MICHIGAN REPORTS
CASES DECIDED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
MICHIGAN
FROM
September 10, 2007 to May 6, 2008
DANILO ANSELMO
REPORTER OF DECISIONS
VOL. 480
FIRST EDITION
2008
Copyright 2008, by Michigan Supreme Court
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum
requirements of American National Standard for Information
Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48-1984.
SUPREME COURT
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
C
HIEF
J
USTICE
CLIFFORD W. TAYLOR, L
AINGSBURG
........................................... 2009
J
USTICES
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, E
AST
L
ANSING
.................................... 2015
ELIZABETH A. WEAVER, G
LEN
A
RBOR
....................................... 2011
MARILYN KELLY, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
............................................ 2013
MAURA D. CORRIGAN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
.............................. 2015
ROBERT P. YOUNG, J
R
., G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
............................ 2011
STEPHEN J. MARKMAN, M
ASON
................................................ 2013
C
OMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL J. SCHMEDLEN, C
HIEF
C
OMMISSIONER
SHARI M. OBERG, D
EPUTY
C
HIEF
C
OMMISSIONER
JOHN K. PARKER DANIEL C. BRUBAKER
TIMOTHY J. RAUBINGER MICHAEL S. WELLMAN
LYNN K. RICHARDSON GARY L. ROGERS
KATHLEEN A. FOSTER RICHARD B. LESLIE
NELSON S. LEAVITT FREDERICK M. BAKER, J
R
.
DEBRA A. GUTIERREZ-M
C
GUIRE KATHLEEN M. DA WSON
ANNE-MARIE HYNOUS VOICE RUTH E. ZIMMERMAN
DON W. A TKINS SAMUEL R. SMITH
JÜRGEN O . SKOPPEK ANNE E. ALBERS
S
TATE
C
OURT
A
DMINISTRATOR:
CARL L. GROMEK
C
LERK:
CORBIN R. DAVIS
C
RIER:
DAVID G. PALAZZOLO
R
EPORTER OF
D
ECISIONS:
DANILO ANSELMO
iii
COURT OF APPEALS
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
C
HIEF
J
UDGE
HENRY WILLIAM SAAD, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
............................ 2009
C
HIEF
J
UDGE
P
RO
T
EM
CHRISTOPHER M. MURRAY, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
F
ARMS
............... 2009
J
UDGES
DAVID H. SAWYER, G
RAND
R
APIDS
........................................... 2011
WILLIAM B. MURPHY,
G
RAND
R
APIDS
...................................... 2013
MARK J. CAVANAGH,
R
OYAL
O
AK
............................................ 2009
KATHLEEN JANSEN,
S
T.
C
LAIR
S
HORES
................................... 2013
E. THOMAS FITZGERALD,
O
WOSSO
........................................ 2009
HELENE N. WHITE,
D
ETROIT
.................................................. 2011
RICHARD A. BANDSTRA,
G
RAND
R
APIDS
................................. 2009
JOEL P. HOEKSTRA,
G
RAND
R
APIDS
......................................... 2011
JANE E. MARKEY,
G
RAND
R
APIDS
............................................. 2009
PETER D. O’CONNELL,
M
T.
P
LEASANT
.................................... 2013
MICHAEL R. SMOLENSKI,
M
IDDLEVILLE
................................. 2013
WILLIAM C. WHITBECK,
L
ANSING
........................................... 2011
MICHAEL J. TALBOT,
G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
F
ARMS
........................... 2009
KURTIS T. WILDER,
C
ANTON
................................................... 2011
BRIAN K. ZAHRA,
N
ORTHVILLE
................................................. 2013
PATRICK M. METER,
S
AGINAW
................................................. 2009
DONALD S. OWENS,
W
ILLIAMSTON
........................................... 2011
KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY,
G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
...................... 2013
PAT M. DONOFRIO,
M
ACOMB
T
OWNSHIP
................................... 2011
KAREN FORT HOOD,
D
ETROIT
................................................ 2009
BILL SCHUETTE,
M
IDLAND
...................................................... 2009
STEPHEN L. BORRELLO,
S
AGINAW
......................................... 2013
ALTON T. DAVIS,
G
RAYLING
...................................................... 2009
DEBORAH A. SERVITTO,
M
T
.C
LEMENS
.................................. 2013
JANE M. BECKERING,
G
RAND
R
APIDS
...................................... 2009
1
ELIZABETH L. GLEICHER, P
LEASANT
R
IDGE
........................... 2009
2
C
HIEF
C
LERK:
SANDRA SCHULTZ MENGEL
R
ESEARCH
D
IRECTOR:
LARRY S. ROYSTER
1
From August 20, 2007.
2
From August 20, 2007.
iv
CIRCUIT JUDGES
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
1. MICHAEL R. SMITH, J
ONESVILLE
,..................................... 2009
2. ALFRED M. BUTZBAUGH, B
ERRIEN
S
PRINGS
,.................. 2013
JOHN E. DEWANE, S
T
.J
OSEPH
, ....................................... 2009
1
JOHN M. DONAHUE, S
T
.J
OSEPH
,.................................... 2011
CHARLES T. L
A
SATA, B
ENTON
H
ARBOR
,............................ 2011
3. DEB ORAH ROSS ADAMS, D
ETROIT
, ................................ 2013
DAVID J. ALLEN, D
ETROIT
,................................................ 2009
WENDY M. BAXTER, D
ETROIT
,......................................... 2013
ANNETTE J. BERRY, P
LYMOUTH
, ...................................... 2013
GREGORY D. BILL, N
ORTHVILLE
T
WP
.,.............................. 2013
SUSAN D. BORMAN, D
ETROIT
,.......................................... 2009
ULYSSES W. BOYKIN, D
ETROIT
, ....................................... 2009
MARGIE R. BRAXTON, D
ETROIT
, ..................................... 2011
MEGAN MAHER BRENNAN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
,........ 2009
HELEN E. BROWN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
,........................ 2009
BILL CALLAHAN, D
ETROIT
, ............................................. 2009
JAMES A. CALLAHAN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
, ........................... 2011
MICHAEL J. CALLAHAN, B
ELLEVILLE
, ............................. 2009
JEROME C. CAVANAGH, H
AMTRAMCK
, ............................ 2013
JAMES R. CHYLINSKI, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
W
OODS
, ............... 2011
ROBERT J. COLOMBO, J
R
., G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
,.................... 2013
DAPHNE MEANS CURTIS, D
ETROIT
,............................... 2009
CHRISTOPHER D. DINGELL, T
RENTON
,......................... 2009
GERSHWIN ALLEN DRAIN, D
ETROIT
, ............................ 2011
PRENTIS EDWARDS, D
ETROIT
, ........................................ 2013
CHARLENE M. ELDER, D
EARBORN
, ................................. 2009
VONDA R. EVANS, D
EARBORN
, .......................................... 2009
EDWARD EWELL, J
R
., D
ETROIT
, ....................................... 2013
PATRICIA SUSAN FRESARD, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
W
OODS
, .... 2011
SHEILA ANN GIBSON, D
ETROIT
, ..................................... 2011
JOHN H. GILLIS, J
R
., G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
,.............................. 2009
WILLIAM J. GIOVAN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
F
ARMS
, ................... 2009
1
From February 25, 2008.
v
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
DAVID ALAN GRONER, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
, ................ 2011
RICHARD B. HALLORAN, J
R
., D
ETROIT
,.......................... 2013
AMY PATRICIA HATHAWAY, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
,........ 2013
CYNTHIA GRAY HATHAWAY, D
ETROIT
,.......................... 2011
DIANE MARIE HATHAWAY, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
, ......... 2011
MICHAEL M. HATHAWAY, D
ETROIT
, ............................... 2011
MURIEL D. HUGHES, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
W
OODS
,................. 2009
THOMAS EDWARD JACKSON, D
ETROIT
,........................ 2013
VERA MASSEY JONES, D
ETROIT
, .................................... 2009
MARY BETH KELLY, G
ROSSE
I
LE
,..................................... 2009
TIMOTHY MICHAEL KENNY, L
IVONIA
,.......................... 2011
ARTHUR J. LOMBARD, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
F
ARMS
,................ 2009
KATHLEEN I. MACDONALD, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
W
OODS
, .... 2011
KATHLEEN M. McCARTHY, D
EARBORN
, .......................... 2013
WADE H. M
C
CREE, D
ETROIT
, ............................................ 2009
WARFIELD MOORE, J
R
., D
ETROIT
,................................... 2009
BRUCE U. MORROW, D
ETROIT
,......................................... 2011
JOHN A. MURPHY, P
LYMOUTH
T
WP
., ................................ 2011
MARIA L. OXHOLM, D
ETROIT
,.......................................... 2013
LITA MASINI POPKE, C
ANTON
, ....................................... 2011
DANIEL P.RYAN,R
EDFORD
,............................................... 2013
MICHAEL F. SAPALA, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
, .................... 2013
RICHARD M. SKUTT, D
ETROIT
, ........................................ 2009
MARK T. SLAVENS, C
ANTON
,............................................ 2011
LESLIE KIM SMITH, N
ORTHVILLE
T
WP
.,........................... 2013
VIRGIL C. SMITH, D
ETROIT
, ............................................. 2013
JEANNE STEMPIEN, N
ORTHVILLE
,................................... 2011
CYNTHIA DIANE STEPHENS, D
ETROIT
, ........................ 2013
CRAIG S. STRONG, D
ETROIT
,............................................ 2009
BRIAN R. SULLIVAN, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
,..................... 2011
DEBORAH A. THOMAS, D
ETROIT
,.................................... 2013
ISIDORE B. TORRES, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
,..................... 2011
CAROLE F. YOUNGBLOOD, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
,................... 2013
ROBERT L. ZIOLKOWSKI, N
ORTHVILLE
,.......................... 2009
4. SUSAN E. BEEBE, J
ACKSON
, ............................................. 2011
2
EDWARD J. GRANT, J
ACKSON
,........................................... 2011
3
JOHN G. M
C
BAIN, J
R
., R
IVES
J
UNCTION
,............................ 2009
CHAD C. SCHMUCKER, J
ACKSON
,.................................... 2011
2
From March 31, 2008.
3
To March 31, 2008.
vi
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
THOMAS D. WILSON, G
RASSLAKE
,.................................... 2013
5. JAMES H. FISHER, H
ASTINGS
, .......................................... 2009
6. JAMES M. ALEXANDER, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
, ................... 2009
MARTHA ANDERSON, T
ROY
,........................................... 2009
STEVEN N. ANDREWS, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
, ..................... 2009
LEO BOWMAN, P
ONTIAC
,................................................... 2009
RAE LEE CHABOT, F
RANKLIN
, .......................................... 2011
MARK A. GOLDSMITH, H
UNTINGTON
W
OODS
, .................. 2013
NANCI J. GRANT, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
,................................ 2009
SHALINA D. KUMAR, B
IRMINGHAM
, .................................. 2009
4
DENISE LANGFORD-MORRIS, W
EST
B
LOOMFIELD
,......... 2013
CHERYL A. MATTHEWS, S
YLVAN
L
AKE
, .......................... 2011
JOHN JAMES M
C
DONALD, F
ARMINGTON
H
ILLS
, .............. 2011
FRED M. MESTER, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
,............................. 2009
RUDY J. NICHOLS, C
LARKSTON
, ........................................ 2009
COLLEEN A. O’BRIEN, R
OCHESTER
H
ILLS
, ....................... 2011
DANIEL PATRICK O’BRIEN, T
ROY
, ................................ 2011
WENDY LYNN POTTS, B
IRMINGHAM
,................................ 2013
EDWARD SOSNICK, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
, ........................... 2013
MICHAEL D. WARREN, J
R
., B
EVERLY
H
ILLS
,.................... 2013
JOAN E. YOUNG, B
LOOMFIELD
V
ILLAGE
,............................. 2011
7. DUNCAN M. BEAGLE, F
ENTON
,....................................... 2011
JOSEPH J. FARAH, G
RAND
B
LANC
,.................................... 2011
JUDITH A. FULLERTON, F
LINT
,..................................... 2013
JOHN A. GADOLA, F
ENTON
, ............................................. 2009
ARCHIE L. HAYMAN, F
LINT
,............................................ 2013
GEOFFREY L. NEITHERCUT, F
LINT
,............................. 2013
DAVID J. NEWBLATT, L
INDEN
,......................................... 2011
MICHAEL J. THEILE, F
LUSHING
,...................................... 2009
RICHARD B. YUILLE, F
LINT
, ........................................... 2009
8. DAVID A. HOORT, P
ORTLAND
,............................................ 2011
CHARLES H. MIEL, S
TANTON
, .......................................... 2009
9. GARY C. GIGUERE J
R
., P
ORTAGE
,..................................... 2009
STEPHEN D. GORSALITZ, P
ORTAGE
, .............................. 2011
J. RICHARDSON JOHNSON, P
ORTAGE
, ........................... 2011
PAMELA L. LIGHTVOET, K
ALAMAZOO
,............................. 2013
10. FRED L. B ORCHARD, S
AGINAW
, ....................................... 2011
WILLIAM A. CRANE, S
AGINAW
,......................................... 2011
LYNDA L. HEATHSCOTT, S
AGINAW
,................................. 2013
5
4
From October 1, 2007.
5
To May 1, 2008.
vii
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
DARNELL JACKSON, S
AGINAW
,........................................ 2013
ROBERT L. KACZMAREK, F
REELAND
,.............................. 2009
11. CHARLES H. STARK, M
UNISING
, ...................................... 2009
12. GARFIELD W. HOOD, P
ELKIE
, .......................................... 2009
13. THOMAS G. POWER, T
RAVERSE
C
ITY
,............................... 2011
PHILIP E. RODGERS, J
R
., T
RAVERSE
C
ITY
,....................... 2009
14. JAMES M. GRAVES, J
R
., M
USKEGON
, ................................ 2013
TIMOTHY G. HICKS, M
ONTAGUE
, ..................................... 2011
WILLIAM C. MARIETTI, N
ORTH
M
USKEGON
, .................... 2011
JOHN C. RUCK, W
HITEHALL
,.............................................. 2009
15. MICHAEL H. CHERRY, C
OLDWATER
, ................................. 2009
16. JAMES M. BIERNAT, S
R
., C
LINTON
T
WP
., ......................... 2011
RICHARD L. CARETTI, F
RASER
,....................................... 2011
MARY A. CHRZANOWSKI, H
ARRISON
T
WP
., ..................... 2011
DIANE M. DRUZINSKI, S
HELBY
T
WP
.,.............................. 2009
JOHN C. FOSTER, C
LINTON
T
WP
.,..................................... 2009
PETER J. MACERONI, C
LINTON
T
WP
.,.............................. 2009
DONALD G. MILLER, H
ARRISON
T
WP
., ............................. 2013
EDWARD A. SERVITTO, J
R
., W
ARREN
,............................. 2013
MARK S. SWITALSKI, R
AY
T
WP
., ..................................... 2013
MATTHEW S. SWITALSKI, C
LINTON
T
WP
.,...................... 2009
ANTONIO P.VIVIANO,C
LINTON
T
WP
.,............................. 2011
DAVID VIVIANO, S
TERLING
H
EIGHTS
,................................. 2013
TRACEY A. YOKICH, S
T
.C
LAIR
S
HORES
,........................... 2013
17. GEORGE S. BUTH, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, ................................... 2011
KATHLEEN A. FEENEY, R
OCKFORD
, ................................ 2009
DONALD A. JOHNSTON, III, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, .................. 2013
DENNIS C. KOLENDA, R
OCKFORD
,................................... 2013
6
DENNIS B. LEIBER, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, ................................. 2013
STEVEN MITCHELL PESTKA, G
RAND
R
APIDS
,............... 2011
JAMES ROBERT REDFORD, E
AST
G
RAND
R
APIDS
, .......... 2011
PAUL J. SULLIVAN, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, .................................. 2009
MARK A. TRUSOCK, C
OMSTOCK
P
ARK
,.............................. 2013
CHRISTOPHER P.YATES,E
AST
G
RAND
R
APIDS
,............... 2013
7
DANIEL V. ZEMAITIS, G
RAND
R
APIDS
,.............................. 2009
18. WILLIAM J. CAPRATHE, B
AY
C
ITY
,................................. 2011
KENNETH W. SCHMIDT, B
AY
C
ITY
,................................. 2013
JOSEPH K. SHEERAN, E
SSEXVILLE
,.................................. 2009
19. JAMES M. BATZER, M
ANISTEE
,......................................... 2009
6
To April 22, 2008.
7
From April 22, 2008.
viii
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
20. CALVIN L. BOSMAN, G
RAND
H
AVEN
, ................................ 2011
JON H. HULSING, J
ENISON
,.............................................. 2009
EDWARD R. POST, G
RAND
H
AVEN
, .................................... 2011
JON VAN ALLSBURG, H
OLLAND
,...................................... 2013
21. PAUL H. CHAMBERLAIN, B
LANCHARD
,............................ 2011
MARK H. DUTHIE, M
T.
P
LEASANT
, ................................... 2013
22. ARCHIE CAMERON BROWN, A
NN
A
RBOR
, ..................... 2011
TIMOTHY P. CONNORS, A
NN
A
RBOR
, .............................. 2013
MELINDA MORRIS, A
NN
A
RBOR
, ...................................... 2013
DONALD E. SHELTON, S
ALINE
,....................................... 2009
DAVIDS.SWARTZ,A
NN
A
RBOR
,........................................ 2009
23. RONALD M. BERGERON, S
TANDISH
, ............................... 2009
WILLIAM F. MYLES, E
AST
T
AWAS
, .................................... 2009
24. DONALD A. TEEPLE, S
ANDUSKY
, ..................................... 2009
25. THOMAS L. SOLKA, M
ARQUETTE
, ..................................... 2011
JOHN R. WEBER, M
ARQUETTE
,.......................................... 2009
26. JOHN F. KOWALSKI, A
LPENA
, .......................................... 2009
27. ANTHONY A. MONTON, P
ENTWATER
,.............................. 2013
TERRENCE R. THOMAS, N
EWAYGO
,................................ 2009
28. WILLIAM M. FAGERMAN, C
ADILLAC
,............................... 2009
29. MICHELLE M. RICK, D
E
W
ITT
,......................................... 2011
8
RANDY L. TAHVONEN, E
LSIE
,......................................... 2009
30. LAURA BAIRD, O
KEMOS
,.................................................... 2013
WILLIAM E. COLLETTE, E
AST
L
ANSING
,......................... 2009
JOYCE DRAGANCHUK, L
ANSING
, .................................... 2011
JAMES R. GIDDINGS, W
ILLIAMSTON
, ................................ 2011
JANELLE A. LAWLESS, O
KEMOS
,..................................... 2009
PAULA J.M. MANDERFIELD, E
AST
L
ANSING
, .................. 2013
BEVERLEY NETTLES-NICKERSON, O
KEMOS
,.............. 2009
31. JAMES P.ADAIR,P
ORT
H
URON
,......................................... 2013
PETER E. DEEGAN, P
ORT
H
URON
, ................................... 2011
DANIEL J. KELLY, F
ORT
G
RATIOT
,..................................... 2009
32. ROY D. GOTHAM, B
ESSEMER
,............................................ 2009
33. RICHARD M. PAJTAS, C
HARLEVOIX
, .................................. 2009
34. MICHAEL J. BAUMGARTNER, P
RUDENVILLE
, ................. 2011
35. GERALD D. LOSTRACCO, O
WOSSO
, ................................. 2009
36. WILLIAM C. BUHL, P
AW
P
AW
, .......................................... 2013
PAUL E. HAMRE, L
AWTON
,................................................ 2009
37. ALLEN L. GARBRECHT, B
ATTLE
C
REEK
,.......................... 2011
JAMES C. KINGSLEY, A
LBION
, ......................................... 2009
8
From September 10, 2007.
ix
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
STEPHEN B. MILLER, B
ATTLE
C
REEK
,............................. 2011
CONRAD J. SINDT, H
OMER
, .............................................. 2013
38. JOSEPH A. COSTELLO, J
R
., M
ONROE
,............................. 2009
MICHAEL W. L
A
BEAU, M
ONROE
,....................................... 2013
MICHAEL A. WEIPERT, M
ONROE
, .................................... 2011
39. HARVEY A. KOSELKA, A
DRIAN
, ....................................... 2009
TIMOTHY P.PICKARD,A
DRIAN
,....................................... 2013
40. MICHAEL P. HIGGINS, L
APEER
, ....................................... 2009
NICK O. HOLOWKA, I
MLAY
C
ITY
, ..................................... 2011
41. MARY BROUILLETTE BARGLIND, I
RON
M
OUNTAIN
, ..... 2011
RICHARD J. CELELLO, I
RON
M
OUNTAIN
,.......................... 2009
42. MICHAEL J. BEALE, M
IDLAND
,......................................... 2009
9
JONATHAN E. LAUDERBACH, M
IDLAND
, ...................... 2013
43. MICHAEL E. DODGE, E
DWARDSBURG
, ............................... 2011
44. STANLEY J. LATREILLE, H
OWELL
, ................................. 2013
DAVID READER, H
OWELL
,................................................. 2011
45. PAUL E. STUTESMAN, T
HREE
R
IVERS
,............................. 2013
46. JANET M. ALLEN, G
AYLORD
, ............................................ 2011
DENNIS F. MURPHY, G
AYLORD
,........................................ 2009
47. STEPHEN T. DAVIS, E
SCANABA
, ........................................ 2011
48. WILLIAM A. BAILLARGEON, S
AUGATUCK
, ...................... 2009
GEORGE R. CORSIGLIA, A
LLEGAN
, ................................. 2011
49. SCOTT P. HILL-KENNEDY, B
IG
R
APIDS
,.......................... 2013
RONALD C. NICHOLS, B
IG
R
APIDS
, ................................. 2015
50. NICHOLAS J. LAMBROS, S
AULT
S
TE
.M
ARIE
, .................. 2013
51. RICHARD I. COOPER, L
UDINGTON
,................................... 2009
52. M. RICHARD KNOBLOCK, P
ORT
A
USTIN
,........................ 2009
53. SCOTT LEE PAVLICH, C
HEBOYGAN
, ................................. 2011
54. PATRICK REED JOSLYN, C
ARO
,...................................... 2013
55. THOMAS R. EVANS, B
EAVERTON
,...................................... 2009
ROY G. MIENK, G
LADWIN
, ................................................. 2013
56. THOMAS S. EVELAND, D
IMONDALE
,................................. 2013
CALVIN E. OSTERHAVEN, G
RAND
L
EDGE
,....................... 2009
57. CHARLES W. JOHNSON, P
ETOSKEY
,................................. 2013
9
From December 3, 2007.
x
DISTRICT JUDGES
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
1. MARK S. BRAUNLICH, M
ONROE
, ...................................... 2009
TERRENCE P. BRONSON, M
ONROE
, ................................. 2013
JACK VITALE, M
ONROE
, ..................................................... 2011
2A. NATALIA M. KOSELKA, A
DRIAN
, ...................................... 2011
JAMES E. SHERIDAN, A
DRIAN
, ......................................... 2009
2B. DONALD L. SANDERSON, H
ILLSDALE
, ............................. 2009
3A. DAVID T. COYLE, C
OLDWATER
,............................................ 2009
3B. JEFFREY C. MIDDLETON, T
HREE
R
IVERS
, ....................... 2009
WILLIAM D. WELTY, T
HREE
R
IVERS
,.................................. 2013
4. PAUL E. DEATS, E
DWARDSBURG
,.......................................... 2009
5. GARY J. BRUCE, S
T
.J
OSEPH
, ............................................. 2011
ANGELA PASULA, S
TEVENSVILLE
,....................................... 2009
SCOTT SCHOFIELD, N
ILES
,.............................................. 2009
LYNDA A. TOLEN, S
TEVENSVILLE
,....................................... 2013
DENNIS M. WILEY, S
T
.J
OSEPH
, ........................................ 2011
7. ARTHUR H. CLARKE, III, S
OUTH
H
AVEN
,......................... 2009
ROBERT T. HENTCHEL, P
AW
P
AW
,.................................. 2011
8-1. QUINN E. BENSON, K
ALAMAZOO
,....................................... 2009
ANNE E. BLATCHFORD, K
ALAMAZOO
, .............................. 2011
PAUL J. BRIDENSTINE, K
ALAMAZOO
,................................ 2013
CAROL A. HUSUM, K
ALAMAZOO
, ........................................ 2011
8-2. ROBERT C. KROPF, P
ORTAGE
,............................................ 2009
8-3. RICHARD A. SANTONI, K
ALAMAZOO
,................................. 2009
VINCENT C. WESTRA, K
ALAMAZOO
, .................................. 2011
10. SAMUEL I. DURHAM, J
R
., B
ATTLE
C
REEK
,........................ 2011
JOHN R. HOLMES, B
ATTLE
C
REEK
,.................................... 2013
FRANKLIN K. LINE, J
R
., M
ARSHALL
,................................. 2009
MARVIN RATNER, B
ATTLE
C
REEK
,..................................... 2009
12. JOSEPH S. FILIP,J
ACKSON
, ................................................ 2011
JAMES M. JUSTIN, J
ACKSON
,............................................. 2013
MICHAEL J. KLAEREN, J
ACKSON
,..................................... 2009
R. DARRYL MAZUR, J
ACKSON
, ........................................... 2009
14A. RICHARD E. CONLIN, A
NN
A
RBOR
,................................... 2009
J. CEDRIC SIMPSON, Y
PSILANTI
, ....................................... 2013
KIRK W. TABBEY, S
ALINE
,.................................................. 2011
14B. JOHN B. COLLINS, Y
PSILANTI
,........................................... 2009
15. JULIE CREAL, A
NN
A
RBOR
, ................................................ 2013
xi
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
ELIZABETH POLLARD HINES, A
NN
A
RBOR
, .................. 2011
ANN E. MATTSON, A
NN
A
RBOR
,........................................ 2009
16. ROBERT B. BRZEZINSKI, L
IVONIA
, .................................. 2009
KATHLEEN J. M
C
CANN, L
IVONIA
,..................................... 2013
17. KAREN KHALIL, R
EDFORD
, ................................................ 2011
CHARLOTTE L. WIRTH, R
EDFORD
,................................... 2009
18. C. CHARLES BOKOS, W
ESTLAND
, ...................................... 2009
SANDRA A. CICIRELLI, W
ESTLAND
,.................................. 2013
19. WILLIAM C. HULTGREN, D
EARBORN
,............................... 2011
MARK W. SOMERS, D
EARBORN
, .......................................... 2009
RICHARD WYGONIK, D
EARBORN
,...................................... 2013
20. MARK J. PLAWECKI, D
EARBORN
H
EIGHTS
,......................... 2009
DAVID TURFE, D
EARBORN
H
EIGHTS
, ................................... 2013
21. RICHARD L. HAMMER, J
R
., G
ARDEN
C
ITY
,....................... 2009
22. SYLVIA A. JAMES, I
NKSTER
, ............................................... 2013
23. GENO SALOMONE, T
AYLOR
, ............................................. 2013
WILLIAM J. SUTHERLAND, T
AYLOR
,............................... 2009
24. JOHN T. COURTRIGHT, A
LLEN
P
ARK
,............................... 2009
RICHARD A. PAGE, A
LLEN
P
ARK
, ...................................... 2011
25. DAVID A. BAJOREK, L
INCOLN
P
ARK
, ................................. 2009
DAVID J. ZELENAK, L
INCOLN
P
ARK
, .................................. 2011
26-1. RAYMOND A. CHARRON, R
IVER
R
OUGE
, .......................... 2009
26-2. MICHAEL F. CIUNGAN, E
CORSE
, ...................................... 2009
27. RANDY L. KALMBACH, W
YANDOTTE
, ................................ 2013
28. JAMES A. KANDREVAS, S
OUTHGATE
, ................................ 2009
29. LAURA REDMOND MACK, W
AYNE
, ................................. 2013
30. BRIGETTE R. OFFICER, H
IGHLAND
P
ARK
,........................ 2011
31. PAUL J. PARUK, H
AMTRAMCK
,............................................. 2009
32A. ROGER J. L
A
ROSE, H
ARPER
W
OODS
, ................................. 2009
33. JAMES KURT KERSTEN, T
RENTON
, ................................. 2009
MICHAEL K. McNALLY, T
RENTON
,.................................... 2013
EDWARD J. NYKIEL, G
ROSSE
I
LE
, ..................................... 2011
34. TINA BROOKS GREEN, N
EW
B
OSTON
,.............................. 2013
BRIAN A. OAKLEY, R
OMULUS
,............................................ 2011
DAVID M. PARROTT, B
ELLEVILLE
,...................................... 2009
35. MICHAEL J. GEROU, P
LYMOUTH
,....................................... 2011
RONALD W. LOWE, C
ANTON
, ............................................. 2013
JOHN E. M
AC
DONALD, N
ORTHVILLE
,................................. 2009
36. LYDIA NANCE ADAMS, D
ETROIT
, ..................................... 2011
ROBERTA C. ARCHER, D
ETROIT
, ...................................... 2013
MARYLIN E. ATKINS, D
ETROIT
, ........................................ 2013
JOSEPH N. BALTIMORE, D
ETROIT
, .................................. 2009
NANCY M
C
CAUGHAN BLOUNT, D
ETROIT
,...................... 2009
IZETTA F. BRIGHT, D
ETROIT
,............................................. 2011
ESTHER LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, D
ETROIT
, .............. 2008
1
1
From November 19, 2008.
xii
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
RUTH C. CARTER, D
ETROIT
,.............................................. 2011
DONALD COLEMAN, D
ETROIT
, ......................................... 2013
NANCY A. FARMER, D
ETROIT
,........................................... 2013
DEBORAH GERALDINE FORD, D
ETROIT
, ....................... 2011
RUTH ANN GARRETT, D
ETROIT
, ...................................... 2013
RONALD GILES, D
ETROIT
, ................................................. 2013
JIMMYLEE GRAY, D
ETROIT
,............................................... 2009
KATHERINE HANSEN, D
ETROIT
,...................................... 2011
BEVERLY J. HAYES-SIPES, D
ETROIT
,............................... 2009
PAULA G. HUMPHRIES, D
ETROIT
,.................................... 2011
PATRICIA L. JEFFERSON, D
ETROIT
, ................................ 2009
VANESA F. JONES-BRADLEY, D
ETROIT
, .......................... 2013
KENNETH J. KING, D
ETROIT
,............................................ 2009
DEBORAH L. LANGSTON, D
ETROIT
, ................................ 2013
WILLIE G. LIPSCOMB, J
R
., D
ETROIT
,................................ 2009
LEONIA J. LLOYD, D
ETROIT
,.............................................. 2011
MIRIAM B. MARTIN-CLARK, D
ETROIT
,............................ 2011
DONNA R. MILHOUSE, D
ETROIT
, ..................................... 2013
B. PENNIE MILLENDER, D
ETROIT
,.................................. 2011
CYLENTHIA L. MILLER, D
ETROIT
,................................... 2011
MARK A. RANDON, D
ETROIT
, ............................................ 2009
KEVIN F. ROBBINS, D
ETROIT
,............................................ 2013
DAVID S. ROBINSON, J
R
., D
ETROIT
,.................................. 2013
C. LORENE ROYSTER, D
ETROIT
, ...................................... 2013
37. JOHN M. CHMURA, W
ARREN
,............................................ 2013
JENNIFER FAUNCE, W
ARREN
,.......................................... 2009
DAWNN M. GRUENBURG, W
ARREN
, ................................ 2011
WALTER A. JAKUBOWSKI, J
R
., W
ARREN
, ........................ 2013
38. NORENE S. REDMOND, E
ASTPOINTE
, ............................... 2009
39. JOSEPH F. BOEDEKER, R
OSEVILLE
,.................................. 2009
MARCO A. SANTIA, F
RASER
, .............................................. 2013
CATHERINE B. STEENLAND, R
OSEVILLE
, ....................... 2011
40. MARK A. FRATARCANGELI, S
T
.C
LAIR
S
HORES
, .............. 2013
JOSEPH CRAIGEN OSTER, S
T
.C
LAIR
S
HORES
,................ 2009
41A. MICHAEL S. MACERONI, S
TERLING
H
EIGHTS
,................... 2009
DOUGLAS P. SHEPHERD, M
ACOMB
T
WP
.,......................... 2013
STEPHEN S. SIERAWSKI, S
TERLING
H
EIGHTS
,.................. 2011
KIMBERLEY ANNE WIEGAND, S
TERLING
H
EIGHTS
,........ 2013
41B. LINDA DAVIS, C
LINTON
T
WP
.,............................................. 2009
SEBASTIAN LUCIDO, C
LINTON
T
WP.
, ................................ 2013
SHEILA A. MILLER, C
LINTON
T
WP.
, .................................. 2011
42-1. DENIS R. L
E
DUC, W
ASHINGTON
, ......................................... 2009
42-2. PAUL CASSIDY, N
EW
B
ALTIMORE
,........................................ 2013
43. KEITH P. HUNT, F
ERNDALE
,................................................ 2013
JOSEPH LONGO, M
ADISON
H
EIGHTS
,.................................. 2011
ROBERT J. TURNER, F
ERNDALE
,....................................... 2009
44. TERRENCE H. BRENNAN, R
OYAL
O
AK
,........................... 2009
DANIEL SAWICKI, R
OYAL
O
AK
, ......................................... 2013
xiii
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
45A. WILLIAM R. SAUER, B
ERKLEY
,.......................................... 2009
45B. MICHELLE FRIEDMAN APPEL, H
UNTINGTON
W
OODS
,.... 2009
DAVID M. GUBOW, H
UNTINGTON
W
OODS
, ........................... 2009
46. SHEILA R. JOHNSON, S
OUTHFIELD
, .................................. 2009
SUSAN M. MOISEEV, S
OUTHFIELD
,..................................... 2013
WILLIAM J. RICHARDS, B
EVERLY
H
ILLS
, .......................... 2009
47. JAMES BRADY, F
ARMINGTON
H
ILLS
, .................................... 2009
MARLA E. PARKER, F
ARMINGTON
H
ILLS
,............................ 2011
48. MARC BARRON, B
IRMINGHAM, ......................................................................
2011
DIANE D’AGOSTINI, B
LOOMFIELD
H
ILLS
,........................... 2013
KIMBERLY SMALL, W
EST
B
LOOMFIELD
, ............................. 2009
50. MICHAEL C. MARTINEZ, P
ONTIAC
, .................................. 2009
PRESTON G. THOMAS, P
ONTIAC
, ..................................... 2011
CYNTHIA THOMAS WALKER, P
ONTIAC
, ......................... 2009
51. RICHARD D. KUHN, J
R
., W
ATERFORD
, ............................... 2009
PHYLLIS C. M
C
MILLEN, W
ATERFORD
,............................... 2013
52-1. ROBERT BONDY, M
ILFORD
,................................................ 2013
BRIAN W. M
AC
KENZIE, N
OVI
, ........................................... 2009
DENNIS N. POWERS, H
IGHLAND
, ...................................... 2013
52-2. DANA FORTINBERRY, C
LARKSTON
, ................................... 2009
KELLEY RENAE KOSTIN, C
LARKSTON
,............................. 2011
52-3. LISA L. ASADOORIAN, R
OCHESTER
H
ILLS
,......................... 2013
NANCY TOLWIN CARNIAK, R
OCHESTER
H
ILLS
,................ 2011
JULIE A. NICHOLSON, R
OCHESTER
H
ILLS
,........................ 2009
52-4. WILLIAM E. B OLLE, T
ROY
,............................................... 2009
DENNIS C. DRURY, T
ROY
, ................................................. 2013
MICHAEL A. MARTONE, T
ROY
, ....................................... 2011
53. THERESA M. BRENNAN, B
RIGHTON
,................................ 2009
L. SUZANNE GEDDIS, B
RIGHTON
, ..................................... 2011
CAROL SUE READER, H
OWELL
,........................................ 2013
54A. LOUISE ALDERSON, L
ANSING
,.......................................... 2011
PATRICK F. CHERRY, L
ANSING
, ......................................... 2009
FRANK J. D
E
LUCA, L
ANSING
,............................................. 2013
CHARLES F. FILICE, L
ANSING
, .......................................... 2009
AMY R. KRAUSE, L
ANSING
, ................................................ 2011
54B. RICHARD D. BALL, E
AST
L
ANSING
, .................................... 2011
DAVID L. JORDON, E
AST
L
ANSING
, .................................... 2013
55. ROSEMARIE ELIZABETH AQUILINA, E
AST
L
ANSING
,... 2011
THOMAS P.BOYD,O
KEMOS
,.............................................. 2009
56A. HARVEY J. HOFFMAN, G
RAND
L
EDGE
,.............................. 2011
JULIE H. REINCKE, E
ATON
R
APIDS
,.................................. 2009
56B. GARY R. HOLMAN, H
ASTINGS
, ........................................... 2013
57. STEPHEN E. SHERIDAN, S
AUGATUCK
,.............................. 2013
JOSEPH S. SKOCELAS, P
LAINWELL
, .................................. 2009
58. SUSAN A. JONAS, S
PRING
L
AKE
,........................................ 2009
RICHARD J. KLOOTE, G
RAND
H
AVEN
, .............................. 2013
xiv
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
BRADLEY S. KNOLL, H
OLLAND
,........................................ 2009
KENNETH D. POST, Z
EELAND
,........................................... 2011
59. PETER P. VERSLUIS, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, ................................ 2011
60. HAROLD F. CLOSZ, III, N
ORTH
M
USKEGON
, ....................... 2009
MARIA LADAS HOOPES, N
ORTH
M
USKEGON
,.................... 2009
MICHAEL JEFFREY NOLAN, T
WIN
L
AKE
,....................... 2013
ANDREW WIERENGO, M
USKEGON
, ................................... 2011
61. PATRICK C. BOWLER, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, .............................. 2009
DAVID J. BUTER, G
RAND
R
APIDS
,....................................... 2009
J. MICHAEL CHRISTENSEN, G
RAND
R
APIDS
,................... 2011
JEANINE NEMESI L
A
VILLE, G
RAND
R
APIDS
,................... 2013
BEN H. LOGAN, II, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, .................................... 2013
DONALD H. PASSENGER, G
RAND
R
APIDS
, ....................... 2011
62A. PABLO CORTES, W
YOMING
,................................................ 2009
STEVEN M. TIMMERS, G
RANDVILLE
,................................. 2013
62B. WILLIAM G. KELLY, K
ENTWOOD
,........................................ 2009
63-1. STEVEN R. SERVAAS, R
OCKFORD
, ..................................... 2009
63-2. SARA J. SMOLENSKI, E
AST
G
RAND
R
APIDS
,....................... 2009
64A. RAYMOND P.VOET,I
ONIA
, ................................................ 2009
64B. DONALD R. HEMINGSEN, S
HERIDAN
, .............................. 2009
65A. RICHARD D. WELLS, D
E
W
ITT
,.......................................... 2009
65B. JAMES B. MACKIE, A
LMA
,................................................. 2009
66. WARD L. CLARKSON, C
ORUNNA
, ....................................... 2013
TERRANCE P. DIGNAN, O
WOSSO
, ..................................... 2009
67-1. DAVID J. GOGGINS, F
LUSHING
,.......................................... 2009
67-2. JOHN L. CONOVER, D
AVISON
,........................................... 2009
RICHARD L. HUGHES, O
TISVILLE
, .................................... 2011
67-3. LARRY STECCO, F
LUSHING
,................................................ 2009
67-4. MARK C. M
C
CABE, F
ENTON
,............................................... 2009
CHRISTOPHER ODETTE, G
RAND
B
LANC
,......................... 2013
68. TRACY L. COLLIER-NIX, F
LINT
, ...................................... 2009
2
WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD, II, F
LINT
,................................ 2013
HERMAN MARABLE, J
R
., F
LINT
,...................................... 2013
NATHANIEL C. PERRY, III, F
LINT
, .................................. 2009
RAMONA M. ROBERTS, F
LINT
, ........................................ 2011
70-1. TERRY L. CLARK, S
AGINAW
,............................................... 2013
M. RANDALL JURRENS, S
AGINAW
,................................... 2011
M. T. THOMPSON, J
R
., S
AGINAW
, ....................................... 2009
70-2. CHRISTOPHER S. BOYD, S
AGINAW
,.................................. 2011
ALFRED T. FRANK, S
AGINAW
,............................................ 2009
KYLE HIGGS TARRANT, S
AGINAW
, ................................... 2013
71A. LAURA CHEGER BARNARD, M
ETAMORA
, ........................ 2009
JOHN T. CONNOLLY, L
APEER
,........................................... 2013
71B. KIM DAVID GLASPIE, C
ASS
C
ITY
,..................................... 2009
72. RICHARD A. COOLEY, J
R
., P
ORT
H
URON
, ......................... 2011
2
From December 10, 2007.
xv
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
JOHN D. MONAGHAN, P
ORT
H
URON
, ............................... 2013
CYNTHIA SIEMEN PLATZER, L
AKEPORT
, ....................... 2009
73A. JAMES A. MARCUS, A
PPLEGATE
,........................................ 2009
73B. DAVID B. HERRINGTON, B
AD
A
XE
, ................................. 2009
3
KARL E. KRAUS, B
AD
A
XE
,................................................ 2009
4
74. CRAIG D. ALSTON, B
AY
C
ITY
, ........................................... 2009
TIMOTHY J. KELLY, B
AY
C
ITY
,.......................................... 2013
SCOTT J. NEWCOMBE, B
AY
C
ITY
,.................................... 2011
75. STEVEN CARRAS, M
IDLAND
,.............................................. 2011
JOHN HENRY HART, M
IDLAND
,......................................... 2009
76. WILLIAM R. RUSH, M
T
.P
LEASANT
, ................................... 2009
77. SUSAN H. GRANT, B
IG
R
APIDS
, ......................................... 2009
78. H. KEVIN DRAKE, F
REMONT
,............................................. 2009
79. PETER J. WADEL, B
RANCH
, ............................................... 2009
80. GARY J. ALLEN, G
LADWIN
, ................................................. 2009
81. ALLEN C. YENIOR, S
TERLING
, ........................................... 2009
82. RICHARD E. NOBLE, W
EST
B
RANCH
, ................................ 2009
83. DANIEL L. SUTTON, P
RUDENVILLE
,................................... 2009
84. DAVID A. HOGG, H
ARRIETTA
, ............................................. 2009
85. BRENT V. DANIELSON, M
ANISTEE
,................................... 2009
86. JOHN D. FORESMAN, T
RAVERSE
C
ITY
, .............................. 2011
MICHAEL J. HALEY, T
RAVERSE
C
ITY
,................................. 2009
THOMAS J. PHILLIPS, T
RAVERSE
C
ITY
,............................. 2013
87. PATRICIA A. MORSE, G
AYLORD
,........................................ 2009
88. THEODORE O. JOHNSON, A
LPENA
,................................. 2009
89. HAROLD A. JOHNSON, J
R
., C
HEBOYGAN
,.......................... 2009
90. RICHARD W. MAY, C
HARLEVOIX
,.......................................... 2009
91. MICHAEL W. M
AC
DONALD, S
AULT
S
TE
.M
ARIE
,................ 2009
92. BETH GIB SON, N
EWBERRY
,................................................. 2009
93. MARK E. LUOMA, M
UNISING
,............................................. 2009
94. GLENN A. PEARSON, G
LADSTONE
, .................................... 2009
95A. JEFFREY G. BARSTOW, M
ENOMINEE
,................................ 2009
95B. MICHAEL J. KUSZ, I
RON
M
OUNTAIN
,.................................. 2009
96. DENNIS H. GIRARD, M
ARQUETTE
,..................................... 2011
ROGER W. KANGAS, I
SHPEMING
,........................................ 2009
97. PHILLIP L. KUKKONEN, H
ANCOCK
,................................. 2009
98. ANDERS B. TINGSTAD, J
R
., B
ESSEMER
,............................ 2009
3
From February 8, 2008.
4
To January 1, 2008.
xvi
MUNICIPAL JUDGES
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
J
ANUARY
1
OF
RUSSELL F. ETHRIDGE, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
,............................. 2012
CARL F. JARBOE, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
P
ARK
, ................................ 2010
LYNNE A. PIERCE, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
W
OODS
,........................... 2012
MATTHEW R. RUMORA, G
ROSSE
P
OINTE
F
ARMS
,.................. 2010
xvii
PROBATE JUDGES
T
ERM
E
XPIRES
C
OUNTY
J
ANUARY
1
OF
Alcona .......................LAURA A. FRAWLEY .............................. 2013
Alger/Schoolcraft......WILLIAM W. CARMODY ......................... 2013
Allegan ......................MICHAEL L. BUCK................................. 2013
Alpena .......................THOMAS J. L
A
CROSS ............................. 2013
Antrim.......................NORMAN R. HAYES................................ 2013
Arenac.......................JACK WILLIAM SCULLY........................ 2013
Baraga.......................TIMOTHY S. BRENNAN ........................ 2013
Barry .........................WILLIAM M. DOHERTY......................... 2013
Bay ............................KAREN TIGHE ........................................ 2013
Benzie........................NANCY A. KIDA....................................... 2013
Berrien ......................MABEL JOHNSON MAYFIELD............. 2009
Berrien ......................THOMAS E. NELSON............................. 2013
Branch.......................FREDERICK L. WOOD ........................... 2013
Calhoun.....................PHILLIP E. HARTER .............................. 2011
Calhoun.....................GARY K. REED......................................... 2013
Cass ...........................SUSAN L. DOBRICH ............................... 2013
Cheboygan ................ROBERT JOHN BUTTS.......................... 2013
Chippewa ..................LOWELL R. ULRICH .............................. 2013
Clare/Gladwin...........THOMAS P. McLAUGHLIN .................... 2013
Clinton ......................LISA SULLIVAN ....................................... 2013
Crawford ...................MONTE BURMEISTER........................... 2013
Delta..........................ROBERT E. GOEBEL, J
R
. ....................... 2013
Dickinson..................THOMAS D. SLAGLE.............................. 2013
Eaton.........................MICHAEL F. SKINNER........................... 2013
Emmet/Charlevoix ...FREDERICK R. MULHAUSER .............. 2013
Genesee.....................JENNIE E. BARKEY ............................... 2009
Genesee.....................ROBERT E. WEISS.................................. 2013
Gogebic......................JOEL L. MASSIE...................................... 2013
Grand Traverse........DAVID L. STOWE .................................... 2013
Gratiot.......................JACK T. ARNOLD .................................... 2013
Hillsdale....................MICHAEL E. NYE.................................... 2013
Houghton..................CHARLES R. GOODMAN ....................... 2013
xviii
Huron........................DAVID L. CLABUESCH .......................... 2013
Ingham......................R. GEORGE ECONOMY.......................... 2013
Ingham......................RICHARD JOSEPH GARCIA.................. 2009
Ionia ..........................ROBERT SYKES, J
R
................................. 2013
Iosco ..........................JOHN D. HAMILTON.............................. 2013
Iron............................C. JOSEPH SCHWEDLER ...................... 2013
Isabella......................WILLIAM T. ERVIN................................. 2013
Jackson .....................DIANE M. RAPPLEYE ............................ 2013
Kalamazoo ................CURTIS J. BELL, J
R
................................. 2013
Kalamazoo ................PATRICIA N. CONLON........................... 2009
Kalamazoo ................DONALD R. HALSTEAD ........................ 2011
Kalkaska ...................LYNNE MARIE BUDAY .......................... 2013
Kent...........................NANARUTH H. CARPENTER ............... 2011
Kent...........................PATRICIA D. GARDNER......................... 2013
Kent...........................G. PATRICK HILLARY ............................ 2013
Kent...........................DAVID M. MURKOWSKI ........................ 2009
Keweenaw.................JAMES G. JAASKELAINEN ................... 2013
Lake...........................MARK S. WICKENS................................. 2013
Lapeer .......................JUSTUS C. SCOTT .................................. 2013
Leelanau ...................JOSEPH E. DEEGAN .............................. 2013
Lenawee ....................MARGARET MURRAY-SCHOLZ NOE... 2013
Livingston.................CAROL HACKETT GARAGIOLA........... 2013
Luce/Mackinac..........W. CLAYTON GRAHAM .......................... 2013
Macomb.....................KATHRYN A. GEORGE........................... 2009
Macomb.....................PAMELA GILBERT O’SULLIVAN ......... 2013
Manistee....................THOMAS N. BRUNNER.......................... 2013
Marquette .................MICHAEL J. ANDEREGG....................... 2013
Mason........................MARK D. RAVEN ..................................... 2013
Mecosta/Osceola .......LaVAIL E. HULL...................................... 2013
Menominee ...............WILLIAM A. HUPY.................................. 2013
Midland.....................DORENE S. ALLEN................................. 2013
Missaukee .................CHARLES R. PARSONS .......................... 2013
Monroe......................JOHN A. HOHMAN, J
R
. .......................... 2013
Monroe......................PAMELA A. MOSKWA............................. 2009
Montcalm..................CHARLES W. SIMON, III ........................ 2013
Montmorency............JOHN E. FITZGERALD .......................... 2013
Muskegon..................NEIL G. MULLALLY ............................... 2011
Muskegon..................GREGORY C. PITTMAN ......................... 2013
Newaygo....................GRAYDON W. DIMKOFF ........................ 2013
Oakland.....................BARRY M. GRANT................................... 2009
Oakland.....................LINDA S. HALLMARK ............................ 2013
Oakland.....................EUGENE ARTHUR MOORE .................. 2011
Oakland.....................ELIZABETH M. PEZZETTI .................... 2011
Oceana ......................BRADLEY G. LAMBRIX .......................... 2013
Ogemaw ....................SHANA A. LAMBOURN.......................... 2013
xix
Ontonagon ................JOSEPH D. ZELEZNIK ........................... 2013
Oscoda.......................KATHRYN JOAN ROOT ......................... 2013
Otsego .......................MICHAEL K. COOPER ........................... 2013
Ottawa ......................MARK A. FEYEN ..................................... 2013
Presque Isle..............DONALD J. McLENNAN......................... 2013
Roscommon ..............DOUGLAS C. DOSSON ........................... 2013
Saginaw.....................FAYE M. HARRISON............................... 2009
Saginaw.....................PATRICK J. M
C
GRAW.............................. 2013
St. Clair.....................ELWOOD L. BROWN............................... 2009
St. Clair.....................JOHN TOMLINSON ................................ 2013
St. Joseph .................THOMAS E. SHUMAKER....................... 2013
Sanilac.......................R. TERRY MALTBY ................................. 2013
Shiawassee................JAMES R. CLATTERBAUGH ................. 2013
Tuscola......................W. WALLACE KENT, J
R
........................... 2013
Van Buren.................FRANK D. WILLIS................................... 2013
Washtenaw................NANCY CORNELIA FRANCIS............... 2009
Washtenaw................DARLENE A. O’BRIEN........................... 2013
Wayne........................JUNE E. BLACKWELL-HATCHER ....... 2013
Wayne........................FREDDIE G. BURTON, J
R
. ..................... 2013
Wayne........................JUDY A. HARTSFIELD........................... 2009
Wayne........................MILTON L. MACK, J
R
. ............................ 2011
Wayne........................CATHIE B. MAHER................................. 2011
Wayne........................MARTIN T. MAHER................................. 2009
Wayne........................DAVID J. SZYMANSKI ............................ 2009
Wayne........................FRANK S. SZYMANSKI .......................... 2013
Wexford .....................KENNETH L. TACOMA.......................... 2013
xx
JUDICIAL CIRCUITS
County Seat Circuit
Alcona....................Harrisville ......... 26
Alger......................Munising ........... 11
Allegan ..................Allegan............... 48
Alpena ...................Alpena................ 26
Antrim...................Bellaire .............. 13
Arenac ...................Standish ............ 34
Baraga ...................L’Anse................ 12
Barry .....................Hastings ............ 5
Bay.........................Bay City............. 18
Benzie....................Beulah ............... 19
Berrien ..................St. Joseph.......... 2
Branch...................Coldwater .......... 15
Calhoun.................Marshall, Battle
Creek................ 37
Cass .......................Cassopolis.......... 43
Charlevoix.............Charlevoix ......... 33
Cheboygan ............Cheboygan......... 53
Chippewa ..............Sault Ste. Marie. 50
Clare......................Harrison ............ 55
Clinton ..................St. Johns............ 29
Crawford ...............Grayling............. 46
Delta......................Escanaba ........... 47
Dickinson ..............Iron Mountain .. 41
Eaton.....................Charlotte ........... 5
Emmet ...................Petoskey ............ 33
Genesee .................Flint................... 7
Gladwin.................Gladwin ............. 55
Gogebic..................Bessemer ........... 32
Grand Traverse ....Traverse City .... 13
Gratiot...................Ithaca................. 29
Hillsdale ................Hillsdale ............ 1
Houghton ..............Houghton .......... 12
Huron....................Bad Axe ............. 52
Ingham..................Mason, Lansing. 30
Ionia ......................Ionia................... 8
Iosco ......................Tawas City ........ 23
Iron........................Crystal Falls...... 41
Isabella..................Mount Pleasant. 21
Jackson..................Jackson.............. 4
Kalamazoo ............Kalamazoo......... 9
Kalkaska ...............Kalkaska............ 46
Kent.......................Grand Rapids.... 17
Keweenaw.............Eagle River........ 12
County Seat Circuit
Lake ................Baldwin ................. 51
Lapeer.............Lapeer ................... 40
Leelanau .........Leland ................... 13
Lenawee..........Adrian ................... 39
Livingston.......Howell ................... 44
Luce.................Newberry .............. 11
Mackinac.........St. Ignace .............. 50
Macomb...........Mount Clemens .... 16
Manistee .........Manistee................ 19
Marquette.......Marquette ............. 25
Mason..............Ludington ............. 51
Mecosta...........Big Rapids............. 49
Menominee .....Menominee ........... 41
Midland...........Midland ................. 42
Missaukee .......Lake City .............. 28
Monroe............Monroe .................. 38
Montcalm........Stanton.................. 8
Montmorency .Atlanta .................. 26
Muskegon .......Muskegon.............. 14
Newaygo .........White Cloud.......... 27
Oakland ..........Pontiac .................. 6
Oceana ............Hart....................... 27
Ogemaw ..........West Branch.......... 34
Ontonagon......Ontonagon ............ 32
Osceola............Reed City .............. 49
Oscoda.............Mio......................... 23
Otsego .............Gaylord.................. 46
Ottawa ............Grand Haven ........ 20
Presque Isle....Rogers City ........... 26
Roscommon ....Roscommon........... 34
Saginaw...........Saginaw................. 10
St. Clair ..........Port Huron ........... 31
St. Joseph .......Centreville............. 45
Sanilac.............Sandusky ............... 24
Schoolcraft......Manistique ............ 11
Shiawassee......Corunna ................ 35
Tuscola............Caro....................... 54
Van Buren.......Paw Paw................ 36
Washtenaw......Ann Arbor............. 22
Wayne..............Detroit................... 3
Wexford...........Cadillac.................. 28
xxi
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
12 C
ASES
;25O
PINIONS
; 2044 A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
FOR
L
EAVE TO
A
PPEAL
G
RANTED OR
D
ENIED
(Lines set in small type refer to actions on application for leave
to appeal from the Court of Appeals starting at page 851, and to
special orders in other matters starting at page 1201.)
