger who expresses sympathy for
black nationalism and ethno-nationalism more broadly. He has appeared on the white
nationalist Colin Robertson’s channel (Millennial Woes) during the “Millenniyule”
series in December 2017.
Steven Crowder is an American, Christian conservative commentator and talk show
host. On his channel, he broadcasts political comedy sketches and stunts, such as
those in which he appears on college campuses asking participants to “change his
mind” about controversial political topics.
James Damore is an American former Google engineer. At Google, he gained
notoriety after the leak of his memo about the company’s diversity initiatives. He
does not have his own YouTube channel, but he has appeared as a guest on the
channels of multiple influencers, such as Dave Rubin, Milo Yiannopolous, and Stefan
Molyneux.
Larry Elder is an American libertarian radio host and commentator. He has appeared
on libertarian and conservative YouTube channels, such as The Rubin Report and
PragerU, where he has argued against the existence of systematic racism in the United
States.
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APPENDIX A: INDEX OF AIN INFLUENCERS
Marcus Follin (The Golden One) is a Swedish self-help influencer who posts
a blend of men’s rights, white nationalist, and fantasy enthusiast content. On his
channel, he promotes hyper-traditional gender roles, commitment to physical fitness,
and mythology.
Jean-François Gariépy is a French-Canadian YouTuber who promotes scientific
racism and ethno-nationalism. In early 2018, he co-hosted a number of “Bloodsports”
debates alongside Andy Warski on the latter’s show Warski Live. He has since left to
host content on his own channel.
Timothy Gionet (Baked Alaska) is a social media personality who has published
anti-Semitic content online and who marched at Unite the Right in Charlottesville.
On YouTube, he has hosted live streamed debates between far-right personalities. He
has also appeared alongside Andy Warski in the “IRL Bloodsports.”
Rebecca Hargraves (Blonde in the Belly of the Beast) is a conservative, anti-
feminist vlogger who also frequently employs white nationalist arguments.
Sam Harris is an American philosopher and neuroscientist who hosts a podcast
called Waking Up with Sam Harris. He is known as one of the “four horsemen” of the
New Atheist movement. He is also a frequent critic of contemporary Islam and often
appears alongside self-identified members of the “Intellectual Dark Web.”
Stefan Molyneux is a Canadian talk show host who promotes scientific racism,
advocates on behalf of men’s rights, and criticizes initiatives devoted to gender equity.
He also frequently promotes far-right conspiracy theories.
MundaneMatt is a YouTuber who was a primary organizer of harassment against
Zoe Quinn throughout Gamergate. He still actively posts “anti-SJW” content and
frequently appears alongside far-right YouTubers on live streams and debates.
Antonia Okafor is an American, conservative activist who often advocates on behalf
of “campus carry” laws. She has appeared in PragerU videos describing why she is a
black, millennial conservative.
Candace Owens (Red Pill Black) is an American conservative commentator and
Director of Urban Engagement at Turning Point USA, a conservative activist group
focused on mobilizing college students. She hosts a vlog series in which she criticizes
the Democratic Party and racial justice movements such as Black Lives Matter.
Jordan Peterson is a Canadian public intellectual, author, and professor of
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APPENDIX A: INDEX OF AIN INFLUENCERS
psychology at the University of Toronto. He gained mainstream media attention for
opposing the gender equity Bill C-16 in Canada in 2016. He has since published a
best-selling self-help book called 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos. He frequently
appears alongside other self-identified members of the “Intellectual Dark Web.”
Brittany Pettibone is an American political commentator who frequently collaborates
with her boyfriend Martin Sellner and her friend Lauren Southern. Her content
features her tours of Europe in which she engages in anti-immigrant protests.
Tim Pool is an American citizen journalist who often covers political protests. He
previously worked for Vice News and FusionTV before launching his independent
YouTube channel. In his content, he frequently criticizes legacy media outlets and
provides commentary on news media production processes.