P
AGE
A
A & L Parts, Inc, Chapin v ................................................... 879
AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, Inc, Grant v ............................... 904
AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, Allison v ......................................... 894
ASE Industries, Inc, Rodriguez v ...................... 908, 1108, 1159
Aaron, People v ...................................................................... 1134
Abay v DaimlerChrysler Corp .............................................. 1107
Abby, People v ........................................................................ 1003
Abdellatif, People v ................................................................ 1010
Abraham, People v ................................................................ 1007
Aceval, People v ..................................................................... 1108
Acosta, People v ..................................................................... 925
Ad Hoc Membership Group v Yankee Air Force, Inc ......... 1033
Adams v Adams ..................................................................... 1111
Adams, People v ..................................................................... 861
Adamus v Bigger ................................................................... 1194
Adkison, Need, Green & Allen, PLLC, Kelly Trust v ........ 909
Aeropostale, Inc, Bromley v .................................................. 924
Aguirre, People v ................................................................... 1186
Ajluni, Dykema Gossett, PLLC v ......................................... 913
Akans, People v ...................................................................... 926
Al-Khalil, People v ................................................................. 890
Al-Mayahi, In re ..................................................................... 1031
xxiii
P
AGE
Alber v Big Rapids Automotive, Inc .................................... 886
Albert, People v ..................................................................... 1188
Albion Memory Gardens, Cemetery Comm’r v ................... 1142
Alexander, People v (Michael) ...................................... 920, 1034
Alexander, People v (Teddy) ................................................. 855
Alfiero, People v ..................................................................... 862
Alford, People v ..................................................................... 1009
Alfrey, People v ...................................................................... 1012
Alibri, Dep’t of Transportation v ......................................... 863
Allen, Kaiser v ..................................................... 31
Allen, People v (Herbert) ...................................................... 1191
Allen, People v (Norman) ..................................................... 859
Allen, People v (Roxie) .......................................................... 958
Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP ......................................... 894
Allstate Ins Co, Burris v .............................................. 911, 1081
Allstate Ins Co, Miller v ........................................................ 938
Allstate Ins Co, Romeo v ...................................................... 859
Allstate Ins Co v Vaughan .................................................... 910
Alpena Gen Hosp, Boik v ...................................................... 1001
Alpena Surgical Assoc, PLLC, Ballard v ............................. 924
Alpine Twp, Pulte Land Co, LLC v ..................................... 1144
Alspaugh, People v ................................................................ 919
Altman, People v ................................................................... 1074
Alton v Alton ......................................................................... 1138
Alton, Ameriquest Mortgage Co v ........................................ 944
Altoonian, People v ................................................................ 954
Alumi-Bunk, Inc, Gen Motors Corp v .................................. 1193
Amaro, People v .......................................................... 925, 1078
Ambrose, People v .................................................... 1005, 1140
American Axle & Mfg, Inc v Murdock ................................. 864
American Axle & Mfg of Michigan, Inc, Idolski v .............. 859
American Family Ass’n of Michigan v Michigan State
Univ Bd of Trustees ......................................................... 918
Ameriquest Mortgage Co v Alton ......................................... 944
Amerisure, Inc v Brennan .................................................... 883
Ameritech Corp, Inc, Brown v .............................................. 863
Ammex, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury .......................................... 883
Amon v Botsford Gen Hosp .................................................. 978
Amos, People v ....................................................................... 852
xxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Amway Asia Pacific Ltd, Metro v ......................................... 868
Anderson, People v (Andy) ................................................... 1189
Anderson, People v (Anthony) .............................................. 865
Anderson, People v (Brian) ................................................... 959
Anderson, People v (Eric) ..................................................... 959
Anderson, People v (Harold) ................................................ 1074
Anderson, People v (Robert) ................................................. 955
Anderson, People v (Ronnie) ................................................ 954
Anderson v Senger ................................................................ 957
Andrews, People v (Dean) ..................................................... 1003
Andrews, People v (Ravis) .................................................... 928
Andrews, People v (Robert) .................................................. 1033
Andrews, People v (Stephen) ................................................ 891
Andris v Miller (Attorney Fees, In re) ................................. 1059
Ann Arbor Charter Twp, Shepherd Montessori Ctr
Milan v ............................................................................... 1143
Ann Arbor (City of), Carter v ............................................... 975
Anonymous Judge v Judicial Tenure Comm, In re ............ 1217
Ansari v Gold ......................................................................... 877
Anspaugh v Imlay Twp ......................................................... 964
Antonini, Short v ................................................................... 991
Apostolou, McClendon v ....................................................... 977
Appenzeller, People v ............................................................ 1147
Applewhite, People v ............................................................. 1010
Aramark Services Mgt of Michigan, Inc,
Ferrari v ............................................................................ 867
Archer, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Nierescher) ...... 994
Ardito, People v ..................................................................... 1013
Armada Twp v Marah ........................................................... 910
Armstrong, People v .............................................................. 952
Arnold, People v ..................................................................... 1075
Arrahmaan, People v ............................................................. 1009
Arsenault v Munson Med Ctr ............................................... 1137
Arthur B Myr Industries, Inc, Gee v .......................... 868, 1154
Arzola, People v ..................................................................... 1075
Ascherl, Robertson v ............................................................. 851
Ashford, People v ................................................................... 1135
Aslani, People v ..................................................................... 1190
Asplundh Tree Expert Co, Conn v ....................................... 864
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxv
P
AGE
Ata, People v .......................................................................... 1186
Atkins, People v ..................................................................... 859
Attorney Fees, In re (Andris v Miller) ................................. 1059
Attorney Fees, In re (Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n ) ....... 1059
Attorney General v Philip Morris USA ............................... 990
Attorney Grievance Comm, Fish v ....................................... 1034
Atwood, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Keast) ............. 862
Aucker Assoc (Eldon L), Wilson v ........................................ 1147
Aukeman v Aukeman ............................................................ 924
Aurich, People v ..................................................................... 959
Auslander v Chernick .................................................. 910, 1140
Austin, People v ..................................................................... 1011
Auto Club Group Ins Co, Michigan Rehabilitation Clinic,
Inc, PC v ..................................................................... 913, 914
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, Dumas v (In re Attorney Fees) ........ 1059
Auto-Owners Ins Co, Dale Osburn, Inc v ............................ 921
Auto-Owners Ins Co, Dobbelaere v ...................................... 1169
Auto Owners Ins Co, Jaakkola v .......................................... 1033
Auto Sports Unlimited, Inc, Kammeraad v ........................ 864
Auto Zone, Inc, Miller v ........................................................ 859
Ave Maria College, Ernsting v ............................................. 985
Aylward, People v .................................................................. 945
Azar v Azar ............................................................................ 858
B
BMJ Engineers & Surveyors, Inc v Nature’s Way
Properties, LLC ................................................................ 923
Backus, People v .................................................................... 1002
Bagdasarian, City of Detroit v .............................................. 853
Bailey v Khalid ...................................................................... 877
Bailey, People v (Antonio) ..................................................... 886
Bailey, People v (Mark) ......................................................... 1074
Bailey, People v (William) ..................................................... 925
Bailey v Pornpichit ........................................................ 909, 1034
Baker v HBI ........................................................................... 1008
Baker, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Gach) ................. 1072
Baker, People v (Altoney) ...................................................... 1012
Baker, People v (Curtis) ........................................................ 1189
Baker, People v (Lawrence, Jr) ............................................. 1138
xxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Baker, People v (Leonard) ..................................................... 1189
Baker, People v (Michael) ..................................................... 922
Baldwin, People v .................................................................. 901
Baldwin Trust, In re (Shoaff v Woods) ....................... 915, 1192
Bales, People v ....................................................................... 928
Ballard v Alpena Surgical Assoc, PLLC .............................. 924
Ballard, People v (Darryl) ..................................................... 1074
Ballard, People v (Franklin) ................................................. 890
Bancroft, Crehan v ................................................................ 1137
Banks v Genovese .................................................................. 1074
Banks, People v (Jeremy) ..................................................... 925
Banks, People v (Kena) ......................................................... 1009
Bankston, People v ................................................................ 1013
Baraga Circuit Court, Delene v ............................................ 898
Barlow, People v ..................................................................... 1138
Barnard, People v ............................................................ 860, 961
Barnes, In re .......................................................................... 1034
Barnes v Kircher ................................................................... 910
Barnes, People v (Jeffery) ..................................................... 1134
Barnes, People v (Patrick) .................................................... 1075
Barnwell v City of Petoskey ................................................. 958
Baron, Lenawee Co v ............................................................ 911
Barrett, Hoffman v ................................................................ 981
Barrett, People v .................................................. 125
Barton Malow Co, Beavers v ................................................ 1049
Barton Malow Co, Latham v .............................. 105
Barton Malow Co, W J O’Neil Co v ..................................... 991
Basat, People v ....................................................................... 1186
Basquin v Menken ................................................................. 991
Bass, People v (Amor) ........................................................... 1004
Bass, People v (Gerald) ......................................................... 945
Bastian Bros, Inc, Coates v ................................................... 1193
Bates, People v ....................................................................... 854
Baublitz v Ingham Circuit Judge ......................................... 1011
Baumbach, Byzewski v .......................................................... 944
Baumer, People v ................................................................... 856
Bavas, Tomecek v .................................................................. 1195
Bays, People v ........................................................................ 860
Bayside Mall, LLC, Flagstar Bank, FSB v .......................... 1034
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxvii
P
AGE
Bazzetta v Dep’t of Corrections ..................................... 857, 961
Bd of Trustees of Michigan State Univ v Court of Claims
Judge ................................................................................. 1052
Bd of Water & Light, Pandy v .............................................. 899
Beacham, People v ................................................................. 862
Beavers v Barton Malow Co ................................................. 1049
Beck v TGM Broadband Cable Services .............................. 1187
Bedford Pub Schools, Rudd v ............................................... 867
Bediako, Wood v .................................................................... 887
Bednarsh, Cargas v ............................................................... 920
Beer, People v ......................................................................... 1077
Belcher, People v .................................................................... 890
Belcourt, People v .................................................................. 854
Bell, In re (King v Dep’t of Human Services) ..................... 894
Bell, People v (Anthony) ....................................................... 1060
Bell, People v (Charles) ......................................................... 1013
Bell, People v (Harold) .......................................................... 947
Bell, People v (James) ........................................................... 1190
Bell, People v (Keith) ............................................................ 893
Bell, People v (Stevenson) ..................................................... 1012
Bell, People v (Tyrone) .......................................................... 951
Bellamy, People v ................................................................... 1188
Bellville v Michigan Court of Appeals ................................. 1220
Belser, People v ...................................................................... 1137
Bennett v Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc .................................... 1105
Bennett, Elezovic v ................................................................ 1001
Bennett v Lake Michigan Packaging Products, Inc ........... 1135
Bennett, People v ................................................................... 1118
Bentley, People v .................................................................... 1076
Berg, People v ........................................................................ 863
Bergman, Spires v ................................................................. 948
Bermudez v Capital Area Transportation Auth ................. 1147
Bernaiche, People v ............................................................... 1046
Bernard, People v .................................................................. 920
Bernhardt, Burgess v ................................................... 956, 1078
Bero Motors, Inc v Gen Motors Corp ..................... 1053, 1192
Berrien Co, Herman v ........................................................... 961
Berry, People v (Dwayne) ...................................................... 889
Berry, People v (Tony) ........................................................... 891
xxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Beus v Broad, Vogt & Conant, Inc ....................................... 863
Beverly, People v .................................................................... 851
Big Rapids Automotive, Inc, Alber v ................................... 886
Bigger, Adamus v ................................................................... 1194
Binkowski, Kaseta v .............................................................. 939
Binyard, People v ................................................................... 857
Bird, People v ......................................................................... 1011
Bireta, Fairview Builders, Inc v ........................................... 954
Birmingham Pub Schools, Zangkas v .................................. 1136
Bit Mat Products of Michigan, Inc, Fire & Ice
Mechanical, Inc v .............................................................. 1076
Blackston, People v ............................................................... 929
Blanks, People v ............................................................ 914, 1006
Bloomfield Twp Pub Library, Goldstone v .......................... 1201
Blosser, People v .................................................................... 861
Blue Care Network, Ross v ................................. 153
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, Newman v ............ 855
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Nuckols v .................. 864
Blunt, People v ...................................................................... 1010
Boik v Alpena Gen Hosp ....................................................... 1001
Boldon’s Body Shop, LLC, Williams v ................................. 990
Boler, People v ....................................................................... 1003
Bologna v Pevarnek ............................................................... 1138
Bond, People v (Andre) ......................................................... 1114
Bond, People v (Kevin) .......................................................... 1138
Bonior, People v ..................................................................... 1032
Bonnell, People v ................................................................... 957
Bono, Newsome v .................................................................. 852
Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr ...................................................... 908
Booth, People v ...................................................................... 1009
Borbolla Constr & Concrete Supply, Inc,
Simpson v .......................................................................... 964
Borgess Med Ctr, Boodt v ..................................................... 908
Borghese, In re (Borghese v Michigan Children’s
Institute) .................................................................. 976, 1079
Borgne, People v .................................................................... 1193
Bortz Health Care Facilities, Inc, Pappas v ........................ 907
Boshaw, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Boshaw) .......... 935
Boss, People v ........................................................................ 1008
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxix
P
AGE
Botello, People v .................................................................... 1138
Botsford Continuing Care Corp, Harris v ........................... 953
Botsford Gen Hosp, Amon v ................................................. 978
Botsford Gen Hosp, Fowler v ............................................... 1007
Botsford Gen Hosp, Kimpson v ............................................ 1031
Bourne, People v .................................................................... 950
Bowman, People v ................................................................. 1138
Boxley, People v ..................................................................... 1189
Brackett v Focus Hope .......................................................... 1147
Braddock, People v ................................................................ 925
Bradley, People v .................................................................... 861
Bradshaw v West Shore Med Ctr ......................................... 1001
Bramlage, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc v .................... 935
Branch, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Scott) ............... 935
Brand, People v ...................................................................... 1075
Brandow, People v ................................................................. 1075
Branford Towne Houses Coop v City of Taylor .................. 858
Brantley, People v .................................................................. 1033
Braswell, People v ................................................................. 923
Braverman v Garden City Hosp ................................. 896, 1159
Brennan, Amerisure, Inc v ................................................... 883
Brewer, People v .................................................................... 1013
Bridges, People v ................................................................... 858
Bridgman Pub Schools, Lewis v ................................. 1000, 1140
Briggs v Oakland Co ............................................................. 1006
Briggs, People v ..................................................................... 1034
Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub Schools ................. 949
Brighton Twp, Red Ribbon Properties, LLC, v .................. 1107
Brinker, People v ................................................................... 925
Brinkley v Brinkley ............................................................... 1135
Broad, Vogt & Conant, Inc, Beus v ...................................... 863
Broadnax, People v ................................................................ 859
Brodie, People v ..................................................................... 893
Brogue, In re ......................................................................... 1220
Bromley v Aeropostale, Inc ................................................... 924
Broniak v Clendening ........................................................... 892
Brooks, People v (Carl) ......................................................... 1033
Brooks, People v (Jeremiah) ................................................. 951
Brooks, People v (Julian) ...................................................... 890
xxx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Brookshire v Patel ................................................................. 980
Brown v Ameritech Corp, Inc ............................................... 863
Brown, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Nickson) ........... 1107
Brown, Johnson v (In re Zimmerman) ................................ 1143
Brown, People v (Aaron) ....................................................... 1135
Brown, People v (Aaron Todd) ............................................. 853
Brown, People v (Cornelius) ................................................. 950
Brown, People v (Dane) ........................................................ 1076
Brown, People v (Grady) ....................................................... 1013
Brown, People v (Kenneth) ................................................... 1187
Brown, People v (Kevin) ....................................................... 1077
Brown, People v (Lavonn) .................................................... 855
Brown, People v (Mark) ........................................................ 1077
Brown, People v (Michael) .................................................... 959
Brown, People v (Wayne) ...................................................... 945
Brown, Warren v ................................................................... 858
Brown, Xiaoxin v ................................................................... 914
Brown-Bey v Dep’t of Corrections ....................................... 1185
Brownlow, People v ................................................................ 919
Brownrigg, People v .............................................................. 1169
Broyles, People v ............................................................. 857, 953
Bryant, People v .................................................................... 926
Buchan, People v ................................................................... 1139
Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, Trentadue v ........ 1202
Buckner Estate v City of Lansing ........................................ 895
Budget Rent-A-Car Sys, Inc, v City of Detroit ................... 1194
Buie, People v ........................................................................ 1187
Buley, People v ....................................................................... 1189
Burch, People v ...................................................................... 886
Burger, People v ..................................................................... 921
Burgess v Bernhardt .................................................... 956, 1078
Burk, People v ....................................................................... 1075
Burke, People v ............................................................... 889, 961
Burkes, People v .................................................................... 861
Burks, People v ...................................................................... 1032
Burnett, People v (Germain) ................................................ 1146
Burnett, People v (Shawn) .................................................... 1003
Burns Int’l Security Services Corp, Delay v ....................... 856
Burrel, People v ..................................................................... 856
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxxi
P
AGE
Burrell, People v .................................................................... 1077
Burris v Allstate Ins Co ............................................... 911, 1081
Burton v Helen Newberry Joy Hosp ................................... 892
Bushey, People v .................................................................... 1006
Butcher, Grievance Administrator v .................................... 1212
Butler, People v ...................................................................... 888
Butz, People v (Frank) ................................................ 896, 1074
Byrd, People v ........................................................................ 920
Byzewski v Baumbach ........................................................... 944
C
CARS Protection Plus, Inc, Van Eman v ............................. 892
Cadarette, People v ................................................................ 900
Cadle Co II, Inc v PM Group, Inc ........................................ 1135
Cage, People v ........................................................................ 1137
Calbert, People v .................................................................... 1146
Caldwell v Waste Mgt of Michigan ...................................... 1032
Calhoun, People v .................................................................. 891
Calvin, People v ..................................................................... 1190
Camarda v City of Eaton Rapids ......................................... 853
Cambridge Investment Group, Inc, Caruso v ..................... 1136
Camp, People v ...................................................................... 1022
Cannon, People v ................................................................... 859
Capital Area Transportation Auth, Bermudez v ................ 1147
Capital Area Transportation Auth, Fundunburks v .......... 1060
Capital Area Transportation Auth, Smith v ....................... 1194
Capitol City Lodge No 141 of the Fraternal Order of
Police, Ingham Co v .......................................................... 990
Caprathe v Judges Retirement Bd ....................................... 1036
Carethers, People v ............................................................... 959
Cargas v Bednarsh ................................................................ 920
Carico, People v ........................................................... 864, 1185
Carless v Parole Bd ............................................................... 1188
Carlton, People v ................................................................... 952
Carlton Pharmacy, LLC, Maness v ...................................... 1100
Carmichael, People v ............................................................. 891
Caroen, People v .................................................................... 1002
Carpenter, People v ............................................................... 1137
Carroll, People v .................................................................... 1009
xxxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Carson City Hosp, Reeves v ................................................. 1056
Carson City Hosp, Stoneman v ............................................ 917
Carswell, People v .................................................................. 1185
Carter v City of Ann Arbor .................................................. 975
Carter v H&MDemolition Co ............................................ 861
Carter v Ingham Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd ..... 892
Carter, People v (Darius) ...................................................... 926
Carter, People v (Kewayne) .................................................. 854
Carter, People v (Steven) .................................... 938, 1011, 1063
Caruso v Cambridge Investment Group, Inc ...................... 1136
Cascade Charter Twp, VanFarowe v .................................... 1168
Caschera, People v ................................................................. 886
Castaneda, People v ............................................................... 922
Castle, People v ...................................................................... 923
Catanzaro, People v ............................................................... 1075
Cateraid, Inc, Donahue v ...................................................... 927
Cathron, People v ......................................................... 958, 1079
Cauvin, People v .................................................................... 922
Ceasor, People v ..................................................................... 926
Celley v Stevens ..................................................................... 927
Cemetery Comm’r v Albion Memory Gardens .................... 1142
Centerline (City of), Koulta v ............................................... 932
Centerline Piping, Inc, Morris Pumps v ............................. 928
Centerline Piping, Inc, R Vander Lind & Son, Inc v .......... 928
Cervi, People v ....................................................................... 1002
Chahine, People v .................................................................. 1168
Chambless, People v .............................................................. 1044
Champion, People v ............................................................... 1190
ChapinvA&LParts, Inc .................................................... 879
Chapman, People v (Aaron) .................................................. 958
Chapman, People v (Anthony) .............................................. 955
Chapman v Phil’s Co Line Service, Inc ............................... 901
Charvat, People v .................................................................. 1191
Cheatham, People v ............................................................... 1011
Cheese, People v .................................................................... 1190
Chernick, Auslander v ................................................. 910, 1140
Cherry, People v ..................................................................... 1186
Children’s Hosp of Michigan, Long v .................................. 899
Childs, People v ..................................................................... 951
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxxiii
P
AGE
Chittick, People v .................................................................. 928
Choyce, People v .................................................................... 926
Christ, People v ..................................................................... 1186
Christian-Bates, People v ...................................................... 1015
Christle, People v ................................................................... 1005
Church, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Church)
No. 1 .................................................................................. 1165
Church, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Church)
No. 2 .................................................................................. 1184
Cieslinski, People v ................................................................ 955
Cintron, People v ................................................................... 1189
Citifinancial Mortgage Co, LLC v Comerica Bank ............. 944
Citizens Ins Co, Drake v ....................................................... 918
City of Ann Arbor, Carter v .................................................. 975
City of Centerline, Koulta v ................................................. 932
City of Dearborn, Detroit Lions, Inc v ................................ 893
City of Dearborn, McGuire v ................................................ 911
City of Detroit v Bagdasarian ............................................... 853
City of Detroit, Budget Rent-A-Car Sys, Inc, v .................. 1194
City of Detroit, Detroit Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF, Local
344 v .................................................................................. 880
City of Detroit, Detroit Free Press, Inc v ........................... 1079
City of Detroit, HRT Enterprises v ..................................... 1134
City of Detroit, Ligon v ......................................................... 1009
City of Detroit v 17526 Riopelle ........................................... 960
City of Detroit v Thomas ...................................................... 1076
City of Detroit Downtown Dev Auth v US Outdoor
Advertising, Inc ................................................................ 991
City of Eaton Rapids, Camarda v ........................................ 853
City of Flint, Complete Auto & Truck Parts, Inc v ............ 954
City of Grand Rapids v Grand Rapids Employees
Independent Union ........................................................... 852
City of Grand Rapids, Minter v .................................. 976, 1182
City of Jackson, The Greater Way Bible Way Temple of
Jackson v ........................................................................... 1201
City of Lansing, Buckner Estate v ....................................... 895
City of Lansing, Estate of Buckner v .................................. 1243
City of Lansing, Mercer v ..................................................... 858
City of Lansing v State of Michigan .................................... 1104
xxxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
City of Livonia, Liberty Hill Housing Corp v .... 44
City of Madison Hts v Elgin Sweeper Co ................. 1002, 1078
City of Petoskey, Barnwell v ................................................. 958
City of Romulus, Houdini Properties, LLC v ...................... 1022
City of Southfield v Covensky .............................................. 1137
City of Sterling Hts, Ljuljdjuraj v ........................................ 1138
City of Taylor, Branford Towne Houses Coop v ................. 858
City of Troy, Papadelis v ....................................................... 863
City of Warren, Hill v ............................................................ 1195
City of Westland, Taylor v .................................................... 1033
Clark, People v (Alphonso) ................................................... 893
Clark, People v (George) ....................................................... 1032
Clark, People v (Michael) ...................................................... 855
Clark, People v (Paul) ........................................................... 864
Clark, People v (Stephan) ..................................................... 926
Claudio, People v ................................................................... 1189
Clay, People v ......................................................................... 856
Clayton, People v (Derrick) .................................................. 1138
Clayton, People v (Julius) ..................................................... 922
Clemens v Koziarski .............................................................. 1032
Clements, People v ................................................................ 1136
Clemmons, People v .............................................................. 862
Clendening, Broniak v .......................................................... 892
Cline, People v ....................................................................... 1134
Cloy, People v ......................................................................... 1004
Coachlight Estates of Blissfield, Inc, Kwiatkowski v ......... 1062
Coates v Bastian Bros, Inc .................................................... 1193
Coates, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Conkle) ............. 1059
Cobas, People v ...................................................................... 955
Coburn, People v ................................................................... 957
Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc, Jensen v .................................. 960
Cochrane, People v (Ronald) ................................................ 1190
Cochrane, People v (Stephan) .............................................. 1005
Cochrane, People v (Tony) .................................................... 1075
Cogan, Honigman, Miller, Schwarta & Cohn, LLP v ......... 935
Cohen v Gen Motors Corp .................................................... 925
Cohen, Hall v ......................................................................... 949
Colbert, People v .................................................................... 1033
Cole, People v (Jacqueline) ................................................... 859
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxxv
P
AGE
Cole, People v (Jennifer) ....................................................... 1033
Cole, People v (Rashaan) ...................................................... 861
Cole’s Corner Restaurant & Catering, Inc, Gruber v ........ 892
Coleman, People v (Antonio) ................................................ 926
Coleman, People v (Cleveland) ............................................. 952
Coleman, People v (Derrick) ................................................. 863
Coleman, People v (Sonya) ................................................... 925
Coleman Community Schools, Saginaw Intermediate
School Dist v ..................................................................... 1137
Coley, People v ....................................................................... 952
Collier, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Miller) ............... 1031
Collins, People v (Breelove) .................................................. 956
Collins, People v (Derrick) .................................................... 860
Collins, People v (Earland) ................................................... 924
Collins, People v (Jarrod) ...................................................... 1136
Comerica Bank, Citifinancial Mortgage Co, LLC v ............ 944
Comerica Bank, Rogow v ...................................................... 857
Comm’r of the Office of Financial & Ins Services,
Priority Health v .............................................................. 1073
Community Health (Dep’t of), Khemmoro Inc v ................ 891
Community Resource Consultants, Inc v Progressive
Michigan Ins Co ...................................................... 868, 1097
Community Shores Bank, Washington Mut Bank, FA v .... 1188
Comonte, People v ................................................................. 1033
Compeau v Currier ................................................................ 891
Compeau, People v ................................................................ 929
Complete Auto & Truck Parts, Inc v City of Flint ............. 954
Compton, Shaina v ................................................................ 1075
Conely, People v ..................................................................... 1012
Conkle, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Coates) ............. 1059
Conn v Asplundh Tree Expert Co ........................................ 864
Consolidated Rail Corp, Frye v ............................................ 897
Convention & Show Services, Petsch v ............................... 1013
Cooley Law School (Thomas D), Dulemba v ....................... 1017
Cooper, People v (James) ...................................................... 892
Cooper, People v (John) ............................................... 957, 1078
Cooper, People v (Tyrone) ..................................................... 1189
Cooper-Reid v State of Michigan Third Judicial Circuit ... 963
Coppess, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Keast) ............ 862
xxxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Cornell Engineering, Fisher v .............................................. 1188
Corrections (Dep’t of), Bazzetta v ................................. 857, 961
Corrections (Dep’t of), Brown-Bey v .................................... 1185
Corrections (Dep’t of), Douglas v ......................................... 856
Corrections (Dep’t of), Guoan v ........................................... 1134
Corrections (Dep’t of), Harter v ........................................... 854
Corrections (Dep’t of), Hubbert v ........................................ 890
Corrections (Dep’t of), Mathis v ........................................... 1141
Corrections (Dep’t of), Menefee v ........................................ 923
Corrections (Dep’t of), Michigan State Employees
Ass’n v ............................................................................... 950
Corrections (Dep’t of), Muskegon Co Prosecutor v .... 929, 1072
Corrections (Dep’t of), Provost v ......................................... 858
Corrections (Dep’t of), Reagan v .......................................... 1136
Corrections (Dep’t of), Rogers v ........................................... 960
Corrections (Dep’t of), Sandberg v ...................................... 890
Corrections (Dep’t of), Spencer v ................................ 958, 1078
Corrections (Dep’t of), The Geo Group, Inc v .................... 991
Corrections (Dep’t of), Umbarger v ..................................... 1075
Costa v Gago .......................................................................... 978
Cotter v Wisner ..................................................................... 1191
Cottrell, People v ................................................................... 916
Court of Claims Judge, Bd of Trustees of Michigan State
Univ v ................................................................................ 1052
Couzens, People v ................................................ 240
Covensky, City of Southfield v .............................................. 1137
Cox, Fieger v ................................................................. 874, 1139
Cox, People v .......................................................................... 953
Crabtree, People v ................................................................. 854
Crapoff, People v .................................................................... 1075
Crawford, People v ....................................................... 925, 1078
Crawford Co, 46th Circuit Trial Court v ................... 1119, 1132
Crawford Co v Otsego Co ..................................................... 1132
Credit Acceptance Corp v 46th Dist Court (In re Credit
Acceptance Corp) .............................................................. 917
Credit Acceptance Corp, In re (Credit Acceptance Corp v
46th Dist Court) ............................................................... 917
Creeden, People v .................................................................. 1076
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxxvii
P
AGE
Crehan v Bancroft ................................................................. 1137
Crest Financial, Inc, Gomery v ............................................ 1185
Crimes, People v .................................................................... 1189
Criston, People v .................................................................... 921
Cromwell v West Branch Regional Med Ctr ....................... 1135
Cron, People v ................................................................. 856, 999
Crowe, People v ..................................................................... 925
Cryderman v Verburg ............................................................ 1104
Crystal Homes, Inc, Homecomings Financial Network v .. 945
Cunningham, People v (Dion) .............................................. 1138
Cunningham, People v (James) ............................................ 1137
Cunningham, Svoboda v ....................................................... 888
Cureton, People v .................................................................. 897
Currier, Compeau v ............................................................... 891
Currier, People v (Kevin) ...................................................... 1033
D
DP Fox Football Holdings, LLC, Raybon v ......................... 1109
Dado, People v ................................................................. 855, 960
Dahringer, Goodman v .......................................................... 1118
DaimlerChrysler Corp, Abay v ............................................. 1107
DaimlerChrysler Corp, Legg v .............................................. 886
DaimlerChrysler Corp, Schornak v ...................................... 1000
DaimlerChrysler Corp v State Tax Comm .......................... 880
DaimlerChrysler Corp, Swearinger v ................................... 897
Dale Osburn, Inc v Auto-Owners Ins Co ............................. 921
Dalgliesh, People v ................................................................ 958
Dalton, People v ..................................................................... 960
D’Antonio, People v ............................................................... 926
Darby, People v (Greg) .......................................................... 1013
Darby, People v (Michael) ..................................................... 1012
Davenport v HSBC Bank USA ............................................. 1062
David, People v (Jack) ........................................................... 1185
David, People v (John) .......................................................... 860
Davis, People v (Anthony) .................................................... 924
Davis, People v (Antonio) ..................................................... 857
Davis, People v (Charles) ...................................................... 1075
Davis, People v (Detrick) ...................................................... 859
Davis, People v (Donnie) ....................................................... 889
xxxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Davis, People v (Ezekiel) ....................................................... 1075
Davis, People v (Henry) ........................................................ 1073
Davis, People v (Lynn) .......................................................... 1010
Davis, People v (Michael) ...................................................... 1148
Davis, People v (Montrey) ..................................................... 1138
Davis, People v (Perry) ................................................ 1005, 1078
Davis, People v (Shawn) ....................................................... 955
Davis, People v (Stanley) ...................................................... 855
Davis, People v (Terry) ......................................................... 1010
Davis, People v (Troy) ........................................................... 963
Davis, Taylor v ....................................................................... 1134
Dawkins, People v ................................................................. 855
Dawson, People v ................................................................... 958
Dawson v Secretary of State ................................................ 1169
Deal, Haas v .................................................................... 911, 947
Deals, People v ....................................................................... 920
Dean, People v ....................................................................... 954
Dearborn (City of), Detroit Lions, Inc v .............................. 893
Dearborn (City of), McGuire v ............................................. 911
Deberry, People v ................................................................... 1134
Decina, H A Smith Lumber & Hardware Co v ......... 987, 1132
DeKubber, People v ............................................................... 1051
Delano, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Stienke) ........... 1154
Delay v Burns Internat’l Security Services Corp ............... 856
Delene v Baraga Circuit Court ............................................. 898
DeLeon, People v ................................................................... 1141
Deleon-Puentes, People v ...................................................... 1138
Deloitte & Touche (ISC), LLC, Dimmitt & Owens
Financial Inc v .................................................................. 899
Delphi Automotive Sys, Erby v ............................................ 958
Delphi Automotive Sys Corp, Moore v ................................ 1076
Delphi Automotive Sys Corp, Sims v ................................... 894
Delphi Corp, Patterson v ...................................................... 1168
Demann, People v .................................................................. 1135
Denk v Marderosian ................................................. 1076, 1192
Dennis, People v .................................................................... 864
Denson, People v ................................................................... 890
Dent, People v ........................................................................ 1189
Denton, People v .................................................................... 925
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xxxix
P
AGE
Dep’t of Community Health, Khemmoro Inc v .................. 891
Dep’t of Corrections, Bazzetta v .................................... 857, 961
Dep’t of Corrections, Brown-Bey v ...................................... 1185
Dep’t of Corrections, Douglas v ........................................... 856
Dep’t of Corrections, Guoan v .............................................. 1134
Dep’t of Corrections, Harter v ............................................. 854
Dep’t of Corrections, Hubbert v ........................................... 890
Dep’t of Corrections, Mathis v ............................................. 1141
Dep’t of Corrections, Menefee v ........................................... 923
Dep’t of Corrections, Michigan State Employees Ass’n v .. 950
Dep’t of Corrections, Muskegon Co Prosecutor v ....... 929, 1072
Dep’t of Corrections, Provost v ............................................ 858
Dep’t of Corrections, Reagan v ............................................ 1136
Dep’t of Corrections, Rogers v ............................................. 960
Dep’t of Corrections, Sandberg v ......................................... 890
Dep’t of Corrections, Spencer v .................................. 958, 1078
Dep’t of Corrections, The Geo Group, Inc v ....................... 991
Dep’t of Corrections, Umbarger v ........................................ 1075
Dep’t of Environmental Quality, Jacques v ........................ 1009
Dep’t of Environmental Quality, Preserve the Dunes,
Inc v ................................................................................... 944
Dep’t of Environmental Quality, Schultz v ......................... 857
Dep’t of Environmental Quality v South Huron Valley
Utility Auth ....................................................................... 1044
Dep’t of Human Services v Atwood (In re Keast) .............. 862
Dep’t of Human Services v Boshaw (In re Boshaw) .......... 935
Dep’t of Human Services v Church (In re Church)
No. 1 ................................................................................. 1165
Dep’t of Human Services v Church (In re Church)
No. 2 .................................................................................. 1184
Dep’t of Human Services v Conkle (In re Coates) .............. 1059
Dep’t of Human Services v Coppess (In re Keast) ............. 862
Dep’t of Human Services v Delano (In re Stienke) ............ 1154
Dep’t of Human Services v Engle (In re Engle) ................. 931
Dep’t of Human Services, Evans v ...................................... 1012
Dep’t of Human Services v Faulkner (In re Faulkner) ...... 1058
Dep’t of Human Services v Gach (In re Baker) .................. 1072
Dep’t of Human Services v Garcia (In re Garcia) .............. 899
xl 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Dep’t of Human Services v Hoyt (In re Hoyt) .................... 919
Dep’t of Human Services v Jackson (In re Jackson) .......... 1140
Dep’t of Human Services v James (In re James) ............... 904
Dep’t of Human Services v Kessler (In re White) .............. 1022
Dep’t of Human Services, King v (In re Bell) ..................... 894
Dep’t of Human Services v Kuttkuhn (In re Klank) .......... 1072
Dep’t of Human Services v Kyle (In re Kyle) ..................... 1151
Dep’t of Human Services v Lakies (In re Lakies) .............. 1106
Dep’t of Human Services v Long (In re Long) .................... 1022
Dep’t of Human Services v Miller (In re Collier) ............... 1031
Dep’t of Human Services v Moon (In re Moon) .................. 886
Dep’t of Human Services v Nickson (In re Brown) ............ 1107
Dep’t of Human Services v Nieminen (In re Metcalf) ....... 976
Dep’t of Human Services v Nierescher (In re Archer) ....... 994
Dep’t of Human Services v O’Berry (In re O’Berry) .......... 1200
Dep’t of Human Services v Ollie (In re Ollie) ..................... 886
Dep’t of Human Services v Ostrander (In re Ostrander) .. 908
Dep’t of Human Services v Peoples (In re Peoples) ........... 899
Dep’t of Human Services v Scott (In re Branch) ................ 935
Dep’t of Human Services v Sikora (In re Schneider) ......... 1165
Dep’t of Human Services v Thompson (In re Marshall) .... 1022
Dep’t of Human Services, Voris v ........................................ 1145
Dep’t of Human Services v Welsh (In re Welsh) ................. 1106
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Dykstra .................. 869
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Jordan ................... 869
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Kaminski ............... 873
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth, Kim v ....................... 1076
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Moralez .................. 873
Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Nash ....................... 873
Dep’t of Mgt & Budget, Wilson v ......................................... 1008
Dep’t of Transportation v Alibri .......................................... 863
Dep’t of Transportation v Initial Transport, Inc ................ 1044
Dep’t of Transportation, Price v .......................................... 894
Dep’t of Transportation v Sehn Family Novi Ltd
Partnership ....................................................................... 1141
Dep’t of Treasury, Ammex, Inc v ......................................... 883
Dep’t of Treasury, Lake Forest Partners 2, Inc v .. 1046, 1169
Dep’t of Treasury, McLeod v ................................................ 1135
Dep’t of Treasury, Prudential Ins Co v ............................... 863
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xli
P
AGE
Dep’t of Treasury, Prudential Prop & Cas Ins
Co v .................................................................................... 863
Dep’t of Treasury, Tyson Foods, Inc v ................................. 1137
Depew, Shields v .................................................................... 862
Detroit Bd of Ed, Turner v ................................................... 1043
Detroit Bldg Auth v Wayne Co Treasurer ................. 897, 1139
Detroit (City of) v Bagdasarian ............................................ 853
Detroit (City of), Budget Rent-A-Car Sys, Inc, v ................ 1194
Detroit (City of), Detroit Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF, Local
344 v .................................................................................. 880
Detroit (City of), Detroit Free Press, Inc v ......................... 1079
Detroit (City of), HRT Enterprises v ................................... 1134
Detroit (City of), Ligon v ...................................................... 1009
Detroit (City of) v 17526 Riopelle ........................................ 960
Detroit (City of) v Thomas ................................................... 1076
Detroit Diesel Corp v State Tax Comm ............................... 880
Detroit Downtown Dev Auth (City of) v US
Outdoor Advertising, Inc ................................................. 991
Detroit Edison Co, Sadowy v ................................................ 900
Detroit Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF, Local 344 v City of
Detroit ............................................................................... 880
Detroit Free Press, Inc v City of Detroit ............................ 1079
Detroit Lions, Inc v City of Dearborn ................................. 893
Detroit Med Ctr, Jones v ....................................................... 980
Detroit Pub Schools, Briggs Tax Service, LLC v ................ 949
Devore, People v .................................................................... 919
Dewulf, People v .................................................................... 1032
Diane J, Sutton v ................................................................... 868
Diaz, People v ........................................................................ 1185
Dib, Grievance Administrator v ........................................... 1215
Dickson, People v ......................................................... 1003, 1140
Dillahunty, People v .............................................................. 958
Dilsworth, People v ............................................................... 890
Dilworth, Schwarze v ..................................................... 853, 960
Dimmitt & Owens Financial Inc v Deloitte & Touche
(ISC), LLC ......................................................................... 899
Dinoffria, People v ................................................................. 886
Dipzinski, People v ................................................................ 938
Disney, People v ..................................................................... 858
xlii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
DiVergilio v West Bloomfield Charter Twp ................ 949, 1077
Dixon, People v ...................................................................... 954
Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co ....................................... 1169
Dobek, People v ..................................................................... 897
Dobra, People v ...................................................................... 911
Dobson, People v .................................................................... 856
Dockett’s Mobile Home Sales, Sanborn v ........................... 887
Dodaj, People v ...................................................................... 925
Dolph-Hostetter, People v ..................................................... 901
Domine, People v ................................................................... 959
Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc, Bennett v ................................... 1105
Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc, Miller v ....................................... 1105
Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc, Powell v ...................................... 1105
Donahue v Cateraid, Inc ....................................................... 927
Donaldson, People v .............................................................. 921
Dorsey, People v (Jarrett) ..................................................... 951
Dorsey, People v (Tyrone) ..................................................... 1136
Doss, People v ........................................................................ 859
Douglas v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................ 856
Douglas, People v (Jamaal) ................................................... 1186
Douglas, People v (Ronald) ................................................... 856
Dove, People v ........................................................................ 1009
Dowell v Marsack .................................................................. 963
Dowell, People v ..................................................................... 951
Downing, People v ................................................................. 954
Downs v Keebler .......................................................... 1081, 1104
Downs v Northern Michigan Hosp ...................................... 1081
Downs v Northern Michigan Hosps, Inc ............................. 1103
Drain, People v ...................................................................... 1010
Drake v Citizens Ins Co ........................................................ 918
Draughn, People v ................................................................. 1186
Dube v St John Hosp & Med Ctr ......................................... 914
Dulemba v Thomas M Cooley Law School .......................... 1017
Dulic v Progressive Michigan Ins Co ................................... 888
Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n (In re Attorney Fees) ......... 1059
Dunlap, People v .................................................................... 1011
Dunmire, People v ................................................................. 1190
Dunson, People v ................................................................... 959
Duran, People v ..................................................................... 1187
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xliii
P
AGE
Durand Clinic, PC, People v ................................................. 951
Duyst, People v ...................................................................... 1055
Dykema Gossett, PLLC v Ajluni .......................................... 913
Dykstra, Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v ................. 869
E
E T MacKenzie Co v Long Investment Co, Ltd .................. 926
Earegood, People v ................................................................ 890
Eatmon, People v ................................................................... 922
Eaton Co Rd Comm, Ells v ................................................... 902
Eaton Rapids (City of), Camarda v ...................................... 853
Echols, People v ..................................................................... 1010
Eddie’s Int’l Touchless Car Wash, Sweeney v .................... 1137
Edmonds, People v ................................................................ 924
Edmunds, People v ................................................................ 893
Effinger, People v ......................................................... 1003, 1140
Egbert R Smith Trust, In re ............................... 19
Eifler v Swartz (In re Miltenberger Estate) ........................ 976
Einstandig, McAlpine v ......................................................... 855
Eisenzoph, Kienitz v (In re Truitt) ...................................... 1134
Eldon L Aucker Assoc, Wilson v .......................................... 1147
Elezovic v Bennett ................................................................. 1001
Elgin Sweeper Co, City of Madison Hts v .................. 1002, 1078
Elie, People v ......................................................................... 1191
Ells v Eaton Co Rd Comm .................................................... 902
Ely, People v ........................................................................... 856
Engle, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Engle) ................ 931
Engle, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Engle) ................ 931
English, People v ................................................................... 1060
English Gardens Condo, LLC v Howell Twp ...................... 962
Environmental Quality (Dep’t of), Jacques v ..................... 1009
Environmental Quality (Dep’t of), Preserve the Dunes,
Inc v ................................................................................... 944
Environmental Quality (Dep’t of), Schultz v ...................... 857
Environmental Quality (Dep’t of) v South Huron Valley
Utility Auth ....................................................................... 1044
Epicentre Strategic Corp-Michigan v Jenkins
Constr, Inc ......................................................................... 927
xliv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Erby v Delphi Automotive Sys ............................................. 958
Erickson v Evans ................................................................... 886
Erlich, People v ...................................................................... 957
Ernsting v Ave Maria College .............................................. 985
Ertman, People v ................................................................... 1012
Ervin, People v ....................................................................... 1009
Estate Dev Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm .............................. 1137
Estate of Buckner v City of Lansing ................................... 1243
Estate of Papazian, In re (Papazian v Papazian) ................ 1185
Evanish v Ledis ..................................................................... 1007
Evans v Dep’t of Human Services ....................................... 1012
Evans, Erickson v .................................................................. 886
Evans, People v (Archie) ....................................................... 1187
Evans, People v (Delano) ...................................................... 1136
Evans, People v (Jeffrey) ...................................................... 922
Evans, People v (Michael) ..................................................... 901
Everette, People v .................................................................. 910
F
Faargsob LLC v HTSTS, LLC .............................................. 1074
Fabian, People v ..................................................................... 923
Fahey v Fahey ........................................................................ 860
Faidley, People v .................................................................... 952
Fairley, People v ..................................................................... 1139
Fairview Builders, Inc v Bireta ............................................ 954
Fannin, People v .................................................................... 953
Faremouth, Young v .............................................................. 957
Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, Kennedy v ............ 1001
Farm Bureau Ins Co, Feldkamp v ........................................ 916
Farm Bureau Ins Co, McDonald v ..................... 191
Farm Bureau Life Ins Co of Michigan, Schmid v ............... 1106
Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan, Healing Place,
Ltd v .................................................................................. 904
Farmer, People v .................................................................... 1044
Farraj, People v ...................................................................... 862
Farrow, People v .................................................................... 1136
Faulkner, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Faulkner) ...... 1058
Faurot v Miller ....................................................................... 928
Favors, People v ..................................................................... 1134
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xlv
P
AGE
Fawaz, People v ..................................................................... 860
Fay, People v ........................................................................... 854
Feinbloom, Mosher, Dolan, Cataldo & Kelly, Inc v ............. 1077
Feldkamp v Farm Bureau Ins Co ......................................... 916
Feliciano, People v ................................................................. 1138
Ferguson, People v (Curtis) .................................................. 956
Ferguson, People v (Eric) ...................................................... 1134
Ferguson, State Treasurer v ................................................. 1137
Ferrari v Aramark Services Mgt of Michigan, Inc .................. 867
Fieger v Cox .................................................................. 874, 1139
Fieger, State Automobile Mut Ins Co v ............................... 862
Fields, People v (Edmund) .................................................... 925
Fields, People v (Frederick) .................................................. 889
Fifth Third Bank v Taylor .................................................... 1009
Filipiak, People v ................................................................... 1077
Fire & Ice Mechanical, Inc v Bit Mat Products of
Michigan, Inc .................................................................... 1076
First Nat’l Bank of Crystal Falls v Koski ............................ 921
Fish v Attorney Grievance Comm ........................................ 1034
Fish, People v ......................................................................... 964
Fisher v Cornell Engineering ............................................... 1188
Fisher, People v (Glenn) ........................................................ 853
Fisher, People v (Marquis) .................................................... 928
Fisher, People v (Robert) ...................................................... 861
Flagstar Bank, FSB v Bayside Mall, LLC ........................... 1034
Flanagan, Frohriep v ............................................................. 962
Fleischfresser v Peterson Towing, Inc ....................... 918, 1034
Flennoy, People v ................................................................... 1188
Fletcher, People v (James) .................................................... 949
Fletcher, People v (Melissa) .................................................. 865
Flint (City of), Complete Auto & Truck Parts, Inc v ......... 954
Flood, People v ....................................................................... 891
Flores, People v ...................................................................... 1077
Flowers, People v (Jesse) ...................................................... 1076
Flowers, People v (Joseph) ................................................... 1012
Floyd, People v ....................................................................... 887
Fluckes, People v ................................................................... 861
Focus Hope, Brackett v ......................................................... 1147
Fonville, People v ................................................................... 1136
xlvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Ford, People v (Edwin, III) ................................................... 1135
Ford, People v (Elijah) .......................................................... 1006
Ford, People v (Riley) ............................................................ 922
Ford Health Sys (Henry), Watts v ....................................... 1055
Ford Motor Co, Johnson v .................................................... 863
Ford Motor Co, Miller v (In re Certified Question from
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals Dist of Texas) ............ 1203
Ford Motor Co, Perez v ......................................................... 1202
Ford Motor Co v State Tax Comm ....................................... 880
Ford Motor Credit Co v Odom ............................................. 1060
Fornari v Hoover ................................................................... 920
Forner v Robinson Twp ........................................................ 1141
Forsyth v Hopper ................................................................... 979
46th Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co .................... 1119, 1132
46th Dist Court, Credit Acceptance Corp v (In re Credit
Acceptance Corp) .............................................................. 917
Foster, People v (Morris) ....................................................... 952
Foster, People v (Ronald) ...................................................... 1188
Foster, People v (Sheamekia) ................................................ 1075
Fountain, People v ................................................................. 1006
Fowler v Botsford Gen Hosp ................................................ 1007
Frailey, People v ..................................................................... 1138
Franklin Properties LTD v Molybdenum Unlimited Co .... 1189
Franklin Twp, War-Ag Farms, LLC v .................................. 948
Franta, People v .................................................................... 958
Frasure, People v ................................................................... 919
Frazier, People v (Corey) ....................................................... 935
Frazier, People v (Otis) ......................................................... 885
Fritz, People v ........................................................................ 1010
Frohriep v Flanagan .............................................................. 962
Fry, People v ........................................................................... 925
Frye v Consolidated Rail Corp ............................................. 897
Fuller, People v ...................................................................... 1187
Fulton, People v ..................................................................... 959
Fundunburks v Capital Area Transportation Auth ........... 1060
Fuqua, People v ..................................................................... 1011
G
Gach, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Baker) ................. 1072
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xlvii
P
AGE
Gago, Costa v ......................................................................... 978
Gaines v Kern ........................................................................ 862
Gainors Meat Packing, Inc v Home-Owners Ins Co ........... 1044
Gales, People v ....................................................................... 926
Galineau, People v ................................................................. 1033
Galka, People v ...................................................................... 858
Gallant v Gallant ................................................................... 1134
Galliher v Trinity Health - Michigan .................................. 1072
Galvin, People v ..................................................................... 951
Garcia, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Garcia) ............. 899
Garden City Hosp, Braverman v ................................ 896, 1159
Gardener, Lenawee Co v ....................................................... 911
Gardocki, Sweatt v ................................................................ 863
Garrell v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional
Transportation .................................................................. 861
Garrett, People v ................................................................... 894
Garrison, People v ................................................................. 1006
Gary, People v ........................................................................ 1074
Garza, People v ...................................................................... 924
Gatlin, People v ..................................................................... 957
Gee v Arthur B Myr Industries, Inc ........................... 868, 1154
Gee, People v .......................................................................... 1013
Gen Motors Corp v Alumi-Bunk, Inc ................................... 1193
Gen Motors Corp, Bero Motors, Inc v .................... 1053, 1192
Gen Motors Corp, Cohen v ................................................... 925
Gen Motors Corp, Johnson v ................................................ 1076
Gen Motors Corp, Taig v ...................................................... 883
Genesee Co Concealed Weapons Bd, Wilson v .................... 1147
Genesys Regional Med Ctr, Griswold v ............................... 1190
Geno, People v ....................................................................... 957
Genovese, Banks v ................................................................. 1074
Geo Group, Inc (The) v Dep’t of Corrections ..................... 991
George, People v (Bruce) ...................................................... 1010
George, People v (John) ........................................................ 1033
Germain, People v ................................................................. 920
German v Leforge .................................................................. 922
Gerred, People v .................................................................... 1033
Gerrity, Glisson v ................................................................... 883
Giacolone, People v ................................................................ 1137
xlviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Gibbons, People v .................................................................. 1135
Gibbs v Gibbs ......................................................................... 862
Gibson, People v (Don) ......................................................... 952
Gibson, People v (Gregory) ................................................... 856
Gidron, People v .................................................................... 891
Gilbert, People v (Jessie) ...................................................... 1138
Gilbert, People v (Nathaniel) ................................................ 1188
Gill, Manuel v ........................................................................ 929
Gillam, People v (Reginald) .................................................. 1188
Gillam, People v (Timothy) ................................................... 1005
Givans v Parole Bd ................................................................ 859
Glassbrook, People v ............................................................. 859
Glazier, Lewis-Clark v ........................................................... 1191
Gleason, People v ................................................................... 952
Glisson v Gerrity ................................................................... 883
Gloster, People v .................................................................... 893
Glover, People v ..................................................................... 1033
Gogins, People v .................................................................... 917
Goins, People v ...................................................................... 859
Gojcaj v Jenkins Constr, Inc ................................................. 861
Gold, Ansari v ........................................................................ 877
Golden, People v .................................................................... 919
Goldring, People v ................................................................. 1010
Goldstick, People v ................................................................ 1074
Goldstone v Bloomfield Twp Pub Library ........................... 1201
Gollman, People v .................................................................. 921
Gomery v Crest Financial, Inc ............................................. 1185
Gonzalez, People v (Carlos) .................................................. 1150
Gonzalez, People v (Miguel) ................................................. 860
Gonzalez, People v (Orlando) ............................................... 927
Gonzalez v St John Hosp & Med Ctr .................................. 1109
Goodell, People v ................................................................... 1134
Goodger, People v .................................................................. 910
Goodman v Dahringer ........................................................... 1118
Goodman, People v (Curtis) .................................................. 1051
Goodman, People v (Geoffrey) .............................................. 855
Goodson, Long v .................................................................... 1048
Goodwin, People v ................................................................. 1018
Gordon v Nucraft Furniture Co,
I
NC
......................................... 1075
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xlix
P
AGE
Goree, People v ...................................................................... 951
Gould, People v (Danny) ....................................................... 1133
Gould, People v (Rand) ................................................... 854, 960
Gower v Harkema ................................................................. 977
Gowing, People v (Delmar) ................................................... 889
Gowing, People v (Donald) ................................................... 889
Goza, People v ........................................................................ 955
Grabiec, People v ................................................................... 1036
Grace v Leitman ............................................................. 913, 987
Graham v Hopkins ................................................................ 1048
Graham, Seman v .................................................................. 862
Grand Rapids (City of) v Grand Rapids Employees
Independent Union ........................................................... 852
Grand Rapids (City of), Minter v ................................ 976, 1182
Grand Rapids Employees Independent Union, City of
Grand Rapids v ................................................................. 852
Grandberry, People v ............................................................. 922
Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, Inc ................................ 904
Gray, Mackley v ..................................................................... 917
Gray, People v ........................................................................ 859
Grays, People v ...................................................................... 1076
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co/Farmer Jack/Borman’s,
Inc, Ketterer v .................................................................. 1077
Greater Way Bible Way Temple of Jackson (The) v City
of Jackson .......................................................................... 1201
Grebner v State of Michigan ................................................ 939
Green, People v (Anthony) ................................................... 1011
Green, People v (Curtis) ....................................................... 922
Green, People v (Ernest) ....................................................... 922
Green, People v (Jason) ........................................................ 955
Green v Pierson ..................................................................... 979
Greene, People v (Chozen) .................................................... 1076
Greene, People v (Loren) ...................................................... 864
Greenhill, People v ................................................................ 917
Greenwald v Greenwald ........................................................ 1158
Grievance Administrator v Butcher ..................................... 1212
Grievance Administrator v Dib ............................................ 1215
Grievance Administrator v Trombley .................................. 1201
Grievance Administrator v Weideman ................................. 1220
l 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Griffin, People v (Damaine) .................................................. 860
Griffin, People v (Randall) .................................................... 854
Grillo v Posen Constr, Inc ..................................................... 990
Grinderz Oak Park, 10 & Scotia Plaza, LLC v ................... 1188
Grissom, People v .................................................................. 1140
Griswold v Genesys Regional Med Ctr ................................ 1190
Griswold Properties, LLC v Lexington Ins Co .................... 1044
Groesbeck, People v (Gary) .................................................. 886
Groesbeck, People v (Joseph) ............................................... 861
Gross, Hamilton v ................................................................. 1134
Gross v Landin ...................................................................... 1188
Gross, People v ...................................................................... 851
Grossnickle, People v ............................................................ 954
Grossnickle, State Treasurer v ............................................. 1077
Gruber v Cole’s Corner Restaurant & Catering, Inc ......... 892
Grumbley, People v ................................................................ 854
Guardian Alarm Co of Michigan v May .............................. 1188
Gulley, People v ...................................................................... 1187
Guoan v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................... 1134
Guthrie, People v ................................................................... 889
Gutlerrez, People v ................................................................ 934
Gwizdala, People v ................................................................ 893
H
H&MDemolition Co, Carter v ........................................... 861
H A Smith Lumber & Hardware Co v Decina .......... 987, 1132
HBI, Baker v .......................................................................... 1008
HRT Enterprises v City of Detroit ...................................... 1134
HSBC Bank USA, Davenport v ............................................ 1062
HTSTS, LLC, Faargsob LLC v ............................................. 1074
Haas v Deal ..................................................................... 911, 947
Haddad v Mammo ................................................................. 980
Hahn, People v ....................................................................... 1136
Hale, People v ........................................................................ 1009
Hall v Cohen .......................................................................... 949
Hall v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp .............................................. 1184