Colin Robertson (Millennial Woes) is a Scottish white-nationalist vlogger. For
the past several Decembers, he has hosted an event called “Milleniyule” in which he
invites a range of white supremacist, libertarian, and conservative guests onto his
channel.
Joe Rogan is an American comedian and the host of The Joe Rogan Experience podcast.
On his show, he hosts guests with a wide range of political views. Some of these
include conservative and libertarian YouTubers, as well as self-identified members of
the “Intellectual Dark Web.”
Dave Rubin is an American YouTube talk show host who frequently hosts libertarian
and conservative guests. He is a self-defined “classical liberal” who values individual
liberty and small government. He has a partnership with the libertarian organization
Learn Liberty, a subsidiary of the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason
University. He is also a self-identified member of the “Intellectual Dark Web.”
Martin Sellner is an Austrian far-right leader and the co-founder of Generation
Identity, a far-right European youth organization. His high-profile relationship with
Brittany Pettibone has been well-documented on both of their channels, and he has
organized both online and offline protests against immigration advocacy groups.
Ben Shapiro is an American conservative commentator and former editor-at-large at
Breitbart News. He founded and hosts videos on The Daily Wire, where he promotes
conservativism from an Orthodox Jewish perspective. He sometimes appears in
content with self-described members of the “Intellectual Dark Web.”
Lauren Southern is a Canadian citizen journalist and former contributor to the
online outlet The Rebel Media. She publishes anti-feminist, anti-Islamic, and anti-
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APPENDIX A: INDEX OF AIN INFLUENCERS
immigration content and frequently collaborates with the influencer Brittany
Pettibone.
Richard Spencer is an American white nationalist leader and celebrity who
popularized the term “alt-right.” He hosts a filmed podcast from his YouTube channel
Altright.com.
Ayla Stewart (Wife with a Purpose) is an American “pro-white” vlogger who
promotes traditional gender values (“trad life”) and Christianity. Her channel mixes
lifestyle content with political ideology.
Jared Taylor is an American white nationalist and the founder and editor of the
magazine American Renaissance. On the magazine’s YouTube channel, he frequently
promotes scientific racism, anti-immigration, and white nationalist content.
Andy Warski is a Canadian YouTube talk show host who facilitates live streamed
debates between influencers on his show Warski Live. Alongside his former co-host
Jean-François Gariépy, he formalized the “Internet Bloodsports” debate series.
Paul Joseph Watson is the British editor-at-large of the conspiracy theory media
outlet Infowars. He also posts his own content to his YouTube channel, in which
he criticizes social justice movements, mainstream news media, and mainstream
entertainment.
Blaire White is an American, conservative vlogger who posts content criticizing
social justice movements. She often discusses her identity as a trans woman who
opposes contemporary LGBTQ activist movements and denies the existence of
nonbinary gender identities.
Milo Yiannopolous is a British media provocateur with ties to white nationalists.
He was formerly a senior editor at Breitbart News but resigned after publicly making
comments in support of pedophilia.
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APPENDIX B:
NETWORK VISUALIZATION
Note (as of the publishing of this report): Some influencers have multiple channels,
some influencers host specific shows within their channels, and some influencers
do not have their own channels but appear as guests frequently enough that I have
included them in the network. In addition, there are some members of the AIN
discussed in this report whose guest appearances were infrequent and thus did not
appear in the visualization.