Hall, People v (David) ........................................................... 1194
Hall, People v (Ernest) .......................................................... 860
Hall, People v (Frankie) ........................................................ 888
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
li
P
AGE
Hall, People v (Michael) ........................................................ 854
Hall, People v (Michael J) ..................................................... 1077
Hall, People v (Nolan) ........................................................... 1008
Halstead, Lenawee Co v ........................................................ 911
Hamilton v Gross .................................................................. 1134
Hamilton, People v (Gregory) ............................................... 1191
Hamilton, People v (Jeffrey) ................................................. 954
Hamilton, People v (Timothy) .............................................. 956
Hammond, People v .............................................................. 887
Hampton, People v ................................................................ 1008
Hanible, People v ................................................................... 1075
Hanks, People v ..................................................................... 1008
Hanna, People v ..................................................................... 1009
Hansend, People v ................................................................. 964
Hapeman, People v ................................................................ 855
Hardin, People v .................................................................... 891
Harding, Masse v ................................................................... 954
Hardrick, People v ................................................................. 1004
Hardy, People v ...................................................................... 951
Hardy v Safeway Food Ctr, Inc ............................................ 886
Haremza, People v ................................................................. 886
Harkema, Gower v ................................................................ 977
Harlan, People v .................................................................... 858
Harper, People v (Calvin) ...................................................... 1005
Harper, People v (Charles) .................................................... 950
Harper-Hutzel Hosp, McElhaney v ............................ 853, 1142
Harper Univ Hosp, Hobdy v ................................................. 1133
Harrington v Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co ........................ 1033
Harris v Botsford Continuing Care Corp ............................ 953
Harris, People v (Ameir) ....................................................... 1189
Harris, People v (Issac) ......................................................... 911
Harris, People v (Jeffrey) ...................................................... 857
Harris, People v (Lewis) ........................................................ 1188
Harris, People v (Melody) ..................................................... 897
Harris, People v (Taureen) ................................................... 920
Harris, People v (Terrance) .................................................. 861
Harrison Constr Co, Livonia Bldg Materials Co v ............. 1005
Hart, People v ........................................................................ 1076
lii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Harter v Dep’t of Corrections .............................................. 854
Hartman, People v ................................................................. 1058
Hartman v Port Huron Hosp ............................................... 1031
Harvey, People v (Chari) ....................................................... 1136
Harvey, People v (Kim) ......................................................... 1191
Harvey, People v (Marcus) .................................................... 953
Hasselbring, People v ............................................................ 945
Hassler, Moore & Carter Lumber Real Estate Co v ........... 959
Hastings, People v ................................................................. 864
Hastings Mut Ins Co v Mosher, Dolan, Cataldo & Kelly,
Inc ...................................................................................... 928
Hatchett, People v ................................................................. 861
Hatter, People v ..................................................................... 1141
Hawkins, Thomas v ............................................................... 1032
Hawthorne, People v ........................................... 913, 1000, 1185
Hayes, People v ...................................................................... 927
Hayes Green Beach Mem Hosp Ass’n, Umbarger v ........... 985
Hayes Green Beach Mem Hosp Corp, Umbarger v ............ 1050
Haymer, People v ................................................................... 1002
Head, People v ....................................................................... 866
Healing Place, LTD v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of
Michigan ............................................................................ 904
Hearn, People v ..................................................................... 957
Heath, People v ...................................................................... 1136
Heinz, In re Heinz Estate (Heinz v Heinz) ......................... 920
Helen Newberry Joy Hosp, Burton v .................................. 892
Hemp, People v ............................................................. 957, 1078
Henderson, People v .............................................................. 1191
Hendrick v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co ................ 892
Hendricks, People v ............................................................... 951
Henley v Herschelman .......................................................... 867
Henney, Rumfield v ...................................................... 944, 1077
Henning, People v ................................................................. 1005
Henry Ford Health Sys, Watts v .......................................... 1055
Herholtz, People v ................................................................. 856
Herman v Berrien Co ............................................................ 961
Hernandez-Diaz, People v ..................................................... 1188
Hernandez-Orta, People v .................................................... 1101
Herschelman, Henley v ......................................................... 867
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
liii
P
AGE
Hiar v Strong ......................................................................... 857
Hicks, People v (Dustin) ....................................................... 1012
Hicks, People v (Rodney) .............................................. 921, 1034
Hicks, People v (Terance) ..................................................... 898
Hilgendorf v Lee .................................................................... 952
Hill v City of Warren ............................................................. 1195
Hill, People v (Jonathan) ..................................... 910, 919, 1005
Hill, People v (Ranis) ...................................................... 859, 924
Hilliard, People v ................................................................... 892
Hills, People v ........................................................................ 1188
Hilton, People v ............................................................... 888, 894
Hinds, People v ...................................................................... 1186
Hines, People v ...................................................................... 1033
Hobdy v Harper Univ Hosp .................................................. 1133
Hobson, People v ................................................................... 1012
Hodges v Renaissance Ctr .................................................... 864
Hodo, People v ....................................................................... 991
Hoffman v Barrett ................................................................. 981
Hoffman, People v (Curtis) ................................................... 858
Hoffman, People v (Robert) .................................................. 874
Hofmann, Ronan v ................................................................ 863
Hogan, People v ..................................................................... 1134
Holder, People v ..................................................................... 991
Holland, People v ................................................................... 855
Holley, People v .................................................... 222
Hollis, People v ...................................................................... 1006
Holmes, People v ................................................................... 888
Holoweski, People v ............................................................... 919
Holzer, People v ..................................................................... 955
Home-Owners Ins Co, Gainors Meat Packing, Inc v .......... 1044
Homecomings Financial Network v Crystal Homes, Inc ... 945
Hometown America, LLC, Sickles v .................................... 863
Honigman, Miller, Schwarta & Cohn, LLP v Cogan .......... 935
Honorable Norene S Redmond (The), In re ........................ 1227
Hoops, People of Farmington Hills v ................................... 926
Hoover, Fornari v ................................................................... 920
Hope Network North Michigan, Ottobre v ......................... 894
Hopkins, Graham v ............................................................... 1048
Hopkins, People v (Christopher) .......................................... 1006
liv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Hopkins, People v (Lance) .................................................... 1162
Hopper, Forsyth v .................................................................. 979
Hopson, People v ................................................................... 1061
Horan, People v ..................................................................... 1011
Horne, People v ..................................................................... 892
Horton, People v .................................................................... 987
Hoskins, People v .................................................................. 868
Houdini Properties, LLC v City of Romulus ....................... 1022
Houghtaling, People v ........................................................... 864
Houlihan, People v ................................................................ 1165
Houston, People v ........................................................ 1004, 1078
Howard, Overall v ................................................................. 896
Howard, People v (Bruce) ..................................................... 1013
Howard, People v (Deshawn) ............................................... 1188
Howell Twp, English Gardens Condo, LLC v ..................... 962
Hoyt, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Hoyt) ................... 919
Hroba Trust, In re (Hroba v Hroba) .......................... 1059, 1191
Hubbard, People v (Alton) .................................................... 856
Hubbard, People v (Anthony) ............................................... 888
Hubbard, People v (Idolthus) ............................................... 859
Hubbard, People v (Rodney) ........................................ 898, 1006
Hubbert v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................ 890
Huck, People v ....................................................................... 1077
Huckaby, People v .................................................................. 1010
Huerta-Rodriguez, People v .................................................. 1186
Huff, People v ........................................................................ 924
Hughes v Jackson Co Rd Comm .......................................... 862
Hughes v Timko .................................................................... 1013
Hulbert, People v ................................................................... 1184
Hull, People v ......................................................................... 892
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Atwood (In re Keast) ............ 862
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Boshaw (In re Boshaw) ........ 935
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Church (In re Church)
No. 1 .................................................................................. 1165
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Church (In re Church)
No. 2 .................................................................................. 1184
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Conkle (In re Coates) ........... 1059
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Coppess (In re Keast) ........... 862
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Delano (In re Stienke) ......... 1154
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lv
P
AGE
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Engle (In re Engle) .............. 931
Human Services (Dep’t of), Evans v .................................... 1012
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Faulkner (In re Faulkner) .... 1058
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Gach (In re Baker) ............... 1072
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Garcia (In re Garcia) ............ 899
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Hoyt (In re Hoyt) ................. 919
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Jackson (In re Jackson) ....... 1140
Human Services (Dep’t of) v James (In re James) ............. 904
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Kessler (In re White) ............ 1022
Human Services (Dep’t of), King v (In re Bell) .................. 894
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Kuttkuhn (In re Klank) ....... 1072
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Kyle (In re Kyle) ................... 1151
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Lakies (In re Lakies) ............ 1106
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Long (In re Long) ................. 1022
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Miller (In re Collier) ............. 1031
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Moon (In re Moon) ............... 886
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Nickson (In re Brown) ......... 1107
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Nieminen (In re Metcalf) ..... 976
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Nierescher (In re Archer) .... 994
Human Services (Dep’t of) v O’Berry (In re O’Berry) ....... 1200
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Ollie (In re Ollie) .................. 886
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Ostrander (In re
Ostrander) ......................................................................... 908
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Peoples (In re Peoples) ......... 899
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Scott (In re Branch) ............. 935
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Sikora (In re Schneider) ...... 1165
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Thompson (In re
Marshall) ........................................................................... 1022
Human Services (Dep’t of), Voris v ...................................... 1145
Human Services (Dep’t of) v Welsh (In re Welsh) .............. 1106
Humphrey, People v (Jeffrey) ......................................... 856, 958
Humphrey, People v (Joey) ................................................... 958
Hunter, People v .................................................................... 923
Hurley Med Ctr, Summers v ................................................ 1072
Hurley Med Ctr v Thames .................................................... 1185
Hurley Med Group, PC, Johnson v ...................................... 1047
Hurt, People v ........................................................................ 958
Huston, People v .................................................................... 923
lvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
I
Idolski v American Axle & Mfg of Michigan, Inc ............... 859
Imlay Twp, Anspaugh v ........................................................ 964
In re Al-Mayahi ...................................................................... 1031
In re Anonymous Judge v Judicial Tenure Comm ............. 1217
In re Archer (Dep’t of Human Services v Nierescher) ....... 994
In re Attorney Fees (Andris v Miller) .................................. 1059
In re Attorney Fees (Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n ) ........ 1059
In re Baker (Dep’t of Human Services v Gach) .................. 1072
In re Baldwin Trust (Shoaff v Woods) ........................ 915, 1192
In re Barnes ........................................................................... 1034
In re Bell (King v Dep’t of Human Services) ...................... 894
In re Borghese (Borghese v Michigan Children’s
Institute) .................................................................. 976, 1079
In re Boshaw (Dep’t of Human Services v Boshaw) .......... 935
In re Branch (Dep’t of Human Services v Scott)................. 935
In re Brogue ........................................................................... 1220
In re Brown (Dep’t of Human Services v Nickson) ............ 1107
In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals Dist of Texas (Miller v Ford Motor Co ............. 1203
In re Church (Dep’t of Human Services v Church)
No. 1 .................................................................................. 1165
In re Church (Dep’t of Human Services v Church)
No. 2 .................................................................................. 1184
In re Coates (Dep’t of Human Services v Conkle) .............. 1059
In re Collier (Dep’t of Human Services v Miller) ............... 1031
In re Credit Acceptance Corp (Credit Acceptance Corp v
46th Dist Court) ............................................................... 917
In re Egbert R Smith Trust .................................................. 19
In re Engle (Dep’t of Human Services v Engle) ................. 931
In re Faulkner (Dep’t of Human Services v Faulkner) ...... 1058
In re Garcia (Dep’t of Human Services v Garcia) .............. 899
In re Heinz Estate (Heinz v Heinz) ..................................... 920
In re Honorable Norene S Redmond (The) ......................... 1227
In re Hoyt (Dep’t of Human Services v Hoyt) .................... 919
In re Hroba Trust (Hroba v Hroba) ........................... 1059, 1191
In re Jackson (Dep’t of Human Services v Jackson) .......... 1140
In re James (Dep’t of Human Services v James) ............... 904
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lvii
P
AGE
In re Kadzban (People v Kadzban) ...................................... 1148
In re Keast (Dep’t of Human Services v Atwood) .............. 862
In re Keast (Dep’t of Human Services v Coppess) ............. 862
In re Klank (Dep’t of Human Services v Kuttkuhn) .......... 1072
In re Kyle (Dep’t of Human Services v Kyle) ..................... 1151
In re Lager Estate ................................................................. 1133
In re Lakies (Dep’t of Human Services v Lakies) .............. 1106
In re Long (Dep’t of Human Services v Long) .................... 1022
In re Marshall (Dep’t of Human Services v Thompson) .... 1022
In re Metcalf (Dep’t of Human Services v Nieminen) ....... 976
In re Miltenberger Estate (Eifler v Swartz) ........................ 976
In re Moon (Dep’t of Human Services v Moon) .................. 886
In re O’Berry (Dep’t of Human Services v O’Berry) .......... 1200
In re Ollie (Dep’t of Human Services v Ollie) ..................... 886
In re Ostrander (Dep’t of Human Services v Ostrander) .. 908
In re Papazian Estate (Papazian v Papazian) ..................... 1185
In re Peoples (Dep’t of Human Services v Peoples) ........... 899
In re Petition of Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure
(Wayne Co Treasurer v Watson) ............................ 981, 1139
In re Raymond Estate (Morse v Sharkey) ........................... 1194
In re Rusiecki Estate (Jensen v Rusiecki) ........................... 923
In re Schneider (Dep’t of Human Services v Sikora) ......... 1165
In re Stienke (Dep’t of Human Services v Delano) ............ 1154
In re Thomas (People v Michael Thomas) ........................... 874
In re Trudel ............................................................................ 1213
In re Truitt Estate (Kienitz v Eisenzoph) ........................... 1134
In re Welsh (Dep’t of Human Services v Welsh) ................. 1106
In re White (Dep’t of Human Services v Kessler) .............. 1022
In re Zimmerman (Johnson v Brown) ................................. 1143
Ingham Circuit Judge, Baublitz v ........................................ 1011
Ingham Co v Capitol City Lodge No 141 of the Fraternal
Order of Police .................................................................. 990
Ingham Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, Carter v .... 892
Ingram, People v (Roummel) ...................................... 927, 1138
Initial Transport, Inc, Dep’t of Transportation v ............... 1044
Irwin Mortgage Corp, Respess v .................................. 889, 1007
Iscaro, People v ...................................................................... 890
Ivy, People v ........................................................................... 1190
lviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
J
J & D Implement, Inc, Laethem Equip Co v ...................... 1074
J B Installed Sales, Inc, Loos v ............................................ 990
JTRB, Inc, Zavradinos v ....................................................... 1080
Jaafar, People v ...................................................................... 1136
Jaakkola v Auto Owners Ins Co ........................................... 1033
Jackson, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Jackson) ......... 1140
Jackson, People v (Alfred) .................................................... 901
Jackson, People v (Bryan) ..................................................... 1033
Jackson, People v (Christine) ............................................... 1003
Jackson, People v (Christopher) ........................................... 1002
Jackson, People v (Corey) ..................................................... 1008
Jackson, People v (Dalaynard) ............................................. 991
Jackson, People v (Ernest) ................................................... 873
Jackson, People v (Fonza) ........................................... 1102, 1192
Jackson, People v (James) .................................................... 957
Jackson, People v (Michael) .................................................. 855
Jackson, People v (Robert) ................................................... 860
Jackson, People v (Tyrone) ................................................... 1010
Jackson, Washington v .......................................................... 1135
Jackson (City of), The Greater Way Bible Way Temple of
Jackson v ........................................................................... 1201
Jackson Co Rd Comm, Hughes v ......................................... 862
Jacoboni v Royal Oak Twp ................................................... 861
Jacobsen, People v ................................................................. 959
Jacoby, People v ..................................................................... 1009
Jacques v Dep’t of Environmental Quality ......................... 1009
Jahed, People v ...................................................................... 1010
Jalovec, People v .................................................................... 926
James, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re James) .............. 904
James, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v James) .............. 904
James, People v (Anthony D) ............................................... 1138
James, People v (Anthony Darryl) ....................................... 1076
James, People v (Anthony Dwayne) ..................................... 1190
James, People v (Derrick) ..................................................... 926
James, People v (Jerald) ....................................................... 1137
James, People v (Laquan) ..................................................... 956
James v State Farm Fire & Cas Co ..................................... 1014
Jenkins v Koester .................................................................. 1036
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lix
P
AGE
Jenkins, People v (Daniels) ................................................... 953
Jenkins, People v (Marquis) ................................................. 1139
Jenkins, People v (Nathaniel) .............................................. 924
Jenkins, People v (William) .................................................. 1134
Jenkins Constr, Inc, Epicentre Strategic Corp-
Michigan v ......................................................................... 927
Jenkins Constr, Inc, Gojcaj v ................................................ 861
Jensen v Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc ................................... 960
Jensen v Rusiecki (In re Rusiecki Estate) ........................... 923
Jiles, People v ........................................................................ 1010
John M Peters, PLC v Kandalaft ......................................... 924
Johnigan, People v ................................................................. 886
Johnson v Brown (In re Zimmerman) ................................. 1143
Johnson v Ford Motor Co ..................................................... 863
Johnson v Gen Motors Corp ................................................. 1076
Johnson v Hurley Med Group, PC ....................................... 1047
Johnson, Manetta v ............................................................... 1076
Johnson v Millennium Treatment Services, LLC ............... 860
Johnson, People v (Anthony) ................................................ 1137
Johnson, People v (Artis) ...................................................... 955
Johnson, People v (Brandon) ......................................... 860, 961
Johnson, People v (Corielle) ................................................. 1191
Johnson, People v (Damon) .................................................. 927
Johnson, People v (Darryl) ................................................... 920
Johnson, People v (Dean) ..................................................... 954
Johnson, People v (Frederick) .............................................. 1076
Johnson, People v (George) .................................................. 861
Johnson, People v (James A) ................................................ 925
Johnson, People v (James E) ................................................ 924
Johnson, People v (Joseph) ................................................... 1119
Johnson, People v (Leon) ...................................................... 1169
Johnson, People v (Marvin) .................................................. 922
Johnson, People v (Michael) ................................................. 1137
Johnson, People v (Raynelle) ................................................ 917
Johnson, People v (Stephen) ................................................ 954
Johnson, People v (Terence) ................................................. 1076
Johnson, People v (Terrise) .................................................. 893
Johnson, People v (Vargas) ................................................... 1012
Johnson v Smith .................................................................... 1162
lx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Johnson, Soulliere v .............................................................. 1076
Johnson v Suburban Mobility Auth Regional
Transportation .................................................................. 930
Jones v Detroit Med Ctr ....................................................... 980
Jones v Olson ......................................................................... 1169
Jones, People v (Alvin) .......................................................... 1135
Jones, People v (Anthony) ........................................... 1012, 1076
Jones, People v (Bernard) ..................................................... 953
Jones, People v (Brian) ................................................ 1003, 1078
Jones, People v (David) ................................................ 926, 1077
Jones, People v (Deangelo) .......................................... 959, 1079
Jones, People v (Dwayne) ............................................ 1005, 1140
Jones, People v (Gregory) ..................................................... 1044
Jones, People v (Jonathan) ................................................... 854
Jones, People v (Larry) ......................................................... 958
Jones, People v (Lonye) ........................................................ 1011
Jones, People v (Phillip) ........................................................ 1006
Jones, People v (Thurman) ............................................ 874, 960
Jones, People v (Tremain) .................................................... 893
Jones v Ribbron ..................................................................... 863
Jordan, Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v ................... 869
Jordan v Mercy Mem Hosp ........................................ 979, 1191
Jordan, People v .................................................................... 950
Judd v Towfiq ........................................................................ 1073
Judge v Judge ........................................................................ 925
Judges Retirement Bd, Caprathe v ...................................... 1036
Judicial Attorneys Ass’n (The), Third Judicial Circuit
Court v ............................................................................... 994
K
Kadzban, In re (People v Kadzban) ..................................... 1148
Kaiser v Allen ...................................................... 31
Kalaj, People v ....................................................................... 855
Kalasho, People v ................................................................... 923
Kallman v Sunseekers Prop Owners Ass’n, LLC ............... 1099
Kaminski, Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v .............. 873
Kammeraad v Auto Sports Unlimited, Inc ......................... 864
Kandalaft v John M Peters, PLC ......................................... 924
Kane, People v ....................................................................... 925
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxi
P
AGE
Kaplan, People v .................................................................... 1186
Kaseta v Binkowski ............................................................... 939
Katona, People v .................................................................... 1135
Kauffman v Preston .............................................................. 1137
Kean, People v (Olatunji) ...................................................... 890
Kean, People v (Tony) ........................................................... 1013
Keast, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Atwood) ............. 862
Keast, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Coppess) ............ 862
Keebler, Downs v .......................................................... 1081, 1104
Keith, People v ....................................................................... 1035
Keller, People v ...................................................................... 1036
Kelley, People v ...................................................................... 920
Kelly, People v ........................................................................ 991
Kelly Trust v Adkison, Need, Green & Allen, PLLC ......... 909
Kemp, People v ...................................................................... 1013
Kendall v State Bar of Michigan .......................................... 861
Kennedy v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan ............. 1001
Kennedy, People v (Dana) ..................................................... 958
Kennedy, People v (David) .................................................... 927
Kenney, Sweet Air Investment, Inc v .................................. 990
Kern, Gaines v ....................................................................... 862
Kerr, People v ......................................................................... 921
Kersey, People v ..................................................................... 860
Kessler, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re White) .............. 1022
Kestner, People v ................................................................... 860
Ketelhut v Ketelhut .............................................................. 1137
Ketterer v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co/Farmer Jack/
Borman’s, Inc .................................................................... 1077
Keys, People v ........................................................................ 857
Khalid, Bailey v ..................................................................... 877
Khalife, People v .................................................................... 1134
Khemmoro Inc v Dep’t of Community Health ................... 891
Khurana v Khurana .............................................................. 859
Kibby, People v ....................................................................... 1191
Kienitz v Eisenzoph (In re Truitt) ....................................... 1134
Kierzak, People v ................................................................... 890
Kik v Sbraccia ...................................................... 75
Kilburn v Progressive Michigan Ins Co .............................. 945
Kim v Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth ........................ 1076
lxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Kimbrough, People v ............................................................. 1187
Kimpson v Botsford Gen Hosp ............................................. 1031
King v Dep’t of Human Services (In re Bell) ...................... 894
King, People v (Jackie Ray) .................................................. 1077
King, People v (Jamal) .......................................................... 860
Kinnison, People v ................................................................. 1183
Kint, People v ................................................................ 857, 1005
Kipfer, People v ...................................................................... 990
Kircher, Barnes v ................................................................... 910
Kircher, Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v ........................................ 910
Kirtdoll, People v ................................................................... 1076
Kissner, People v .................................................................... 1011
Kittka, People v ..................................................................... 893
Klank, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Kuttkuhn) ......... 1072
Klemas, People v .................................................................... 1013
Klock, People v ...................................................................... 1077
Kloian v Van Fossen ..................................................... 1003, 1140
Knajdek, People v .................................................................. 1190
Knappenberger, People v ...................................................... 1189
Kniff, People v ....................................................................... 955
Knowles, People v .................................................................. 861
Knubbe, Portfolio Recovery Assoc v .................................... 920
Koester, Jenkins v ................................................................. 1036
Kone, People v ....................................................................... 929
Korpal v Shaheen .................................................................. 1193
Korpi, People v ....................................................................... 858
Koski, First Nat’l Bank of Crystal Falls v ........................... 921
Koulta v City of Centerline .................................................. 932
Koziarski, Clemens v ............................................................. 1032
Koziarski, MacKenzie v ......................................................... 1032
Krajewski, People v ............................................................... 888
Krzyzaniak, People v ............................................................. 921
Kuczmera v Sappi Fine Paper North America ................... 893
Kusmierz, Struck v ..................................................... 1060, 1192
Kuttkuhn, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Klank) ......... 1072
Kwiatkowski v Coachlight Estates of Blissfield, Inc .......... 1062
Kyle, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Kyle) .................... 1151
Kyle, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Kyle) .................... 1151
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxiii
P
AGE
L
LaBarge v Walgreen Co ......................................................... 1136
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Dykstra ................ 869
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Jordan ................ 869
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Kaminski ............. 873
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Kim ...................... 1076
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Moralez ................ 873
Labor & Economic Growth (Dep’t of) v Nash .................... 873
Laethem Equip Co v J & D Implement, Inc ....................... 1074
LaFountain, People v ............................................................ 862
Lager Estate, In re ................................................................ 1133
Lahtinen v Michigan Ed Support Personnel–WUPEA/
MEA-NEA ......................................................................... 1005
Laidlaw, People v ................................................................... 1186
Lake Forest Partners 2, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury ...... 1046, 1169
Lake Michigan Packaging Products, Inc, Bennett v .......... 1135
Lake States Ins Co v Mason Ins Agency ............................. 1007
Lakies, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Lakies) ............. 1106
Lalone, People v ..................................................................... 860
Lamar v Ramada Franchise Sys, Inc ................................... 880
Lambert, People v .................................................................. 857
Lamkin, People v ................................................................... 958
Lamorand, People v ............................................................... 1111
Lamotte Coachlight Corp, McCoy v ..................................... 1191
Landin, Gross v ..................................................................... 1188
Lang v Flint Bd of Ed ........................................................... 945
Lange v Lange ....................................................................... 950
Lange v St Joseph Mercy Hosp ............................................ 1007
Lanphar v Shisler .................................................................. 1135
Lansing (City of), Buckner Estate v .................................... 895
Lansing (City of), Estate of Buckner v ................................ 1243
Lansing (City of), Mercer v .................................................. 858
Lansing (City of) v State of Michigan ................................. 1104
Lapine, People v .................................................................... 893
Lapine, Inc (R W), Stone v ................................................... 916
LaPlante, People v ................................................................. 1190
Lari, People v ......................................................................... 857
LaRosa, People v .................................................................... 957
Larson, Mather Investors, LLC v ........................................ 1159
lxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Larson, Roberson Builders, Inc v ......................................... 1045
Lasco, People v ....................................................................... 1044
Lasenby, People v ................................................................... 1136
Lassetti, People v ................................................................... 893
Latham v Barton Malow Co ............................... 105
Lathrop, People v .................................................................. 1036
Laurel Woods Apartments v Roumayah .............................. 990
Lavell, People v ...................................................................... 1004
Lawn Works, Melbourne v .................................................... 886
Lawson, People v (James) ..................................................... 1187
Lawson, People v (Richard) .................................................. 1074
Lawton, People v ................................................................... 957
Ledis, Evanish v .................................................................... 1007
Lee, Hilgendorf v ................................................................... 952
Lee, People v (Anthony) ........................................................ 1191
Lee, People v (Donelle) ......................................................... 860
Lee, People v (Jalvelyn) ........................................................ 926
Lee, People v (Kendell) ......................................................... 955
Lee, People v (Kendrick) ....................................................... 1185
Lee, People v (Nathaniel) ..................................................... 854
Lee, People v (Roderick) ....................................................... 1075
Lee, People v (Shedrick) ....................................................... 890
Lee, People v (Theodore) ...................................................... 863
Lee, People v (Vaughn) ......................................................... 1190
Lee, People v (Mario) ............................................................ 1185
Leese v Leese ......................................................................... 1136
Leforge, German v ................................................................. 922
Legg v DaimlerChrysler Corp ............................................... 886
Leiterman, People v .............................................................. 1008
Leitman, Grace v ............................................................ 913, 987
Lenawee Co v Baron ............................................................. 911
Lenawee Co v Gardener ........................................................ 911
Lenawee Co v Halstead ......................................................... 911
Lenawee Co v Sellers ............................................................ 911
Lenawee Co v Wagley ............................................................ 911
Lewis v Bridgman Pub Schools .................................. 1000, 1140
Lewis, People v (Adrian) ....................................................... 1191
Lewis, People v (Charles) ...................................................... 1013
Lewis, People v (Eddie) ......................................................... 862
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxv
P
AGE
Lewis, People v (Jerome) ...................................................... 920
Lewis, People v (Ramie) ........................................................ 889
Lewis, People v (Romonda) ................................................... 925
Lewis-Clark v Glazier ............................................................ 1191
Lexington Ins Co, Griswold Properties, LLC v ................... 1044
Liberty Hill Housing Corp v City of Livonia ..... 44
Liberty Mut Ins Co, Wolverine World Wide, Inc v ............. 928
Lige, People v ......................................................................... 894
Light, People v ....................................................................... 1198
Ligon v City of Detroit .......................................................... 1009
Ligon, People v ...................................................................... 1141
Lindensmith, People v ........................................................... 1008
Lindsey, People v ................................................................... 1136
Link v Thomas Electric, LLC ............................................... 1035
Little, People v ....................................................................... 860
Livingston, People v .............................................................. 860
Livonia Bldg Materials Co v Harrison Constr
Co ....................................................................................... 1005
Livonia (City of), Liberty Hill Housing Corp v .... 44
Ljuljdjuraj v City of Sterling Hts ......................................... 1138
Llanes, People v ..................................................................... 1005
Locklear, People v .................................................................. 893
Long v Children’s Hosp of Michigan ................................... 899
Long, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Long) ................... 1022
Long v Goodson ..................................................................... 1048
Long, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Long) ................... 1022
Long, People v ........................................................................ 953
Long Investment Co, Ltd, E T MacKenzie Co v ................. 926
LoosvJBInstalled Sales, Inc ............................................. 990
Lott, People v (Brian) ............................................................ 911
Lott, People v (Henry) .......................................................... 924
Lotts, People v ....................................................................... 1135
Love, People v (Damon) ........................................................ 1033
Love, People v (Duquil) ............................................... 1044, 1190
Lown, People v ....................................................................... 1010
Ludy, People v ........................................................................ 1010
Lugo, People v ........................................................................ 858
Lumpkin, People v ................................................................. 953
Lyle, People v ......................................................................... 863
lxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Lyon, People v ........................................................................ 1077
Lyons, People v ...................................................................... 958
M
Mack, People v ....................................................................... 927
MacKenzie v Koziarski .......................................................... 1032
MacKenzie Co (E T) v Long Investment Co, Ltd ............... 926
Mackley v Gray ...................................................................... 917
MacLean, People v ................................................................. 1141
Macomb Twp v Michaels ...................................................... 1165
Maddox, People v ................................................................... 862
Madison, People v .................................................................. 1077
Madison Hts (City of) v Elgin Sweeper Co .................1002, 1078
Maguire, People v .................................................................. 928
Major, People v ....................................................................... 1137
Maki, People v ....................................................................... 891
Malik v Salamy ...................................................................... 1074
Malone, People v .................................................................... 1009
Maloy v St John Detroit Riverview Hosp ............................ 915
Maltos, People v ..................................................................... 1004
Mammo, Haddad v ................................................................ 980
Mandeville, Tkachik v ........................................................... 898
Maness v Carlton Pharmacy, LLC ....................................... 1100
Manetta v Johnson ................................................................ 1076
Mankoff, People v .................................................................. 1187
Manning, People v ................................................................. 956
Mannion, People v ................................................................. 861
Manson, People v ................................................................... 893
Manuel v Gill ......................................................................... 929
Manzella v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins ....................... 1115
Manzella v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co ................. 912
Maple Ridge Bldg, Inc, Trzcienski v .................................... 917
Marah, Armada Twp v .......................................................... 910
Marchant, People v ................................................................ 1036
Marderosian, Denk v ................................................ 1076, 1192
Markey, People v .................................................................... 855
Markos, People v ................................................................... 963
Maronek v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc .......................................... 896
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxvii
P
AGE
Marsack, Dowell v ................................................................. 963
Marsh, People v ..................................................................... 1134
Marshall, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Thompson) ... 1022
Marshall, People v ................................................................. 1003
Martell, People v .................................................................... 1141
Marten, People v .................................................................... 853
Marth, People v ..................................................................... 919
Martin, People v (Bernard) ................................................... 1012
Martin, People v (Eric) ......................................................... 952
Martin, People v (Marcus) .................................................... 892
Martin, People v (Salvador) .................................................. 911
Martin, People v (Shawn) ..................................................... 911
Martin v SMG .............................................................. 1043, 1192
Martin v The Rapid Inter-Urban Partnership .................... 936
Martin v The Rapid Inter-Urban Transit Partnership ...... 1052
Martindale, People v (James) ..................................... 1137, 1139
Martinez, People v ................................................................. 956
Martinrea Internat’l, Inc, Smith v ....................................... 945
Mason, People v ..................................................................... 1004
Mason Ins Agency, Lake States Ins Co v ............................ 1007
Masse v Harding .................................................................... 954
Massey, People v .............................................................. 859, 961
Mateo-Castellanos, People v ................................................. 891
Mather Investors, LLC v Larson ......................................... 1159
Mathis v Dep’t of Corrections .............................................. 1141
Mathis, People v (Andre) ...................................................... 858
Mathis, People v (Dennis) ..................................................... 1009
Mathis, People v (Ronald) ..................................................... 1134
Mattoon, People v .................................................................. 1135
Mauer v Topping ................................................................... 912
Mauricio, People v ................................................................. 1077
Maurino v Stern .................................................................... 927
May, Guardian Alarm Co of Michigan v .............................. 1188
May, People v (Anthony) ....................................................... 1136
May, People v (Orlando) ........................................................ 959
May, People v (Paul) .............................................................. 1138
Maybee, People v ................................................................... 1013
Mayberry, People v ................................................................ 861
Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents .................... 1045
lxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
McAlpine v Einstandig .......................................................... 855
McBride, People v .................................................................. 1047
McCabe v Miller & Assoc, LLP ............................................ 1075
McCaleb, People v .................................................................. 1009
McCall, People v (Corey) ....................................................... 1137
McCall, People v (Pierre) ...................................................... 1004
McClellan, People v ............................................................... 1006
McClelland, People v ............................................................. 859
McClendon v Apostolou ........................................................ 977
McClenton, People v .............................................................. 924
McCormick, People v ............................................................. 922
McCoy v Lamotte Coachlight Corp ...................................... 1191
McCoy, People v ..................................................................... 989
McCray, People v (Christopher) ............................................ 1075
McCray, People v (Jeffrey) .................................................... 1189
McCray, People v (Stanley) ................................................... 949
McCummings v Pioneer State Mut Ins Co ......................... 1044
McCune, People v .................................................................. 927
McCutcheon, People v ........................................................... 923
McDaniel, People v ...................................................... 880, 1162
McDaniels, People v .............................................................. 1012
McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co ...................... 191
McDonald, People v (Aaron) ................................................. 1010
McDonald, People v (Demond) ............................................. 1138
McElhaney v Harper-Hutzel Hosp ............................. 853, 1142
McElhaney, McLean v ........................................................... 978
McElroy v Michigan State Police Criminal Justice
Information Ctr ................................................................ 887
McGill, People v ..................................................................... 921
McGinnis, People v ................................................................ 1009
McGuire v City of Dearborn ................................................. 911
McKalpain, People v .............................................................. 1075
Mckay, People v ...................................................................... 1186
McKinney, People v (Clarence) ............................................. 924
McKinney, People v (Mack) .................................................. 892
McLain v Portell .................................................................... 1167
McLaughlin, People v ............................................................ 1005
McLean v McElhaney ............................................................ 978
McLeary, Potter v .................................................................. 915
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxix
P
AGE
McLeod v Dep’t of Treasury ................................................. 1135
McMahon v McMahon ........................................................... 1135
McMaster v Setty .................................................................. 1074
McNamee, People v ..................................................... 955, 1078
McQueen, People v ...................................................... 920, 1034
McShane & Bowie, Paramount Properties Group LLC v .. 1008
Meadows, People v (Bradly) .................................................. 1135
Meadows, People v (Charles) ................................................ 1190
Means, People v ..................................................................... 989
Mecosta Co Rd Comm, Wesche v ........................ 75
Meeks, People v ..................................................................... 950
Meier, People v ....................................................................... 1012
Mejia, People v ....................................................................... 1011
Melbourne v Lawn Works ..................................................... 886
Melbourne v Wayne Bowling & Recreation, Inc ................ 886
Melton, People v .................................................................... 1188
Mendez v Mendez .................................................................. 1008
Menefee v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................ 923
Menken, Basquin v ................................................................ 991
Mercer v City of Lansing ...................................................... 858
Mercer, People v ..................................................................... 1148
Mercy Mem Hosp, Jordan v ....................................... 979, 1191
Mercy Mem Hosp Corp, Hall v ............................................. 1184
Metamora Water Service, Inc, People v ............................... 1003
Metcalf, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Nieminen) ....... 976
Metcalf, People v .................................................................... 1134
Metras, People v .................................................................... 860
Metro v Amway Asia Pacific Ltd .......................................... 868
Meyers, People v (Kevin) ...................................................... 1044
Mgt & Budget (Dep’t of), Wilson v ...................................... 1008
Michaels, Macomb Twp v ..................................................... 1165
Michigan Children’s Institute, Borghese v (In re
Borghese) ................................................................. 976, 1079
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé
Waters North America Inc ............................................... 1203
Michigan Community Action Agency Ass’n v Pub
Service Comm ................................................................... 953
Michigan Court of Appeals, Bellville v ................................ 1220
Michigan Ed Support Personnel–WUPEA/MEA-NEA,
Lahtinen v ......................................................................... 1005
lxx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Michigan Environmental Council v Michigan Pub
Service Comm ................................................................... 1032
Michigan Federation of Teachers & School Related
Personnel, AFT, AFL-CIO v Univ of Michigan .............. 902
Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co, Harrington v ....................... 1033
Michigan Pub Service Comm, Michigan Environmental
Council v ............................................................................ 1032
Michigan Rehabilitation Clinic, Inc, PC v Auto Club
Group Ins Co .............................................................. 913, 914
Michigan State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Corrections ... 950
Michigan (State of), City of Lansing v ................................ 1104
Michigan (State of), Grebner v ............................................ 939
Michigan (State of), Owczarek v .......................................... 1060
Michigan State Police Criminal Justice Information
Ctr, McElroy v ................................................................... 887
Michigan State Univ Bd of Trustees, American
Family Ass’n of Michigan v ............................................. 918
Middleton, People v ............................................................... 964
Mielcarek, People v ................................................................ 1074
Mihelich & Kavanaugh, PLC, Sam’s Town & Country
Market, Inc v ........................................................... 920, 1078
Milbourn, People v ................................................................ 859
Miles, People v ....................................................................... 891
Miljevich Corp v North Country Bank & Trust ................. 1045
Millennium Treatment Services, LLC, Johnson v .............. 860
Miller v Allstate Ins Co ......................................................... 938
Miller, Andris v (Attorney Fees, In re) ................................ 1059
Miller v Auto Zone, Inc ......................................................... 859
Miller, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Collier) ............... 1031
Miller v Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc ........................................ 1105
Miller, Faurot v ...................................................................... 928
Miller v Ford Motor Co (In re Certified Question from
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals Dist of Texas ............. 1203
Miller, People v (Andrew) ..................................................... 949
Miller, People v (Brandon) .................................................... 893
Miller, People v (Dustin) ....................................................... 893
Miller, People v (Frederick) .................................................. 922
Miller, People v (Jeffrey) ....................................................... 897
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxi
P
AGE
Miller v Progressive Corp ..................................................... 998
Miller v Rubin ........................................................................ 862
Miller v Schuchard ................................................................ 1009
Miller & Assoc, LLP, McCabe v ............................................ 1075
Mills, People v (Alphonso) .................................................... 892
Mills, People v (Jeffrey) ........................................................ 891
Milstead, People v ........................................................ 951, 1078
Miltenberger Estate, In re (Eifler v Swartz) ....................... 976
Minter v City of Grand Rapids ................................... 976, 1182
Missouri, People v ................................................................. 1009
Mitan v Reznick .................................................................... 856
Mitchell, People v (Aaron) .................................................... 1188
Mitchell, People v (Delmarey) .............................................. 1005
Mitchell, People v (Derrick) .................................................. 1044
Mitchell, People v (Terry) ..................................................... 1011
Molybdenum Unlimited Co, Franklin Properties LTD v ... 1189
Mona Shores Bd of Ed v Mona Shores Teachers Ed Ass’n ... 1107
Mona Shores Bd of Ed v Mona Shores Teachers Ed
Ass’n, MEA/NEA .............................................................. 1142
Montgomery, People v ........................................................... 858
Moody, People v ..................................................................... 1135
Moon, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Moon) ................. 886
Moon, People v ....................................................................... 944
Moore v Delphi Automotive Sys Corp ................................. 1076
Moore, People v (Andre) ....................................................... 886
Moore, People v (Arnold) ...................................................... 1185
Moore, People v (George) ...................................................... 1136
Moore, People v (Jeffrey) ...................................................... 1008
Moore, People v (Jerry) ......................................................... 1152
Moore, People v (Jesse, Jr.) .................................................. 1138
Moore, People v (Leeclifton) ................................................. 1044
Moore, People v (Phillip) ...................................................... 1033
Moore, People v (Shane) ....................................................... 924
Moore, People v (Terrence) ................................................... 952
Moore, People v (Timothy) ......................................... 1036, 1140
Moore, People v (Tony) ......................................................... 1135
Moore & Carter Lumber Real Estate Co v Hassler ........... 959
Moralez, Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v ................. 873
Morgan, People v (Alex) ........................................................ 1010
lxxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Morgan, People v (Christopher) ........................................... 893
Morgan, People v (Orlando) .................................................. 860
Moritz, People v ..................................................................... 1190
Morris, People v ..................................................................... 958
Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc .............................. 928
Morrison, People v ................................................................. 1139
Morse, People v ...................................................................... 1074
Morse v Sharkey (In re Estate of Raymond) ...................... 1194
Morton, People v .................................................................... 921
Mosher, Dolan, Cataldo & Kelly, Inc v Feinbloom .............. 1077
Mosher, Dolan, Cataldo & Kelly, Inc, Hastings Mut Ins
Co v .................................................................................... 928
Moss, People v (Anthony) ............................................ 921, 1078
Moss, People v (Kim) ............................................................. 856
Mougrabi, People v ................................................................ 893
Moultrie, People v ................................................................. 1187
Moyer v Sieloff ....................................................................... 1034
Mt Clemens Gen Hosp, Stoyka Estate v ............................. 908
Muhammad, People v (El Amin) .......................................... 923
Muhammad, People v (Joan) ................................................ 929
Mulcahy v Verhines ............................................................... 1141
Mullen v Zerfas ...................................................................... 989
Mullins, People v (James) ..................................................... 1013
Mullins, People v (Jon) ......................................................... 1011
Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp ......................................... 948
Mullins v Stanford ................................................................. 1139
Munson Med Ctr, Arsenault v .............................................. 1137
Murdock, American Axle & Mfg, Inc v ................................ 864
Murdock, People v ................................................................. 956
Murphy, People v ................................................................... 954
Murray, People v .................................................................... 1004
Muse, Taylor v ....................................................................... 924
Muskegon Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections ................ 929
Muskegon Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections ................ 1072
Musselman, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co v ................... 1075
Muzyk, People v ..................................................................... 855
Myott, People v ...................................................................... 1012
Myr Industries, Inc (Arthur B), Gee v ....................... 868, 1154
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxiii
P
AGE
N
Nali, People v ......................................................................... 951
Nardi v Satellite Services, Inc .............................................. 891
Nash, Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v ...................... 873
Nash, People v ....................................................................... 991
Nationwide Mut Ins Co, Smart v ......................................... 891
Nature’s Way Properties, LLC, BMJ Engineers &
Surveyors, Inc v ................................................................ 923
Neal, People v (Carl) ............................................................. 1008
Neal, People v (Dawan) ......................................................... 958
Neal, People v (Wesley Jr) .................................................... 1076
Nefcy, Proassurance Corp v .................................................. 916
Nelson, People v (Alonzo) ..................................................... 862
Nelson, People v (Andre) ...................................................... 1010
Nelson, People v (Corey) ....................................................... 1077
Nelson, People v (Joliet, Jr) .................................................. 1189
Nelson, People v (Otis) .......................................................... 1012
Nestlé Waters North America Inc, Michigan Citizens for
Water Conservation v ....................................................... 1203
Neuhaus v Pepsi Cola Metro Bottling Co ............................ 1000
Nevils, Watts v ....................................................................... 1060
New Light Nursing Home Corp, Wayland v ....................... 1194
Newell, People v .................................................................... 1191
Newman v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan ............. 855
Newsome v Bono ................................................................... 852
Newson, People v ................................................................... 1004
Newton, People v ................................................................... 1136
Nguyen, People v ................................................................... 1190
Nichiow-Brubaker, People v .................................................. 1075
Nickson (In re Brown), Dep’t of Human Services v ........... 1107
Nicolaides, People v ............................................................... 1033
Nieminen, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Metcalf) ...... 976
Nierescher, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Archer) ...... 994
Nixon, People v ............................................................... 854, 960
Noble, People v ...................................................................... 856
Nolen v Nolen ........................................................................ 926
Norman, People v .................................................................. 892
North Country Bank & Trust, Miljevich Corp v ................ 1045
Northern, People v ................................................................ 1008
lxxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Northern Michigan Hosp, Downs v ..................................... 1081
Northern Michigan Hosps, Inc, Downs v ............................ 1103
Northville Twp, Toll Northville Ltd v ............... 6
Nuckols v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan ................... 864
Nucraft Furniture Co,
I
NC
, Gordon v ......................................... 1075
Nyx, People v ......................................................................... 1204
O
Oakland Co, Briggs v ............................................................ 1006
Oakland Co, Perez v .............................................................. 934
Oakland Co Rd Comm, Estate Dev Co v ............................. 1137
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, Powell v ..................................... 978
Oakwood Hosp & Med Ctrs, Wyatt v .................................. 1073
O’Berry, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v O’Berry) ......... 1200
Ochoa-Rodriguez, People v ................................................... 1188
Odom, Ford Motor Credit Co v ............................................ 1060
Odom, People v ...................................................................... 1141
Odom v Wayne Co ....................................................... 1015, 1184
Ohlendorf, People v ...................................................... 956, 1078
Oliver, People v ...................................................................... 856
Ollie, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Ollie) .................... 886
Olman, People v ..................................................................... 925
Olsen, People v ...................................................................... 1137
Olson, Jones v ........................................................................ 1169
Omecinskyj, People v ............................................................ 1188
O’Neil Co (W J), Barton Malow Co v .................................. 991
Onumonu, People v ............................................................... 1006
Option One Mortgage Corp, Ursery v ................................. 1141
Oram v Oram ...................................................... 852, 1013, 1163
Orr v Wilshire Credit Corp ................................................... 927
Ort, People v .......................................................................... 855
Ortega, People v .................................................................... 925
Ortiz, People v ....................................................................... 861
Osantowski, People v ............................................................ 961
Osborne v Washtenaw Circuit Judge ................................... 894
Osburn, Inc (Dale), Auto-Owners Ins Co ............................ 921
Ostrander, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Ostrander) .. 908
Ostrander, People v ............................................................... 1189
Otis, People v ................................................................... 886, 960
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxv
P
AGE
Otsego Co, Crawford Co v .................................................... 1132
Ottobre v Hope Network North Michigan .......................... 894
Outley, People v ..................................................................... 889
Overall v Howard .................................................................. 896
Owczarek v State of Michigan .............................................. 1060
Owens, People v (Antjuan) ................................................... 1012
Owens, People v (Gifford) ..................................................... 923
P
PM Group, Inc, Cadle Co II, Inc v ....................................... 1135
Page, People v ........................................................................ 1011
Paladino, People v ................................................................. 950
Palazzolo, People v ................................................................ 1011
Pandy v Bd of Water & Light ............................................... 899
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co v Musselman .................... 1075
Pann, People v ....................................................................... 1033
Panousopoulos, People v ....................................................... 923
Papadelis v City of Troy ........................................................ 863
Papazian v Papazian (In re Estate of Papazian) ................. 1185
Pappas v Bortz Health Care Facilities, Inc ......................... 907
Paramount Properties Group LLC v McShane & Bowie ... 1008
Pardee, People v ..................................................................... 957
Parish, People v ..................................................................... 853
Parker, People v (Jack, Jr) ............................................. 854, 960
Parker, People v (John) ......................................................... 1033
Parks, People v (Angelo) ....................................................... 1011
Parks, People v (Donald) ....................................................... 862
Parks, People v (Michael) ..................................................... 953
Parks, People v (Robert) ....................................................... 1060
Parole Bd, Carless v .............................................................. 1188
Parole Bd, Givans v ............................................................... 859
Passage, People v ................................................................... 1138
Passaro v Taglia, Fette, Dumke & White, PC ..................... 1074
Patel, Brookshire v ................................................................ 980
Patrick v Shaw ....................................................................... 1050
Patterson v Delphi Corp ....................................................... 1168
Patterson, People v (Chester) ............................................... 863
Patterson, People v (Donald) ................................................ 892
Patterson, People v (Gary) .................................................... 911
lxxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Patterson, People v (Kenneth) ............................................. 890
Paus, People v ........................................................................ 911
Pears v Ramsey ...................................................................... 901
Pelichet, People v ................................................................... 922
Pellot, People v ...................................................................... 1077
Pendergrass, People v ............................................................ 955
Penigar, People v .................................................................... 1188
People v Aaron ....................................................................... 1134
People v Abby ........................................................................ 1003
People v Abdellatif ................................................................. 1010
People v Abraham ................................................................. 1007
People v Aceval ...................................................................... 1108
People v Acosta ...................................................................... 925
People v Adams ...................................................................... 861
People v Aguirre .................................................................... 1186
People v Akans ....................................................................... 926
People v Al-Khalil .................................................................. 890
People v Albert ...................................................................... 1188
People v Alexander (Michael) ..................................... 920, 1034
People v Alexander (Teddy) .................................................. 855
People v Alfiero ...................................................................... 862
People v Alford ...................................................................... 1009
People v Alfrey ....................................................................... 1012
People v Allen (Herbert) ....................................................... 1191
People v Allen (Norman) ...................................................... 859
People v Allen (Roxie) ........................................................... 958
People v Alspaugh ................................................................. 919
People v Altman .................................................................... 1074
People v Altoonian ................................................................. 954
People v Amaro ............................................................ 925, 1078
People v Ambrose ......................................................... 1005, 1140
People v Amos ........................................................................ 852
People v Anderson (Andy) .................................................... 1189
People v Anderson (Anthony) ............................................... 865
People v Anderson (Brian) .................................................... 959
People v Anderson (Eric) ...................................................... 959
People v Anderson (Harold) ................................................. 1074
People v Anderson (Robert) .................................................. 955
People v Anderson (Ronnie) ................................................. 954
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxvii
P
AGE
People v Andrews (Dean) ...................................................... 1003
People v Andrews (Ravis) ..................................................... 928
People v Andrews (Robert) ................................................... 1033
People v Andrews (Stephen) ................................................. 891
People v Appenzeller ............................................................. 1147
People v Applewhite .............................................................. 1010
People v Ardito ...................................................................... 1013
People v Armstrong ............................................................... 952
People v Arnold ...................................................................... 1075
People v Arrahmaan .............................................................. 1009
People v Arzola ...................................................................... 1075
People v Ashford .................................................................... 1135
People v Aslani ...................................................................... 1190
People v Ata ........................................................................... 1186
People v Atkins ...................................................................... 859
People v Aurich ...................................................................... 959
People v Austin ...................................................................... 1011
People v Aylward ................................................................... 945
People v Backus ..................................................................... 1002
People v Bailey (Antonio) ..................................................... 886
People v Bailey (Mark) .......................................................... 1074
People v Bailey (William) ...................................................... 925
People v Baker (Altoney) ...................................................... 1012
People v Baker (Curtis) ......................................................... 1189
People v Baker (Lawrence, Jr.) ............................................. 1138
People v Baker (Leonard) ..................................................... 1189
People v Baker (Michael) ...................................................... 922
People v Baldwin ................................................................... 901
People v Bales ........................................................................ 928
People v Ballard (Darryl) ...................................................... 1074
People v Ballard (Franklin) .................................................. 890
People v Banks (Jeremy) ...................................................... 925
People v Banks (Kena) .......................................................... 1009
People v Bankston ................................................................. 1013
People v Barlow ..................................................................... 1138
People v Barnard ............................................................. 860, 961
People v Barnes (Jeffery) ...................................................... 1134
People v Barnes (Patrick) ..................................................... 1075
People v Barrett ................................................... 125
lxxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Basat ........................................................................ 1186
People v Bass (Amor) ............................................................ 1004
People v Bass (Gerald) .......................................................... 945
People v Bates ........................................................................ 854
People v Baumer .................................................................... 856
People v Bays ......................................................................... 860
People v Beacham .................................................................. 862
People v Beer ......................................................................... 1077
People v Belcher .................................................................... 890
People v Belcourt ................................................................... 854
People v Bell (Anthony) ........................................................ 1060
People v Bell (Charles) .......................................................... 1013
People v Bell (Harold) ........................................................... 947
People v Bell (James) ............................................................ 1190
People v Bell (Keith) ............................................................. 893
People v Bell (Stevenson) ...................................................... 1012
People v Bell (Tyrone) ........................................................... 951
People v Bellamy ................................................................... 1188
People v Belser ....................................................................... 1137
People v Bennett .................................................................... 1118
People v Bentley .................................................................... 1076
People v Berg ......................................................................... 863
People v Bernaiche ................................................................ 1046
People v Bernard ................................................................... 920
People v Berry (Dwayne) ...................................................... 889
People v Berry (Tony) ........................................................... 891
People v Beverly .................................................................... 851
People v Binyard .................................................................... 857
People v Bird .......................................................................... 1011
People v Blackston ................................................................ 929
People v Blanks ............................................................. 914, 1006
People v Blosser ..................................................................... 861
People v Blunt ....................................................................... 1010
People v Boler ........................................................................ 1003
People v Bond (Andre) .......................................................... 1114
People v Bond (Kevin) ........................................................... 1138
People v Bonior ...................................................................... 1032
People v Bonnell .................................................................... 957
People v Booth ....................................................................... 1009
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxix
P
AGE
People v Borgne ..................................................................... 1193
People v Boss ......................................................................... 1008
People v Botello ..................................................................... 1138
People v Bourne ..................................................................... 950
People v Bowman .................................................................. 1138
People v Boxley ...................................................................... 1189
People v Braddock ................................................................. 925
People v Bradley .................................................................... 861
People v Brand ....................................................................... 1075
People v Brandow .................................................................. 1075
People v Brantley .................................................................. 1033
People v Braswell .................................................................. 923
People v Brewer ..................................................................... 1013
People v Bridges .................................................................... 858
People v Briggs ...................................................................... 1034
People v Brinker .................................................................... 925
People v Broadnax ................................................................. 859
People v Brodie ...................................................................... 893
People v Brooks (Carl) .......................................................... 1033
People v Brooks (Jeremiah) .................................................. 951
People v Brooks (Julian) ....................................................... 890
People v Brown (Aaron) ........................................................ 1135
People v Brown (Aaron Todd) .............................................. 853
People v Brown (Cornelius) .................................................. 950
People v Brown (Dane) ......................................................... 1076
People v Brown (Grady) ........................................................ 1013
People v Brown (Kenneth) .................................................... 1187
People v Brown (Kevin) ........................................................ 1077
People v Brown (Lavonn) ..................................................... 855
People v Brown (Mark) ......................................................... 1077
People v Brown (Michael) ..................................................... 959
People v Brown (Wayne) ....................................................... 945
People v Brownlow ................................................................ 919
People v Brownrigg ............................................................... 1169
People v Broyles .............................................................. 857, 953
People v Bryant ..................................................................... 926
People v Buchan .................................................................... 1139
People v Buie ......................................................................... 1187
People v Buley ....................................................................... 1189
lxxx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Burch ....................................................................... 886
People v Burger ..................................................................... 921
People v Burk ........................................................................ 1075
People v Burke ................................................................ 889, 961
People v Burkes ..................................................................... 861
People v Burks ....................................................................... 1032
People v Burnett (Germain) ................................................. 1146
People v Burnett (Shawn) ..................................................... 1003
People v Burrel ...................................................................... 856
People v Burrell ..................................................................... 1077
People v Bushey ..................................................................... 1006
People v Butler ...................................................................... 888
People v Butz (Frank) ................................................. 896, 1074
People v Byrd ......................................................................... 920
People v Cadarette ................................................................. 900
People v Cage ......................................................................... 1137
People v Calbert ..................................................................... 1146
People v Calhoun ................................................................... 891
People v Calvin ...................................................................... 1190
People v Camp ....................................................................... 1022
People v Cannon .................................................................... 859
People v Carethers ................................................................ 959
People v Carico ............................................................ 864, 1185
People v Carlton .................................................................... 952
People v Carmichael .............................................................. 891
People v Caroen ..................................................................... 1002
People v Carpenter ................................................................ 1137
People v Carroll ..................................................................... 1009
People v Carswell ................................................................... 1185
People v Carter (Darius) ....................................................... 926
People v Carter (Kewayne) ................................................... 854
People v Carter (Steven) .................................... 938, 1011, 1063
People v Caschera .................................................................. 886
People v Castaneda ................................................................ 922
People v Castle ....................................................................... 923
People v Catanzaro ................................................................ 1075
People v Cathron .......................................................... 958, 1079
People v Cauvin ..................................................................... 922
People v Ceasor ...................................................................... 926
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxxi
P
AGE
People v Cervi ........................................................................ 1002
People v Chahine ................................................................... 1168
People v Chambless ............................................................... 1044
People v Champion ................................................................ 1190
People v Chapman (Aaron) ................................................... 958
People v Chapman (Anthony) ............................................... 955
People v Charvat ................................................................... 1191
People v Cheatham ................................................................ 1011
People v Cheese ..................................................................... 1190
People v Cherry ..................................................................... 1186
People v Childs ...................................................................... 951
People v Chittick ................................................................... 928
People v Choyce ..................................................................... 926
People v Christ ...................................................................... 1186
People v Christian-Bates ....................................................... 1015
People v Christle .................................................................... 1005
People v Cieslinski ................................................................. 955
People v Cintron .................................................................... 1189
People v Clark (Alphonso) .................................................... 893
People v Clark (George) ........................................................ 1032
People v Clark (Michael) ....................................................... 855
People v Clark (Paul) ............................................................ 864
People v Clark (Stephan) ...................................................... 926
People v Claudio .................................................................... 1189
People v Clay .......................................................................... 856
People v Clayton (Derrick) ................................................... 1138
People v Clayton (Julius) ...................................................... 922
People v Clements ................................................................. 1136
People v Clemmons ............................................................... 862
People v Cline ........................................................................ 1134
People v Cloy .......................................................................... 1004
People v Cobas ....................................................................... 955
People v Coburn .................................................................... 957
People v Cochrane (Ronald) ................................................. 1190
People v Cochrane (Stephan) ............................................... 1005
People v Cochrane (Tony) ..................................................... 1075
People v Colbert ..................................................................... 1033
People v Cole (Jacqueline) .................................................... 859
People v Cole (Jennifer) ........................................................ 1033
lxxxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Cole (Rashaan) ....................................................... 861
People v Coleman (Antonio) ................................................. 926
People v Coleman (Cleveland) .............................................. 952
People v Coleman (Derrick) .................................................. 863
People v Coleman (Sonya) .................................................... 925
People v Coley ........................................................................ 952
People v Collins (Breelove) ................................................... 956
People v Collins (Derrick) ..................................................... 860
People v Collins (Earland) .................................................... 924
People v Collins (Jarrod) ....................................................... 1136
People v Comonte .................................................................. 1033
People v Compeau ................................................................. 929
People v Conely ...................................................................... 1012
People v Cooper (James) ....................................................... 892
People v Cooper (John) ................................................ 957, 1078
People v Cooper (Tyrone) ..................................................... 1189
People v Cottrell .................................................................... 916
People v Couzens ................................................. 240
People v Cox ........................................................................... 953
People v Crabtree .................................................................. 854
People v Crapoff .................................................................... 1075
People v Crawford ........................................................ 925, 1078
People v Creeden ................................................................... 1076
People v Crimes ..................................................................... 1189
People v Criston ..................................................................... 921
People v Cron .................................................................. 856, 999
People v Crowe ...................................................................... 925
People v Cunningham (Dion) ............................................... 1138
People v Cunningham (James) ............................................. 1137
People v Cureton ................................................................... 897
People v Currier (Kevin) ....................................................... 1033
People v Dado .................................................................. 855, 960
People v Dalgliesh ................................................................. 958
People v Dalton ...................................................................... 960
People v D’Antonio ................................................................ 926
People v Darby (Greg) ........................................................... 1013
People v Darby (Michael) ...................................................... 1012
People v David (Jack) ............................................................ 1185
People v David (John) ........................................................... 860
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxxiii
P
AGE
People v Davis (Anthony) ..................................................... 924
People v Davis (Antonio) ...................................................... 857
People v Davis (Charles) ....................................................... 1075
People v Davis (Detrick) ....................................................... 859
People v Davis (Donnie) ........................................................ 889
People v Davis (Ezekiel) ........................................................ 1075
People v Davis (Henry) ......................................................... 1073
People v Davis (Lynn) ........................................................... 1010
People v Davis (Michael) ....................................................... 1148
People v Davis (Montrey) ...................................................... 1138
People v Davis (Perry) ................................................. 1005, 1078
People v Davis (Shawn) ........................................................ 955
People v Davis (Stanley) ....................................................... 855
People v Davis (Terry) .......................................................... 1010
People v Davis (Troy) ............................................................ 963
People v Dawkins .................................................................. 855
People v Dawson .................................................................... 958
People v Deals ........................................................................ 920
People v Dean ........................................................................ 954
People v Deberry ................................................................... 1134
People v DeKubber ................................................................ 1051
People v DeLeon .................................................................... 1141
People v Deleon-Puentes ....................................................... 1138
People v Demann ................................................................... 1135
People v Dennis ..................................................................... 864
People v Denson .................................................................... 890
People v Dent ......................................................................... 1189
People v Denton ..................................................................... 925
People v Devore ..................................................................... 919
People v Dewulf ..................................................................... 1032
People v Diaz ......................................................................... 1185
People v Dickson .......................................................... 1003, 1140
People v Dillahunty ............................................................... 958
People v Dilsworth ................................................................ 890
People v Dinoffria .................................................................. 886
People v Dipzinski ................................................................. 938
People v Disney ...................................................................... 858
People v Dixon ....................................................................... 954
People v Dobek ...................................................................... 897
lxxxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Dobra ....................................................................... 911
People v Dobson ..................................................................... 856
People v Dodaj ....................................................................... 925
People v Dolph-Hostetter ...................................................... 901
People v Domine .................................................................... 959
People v Donaldson ............................................................... 921
People v Dorsey (Jarrett) ...................................................... 951
People v Dorsey (Tyrone) ...................................................... 1136
People v Doss ......................................................................... 859
People v Douglas (Jamaal) .................................................... 1186
People v Douglas (Ronald) .................................................... 856
People v Dove ......................................................................... 1009
People v Dowell ...................................................................... 951
People v Downing .................................................................. 954
People v Drain ....................................................................... 1010
People v Draughn .................................................................. 1186
People v Dunlap ..................................................................... 1011
People v Dunmire .................................................................. 1190
People v Dunson .................................................................... 959
People v Duran ...................................................................... 1187
People v Durand Clinic, PC .................................................. 951
People v Duyst ....................................................................... 1055
People v Earegood ................................................................. 890
People v Eatmon .................................................................... 922
People v Echols ...................................................................... 1010
People v Edmonds ................................................................. 924
People v Edmunds ................................................................. 893
People v Effinger .......................................................... 1003, 1140
People v Elie .......................................................................... 1191
People v Ely ........................................................................... 856
People v English .................................................................... 1060
People v Erlich ....................................................................... 957
People v Ertman .................................................................... 1012
People v Ervin ........................................................................ 1009
People v Evans (Archie) ........................................................ 1187
People v Evans (Delano) ....................................................... 1136
People v Evans (Jeffrey) ....................................................... 922
People v Evans (Michael) ...................................................... 901
People v Everette ................................................................... 910
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxxv
P
AGE
People v Fabian ...................................................................... 923
People v Faidley ..................................................................... 952
People v Fairley ..................................................................... 1139
People v Fannin ..................................................................... 953
People v Farmer ..................................................................... 1044
People v Farraj ....................................................................... 862
People v Farrow ..................................................................... 1136
People v Favors ...................................................................... 1134
People v Fawaz ...................................................................... 860
People v Fay ........................................................................... 854
People v Feliciano .................................................................. 1138
People v Ferguson (Curtis) ................................................... 956
People v Ferguson (Eric) ....................................................... 1134
People v Fields (Edmund) ..................................................... 925
People v Fields (Frederick) ................................................... 889
People v Filipiak .................................................................... 1077
People v Fish .......................................................................... 964
People v Fisher (Glenn) ........................................................ 853
People v Fisher (Marquis) .................................................... 928
People v Fisher (Robert) ....................................................... 861
People v Flennoy ................................................................... 1188
People v Fletcher (James) ..................................................... 949
People v Fletcher (Melissa) ................................................... 865
People v Flood ........................................................................ 891
People v Flores ....................................................................... 1077
People v Flowers (Jesse) ....................................................... 1076
People v Flowers (Joseph) .................................................... 1012
People v Floyd ........................................................................ 887
People v Fluckes .................................................................... 861
People v Fonville .................................................................... 1136
People v Ford (Edwin, III) .................................................... 1135
People v Ford (Elijah) ........................................................... 1006
People v Ford (Riley) ............................................................. 922
People v Foster (Morris) ....................................................... 952
People v Foster (Ronald) ....................................................... 1188
People v Foster (Sheamekia) ................................................ 1075
People v Fountain .................................................................. 1006
People v Frailey ..................................................................... 1138
People v Franta ..................................................................... 958
lxxxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Frasure .................................................................... 919
People v Frazier (Corey) ....................................................... 935
People v Frazier (Otis) .......................................................... 885
People v Fritz ......................................................................... 1010
People v Fry ........................................................................... 925
People v Fuller ....................................................................... 1187
People v Fulton ...................................................................... 959
People v Fuqua ...................................................................... 1011
People v Gales ........................................................................ 926
People v Galineau .................................................................. 1033
People v Galka ....................................................................... 858
People v Galvin ...................................................................... 951
People v Garrett .................................................................... 894
People v Garrison .................................................................. 1006
People v Gary ......................................................................... 1074
People v Garza ....................................................................... 924
People v Gatlin ...................................................................... 957
People v Gee ........................................................................... 1013
People v Geno ........................................................................ 957
People v George (Bruce) ....................................................... 1010
People v George (John) ......................................................... 1033
People v Germain .................................................................. 920
People v Gerred ..................................................................... 1033
People v Giacolone ................................................................. 1137
People v Gibbons ................................................................... 1135
People v Gibson (Don) .......................................................... 952
People v Gibson (Gregory) .................................................... 856
People v Gidron ..................................................................... 891
People v Gilbert (Jessie) ....................................................... 1138
People v Gilbert (Nathaniel) ................................................. 1188
People v Gillam (Reginald) ................................................... 1188
People v Gillam (Timothy) .................................................... 1005
People v Glassbrook .............................................................. 859
People v Gleason .................................................................... 952
People v Gloster ..................................................................... 893
People v Glover ...................................................................... 1033
People v Gogins ..................................................................... 917
People v Goins ....................................................................... 859
People v Golden ..................................................................... 919
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxxvii
P
AGE
People v Goldring .................................................................. 1010
People v Goldstick ................................................................. 1074
People v Gollman ................................................................... 921
People v Gonzalez (Carlos) ................................................... 1150
People v Gonzalez (Miguel) .................................................. 860
People v Gonzalez (Orlando) ................................................ 927
People v Goodell .................................................................... 1134
People v Goodger ................................................................... 910
People v Goodman (Curtis) ................................................... 1051
People v Goodman (Geoffrey) ............................................... 855
People v Goodwin .................................................................. 1018
People v Goree ....................................................................... 951
People v Gould (Danny) ........................................................ 1133
People v Gould (Rand) .................................................... 854, 960
People v Gowing (Delmar) .................................................... 889
People v Gowing (Donald) .................................................... 889
People v Goza ......................................................................... 955
People v Grabiec .................................................................... 1036
People v Grandberry ............................................................. 922
People v Gray ......................................................................... 859
People v Grays ....................................................................... 1076
People v Green (Anthony) .................................................... 1011
People v Green (Curtis) ........................................................ 922
People v Green (Ernest) ........................................................ 922
People v Green (Jason) ......................................................... 955
People v Green (Wendell) ...................................................... 956
People v Greene (Chozen) ..................................................... 1076
People v Greene (Loren) ....................................................... 864
People v Greenhill ................................................................. 917
People v Griffin (Damaine) ................................................... 860
People v Griffin (Randall) ..................................................... 854
People v Grissom ................................................................... 1140
People v Groesbeck (Gary) ................................................... 886
People v Groesbeck (Joseph) ................................................ 861
People v Gross ....................................................................... 851
People v Grossnickle ............................................................. 954
People v Grumbley ................................................................ 854
People v Gulley ...................................................................... 1187
People v Guthrie .................................................................... 889
lxxxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Gutlerrez ................................................................. 934
People v Gwizdala ................................................................. 893
People v Hahn ........................................................................ 1136
People v Hale ......................................................................... 1009
People v Hall (David) ............................................................ 1194
People v Hall (Ernest) ........................................................... 860
People v Hall (Frankie) ......................................................... 888
People v Hall (Michael) ......................................................... 854
People v Hall (Michael J) ...................................................... 1077
People v Hall (Nolan) ............................................................ 1008
People v Hamilton (Gregory) ................................................ 1191
People v Hamilton (Jeffrey) .................................................. 954
People v Hamilton (Timothy) ............................................... 956
People v Hammond ............................................................... 887
People v Hampton ................................................................. 1008
People v Hanible .................................................................... 1075
People v Hanks ...................................................................... 1008
People v Hanna ...................................................................... 1009
People v Hansend .................................................................. 964
People v Hapeman ................................................................. 855
People v Hardin ..................................................................... 891
People v Hardrick .................................................................. 1004
People v Hardy ...................................................................... 951
People v Haremza .................................................................. 886
People v Harlan ..................................................................... 858
People v Harper (Calvin) ...................................................... 1005
People v Harper (Charles) .................................................... 950
People v Harris (Ameir) ........................................................ 1189
People v Harris (Issac) .......................................................... 911
People v Harris (Jeffrey) ....................................................... 857
People v Harris (Lewis) ......................................................... 1188
People v Harris (Melody) ...................................................... 897
People v Harris (Taureen) .................................................... 920
People v Harris (Terrance) ................................................... 861
People v Hart ......................................................................... 1076
People v Hartman .................................................................. 1058
People v Harvey (Chari) ........................................................ 1136
People v Harvey (Kim) .......................................................... 1191
People v Harvey (Marcus) ..................................................... 953
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
lxxxix
P
AGE
People v Hasselbring ............................................................. 945
People v Hastings .................................................................. 864
People v Hatchett .................................................................. 861
People v Hatter ...................................................................... 1141
People v Hawthorne ............................................ 913, 1000, 1185
People v Hayes ....................................................................... 927
People v Haymer ................................................................... 1002
People v Head ........................................................................ 866
People v Hearn ...................................................................... 957
People v Heath ....................................................................... 1136
People v Hemp .............................................................. 957, 1078
People v Henderson ............................................................... 1191
People v Hendricks ................................................................ 951
People v Henning .................................................................. 1005
People v Herholtz .................................................................. 856
People v Hernandez-Diaz ...................................................... 1188
People v Hernandez-Orta ..................................................... 1101
People v Hicks (Dustin) ........................................................ 1012
People v Hicks (Rodney) .............................................. 921, 1034
People v Hicks (Terance) ...................................................... 898
People v Hill (Jonathan) ................................... 910, 919, 1005
People v Hill (Ranis) ....................................................... 859, 924
People v Hilliard .................................................................... 892
People v Hills ......................................................................... 1188
People v Hilton ................................................................ 888, 894
People v Hinds ....................................................................... 1186
People v Hines ....................................................................... 1033
People v Hobson .................................................................... 1012
People v Hodo ........................................................................ 991
People v Hoffman (Curtis) .................................................... 858
People v Hoffman (Robert) ................................................... 874
People v Hogan ...................................................................... 1134
People v Holder ..................................................................... 991
People v Holland .................................................................... 855
People v Holley .................................................... 222
People v Hollis ....................................................................... 1006
People v Holmes .................................................................... 888
People v Holoweski ................................................................ 919
People v Holzer ...................................................................... 955
xc 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Hopkins (Christopher) ........................................... 1006
People v Hopkins (Lance) ..................................................... 1162
People v Hopson .................................................................... 1061
People v Horan ...................................................................... 1011
People v Horne ...................................................................... 892
People v Horton ..................................................................... 987
People v Hoskins ................................................................... 868
People v Houghtaling ............................................................ 864
People v Houlihan ................................................................. 1165
People v Houston ......................................................... 1004, 1078
People v Howard (Bruce) ...................................................... 1013
People v Howard (Deshawn) ................................................ 1188
People v Hubbard (Alton) ..................................................... 856
People v Hubbard (Anthony) ................................................ 888
People v Hubbard (Idolthus) ................................................ 859
People v Hubbard (Rodney) ......................................... 898, 1006
People v Huck ........................................................................ 1077
People v Huckaby .................................................................. 1010
People v Huerta-Rodriguez ................................................... 1186
People v Huff ......................................................................... 924
People v Hulbert .................................................................... 1184
People v Hull .......................................................................... 892
People v Humphrey (Jeffrey) ......................................... 856, 958
People v Humphrey (Joey) .................................................... 958
People v Hunter ..................................................................... 923
People v Hurt ......................................................................... 958
People v Huston ..................................................................... 923
People v Ingram (Roummel) ......................................... 927, 1138
People v Iscaro ....................................................................... 890
People v Ivy ............................................................................ 1190
People v Jaafar ...................................................................... 1136
People v Jackson (Alfred) ..................................................... 901
People v Jackson (Bryan) ...................................................... 1033
People v Jackson (Christine) ................................................ 1003
People v Jackson (Christopher) ............................................ 1002
People v Jackson (Corey) ...................................................... 1008
People v Jackson (Dalaynard) .............................................. 991
People v Jackson (Ernest) .................................................... 873
People v Jackson (Fonza) ............................................ 1102, 1192
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xci
P
AGE
People v Jackson (James) ..................................................... 957
People v Jackson (Michael) ................................................... 855
People v Jackson (Robert) .................................................... 860
People v Jackson (Tyrone) .................................................... 1010
People v Jacobsen .................................................................. 959
People v Jacoby ...................................................................... 1009
People v Jahed ....................................................................... 1010
People v Jalovec ..................................................................... 926
People v James (Anthony D) ................................................ 1138
People v James (Anthony Darryl)) ....................................... 1076
People v James (Anthony Dwayne) ...................................... 1190
People v James (Derrick) ...................................................... 926
People v James (Jerald) ........................................................ 1137
People v James (Laquan) ...................................................... 956
People v Jenkins (Daniel) ..................................................... 953
People v Jenkins (Marquis) .................................................. 1139
People v Jenkins (Nathaniel) ............................................... 924
People v Jenkins (William) ................................................... 1134
People v Jiles ......................................................................... 1010
People v Johnigan .................................................................. 886
People v Johnson (Anthony) ................................................. 1137
People v Johnson (Artis) ....................................................... 955
People v Johnson (Brandon) .......................................... 860, 961
People v Johnson (Corielle) .................................................. 1191
People v Johnson (Damon) ................................................... 927
People v Johnson (Darryl) .................................................... 920
People v Johnson (Dean) ...................................................... 954
People v Johnson (Frederick) ............................................... 1076
People v Johnson (George) ................................................... 861
People v Johnson (James A) ................................................. 925
People v Johnson (James E).................................................. 924
People v Johnson (Joseph) .................................................... 1119
People v Johnson (Leon) ....................................................... 1169
People v Johnson (Marvin) ................................................... 922
People v Johnson (Michael) .................................................. 1137
People v Johnson (Raynelle) ................................................. 917
People v Johnson (Stephen) ................................................. 954
People v Johnson (Terence) .................................................. 1076
People v Johnson (Terrise) ................................................... 893
xcii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Johnson (Vargas) .................................................... 1012
People v Jones (Alvin) ........................................................... 1135
People v Jones (Anthony) ............................................ 1012, 1076
People v Jones (Bernard) ...................................................... 953
People v Jones (Brian) ................................................ 1003, 1078
People v Jones (David) ................................................. 926, 1077
People v Jones (Deangelo) ........................................... 959, 1079
People v Jones (Dwayne) ............................................. 1005, 1140
People v Jones (Gregory) ...................................................... 1044
People v Jones (Jonathan) .................................................... 854
People v Jones (Larry) .......................................................... 958
People v Jones (Lonye) ......................................................... 1011
People v Jones (Phillip) ......................................................... 1006
People v Jones (Thurman) ............................................. 874, 960
People v Jones (Tremain) ..................................................... 893
People v Jordan ..................................................................... 950
People v Kadzban (In re Kadzban) ...................................... 1148
People v Kalaj ........................................................................ 855
People v Kalasho .................................................................... 923
People v Kane ........................................................................ 925
People v Kaplan ..................................................................... 1186
People v Katona ..................................................................... 1135
People v Kean (Olatunji) ....................................................... 890
People v Kean (Tony) ............................................................ 1013
People v Keith ........................................................................ 1035
People v Keller ....................................................................... 1036
People v Kelley ....................................................................... 920
People v Kelly ........................................................................ 991
People v Kemp ....................................................................... 1013
People v Kennedy (Dana) ...................................................... 958
People v Kennedy (David) ..................................................... 927
People v Kerr ......................................................................... 921
People v Kersey ...................................................................... 860
People v Kestner .................................................................... 860
People v Keys ......................................................................... 857
People v Khalife ..................................................................... 1134
People v Kibby ....................................................................... 1191
People v Kierzak .................................................................... 890
People v Kimbrough .............................................................. 1187
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xciii
P
AGE
People v King (Jackie Ray) ................................................... 1077
People v King (Jamal) ........................................................... 860
People v Kinnison .................................................................. 1183
People v Kint ................................................................. 857, 1005
People v Kipfer ...................................................................... 990
People v Kirtdoll .................................................................... 1076
People v Kissner .................................................................... 1011
People v Kittka ...................................................................... 893
People v Klemas ..................................................................... 1013
People v Klock ....................................................................... 1077
People v Knajdek ................................................................... 1190
People v Knappenberger ....................................................... 1189
People v Kniff ........................................................................ 955
People v Knowles ................................................................... 861
People v Kone ........................................................................ 929
People v Korpi ........................................................................ 858
People v Krajewski ................................................................ 888
People v Krzyzaniak .............................................................. 921
People v LaFountain ............................................................. 862
People v Laidlaw .................................................................... 1186
People v Lalone ...................................................................... 860
People v Lambert ................................................................... 857
People v Lamkin .................................................................... 958
People v Lamorand ................................................................ 1111
People v Lapine ..................................................................... 893
People v LaPlante .................................................................. 1190
People v Lari .......................................................................... 857
People v LaRosa ..................................................................... 957
People v Lasco ........................................................................ 1044
People v Lasenby ................................................................... 1136
People v Lassetti .................................................................... 893
People v Lathrop ................................................................... 1036
People v Lavell ....................................................................... 1004
People v Lawson (James) ...................................................... 1187
People v Lawson (Richard) ................................................... 1074
People v Lawton .................................................................... 957
People v Lee (Anthony) ......................................................... 1191
People v Lee (Donelle) .......................................................... 860
People v Lee (Jalvelyn) ......................................................... 926
xciv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Lee (Kendell) .......................................................... 955
People v Lee (Kendrick) ........................................................ 1185
People v Lee (Mario) ............................................................. 1185
People v Lee (Nathaniel) ...................................................... 854
People v Lee (Roderick) ........................................................ 1075
People v Lee (Shedrick) ........................................................ 890
People v Lee (Theodore) ....................................................... 863
People v Lee (Vaughn) .......................................................... 1190
People v Leiterman ............................................................... 1008
People v Lewis (Adrian) ........................................................ 1191
People v Lewis (Charles) ....................................................... 1013
People v Lewis (Eddie) .......................................................... 862
People v Lewis (Jerome) ....................................................... 920
People v Lewis (Ramie) ......................................................... 889
People v Lewis (Romonda) .................................................... 925
People v Lige .......................................................................... 894
People v Light ........................................................................ 1198
People v Ligon ....................................................................... 1141
People v Lindensmith ............................................................ 1008
People v Lindsey .................................................................... 1136
People v Little ........................................................................ 860
People v Livingston ............................................................... 860
People v Llanes ...................................................................... 1005
People v Locklear .................................................................. 893
People v Long ......................................................................... 953
People v Lott (Brian) ............................................................. 911
People v Lott (Henry) ........................................................... 924
People v Lotts ........................................................................ 1135
People v Love (Damon) ......................................................... 1033
People v Love (Duquil) ................................................ 1044, 1190
People v Lown ........................................................................ 1010
People v Ludy ........................................................................ 1010
People v Lugo ......................................................................... 858
People v Lumpkin .................................................................. 953
People v Lyle .......................................................................... 863
People v Lyon ......................................................................... 1077
People v Lyons ....................................................................... 958
People v Mack ........................................................................ 927
People v MacLean .................................................................. 1141
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xcv
P
AGE
People v Maddox .................................................................... 862
People v Madison ................................................................... 1077
People v Maguire ................................................................... 928
People v Major ....................................................................... 1137
People v Maki ........................................................................ 891
People v Malone ..................................................................... 1009
People v Maltos ...................................................................... 1004
People v Mankoff ................................................................... 1187
People v Manning .................................................................. 956
People v Mannion .................................................................. 861
People v Manson .................................................................... 893
People v Marchant ................................................................. 1036
People v Markey .................................................................... 855
People v Markos .................................................................... 963
People v Marsh ...................................................................... 1134
People v Marshall .................................................................. 1003
People v Martell ..................................................................... 1141
People v Marten ..................................................................... 853
People v Marth ...................................................................... 919
People v Martin (Bernard) .................................................... 1012
People v Martin (Eric) .......................................................... 952
People v Martin (Marcus) ..................................................... 892
People v Martin (Salvador) ................................................... 911
People v Martin (Shawn) ...................................................... 911
People v Martindale (James) ...................................... 1137, 1139
People v Martinez .................................................................. 956
People v Mason ...................................................................... 1004
People v Massey .............................................................. 859, 961
People v Mateo-Castellanos .................................................. 891
People v Mathis (Andre) ....................................................... 858
People v Mathis (Dennis) ...................................................... 1009
People v Mathis (Ronald) ...................................................... 1134
People v Mattoon ................................................................... 1135
People v Mauricio .................................................................. 1077
People v May (Anthony) ....................................................... 1136
People v May (Orlando) ........................................................ 959
People v May (Paul) .............................................................. 1138
People v Maybee .................................................................... 1013
People v Mayberry ................................................................. 861
xcvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v McBride ................................................................... 1047
People v McCaleb ................................................................... 1009
People v McCall (Corey) ........................................................ 1137
People v McCall (Pierre) ....................................................... 1004
People v McClellan ................................................................ 1006
People v McClelland .............................................................. 859
People v McClenton ............................................................... 924
People v McCormick .............................................................. 922
People v McCoy ...................................................................... 989
People v McCray (Christopher) ............................................ 1075
People v McCray (Jeffrey) ..................................................... 1189
People v McCray (Stanley) .................................................... 949
People v McCune ................................................................... 927
People v McCutcheon ............................................................ 923
People v McDaniel ....................................................... 880, 1162
People v McDaniels ............................................................... 1012
People v McDonald (Aaron) .................................................. 1010
People v McDonald (Demond) .............................................. 1138
People v McGill ...................................................................... 921
People v McGinnis ................................................................. 1009
People v McKalpain ............................................................... 1075
People v Mckay ...................................................................... 1186
People v McKinney (Clarence) ............................................. 924
People v McKinney (Mack) ................................................... 892
People v McLaughlin ............................................................. 1005
People v McNamee ...................................................... 955, 1078
People v McQueen ....................................................... 920, 1034
People v Meadows (Bradly) ................................................... 1190
People v Meadows (Charles) ................................................. 1135
People v Means ...................................................................... 989
People v Meeks ...................................................................... 950
People v Meier ....................................................................... 1012
People v Mejia ........................................................................ 1011
People v Melton ..................................................................... 1188
People v Mercer ..................................................................... 1148
People v Metamora Water Service, Inc ................................ 1003
People v Metcalf .................................................................... 1134
People v Metras ..................................................................... 860
People v Meyers (Kevin) ....................................................... 1044
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xcvii
P
AGE
People v Middleton ................................................................ 964
People v Mielcarek ................................................................. 1074
People v Milbourn ................................................................. 859
People v Miles ........................................................................ 891
People v Miller (Andrew) ...................................................... 949
People v Miller (Brandon) ..................................................... 893
People v Miller (Dustin) ........................................................ 893
People v Miller (Frederick) ................................................... 922
People v Miller (Jeffrey) ....................................................... 897
People v Mills (Alphonso) ..................................................... 892
People v Mills (Jeffrey) ......................................................... 891
People v Milstead ......................................................... 951, 1078
People v Missouri .................................................................. 1009
People v Mitchell (Aaron) ..................................................... 1188
People v Mitchell (Delmarey) ............................................... 1005
People v Mitchell (Derrick) ................................................... 1044
People v Mitchell (Terry) ...................................................... 1011
People v Montgomery ............................................................ 858
People v Moody ...................................................................... 1135
People v Moon ........................................................................ 944
People v Moore (Andre) ........................................................ 886
People v Moore (Arnold) ....................................................... 1185
People v Moore (George) ....................................................... 1136
People v Moore (Jeffrey) ....................................................... 1008
People v Moore (Jerry) .......................................................... 1152
People v Moore (Jesse, Jr.) ................................................... 1138
People v Moore (Leeclifton) .................................................. 1044
People v Moore (Phillip) ....................................................... 1033
People v Moore (Shane) ........................................................ 924
People v Moore (Terrence) .................................................... 952
People v Moore (Timothy) ........................................... 1036, 1140
People v Moore (Tony) .......................................................... 1135
People v Morgan (Alex) ......................................................... 1010
People v Morgan (Christopher) ............................................ 893
People v Morgan (Orlando) ................................................... 860
People v Moritz ...................................................................... 1190
People v Morris ...................................................................... 958
People v Morrison .................................................................. 1139
People v Morse ....................................................................... 1074
xcviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Morton ..................................................................... 921
People v Moss (Anthony) ............................................. 921, 1078
People v Moss (Kim) .............................................................. 856
People v Mougrabi ................................................................. 893
People v Moultrie .................................................................. 1187
People v Muhammad (El Amin) ........................................... 923
People v Muhammad (Joan) ................................................. 929
People v Mullins (James) ...................................................... 1013
People v Mullins (Jon) .......................................................... 1011
People v Murdock .................................................................. 956
People v Murphy .................................................................... 954
People v Murray .................................................................... 1004
People v Muzyk ...................................................................... 855
People v Myott ....................................................................... 1012
People v Nali .......................................................................... 951
People v Nash ........................................................................ 991
People v Neal (Carl) .............................................................. 1008
People v Neal (Dawan) .......................................................... 958
People v Neal (Wesley, Jr) ..................................................... 1076
People v Nelson (Alonzo) ...................................................... 862
People v Nelson (Andre) ....................................................... 1010
People v Nelson (Corey) ........................................................ 1077
People v Nelson (Joliet, Jr) ................................................... 1189
People v Nelson (Otis) ........................................................... 1012
People v Newell ..................................................................... 1191
People v Newson .................................................................... 1004
People v Newton .................................................................... 1136
People v Nguyen .................................................................... 1190
People v Nichiow-Brubaker .................................................. 1075
People v Nicolaides ................................................................ 1033
People v Nixon ................................................................ 854, 960
People v Noble ....................................................................... 856
People v Norman ................................................................... 892
People v Northern ................................................................. 1008
People v Nyx .......................................................................... 1204
People v Ochoa-Rodriguez .................................................... 1188
People v Odom ....................................................................... 1141
People v Ohlendorf ....................................................... 956, 1078
People v Oliver ....................................................................... 856
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
xcix
P
AGE
People v Olman ...................................................................... 925
People v Olsen ....................................................................... 1137
People v Omecinskyj ............................................................. 1188
People v Onumonu ................................................................ 1006
People v Ort ........................................................................... 855
People v Ortega ..................................................................... 925
People v Ortiz ........................................................................ 861
People v Osantowski ............................................................. 961
People v Ostrander ................................................................ 1189
People v Otis .................................................................... 886, 960
People v Outley ...................................................................... 889
People v Owens (Antjuan) .................................................... 1012
People v Owens (Gifford) ...................................................... 923
People v Page ......................................................................... 1011
People v Paladino .................................................................. 950
People v Palazzolo ................................................................. 1011
People v Pann ........................................................................ 1033
People v Panousopoulos ........................................................ 923
People v Pardee ...................................................................... 957
People v Parish ...................................................................... 853
People v Parker (Jack, Jr) .............................................. 854, 960
People v Parker (John) ......................................................... 1033
People v Parks (Angelo) ........................................................ 1011
People v Parks (Donald) ........................................................ 862
People v Parks (Michael) ...................................................... 953
People v Parks (Robert) ........................................................ 1060
People v Passage .................................................................... 1138
People v Patterson (Chester) ................................................ 863
People v Patterson (Donald) ................................................. 892
People v Patterson (Gary) ..................................................... 911
People v Patterson (Kenneth) .............................................. 890
People v Paus ......................................................................... 911
People v Pelichet .................................................................... 922
People v Pellot ....................................................................... 1077
People v Pendergrass ............................................................. 955
People v Penigar .................................................................... 1188
People v Peoples .................................................................... 858
People v Perdue ..................................................................... 889
People v Perez-Garcia ........................................................... 964
c 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Perry (Basil) ............................................................ 1036
People v Perry (Bobby) ................................................... 892, 949
People v Perry (Casey) .......................................................... 923
People v Perry (James) ............................................... 1106, 1200
People v Pettigrew ................................................................. 1008
People v Petty ........................................................................ 1187
People v Pfenninger .............................................................. 1188
People v Phillips .................................................................... 858
People v Phipps (Jeffrey) ...................................................... 921
People v Phipps (Kevin) ........................................................ 889
People v Phraxayavong ......................................................... 1010
People v Piontek .................................................................... 861
People v Piotter ..................................................................... 957
People v Piscopo .................................................................... 966
People v Planes ...................................................................... 856
People v Podlaszuk ................................................................ 866
People v Poindexter (Cleo) .................................................... 1076
People v Poindexter (Gregory) ............................................. 922
People v Pointer ..................................................................... 1033
People v Poniedzialek ............................................................ 1009
People v Poole ........................................................................ 1186
People v Porter (India) .......................................................... 1187
People v Porter (Mark) ......................................................... 921
People v Posey ....................................................................... 894
People v Potts ........................................................................ 1187
People v Pouncy ..................................................................... 1190
People v Pounders ................................................................. 1191
People v Powell (Michael) ..................................................... 1034
People v Powell (Phillip) ....................................................... 950
People v Poynter .................................................................... 1188
People v Prater ...................................................................... 927
People v Prescott ................................................................... 1033
People v Price (Anthony) ...................................................... 1185
People v Prince ...................................................................... 991
People v Proffitt ..................................................................... 1139
People v Propes ...................................................................... 856
People v Prophet ................................................................... 855
People v Purifoy ........................................................... 959, 1076
People v Queen ...................................................................... 910
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
ci
P
AGE
People v Quill ......................................................................... 1190
People v Ramirez ................................................................... 924
People v Ramsey (James) ...................................................... 1043
People v Ramsey (Kenneth) .................................................. 950
People v Range ...................................................................... 1010
People v Ratajczak ................................................................. 1004
People v Ratliff ...................................................................... 1108
People v Rausch ..................................................................... 1138
People v Rawls ....................................................................... 1011
People v Ray .......................................................................... 857
People v Rea ........................................................................... 1005
People v Ream ....................................................................... 935
People v Rebman ................................................................... 1033
People v Rector ...................................................................... 922
People v Redick ...................................................................... 927
People v Redinger .................................................................. 1011
People v Redmond ........................................................... 883, 960
People v Reed (Mark) ............................................................ 857
People v Reed (Richard) ........................................................ 853
People v Reynolds (Robert) .................................................. 956
People v Reynolds (Ronald) .................................................. 1190
People v Rhodes (Dennis) ..................................................... 856
People v Rhodes (Kareem) .................................................... 911
People v Rice .......................................................................... 1033
People v Richard .................................................................... 957
People v Richards .................................................................. 889
People v Richardson (Demario) ............................................ 926
People v Richardson (Tyrell) ................................................ 1136
People v Rick .......................................................................... 861
People v Riddell ..................................................................... 926
People v Riddle ...................................................................... 887
People v Rigel ........................................................................ 1190
People v Riggins .................................................................... 1190
People v Riker ........................................................................ 888
People v Riley ........................................................................ 1077
People v Rinckey .................................................................... 926
People v Ritchie ..................................................................... 954
People v Rizk ......................................................................... 1075
People v Roberts (Kendell) ................................................... 1185
cii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Roberts (Lamar) ........................................... 932, 1034
People v Roberts (Marvis) ..................................................... 964
People v Robinson (Arthur) .................................................. 891
People v Robinson (Deyonta) ............................................... 1003
People v Robinson (Joseph) .................................................. 858
People v Robinson (Keenan) ................................................. 947
People v Robinson (Leonard) ................................................ 1012
People v Robinson (Marvin) ................................................. 856
People v Robinson (Vernice) ................................................. 854
People v Rodgers (Allen) ....................................................... 1186
People v Rodgers (Arthur) .................................................... 989
People v Roeder ..................................................................... 963
People v Rogers (Brian) ........................................................ 963
People v Rogers (Charles) ..................................................... 888
People v Rogers (Gary) ......................................................... 888
People v Roland ..................................................................... 867
People v Rollston ................................................................... 860
People v Roney ...................................................................... 945
People v Root ......................................................................... 1185
People v Rosas ....................................................................... 924
People v Rosenberg ............................................................... 991
People v Ross (Bradford) ...................................................... 1004
People v Ross (Kendrick) ...................................................... 1148
People v Ross (Kevin) ............................................................ 926
People v Ross (Ronald) ............................................... 1189, 1191
People v Roundtree ............................................................... 957
People v Royal ....................................................................... 1136
People v Rozier ...................................................................... 1190
People v Rucker ..................................................................... 1136
People v Ruffin ...................................................................... 889
People v Ruiz ......................................................................... 888
People v Rummins ................................................................. 855
People v Rushell .................................................................... 955
People v Rushin ..................................................................... 1185
People v Rushmore ................................................................ 1141
People v Russell ..................................................................... 1077
People v Rutherford .............................................................. 958
People v Ryder ....................................................................... 958
People v Saari ........................................................................ 991
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
ciii
P
AGE
People v Sabo ......................................................................... 1044
People v Sallis ........................................................................ 950
People v Sanders (Anthony) ................................................. 901
People v Sanders (Conrad) ........................................... 860, 1007
People v Sanders (Marc) ....................................................... 949
People v Sanders (Rommell) ................................................. 1006
People v Sanders (Timothy) ................................................. 1138
People v Sandoval .................................................................. 857
People v Sargent .................................................................... 869
People v Savoy ....................................................................... 1139
People v Schaub ..................................................................... 1011
People v Schmitt .................................................................... 963
People v Schorling ................................................................. 957
People v Schumacher ............................................................ 1043
People v Scott (Alex) ............................................................. 1019
People v Scott (Clarence) ...................................................... 920
People v Scott (George) ......................................................... 929
People v Scott (James) .......................................................... 923
People v Scott (Leroy) ........................................................... 920
People v Scott-Parkin ................................................... 959, 1079
People v Seaman .................................................................... 888
People v Searcy ...................................................................... 1189
People v Searight ................................................................... 1138
People v Seid ................................................................. 1009, 1140
People v Severe ...................................................................... 1162
People v Shafier (Harold, III) ............................................... 1193
People v Shahideh ................................................................. 1195
People v Shaw (Desmond) .................................................... 955
People v Shaw (Harold) ........................................................ 1005
People v Sheldon .................................................................... 1008
People v Shelton ........................................................... 925, 1078
People v Shemanski ............................................................... 1006
People v Sherwood ................................................................. 924
People v Short ........................................................................ 1135
People v Shulick .................................................................... 953
People v Sillivan .................................................................... 1009
People v Silva ......................................................................... 953
People v Simmons (Andre) ................................................... 1190
People v Simmons (Carlos) ................................................... 1189
civ 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Simmons (Vernon) .................................................. 1008
People v Simpson ................................................................... 955
People v Sirois ....................................................................... 951
People v Sleep ........................................................................ 958
People v Slotkowski ..................................................... 852, 1185
People v Smart ....................................................................... 857
People v Smith (Anne) .......................................................... 858
People v Smith (Anthony) .................................................... 1059
People v Smith (Bobby) ......................................................... 854
People v Smith (Carl) ............................................................ 888
People v Smith (Cedric) ........................................................ 894
People v Smith (Curtis) ........................................................ 1011
People v Smith (Dale) ........................................................... 893
People v Smith (Darin) ......................................................... 950
People v Smith (Derrick) ...................................................... 1009
People v Smith (Dontrell) ............................................ 920, 1078
People v Smith (Elizabeth) ................................................... 1148
People v Smith (Frank) ......................................................... 926
People v Smith (Gary) ........................................................... 1014
People v Smith (John) ........................................................... 1136
People v Smith (Larome) ...................................................... 857
People v Smith (Larry) ......................................................... 950
People v Smith (Lawrence) ................................................... 951
People v Smith (Marcel) ........................................................ 950
People v Smith (Matthew) .................................................... 927
People v Smith (Philip) ......................................................... 956
People v Smith (Printice) ...................................................... 956
People v Smith (Romando) ................................................... 952
People v Smith (Shane) ......................................................... 959
People v Smith (Terry) .......................................................... 1012
People v Smith (William) ...................................................... 854
People v Snyder ..................................................................... 901
People v Soderberg ................................................................ 1187
People v Sones ....................................................................... 921
People v Sorlien ..................................................................... 863
People v Sosa ......................................................................... 954
People v Sousa ....................................................................... 888
People v Southward ..................................................... 925, 1034
People v Spacher .................................................................... 1139
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cv
P
AGE
People v Spangler .................................................................. 947
People v Spearman ................................................................ 1009
People v Spears ...................................................................... 854
People v Spencer (Daniel) ..................................................... 862
People v Spencer (Frederick) ................................................ 1135
People v Spencer (William) ................................................... 1008
People v Stadtfeld .................................................................. 858
People v Stallworth ............................................................... 894
People v Stamper ................................................. 1
People v Stapleton ................................................................. 962
People v Steed ........................................................................ 1134
People v Steele (Jerry) .......................................................... 922
People v Steele (Shane) ......................................................... 1138
People v Stephens (Carl) ....................................................... 889
People v Stephens (Frank) .................................................... 1035
People v Stephenson .............................................................. 1002
People v Sterhan .................................................................... 858
People v Stevens .................................................................... 956
People v Stewart (David) ...................................................... 954
People v Stewart (George) .................................................... 1186
People v Stewart (Gordon) ................................................... 1074
People v Stewart (Leonard) .................................................. 921
People v Stewart (Terrance) ................................................. 1191
People v Stewart (William) ................................................... 923
People v Stinnett ................................................................... 865