INFLUENCER NAME CHANNEL NAME(S) SHOW/SERIES NAME
Andrew Klavan The Daily Wire The Andrew Klavan Show
Andy Warski Andywarski Warski Live
Annand Virk (Bunty
King)
Bunty King
Antonia Okafur
Ayla Stewart (Wife with
a Purpose)
Ayla Stewart Wife with a Purpose
Ben Shapiro The Daily Wire The Ben Shapiro Show
Black Pigeon Speaks Black Pigeon Speaks; Navy Hato
Blaire White Blaire White
Blonde in the Belly of
the Beast
Blonde in the Belly of the Beast
Braving Ruin (No longer active) Braving Ruin;
Braving Ruin Archives; Braving Ruin
Live
Bre Faucheux Bre Faucheux This Week on the Alt-Right
(formerly)
Brittany Pettibone Brittany Pettibone
Brooks Heatherly (No
Bullshit)
No Bullshit; No Bullshit 2
Candace Owens (Red
Pill Black)
Candace Owens The Declaration (formerly Myth of
the Coon)
Caolan Robertson Caolan Robertson The Culture Report
Carl Benjamin (Sargon
of Akkad)
Sargon of Akkad Live; The Thinkery This Week in Stupid
Chris Maldonado
(Chris Ray Gun)
Chris Ray Gun
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APPENDIX B: NETWORK VISUALIZATION
Coach Red Pill Coach Red Pill; CRP Streams/Backup;
Coach and Benway Podcast
Dave Cullen
(Computing Forever)
Computing Forever; The Dave Cullen
Show; Computing Forever Archive
The Dave Cullen Show
Dave Rubin The Rubin Report The Rubin Report
Dennis Prager PragerU
Derrick Blackman
(Some Black Guy)
Some Black Guy; Derrick Blackman
Faith J Goldy Faith J Goldy (formerly The Rebel
Media)
Gavin McInnes Gavin MicInnes (formerly The Rebel
Media)
Henrik Palmgren Red Ice TV
James Allsup James Allsup
James Damore
James O’Keefe Project Veritas; Project Veritas Action
Jared Taylor American Renaissance
Jean-François Gariépy Jean-François Gariépy
Jeff Holiday Jeff Holiday; YouTube Saints; Jeff
Holiday 2 Electric Boogaloo
Joe Rogan PowerfulJRE The Joe Rogan Experience
Jordan Peterson Jordan Peterson
Kraut and Tea Kraut (no longer active)
Lana Lokteff Red Ice TV
Larry Elder
Lauren Southern Lauren Southern (previously The
Rebel Media)
Marcus Follin (The
Golden One)
The Golden One
Mark Collett Mark Collett This Week on the Alt-Right
Martin Sellner Martin Sellner; Martin Sellner GI
Matt Jarbo (Mundane
Matt)
MundaneMatt; Mundane Chats;
Forbidden Knowledge
Michael Knowles The Daily Wire The Michael Knowles Show
Mike Cernovich Mike Cernovich
Mike Enoch
Millennial Woes Millennial Woes; MW Live; MW Off-
Duty
Millenniyule (seasonal)
Milo Yiannopolous MILO The Milo Show
Mister Metokur Mister Metokur (formerly Internet
Aristocrat)
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APPENDIX B: NETWORK VISUALIZATION
Mouthy Buddha Mouthy Buddha
Nicholas J Fuentes Nicholas J Fuentes America First
Owen Benjamin Owen Benjamin
Paul Joseph Watson Paul Joseph Watson
Richard Spencer Altright.com Alt-Right Politics
Roaming Millennial Roaming Millennial
Sam Harris Sam Harris Waking Up with Sam Harris
Stefan Molyneux Stefan Molyneux Freedomain Radio
Stephen Christopher
Yaxley-Lennon
(Tommy Robinson)
(formerly The Rebel Media)
Steven Bonnell II
(Destiny)
Destiny
Steven Crowder StevenCrowder Louder with Crowder
Styxhexenhammer666 Styxhexenhammer666
Taleed Brown (That
Guy T)
That Guy T
Tara McCarthy The Reality Calls Show The Reality Call Show (no longer
active)
Tim Pool Tim Pool; Timcast; Subverse
Timothy Gionet (Baked
Alaska)
Baked Alaska; Baked Alaska
Livestreams; (formerly) The BA
Experience
The BA Experience
Tree of Logic Tree of Logic; Tree of Logic –
Livestreams
Vee Vee; Vee Live Stream
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
52
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am incredibly grateful to Data & Society for supporting and guiding me throughout
this project. In particular, the project benefited from extensive conversations,
collaboration, and feedback from my colleagues on the Media Manipulation Initiative.