People v Stinson (Desmone) ................................................. 926
People v Stinson (Keith) ....................................................... 891
People v Stokes .............................................................. 991, 1011
People v Stone ....................................................................... 1075
People v Stovall (Larry) ........................................................ 954
People v Stovall (Montez) ..................................................... 953
People v Strawther ......................................................... 900, 901
People v Strayhorn ................................................................ 953
People v Streeter ................................................................... 925
People v Sueing ...................................................................... 1009
People v Sullivan ................................................................... 859
People v Sunde ....................................................................... 959
People v Swafford .................................................................. 881
People v Swanigan (David) ............................................. 919, 952
cvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Swanigan (John) ..................................................... 1003
People v Swansbrough .......................................................... 1013
People v Swanson ......................................................... 1008, 1140
People v Swift ........................................................................ 1060
People v Tafil ......................................................................... 1044
People v Talley ....................................................................... 1012
People v Tatum ...................................................................... 1013
People v Taylor (Antonio) ..................................................... 1004
People v Taylor (Beatrice) .................................................... 1137
People v Taylor (Damien) ..................................................... 922
People v Taylor (Geracer) ..................................................... 946
People v Taylor (James) ........................................................ 1188
People v Taylor (Jaquavis) .................................................... 1135
People v Taylor (John) .......................................................... 956
People v Taylor (Leroy) ......................................................... 955
People v Taylor (William) ..................................................... 1138
People v Teel .......................................................................... 957
People v Templeton ............................................................... 1190
People v Terrell ...................................................................... 890
People v Terry (Antwain) ..................................................... 854
People v Terry (Frederick) .................................................... 955
People v Tesen ....................................................................... 945
People v Tesley ...................................................................... 959
People v Thomas (Antoine) ......................................... 963, 1157
People v Thomas (Hans) ....................................................... 928
People v Thomas (Jamal) ...................................................... 1188
People v Thomas (Michael) (In re Thomas) ........................ 874
People v Thomas (Ronnie) .................................................... 858
People v Thomas (Yosheyah) ................................................ 1185
People v Thompson (Keith) .................................................. 927
People v Thompson (Philip) ................................................. 888
People v Thompson (Robert) ................................................ 1003
People v Thompson (Roger) .................................................. 1006
People v Thompson (Stanford) ............................................. 855
People v Tigney ..................................................................... 859
People v Tipton ...................................................................... 963
People v Titlow ...................................................................... 890
People v Tobin ....................................................................... 854
People v Todorovski .............................................................. 886
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cvii
P
AGE
People v Tolson ...................................................................... 1135
People v Toplin ...................................................................... 1189
People v Toth ......................................................................... 1032
People v Trakhtenberg .......................................................... 856
People v Trapp ....................................................................... 951
People v Traylor .................................................................... 1004
People v Truelove .................................................................. 1004
People v Turner ..................................................................... 959
People v Turrentine .............................................................. 911
People v Tyler ........................................................................ 858
People v Tyszkowski ............................................................. 893
People v Underwood (Jermaine) .......................................... 855
People v Underwood (Michael) ............................................. 902
People v Underwood (Travis) ............................................... 954
People v Unger (Mark) .......................................................... 1080
People v Unger (Ola-Tokumbo) ..................................... 892, 961
People v Uphaus .................................................................... 939
People v Vaden ....................................................................... 948
People v Valentine ................................................................. 956
People v Valladolid ................................................................. 892
People v Van Cleve ................................................................ 887
People v VanBrocklin ............................................................ 1010
People v Vanhorn ................................................................... 924
People v Vanrenselaar ........................................................... 1187
People v VanReyendam ......................................................... 889
People v Varner ...................................................................... 1134
People v Vaughn .................................................................... 1011
People v Vieau ....................................................................... 955
People v Villegas .................................................................... 931
People v Wade ........................................................................ 1189
People v Wagner .................................................................... 926
People v Waire ....................................................................... 1188
People v Walden ..................................................................... 953
People v Walker (Coleman) ................................................... 1010
People v Walker (Darnell Jr) ................................................ 1059
People v Walker (Javonta) .................................................... 1036
People v Walker (Jim) ........................................................... 917
People v Walker (Juan) ......................................................... 926
People v Walker (Lenny) ....................................................... 924
cviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Walker (Nicholas) ................................................... 854
People v Wallace (Delvrene) ................................................. 1032
People v Wallace (Horace) ..................................................... 1186
People v Wallace (John) ........................................................ 925
People v Wallace (Marcus) .................................................... 924
People v Wallager .................................................................. 952
People v Walleman ................................................................ 1004
People v Walters .................................................................... 926
People v Walton ............................................................... 949, 956
People v Waltonen ........................................................ 958, 1079
People v Ward (Gary) ............................................................ 1060
People v Ward (Michael) ....................................................... 1005
People v Ward (Watson) ........................................................ 926
People v Ware ........................................................................ 893
People v Warne ...................................................................... 1135
People v Washington (Gregory) ............................................ 891
People v Washington (Tamerra) ........................................... 887
People v Watkins (Freddie) ................................................... 926
People v Watkins (Justin) ..................................................... 952
People v Watkins (Lincoln) ................................................... 1167
People v Watkins (Theodore) ................................................ 1006
People v Weatherspoon ......................................................... 1137
People v Webb ........................................................................ 1187
People v Weiss ........................................................................ 1034
People v Wentworth .............................................................. 1189
People v West ......................................................................... 893
People v Westerfield .............................................................. 1011
People v Wheeler (James) .............................................. 893, 961
People v Wheeler (Ronald) .................................................... 965
People v Wheetley .................................................................. 887
People v Whetstone ............................................................... 1138
People v White (Donald) ....................................................... 1044
People v White (Dwayne) ...................................................... 888
People v White (Earnest) ...................................................... 861
People v White (Lee) ............................................................. 1033
People v Whitley .................................................................... 888
People v Whitman ................................................................. 1188
People v Whorton .................................................................. 1137
People v Wigfall ..................................................................... 926
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cix
P
AGE
People v Wilburn ................................................................... 1075
People v Wilder ...................................................................... 857
People v Wilke ....................................................................... 861
People v Williams (Bruce) ..................................................... 959
People v Williams (Chad) ...................................................... 1138
People v Williams (Dewon) ................................................... 952
People v Williams (Douglas) ................................................. 1136
People v Williams (Eric) ........................................................ 1190
People v Williams (Eva) ........................................................ 888
People v Williams (Gary) ...................................................... 917
People v Williams (James) .................................................... 957
People v Williams (Keith) ..................................................... 1012
People v Williams (Kenney) .................................................. 958
People v Williams (Lester) .................................................... 959
People v Williams (Maurice) ................................................. 1190
People v Williams (Reginald) ................................................ 920
People v Williams (Roosevelt) ............................................... 1189
People v Williams (Shirley) ................................................... 1076
People v Williams (Stephen) ................................................. 950
People v Williams (Terrence) ................................................ 1137
People v Williams (Timothy) ................................................ 1135
People v Willis ........................................................................ 1077
People v Wilson (Charles) ..................................................... 860
People v Wilson (Devaughn) ................................................. 862
People v Wilson (Hyrosha) .................................................... 1187
People v Wilson (Marcia) ...................................................... 861
People v Wilson (Ryan) ......................................................... 1073
People v Wilson (Sean) .......................................................... 1190
People v Wilson (Shawn) ...................................................... 959
People v Wilson (Treyveon) .................................................. 1012
People v Winbush ............................................................ 854, 960
People v Winer ....................................................................... 925
People v Wingo ...................................................................... 951
People v Winstead ................................................................. 886
People v Winters .................................................................... 886
People v Wise ............................................................... 1136, 1189
People v Witczak .................................................................... 958
People v Wood (Alan) ............................................................ 1074
People v Wood (Mark) ........................................................... 1033
cx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
People v Woodall .................................................................... 890
People v Woodman ................................................................. 889
People v Woods (Deandre) .................................................... 928
People v Woods (Edward) ..................................................... 868
People v Woods (Lawrence) .................................................. 928
People v Woolsey .................................................................... 909
People v Wordell .................................................................... 1141
People v Wright (Algerow) .................................................... 1013
People v Wright (Alphonzo) ........................................ 858, 1057
People v Wright (Carl, Jr) ..................................................... 1188
People v Wright (Donald) ...................................................... 957
People v Wright (James) ....................................................... 959
People v Wright (Marshall) ................................................... 922
People v Wright (William) ..................................................... 959
People v Wroblewski .............................................................. 858
People v Yant ......................................................................... 950
People v Yax ........................................................................... 892
People v Ybarra ..................................................................... 1003
People v Young (Jimmie) ...................................................... 1033
People v Young (Kevin) ............................................... 957, 1078
People v Young (Michael Anthony) ...................................... 1011
People v Young (Michael Earl) ............................................. 1187
People v Young (Raymond) ................................................... 1076
People v Young (Spencer) ...................................................... 1169
People v Younger ................................................................... 1012
People v Yowell ...................................................................... 855
People v Zamora .................................................................... 1135
People v Zeller ....................................................................... 886
People of Farmington Hills v Hoops .................................... 926
Peoples, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Peoples) .......... 899
Peoples, People v ................................................................... 858
Pepsi Cola Metro Bottling Co, Neuhaus v ........................... 1000
Perdue, People v .................................................................... 889
Perez v Ford Motor Co .......................................................... 1202
Perez v Oakland Co ............................................................... 934
Perez-Garcia, People v .......................................................... 964
Perry, People v (Basil) ........................................................... 1036
Perry, People v (Bobby) .................................................. 892, 949
Perry, People v (Casey) .......................................................... 923
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxi
P
AGE
Perry, People v (James) ............................................... 1106, 1200
Peters, PLC (John M), Kandalaft v ..................................... 924
Petersen v Riverview Police Dep’t ....................................... 1187
Peterson Towing, Inc, Fleischfresser v ...................... 918, 1034
Petition of Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure
(Wayne Co Treasurer v Watson), In re .................. 981, 1139
Petoskey (City of), Barnwell v .............................................. 958
Petsch v Convention & Show Services ................................ 1013
Pettigrew, People v ................................................................ 1008
Pettineo v Scientific Image Ctr Staffing, Inc ...................... 976
Petty, People v ........................................................................ 1187
Pevarnek, Bologna v .............................................................. 1138
Pfenninger, People v .............................................................. 1188
Phil’s Co Line Service, Inc, Chapman v .............................. 901
Philip Morris USA, Attorney General v .............................. 990
Phillips, People v ................................................................... 858
Phipps, People v (Jeffrey) ..................................................... 921
Phipps, People v (Kevin) ....................................................... 889
Phraxayavong, People v ........................................................ 1010
Pierson, Green v .................................................................... 979
Pioneer State Mut Ins Co, McCummings v ........................ 1044
Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wagner .................................... 1002
Piontek, People v ................................................................... 861
Piotter, People v ..................................................................... 957
Piscopo, People v ................................................................... 966
Planes, People v ..................................................................... 856
Plante & Moran, PLLC, Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v .......... 950
Plyler, Wilson v ...................................................................... 855
Podlaszuk, People v ............................................................... 866
Poindexter, People v (Cleo) ................................................... 1076
Poindexter, People v (Gregory) ............................................. 922
Pointer, People v .................................................................... 1033
Poniedzialek, People v ........................................................... 1009
Ponte v Ponte ......................................................................... 1032
Poole, People v ....................................................................... 1186
Pornpichit, Bailey v ..................................................... 909, 1034
Port Huron Hosp, Hartman v .............................................. 1031
Portell, McLain v ................................................................... 1167
Porter, People v (India) ......................................................... 1187
cxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Porter, People v (Mark) ......................................................... 921
Portfolio Recovery Assoc v Knubbe ..................................... 920
Posen Constr, Inc, Grillo v .................................................... 990
Posey, People v ....................................................................... 894
Potter v McLeary ................................................................... 915
Potts, People v ....................................................................... 1187
Potts v Stieve ......................................................................... 891
Pouncy, People v .................................................................... 1190
Pounders, People v ................................................................ 1191
Powell v Domino’s Pizza Int’l, Inc ....................................... 1105
Powell v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc ...................................... 978
Powell, People v (Michael) .................................................... 1034
Powell, People v (Phillip) ...................................................... 950
Poynter, People v ................................................................... 1188
Prater, People v ...................................................................... 927
Prescott, People v .................................................................. 1033
Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental
Quality ............................................................................... 944
Preston, Kauffman v ............................................................. 1137
Price v Dep’t of Transportation ........................................... 894
Price, People v (Anthony) ..................................................... 1185
Prince, People v ..................................................................... 991
Priority Health v Comm’r of the Office of Financial &
Ins Services ....................................................................... 1073
Proassurance Corp v Nefcy .................................................. 916
Proffitt, People v .................................................................... 1139
Progressive Corp, Miller v .................................................... 998
Progressive Michigan Ins Co, Community Resource
Consultants, Inc v .................................................. 868, 1097
Progressive Michigan Ins Co, Dulic v .................................. 888
Progressive Michigan Ins Co, Kilburn v ............................. 945
Propes, People v ..................................................................... 856
Prophet, People v .................................................................. 855
Provost v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................. 858
Prudential Prop & Cas Ins Co v Dep’t of
Treasury ............................................................................ 863
Pub Service Comm, Michigan Community Action
Agency Ass’n v .................................................................. 953
Pub Service Comm, SBC Michigan v ................................... 977
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxiii
P
AGE
Pulte Land Co, LLC v Alpine Twp ...................................... 1144
Purifoy, People v ........................................................... 959, 1076
Q
Queen, People v ..................................................................... 910
Quill, People v ........................................................................ 1190
R
R Vander Lind & Son, Inc v Centerline Piping, Inc ........... 928
R W Lapine, Inc, Stone v ...................................................... 916
Ramada Franchise Sys, Inc, Lamar v .................................. 880
Ramanathan v Wayne State Univ Bd of
Governors ................................................................ 1090, 1200
Ramirez, People v .................................................................. 924
Ramsey, Pears v ..................................................................... 901
Ramsey, People v (James) ..................................................... 1043
Ramsey, People v (Kenneth) ................................................. 950
Ramsey Holding, LLC, Russell v .......................................... 868
Range, People v ..................................................................... 1010
Rapid Inter-Urban Partnership, Martin (The) v ................ 936
Rapid Inter-Urban Transit Partnership, Martin (The) v .. 1052
Ratajczak, People v ................................................................ 1004
Ratliff, People v ..................................................................... 1108
Rausch, People v .................................................................... 1138
Rawls, People v ...................................................................... 1011
Ray, People v .......................................................................... 857
Raybon v DP Fox Football Holdings, LLC .......................... 1109
Raymond Estate, In re (Morse v Sharkey) .......................... 1194
Razzook’s Properties, LLC v Yono ....................................... 865
Rea, People v .......................................................................... 1005
Reagan v Dep’t of Corrections ............................................. 1136
Ream, People v ...................................................................... 935
Rebman, People v .................................................................. 1033
Rector, People v ..................................................................... 922
Red Ribbon Properties, LLC, v Brighton Twp ................... 1107
Redick, People v ..................................................................... 927
Redinger, People v ................................................................. 1011
Redmond, People v .......................................................... 883, 960
Reed, People v (Mark) ........................................................... 857
cxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Reed, People v (Richard) ....................................................... 853
Reeves v Carson City Hosp .................................................. 1056
Reid v Williamstown Twp ..................................................... 1189
Renaissance Ctr, Hodges v .................................................... 864
Respess v Irwin Mortgage Corp ................................... 889, 1007
Reynolds, People v (Robert) ................................................. 956
Reynolds, People v (Ronald) ................................................. 1190
Reznick, Mitan v ................................................................... 856
Rhodes, People v (Dennis) .................................................... 856
Rhodes, People v (Kareem) ................................................... 911
Ribbron, Jones v .................................................................... 863
Rice, People v ......................................................................... 1033
Richard, People v ................................................................... 957
Richards, People v ................................................................. 889
Richardson, People v (Demario) ........................................... 926
Richardson, People v (Tyrell) ............................................... 1136
Rick, People v ......................................................................... 861
Riddell, People v .................................................................... 926
Riddle, People v ..................................................................... 887
Rigel, People v ....................................................................... 1190
Riggins, People v ................................................................... 1190
Riker, People v ....................................................................... 888
Riley, People v ........................................................................ 1077
Riley v Steele ......................................................................... 1136
Rinckey, People v ................................................................... 926
Ritchie, People v .................................................................... 954
Riverview Police Dep’t, Petersen v ...................................... 1187
Rizk, People v ........................................................................ 1075
Roberson Builders, Inc v Larson .......................................... 1045
Roberts, People v (Kendell) .................................................. 1185
Roberts, People v (Lamar) .......................................... 932, 1034
Roberts, People v (Marvis) .................................................... 964
Robertson v Ascherl .............................................................. 851
Robinson, People v (Arthur) ................................................. 891
Robinson, People v (Deyonta) .............................................. 1003
Robinson, People v (Joseph) ................................................. 858
Robinson, People v (Keenan) ................................................ 947
Robinson, People v (Leonard) ............................................... 1012
Robinson, People v (Marvin) ................................................ 856
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxv
P
AGE
Robinson, People v (Vernice) ................................................ 854
Robinson Twp, Forner v ....................................................... 1141
Rodgers, People v (Allen) ...................................................... 1186
Rodgers, People v (Arthur) ................................................... 989
Rodriguez v ASE Industries, Inc ....................... 908, 1108, 1159
Roeder, People v ..................................................................... 963
Rogers v Dep’t of Corrections .............................................. 960
Rogers, People v (Brian) ....................................................... 963
Rogers, People v (Charles) .................................................... 888
Rogers, People v (Gary) ........................................................ 888
Rogow v Comerica Bank ....................................................... 857
Roland, People v .................................................................... 867
Rollston, People v .................................................................. 860
Romeo v Allstate Ins Co ....................................................... 859
Romulus (City of), Houdini Properties, LLC v ................... 1022
Ronan v Hofmann ................................................................. 863
Roney, People v ...................................................................... 945
Root, People v ........................................................................ 1185
Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v Plante & Moran, PLLC .......... 950
Rosas, People v ...................................................................... 924
Rosenberg, People v .............................................................. 991
Ross v Blue Care Network .................................. 153
Ross, People v (Bradford) ..................................................... 1004
Ross, People v (Kendrick) ..................................................... 1148
Ross, People v (Kevin) ........................................................... 926
Ross, People v (Ronald) .............................................. 1189, 1191
Roumayah, Laurel Woods Apartments v ............................. 990
Roundtree, People v .............................................................. 957
Royal, People v ...................................................................... 1136
Royal Oak Twp, Jacoboni v .................................................. 861
Rozier, People v ...................................................................... 1190
Rubin, Miller v ....................................................................... 862
Ruby & Assoc, PC v Shore Financial Services .................... 1107
Rucker, People v .................................................................... 1136
Rudd v Bedford Pub Schools ................................................ 867
Ruffin, People v ..................................................................... 889
Ruiz, People v ........................................................................ 888
Rumfield v Henney ...................................................... 944, 1077
Rummins, People v ................................................................ 855
cxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Rushell, People v ................................................................... 955
Rushin, People v .................................................................... 1185
Rushmore, People v ............................................................... 1141
Rusiecki Estate, In re (Jensen v Rusiecki) .......................... 923
Rusnak v Walker ................................................................... 868
Russell, People v .................................................................... 1077
Russell v Ramsey Holding, LLC ........................................... 868
Rutherford, People v ............................................................. 958
Ryder, People v ....................................................................... 958
S
SBC Michigan v Pub Service Comm .................................... 977
SMG, Martin v ............................................................. 1043, 1192
Saari, People v ....................................................................... 991
Sabo, People v ........................................................................ 1044
Sachs v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit ................................ 1074
Sadowy v Detroit Edison Co ................................................. 900
Safeway Food Ctr, Inc, Hardy v ........................................... 886
Saginaw Intermediate School Dist v Coleman Community
Schools ............................................................................... 1137
Salamy, Malik v ..................................................................... 1074
Sallis, People v ....................................................................... 950
Salmon v Smith ..................................................................... 892
Sam’s Town & Country Market, Inc v Mihelich &
Kavanaugh, PLC ..................................................... 920, 1078
Sanborn v Dockett’s Mobile Home Sales ............................ 887
Sandberg v Dep’t of Corrections .......................................... 890
Sanders, People v (Anthony) ................................................ 901
Sanders, People v (Conrad) .......................................... 860, 1007
Sanders, People v (Marc) ...................................................... 949
Sanders, People v (Rommell) ................................................ 1006
Sanders, People v (Timothy) ................................................ 1138
Sandoval, People v ................................................................. 857
Sappi Fine Paper North America, Kuczmera v .................. 893
Sargent, People v ................................................................... 869
Satellite Services, Inc, Nardi v ............................................. 891
Savoy, People v ....................................................................... 1139
Sbraccia, Kik v ..................................................... 75
Schaub, People v .................................................................... 1011
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxvii
P
AGE
Schils v Washtenaw Co .......................................... 888, 960, 1141
Schils v Washtenaw Co Office of the Sheriff ................ 888, 960
Schils v Washtenaw Community Health Org ................... 888, 960
Schmid v Farm Bureau Life Ins Co of Michigan ................ 1106
Schmitt, People v ................................................................... 963
Schneider, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Sikora) ........ 1165
Schorling, People v ................................................................ 957
Schornak v DaimlerChrysler Corp ....................................... 1000
Schuchard, Miller v ............................................................... 1009
Schultz v Dep’t of Environmental Quality .......................... 857
Schumacher, People v ............................................................ 1043
Schwarze v Dilworth ...................................................... 853, 960
Scientific Image Ctr Staffing, Inc, Pettineo v ..................... 976
Sciotti v 36th Dist Court ...................................................... 1192
Scott, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Branch) ............... 935
Scott, People v (Alex) ............................................................ 1019
Scott, People v (Clarence) ..................................................... 920
Scott, People v (George) ........................................................ 929
Scott, People v (James) ......................................................... 923
Scott, People v (Leroy) .......................................................... 920
Scott-Parkin, People v .................................................. 959, 1079
Seaman, People v ................................................................... 888
Searcy, People v ..................................................................... 1189
Searight, People v .................................................................. 1138
Secretary of State, Dawson v ............................................... 1169
Secretary of State, White v ................................................... 1004
Sehn Family Novi Ltd Partnership, Dep’t of
Transportation v ............................................................... 1141
Seid, People v ................................................................ 1009, 1140
Sellers, Lenawee Co v ........................................................... 911
Sellers v Smith ....................................................................... 904
Seman v Graham ................................................................... 862
Senger, Anderson v ................................................................ 957
Setty, McMaster v .................................................................. 1074
17526 Riopelle, City of Detroit v .......................................... 960
Severe, People v ..................................................................... 1162
Severstal North America, Inc, Vaughn v ............................. 959
Shafier, People v (Harold, III) .............................................. 1193
Shaheen, Korpal v ................................................................. 1193
cxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Shahideh, People v ................................................................ 1195
Shaina v Compton ................................................................. 1075
Sharkey, Morse v (In re Estate of Raymond) ...................... 1194
Shaw, Patrick v ...................................................................... 1050
Shaw, People v (Desmond) .................................................... 955
Shaw, People v (Harold) ........................................................ 1005
Sheldon, People v ................................................................... 1008
Shelton, People v .......................................................... 925, 1078
Shemanski, People v .............................................................. 1006
Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter
Twp .................................................................................... 1143
Sherman, State Automobile Ins Co v .................................. 853
Sherwood, People v ................................................................ 924
Shields v Depew ..................................................................... 862
Shisler, Lanphar v ................................................................. 1135
Shoaff v Woods (In re Baldwin Trust) ........................ 915, 1192
Shore Financial Services, Ruby & Assoc, PC v ................... 1107
Short v Antonini .................................................................... 991
Short, People v ....................................................................... 1135
Shulick, People v ................................................................... 953
Siano, Ward v ......................................................................... 979
Sickles v Hometown America, LLC ..................................... 863
Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer ............................................... 864
Sieloff, Moyer v ...................................................................... 1034
Sikora, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Schneider) ........ 1165
Sillivan, People v ................................................................... 1009
Silva, People v ........................................................................ 953
Simmons, People v (Andre) .................................................. 1190
Simmons, People v (Carlos) .................................................. 1189
Simmons, People v (Vernon) ................................................. 1008
Simpson v Borbolla Constr & Concrete Supply,
Inc ...................................................................................... 964
Simpson, People v .................................................................. 955
Sims v Delphi Automotive Sys Corp .................................... 894
Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, Sachs v ............................... 1074
Sirois, People v ...................................................................... 951
Sleep, People v ....................................................................... 958
Slota v Slota ........................................................................... 1074
Slotkowski, People v .................................................... 852, 1185
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxix
P
AGE
Small v Wysong ..................................................................... 1200
Smart v Nationwide Mut Ins Co .......................................... 891
Smart, People v ...................................................................... 857
Smith v Capital Area Transportation Auth ........................ 1194
Smith, Johnson v ................................................................... 1162
Smith v Martinrea Internat’l, Inc ........................................ 945
Smith, People v (Anne) ......................................................... 858
Smith, People v (Anthony) ................................................... 1059
Smith, People v (Bobby) ........................................................ 854
Smith, People v (Carl) ........................................................... 888
Smith, People v (Cedric) ....................................................... 894
Smith, People v (Curtis) ....................................................... 1011
Smith, People v (Dale) .......................................................... 893
Smith, People v (Darin) ........................................................ 950
Smith, People v (Derrick) ..................................................... 1009
Smith, People v (Dontrell) ........................................... 920, 1078
Smith, People v (Elizabeth) .................................................. 1148
Smith, People v (Frank) ........................................................ 926
Smith, People v (Gary) .......................................................... 1014
Smith, People v (John) .......................................................... 1136
Smith, People v (Larome) ..................................................... 857
Smith, People v (Larry) ........................................................ 950
Smith, People v (Lawrence) .................................................. 951
Smith, People v (Marcel) ....................................................... 950
Smith, People v (Matthew) ................................................... 927
Smith, People v (Philip) ........................................................ 956
Smith, People v (Printice) ..................................................... 956
Smith, People v (Romando) .................................................. 952
Smith, People v (Shane) ........................................................ 959
Smith, People v (Terry) ......................................................... 1012
Smith, People v (William) ..................................................... 854
Smith, Salmon v .................................................................... 892
Smith, Sellers v ...................................................................... 904
Smith Lumber & Hardware Co (HA) v Decina .................. 1132
Smith Trust (Egbert R), In re ............................ 19
Snyder, People v ..................................................................... 901
Soderberg, People v ............................................................... 1187
Sones, People v ...................................................................... 921
Sorlien, People v .................................................................... 863
cxx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Sosa, People v ........................................................................ 954
Soulliere v Johnson ............................................................... 1076
Sousa, People v ...................................................................... 888
South Huron Valley Utility Auth, Dep’t of
Environmental Quality v ................................................. 1044
Southfield (City of) v Covensky ........................................... 1137
Southward, People v .................................................... 925, 1034
Spacher, People v ................................................................... 1139
Spangler, People v .................................................................. 947
Spearman, People v ............................................................... 1009
Spears, People v ..................................................................... 854
Spencer v Dep’t of Corrections ................................... 958, 1078
Spencer, People v (Daniel) .................................................... 862
Spencer, People v (Frederick) ............................................... 1135
Spencer, People v (William) .................................................. 1008
Spires v Bergman .................................................................. 948
St John Detroit Riverview Hosp, Maloy v ........................... 915
St John Hosp & Med Ctr, Dube v ........................................ 914
St John Hosp & Med Ctr, Gonzalez v .................................. 1109
St Joseph Mercy Hosp, Lange v ........................................... 1007
St Joseph Mercy Hosp, Mullins v ........................................ 948
Stadtfeld, People v ................................................................. 858
Stallworth, People v .............................................................. 894
Stamper, People v ................................................ 1
Stanford, Mullins v ................................................................ 1139
Stanke v Stanke ..................................................................... 927
Stapleton, People v ................................................................ 962
Stapleton v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co ................ 1148
State Automobile Ins Co v Sherman ................................... 853
State Automobile Mut Ins Co v Fieger ................................ 862
State Bar of Michigan, Kendall v ......................................... 861
State Farm Fire & Cas Co, James v .................................... 1014
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins, Manzella v ...................... 1115
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, Hendrick v ............... 892
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, Manzella v ................ 912
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, Stapleton v ............... 1148
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, Veucasovic v ............. 886
State News v Michigan State Univ ...................................... 902
State of Michigan, City of Lansing v ................................... 1104
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxi
P
AGE
State of Michigan, Grebner v ............................................... 939
State of Michigan, Owczarek v ............................................. 1060
State of Michigan Third Judicial Circuit, Cooper-Reid v .. 963
State Tax Comm, DaimlerChrysler Corp v ......................... 880
State Tax Comm, Detroit Diesel Corp v .............................. 880
State Tax Comm, Ford Motor Co v ...................................... 880
State Treasurer v Ferguson .................................................. 1137
State Treasurer v Grossnickle .............................................. 1077
Steed, People v ....................................................................... 1134
Steele, People v (Jerry) ......................................................... 922
Steele, People v (Shane) ........................................................ 1138
Steele, Riley v ........................................................................ 1136
Stephens, People v (Carl) ...................................................... 889
Stephens, People v (Frank) ................................................... 1035
Stephenson, People v ............................................................. 1002
Sterhan, People v ................................................................... 858
Sterling Hts (City of), Ljuljdjuraj v ..................................... 1138
Stern, Maurino v ................................................................... 927
Stevens, Celley v .................................................................... 927
Stevens, People v ................................................................... 956
Stewart, People v (David) ..................................................... 954
Stewart, People v (George) ................................................... 1186
Stewart, People v (Gordon) .................................................. 1074
Stewart, People v (Leonard) ................................................. 921
Stewart, People v (Terrance) ................................................ 1191
Stewart, People v (William) .................................................. 923
Stienke, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Delano) ........... 1154
Stieve, Potts v ........................................................................ 891
Stinnett, People v .................................................................. 865
Stinson, People v (Desmone) ................................................ 926
Stinson, People v (Keith) ...................................................... 891
Stokes, People v ............................................................. 991, 1011
Stone, People v ...................................................................... 1075
Stone v R W Lapine, Inc ....................................................... 916
Stone v Williamson ................................................................ 895
Stoneman v Carson City Hosp ............................................. 917
Stovall, People v (Larry) ....................................................... 954
Stovall, People v (Montez) .................................................... 953
Stoyka Estate v Mt Clemens Gen Hosp .............................. 908
cxxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Strawther, People v ......................................................... 900, 901
Strayhorn, People v ............................................................... 953
Streeter, People v ................................................................... 925
Strong, Hiar v ........................................................................ 857
Struck v Kusmierz ...................................................... 1060, 1192
Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional
Transportation, Garrell v ................................................ 861
Suburban Mobility Auth Regional Transportation,
Johnson v .......................................................................... 930
Sueing, People v ..................................................................... 1009
Sullivan, People v .................................................................. 859
Summers v Hurley Med Ctr ................................................. 1072
Sunde, People v ...................................................................... 959
Sunseekers Prop Owners Ass’n, LLC, Kallman v .............. 1099
Surman v Surman ................................................................. 1138
Sutton v Diane J .................................................................... 868
Svoboda v Cunningham ........................................................ 888
Swafford, People v ................................................................. 881
Swanigan, People v (David) ............................................ 919, 952
Swanigan, People v (John) .................................................... 1003
Swansbrough, People v ......................................................... 1013
Swanson, People v ........................................................ 1008, 1140
Swartz, Eifler v (In re Miltenberger Estate) ....................... 976
Swearinger v DaimlerChrysler Corp .................................... 897
Sweatt v Gardocki ................................................................. 863
Sweeney v Eddie’s Int’l Touchless Car Wash ..................... 1137
Sweet Air Investment, Inc v Kenney ................................... 990
Swift, People v ....................................................................... 1060
T
TGM Broadband Cable Services, Beck v ............................. 1187
Tafil, People v ........................................................................ 1044
Taglia, Fette, Dumke & White, PC, Passaro v .................... 1074
Taig v Gen Motors Corp ....................................................... 883
Talley, People v ...................................................................... 1012
Tatum, People v ..................................................................... 1013
Taylor v City of Westland ..................................................... 1033
Taylor v Davis ........................................................................ 1134
Taylor, Fifth Third Bank v ................................................... 1009
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxiii
P
AGE
Taylor v Muse ........................................................................ 924
Taylor, People v (Antonio) .................................................... 1004
Taylor, People v (Beatrice) .................................................... 1137
Taylor, People v (Damien) ..................................................... 922
Taylor, People v (Geracer) .................................................... 946
Taylor, People v (James) ....................................................... 1188
Taylor, People v (Jaquavis) ................................................... 1135
Taylor, People v (John) ......................................................... 956
Taylor, People v (Leroy) ........................................................ 955
Taylor, People v (William) ..................................................... 1138
Taylor v Yalamanchi .............................................................. 980
Taylor (City of), Branford Towne Houses Coop v .............. 858
Taylor Distributing Co, White v ........................................... 961
Teel, People v ......................................................................... 957
Templeton, People v .............................................................. 1190
10 & Scotia Plaza, LLC v Grinderz Oak Park .................... 1188
Terrell, People v ..................................................................... 890
Terry, People v (Antwain) ..................................................... 854
Terry, People v (Frederick) ................................................... 955
Tesen, People v ...................................................................... 945
Tesley, People v ...................................................................... 959
Thames, Hurley Med Ctr v ................................................... 1185
Third Judicial Circuit Court v The Judicial Attorneys
Ass’n .................................................................................. 994
36th Dist Court, Sciotti v ..................................................... 1192
Thomas, City of Detroit v ..................................................... 1076
Thomas v Hawkins ................................................................ 1032
Thomas, In re (People v Michael Thomas) .......................... 874
Thomas, People v (Antoine) ........................................ 963, 1157
Thomas, People v (Hans) ...................................................... 928
Thomas, People v (Jamal) ..................................................... 1188
Thomas, People v (Michael) (In re Thomas) ....................... 874
Thomas, People v (Ronnie) ................................................... 858
Thomas, People v (Yosheyah) ............................................... 1185
Thomas Electric, LLC, Link v .............................................. 1035
Thomas M Cooley Law School, Dulemba v ......................... 1017
Thompson (In re Marshall), Dep’t of Human Services v ... 1022
Thompson, People v (Keith) ................................................. 927
Thompson, People v (Philip) ................................................ 888
cxxiv 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Thompson, People v (Robert) ............................................... 1003
Thompson, People v (Roger) ................................................. 1006
Thompson, People v (Stanford) ............................................ 855
Tigney, People v ..................................................................... 859
Timko, Hughes v ................................................................... 1013
Tingley v Wardrop ................................................................. 944
Tippins v Wayne Circuit Judge ............................................ 1075
Tipton, People v ..................................................................... 963
Titan Ins Co, Willer v ................................................. 987, 1177
Titlow, People v ...................................................................... 890
Tkachik v Mandeville ............................................................ 898
Tobin, People v ...................................................................... 854
Todorovski, People v ............................................................. 886
Toll Northville Ltd v Northville Twp ................ 6
Tolson, People v ..................................................................... 1135
Tomasi v Tomasi .................................................................... 857
Tomecek v Bavas ................................................................... 1195
Toplin, People v ..................................................................... 1189
Topping, Mauer v .................................................................. 912
Total Mfg Sys Inc, Warring v ............................................... 1074
Toth, People v ........................................................................ 1032
Towfiq, Judd v ....................................................................... 1073
Trakhtenberg, People v ......................................................... 856
Transportation (Dep’t of) v Alibri ....................................... 863
Transportation (Dep’t of) v Initial Transport, Inc ............. 1044
Transportation (Dep’t of), Price v ....................................... 894
Transportation (Dep’t of) v Sehn Family Novi Ltd
Partnership ....................................................................... 1141
Trapp, People v ...................................................................... 951
Traylor, People v .................................................................... 1004
Treasury (Dep’t of), Ammex, Inc v ...................................... 883
Treasury (Dep’t of), Lake Forest Partners 2, Inc v .. 1046, 1169
Treasury (Dep’t of), McLeod v ............................................. 1135
Treasury (Dep’t of), Prudential Ins Co v ............................ 863
Treasury (Dep’t of), Prudential Prop & Cas Ins
Co v .................................................................................... 863
Treasury (Dep’t of), Tyson Foods, Inc v .............................. 1137
Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co ......... 1202
Trinity Health - Michigan, Galliher v ................................. 1072
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxv
P
AGE
Trombley, Grievance Administrator v ................................. 1201
Troy (City of), Papadelis v .................................................... 863
Trudel, In re ........................................................................... 1213
Truelove, People v ................................................................. 1004
Truitt Estate, In re (Kienitz v Eisenzoph) .......................... 1134
Trzcienski v Maple Ridge Bldg, Inc ..................................... 917
Turner v Detroit Bd of Ed .................................................... 1043
Turner, People v .................................................................... 959
Turrentine, People v ............................................................. 911
Twitchell v Twitchell ............................................................ 935
Tyler, People v ....................................................................... 858
Tyson Foods, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury ................................. 1137
Tyszkowski, People v ............................................................ 893
U
US Outdoor Advertising, Inc, City of Detroit Downtown
Dev Auth v ........................................................................ 991
Umbarger v Dep’t of Corrections ......................................... 1075
Umbarger v Hayes Green Beach Mem Hosp Ass’n ............ 985
Umbarger v Hayes Green Beach Mem Hosp Corp ............. 1050
Underwood, People v (Jermaine) ......................................... 855
Underwood, People v (Michael) ............................................ 902
Underwood, People v (Travis) .............................................. 954
Unger, People v (Mark) ......................................................... 1080
Unger, People v (Ola-Tokumbo) ..................................... 892, 961
Univ of Michigan, Michigan Federation of Teachers
and School Related Personnel, AFT, AFL-CIO v ........... 902
Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, Mazumder v ................... 1045
Uphaus, People v ................................................................... 939
Ursery v Option One Mortgage Corp .................................. 1141
V
Vaden, People v ...................................................................... 948
Valentine, People v ................................................................ 956
Valladolid, People v ................................................................ 892
Van Cleve, People v ............................................................... 887
Van Eman v CARS Protection Plus, Inc .............................. 892
Van Fossen, Kloian v .................................................... 1003, 1140
VanBrocklin, People v ........................................................... 1010
cxxvi 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Vander Lind & Son, Inc (R) v Centerline Piping, Inc ........ 928
VanFarowe v Cascade Charter Twp ..................................... 1168
Vanhorn, People v .................................................................. 924
Vanrenselaar, People v .......................................................... 1187
VanReyendam, People v ........................................................ 889
Varner, People v ..................................................................... 1134
Vaughan, Allstate Ins Co v ................................................... 910
Vaughn, People v ................................................................... 1011
Vaughn v Severstal North America, Inc .............................. 959
Venture Industries, Inc, Wozniak v ..................................... 955
Verburg, Cryderman v ........................................................... 1104
Verhines, Mulcahy v .............................................................. 1141
Veucasovic v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co .............. 886
Vieau, People v ...................................................................... 955
Villegas, People v ................................................................... 931
Voris v Dep’t of Human Services ......................................... 1145
W
W J O’Neil Co v Barton Malow Co ...................................... 991
Wade, People v ....................................................................... 1189
Wagley, Lenawee Co v ........................................................... 911
Wagner, People v .................................................................... 926
Wagner, Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v ................................... 1002
Waire, People v ...................................................................... 1188
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Maronek v ......................................... 896
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Zacharski v ....................................... 929
Walden, People v .................................................................... 953
Walgreen Co, LaBarge v ........................................................ 1136
Walker, People v (Coleman) .................................................. 1010
Walker, People v (Darnell, Jr) .............................................. 1059
Walker, People v (Javonta) .................................................... 1036
Walker, People v (Jim) ........................................................... 917
Walker, People v (Juan) ........................................................ 926
Walker, People v (Lenny) ...................................................... 924
Walker, People v (Nicholas) .................................................. 854
Walker, Rusnak v ................................................................... 868
Wallace, People v (Delvrene) ................................................ 1032
Wallace, People v (Horace) .................................................... 1186
Wallace, People v (John) ....................................................... 925
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxvii
P
AGE
Wallace, People v (Marcus) ................................................... 924
Wallager, People v .................................................................. 952
Walleman, People v ............................................................... 1004
Wallington v Wolverine Engineers & Surveyors, Inc ......... 909
Walters, People v ................................................................... 926
Walton, People v .............................................................. 949, 956
Waltonen, People v ....................................................... 958, 1079
War-Ag Farms, LLC v Franklin Twp ................................... 948
Ward, People v (Gary) ........................................................... 1060
Ward, People v (Michael) ...................................................... 1005
Ward, People v (Watson) ....................................................... 926
Ward v Siano .......................................................................... 979
Wardrop, Tingley v ................................................................ 944
Ware, People v ....................................................................... 893
Warne, People v ..................................................................... 1135
Warren v Brown .................................................................... 858
Warren (City of), Hill v ......................................................... 1195
Warring v Total Mfg Sys Inc ................................................ 1074
Washington v Jackson ........................................................... 1135
Washington, People v (Gregory) ........................................... 891
Washington, People v (Tamerra) .......................................... 887
Washington Mut Bank, FA v Community Shores Bank ..... 1188
Washtenaw Circuit Judge, Osborne v .................................. 894
Washtenaw Co, Schils v ......................................... 888, 960, 1141
Washtenaw Co Office of the Sheriff, Schils v ............... 888, 960
Washtenaw Community Health Org, Schils v .................. 888, 960
Waste Mgt of Michigan, Caldwell v ..................................... 1032
Watkins, People v (Freddie) .................................................. 926
Watkins, People v (Justin) .................................................... 952
Watkins, People v (Lincoln) .................................................. 1167
Watkins, People v (Theodore) ............................................... 1006
Watson, Wayne Co Treasurer v (In re Petition of Wayne
Co Treasurer for Foreclosure) ............................... 981, 1139
Watts v Henry Ford Health Sys ........................................... 1055
Watts v Nevils ........................................................................ 1060
Wayland v New Light Nursing Home Corp ........................ 1194
Wayne Bowling & Recreation, Inc, Melbourne v ............... 886
Wayne Circuit Judge, Tippins v ........................................... 1075
Wayne Co, Odom v ...................................................... 1015, 1184
cxxviii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Wayne Co Treasurer, Detroit Bldg Auth v ................. 897, 1139
Wayne Co Treasurer, Sidun v ............................................... 864
Wayne Co Treasurer v Watson (In re Petition of Wayne
Co Treasurer for Foreclosure ................................. 981, 1139
Wayne State Univ Bd of Governors,
Ramanathan v .............................................................. 1090, 1200
Weatherspoon, People v ........................................................ 1137
Webb, People v ....................................................................... 1187
Weideman, Grievance Administrator v ................................ 1220
Weiss, People v ....................................................................... 1034
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc v Bramlage ..................... 935
Welsh, Dep’t of Human Services v (In re Welsh) ................ 1106
Welsh, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Welsh) ................ 1106
Wentworth, People v ............................................................. 1189
Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm ......................... 75
West, People v ........................................................................ 893
West Bloomfield Charter Twp, DiVergilio v ............... 949, 1077
West Branch Regional Med Ctr, Cromwell v ....................... 1135
West Michigan Mechanical, Inc v West Michigan
Mechanical Services, LLC ................................................ 916
West Michigan Mechanical Services, LLC, West Michigan
Mechanical, Inc v .............................................................. 916
West Shore Med Ctr, Bradshaw v ........................................ 1001
Westerfield, People v ............................................................. 1011
Westland (City of), Taylor v .................................................. 1033
Wheeler, People v (James) .............................................. 893, 961
Wheeler, People v (Ronald) ................................................... 965
Wheetley, People v ................................................................. 887
Whetstone, People v .............................................................. 1138
White, In re (Dep’t of Human Services v Kessler) ............. 1022
White, People v (Donald) ...................................................... 1044
White, People v (Dwayne) ..................................................... 888
White, People v (Earnest) ..................................................... 861
White, People v (Lee) ............................................................ 1033
White v Secretary of State .................................................... 1004
White v Taylor Distributing Co ............................................ 961
Whitley, People v ................................................................... 888
Whitman, People v ................................................................ 1188
Whorton, People v ................................................................. 1137
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxix
P
AGE
Wigfall, People v .................................................................... 926
Wilburn, People v .................................................................. 1075
Wilder, People v ..................................................................... 857
Wilke, People v ...................................................................... 861
Willer v Titan Ins Co .................................................. 987, 1177
Williams v Boldon’s Body Shop, LLC .................................. 990
Williams, People v (Bruce) .................................................... 959
Williams, People v (Chad) ..................................................... 1138
Williams, People v (Dewon) .................................................. 952
Williams, People v (Douglas) ................................................ 1136
Williams, People v (Eric) ....................................................... 1190
Williams, People v (Eva) ....................................................... 888
Williams, People v (Gary) ..................................................... 917
Williams, People v (James) ................................................... 957
Williams, People v (Keith) .................................................... 1012
Williams, People v (Kenney) ................................................. 958
Williams, People v (Lester) ................................................... 959
Williams, People v (Maurice) ................................................ 1190
Williams, People v (Reginald) ............................................... 920
Williams, People v (Roosevelt) .............................................. 1189
Williams, People v (Shirley) .................................................. 1076
Williams, People v (Stephen) ................................................ 950
Williams, People v (Terrence) ............................................... 1137
Williams, People v (Timothy) ............................................... 1135
Williams & Son Plumbing & Heating, Inc, Woods v .......... 927
Williamson, Stone v ............................................................... 895
Williamstown Twp, Reid v .................................................... 1189
Willis, People v ....................................................................... 1077
Wilshire Credit Corp, Orr v .................................................. 927
Wilson v Dep’t of Mgt & Budget .......................................... 1008
Wilson v Eldon L Aucker Assoc ........................................... 1147
Wilson v Genesee Co Concealed Weapons Bd ..................... 1147
Wilson, People v (Charles) .................................................... 860
Wilson, People v (Devaughn) ................................................ 862
Wilson, People v (Hyrosha) ................................................... 1187
Wilson, People v (Marcia) ..................................................... 861
Wilson, People v (Ryan) ........................................................ 1073
Wilson, People v (Sean) ......................................................... 1190
Wilson, People v (Shawn) ..................................................... 959
cxxx 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
P
AGE
Wilson, People v (Treyveon) ................................................. 1012
Wilson v Plyler ....................................................................... 855
Winbush, People v ........................................................... 854, 960
Winer, People v ...................................................................... 925
Wingo, People v ..................................................................... 951
Winstead, People v ................................................................ 886
Winters, People v ................................................................... 886
Wise, People v ............................................................. 1136, 1189
Wisner, Cotter v ..................................................................... 1191
Witczak, People v ................................................................... 958
Wolverine Engineers & Surveyors, Inc, Wallington v ........ 909
Wolverine World Wide, Inc v Liberty Mut Ins Co .............. 928
Wood v Bediako ..................................................................... 887
Wood, People v (Alan) ........................................................... 1074
Wood, People v (Mark) .......................................................... 1033
Woodall, People v ................................................................... 890
Woodman, People v ................................................................ 889
Woods, People v (Deandre) ................................................... 928
Woods, People v (Edward) .................................................... 868
Woods, People v (Lawrence) ................................................. 928
Woods, Shoaff v (In re Baldwin Trust) ....................... 915, 1192
Woods v Williams & Son Plumbing & Heating, Inc ........... 927
Woolsey, People v ................................................................... 909
Wordell, People v ................................................................... 1141
Wozniak v Venture Industries, Inc ...................................... 955
Wright, People v (Algerow) ................................................... 1013
Wright, People v (Alphonzo) ....................................... 858, 1057
Wright, People v (Carl, Jr) .................................................... 1188
Wright, People v (Donald) ..................................................... 957
Wright, People v (James) ...................................................... 959
Wright, People v (Marshall) .................................................. 922
Wright, People v (William) .................................................... 959
Wroblewski, People v ............................................................. 858
Wyatt v Oakwood Hosp & Med Ctrs ................................... 1073
Wysong, Small v .................................................................... 1200
X
Xiaoxin v Brown .................................................................... 914
T
ABLE OF
C
ASES
R
EPORTED
cxxxi
P
AGE
Y
Yalamanchi, Taylor v ............................................................. 980
Yaldo v Yaldo .......................................................................... 1188
Yankee Air Force, Inc, Ad Hoc Membership Group v ........ 1033
Yant, People v ........................................................................ 950
Yax, People v .......................................................................... 892
Ybarra, People v .................................................................... 1003
Yono, Razzook’s Properties, LLC v ...................................... 865
Young v Faremouth ............................................................... 957
Young, People v (Jimmie) ..................................................... 1033
Young, People v (Kevin) .............................................. 957, 1078
Young, People v (Michael Anthony) ..................................... 1011
Young, People v (Michael Earl) ............................................ 1187
Young, People v (Raymond) .................................................. 1076
Young, People v (Spencer) ..................................................... 1169
Younger, People v ................................................................... 1012
Yount v Yount ........................................................................ 1106
Yowell, People v ..................................................................... 855
Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v Kircher ......................................... 910
Z
Zacharski v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ........................................ 929
Zamora, People v ................................................................... 1135
Zangkas v Birmingham Pub Schools ................................... 1136
Zavradinos v JTRB, Inc ........................................................ 1080
Zeller, People v ....................................................................... 886
Zerfas, Mullen v ..................................................................... 989
Zimmerman, In re (Johnson v Brown) ................................ 1143
cxxxii 480 M
ICH
R
EPORTS
TABLE OF SPECIAL ORDERS NOT
RELATED TO SPECIFIC CASES
P
AGE
P
ROPOSED
A
DOPTION OF
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
MCR 3.930 ........................................................................ 1239
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
MCR 2.107 ........................................................................ 1240
MCR 2.117 ........................................................................ 1242
MCR 2.119 ........................................................................ 1205
MCR 2.203 ........................................................................ 1215
MCR 2.301 ........................................................................ 1261
MCR 2.302 ........................................................................ 1261
MCR 2.306 ........................................................................ 1211
MCR 2.401 ........................................................................ 1262
MCR 2.504 ........................................................................ 1224
MCR 2.506 ........................................................................ 1264
MCR 2.510 ........................................................................ 1213
MCR 2.603 ........................................................................ 1220
MCR 2.614 ........................................................................ 1221
MCR 3.204 ........................................................................ 1208
MCR 3.212 ....................................................................... 1209
MCR 3.901 ........................................................................ 1239
MCR 3.903 ........................................................................ 1266
MCR 3.920 ........................................................................ 1266
MCR 3.928 ........................................................................ 1265
MCR 4.201 ........................................................................ 1237
MCR 6.201 ........................................................................ 1226
MCR 6.302 ........................................................................ 1236
MCR 6.310 ........................................................................ 1236
MCR 7.101 ........................................................................ 1221
MCR 7.202 ........................................................................ 1227
MCR 7.204 ........................................................................ 1205
MCR 7.205 ........................................................................ 1206
cxxxiii
P
AGE
MCR 7.209 ........................................................................ 1223
MCR 7.215 ........................................................................ 1201
MCR 7.302 ........................................................................ 1223
MCR 9.108 ........................................................................ 1219
MCR 9.208 ........................................................................ 1216
P
ROPOSED
N
EW
R
ULE OF
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
MCR 8.126 ....................................................................... 1218
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES FOR THE
B
OARD OF
L
AW
E
XAMINERS
MCR 6 ............................................................................... 1265
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES OF
S
TATE
B
AR OF
M
ICHIGAN
Rule 15 .............................................................................. 1219
cxxxiv
TABLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
AND RULES ADOPTED
A
DMINISTRATIVE
O
RDERS
No. 2007-4 ................................................................................ cxxxviii
No. 2008-1 ...................................................................................... cxlii
P
ARTIAL
R
ESCISSION OF
T
HIRD
J
UDICIAL
C
IRCUIT
L
OCAL
A
DMINISTRATIVE
O
RDERS
Third Circuit LAO 2006-12....................................................... cxxxix
A
DMINISTRATIVE
O
RDER
A
MENDED
No. 1998-5 ................................................................................. cxxxvii
R
ULES
A
DOPTED
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985
MCR 2.107........................................................................................ clv
MCR 2.112..................................................................................... clviii
MCR 5.125...................................................................................... clxx
MCR 5.125.................................................................................... clxxii
MCR 5.302.......................................................................................... cl
MCR 5.409......................................................................................... cli
MCR 7.206....................................................................................... clix
MCR 7.306....................................................................................... cliv
L
OCAL
C
OURT
R
ULES
Rule 4.201.................................................................................... clxxiv
S
TATE
B
AR
R
ULES
Rule 19......................................................................................... clxxvi
cxxxv
R
ULES
A
MENDED
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985
MCR 3.602...................................................................................... cxlv
MCR 5.207..................................................................................... cxlix
R
ULES
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985
MCR 3.928.................................................................................... clxxii
R
ULES
R
ESCINDED
L
OCAL
C
OURT
R
ULES
Rule 2.119..................................................................................... clxxv
Rule 2.501..................................................................................... clxxv
Rule 6.000..................................................................................... clxxv
Rule 6.001..................................................................................... clxxv
R
ULES
R
ETAINED
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985
MCR 5.307.......................................................................................... cl
MCR 5.310.......................................................................................... cl
cxxxvi 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
1998-5
Entered September 18, 2007, effective October 1, 2007 (File No.
2006-19)—R
EPORTER
.
On order of the Court, the following amendments of
Administrative Order No. 1998-5 are effective October
1, 2007:
1. In subsection II, delete the first two sentences.
2. In subsection II, insert “court” between “pro-
posed” and “budget” in the third sentence.
3. In subsection II, insert “court” between “a” and
“budget” in the fourth sentence.
K
ELLY,
J
.
I would not adopt the proposed changes
without first publishing the proposal for comment.
cxxxvii
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
2007-4
A
DOPTION OF
C
ONCURRENT
J
URISDICTION
P
LAN FOR THE
49
TH
C
IRCUIT
C
OURT, THE
77
TH
D
ISTRICT
C
OURT, AND
P
RO-
BATE
D
ISTRICT
18
OF
M
ECOSTA AND
O
SCEOLA
C
OUNTIES
Entered December 18, 2007, effective April 1, 2008 (File No. 2004-04)
—R
EPORTER
.
Administrative Order No. 2003-1 and MCL 600.401
et seq. authorize Michigan trial courts to adopt concur-
rent jurisdiction plans within a county or judicial cir-
cuit, subject to approval of the Court.
The Court hereby approves the adoption of the
following concurrent jurisdiction plan, effective April 1,
2008:
The 49th Circuit Court, the 77th District Court, and
Probate District 18 of Mecosta and Osceola Counties
The plan shall remain on file with the state court
administrator.
Amendments to concurrent jurisdiction plans may be
implemented by local administrative order pursuant to
MCR 8.112. Plan amendments shall conform to the
requirements of Administrative Order No. 2003-1 and
MCL 600.401 et seq.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I wish to incorporate by
reference the views that I expressed in concurring with
Administrative Order No. 2004-2.
cxxxviii
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
2006-12
Adopted February 8, 2008. —R
EPORTER
.
We rescind in part Third Judicial Circuit Court Local
Administrative Order 2006-12 (LAO 2006-12), dated
November 1, 2006.
The Third Judicial Circuit Court’s LAO 2006-12 is
valid to the extent that it reassigns all general consti-
tutional challenges to the circuit’s jury pool summoning
and qualification procedures for the “limited purpose of
adjudicating the challenge[s]” in order to “avoid the
risk of inconsistent rulings, and to avoid the possibility
of the Court’s administrative staff being subject to
inconsistent requirements.” LAO 2006-12. The chief
judge may order such reassignment as the chief judge
has “administrative superintending power and control
over the judges of the court and all court personnel,”
MCR 8.110(C)(3), and authority to “direct the appor-
tionment and assignment of the business of the court,
subject to the provisions of MCR 8.111,” MCR
8.110(C)(3)(b), and to “perform any act or duty or enter
any order necessarily incidental to carrying out the
purposes of [MCR 8.110],” MCR 8.110(C)(3)(i).
The chief judge’s authority to reassign challenges to
the circuit’s jury pool summoning and qualification
procedures is not inconsistent with MCR 8.111 because
these general issues are common to each case in the
circuit, they implicate administrative policy and prac-
tice, and their resolution does not require dispositive
cxxxix
rulings in individual cases. See Schell v Baker Furniture
Co, 461 Mich 502, 511, 513-515 (2000) (stating that
under MCR 8.110[C] and MCR 8.111 a chief judge “had
authority to issue...adirective for cases pending be-
fore other judges of the court” but not “to enter
dispositive orders in these cases, which had been as-
signed to other judges of the circuit”). Reassignment
limited to resolution of the common issues is not
inconsistent with the requirements that all cases be
assigned by lot, MCR 8.111(B), and that cases be
reassigned only under certain circumstances, MCR
8.111(C). Moreover, to the extent such reassignment
could implicate the rule requiring assignment by lot,
that rule expressly permits “a different system” if the
system is adopted by local court administrative order.
MCR 8.111(B).
Because a defendant has a right to be tried by a jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community,
Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 527 (1975); People v
Smith, 463 Mich 199, 214 (2000), resolution of consti-
tutional challenges to the jury venire may not be held in
abeyance until after trial.
Accordingly, we rescind the Third Judicial Circuit
Court’s LAO 2006-12 to the extent that it postpones
resolution of challenges to jury venires in individual
cases until after trial and to the extent that it purports
to reassign resolution of issues unrelated to the Third
Judicial Circuit’s overall jury summoning and qualifi-
cation procedures. The chief judge may hold any pro-
ceedings necessary to resolve common issues raised in
challenges to these overall procedures. The chief judge
also remains empowered to enact administrative poli-
cies or issue local administrative orders consistent with
this order, MCR 8.110, MCR 8.111, and MCR 8.112, in
cxl 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
the interest of establishing consistency among the cir-
cuit judges in resolving challenges to jury venires in
particular cases.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We concur with the result
of the order.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would have remanded People
v Hopson, 480 Mich 1061 (2008), to the Court of Appeals
for a ruling on the validity of Local Administrative
Order No. 2006-12 before the Supreme Court takes
action on it. The defendant in Hopson made several
good arguments. Among them was that the language of
MCR 8.111 and this Court’s decision in Schell v Baker
Furniture Co, 461 Mich 502 (2000), prohibit a chief
judge from reassigning a case to himself or herself in
order to make a substantive ruling. The Court of
Appeals has not had the opportunity to address this
issue. This Court’s partial rescission of the local admin-
istrative order sanctions the reassignment that oc-
curred in the Hopson case. The Court rescinded the
order without hearing oral argument and without the
benefit of analysis by the Court of Appeals.
A
DM
O
RDER
2006-12 cxli
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
2008-1
P
ILOT
P
ROJECT
N
O.
117
TH
J
UDICIAL
C
IRCUIT
C
OURT
(E
XPEDITED
P
ROCESS IN THE
R
ESOLUTION OF THE
L
OW
C
ONFLICT
D
OCKET OF THE
F
AMILY
D
IVISION
)
Entered April 8, 2008 (File No. 2006-25)—R
EPORTER
.
On order of the Court, the 17th Judicial Circuit Court is
authorized to implement a domestic relations pilot
project. The pilot project will study the effectiveness of the
use of pleadings that contain nonadversarial language,
and the requirement that parents submit parenting time
plans to encourage settlements and reduce postjudgment
litigation.
The pilot project shall begin April 1, 2008, or as soon
thereafter as is possible, and shall remain in effect until
July 30, 2009, or until further order of this Court.
The 17th Judicial Circuit Court will track the degree
of participation and the overall effectiveness of this
pilot project and shall report to and provide information
as requested by the State Court Administrative Office.
1. Purpose of the Pilot Project.
The purpose of the pilot project is to study the
effectiveness of the use of nonadversarial language in
pleadings, judgments, and orders, and the effectiveness
of a proposed provision for inclusion of parenting time
cxlii
plans, particularly in relation to the just, speedy, and
economical determination of the actions involved in the
pilot project and the reduction of postjudgment litiga-
tion. Except for matters related to the form of pleadings
and orders, requirements for parenting time plans, and
the use of nonadversarial language during the pilot
project, the Michigan Court Rules govern all other
aspects of the cases involved in the pilot project.
2. Construction and Participation.
(a) The 17th Judicial Circuit Court shall determine
a method by local administrative order that creates a
pool of pilot-project cases and also a pool of control-
group cases. The local administrative order shall
specify the cases to be included in the pilot project by
one of the following methods: the date an action is
filed, a specific number of consecutive cases or actions
filed, or by the assigned judge.
(b) Participation also shall include postjudgment
proceedings in qualifying cases that were included in
the pilot pool.
(c) This is a mandatory project. A self-represented
party is not excused from the project merely because
the individual does not have counsel.
3. Nonadversarial Terms.
The pilot project will incorporate the use of nonadver-
sarial terms, such as “mother” or “parent” instead of
“plaintiff” or “defendant.” However, the use of nonadver-
sarial language will not change the roles of parents as
custodians for purposes of any state or federal law for
which custody is required to be determined. Judgments
and orders produced in the pilot project will clearly
delineate how custody is to be determined for purposes of
state and federal laws that require a person to be desig-
nated as a custodian.
A
DM
O
RDER
2008-1 cxliii
4. Procedure.
When an attorney or a pro se parent files a complaint
with the clerk’s office, and the clerk’s office determines
that the new case meets the requirements of the pilot
project, that parent will be given two informational
pamphlets explaining the purpose of the project, as well
as two sets of instructions for a parenting time plan and
two blank forms for proposed parenting time plans.
Each of these documents must be approved by the State
Court Administrative Office before they are distributed
by the court to the parent.
The parent’s attorney or the pro se parent seeking
the divorce will be responsible for serving the informa-
tional pamphlet regarding parenting time instructions
and the proposed parenting time plan on the other
parent. The parent’s attorney must ensure that his or
her client receives the informational pamphlet contain-
ing the parenting time instructions and the proposed
parenting time plan.
Each parent must complete the proposed parenting
time plan and file it with the court within 28 days of
filing his or her initial pleadings. The parents must also
serve the other parent’s attorney, or the other parent if
that parent is not represented, and the friend of the
court with a copy of the proposed parenting time plan.
5. Amendment.
These processes may be amended upon the recom-
mendation of the participating judges, approval of the
chief judge, and authorization by the state court admin-
istrator.
6. Expiration.
Unless otherwise directed by the Michigan Supreme
Court, this pilot program shall continue until July 30,
2009.
cxliv 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
AMENDMENTS OF MICHIGAN
COURT RULES OF 1985
Adopted October 2, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No. 2005-
31)—R
EPORTER
.
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
3.602. A
RBITRATION.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Proceedings to Compel or to Stay Arbitration.
(1) A request for an order to compel or to stay
arbitration or for another order under this rule must be
by motion, which shall be heard in the manner and on
the notice provided by these rules for motions. If there
is not a pending action between the parties, the party
seeking the requested relief must first file a complaint
as in other civil actions.
(2) On motion of a party showing an agreement to
arbitrate that conforms to the arbitration statute, and
the opposing party’s refusal to arbitrate, the court may
order the parties to proceed with arbitration and to take
other steps necessary to carry out the arbitration agree-
ment and the arbitration statute. If the opposing party
denies the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the
court shall summarily determine the issues and may
order arbitration or deny the motion.
cxlv
(3) On motion, the court may stay an arbitration
proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that
there is no agreement to arbitrate. If there is a substan-
tial and good-faith dispute, the court shall summarily
try the issue and may enter a stay or direct the parties
to proceed to arbitration.
(4) A motion to compel arbitration may not be denied
on the ground that the claim sought to be arbitrated
lacks merit or is not filed in good faith, or because fault
or grounds for the claim have not been shown.
(C) Action Involving Issues Subject to Arbitration;
Stay. Subject to MCR 3.310(E), an action or proceed-
ing involving an issue subject to arbitration must be
stayed if an order for arbitration or a motion for such
an order has been made under this rule. If the issue
subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be
limited to that issue. If a motion for an order com-
pelling arbitration is made in the action or proceeding
in which the issue is raised, an order for arbitration
must include a stay.
(D)-(I) [Unchanged.]
(J) Vacating Award.
(1) A request for an order to vacate an arbitration
award under this rule must be made by motion. If there
is not a pending action between the parties, the party
seeking the requested relief must first file a complaint
as in other civil actions. A complaint to vacate an
arbitration award must be filed no later than 21 days
after the date of the arbitration award.
(2) On motion of a party, the court shall vacate an
award if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
other undue means;
cxlvi 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(b) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator
appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or
misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights;
(c) the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers; or
(d) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on
a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the
hearing to prejudice substantially a party’s rights.
The fact that the relief could not or would not be
granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(3) A motion to vacate an award must be filed within
91 days after the date of the award. However, if the
motion is predicated on corruption, fraud, or other
undue means, it must be filed within 21 days after the
grounds are known or should have been known. A
motion to vacate an award in a domestic relations case
must be filed within 21 days after the date of the award.
(4) In vacating the award, the court may order a
rehearing before a new arbitrator chosen as provided in
the agreement, or, if there is no such provision, by the
court. If the award is vacated on grounds stated in
subrule (J)(1)(c) or (d), the court may order a rehearing
before the arbitrator who made the award. The time
within which the agreement requires the award to be
made is applicable to the rehearing and commences
from the date of the order.
(5) If the motion to vacate is denied and there is no
motion to modify or correct the award pending, the
court shall confirm the award.
(K) Modification or Correction of Award.
(1) A request for an order to modify or correct an
arbitration award under this rule must be made by
motion. If there is not a pending action between the
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 cxlvii
parties, the party seeking the requested relief must first
file a complaint as in other civil actions. A complaint to
correct or modify an arbitration award must be filed no
later than 21 days after the date of the arbitration
award.
(2) On motion of a party filed within 91 days after the
date of the award, the court shall modify or correct the
award if:
(a) there is an evident miscalculation of figures or an
evident mistake in the description of a person, a thing,
or property referred to in the award;
(b) the arbitrator has awarded on a matter not
submitted to the arbitrator, and the award may be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision on
the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
(3) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify
and correct the award to effect its intent and shall
confirm the award as modified and corrected. Other-
wise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(4) A motion to modify or correct an award may be
joined in the alternative with a motion to vacate the
award.
(L)-(N) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The amendments eliminate the term “application,”
and substitute the word “motion” or “complaint,” depending upon
whether there is a pending action. “Application” is not a defined term
within the Michigan Court Rules or in the arbitration act, MCL 600.5025.
The revisions also clarify that a complaint to stay or compel arbitra-
tion, or to vacate, modify, or correct an award must first be filed, and then
a motion, consistent with the spirit of MCR 3.602(B)(1), must be filed.
They also set timing deadlines consistent with the time frame allowed
under the federal arbitration act, 9 USC 1 et seq., by requiring that a
motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award be filed within 91 days.
cxlviii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
However, for domestic relations cases, and for motions that claim an
award is based on corruption, fraud, or other undue means, the current
21-day filing period applies for motions to vacate an arbitration award.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Retained October 2, 2007 (File No. 2006-21)—R
EPORTER
.
By order dated March 20, 2007, this Court amended
Rules 5.307 and 5.310 of the Michigan Court Rules,
effective immediately. 477 Mich ccxii-ccxiii (2007). At
the same time, the Court stated that it would consider
at a future public hearing whether to retain the amend-
ment, which conformed a requirement for a personal
representative to file a Notice of Continued Adminis-
tration in the rules to MCL 700.3951. Notice and an
opportunity for comment at a public hearing having
been provided, the amendments of MCR 5.307 and
MCR 5.310 are retained.
Adopted October 11, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No. 2006-
28)—R
EPORTER
.
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
5.207. S
ALE OF
R
EAL
E
STATE.
(A) Petition. Any petition to approve the sale of real
estate must contain the following:
(1) the terms and purpose of the sale,
(2) the legal description of the property,
(3) the financial condition of the estate before the
sale, and
(4) an appended copy of the most recent assessor
statement or tax statement showing the state equalized
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 cxlix
value of the property. If the court is not satisfied that
the evidence provides the fair market value, a written
appraisal may be ordered.
(B) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
5.302. C
OMMENCEMENT OF
D
ECEDENT
E
STATES
.
(A) Methods of Commencement. A decedent estate
may be commenced by filing an application for an
informal proceeding or a petition for a formal testacy
proceeding. A request for supervised administration
may be made in a petition for a formal testacy proceed-
ing. When filing either an application or petition to
commence a decedent estate, a copy of the death cer-
tificate must be attached. If the death certificate is not
available, the petitioner may provide alternative docu-
mentation of the decedent’s death. Requiring additional
documentation, such as information about the proposed
or appointed personal representative, is prohibited.
(B)-(D) [Unchanged.]
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
5.307. R
EQUIREMENTS
A
PPLICABLE TO
A
LL
D
ECEDENT
E
STATES
.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Notice to Personal Representative. At the time of
appointment, the court must provide the personal rep-
resentative with written notice of information to be
provided to the court. The notice should be substan-
tially in the following form or in the form specified by
MCR 5.310(E), if applicable:
“Inventory Information: Within 91 days of the date
of the letters of authority, you must submit to the court
cl 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
the information necessary for computation of the pro-
bate inventory fee. You must also provide the name and
address of each financial institution listed on your
inventory at the time the inventory is presented to the
court. The address for a financial institution shall be
either that of the institution’s main headquarters or the
branch used most frequently by the personal represen-
tative.
“Change of Address: You must keep the court and all
interested persons informed in writing within 7 days of
any change in your address.
“Notice of Continued Administration: If you are
unable to complete the administration of the estate
within one year of the original personal representative’s
appointment, you must file with the court and all
interested persons a notice that the estate remains
under administration, specifying the reason for the
continuation of the administration. You must give this
notice within 28 days of the first anniversary of the
original appointment and all subsequent anniversaries
during which the administration remains uncompleted.
“Duty to Complete Administration of Estate: You
must complete the administration of the estate and file
appropriate closing papers with the court. Failure to do
so may result in personal assessment of costs.”
(C)-(D) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
5.409. R
EPORT OF
G
UARDIAN;
I
NVENTORIES AND
A
CCOUNTS OF
C
ONSERVATORS
.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Inventories.
(1) [Unchanged.]
(2) Filing and Service. Within 56 days after appoint-
ment, a conservator or, if ordered to do so, a guardian
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 cli
shall file with the court a verified inventory of the
estate of the protected person, serve copies on the
persons required by law or court rule to be served, and
file proof of service with the court.
(3) Contents. The guardian or conservator must
provide the name and address of each financial institu-
tion listed on the inventory. The address for a financial
institution shall be either that of the institution’s main
headquarters or the branch used most frequently by the
guardian or conservator. Property that the protected
individual owns jointly or in common with others must
be listed on the inventory along with the type of
ownership and value.
(C) Accounts.
(1) Filing, Service. A conservator must file an annual
account unless ordered not to by the court. A guardian
must file an annual account if ordered by the court. The
provisions of the court rules apply to any account that is
filed with the court, even if the account was not
required by court order. The account must be served on
interested persons, and proof of service must be filed
with the court. The copy of the account served on
interested persons must include a notice that any
objections to the account should be filed with the court
and noticed for hearing. When required, an accounting
must be filed within 56 days after the end of the
accounting period.
(2)-(3) [Unchanged.]
(4) Exception, Conservatorship of Minor. Unless oth-
erwise ordered by the court, no accounting is required
in a minor conservatorship where the assets are re-
stricted or in a conservatorship where no assets have
been received by the conservator. If the assets are
ordered to be placed in a restricted account, proof of the
restricted account must be filed with the court within
clii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
28 days of the conservator’s qualification or as other-
wise ordered by the court. The conservator must file
with the court an annual verification of funds on
deposit with a copy of the corresponding financial
institution statement attached.
(5) Contents. The accounting is subject to the provi-
sions of MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c) and (d), except that refer-
ences to a personal representative shall be to a conser-
vator. A copy of the corresponding financial institution
statement must be presented to the court or a verifica-
tion of funds on deposit must be filed with the court,
either of which must reflect the value of all liquid assets
held by a financial institution dated within 30 days after
the end of the accounting period, unless waived by the
court for good cause.
(6) [Unchanged.]
(D)-(F) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: These amendments were proposed by the Probate
and Estate Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan, and are
intended to address and clarify practice issues within the amended rules.
The amendment of MCR 5.207(A)(4) provides the alternative of including
a tax statement to show the state equalized value of property. The
amendments of MCR 5.307(B) and MCR 5.409(B)(3) require the name
and address of each financial institution be added to the inventory, and
requires that the institution’s main address or branch used most fre-
quently by the filer be identified. The amendment of MCR 5.409(C)(1)
requires any account filed with the court to comply with relevant court
rules. The amendment of MCR 5.409(C)(4) extends the time in which to
file proof of a minor’s assets in a restricted account from 14 to 28 days.
The amendment of MCR 5.409(C)(5) allows the option of filing an annual
verification of funds on deposit or presenting a copy of a financial
institution statement with an annual account.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Adopted October 11, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No. 2006-
44)—R
EPORTER
.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 cliii
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
7.306. B
RIEFS IN
C
ALENDAR
C
ASES
.
(A)-(C) [Unchanged.]
(D) Amicus Curiae Briefs.
(1) Except as provided in subsection(2), an amicus
curiae brief may be filed only on motion granted by the
Court and must conform to subrules (A) and (B) and
MCR 7.309. The brief of an amicus curiae is to be filed
within 21 days after the brief of the appellee, or at such
other time as the Court directs. An amicus curiae may
not participate in oral argument except by Court order.
(2) No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief
is necessary if the brief is presented on behalf of the
people of the state of Michigan or the state of Michigan,
or any of its agencies or officials, by the Attorney
General; on behalf of any political subdivision of the
state when submitted by its authorized legal officer, its
authorized agent, or an association representing a po-
litical subdivision; or on behalf of the Prosecuting
Attorneys Association of Michigan or the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
Staff Comment: These amendments alter the requirements for filing
amicus curiae briefs with the Michigan Supreme Court. They allow
amicus curiae 21 days after the filing of the appellee’s brief to file its
amicus curiae brief, and add a provision similar to Rule 37 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States to allow state agencies and
attorneys operating on behalf of public agencies to submit an amicus
curiae brief without filing a motion to seek permission to do so.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Adopted October 16, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No. 2007-
12)—R
EPORTER
.
cliv 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.107. S
ERVICE AND
F
ILING OF
P
LEADINGS AND
O
THER
P
APERS
.
(A)-(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) Manner of Service. Service of a copy of a paper on
an attorney must be made by delivery or by mailing to
the attorney at his or her last known business address
or, if the attorney does not have a business address,
then to his or her last known residence address. Service
on a party must be made by delivery or by mailing to the
party at the address stated in the party’s pleadings.
(1) Delivery to Attorney. Delivery of a copy to an
attorney within this rule means
(a) handing it to the attorney personally;
(b) leaving it at the attorney’s office with the person
in charge or, if no one is in charge or present, by leaving
it in a conspicuous place; or
(c) if the office is closed or the attorney has no office,
by leaving it at the attorney’s usual residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion residing there.
(2) Delivery to Party. Delivery of a copy to a party
within this rule means
(a) handing it to the party personally; or
(b) leaving it at the party’s usual residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion residing there.
(3) Mailing. Mailing a copy under this rule means
enclosing it in a sealed envelope with first class postage
fully prepaid, addressed to the person to be served, and
depositing the envelope and its contents in the United
States mail. Service by mail is complete at the time of
mailing.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 clv
(4) E-mail. Some or all of the parties may agree to
service by e-mail by filing a stipulation in that case.
E-mail service shall be subject to the following condi-
tions:
(a) The stipulation for service by e-mail shall set
forth the e-mail addresses of the parties or attorneys
that agree to e-mail service, which shall include the
same e-mail address currently on file with the State Bar
of Michigan. If an attorney is not a member of the State
Bar of Michigan, the e-mail address shall be the e-mail
address currently on file with the appropriate register-
ing agency in the state of the attorney’s admission.
(b) The parties shall set forth in the stipulation all
limitations and conditions concerning e-mail service,
including but not limited to:
(i) the maximum size of the document that may be
attached to an e-mail;
(ii) designation of exhibits as separate documents;
(iii) the obligation (if any) to furnish paper copies of
e-mailed documents; and
(iv) the names and e-mail addresses of other individu-
als in the office of an attorney of record designated to
receive e-mail service on behalf of a party.
(c) Documents served by e-mail must be in PDF
format or other format that prevents the alteration of
the document contents.
(d) A paper served by e-mail that an attorney is
required to sign may include the attorney’s actual
signature or a signature block with the name of the
signatory accompanied by “s/” or “/s/.” That designa-
tion shall constitute a signature for all purposes, includ-
ing those contemplated by MCR 2.114(C) and (D).
(e) Each e-mail that transmits a document shall
include a subject line that identifies the case by court,
clvi 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
party name, case number, and the title or legal descrip-
tion of the document(s) being sent.
(f) An e-mail transmission sent after 4:30 p.m. East-
ern Time shall be deemed to be served on the next day
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Service
by e-mail under this subrule is treated as service by
delivery under MCR 2.107(C)(1).
(g) A party may withdraw from a stipulation for
service by e-mail if that party notifies the other party or
parties in writing at least 28 days in advance of the
withdrawal.
(h) Service by e-mail is complete upon transmission,
unless the party making service learns that the at-
tempted service did not reach the e-mail address of the
intended recipient.
(i) The e-mail sender shall maintain an archived
record of sent items that shall not be purged until the
conclusion of the case, including the disposition of all
appeals.
(D)-(F) [Unchanged.]
(G) Filing With Court Defined. The filing of pleadings
and other papers with the court as required by these
rules must be with the clerk of the court, except that the
judge to whom the case is assigned may accept papers
for filing when circumstances warrant. A judge who
does so shall note the filing date on the papers and
transmit them forthwith to the clerk. It is the respon-
sibility of the party who presented the papers to con-
firm that they have been filed with the clerk. If the clerk
dockets papers on a date other than the filing date, the
clerk shall note the filing date on the register of actions.
Staff Comment: The amendments allow parties to stipulate to agree to
e-discovery, or service of papers among the parties, by e-mail. Further, the
amendments require that court clerks note the date pleadings are filed if
that date is different than the date the filing is docketed.
M
ICHIGAN
C
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The e-discovery rules allow parties or those represented by attorneys
to stipulate to service by e-mail. The stipulation establishes the maxi-
mum document size, the designation of exhibits as separate documents,
the persons who are entitled to receive an e-mailed document other than
the party or attorney, and the obligation, if any, to furnish paper copies of
e-mailed documents. The rule also requires that the subject line of an
e-mail that contains a document or has a document attached indicate the
court, case number, party name, and title of the document being sent.
Documents are required to be in a format, such as PDF, that precludes
alteration, and a designation of “s/” or “/s/” is sufficient for a signature.
Documents e-mailed after 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time are considered filed
the next day, and service by e-mail is equivalent to service by delivery.
Service is complete upon transmission, unless the sender receives notice
that the e-mail did not reach the intended e-mail address. An e-mail
sender is required to maintain an archived record of sent items until the
case concludes, including the disposition of all appeals.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Adopted November 27, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No.
2003-59)—R
EPORTER
.
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.112. P
LEADING
S
PECIAL
M
ATTERS
.
(A)-(G) [Unchanged.]
(H) Statutes, Ordinances, or Charters. In pleading a
statute, ordinance, or municipal charter, it is sufficient
to identify it, without stating its substance, except as
provided in subrule (M).
(I)-(L) [Unchanged.]
(M) Headlee Amendment Actions. In an action alleg-
ing a violation of Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25-34, the factual
basis for the alleged violation or a defense must be
stated with particularity. In an action involving Const
1963, art 9, § 29, the plaintiff must state with particu-
clviii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
larity the type and extent of the harm and whether
there has been a violation of either the first or second
sentence of that section. In an action involving the
second sentence of Const 1963, art 9, §29, the plaintiff
must state with particularity the activity or service
involved. All statutes involved in the case must be
identified, and copies of all ordinances and municipal
charter provisions involved, and any available docu-
mentary evidence supportive of a claim or defense, must
be attached to the pleading. The parties may supple-
ment their pleadings with additional documentary evi-
dence as it becomes available to them.
R
ULE
7.206. E
XTRAORDINARY
W
RITS,
O
RIGINAL
A
CTIONS, AND
E
NFORCEMENT
A
CTIONS
.
(A)-(C) [Unchanged.]
(D) Actions for Extraordinary Writs and Original
Actions.
(1) Filing of Complaint. To commence an original
action, the plaintiff shall file with the clerk:
(a) for original actions filed under Const 1963, art 9,
§§ 25-34, 5 copies of a complaint (one signed) that
conforms to the special requirements of MCR 2.112(M),
and which indicates whether there are any factual
questions that must be resolved; for all other extraor-
dinary writs and original actions, 5 copies of a com-
plaint (one signed), which may have copies of support-
ing documents or affidavits attached to each copy;
(b)-(d) [Unchanged.]
(2) Answer. The defendant or any other interested
party must file with the clerk within 21 days of service
of the complaint and any supporting documents or
affidavits:
M
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C
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ULES OF
1985 clix
(a) for original actions filed under Const 1963, art 9,
§§ 25-34, 5 copies of an answer to the complaint (one
signed) that conforms to the special requirements of
MCR 2.112(M), and which indicates whether there are
any factual questions that must be resolved; for all
other extraordinary writs and original actions, 5 copies
of an answer to the complaint (one signed), which may
have copies of supporting documents or affidavits at-
tached to each copy.
(b)-(c) [Unchanged.]
(3) [Unchanged.]
(E) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The amendments establish special pleading require-
ments in actions alleging a violation of the Headlee Amendment, Const
1963, art 9, §§ 25-34. The amendments require that a complaint or
answer state the factual basis for an alleged violation or defense with
particularity. Additionally, documentary evidence supportive of a claim or
defense must be attached to the pleading as an exhibit.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Y
OUNG,
J. (concurring). I concur with this Court’s
adoption of the amendments to MCR 2.112 and 7.206. I
write to respond to Justice W
EAVER
’s assertion that the
“amendments are another attempt by the majority to
reduce the ability of the average taxpayer, who is
unlikely to have legal experience, to seek enforcement
of the Headlee Amendment....”
1
Justice W
EAVER
’s
criticisms ignore the practical difficulties associated
with the Court of Appeals exercise of original jurisdic-
tion over Headlee claims.
The Headlee Amendment
2
vests original jurisdiction
in the Court of Appeals for claims arising under its
1
Post at clxv.
2
Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25 to 34.
clx 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
provisions.
3
The people of the state of Michigan chose to
vest the Court of Appeals with original jurisdiction, and
we are without authority to circumvent the import of
what the constitution requires. We are, however, con-
fronted with certain practical difficulties that inhere
when an appellate court, such as the Court of Appeals,
is required to exercise original jurisdiction over complex
legal claims that require factual development.
The Court of Appeals is not a trial court.
4
In Michi-
gan, the circuit courts and other lower courts are
generally vested with the responsibility of aiding the
parties in developing the facts that define and ulti-
mately decide their claims and defenses. Trial courts
are designed efficiently to preside over discovery mat-
ters, pretrial hearings, and ultimately a trial on the
merits. Those are the means that our system of justice
uses to fully and efficiently develop the facts underlying
the parties’ claims.
None of the tools available to our circuit courts for
processing trials are available in the Court of Appeals.
Thus, the Court of Appeals is poorly suited and
equipped for factual development of new claims. The
Court of Appeals’ primary function is revisionary; it
reviews claims and defenses and assesses their merits
well after the parties have had the opportunity fully to
develop the facts in the lower courts. As such, the Court
3
Id., § 32 (“Any taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit
in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of
Sections 25 through 31, inclusive, of this Article and, if the suit is
sustained, shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs
incurred in maintaining such suit.”).
4
The Michigan Constitution expressly provides that the circuit court is
Michigan’s trial court. Const 1963, art 6, § 1 (“The judicial power of the
state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided
into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the circuit court ....”[Emphasis added.]).
M
ICHIGAN
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of Appeals is ill-equipped to evaluate the claims and
defenses in a complex and fact-intensive original action
without the assistance of the parties in developing the
factual bases for their claims and defenses.
Justice W
EAVER
’s criticisms fail to recognize how
the practical difficulties associated with the Court of
Appeals’ exercise of original jurisdiction over Headlee
claims have affected the very same claimants whose
cause she purports to trumpet. This Court and the
Court of Appeals have experienced repeated frustra-
tion with evaluating complaints that only assert
generalized claims based on the Headlee Amendment.
Pursuant to MCR 7.206(A), plaintiffs filed complaints
asserting only generalized factual allegations.
5
As
with other fact-intensive claims,
6
generalized pleading
proved problematic because of the complex and fact-
intensive nature of Headlee claims. As a result, the
Court of Appeals dismissed several complaints for a
failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
7
Following those dismissals, this Court was in no better
position than the Court of Appeals to evaluate the
generalized pleadings.
8
5
See MCR 2.111(B)(1).
6
See MCR 2.112(B) (requiring that claims of fraud and mistake “must
be stated with particularity”).
7
See, e.g., Duverney v Big Creek Mentor Utility Auth, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 10, 2003 (Docket No.
243866); Ben Drew Co v Ontwa Twp, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered June 9, 2003 (Docket No. 248286); see also Wayne Co Bd
of Comm’rs v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 253 Mich App 144, 169-170 (2002)
(dismissing claims with prejudice on motion for summary disposition
when the plaintiff failed to substantiate claims of Headlee violations).
8
See, e.g., Duverney v Big Creek-Mentor Utility Auth, 469 Mich 1042
(2004) (vacating and remanding for the plaintiffs to “amend their
complaint so as to more specifically allege a violation of Const 1963, art
9, § 31.”); Ben Drew Co, LLC v Ontwa Twp, 472 Mich 886 (2005) (denying
leave to appeal).
clxii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Justice W
EAVER
argues that the amendments are
“unfair and overly burdensome”
9
because they “require
legal reasoning by the average nonlawyer tax-
payer....”
10
Complexity, however, pervades Headlee
claims. This Court has, by necessity, recognized two
distinct claims that may be pursued under article 9,
§ 29.
11
Each claim under § 29 involves separate and
distinct factual support.
12
It would indeed be an injus-
tice if a complaint were dismissed due to a misunder-
standing of which claim the plaintiff intended to ad-
vance. The amendments to MCR 2.112 and 7.206 are
designed to prevent such an unfortunate result.
The amendments do nothing to increase either the
complexity of the issues or the facts necessary to
ultimately prove or disprove either type of claim under
§ 29. Rather, instead of leaving the Court of Appeals to
guess about the basis of the claim and the factual
support for it, the rules now require that the parties
frame their claims and present their factual support at
the outset of the proceeding.
Justice W
EAVER
also argues that the requirement of
five copies of the complaint and the plaintiff’s support-
9
Post at clxv.
10
Post at clxvii-clxviii.
11
See Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 111 (2004) (distinguishing the
“maintenance of support” [MOS] provision and the “prohibition on
unfunded mandates” [POUM] provision); Const 1963, art 9, § 29.
12
For a MOS claim, a plaintiff must show “ ‘ (1) that there is a
continuing state mandate, (2) that the state actually funded the man-
dated activity at a certain proportion of necessary costs in the base year
of 1978-1979, and (3) that the state funding of necessary costs has dipped
below that proportion in a succeeding year.’ ” Adair, supra at 111
(citation omitted). For a POUM claim, a plaintiff must show “that the
state-mandated local activity was originated without sufficient state
funding after the Headlee Amendment was adopted or, if properly funded
initially, that the mandated local role was increased by the state without
state funding for the necessary increased costs.” Id.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
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ULES OF
1985 clxiii
ing documents will prove to be cost prohibitive for
Headlee claimants. I simply note that the copying
requirements (steps four, five, and six in Justice W
EAV-
ER
’s “six detailed legal procedural steps”)
13
are consis-
tent with the copying requirements for all other origi-
nal actions in the Court of Appeals.
The amendments to MCR 2.112 and 7.206 that this
Court adopts today serve to ensure that all parties in-
volved in a Headlee claim—plaintiffs included—receive a
full, fair, and accurate judicial assessment of the issues
presented in their claims and defenses. The amendments
are not a great disservice to the average taxpayer as
Justice W
EAVER
contends. Rather, they serve to remedy
the otherwise unavoidable practical issues involved in the
Court of Appeals exercise of original jurisdiction over
claims that involve complex factual questions. This ap-
proach ensures fairness to all parties.
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.,
concurred with Y
OUNG
,J.
W
EAVER
,J
.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s
adoption of the court rule amendments of MCR 2.112
and 7.206 because the court rule amendments require
particularized fact pleading in Headlee Amendment
claims and effectively reduce the right of any taxpayer
of the state to bring a suit to enforce the provisions of
the Headlee Amendment.
1
13
Post at clxv.
1
The Headlee Amendment was “part of a nationwide ‘taxpayers revolt’.
. . to limit legislative expansion of requirements placed on local govern-
ment, to put a freeze on what they perceived was excessive government
spending, and to lower their taxes both at the local and the state level.”
Durant v State Bd of Ed, 424 Mich 364, 378 (1985).
The Headlee Amendment, presented in an initiative petition, Pro-
posal E, that Michigan voters ratified during the November 7, 1978,
general election, added §§ 25 to 34 to article 9 of the Michigan Constitu-
tion. Appendix A sets forth the amendments of MCR 2.112 and 7.206
affecting actions concerning the Headlee Amendment provisions enacted
by the voters.
clxiv 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
The court rule amendments are another attempt by
the majority to reduce the ability of the average tax-
payer, who is unlikely to have legal experience, to seek
enforcement of the Headlee Amendment because the
court rule amendments make it more difficult for the
average nonlawyer taxpayer to exercise his or her
constitutional right to file a suit to seek enforcement of
the Headlee Amendment provisions.
The court rule amendments are unfair and overly
burdensome because they require the nonlawyer tax-
payer to perform six detailed legal procedural steps
whenever that taxpayer seeks enforcement of the Head-
lee Amendment. Specifically, in order to bring suit to
enforce the Headlee Amendment, the nonlawyer tax-
payer must:
(1) “state with particularity the type and extent of the
harm,”
(2) identify whether the complaint is with respect to the
state’s reduction of “the state financed proportion of the
necessary costs of any existing activity or service” required
of local government or whether the complaint concerns a
failure by the state to appropriate additional funds for any
new activity or service beyond that required by existing law
and, if the latter applies, state with particularity the
activity or service involved, see Const 1963, art 9, § 29,
(3) identify all pertinent statutes,
(4) provide five copies of a complaint for an original
action,
(5) provide five “copies of all ordinances and municipal
charter provisions involved,” and
(6) include “any available documentary evidence sup-
portive of a claim or defense.”
The creation of these six additional legal pleading
requirements for bringing a claim under the Headlee
Amendment will often result in a difficult obstacle and
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
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ULES OF
1985 clxv
an expensive burden for the average taxpayer. Such
results are contrary to the intent of the Headlee
Amendment.
In Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 144 (2004), I
dissented from the majority’s previous attempt to dis-
courage the enforcement of the Headlee Amendment.
In that case, I objected to the majority of four’s evis-
ceration of standing to bring suit under the Headlee
Amendment when that majority, through its judicially
created broad application of res judicata requirements,
sought to preclude taxpayer claims. There I stated:
Const 1963, art 9, § 29 provides in part:
“The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state
financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing
activity or service required of units of Local Government by
state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the
[level] of any activity or service beyond that required by
existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any
state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state
appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of
Local Government for any necessary increased costs.”
Standing to pursue violations of this section, as well as
other sections of the Headlee Amendment, is given to all
taxpayers in the state. Const 1963, art 9, § 32 provides:
“Any taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring
suit in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the
provisions of Sections 25 through 31, inclusive, of the
Article, and, if the suit is sustained, shall receive from the
applicable unit of government his costs incurred in main-
taining such suit. [Emphasis added.]”
***
Art9,§32gives “any taxpayer of the state” standing to
enforce the provisions of the Headlee Amendment. This
grant of standing is consistent with the amendment’s
purpose, which, as explained by this Court, is to limit the
clxvi 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
expansion of legislative requirements placed on local gov-
ernments....Consequently, it is extremely doubtful that
the people of this state would have expected their ability to
enforce the Headlee Amendment to be hampered by the
broad application of res judicata that the majority imposes.
Rather, as explained below, a “common understanding” of
the people would suggest the opposite conclusion—that the
Constitution’s grant of standing under art 9, § 32 to “any
taxpayer” is just that—a broad grant of standing that
permits any taxpayer to pursue actions necessary to en-
force the provisions of the Headlee Amendment.[Id. at
142-145 (some emphasis added).]
Under the new court rule amendments, the average
nonlawyer taxpayer will be required to “state with
particularity the type and extent of the harm” alleged
and to identify (1) whether the complaint is with
respect to the state’s reduction of “the state financed
proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity
or service” required of local units of government or (2)
whether the complaint concerns a failure by the state to
appropriate additional funds (to be disbursed to local
units of government) for any new activity or service
beyond that required by existing law. These unduly
burdensome requirements will likely discourage tax-
payers from attempting to seek enforcement of the
Headlee Amendment because filing a claim will often be
too difficult and too expensive for the average nonlaw-
yer taxpayer.
A nonlawyer taxpayer who wants to bring an action
to enforce the Headlee Amendment, but who cannot
afford the assistance of legal counsel, will be unduly
burdened by these court rule amendments, because the
court rule amendments require legal reasoning by the
average nonlawyer taxpayer and, further, because
collecting the voluminous records that must be filed
with the complaint will be difficult for the taxpayer to
accomplish, given the likelihood that the average
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
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ULES OF
1985 clxvii
nonlawyer taxpayer lacks both the legal experience
and the funds required to properly file a complaint.
Lawyers are trained professionally how to research
statutes and ordinances and how to properly plead
claims supported by relevant evidence. Under the
new court rule amendments, the average taxpayer,
untrained in the law, will have to complete these
additional six procedural pleading requirements just
to file a complaint. As such, the average taxpayer will
essentially be required to “fill the shoes of an attor-
ney,” a nearly insurmountable task for some people,
which will likely result in a reduction in the number
of Headlee Amendment complaints filed.
This result is inconsistent with art 9, §§ 29 and 32
and contrary to the people’s understanding that “any
taxpayer” would have a fair opportunity to seek en-
forcement of the Headlee Amendment. The right to
have a fair opportunity to bring a Headlee Amendment
claim is a constitutionally guaranteed right available to
all taxpayers, not just those who have attended law
school or those who can afford to employ attorneys for
their assistance.
I dissent from the adoption of the court rule amend-
ments of MCR 2.112 and MCR 7.206. The court rule
amendments are contrary to the intent of the Headlee
Amendment, frustrate the broad grant of standing
provided to taxpayers by § 32, and will essentially
preclude the average taxpayer from seeking enforce-
ment of the Headlee Amendment provisions.
C
AVANAGH,
J., concurred with W
EAVER,
J.
APPENDIX A
Note: the underscored text represents the newly
adopted amendments affecting Headlee Amendment
actions.
clxviii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Michigan Court Rule 2.112 — Pleading Special Mat-
ters
(A)-(G) [Unchanged.]
(H) Statutes, Ordinances, or Charters. In pleading a
statute, ordinance, or municipal charter, it is sufficient
to identify it, without stating its substance, except as
provided in subrule (M).
(I)-(L) [Unchanged.]
(M) Headlee Amendment Actions. In an action alleg-
ing a violation of Const 1963, art 9, §§ 25-34, the factual
basis for the alleged violation or a defense must be
stated with particularity. In an action involving Const
1963, art 9, § 29, the plaintiff must state with particu-
larity the type and extent of the harm and whether
there has been a violation of either the first or second
sentence of that section. In an action involving the
second sentence of Const 1963, art 9, §29, the plaintiff
must state with particularity the activity or service
involved. All statutes involved in the case must be
identified, and copies of all ordinances and municipal
charter provisions involved, and any available docu-
mentary evidence supportive of a claim or defense, must
be attached to the pleading. The parties may supple-
ment their pleadings with additional documentary evi-
dence as it becomes available to them.
Michigan Court Rule 7.206—Extraordinary Writs,
Original Actions, and Enforcement Actions.
(A)-(C) [Unchanged.]
(D) Actions for Extraordinary Writs and Original
Actions.
(1) Filing of Complaint. To commence an original
action, the plaintiff shall file with the clerk:
(a) for original actions filed under Const 1963, art 9,
§§ 25-34, 5 copies of a complaint (one signed) that
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 clxix
conforms to the special requirements of MCR 2.112(M),
and which indicates whether there are any factual
questions that must be resolved; for all other extraor-
dinary writs and original actions, 5 copies of a com-
plaint (one signed), which may have copies of support-
ing documents or affidavits attached to each copy;
(b)-(d) [Unchanged.]
(2) Answer. The defendant or any other interested
party must file with the clerk within 21 days of service
of the complaint and any supporting documents or
affidavits:
(a) for original actions filed under Const 1963, art 9,
§§ 25-34, 5 copies of an answer to the complaint (one
signed) that conforms to the special requirements of
MCR 2.112(M), and which indicates whether there are
any factual questions that must be resolved; for all
other extraordinary writs and original actions, 5 copies
of an answer to the complaint (one signed), which may
have copies of supporting documents or affidavits at-
tached to each copy.
(b)-(c) [Unchanged.]
(3) [Unchanged.]
Adopted January 8, 2008, effective immediately (File No. 2007-27)—
R
EPORTER
.
[The present language is repealed and
replaced by the following language unless
otherwise indicated below:]
R
ULE
5.125. I
NTERESTED
P
ERSONS
D
EFINED
.
On order of the Court, the need for immediate action
having been found, the notice requirements are dis-
pensed with and the following amendments of Rules
5.125 of the Michigan Court Rules is adopted, effective
clxx 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
immediately. MCR 1.201(D). Comments will be received
and may be sent to the Supreme Court Clerk in writing or
electronically through January 23, 2008, to P.O. Box
When filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No.
2007-27. Your comments and the comments of others will
be posted at www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources
/administrative/index.htm. The amendment will be con-
sidered at the Supreme Court’s public hearing scheduled
for January 23, 2008. The notices and agendas for public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov
/supremecourt.
(A)-(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) Subject to subrules (A) and (B) and MCR
5.105(E), the following provisions apply. When a single
petition requests multiple forms of relief, the petitioner
must give notice to all persons interested in each type of
relief:
(1)-(21) [Unchanged.]
(22) The persons interested in a petition for appoint-
ment of a guardian of an alleged incapacitated indi-
vidual are
(a) the alleged incapacitated individual,
(b) if known, a person named as attorney in fact
under a durable power of attorney,
(c) the alleged incapacitated individual’s spouse,
(d) the alleged incapacitated individual’s children
and the individual’s parents,
(e) if no spouse, child, or parent is living, the pre-
sumptive heirs of the individual,
(f) the person who has the care and custody of the
alleged incapacitated individual, and
(g) the nominated guardian.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
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ULES OF
1985 clxxi
(23)-(31) [Unchanged.]
(D)-(E) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The amendment of MCR 5.125 conforms the rule to
language in MCL 700.5311 by clarifying that parents are interested
persons entitled to notice in a petition for the appointment of a guardian
of an alleged incapacitated individual, regardless of whether the alleged
incapacitated individual has living adult children.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
Adopted January 29, 2008, (File No. 2007-27)—R
EPORTER
.
By order dated January 8, 2008, this Court adopted
an amendment of Rule 5.125 of the Michigan Court
Rules with immediate effect. 480 Mich cvi (2008). At the
same time, the Court invited comment regarding the
amendment. A public hearing in this matter was held
on January 23, 2008, and the Court has determined
that the comment period should be extended to April 1,
2008, to allow more time to receive public comments,
and that this matter will again appear on a public
hearing agenda after the new comment period has
expired.
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
3.928
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES.
On order of the Court, the need for imme-
diate action having been found, the notice requirements
are dispensed with and the following amendment of Rule
3.928 of the Michigan Court Rules is adopted, effective
immediately. MCR 1.201(D). Comments will be received
and may be sent to the Supreme Court Clerk in writing or
electronically through August 31, 2008, to P.O. Box 30052,
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2008-
19. Your comments and the comments of others will be
posted at www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/
administrative/index.htm. The amendment will be consid-
ered at a future Supreme Court public administrative
clxxii 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
hearing. The notices and agendas for public hearings are
posted at www.courts. michigan.gov/supremecourt.
[The present language would be amended as
indicated below:]
R
ULE
3.928. C
ONTEMPT OF
C
OURT.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) Contempt by Juvenile. A juvenile under court
jurisdiction who is convicted of criminal contempt of
court, and who was at least 17 years of age when the
contempt was committed, may be sentenced to up to 30
93 days in the county jail as a disposition for the
contempt. Juveniles sentenced under this subrule need
not be lodged separate separately and apart from adult
prisoners. Younger juveniles found in contempt of court
are subject to a juvenile disposition under these rules.
Staff Comment: This amendment changes the current maximum
penalty from 30 days in jail for contempt of court to 93 days in jail for
contempt of court to conform to MCL 600.1715.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 31, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2008-19. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at:
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES OF
1985 clxxiii
AMENDMENTS OF LOCAL COURT
RULES
F
IFTY
-F
IFTH
J
UDICIAL
D
ISTRICT
Adopted December 20, 2007, effective January 15, 2008 (File No.
2007-16)—R
EPORTER
.
On order of the Court, the following Rule 4.201 of the
Local Court Rules of the 55th District Court is adopted,
effective January 15, 2008.
[The following is a new local court rule for the 55th
District Court.]
R
ULE
4.201. S
UMMARY
P
ROCEEDINGS TO
R
ECOVER
P
OSSESSION
OF
P
REMISES
.
(C) Summons.
(1) The summons must comply with MCR 2.102, and
shall command the defendant to appear in accord with
MCL 600.5735(4) as follows:
(a) within 10 days after service of the summons upon
the defendant, in proceedings under MCL 600.5726;
(b) within 5 days after service of the summons upon
the defendant in all other proceedings.
Staff Comment: Local Court Rule 4.201(C) of the 55th Judicial
District Court was adopted at the request of that court, to be effective
January 15, 2008.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
clxxiv
RESCISSION OF LOCAL COURT
RULES
Entered March 7, 2008, effective immediately (File No. 2008-05)—
R
EPORTER
.
On order of the Court, Rules 2.119, 2.501, 6.000, and
6.001 of the Local Court Rules of the 9th Judicial
Circuit Court are rescinded, effective immediately.
clxxv
AMENDMENT OF STATE BAR RULES
Adopted December 19, 2007, effective January 1, 2008 (File No.
2005-41)—R
EPORTER
.
On order of the Court, notice of the proposed changes
and an opportunity for comment in writing and at a
public hearing having been provided, and consideration
having been given to the comments received, the fol-
lowing new Rule 19 of the Rules Concerning the State
Bar of Michigan is adopted, effective January 1, 2008.
R
ULE
19. C
ONFIDENTIALITY OF
S
TATE
B
AR
R
ECORDS
.
Sec. 1. Except as provided below, in Rule 15, or as
otherwise provided by law, records maintained by the
state bar are open to the public pursuant to the State
Bar of Michigan Access to Information Policy.