Thank you also to the external readers of this report, who were all extremely generous
with their time and feedback on earlier drafts. Finally, thank you to my family; your
support means the world to me.
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
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DATA & SOCIETY
Data & Society is an independent nonprofit research institute that advances new
frames for understanding the implications of data-centric and automated technology.
We conduct research and build the field of actors to ensure that knowledge guides
debate, decision-making, and technical choices.
www.datasociety.net
@datasociety
Data & Society Research Institute datasociety.net
54
ENDNOTES
1 Matthew N. Lyons, “Ctrl-Alt-Delete: The Origins and Ideology of the Alternative Right | Political Research
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2 While there is a contemporary movement that self-identifies as “neoreactionary,” or “NRx,” the people
analyzed in this report largely do not use the term “reactionary” to describe themselves.
3 Aaron Smith and Monica Anderson, “Social Media Use in 2018” (Pew Research Center, March 1, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/pi_2018-03-01_social-media_0-01/.
4 Elisa Shearer and Jeffrey Gottfried, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017,” Pew Research Center’s
Journalism Project (blog), September 7, 2017, http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-
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the-use-of-video-in-your-content-marketing-strategy/.
5 Art Swift, “Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low,” Gallup (blog), September 14, 2016, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx.
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7 “Abstract.”
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Selfies as Subversive Frivolity,” Social Media + Society 2, no. 2 (April 2016): 205630511664134, https://doi.
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9 Anatoliy Gruzd and Barry Wellman, “Networked Influence in Social Media, Networked Influence in Social
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legacy-media-pewdiepie-weaponized-microcelebrity-and-cross-media-politics/.
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ENDNOTES
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34 Media Insight Project, “‘Who Shared It?’ How Americans Decide What News to Trust on Social Media”
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ENDNOTES
http://www.mediainsight.org/PDFs/Trust%20Social%20Media%20Experiments%202017/MediaInsight_Social%20
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36 wishcrys, “YouTuber Influencers vs. Legacy Media.”
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38 Tim Pool, THIS IS THE FUTURE OF NEWS.
39 wishcrys, “YouTuber Influencers vs. Legacy Media.”
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47 Cunningham and Craig, “Being ‘Really Real’ on YouTube.”
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54 Peck.
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ENDNOTES
57 Blaire White, DE-TRANSITIONING. REGRET & GOING BACK, accessed May 18, 2018, https://www.
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58 The Rubin Report, What Is The Intellectual Dark Web?
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65 Francesca Tripodi, “Just for Clicks? Mainstreaming the Extreme Through Conservative Media Networks,”
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66 Caroline Jack, Becca Lewis, and Kinjal Dave, “‘Viewpoint Diversity’ and the Illusion of an Impartial
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75 Citron.
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ENDNOTES
76 Zack Abnet, “Why I Left The Young Turks” - Dave Rubin’s Story, accessed April 12, 2018, https://www.
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80 Daniels, White Lies: Race, Class, Gender and Sexuality in White Supremacist Discourse.
81 Marwick, “Why Do People Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects.”
82 Duffy, “The Romance of Work.” 451.
83 Alice E. Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age (Yale University
Press, 2013).
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85 Alice E. Marwick, “Instafame: Luxury Selfies in the Attention Economy,” Public Culture 27, no. 1 75
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87 Michael Golebiewski and danah boyd, “Data Voids: Where Missing Data Can Easily Be Exploited” (New
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ENDNOTES
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ENDNOTES
115 Daro and Silverman, “How YouTube’s ‘Super Chat’ System Is Pushing Video Creators Toward More Extreme
Content.”
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