Sec. 2. Records and information of the Client Protec-
tion Fund, Ethics Program, Lawyers and Judges Assis-
tance Program, Practice Management Resource Center
Program, and Unauthorized Practice of Law Program
that contain identifying information about a person
who uses, is a participant in, is subject to, or who
inquires about participation in, any of these programs,
are confidential and are not subject to disclosure, dis-
covery, or production, except as provided in section (3)
and (4).
Sec. 3. Records and information made confidential
under section (1) or (2) shall be disclosed:
(a) pursuant to a court order;
clxxvi
(b) to a law enforcement agency in response to a
lawfully issued subpoena or search warrant, or;
(c) to the attorney grievance commission or attorney
discipline board in connection with an investigation or
hearing conducted by the commission or board, or
sanction imposed by the board.
Sec. 4. Records and information made confidential
under section (1) or (2) may be disclosed:
(a) upon request of the state bar and approval by the
Michigan Supreme Court where the public interest in
disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclo-
sure in the particular instance, or
(b) at the discretion of the state bar, upon written
permission of all persons who would be identified by the
requested information.
Staff Comment: This new rule was submitted for consideration to the
Supreme Court by the State Bar of Michigan to clarify and set out the
rules regarding confidentiality of documents and records of the bar. This
rule requires that internal information that contains identifying infor-
mation, including information that relates to the Client Protection Fund,
the Ethics Program, the Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program, the
Practice Management Resource Center Program, and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Program, be confidential. However, records and docu-
ments must be disclosed pursuant to a court order, to a law enforcement
agency that submits a warrant or subpoena, or to the Attorney Grievance
Commission and Attorney Discipline Board. Confidential information
may be disclosed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public
interest in nondisclosure, or at the discretion of the SBM, with the
approval of all persons who would be identified by the requested
information.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
S
TATE
B
AR
R
ULES
clxxvii
S
UPREME
C
OURT
C
ASES
PEOPLE v STAMPER
Docket No. 132887. Decided December 27, 2007.
A jury in the Wayne Circuit Court convicted Michael W. Stamper
of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); second-degree murder,
MCL 750.317; first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2); and
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a). The
court, Annette J. Berry, J., vacated the second-degree murder
and first-degree child abuse convictions and sentenced the
defendant to life in prison without parole for the felony-murder
conviction and to 225 months to 80 years in prison for the
first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. The Court of
Appeals, S
ERVITTO
, P.J., and F
ITZGERALD
and T
ALBOT
, JJ., affirmed
in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 16,
2006 (Docket No. 263436). With regard to the issue of the trial
court’s admission of the four-year-old victim’s statements as
dying declarations, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. The defendant applied for leave to
appeal.
In a unanimous memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court,
in lieu of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral
argument, held:
A child may have the capacity to be conscious of his or her own
impending death for purposes of the dying declaration exception to
the hearsay rule, MRE 804(b)(2). Under that rule, a statement
made by a declarant is admissible if the declarant is unavailable as
a witness and made the statement “while believing that the
declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circum-
stances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.”
Whether a child was conscious of his or her impending death must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. A declarant’s age alone does
not preclude the admission of a dying declaration. As with an
adult, if the facts show that the child believed that he or she was
about to die, statements made during that time may be proffered
as dying declarations. In this case, the victim died of his injures.
His statement, considered along with those injuries, clearly indi-
cated his belief that his death was imminent, while his statements
P
EOPLE V
S
TAMPER
1
that he received the injuries from the defendant clearly concerned
the circumstances of what the victim believed to be his impending
death.
Affirmed.
E
VIDENCE —
H
EARSAY —
D
YING
D
ECLARATIONS —
C
HILDREN
.
A statement is admissible under the dying declaration exception to
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and
made the statement concerning the cause or circumstances of
what he or she believed to be impending death while believing that
his or her death was imminent; the declarant’s age alone does not
preclude the admission of a dying declaration, and a child may
have the capacity to be conscious of his or her own impending
death for purposes of the exception; whether a child was conscious
of his or her impending death must be determined on a case-by-
case basis (MRE 804[b][2]).
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attor-
ney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Train-
ing, and Appeals, and Jason W. Williams, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Michael W. Stamper in propria persona.
M
EMORANDUM
O
PINION
. At issue in this case is
whether a four-year-old injured child can be sufficiently
aware of his impending death so that a statement given
when death was imminent qualifies for admission as
evidence under the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule, MRE 804(b)(2). In lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we affirm defendant’s convictions and hold that
a child may have the capacity to be conscious of his own
impending death for purposes of the dying declaration
exception.
We adopt the facts as set forth by the Court of
Appeals:
The victim in this case is Jake Logan, the son of
defendant’s girlfriend, Gloria Ann Logan, who is also the
2 480 M
ICH
1 [Dec
mother of defendant’s child. During the late afternoon or
evening of September 8, 2004, defendant gave the victim a
bath. Gloria heard the victim crying during the bath. After
the bath, the victim was “passing out,” and defendant put
him in the bathtub to revive him. The victim later lay on
the bed with Gloria. When Gloria asked him to open his
eyes, he responded, “Mom, I can’t, I’m dead.” Defendant’s
daughter, Jamie, indicated that the victim stated, “don’t
bother me, I’m already dead.” Gloria called her father, who
came over and eventually called 911.
The victim was admitted to the hospital that evening
with bruises on his neck, arms, chest, abdomen, groin,
testicles, and legs. Nurse Hillary Hart asked the victim how
he got his bruises, and the victim responded, “from
‘Mike.’ ” Nurse Lisa Blanchette asked the victim who Mike
was, and the victim responded, “Mom’s wife.” The victim
died shortly thereafter.
According to Dr. Leigh Hlavaty, an expert in forensic
pathology, the victim had 88 bruises on his body as well as
anal injuries. Hlavaty testified that the anal injuries were
consistent with anal penetration. Hlavaty opined that all of
the victim’s bruises and injuries were sustained within
twenty-four hours of his death and that the victim’s
internal injuries were likely sustained within the two to six
hours preceding the victim’s admission into the hospital.
He stated that an adult male fist or being struck with a
blunt object in the abdomen likely caused the victim’s
injuries. [Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued November 16, 2006 (Docket No. 263436),
pp 1-2.]
The trial court admitted Jake’s statements implicating
defendant under the dying declaration exception. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hearsay is an unsworn, out-of-court statement that
is offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted.
MRE 801(c). It is generally inadmissible unless it falls
under one of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the
Michigan Rules of Evidence. MRE 802. One of these
2007] P
EOPLE V
S
TAMPER
3
exceptions is MRE 804(b)(2), commonly known as the
dying declaration exception, which provides that a
statement by a declarant is admissible if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness and the statement was made
“while believing that the declarant’s death was immi-
nent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be impending death.” We review a
trial court’s admission of evidence under a hearsay
exception to determine whether there has been an
abuse of discretion. People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 485;
550 NW2d 505 (1996).
Before admitting a statement as a dying declaration,
the trial court must make a preliminary investigation of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the statement.
People v Johnson, 334 Mich 169, 173-174; 54 NW2d 206
(1952); People v Fritch, 210 Mich 343, 346-347; 178 NW
59 (1920). The trial court, in advance of the proof of the
declaration itself, may “ ‘allow evidence as to the cir-
cumstances under which the dying declaration was
taken to show whether it was really taken when the
declarant was under the conviction of approaching and
inevitable death....’” Fritch, supra at 347, quoting
People v Christmas, 181 Mich 634, 646; 148 NW 369
(1914). If the surrounding circumstances clearly estab-
lish that the declarant was in extremis and believed that
his death was impending, the court may admit state-
ments concerning the cause or circumstances of the
declarant’s impending death as substantive evidence
under MRE 804(b)(2). Johnson, supra at 173.
Here, we conclude that the requirements for admis-
sibility have been met. Jake was clearly unavailable as
a witness. MRE 804(a)(4). His statement to his mother,
“Mom, I can’t, I’m dead,” when considered along with
his injuries, clearly indicated his belief that his death
was imminent. Johnson, supra at 173. And his state-
4 480 M
ICH
1 [Dec
ments to the nurses that he received his injuries from
“Mike” and that Mike was “Mom’s wife” clearly con-
cerned the circumstances of what Jake believed to be
his impending death. MRE 804(b)(2).
We reject defendant’s argument that a four-year-old
child cannot be aware of impending death. Whether a
child was conscious of his own impending death must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. As with an adult, if
the facts show, as they do here, that the child believed
that he was about to die, statements he made may be
proffered as dying declarations. A declarant’s age alone
does not preclude the admission of a dying declaration.
Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision to
uphold the trial court’s admission of the victim’s state-
ments.
The remainder of defendant’s application is denied,
because we are not persuaded that the questions pre-
sented should be reviewed by this Court.
Affirmed.
T
AYLOR
, C .J., and C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,K
ELLY
,C
ORRIGAN
,
Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred.
2007] P
EOPLE V
S
TAMPER
5
TOLL NORTHVILLE LTD v NORTHVILLE TOWNSHIP
Docket No. 132466. Argued on October 4, 2007 (Calendar No. 9). Decided
February 5, 2008.
Toll Northville Ltd and Biltmore Wineman LLC installed road
access, streetlights, sewer service, water service, electrical service,
natural gas service, telephone service, and sidewalks for a residen-
tial development project in Northville Township. The township
increased the tax assessments on the property because of the
enhanced value from these public-service improvements. Toll
Northville and Biltmore contested the assessments before the Tax
Tribunal, and Toll Northville brought an action for a declaratory
judgment against the township in the Wayne Circuit Court,
challenging the constitutionality of MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii), the
statute on which the township based the assessment increases,
arguing that the increases violated Const 1963, art 9, § 3. The Tax
Tribunal stayed the proceeding before it pending a resolution of
the lawsuit. Biltmore was joined in the declaratory–judgment
action. The court, John A. Murphy, J., ruled that the statute was
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals, W
HITBECK
, C.J., and
H
OEKSTRA
and W
ILDER
, JJ., affirmed in an opinion per curiam,
concluding that improvements that become part of the real
property as structures or fixtures constitute taxable “additions”
under the constitution and the statute, but that term does not
include public-service improvements because title to the im-
provements will ultimately vest in the municipality or a utility
company. 272 Mich App 352 (2006). The township applied for
leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. 478 Mich
863 (2007).
In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and
Justices K
ELLY
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme
Court held:
MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitutional because it is incon-
sistent with the meaning of the term “additions” as used in Const
1963, art 9, § 3.
1. Const 1963, art 9, § 3 was amended with the adoption of
Proposal A in 1994. As amended, that constitutional provision caps
general property tax increases while a person owns property, but
6 480 M
ICH
6[Feb
permits additional taxation based on increases in value arising
from additions in the year they were added.
2. Following the adoption of Proposal A, the Legislature
amended MCL 211.34d. Currently, MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) defines
“public services” as “additions” for the purposes of the amended
constitutional provision and, therefore, would allow the taxation of
value added by the installation of public-service improvements,
such as those at issue in this case.
3. The object of interpreting constitutional provisions is to
realize the intent of the people who ratified the provision. A
technical legal term or phrase of art in the law contained in a
constitutional provision must be given the meaning that those
sophisticated in the law understood at the time of adoption unless
it is clear from the provision’s language that another meaning was
intended. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the mere
installation of public-service improvements on public property or
on utility easements does not constitute a taxable “addition” as
that term was understood when the voters adopted Proposal A.
The definition of “additions” found in MCL 211.34d(1)(a), as
amended by 1993 PA 145, reflected the meaning of the term as
understood by those sophisticated in the law when the voters
adopted Proposal A in 1994.
Justice C
AVANAGH
, concurring, agreed with the conclusion that
MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitutional and that public-
service improvements are not additions to property within the
meaning of the constitutional provision. He wrote separately to
disagree with the implication of the majority opinion that only one
valid method exists for determining ambiguity. Many valid, time-
tested methods of determining ambiguity exist and are valuable
for statutory analysis in complex legal and factual circumstances.
While the test for ambiguity used by the Court of Appeals was
proper, that Court applied it improperly in this case.
Justice W
EAVER
, concurring in the result only, would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in that
Court’s opinion.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
T
AXATION —
R
EAL
P
ROPERTY —
T
AXABLE
V
ALUE —
A
DDITIONS —
P
UBLIC
-S
ERVICE
I
MPROVEMENTS —
P
UBLIC
U
TILITIES
.
Public-service improvements consisting of public infrastructure lo-
cated on utility easements or land that ultimately becomes public
do not constitute “additions” to property within the meaning of
that term in the constitution as amended by Proposal A in 1994;
2008] T
OLL
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7
the statutory provision defining “additions” as including public-
service improvements is unconstitutional (Const 1963, art 9, § 3;
MCL 211.34d[1][b][viii]).
Hoffert & Associates, P.C. (by Myles B. Hoffert and
David B. Marmon), for the plaintiffs.
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C.
(by Robert E. Thall), for the defendant.
Amici Curiae:
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, and Ross H. Bishop, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for the State Tax Commission.
James W. Porter, P.C. (by James W. Porter), for the
Michigan Townships Association, the Michigan Munici-
pal League, the Michigan Assessors Association, and
the Michigan Association of School Boards.
McClelland & Anderson, L.L.P. (by Gregory L. Mc-
Clelland and Melissa A. Hagen), for the Michigan
Association of Home Builders.
McClelland & Anderson, L.L.P. (by Gregory L. Mc-
Clelland and Melissa A. Hagen), for the Michigan
Association of Realtors.
P
ER
C
URIAM
. At issue are (1) whether MCL
211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is constitutional and (2) whether
public-service improvements, such as water service,
sewer service, or utility service, constitute “additions”
to property within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 3,
as amended by Proposal A. We affirm in part the
judgment of the Court of Appeals that held that MCL
211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitutional because it is in-
consistent with the meaning of “additions” as used in
Const 1963, art 9, § 3 and that public-service improve-
8 480 M
ICH
6[Feb
O
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ments consisting of public infrastructure located on
utility easements or land that ultimately becomes pub-
lic do not constitute “additions” to property within the
meaning of that constitutional provision. However, we
vacate in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals that
incorrectly defined the term “ambiguous” and mistak-
enly concluded that taxing property on the basis of
value added from available public services and also
taxing utility lines as personal property of the utility
companies results in “double taxation.”
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs T oll Northville Ltd and Biltmore Wineman
LLC are engaged in developing real property. During the
tax years 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs invested millions of
dollars to install infrastructure consisting of physical
improvements, such as a primary access road, streetlights,
sewer service, water service, electrical service, natural gas
service, telephone service, and sidewalks for condominium
and single-family residential lots located in Northville
T ownship. This infrastructure development is required
before a final plat for a subdivision can be approved.
Relying on MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii), defendant Northville
T ownship increased plaintiffs’ property-tax assessments
for the tax years 2001 and 2002 on the basis of the
enhanced value resulting from the public-service improve-
ments that were made to the land.
Plaintiffs challenged their assessments before the
Michigan Tax Tribunal, claiming that the assessment
increases violated Const 1963, art 9, § 3. The Michigan
Tax Tribunal stayed its proceedings so that this declara-
tory action regarding the constitutionality of the stat-
ute could proceed in circuit court. The circuit court held
that MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitutional be-
2008] T
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cause it taxes improvements of real property beyond the
meaning of “additions” when Proposal A was passed.
The circuit court determined that plaintiffs could not be
taxed on the basis of the public-service improvements
because the improvements were not attached to the
separate lots and were either dedicated to the munici-
pality or given to public utilities.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judg-
ment, concluding that the term “additions” as used in
Const 1963, art 9, § 3 refers to improvements that
become part of the real property as structures or
fixtures, but not to public-service improvements. Toll
Northville, Ltd v Northville Twp, 272 Mich App 352;
726 NW2d 57 (2006). The Court of Appeals concluded
that, although at the time of the installation of the
public-service improvements, plaintiffs, as developers,
owned the parcel of land “on which the public service
improvements are installed,” plaintiffs did not owe
property tax on the improvements because title to these
improvements would ultimately vest in the municipal-
ity or a utility company. Id. at 375. We granted defen-
dant’s application for leave to appeal. 478 Mich 863
(2007).
1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling in a declaratory action is
reviewed de novo. Theatre Control Corp v Detroit, 365
Mich 432, 436; 113 NW2d 783 (1962). Matters of
constitutional and statutory interpretation and ques-
tions concerning the constitutionality of a statutory
1
We directed the parties to address “the constitutionality of MCL
211.34d(1)(b)(viii) and whether ‘public service’ improvements (such as
water service, sewer service, utility service) are ‘additions’ to the prop-
erty within the meaning of Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, § 3, which
allows for increased taxation of the property.”
10 480 M
ICH
6[Feb
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provision are also reviewed de novo. Goldstone v Bloom-
field Twp Pub Library, 479 Mich 554, 558; 737 NW2d
476 (2007); Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 422;
685 NW2d 174 (2004); Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572,
576; 683 NW2d 129 (2004). When interpreting consti-
tutional provisions, our primary objective “ ‘is to realize
the intent of the people by whom and for whom the
constitution was ratified.’ ” Studier v Michigan Pub
School Employees’ Retirement Bd, 472 Mich 642, 652;
698 NW2d 350 (2005), quoting Wayne Co v Hathcock,
471 Mich 445, 468; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). In realizing
this intent, we apply the plain meaning of terms used in
the constitution unless technical legal terms were em-
ployed. Phillips, supra at 422.
“[I]f a constitutional phrase is a technical legal term or
a phrase of art in the law, the phrase will be given the
meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at
the time of enactment unless it is clear from the constitu-
tional language that some other meaning was intended.”
[WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy, 466 Mich 117, 123; 643
NW2d 564 (2002), quoting Michigan Coalition of State
Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm, 465 Mich 212, 223;
634 NW2d 692 (2001).]
Statutes are presumed constitutional unless the uncon-
stitutionality is clearly apparent. McDougall v Schanz,
461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS
This appeal addresses legislation enacted after Michi-
gan voters adopted Proposal A in 1994, which amended
article 9, § 3 of the Michigan Constitution. As amended
by Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, § 3 provides, in
relevant part:
The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad
valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property not
2008] T
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exempt by law except for taxes levied for school operating
purposes. The legislature shall provide for the determina-
tion of true cash value of such property; the proportion of
true cash value at which such property shall be uniformly
assessed, which shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50
percent; and for a system of equalization of assessments.
For taxes levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the
legislature shall provide that the taxable value of each
parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall
not increase each year by more than the increase in the
immediately preceding year in the general price level, as
defined in section 33 of this article, or 5 percent, whichever
is less until ownership of the parcel of property is trans-
ferred. When ownership of the parcel of property is trans-
ferred as defined by law, the parcel shall be assessed at the
applicable proportion of current true cash value. [Empha-
sis added.]
The purpose of Proposal A was
to generally limit increases in property taxes on a parcel of
property, as long as it remains owned by the same party, by
capping the amount that the “taxable value” of the prop-
erty may increase each year, even if the “true cash value,”
that is, the actual market value, of the property rises at a
greater rate. However, a qualification is made to allow
adjustments for “additions.” [WPW Acquisition Co, supra
at 121-122.]
Thus, as amended, the constitution caps general
property tax increases during the course of a property
owner’s ownership, but permits additional taxation
based on increases in value arising from “additions” in
the year they are added to the land.
When Proposal A was adopted . . . , the General Prop-
erty Tax Act defined “additions” to mean
“all increases in value caused by new construction or a
physical addition of equipment or furnishings, and the
value of property that was exempt from taxes or not
included on the assessment unit’s immediately preceding
12 480 M
ICH
6[Feb
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year’s assessment role.” [Id. at 122, quoting the text of
MCL 211.34d(1)(a) in effect at the time of Proposal A’s
adoption.]
After Proposal A was adopted, the Legislature en-
acted several amendments of MCL 211.34d. As it now
stands, MCL 211.34d provides, in pertinent part:
(1) As used in this section or section 27a, or section 3 or
31 of article IX of the state constitution of 1963:
(a) For taxes levied before 1995, “additions” means all
increases in value caused by new construction or a physical
addition of equipment or furnishings, and the value of
property that was exempt from taxes or not included on the
assessment unit’s immediately preceding year’s assess-
ment roll.
(b) For taxes levied after 1994, “additions” means,
except as provided in subdivision (c), all of the following:
***
(viii) Public services. As used in this subparagraph,
“public services” means water service, sewer service, a
primary access road, natural gas service, electrical service,
telephone service, sidewalks, or street lighting. For pur-
poses of determining the taxable value of real property
under section 27a, the value of public services is the
amount of increase in true cash value of the property
attributable to the available public services multiplied by
0.50 and shall be added in the calendar year following the
calendar year when those public services are initially
available.
The issue is the constitutionality of MCL
211.34d(1)(b)(viii), which, as written, defines “public
services” as “additions” and, therefore, would allow for
the taxation of the value added from the installation of
public-service improvements, which are “water service,
sewer service, a primary access road, natural gas ser-
vice, electrical service, telephone service, sidewalks, or
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street lighting.” We agree with the analysis and the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which declared MCL
211.34d(1)(b)(viii) unconstitutional. The Court of Ap-
peals correctly concluded that the mere installation of
public-service improvements on public property or on
utility easements does not constitute a taxable
“addition”—as that term was understood when the
public adopted Proposal A—in this instance, involving
infrastructure improvements made to land destined to
become a residential subdivision.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the definition of
“additions” provided by the enabling legislation for the
Headlee Amendment is not pertinent to this case. The
Headlee Amendment, adopted in 1978, limited local
property taxation by controlling changes in the tax
base, i.e., it generally placed an inflation-rate cap on the
increase of taxes by the local taxing authorities with
regard to all property combined within a unit of local
government and without regard to any specific parcel of
property, but it excluded the value of new construction
and improvements. Const 1963, art 9, § 31. The en-
abling legislation for the Headlee Amendment defined
“[n]ew construction and improvements” as “additions
less losses.” MCL 211.34d(1)(e), as added by 1978 PA
532. “Additions” was defined as “all increases in value
caused by new construction, improvements caused by
new construction or a physical addition of equipment or
furnishings....”MCL211.34d(1)(a), as added by 1978
PA 532.
However, this does not reflect the meaning the term
“additions” had when Proposal A was later adopted in
1994. In 1993, the Legislature enacted 1993 PA 145,
which amended the definition of “additions” to include
“all increases in value caused by new construction or a
physical addition of equipment or furnishings,” thus
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discarding any reference to “improvements caused by
new construction.” MCL 211.34d(1)(a), as amended by
1993 PA 145. Thus, for purposes of resolving the instant
case, this later definition superseded the 1978 defini-
tion. The Court of Appeals properly recognized that the
1993 definition reflected the meaning of the term
“additions” as understood by those sophisticated in the
law at the time Proposal A was adopted and correctly
based its analysis on this later definition.
Moreover, because the objectives of the Headlee
Amendment and Proposal A are different, the definition
of “additions” under the Headlee Amendment is of
limited relevance in determining the meaning of “addi-
tions” under Proposal A. The Headlee Amendment
generally placed an inflation-rate cap on tax increases
for all property located within a local government unit,
without regard to any specific parcel, while Proposal A
placed an inflation-rate cap on tax increases for specific
parcels. Thus, in the context of the Headlee Amend-
ment, public-service improvements necessarily are
physically located on the property to be taxed. By
contrast, in the context of Proposal A, public-service
improvements are not physically located on the residen-
tial property to be taxed.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals that MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitu-
tional because it is inconsistent with the meaning of the
term “additions” as used in Proposal A and that public-
service improvements do not constitute “additions” to
property within the meaning of Proposal A.
2
2
However, we vacate two parts of the Court of Appeals judgment that
we believe are in error. First, we believe that the Court significantly erred
when it defined “ambiguous.” Toll Northville, supra at 368. A term is
ambiguous “when it is equally susceptible to more than a single mean-
ing,” Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d
840 (2004), not when reasonable minds can disagree regarding its
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because public-service improvements located on public
easements or land that ultimately becomes public do not
constitute “additions,” as that term was understood when
Proposal A was enacted, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is uncon-
stitutional.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and K
ELLY
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,and
M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(concurring). I agree with this Court’s
conclusion that MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(viii) is unconstitu-
tional and that public-service improvements are not “ad-
ditions” to the property within the meaning of that term
in Const 1963, art 9, § 3, as amended by Proposal A. I
write to address this Court’s comments on the method for
determining ambiguity. The opinion states that a “term is
ambiguous ‘when [the term] is equally susceptible to more
than a single meaning,’ Lansing Mayor v Pub Service
Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d 840 (2004), not
when reasonable minds can disagree regarding its mean-
ing.” Ante at 15-16 n 2. Inasmuch as this statement
implies that there is one, and only one, valid method for
determining ambiguity, I disagree.
meaning. Second, we believe that the Court mistakenly concluded that
taxing property on the basis of the value added by the availability of
public services and also taxing utility lines as personal property of the
utility companies results in “double taxation.” Toll Northville, supra at
371-372. To the contrary, the value of physical lines, i.e., wires, pipes, etc.,
as tangible personal property is distinguishable from the market value
added by the availability of utility services. The distinction is important
because value added from access to services is taxable to the extent that
such services increase market value. Although installation of a public
utility line may not be taxed as an addition in a case such as this, the
value of such services will be incorporated into the value of each
individual home at the time it is built or sold. See id. at 375.
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In Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 610; 608
NW2d 45 (2000), this Court concluded that the single,
unclear term “refuses” was ambiguous.
1
In People v
Denio, 454 Mich 691, 702; 564 NW2d 13 (1997), this
Court concluded that the term “penalty” was ambigu-
ous. This Court stated that ambiguity exists if “a
statute is susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion....”
2
Id. at 699. Further, this Court noted that “a
statute that is unambiguous on its face can be ‘ “ren-
dered ambiguous by its interaction with and its relation
to other statutes.” ’ ”
3
Id., quoting People v Jahner, 433
Mich 490, 496; 446 NW2d 151 (1989), quoting 2A
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.04, pp
86-87. In Elias Bros Restaurants, Inc v Treasury Dep’t,
452 Mich 144, 150; 549 NW2d 837 (1996), this Court
concluded that a statute was ambiguous when applied
to the facts presented.
4
1
See also Lansing Mayor, supra at 175-176 (C
AVANAGH
, J., dissenting);
Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v Michigan, 464 Mich 21, 38; 627 NW2d 236
(2001) (C
AVANAGH
, J., dissenting).
2
See also, e.g., ASAP Storage, Inc v City of Sparks, ___ Nev ___, ___;
173 P3d 734, 739 (2007) (finding ambiguity when there is a “meaning
that it is susceptible to ‘two or more reasonable but inconsistent
interpretations’ ”) (citation omitted); State v Fasteen, 740 NW2d 60, 63
(ND, 2007) (stating that a “statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to
meanings that are different, but rational”); State v Strode, 232 SW3d
1, 12 (Tenn, 2007) (holding that a statute is ambiguous if it is
“susceptible of two interpretations”).
3
See also, e.g., FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120,
132; 120 S Ct 1291; 146 L Ed 2d 121 (2000) (stating that ambiguity may
only become apparent when words or phrases are placed in the context of
the statutory framework); Brown v Gardner, 513 US 115, 118; 115 S Ct
552; 130 L Ed 2d 462 (1994) (stating that ambiguity is a “creature” of
statutory context); McLean v McLean, 323 NC 543, 548; 374 SE2d 376
(1988) (determining that the ambiguity of the statute was revealed when
compared to another statute).
4
See also, e.g., State v Peterson, 247 Wis 2d 871, 885; 634 NW2d 893
(2001) (stating that a statute may be unambiguous in one factual setting
and ambiguous in another).
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These valid, time-tested methods are valuable for
statutory analysis in the complex legal and factual
circumstances presented to any court.
5
These methods
promote precision and facility in faithfully discerning
legislative intent. They are equal in validity to the test
this Court applies today. “Ambiguity exists when a
statute is capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”
2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory
Construction (7th ed), § 45:2, p 13.
The definition applied by the Court of Appeals is
time-tested and proper. However, the operative concept
is “reasonable.” It does not matter if two parties argue
vehemently for two different meanings of a word. It is
an objective analysis. Therefore, though I believe that
the test is proper, I believe the Court of Appeals applied
it improperly in this case.
W
EAVER
,J
.
(concurring in the result only). I would
affirm the Court of Appeals judgment for the reasons
stated in the Court of Appeals opinion.
1
5
“Accepted rules of statutory construction can provide helpful guid-
ance in uncovering the most likely intent of the legislature.” 2A Singer &
Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 45:2, p
15.
1
See Toll Northville, Ltd v Northville Twp, 272 Mich App 352; 726
NW2d 57 (2006).
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In re EGBERT R SMITH TRUST
Docket No. 133462. Argued December 4, 2007 (Calendar No. 5). Decided
March 19, 2008.
Glen and Dale Phillips petitioned the Sanilac County Probate Court
for specific performance of their right of first refusal contained in
a lease between the petitioners and the original trustee of the
Egbert R. Smith Trust. The respondent, Betty Homer, who is the
successor trustee, had notified the petitioners of a third party’s
offer to purchase the land but then declined the offer, notified the
petitioners that she had declined the offer, and refused to sell the
property to the petitioners when they subsequently attempted to
exercise their option to purchase the property. The petitioners and
the respondent moved for summary disposition. The court, David
L. Clabuesch, J., granted summary disposition for the respondent,
concluding that, while the respondent’s initial letter gave the
petitioners the opportunity to exercise their option, the respon-
dent’s subsequent letter countermanding the notice precluded the
petitioners from exercising their right of first refusal. The peti-
tioners appealed. The Court of Appeals, H
OEKSTRA
,P.J., and M
ETER
and D
ONOFRIO
, JJ., reversed. The Court of Appeals held that when
the petitioners received notice of the third party’s offer, their right
of first refusal became an option that the respondent could not
revoke during the time specified in the lease. 274 Mich App 283
(2007). The respondent applied for leave to appeal, which the
Supreme Court granted. 479 Mich 853 (2007).
In a unanimous opinion by Justice W
EAVER
, the Supreme Court
held:
Under the plain language of the lease, the petitioners had an
irrevocable option to purchase the leased property within the time
specified in the lease after the respondent presented a third party’s
bona fide purchase offer. An option is an enforceable promise to
not revoke an offer for a specified period. The respondent breached
the lease agreement by not honoring the petitioners’ option.
Because land has a unique and peculiar value and the petitioners
timely exercised their option to purchase the property, specific
performance is the proper remedy in this case.
In re E
GBERT
RS
MITH
T
RUST
19
Justice C
ORRIGAN
, concurring, agreed with the majority’s result,
given the language in the lease characterizing the petitioners’
right to purchase as an option triggered by notification of a third
party’s offer, but wrote separately to clarify that a right of first
refusal does not always become an irrevocable option following a
third party’s offer. The contract terms establishing a right of first
refusal will control whether the right becomes an irrevocable offer
or whether the owner may revoke the right by changing his or her
mind in good faith and withdrawing the offer to sell before the
holder of the right exercises the right of first refusal. The owner’s
willingness to sell to anyone is a condition precedent for the right
of first refusal to mature into an option. A right of first refusal does
not automatically grant the power to force a sale if the owner in
good faith removes the condition precedent by deciding not to sell.
Affirmed.
Clark & Clark, P.C. (by Donald J. Clark), for the
petitioners.
John S. Paterson for the respondent.
Amicus Curiae:
Berry Moorman P.C. (by Randolph T. Barker) for the
Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan.
W
EAVER
, J. We granted leave to appeal to consider
whether a right of first refusal is revocable once the
holder of the right receives notice of a third party’s offer
and whether the petitioners-tenants are entitled to
summary disposition and specific performance of the
right of first refusal.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
hold that, under the lease agreement in this case, the
petitioners had an irrevocable option to buy the leased
property after the respondent presented to the petition-
ers a bona fide purchase offer from a third party (giving
the petitioners the right of first refusal) and that the
respondent breached the lease agreement by failing to
honor the option. Furthermore, because real property is
20 480 M
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unique, and the petitioners timely exercised their op-
tion to purchase the property, specific performance is
the proper remedy in this case.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of a residential lease agreement for
a 75-acre tract of land between the respondent-successor
trustee and the petitioners-tenants. In the early 1980s,
Egbert Smith died owning a 75-acre tract of farmland. By
the terms of his will, the property became an asset of
Smith’s testamentary trust. In May 1982, Donna Sutton
qualified as the trustee of Smith’s trust.
As trustee, Sutton entered into a lease agreement
with Glen and Dale Phillips, the petitioners. The lease
was for a period of five years, with an option to renew
under the same terms for an additional five years. The
petitioners timely renewed the lease for a second term.
On March 27, 2001, the petitioners and Sutton executed
an additional five-year extension of the lease. As ex-
tended, the lease was to expire by its terms in 2005.
Paragraph 15 of the lease contained the following
right of first refusal:
Landlord hereby grants to Tenant the option to pur-
chase the leased premises upon the following terms:
Tenant shall have the right of first refusal to match any
bona fida [sic] offer to purchase made with regard to the
subject property. In the event Tenant fails to exercise his
option within 30 days following presentment of said bona
fida [sic] offer to purchase the option herein granted shall
terminate.
This option to purchase shall continue through the
primary term of this lease and any extensions thereof.
Upon Tenant notifying Landlord in writing of his intent to
exercise his option to purchase closing for said purchase
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shall be scheduled at a reasonable time mutually agreeable
to the parties.
Upon Tenant’s exercising his offer to purchase, Tenant
shall pay to Landlord in cash the purchase price less the
deposit herein specified and less any and all rental pay-
ments made during the lease term.
The respondent, Betty Homer, was appointed succes-
sor trustee of the Egbert R. Smith Trust in 2001. In
2004, the respondent received an offer to purchase the
property for $225,000. She asserts that she never ac-
cepted the offer. However, on July 28, 2004, the respon-
dent’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioners stating in
pertinent part:
Pursuant to the Lease, it is required that you have the
right to match any bona fide offer presented. This letter is
to inform you that Ms. Homer has a signed purchase
agreement with the offer of $225,000 for the farm. You
must notify our office of your decision to exercise your
option within 30 days. The thirty days will expire on
August 30, 2004. Your offer will be referred to Ms. Homer
for her review and final decision. Upon the expiration of
that time period, Ms. Homer will be selling the farm.
On August 9, 2004, the respondent’s counsel wrote to
the petitioners stating that Ms. Homer had declined the
original offer and was not selling the farm at that time.
On August 13, 2004, within the 30-day period set
forth in the lease and the July 24, 2004, letter, but after
the August 9, 2004, letter informing the petitioners that
the offer to sell had been rejected, the petitioners gave
written notice that they were exercising their option to
purchase the property.
The respondent refused to sell the property to the
petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition in the Sanilac
County Probate Court, seeking to compel the sale of the
land pursuant to the lease agreement. The probate court
22 480 M
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heard oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions for
summary disposition on December 16, 2005, and granted
the respondent’s motion for summary disposition. The
probate court ruled that the respondent’s July 28, 2004,
letter triggered the petitioners’ opportunity to exercise
their option to purchase the property. However, the court
determined that the respondent’s August 9, 2004, letter
had countermanded the July 28 notice before the petition-
ers exercised their right of first refusal and therefore
precluded the petitioners from exercising their right of
first refusal. As a result, the probate court held that no
enforceable agreement existed. The probate court entered
an order to that effect on January 12, 2006.
The petitioners appealed. On February 15, 2007, the
Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the judg-
ment of the probate court.
1
The Court of Appeals
reasoned that after petitioners received notice of the
original offer on the property from the respondent, the
right of first refusal became an option contract that was
not revocable by the respondent during the 30-day
period specified in the lease.
The respondent filed an application for leave to appeal
in this Court. This Court granted leave to appeal and
ordered the parties to brief, among other issues, (1)
whether a right of first refusal is revocable once the holder
of the right receives notice of a third party’s offer and (2)
whether the petitioners are entitled to summary disposi-
tion and specific performance of the right of first refusal.
2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo rulings on summary
disposition motions, viewing the evidence in the light
1
In re Egbert R Smith Trust, 274 Mich App 283; 731 NW2d 810 (2007).
2
In re Smith Trust (Phillips v Homer), 479 Mich 853 (2007).
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most favorable to the nonmoving party.
3
Additionally,
this case involves an issue concerning the proper inter-
pretation of contracts, which is a question of law that is
subject to review de novo by this Court.
4
III. ANALYSIS
The resolution of this case involves interpretation of
the contractual lease agreement between the petition-
ers and the respondent. In interpreting a contract, it is
a court’s obligation to determine the intent of the
parties by examining the language of the contract
according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
5
If the
contractual language is unambiguous, courts must in-
terpret and enforce the contract as written, because an
unambiguous contract reflects the parties’ intent as a
matter of law.
6
However, if the contractual language is
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence can be presented to de-
termine the intent of the parties.
7
In this case, the plain language of the parties’ lease
agreement characterized the petitioners’ right of first
refusal as an option. The lease agreement stated:
Landlord hereby grants to Tenant the option to purchase
the leased premises upon the following terms:
Tenant shall have the right of first refusal to match any
bona fida [sic] offer to purchase made with regard to the
subject property. In the event Tenant fails to exercise his
3
Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 474 Mich 161, 166; 713 NW2d 717
(2006).
4
Archambo v Lawyers Title Ins Corp, 466 Mich 402, 408; 646 NW2d
170 (2002).
5
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 112; 595 NW2d
832 (1999).
6
Id. at 111.
7
New Amsterdam Cas Co v Sokolowski, 374 Mich 340, 342; 132 NW2d
66 (1965).
24 480 M
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option within 30 days following presentment of said bona
fida [sic] offer to purchase the option herein granted shall
terminate.
This option to purchase shall continue through the
primary term of this lease and any extensions thereof.
Upon Tenant notifying Landlord in writing of his intent to
exercise his option to purchase closing for said purchase
shall be scheduled at a reasonable time mutually agreeable
to the parties.
Upon Tenant’s exercising his offer to purchase, Tenant
shall pay to Landlord in cash the purchase price less the
deposit herein specified and less any and all rental pay-
ments made during the lease term. [Emphasis added.]
This section of the lease agreement expressly granted the
petitioners an option to purchase the leased premises in
the event that the respondent decided to sell the land. The
plain language of the lease agreement demonstrates that
the parties intended that when a third party made a bona
fide offer to purchase the property and the respondent
presented the offer to the petitioners, the petitioners had
the irrevocable option to purchase the property for the
purchase price within 30 days of the notice.
“An option is basically an agreement by which the
owner of the property agrees with another that he shall
have a right to buy the property at a fixed price within
a specified time.”
8
As stated in 17 CJS, Contracts, § 55,
p 502:
An option contract is an enforceable promise not to
revoke an offer. It is a continuing offer or agreement to
keep an offer open and irrevocable for a specified period. It
is a contract right, and the optionor must keep the offer
open. Until an option is exercised, the optionor has the
duty not to revoke the offer during the life of the option.
8
Oshtemo Twp v City of Kalamazoo, 77 Mich App 33, 37; 257 NW2d
260 (1977).
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GBERT
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MITH
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An option is an enforceable promise not to revoke an
offer for a specified time, in this case 30 days.
The respondent’s July 28, 2004, letter triggered the
petitioners’ right to exercise their option under the
lease agreement to purchase the property. The letter
expressly stated that the respondent had received a
bona fide offer for the property and would be selling the
property at the expiration of the petitioners’ option
period. Furthermore, the letter informed the petition-
ers that they “must notify [the office of the respon-
dent’s attorney] of your decision to exercise your option
within 30 days” and that the “thirty days will expire on
August 30, 2004.”
Once the respondent notified the petitioners of a
third party’s offer to purchase the property, the option
in the lease agreement became operative. As a result,
the respondent did not have the right to revoke her
offer to sell the property to petitioners until after the
option period expired on August 30, 2004. R espondent’s
argument that her July 28, 2004, letter was nothing
more than an offer to sell that could be withdrawn at
any time before acceptance is incorrect.
Given that the respondent breached the lease agree-
ment by not honoring the petitioners’ option, we next
consider the appropriate remedy for the breach. Land is
presumed to have a unique and peculiar value, and
contracts involving the sale of land are generally subject
to specific performance.
9
In this case, the petitioners
seek specific performance of their option to purchase
the property after the respondent claimed to have
revoked her tender of the third-party offer after she
rejected it. However, since the respondent could not
revoke the option in the lease once she presented the
9
Kent v Bell, 374 Mich 646, 651; 132 NW2d 601 (1965).
26 480 M
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bona fide offer to the petitioners, the respondent was
contractually obligated to schedule a closing date to
convey the property to the petitioners. Because real
property is unique, and the petitioners timely exercised
their option to purchase the property, specific perfor-
mance is the proper remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that, under the lease agreement, the
petitioners had an irrevocable option to buy the leased
property after the respondent presented to the petition-
ers a bona fide purchase offer from a third party and
that the respondent breached the lease agreement by
failing to honor the option. Furthermore, since real
property is unique, and the petitioners timely exercised
their option to purchase the property, specific perfor-
mance is the proper remedy in this case. Accordingly, we
affirm the Court of Appeals judgment.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and C
AVANAGH
,K
ELLY
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred with W
EAVER
,J.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the majority’s
result on the basis of the language of the parties’ lease
agreement. The agreement characterizes petitioners’
right to purchase as an “option” that would be triggered
by a notice from respondent that she had received a
bona fide third-party offer to buy the property. There-
fore, the lower courts did not err in holding that the
right became an irrevocable option to buy once respon-
dent notified petitioners that she intended to accept a
third party’s offer. I write separately to clarify that a
right of first refusal does not always become an irrevo-
cable option once triggered by a third-party offer.
Rather, in any given case, the contract terms establish-
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GBERT
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MITH
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,J.
ing a right of first refusal will control whether the right
either becomes an irrevocable option once triggered or,
instead, may be revoked by the owner if he in good faith
changes his mind—and withdraws his offer to sell—
before the right is exercised.
This Court has long recognized that rights of first
refusal and options to purchase are governed by the
contract terms established by the parties.
1
Therefore, as
the majority observes, ante at 24, the plain language of
the contract determines the nature of those rights in a
given case.
2
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred to
the extent that it relied on a general proposition that,
when an owner notifies the holder of a right of first
refusal of a third party’s bona fide offer to purchase, the
right of first refusal automatically “transmute[s]” into
an irrevocable option. In re Egbert R Smith Trust, 274
Mich App 283, 287-288; 731 NW2d 810 (2007), citing 17
CJS, Contracts, § 56, p 503.
Generally, the owner’s willingness to sell to anyone is
a condition precedent that must be present for a right of
first refusal to mature into a present option to buy. 17
CJS, Contracts, § 56, p 503 (“A right of first refusal is a
conditional option which is dependent upon the decision
to sell the property by its owner.”).
3
Parties may agree
that, if the owner notifies the holder of the right of the
1
See, e.g., Ridinger v Ryskamp, 369 Mich 15; 118 NW2d 689 (1962);
LeBaron Homes, Inc v Pontiac Housing Fund, Inc, 319 Mich 310, 313; 29
NW2d 704 (1947).
2
Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362,
375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003).
3
See also Miller v LeSea Broadcasting, Inc, 87 F3d 224, 226 (CA 7,
1996) (“All [a right of first refusal] entitles the holder to do is to match an
offer from a third party should the grantor of the option be minded to
accept that offer.”); Chapman v Mut Life Ins Co of New York, 800 P2d
1147, 1150 (Wyo, 1990) (“[W]hen the condition precedent of the owner’s
intention to sell is met the right of first refusal ‘ripens’ into an
option....”);Riley v Campeau Homes (Texas), Inc, 808 SW2d 184, 187
28 480 M
ICH
19 [Mar
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ORRIGAN
,J.
owner’s intention to accept a bona fide purchase offer,
the right matures into an option to purchase that the
owner may not revoke during the acceptance period.
But a right of first refusal does not automatically grant
the holder of the right the power to force a sale if the
owner in good faith removes the condition precedent by
deciding not to sell at all. As stated in 17 CJS, Con-
tracts, § 63, p 520: “A right of first refusal does not
create an irrevocable right to purchase which survives
after a proposed third-party transaction has been aban-
doned.”
4
(Tex App, 1991) (“[A] right of first refusal does not give the lessee the
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell.”).
4
17 CJS, Contracts, § 63, p 520 n 58, cited Lin Broadcasting Corp v
Metromedia, Inc, 139 AD2d 124, 133; 531 NYS2d 514 (1988), aff’d 74
NY2d 54 (1989), which stated that “unless the language of the applicable
contractual provisions state otherwise by expressly creating an irrevo-
cable right, there is nothing to prohibit [an owner] from in good faith
changing [his] mind about selling at any time prior to the invocation of
the right of first refusal.” The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
affirming Lin Broadcasting also helpfully observed that
there is nothing to prevent the contracting parties, if they
choose, from simply agreeing on a provision that a first refusal
offer, once made, must remain open for a specified time,
making it an option. Moreover, to read into a right of first
refusal such an unspecified additional provision would be
contrary to the general rule at common law that an offer may
be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted. [Lin Broadcast-
ing Corp v Metromedia, Inc, 74 NY2d 54, 62; 544 NYS2d 316;
542 NE2d 629 (1989) (citation omitted).]
Here, petitioners and respondent generally agree that Lin Broadcasting
and similar authorities conflict with cases like Henderson v Nitschke, 470
SW2d 410 (Tex Civ App, 1971), on which the Court of Appeals relied.
Smith Trust, 274 Mich App at 289-290. I find Henderson unpersuasive to
the extent that it, like the Court of Appeals in this case, relied on a
general proposition that, once an owner decides to sell, a right of first
refusal automatically becomes an irrevocable option that prevents the
owner from changing his mind. Henderson, 470 SW2d at 412-413.
Otherwise, Henderson and Lin Broadcasting are distinguishable on the
2008] In re E
GBERT
RS
MITH
T
RUST
29
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ONCURRING
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PINION BY
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ORRIGAN
,J.
In sum, the terms of the parties’ contract will govern
whether, when an owner expresses his intent to accept
a third party’s bona fide offer, a right of first refusal
becomes an irrevocable option that allows the holder of
the right to force a sale during the contractual accep-
tance period even if the owner in good faith changes his
mind and decides not to sell the property to anyone. I
encourage parties to explicitly establish in the terms of
their contracts whether such an irrevocable option is
created or, instead, whether the owner may withdraw
his offer to sell at any time before the holder of a right
of first refusal exercises that right to purchase.
basis of their facts. In Henderson, as here, the contract referred to the
lessee’s right to exercise an “option” after the owner notified the lessee of
its intent to accept a third party’s offer. Id. at 411. In Lin Broadcasting,
to the contrary, the right of first refusal was premised on the owner’s
continuing desire to sell. Lin Broadcasting, 139 AD2d at 132-134.
Further, cases commonly cited for the general proposition that a seller
may not revoke a right to purchase after that right has matured into an
option do not involve a seller’s decision to simply retain his own property,
as in Henderson and Lin Broadcasting. Rather, these cases most often
address (1) sales made to a third party without ever notifying the holder
of the right of first refusal or (2) an owner’s attempt to cancel a sale to the
holder of the right after the holder exercised his option without the seller
having attempted to withdraw his offer before the holder did so. See, e.g.,
cases cited in 17 CJS, Contracts, § 56, p 503 nn 88 and 89, for the
(overbroad) proposition that “[o]nce the holder of a right of first refusal
receives notice of a third party’s offer, the right of first refusal is
transmuted into an option”; Miller, 87 F3d at 226-227 (addressing how
precisely the holder of the right of first refusal must match the third
party’s offer in order to exercise his option and prevent a sale to the third
party); Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy Sys, Inc v St Joseph Med Ctr of Fort
Wayne, Inc, 683 NE2d 243, 251 (Ind App, 1997) (holding that, once the
holder of the right of first refusal fulfilled the contractual requirements
to exercise his option, the seller could not impose additional require-
ments in order to justify the sale to the third party that it preferred).
30 480 M
ICH
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ORRIGAN
,J.
KAISER v ALLEN
Docket No. 133031. Argued October 3, 2007 (Calendar No. 6). Decided
March 26, 2008.
Roland Kaiser, as personal representative of the estate of Marion
Kaiser, deceased, brought an action in the Bay Circuit Court
against James Allen and Gary Keidel after Marion Kaiser was
killed in an automobile accident involving an automobile owned by
Keidel and driven by Allen. The plaintiff alleged negligence by
Allen and vicarious liability on the part of Keidel under MCL
257.401(1), the owner-liability statute. Keidel settled for $300,000
and was dismissed from the case. Allen admitted liability, and a
jury, considering damages only, awarded the plaintiff $100,000.
Allen requested that the award against him be offset by the
amount the plaintiff had received in the settlement with Keidel.
The court, Lawrence M. Bielawski, J., granted the setoff request
and entered a judgment reflecting a net sum of zero owed to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed the setoff of the judgment only.
The Court of Appeals, W
HITBECK
, C.J., and S
AAD
and S
CHUETTE
,JJ.,
reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment for the plaintiff in
the amount of the jury’s verdict. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that tort reform had converted joint and several liability to several
liability and that common-law setoff had not survived the tort-
reform scheme. Thus, Allen was liable only for his portion of fault,
which resulted in damages of $100,000 separate from the damages
for Keidel’s portion of fault. Unpublished opinion per curiam,
issued October 31, 2006 (Docket No. 264600). Allen applied for
leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. 477 Mich 1097
(2007).
In an opinion by Justice W
EAVER
, joined by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
AVANAGH
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, the Su-
preme Court held:
The common-law setoff rule remains the law in Michigan for
vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases.
1. The tort-reform statutes abolished joint and several liability
in most cases involving more than one tortfeasor, with each
tortfeasor now being liable only for the portion of the total
damages that reflects that tortfeasor’s percentage of fault. The
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
31
tort-reform provisions concerning the allocation of fault, however,
do not apply to vicarious-liability cases, because a vicariously liable
tortfeasor is not at “fault” as defined by MCL 600.6304(8). The
vicariously liable tortfeasor is entirely liable for the active tortfea-
sor’s negligent actions through a legal obligation created by
statute, and there can be no allocation of fault.
2. The common-law setoff rule is based on the principle that a
plaintiff is only entitled to one full recovery for the same injury.
Under the rule, an injured party has the right to pursue multiple
tortfeasors jointly and severally and recover separate judgments,
but a single injury can lead to only a single compensation.
3. The vicarious liability of an automobile owner under MCL
257.401(1) does not involve a percentage of fault by the owner or
an amount of damages distinct from those for which the negligent
operator is responsible. Because the owner’s liability stems from
the operator’s fault, the owner and the negligent operator are
equally responsible legally for the plaintiff’s entire damages. The
statutory purpose is to hold the owner 100 percent liable for the
operator’s negligence.
4. Because the plaintiff’s jury verdict against Allen results in a
double recovery and the common-law setoff rule applies, the
judgment must be offset pro tanto by Keidel’s settlement.
Justice K
ELLY
, concurring, agreed with the majority’s decision
that the common-law setoff rule applies in this case, but wrote
separately to offer another view of the issue. The rule is based on
the premise that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than a full
recovery for his or her injuries. Tort reform did not overrule the
common-law setoff rule; it simply made it unnecessary to apply the
rule in most situations because a tortfeasor ordinarily will be liable
only for the percentage of damages attributable to his or her
negligence. In a vehicle-owner vicarious-liability case, however, the
vehicle owner’s liability is imposed by statute rather than because
the owner was negligent. Without a setoff in such a case, the
injured party could receive more than full compensation if, as here,
the owner settles and the suit against the driver goes to trial. Any
judgment awarded against the driver represents the total amount
of the injured party’s damages, and setoff of the settlement
amount is necessary to prevent overcompensation.
Reversed.
N
EGLIGENCE —
J
OINT AND
S
EVERAL
L
IABILITY —
S
ETOFF
R
ULE —
A
UTOMOBILES —
V
ICARIOUS
L
IABILITY OF
V
EHICLE
O
WNERS
.
The common-law setoff rule, which permits an injured party to
pursue multiple tortfeasors jointly and severally and recover
32 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
separate judgments but allows only a single compensation for a single
injury, remains the law in Michigan for vehicle-owner vicarious-
liability cases, in which an automobile owner is entirely liable for the
negligence of a driver who uses the automobile with the owner’s
permission (MCL 257.401[1], 600.2957[1], 600.6304[1]).
Rieman & Reyes (by Kevin J. Rieman) for Roland
Kaiser.
John A. Lydick for James R. Allen.
Amicus Curiae:
Debra A. Garlinghouse for the Michigan Association
of Justice.
W
EAVER
, J. At issue in this case is whether the 1995
tort-reform amendments of MCL 600.2957(1) and MCL
600.6304(1) abrogated the common-law setoff rule in
automobile accident cases in which the owner of the
vehicle is vicariously liable for the operator’s negli-
gence.
We reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the
common-law setoff rule does not apply. To the extent
that joint and several liability principles have not been
abrogated by statute, they remain intact, and the
common-law setoff rule remains the law in Michigan for
vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases. As a result,
plaintiff’s jury verdict against defendant Allen must be
offset pro tanto by the settlement paid by defendant
Keidel.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The material facts in this case are not in dispute.
Marion Kaiser was killed in an automobile accident on
June 26, 2001. Defendant James Allen was the driver of
the vehicle, and defendant Gary Keidel was the owner
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
33
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of the vehicle. Roland Kaiser, the personal representa-
tive of the decedent’s estate, filed a complaint in the
Bay Circuit Court on October 3, 2003, alleging negli-
gence by Allen, and by Keidel as the owner of the vehicle
through vicarious liability.
On November 18, 2004, plaintiff settled with Keidel
for $300,000. An order dismissing Keidel from the suit
was entered on November 22, 2004.
The case proceeded to trial against Allen, the driver,
only. Allen admitted liability, and a jury trial was
conducted, limited to the issue of plaintiff’s damages.
On June 2, 2005, the jury returned a verdict awarding
plaintiff $100,000 in damages. The verdict stated:
We, the Jury, make the following answers to the ques-
tions submitted by the Court:
What is the total amount of damages suffered by the
Estate of Marion Rose Kaiser as a result of her death in this
accident?
Answer: $100,000.00 [Emphasis added.]
Allen requested, over plaintiff’s objection, that the
trial court set off the $100,000 jury award for the
plaintiff against the $300,000 already paid to the plain-
tiff by the settling codefendant, Keidel. The trial court
granted the setoff request, leaving the net sum owed to
plaintiff by Allen at zero. The order of judgment en-
tered on July 5, 2005. The trial court reasoned that
setoff was proper in this case because the damages for
the injury, in its entirety, were encompassed by Keidel’s
settlement sum.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in the
trial court, but the motion was denied. Plaintiff then
appealed as of right in the Court of Appeals, challenging
only the setoff of the judgment by the trial court. On
October 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued an
34 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
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unpublished decision that reversed the trial court’s
setoff and remanded the case for entry of a judgment for
plaintiff in the amount of the jury’s verdict. Kaiser v
Allen, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued October 31, 2006 (Docket No. 264600).
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the vehicle’s opera-
tor, Allen, and the vehicle’s owner, Keidel, were “con-
current tortfeasors”; that statutory tort reform had
converted joint and several liability into several liabil-
ity; that Allen was liable only for his portion of fault,
separate from Keidel’s portion of fault; and that Allen’s
liability was $100,000. The Court of Appeals analysis
focused solely on the tort-reform statutory allocation of
fault, concluding that the common-law setoff provision
had not survived the tort-reform statutory scheme.
Allen moved for reconsideration, but the Court of
Appeals denied the motion.
Allen applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We
granted leave to appeal by order dated April 13, 2007.
Kaiser v Allen, 477 Mich 1097 (2007).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the jury award in this case is subject to a
setoff for the earlier settlement of a codefendant is a
purely legal question that is reviewed de novo by this
Court. See Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat, 474
Mich 223, 229; 713 NW2d 750 (2006). Questions of
statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.
Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich 36, 40;
709 NW2d 589 (2006).
III. ANALYSIS
To the extent that joint and several liability prin-
ciples have not been abrogated by statute, they remain
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
35
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the law in Michigan. In vicarious-liability cases, in
which the latent tortfeasor’s fault derives completely
from that of the active tortfeasor, there can be no
allocation of fault. The tort-reform statutes do not
apply to allocation of fault in vehicle-owner vicarious-
liability cases, because the fault is indivisible.
1
There-
fore, the common-law setoff rule remains the law in
Michigan for vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases.
The tort-reform statutes applicable in this case are
MCL 600.2957(1) and MCL 600.6304(1) and (8).
MCL 600.2957(1) states in relevant part:
In an action based on tort or another legal theory
seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death, the liability of each person shall be allo-
cated under this section by the trier of fact and, subject to
section 6304, in direct proportion to the person’s percent-
age of fault. In assessing percentages of fault under this
subsection, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of each
person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have
been, named as a party to the action.
MCL 600.6304 states in relevant part:
(1) In an action based on tort or another legal theory
seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death involving fault of more than 1 person,
including third-party defendants and nonparties, the court,
unless otherwise agreed by all parties to the action, shall
instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if
there is no jury, shall make findings indicating both of the
following:
(a) The total amount of each plaintiff’s damages.
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all persons that
contributed to the death or injury, including each plaintiff
and each person released from liability under section
1
See MCL 257.401(1) and MCL 600.6304(8).
36 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
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2925d, regardless of whether the person was or could have
been named as a party to the action.
***
(8) As used in this section, “fault” includes an act, an
omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach
of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that
could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a
proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.
These statutory provisions, included among the pro-
visions referred to as the “tort-reform statutes,” are
designed to allocate fault and responsibility for dam-
ages among multiple tortfeasors. The tort-reform stat-
utes have abolished joint and several liability in cases in
which there is more than one tortfeasor actively at
fault. Traditionally, before tort reform, under estab-
lished principles of joint and several liability, when the
negligence of multiple tortfeasors produced a single
indivisible injury, the tortfeasors were held jointly and
severally liable. Watts v Smith, 375 Mich 120, 125; 134
NW2d 194 (1965); Maddux v Donaldson, 362 Mich 425,
433; 108 NW2d 33 (1961). The tort-reform statutes
have replaced joint and several liability in most cases,
with each tortfeasor now being liable only for the
portion of the total damages that reflects that tortfea-
sor’s percentage of fault.
However, the tort-reform allocation-of-fault provi-
sions do not apply to vicarious-liability cases because a
vicariously liable tortfeasor is not at “fault” as defined
by MCL 600.6304(8). Under MCL 600.6304(8), “fault”
is defined as “an act, an omission, conduct, including
intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of
a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the
imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause of
damage sustained by a party.” “[A] proximate cause” is
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
37
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“a foreseeable, natural, and probable cause” of “the plain-
tiff’s injury and damages.” Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp,
471 Mich 540, 546; 685 NW2d 275 (2004).
Owner liability for an automobile operator’s negli-
gence, on the other hand, is a statutorily created
vicarious liability. In vicarious-liability cases, one tort-
feasor is at fault, and the other tortfeasor, through legal
obligation, is entirely liable for the active tortfeasor’s
negligent actions; that is, the actions of the vicariously
liable tortfeasor are not a “natural” cause of the injury.
Accordingly, the actions of a vicariously liable tortfeasor
do not constitute a proximate cause of that injury.
The vehicle-owner liability statute, MCL 257.401(1),
states in relevant part:
This section shall not be construed to limit the right of
a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to
either person or property resulting from a violation of this
act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her
agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for
an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor
vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a
statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required
by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor
vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied
consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor
vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of
the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or
her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or
other immediate member of the family.
MCL 257.401(1) establishes the vicarious liability of
an automobile owner for the negligence of a driver who
uses the automobile with the owner’s permission. See
Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415; 685 NW2d 174
(2004).
There is neither a percentage of fault nor a distinct
amount of damages that belongs to the vehicle owner
38 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
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separate from those of the negligent operator. The
owner of the vehicle does not need to negligently lend
his car to the operator to incur legal liability—he or she
merely needs to own the vehicle. As a result, under
MCL 257.401(1), a vehicle owner can be held liable for
a plaintiff’s injuries without being a foreseeable and
natural cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, that is, without
being a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The
purpose behind the owner-liability statute is to hold the
passive owner 100 percent liable for the operator’s
negligence. The basis for a vicariously liable tortfeasor’s
liability is entirely derivative and does not meet the
statutory definition of “fault” because the owner of the
vehicle does not need to be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries to be held liable for them. As a result,
MCL 600.2957(1) and MCL 600.6304 do not apply to
vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases.
Because MCL 600.2957(1) and MCL 600.6304 do not
apply to vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases, the
common-law setoff rule remains the operable rule of
law to determine the plaintiff’s recovery of damages.
The common-law setoff rule is based on the principle
that a plaintiff is only entitled to one full recovery for
the same injury. An injured party has the right to
pursue multiple tortfeasors jointly and severally and
recover separate judgments; however, a single injury
can lead to only a single compensation. See Verhoeks v
Gillivan, 244 Mich 367, 371; 221 NW 287 (1928).
Plaintiff argues that the liability structure created by
the tort-reform statutes means that the jury verdict
against Allen represents only the amount due for his
portion of the fault in the accident; as such, the jury
award against Allen cannot be offset by the previous
settlement amount because the settlement paid by
Keidel represented payment only for Keidel’s allocation
of fault. This analysis is doubly flawed. First, the jury
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
39
O
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verdict awarding damages to plaintiff explicitly states
that the award is for “the total amount of damages”
suffered by the plaintiff. Second, the damages in this
case are all due to the fault of Allen because Keidel is
only vicariously liable for Allen’s actions—Keidel is
liable for everything that Allen is liable for through
vicarious liability conferred by the vehicle-owner liabil-
ity statute. Allowing plaintiff to recover the entire
verdict against Allen and to retain all the proceeds from
the settlement with Keidel would allow the plaintiff to
recover four times more than the jury determined
plaintiff should be awarded for his injuries. The Legis-
lature did not intend that a plaintiff be awarded dam-
ages greater than the actual loss in vicarious-liability
cases, resulting in a double recovery. The common-law
setoff rule should be applied to ensure that a plaintiff
only recovers those damages to which he or she is
entitled as compensation for the whole injury. Plain-
tiff’s jury verdict against Allen must be offset pro tanto
by the settlement paid by Keidel.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent that joint and several liability prin-
ciples have not been abrogated by statute, they remain
intact, and the common-law setoff rule remains the law
in Michigan with regard to vehicle-owner vicarious-
liability cases. Consequently, plaintiff’s jury award
against Allen must be reduced pro tanto by plaintiff’s
settlement proceeds from Keidel.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
hold that plaintiff’s jury verdict against Allen must be
offset pro tanto by the settlement paid by Keidel.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and C
AVANAGH
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and
M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred with W
EAVER
,J.
40 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
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K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). The issue here is whether the
common-law setoff rule applies in this vehicle-owner
vicarious-liability case. The majority decides that it
does. I agree. But I write separately to offer another
view of the issue.
For many years, the rule in this state was that
concurrent tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable.
1
As this Court explained:
This meant that where multiple tortfeasors caused a
single or indivisible injury, the injured party could either
sue all tortfeasors jointly or he could sue any individual
tortfeasor severally, and each individual tortfeasor was
liable for the entire judgment, although the injured party
was entitled to full compensation only once.
[2]
A corollary of joint and several liability was that, if one
of the tortfeasors settled, the judgment against the
nonsettling defendant was reduced by the settlement
amount. Thus, the injured party was limited to one full
recovery.
3
This limitation became known as the
common-law setoff rule.
T ort reform altered the general rule that liability was
joint and several. Specifically, MCL 600.2956 reads: “Ex-
cept as provided in [MCL 600.6304], in an action based on
tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal
injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of
each defendant for damages is several only and is not
joint.” Accordingly, after tort reform, liability is several,
though there are specific exceptions for which joint and
several liability survives.
4
1
Gerling Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v Lawson, 472 Mich
44, 49; 693 NW2d 149 (2005).
2
Id.
3
Thick v Lapeer Metal Products, 419 Mich 342, 348 n 1; 353 NW2d 464
(1984).
4
See MCL 600.6304(6)(a); MCL 600.6312.
2008] K
AISER V
A
LLEN
41
C
ONCURRING
O
PINION BY
K
ELLY
,J.
This case involves the vehicle-owner liability stat-
ute.
5
It makes the owner of an automobile liable for the
negligence of a driver who uses the automobile with the
owner’s permission.
6
Notably, though the statute im-
poses liability on the owner regardless of whether he or
she was negligent, no statute specifically provides that
vehicle-owner vicarious-liability is an exception to sev-
eral liability.
Because there is no specific exception to several
liability for vehicle-owner vicarious liability, the plain-
tiff contends that the setoff rule does not apply. The
Court of Appeals accepted this argument, reasoning
that, when liability is several, no need exists to reduce
the award entered against the nonsettling tortfeasor by
the amount the settling tortfeasor paid. Each defendant
is liable for no more than the percentage of damages
attributable to his or her own negligence.
7
The reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals is
generally accurate. When liability is several, each tort-
feasor ordinarily will be liable for the percentage of
damages attributable to his or her own negligence.
8
A
setoff will be unnecessary because, even without it, the
plaintiff will recover full compensation only once. But
in cases like this one, in which liability is not based on
a tortfeasor’s own negligence but is imposed by a
statute, the Court of Appeals reasoning falls apart.
Only the driver of the car is liable on the basis of
negligence. The owner of the car is liable because a
statute specifically imposes liability on him or her, not
because the owner was negligent. Therefore, when the
5
MCL 257.401(1).
6
Id.
7
Kaiser v Allen, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued October 31, 2006 (Docket No. 264600).
8
See MCL 600.2957(1); MCL 600.6304(4) and (8).
42 480 M
ICH
31 [Mar
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ONCURRING
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PINION BY
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ELLY
,J.
vehicle-owner liability statute applies and there is no
setoff, the injured party could recover more than full
compensation. For example, when, as here, the owner
settles and the driver goes to trial, the injured party will
receive both the settlement amount and the judgment
rendered against the driver. This will necessarily mean
that the injured party will recover more than full
compensation, given that the award against the driver
represents the total amount of the injured party’s
damages.
The common-law setoff rule is based on the premise
that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than full recovery
for his or her injuries. Importantly, tort reform did
nothing to overrule the common-law setoff rule. It
simply makes it unnecessary to apply the rule in most
situations. But in cases like this one, in which it is
necessary to apply the rule to prevent overcompensa-
tion, its application is appropriate. Thus, I concur in the
decision of the majority to reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and hold that the setoff was proper in
this case.
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AISER V
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LLEN
43
C
ONCURRING
O
PINION BY
K
ELLY
,J.
LIBERTY HILL HOUSING CORPORATION v CITY OF LIVONIA
Docket No. 131531. Decided April 2, 2008.
Liberty Hill Housing Corporation filed a petition in the Tax Tribu-
nal, challenging the city of Livonia’s denial of a property-tax
exemption under MCL 211.7o(1), which provides an exemption for
property owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institution
while the institution occupies the property solely for its charitable
purposes. Liberty Hill is a Michigan nonprofit organization that
provides housing for low-income individuals and families and
disabled individuals. It rented the property for which it sought the
exemption to qualified tenants under traditional landlord-tenant
agreements. The tribunal upheld the denial of an exemption.
Liberty Hill appealed, and the Court of Appeals, J
ANSEN
,P.J., and
N
EFF
and Z
AHRA
, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per
curiam issued May 16, 2006 (Docket No. 258752), agreeing with
the tribunal that the tenants rather than Liberty Hill occupied the
property and that Liberty Hill accordingly did not qualify for the
exemption. Liberty Hill applied for leave to appeal. While the
application was pending, the Court of Appeals issued a published
opinion, Pheasant Ring v Waterford Twp, 272 Mich App 436
(2006), involving a factual situation similar to the one in this case.
Pheasant Ring held that the charitable organization in that case
did occupy the property it leased to tenants and thus qualified for
the exemption. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on
whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action
after directing the parties to address whether Pheasant Ring
should be overruled. 477 Mich 1018 (2007).
In an opinion by Justice C
ORRIGAN
, joined by Chief Justice
T
AYLOR
and Justices Y
OUNG
and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
To occupy property under MCL 211.7o(1), a charitable institu-
tion must at a minimum have a regular physical presence on the
property. Liberty Hill did not occupy the housing under the plain
language of MCL 211.7o(1) and prior caselaw because it leased the
housing to others for their own personal use and had no regular
physical presence in the housing. Liberty Hill’s tenants occupied
the property, and Liberty Hill is thus not entitled to the exemption
during the tax years at issue. Pheasant Ring interpreted the term
44 480 M
ICH
44 [Apr
“occupied” in a manner that is at odds with the language of the
statute and must be overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the opinion in this case.
Justice W
EAVER
, concurring in the result only, would affirm the
holding of the Court of Appeals in this case. A charitable institu-
tion that claims an exemption under MCL 211.7o(1) must, at a
minimum, have occupancy rights to the property before it can
qualify as having occupied that property. Pheasant Ring incor-
rectly interpreted the term “occupied” in the statute to mean
“used”, and Justice W
EAVER
would overrule Pheasant Ring to the
extent that its holding is inconsistent with her concurring opinion.
In this case, Liberty Hill did not occupy the property during the
tax years at issue, because it contracted away its occupancy rights
in the form of lease agreements. The tenants were the only
occupants of the property during those tax years.
Affirmed.
Justice C
AVANAGH
, joined by Justice K
ELLY
, dissenting, disagreed
that the term “occupied” in the statute relates to residency, which is
a concept that does not typically apply to institutions. Rather, as
determined by applying caselaw and principles of statutory construc-
tion, “occupied” as used in the statute is synonymous with “used.”
Because Liberty Hill leased the housing and specifically arranged to
provide services to assist its tenants—including services provided at
the leased properties—and thus used the properties in fulfillment of
its integral purpose, it qualified for the exemption. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
T
AXATION —
P
ROPERTY
T
AX —
C
HARITABLE
E
XEMPTION
.
A nonprofit charitable institution that claims a tax exemption for
property owned and occupied by the institution while occupied by
that institution solely for charitable purposes for which the
institution was incorporated must, at a minimum, have a regular
physical presence on the property; an institution that leases the
property to others for their own personal use and has no regular
physical presence on the property does not occupy the property for
purposes of the exemption (MCL 211.7o[1]).
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (by June
Summers Haas) for the petitioner.
Sean P. Kavanagh, City Attorney, and Barbara J.
Scherr, Assistant City Attorney, for the respondent.
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Amicus Curiae:
William J. Schramm and Corey Beaubien for Homes
for Autism.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. Petitioner, a nonprofit organization,
leased housing to disabled and low-income individuals
during the tax years at issue. In question is whether
petitioner was entitled to a property-tax exemption for
charitable institutions under MCL 211.7o(1), which
requires that the charitable institution has “occupied”
the property. We affirm the Court of Appeals holding
that because petitioner did not occupy the property
under the unambiguous language of MCL 211.7o, it was
not entitled to the property-tax exemption. Petitioner
did not maintain a regular physical presence on the
property, but instead leased the housing on the property
for tenants to use for their own personal purposes.
Because the Court of Appeals reached the opposite
result in Pheasant Ring v Waterford Twp, 272 Mich App
436; 726 NW2d 741 (2006), which involved similar facts,
we overrule that decision.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is a nonprofit corporation whose stated
purpose is to “creat[e] integrated housing alternatives
for low income individuals and families, and persons
with disabilities, to interact with the general public, and
to promote the establishment of safe, affordable and
accessible as necessary housing for low-income indi-
viduals and families and persons with disabilities.”
1
Petitioner owns 51 single-family homes in the Detroit
1
Although petitioner’s goal is to break even while providing necessary
housing and services to its clients, petitioner had operated at a deficit for
the three years preceding this suit.
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area. It leases or rents these homes to qualified indi-
viduals who are referred by its parent corporation,
Community Living Services.
2
Petitioner’s clients are
individuals whose low-income or disability status
qualify them to receive federal Supplemental Security
Income benefits. All of petitioner’s tenants pay rent
under traditional written leases. These lease agree-
ments include provisions for security deposits, late-
payment fees, and hold-over fees. Petitioner has no
ongoing day-to-day presence in the homes.
At issue in this case are five houses that petitioner
owned and leased to persons who qualified under peti-
tioner’s statement of purpose. Petitioner requested
from respondent city of Livonia an exemption from
property taxes under MCL 211.7o(1) for tax years 2003
and 2004, arguing that the five houses were exempt
because petitioner “owned and occupied” the houses in
furtherance of its charitable purpose. After respondent
denied petitioner’s request, petitioner appealed in the
Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT).
The MTT affirmed, concluding that petitioner was
not entitled to the property-tax exemption because
petitioner did not occupy the houses within the mean-
ing of MCL 211.7o(1). The MTT observed that the
caselaw interpreting the occupancy requirement of
MCL 211.7o(1) had held that a charitable institution
“occupied” the housing when its provision of housing
was incidental to the overall corporate purpose. The
MTT pointed out that, in this case, petitioner’s tenants
were not using the homes for charitable purposes. The
MTT concluded that petitioner did not occupy the
properties under MCL 211.7o for the following reasons:
2
Community Living Services provides the clients with additional
services, such as transportation, meals, monitoring, medical assistance,
repairs, maintenance, and social activities.
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To say that Liberty Hill occupies the properties in these
instances where Liberty Hill lessees reside at the subject
properties does not comport with the plain meaning of the
statute. In a landlord-tenant relationship, the lessee is
generally considered the occupant and the lessor does not
generally have occupancy rights during the term of the
lease. See Frenchtown Villa v Meadors, 117 Mich App 683
[324 NW2d 133] (1982).
In this case, involving single family homes, it is a
significant stretch to say that the non-profit [sic] corporate
owner/lessor occupies the properties by virtue of leasing
them to tenant occupants consistent with the non-profit’s
[sic] corporate purposes.
In these consolidated cases, while Liberty Hill, a non-
profit charitable institution, owns the properties, it does
not occupy any of them. The exemption is apparently
meant for instances where the offices and operations of the
non-profit [sic] charitable institution exist.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished
opinion per curiam. The panel explained that it agreed
with the MTT’s reasoning and conclusion:
The tribunal’s opinion points out that in a landlord-tenant
relationship, the lessee is the occupant while the lessor, here
petitioner, does not have occupancy rights during the terms of
the lease. Further, to find that the non-profit [sic] corporate
owner/lessor occupies the properties by virtue of leasing them
to tenant-occupants, even though the tenancy is consistent
with the non-profit’s [sic] corporate purposes, requires a
“significant stretch”. We agree. [Liberty Hill Housing Corp v
City of Livonia, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
of Appeals, issued May 16, 2006 (Docket No. 258752), p 2
(emphasis in original).]
The panel concluded that petitioner did not occupy the
properties that it leased to tenants for the tenants’
personal housing needs.
While petitioner’s application for leave to appeal the
Court of Appeals decision was pending, the Court of
48 480 M
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Appeals decided Pheasant Ring, in which it held that the
petitioner charitable institution “occupied” property un-
der MCL 211.7o(1) when it leased housing to tenants in
furtherance of its charitable purpose of providing housing
to individuals with autism. No appeal was taken from the
Court of Appeals decision in Pheasant Ring.
To clarify whether a charitable institution that leases
property to others in furtherance of its charitable
purpose occupies the property for purposes of the
property-tax exemption under MCL 211.7o(1), we or-
dered oral argument on the application in the instant
case and directed the parties to address whether Pheas-
ant Ring was correctly decided. 477 Mich 1018 (2007).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich
192, 201; 713 NW2d 734 (2006), this Court described
the standard of review for MTT decisions as follows:
The standard of review for Tax Tribunal cases is multi-
faceted. Where fraud is not claimed, this Court reviews the
tribunal’s decision for misapplication of the law or adop-
tion of a wrong principle. Michigan Bell Tel Co v Dep’t of
Treasury, 445 Mich 470, 476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994). We
deem the tribunal’s factual findings conclusive if they are
supported by “competent, material, and substantial evi-
dence on the whole record.” Id., citing Const 1963, art 6,
§ 28 and Continental Cablevision v Roseville, 430 Mich 727,
735; 425 NW2d 53 (1988). But when statutory interpreta-
tion is involved, this Court reviews the tribunal’s decision
de novo. Danse Corp v Madison Hts, 466 Mich 175; 644
NW2d 721 (2002).
This Court has held that statutes exempting persons or
property from taxation must be narrowly construed in
favor of the taxing authority. See, e.g., id. supra at 204.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. MCL 211.7o
The statute at issue, MCL 211.7o, creates an ad valo-
rem property-tax exemption for charitable institutions.
Wexford Med Group, supra at 199. At the relevant times,
MCL 211.7o(1) provided: “Real or personal property
owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institution
while occupied by that nonprofit charitable institution
solely for the purposes for which it was incorporated is
exempt from the collection of taxes under this act.”
(Emphasis added.)
3
As a consequence of the statutory
requirements, courts should consider three factors
when determining whether the tax exemption under
MCL 211.7o(1) applies:
(1) The real estate must be owned and occupied by the
exemption claimant;
(2) the exemption claimant must be a nonprofit chari-
table institution; and
(3) the exemption exists only when the buildings and
other property thereon are occupied by the claimant solely
for the purposes for which it was incorporated.[Wexford
Med Group, supra at 203 (emphasis added).]
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner owned the prop-
erties at issue. The main point of contention is whether
petitioner “occupied” the properties.
B. CASELAW INTERPRETATIONS
Petitioner argues that this Court, in analyzing the
exemption under MCL 211.7o(1) and its predecessors,
3
MCL 211.7o(1) was last amended by 2006 PA 681. It now provides: “Real
or personal property owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institu-
tion while occupied by that nonprofit charitable institution solely for the
purposes for which that nonprofit charitable institution was incorporated is
exempt from the collection of taxes under this act.”
50 480 M
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has construed “occupation” to mean “charitable use”
and has not required physical possession by the exemp-
tion claimant. In making this argument, petitioner
relies on cases that interpreted the third element of
MCL 211.7o(1), that the property be occupied solely for
a charitable purpose, and not the first element, that the
real estate must be owned and occupied by the claim-
ant. A review of this Court’s caselaw yields no support
for petitioner’s argument.
Our first case addressing the occupation requirement
of Michigan’s statutory tax exemption for nonprofit
institutions was Detroit Young Men’s Society v Detroit,3
Mich 172 (1854).
4
In that case, the plaintiff was incor-
porated “for the purpose of moral and intellectual
improvement” and owned a building in the city of
Detroit that included a library. Id. at 180. The plaintiff
offered for rent by third parties two stores on the first
floor and two small offices on the second floor, but the
“remainder of the building...wasused entirely for the
purposes of the society....”Id. at 173 (opinion sylla-
bus). Because the 1853 statute required “actual[]”
occupation by the institution,
5
this Court held that the
4
1853 PA 86, § 5(8) exempted from taxation the “personal property of
all library, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions, incorporated
within this State, and such real estate belonging to such institutions as
shall actually be occupied by them, for the purposes for which they were
incorporated[.]”
5
The Legislature later amended the statute to remove the word
“actually.” See 1885 PA 153, § 3, providing a tax exemption for the
personal property of “library, benevolent, charitable, and scientific insti-
tutions, incorporated under the laws of this State, and such real estate as
shall be occupied by them for the purposes for which they were incorpo-
rated[.]” This statute was amended a few years later by 1893 PA 206 to
provide a tax exemption for “[s]uch real estate as shall be owned and
occupied by library, benevolent, charitable, educational and scientific
institutions incorporated under the laws of this State, with the buildings
and other property thereon, while occupied by them solely for the
purposes for which they were incorporated....” Thus, although the
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occupation must be exclusive and ruled that the prop-
erty was subject to taxation, “subject to a deduction of
the value of the tenements actually used and occupied
by them for the purposes for which they were incorpo-
rated, from the entire value of the lot and building.” Id.
at 184.
In Webb Academy v Grand Rapids, 209 Mich 523,
525; 177 NW 290 (1920), the plaintiff, an incorporated
educational institution, sought a property-tax exemp-
tion for educational institutions.
6
The plaintiff con-
ducted school business on the property, but the founder
of the school and his wife, a teacher at the school, lived
on the property, along with a student who helped with
upkeep in exchange for room and board. Id. at 532-533.
This Court indicated that the “owned and occupied”
element of the exemption statute was not at issue when
it noted: “That plaintiff was in full possession and
control of the premises, and maintained an academy
there, is not questioned.” Id. at 535. It then agreed with
the trial court that the property was occupied by the
educational institution solely for the purposes for which
it was incorporated and that the other minor uses, such
as housing incidental to the school uses, did not defeat
that conclusion. Id. at 539. Thus, this Court’s decision
focused on whether the property was occupied solely for
statute no longer stated that “actual[]” occupancy was required, it did
require that the property be both “owned and occupied” by charitable
institutions and “occupied by them solely for the purposes for which they
were incorporated.”
6
Webb Academy involved another predecessor of MCL 211.7o, 1915 CL
4001, that, in language essentially identical to that of 1893 PA 206,
exempted from taxation “[s]uch real estate as shall be owned and
occupied by library, benevolent, charitable, educational and scientific
institutions incorporated under the laws of this state, with the buildings
and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the
purposes for which they were incorporated[.]”
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the purposes for which the plaintiff was incorporated,
not on whether actual occupancy was required to
qualify for an exemption.
Likewise, in Gull Lake Bible Conference Ass’n v Ross
Twp, 351 Mich 269, 273; 88 NW2d 264 (1958), this
Court noted that there was no dispute about whether
the plaintiff owned or occupied the property. In that
case, the plaintiff’s stated purpose was “[t]o promote
and conduct gatherings at all seasons of the year for the
study of the Bible and for inspirational and evangelistic
addresses.” Id. at 271. The plaintiff sought a property-
tax exemption for charitable organizations.
7
Besides a
tabernacle and youth chapel (for which the tax-exempt
status was not contested), the property included an old
hotel building used to house employees, a fellowship
center building, a trailer campsite for persons attending
the conference and living in trailers, cottages that were
rented to persons attending the conference, a gravel pit,
a picnic area, boat docks, a bathhouse, a beach, a
playground, horseshoe and badminton courts, and
parking areas. Id. at 272. This Court determined that
the housing and recreational facilities on the property
were necessary to fulfill the plaintiff’s purpose. Id. at
275. Again interpreting the third element of the tax-
exemption statute, this Court held that the property
was occupied by the plaintiff solely for the purpose for
which it was incorporated. Id. at 274-275.
7
Gull Lake involved another predecessor of MCL 211.7o that exempted
from taxation
[s]uch real estate as shall be owned and occupied by library,
benevolent, charitable, educational or scientific institutions
and memorial homes of world war veterans incorporated under
the laws of this state with the buildings and other property
thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for
which they were incorporated. [MCL 211.7, as amended by
1955 PA 46.]
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Finally, in Oakwood Hosp Corp v State Tax Comm,
374 Mich 524, 526; 132 NW2d 634 (1965) (Oakwood
Hosp I), the plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation that
owned and operated a hospital. The plaintiff claimed a
tax exemption for property on which its hospital facili-
ties were located.
8
Id. Also on the property were six
houses that provided housing near the hospital for the
resident physicians and interns whose services and
availability to the hospital at all times were essential to
the operation of the hospital. Id. at 527. This Court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to the tax exemption for
the entire property, including the houses. This Court
explained that housing the doctors and interns near the
hospital was necessary to the proper functioning of the
hospital. Id. at 530. Therefore, the houses were “occu-
pied in furtherance of and for the purposes for which
plaintiff was incorporated and for hospital and public
health purposes.” Id.
9
Thus, this Court was again called
on to address the third element of the tax-exemption
statute: whether the property was occupied for the
purposes for which the claimant was incorporated. This
Court simply did not address the first element: whether
the property was “owned and occupied.”
10
8
At the time Oakwood Hosp I was decided, the pertinent statutory
language was identical to that in effect when Gull Lake was decided. See
MCL 211.7, as amended by 1961 PA 238.
9
Later, in Oakwood Hosp Corp v State Tax Comm, 385 Mich 704; 190
NW2d 105 (1971) (Oakwood Hosp II), this Court reached the opposite
conclusion because the Legislature had amended the statute to specifi-
cally exclude such physician housing from the property-tax exemption.
10
Since Oakwood Hosp II, the Court of Appeals has addressed the tax
exemption at issue several times. See, e.g., Lake Louise Christian
Community v Hudson Twp, 10 Mich App 573, 580; 159 NW2d 849 (1968)
(holding that the religious institution did not occupy 1,300 acres of
mostly unused wooded property because the property was not frequently
used for religious education), Nat’l Music Camp v Green Lake Twp ,76
Mich App 608, 612; 257 NW2d 188 (1977) (holding that the nonprofit
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C. PHEASANT RING v WATERFORD TWP
Five months after the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in the instant case, the Court of Appeals de-
cided Pheasant Ring. In Pheasant Ring, supra at 440,
the petitioner was a nonprofit corporation organized to
carry on educational and other charitable activities,
including establishing and supporting a transitional
community for persons with autism. The petitioner
sought a property-tax exemption for a building that it
owned and rented to persons with autism. Id. at 441-
442. Nothing in the Court of Appeals opinion stated
that any of the petitioner’s employees resided in the
building to supervise or monitor the tenants. Nonethe-
less, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner
“occupied” the home within the meaning of MCL
211.7o(1). The Court looked to the dictionary definition
of “occupy” and then, without discussing Detroit Young
Men’s Society, Webb Academy, Gull Lake,orOakwood
Hosp I, held that the petitioner “occupied” the building
because it used the building in furtherance of its
charitable purpose. The panel held, in pertinent part:
The Township asserts that Pheasant Ring does not
occupy the property because the location of its offices is not
physically on the property at issue and it rents the property
educational institutions were entitled to a property-tax exemption for 92
acres of unspoiled sand dunes on Lake Michigan because “[t]he property
was used in a manner consistent with the nature of the land in such a way
that the purpose for which the owning institution is exempt, education,
was plainly advanced”), Kalamazoo Nature Ctr, Inc v Cooper Twp, 104
Mich App 657, 665-667; 305 NW2d 283 (1981) (holding that the nonprofit
institution “occupied” 31 acres of preserved wilderness land that it did
not physically enter but used for observation and educational purposes),
and Holland Home v Grand Rapids, 219 Mich App 384, 397-398; 557
NW2d 118 (1996) (holding that the nonprofit association did not occupy
the property when a retirement home on the property was under
construction on the relevant tax days). The validity of some of these
opinions is questionable in light of our holding in the instant case.
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to tenants. This interpretation of the requirements for tax
exemption is too narrow and restrictive. There is no
dispute that Pheasant Ring owns the property. Although
Pheasant Ring does not use the property for its own offices,
the property is occupied by tenants of Pheasant Ring in
furtherance of its charitable purposes. This Court, in
determining whether a charitable organization “occupied”
a property for purposes of qualifying for a tax exemption,
has determined that “[t]he proper test is whether the
entire property was used in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the owning institution.” Holland Home v
Grand Rapids, 219 Mich App 384, 398; 557 NW2d 118
(1996). Under this criterion, Pheasant Ring occupied the
residence. [Pheasant Ring, supra at 442.]
IV. ANALYSIS
We conclude that under the plain language of MCL
211.7o(1) and this Court’s previous caselaw, the Court
of Appeals correctly decided this case and incorrectly
decided Pheasant Ring.
First, the Court of Appeals opinion in the instant
case is consistent with the statutory language, whereas
Pheasant Ring is not. Webster’s Universal College Dic-
tionary (1997) defines “occupy” as follows:
11
—v.t. 1. to have, hold, or take as a separate space;
possess, reside in or on, or claim: The orchard occupies half
the farm. 2. to be a resident or tenant of; dwell in. 3. to fill
11
Justice C
AVANAGH
attacks our use of a dictionary in interpreting the
statutory language. He states: “The practice of reaching for a dictionary
to define common words in a statute risks serving to merely confirm the
writer’s assumed meaning of the word, rather than to actually advance
the writer’s legal analysis.” Post at 68. We recognize that dictionaries are
merely interpretive aids used by the court. Consumers Power Co v Pub
Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163 n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999). But in a
previous opinion authored by Justice C
AVANAGH
, this Court held: “When
determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, con-
sulting a dictionary is appropriate.” Title Office, Inc v Van Buren Co
Treasurer, 469 Mich 516, 522; 676 NW2d 207 (2004).
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up, employ, or engage: to occupy time reading. 4. to engage
or employ the mind, energy, or attention of: We occupied the
children with a game. 5. to take possession and control of (a
place), as by military invasion. —v.i. 6. to take or hold
possession.
We conclude that the second meaning is the one the
Legislature intended. The third, fourth, and fifth mean-
ings in the definition are clearly not relevant here.
12
The
first meaning defines “occupy” as “to have, hold,...
possess,... or claim[.]” These parts of the definition
are synonymous with ownership.
13
Because the statute
uses the conjunctive term “owned and occupied,” how-
ever, the Legislature must have intended different
meanings for the words “owned” and “occupied.” Oth-
erwise, the word “occupied” would be mere surplusage.
“Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and
clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or
nugatory.” Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich
304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Thus, the Legislature
must have intended the term “occupy” to mean the
other aspect of the dictionary definition: to “reside in or
on” or “to be a resident or tenant of; dwell in.” This
aspect of the
12
Although the dissent accuses us of cursorily dismissing three of the
alternative meanings of “occupy,” we see no need to discuss these
definitions in detail because they clearly do not apply. The dissent seems
to prefer the third meaning in the definition: “to fill up, employ, or
engage; to occupy time reading.” But the dictionary’s example using this
meaning clearly demonstrates that the third meaning does not make
sense in the context of the statute. One cannot “fill up” property the way
one can fill up time reading. The fourth meaning does not apply because
one cannot “engage or employ the mind, energy, or attention of” an
inanimate object such as real property. Finally, it is preposterous to
suggest that the Legislature intended the exemption to apply only if a
nonprofit charitable institution conducted a successful military invasion
of the property.
13
Webster’s Universal College Dictionary (1997) defines “own” as “to
have or hold as one’s own; possess.”
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definition especially makes sense when viewed in its
specific context;
14
it is “real or personal property” that
must be “occupied.” “Reside” means “1. to dwell per-
manently or for a considerable time; live. 2. (of things,
qualities, etc.) to be present habitually; be inherent
([usually followed] by in).” Webster’s Universal College
Dictionary (1997). Thus, aided by this dictionary defi-
nition, we conclude that to occupy property under MCL
211.7o(1), the charitable institution must at a mini-
mum have a regular physical presence on the property.
15
Using this definition, the Court of Appeals in the
instant case correctly held that petitioner did not oc-
cupy property that it leased to others and did not
physically reside in.
16
In this situation, the tenants, not
petitioner, actually “occupied” the property. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that “to find that the non-
profit [sic] corporate owner/lessor occupies the proper-
ties by virtue of leasing them to tenant-occupants, even
though the tenancy is consistent with the non-profit’s
[sic] corporate purposes, requires a ‘significant
stretch’.” Liberty Hill, supra at 2 (emphasis in original.)
The Pheasant Ring panel’s holding that a nonprofit
corporation occupies a property merely by virtue of the
fact that the property is being used in a manner
14
A word that is defined in various ways is given meaning by its context
or setting. Koontz, supra at 318.
15
A charitable institution does not automatically occupy property if it
has occupancy rights to the property. The term “occupy” requires more
than merely having the “right to occupy.” As we have explained, the
charitable institution must actually occupy the property, i.e., maintain a
regular physical presence there.
16
Petitioner is correct, however, that the fact that it charged the
tenants rent does not disqualify it from the exemption. See Wexford Med
Group, supra at 215 (“A ‘charitable institution’ can charge for its services
as long as the charges are not more than what is needed for its successful
maintenance.”).
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consistent with the corporation’s purpose is at odds
with the statute’s plain language.
The Court of Appeals holding in the instant case is
further supported by this Court’s decisions in Webb
Academy, Gull Lake, and Oakwood Hosp I. Although
those decisions did not focus on the occupancy require-
ment of the statute, but focused instead on the part of
the statute requiring that the property be occupied
“solely for the purposes for which it was incorporated,”
the plaintiffs in those cases were actually physically
present on the property when they engaged in activities
that carried out their nonprofit goals. Here and in
Pheasant Ring, on the other hand, the petitioners were
not present on the properties.
V. RESPONSE TO THE DIS SENT
The dissent and petitioner incorrectly conclude that
the term “occupy” is synonymous with “use.”
17
In
arguing that “occupy” means “use,” the dissent selec-
tively quotes the fifth of five suggested meanings of
“occupancy” in Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed).
18
The
first definition of “occupancy” suggested, however,
17
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Lake Louise Christian, supra at
578, and Kalamazoo Nature Ctr, supra at 665-667, erred in concluding
that “occupy” is synonymous with “use.”
18
Justice C
AVANAGH
’s dissent states that it quotes Black’s Law Dictionary
merely “to draw attention to the inadequacy of a dictionary-driven approach
to statutory interpretation.” Post at 68. Yet Justice C
AVANAGH
does not
explain what interpretive aid, other than his own personal vocabulary, he
would prefer us to use to define the statutory term. Further, when it comes
to actually interpreting the statutory language, Justice C
AVANAGH
, despite
his criticism of our reliance on a dictionary, himself turns to the dictionary
definition. The dissent states that the term “ ‘occupied’ should be under-
stood as synonymous with ‘used,’ because it is the most appropriate
definition for that context.” Post at 70. Justice C
AVANAGH
appears to derive
this definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, which he quotes earlier in his
opinion.
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reads: “The act, state, or condition of holding, possess-
ing, or residing in or on something; actual possession,
residence, or tenancy, [especially] of a dwelling or
land.” Id. (emphasis added). This definition is consis-
tent with the first two meanings of “occupy” suggested
in Webster’s Universal College Dictionary (1997), one of
which we adopt today.
We reject the dissent’s argument that interpreting
“occupied” to mean “reside[d] in or on” is incongruous
with the Legislature’s second use of “occupied” in MCL
211.7o(1). Contrary to the dissent’s argument, a chari-
table institution may reside on property for charitable
purposes, rather than simply dwelling on the property
for no reason other than dwelling itself. For example,
the doctors and interns in Oakwood Hosp I resided in
physicians’ housing “in furtherance of and for the
purposes for which plaintiff was incorporated and for
hospital and public health purposes.” Oakwood Hosp I,
supra at 530.
The dissent argues that charitable institutions do not
typically reside in a place because they are inanimate.
Clearly, just as inanimate things may not “use” prop-
erty, they may not “reside” on property. Charitable
institutions, however, are not merely inanimate bodies;
they are made up of people. A charitable institution’s
members, employees, or volunteers may dwell on the
property or at least be habitually present on the prop-
erty, which is consistent with the meaning of “reside.”
The dissent contends that a charitable institution may
not “reside in” certain property, such as a swimming
pool. Although one obviously cannot dwell in a swim-
ming pool, one can maintain a regular physical presence
at the pool (e.g., by habitually swimming there) or on
the property that contains the pool. Either would gen-
erally be sufficient to occupy the property.
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In citing Oakwood Hosp I to support its argument
that the term “occupied” means “used,” the dissent
conflates the following two factors for determining
whether the tax exemption under MCL 211.7o(1) ap-
plies:
(1) The real estate must be owned and occupied by the
exemption claimant;
***
(3) the exemption exists only when the buildings and
other property thereon are occupied by the claimant solely
for the purposes for which it was incorporated. [Wexford
Med Group, supra at 203.]
As discussed, the Oakwood Hosp I Court addressed only
the third factor. The Court held that the nonprofit
corporation occupied physicians’ housing for the pur-
poses for which it was incorporated. The Oakwood Hosp
I Court’s mention of the nonprofit corporation’s “use”
of the property was a reference to this Court’s holding
in Webb Academy that housing is exempt only when it is
incidental to the use of the entire property for chari-
table purposes. Further, the Court’s discussion of the
“use” of property is not inconsistent with our interpre-
tation of the term “occupy.” It is certainly consistent for
a charitable institution to use property on which it
maintains a regular physical presence. Use of property
is just one part of occupying it. The two terms are not
mutually exclusive; “use” is merely narrower than
“occupy.”
The dissent would hold that a charitable institution
may occupy property by using it without maintaining a
physical presence there. Such an interpretation leads to
one of the following two unsatisfactory conclusions: (1)
a charitable institution can occupy property without
actually being physically present or (2) a charitable
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institution need only use the property sporadically or
perhaps even once to occupy it. Neither of these conclu-
sions is consistent with proper meaning of the term
“occupy.” Rather, a charitable institution must main-
tain a regular physical presence on the property to
occupy the property under MCL 211.7o.
VI. CONCLUSION
Petitioner did not occupy the real property to qualify for
a property-tax exemption under MCL 211.7o(1). Although
petitioner owned the housing, it leased the housing to
others for their own personal use and had no regular
physical presence in the housing. Thus, petitioner did not
occupy the housing under the plain language of the
statute and this Court’s interpretations of the predeces-
sors of MCL 211.7o. Because petitioner cannot satisfy all
the requirements of MCL 211.7o(1), it is not entitled to an
exemption from property taxes during the tax years at
issue. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in the instant case and overrule Pheasant Ring to
the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and Y
OUNG
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred
with C
ORRIGAN
,J.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring in the result only). The ques-
tion before this Court is whether the petitioner is
exempt under MCL 211.7o(1)
1
from paying property tax
on property it uses for the charitable purpose of provid-
ing housing for low-income families, low-income indi-
1
MCL 211.7o(1) states: “Real or personal property owned and occupied
by a nonprofit charitable institution while occupied by that nonprofit
charitable institution solely for the purposes for which that nonprofit
charitable institution was incorporated is exempt from the collection of
taxes under this act.”
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viduals, and disabled individuals. Specifically, does the
petitioner “occupy” the subject property, as the term
“occup[y]” is contemplated as a requirement for exemp-
tion from property tax under MCL 211.7o(1)?
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, I concur in affirming the Court of
Appeals holding that petitioner did not occupy the
subject property as contemplated under MCL 211.7o(1),
and I agree with overruling Pheasant Ring v Waterford
Twp, 272 Mich App 436; 726 NW2d 741 (2006), but
would overrule it to the extent that its holding is
inconsistent with my opinion.
I. FACTS
Petitioner Liberty Hill is a nonprofit organization in-
corporated under the laws of Michigan. Petitioner’s chari-
table purpose is to provide housing for low-income or
disabled individuals, in addition to low-income families.
The tenants of the property at issue lease the housing
under traditional landlord-tenant agreements. Petitioner
collects rent from the tenants, charges late fees when the
deadline for rent passes, and requires security deposits.
Petitioner requested a tax exemption from respondent
city of Livonia for tax years 2003 and 2004, arguing that it
qualified for exemption as a charitable organization occu-
pying property in furtherance of its charitable purpose.
The case was heard in the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT),
which denied petitioner’s request for an exemption. Peti-
tioner appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the MTT’s ruling in an unpublished opinion per curiam.
2
Petitioner then sought leave to appeal in this Court.
2
Liberty Hill Housing Corp v City of Livonia, unpublished opinion
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 16, 2006 (Docket No.
258752).
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While the application for leave to appeal in the instant
case was pending, the Court of Appeals issued a published
opinion in Pheasant Ring v Waterford Twp. The peti-
tioner in Pheasant Ring was a nonprofit organization,
similar to petitioner in this case, that leased housing to
persons with autism under traditional landlord-tenant
agreements. The petitioner in Pheasant Ring requested a
property-tax exemption under MCL 211.7o(1). In Pheas-
ant Ring, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner did
“occupy” the property in a manner that qualified for the
exemption. The decision was not appealed in this Court.
To clarify whether a charitable organization that
leases property to others as part of its charitable
purpose “occupies” the property under MCL 211.7o(1),
this Court ordered oral argument on the application,
directing the parties to address “whether Pheasant
Ring v Waterford Twp . . . was correctly decided.”
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de
novo. Grimes v Dep’t of Transportation, 475 Mich 72,
76; 715 NW2d 275 (2006). “ ‘[E]xemption statutes are
to be strictly construed in favor of the taxing unit.’ ”
Ladies Literary Club v Grand Rapids, 409 Mich 748,
753; 298 NW2d 422 (1980) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
To qualify for an exemption under the text of MCL
211.7o(1), the claimant must satisfy a three-part test:
(1) the real estate must be owned and occupied by the
exemption claimant, (2) the exemption claimant must
be a nonprofit charitable institution incorporated under
3
Liberty Hill Housing Corp v City of Livonia, 477 Mich 1018 (2007).
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the laws of this state, and (3) the buildings and other
property thereon must be occupied by the claimant
solely for the purposes for which it is incorporated.
Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192,
203; 713 NW2d 734 (2006). The issue in common
between Pheasant Ring and the instant case is whether
the petitioners “occupied” their respective properties in
a manner that meets the first and third elements of the
exemption test. In both cases, the properties were
leased as housing to tenants with special needs.
With regard to the petitioner in this case, the Court
of Appeals held that petitioner did not occupy the
property because it had leased the property to tenants
and had thus given up its right to occupy the property.
The Court of Appeals in Pheasant Ring, on the other
hand, criticized that argument as being “too narrow
and restrictive.” Pheasant Ring, 272 Mich App at 442.
The Pheasant Ring panel then went on to hold that,
because the petitioner had used the property in further-
ance of its charitable purpose, it had occupied the
property for the charitable purpose. Id.
I agree with the Court of Appeals in the instant case,
and further conclude that the Pheasant Ring panel
incorrectly interpreted the term “occupied” to mean
“used.” I note that long-established law requires this
Court to give a narrow construction to statutes creating
tax exemptions. Ladies Literary Club, 409 Mich at 753.
I interpret the term “occupied” in the narrowest sense,
looking only at the language used in MCL 211.7o(1).
The statute requires a claimant to perform two actions
before a charitable exemption can be granted: (1) the
charitable organization must own the property and (2)
the charitable organization must occupy the property.
4
4
The occupation must be in furtherance of the organization’s chari-
table purpose.
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The statute makes the occupancy requirement distinct
from the ownership requirement, and it makes no
mention of “using” the property. Thus, I reject the
Pheasant Ring interpretation that “using” the property
is equivalent to occupying the property because that
interpretation goes beyond the text of the statute.
Given the statute’s use of the term “occupied,” a
claimant must, at a minimum, have occupancy rights to
the property before it can qualify as having “occupied”
that property.
By leasing the property to tenants, the petitioner in
this case gave up its right to occupy the property during
the term of the leases. Because petitioner could not
occupy the property by reason of its own agreements, it
cannot now claim that it “occupied” the property for
purposes of MCL 211.7o(1). The tenants were the only
occupants of the property during the tax years at issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Petitioner did not occupy the property at issue during
tax years 2003 and 2004 because petitioner had con-
tracted away its occupancy rights in the form of lease
agreements. Thus, petitioner cannot satisfy the re-
quirements of MCL 211.7o(1) for exemption from prop-
erty taxes for tax years 2003 and 2004.
Accordingly, I concur with the majority in affirming
the Court of Appeals holding in the instant case and
overruling the Court of Appeals opinion in Pheasant
Ring v Waterford Twp, but would overrule it to the
extent that it is inconsistent with my opinion.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority
opinion, which holds that Liberty Hill Housing Corpo-
ration, a nonprofit organization that leases housing to
disabled or low-income individuals, did not qualify for
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the charitable-institution property-tax exemption un-
der MCL 211.7o(1) because it did not occupy the prop-
erties at issue. I disagree that the Legislature intended
the term “occupy,” as used in MCL 211.7o(1), to mean
“reside in or on” or “to be a resident or tenant of; dwell
in.” This cannot be the meaning intended by the
Legislature, because it is inconsistent with the statute’s
subsequent use of the term and the statute’s purpose.
The key issue in this case is the meaning of the term
“occupied” as it is used in MCL 211.7o(1), which
exempts from taxation “[r]eal or personal property
owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institu-
tion....”Themajority opinion rejects the definition of
“occupied” that denotes ownership, “to have, hold,...
possess,...or claim,” reasoning that the term “occu-
pied” must mean something other than ownership
because MCL 211.7o(1) uses the conjunctive phrase
“owned and occupied.” Ante at 56-57. But there are
several definitions for the term, so ruling out the
meaning that denotes ownership only eliminates one
alternative. The entire entry for the term “occupy” in
the dictionary used by the majority opinion suggests six
different meanings:
—v.t. 1. to have, hold, or take as a separate space;
possess, reside in or on, or claim: The orchard occupies half
the farm. 2. to be a resident or tenant of; dwell in. 3. to fill
up, employ, or engage: to occupy time reading. 4. to engage
or employ the mind, energy, or attention of: We occupied the
children with a game. 5. to take possession and control of (a
place), as by military invasion. —v.i. 6. to take or hold
possession. [Webster’s Universal College Dictionary
(1997).]
Moreover, consulting a different dictionary yields addi-
tional variations of the definition, illustrating a hazard
of singularly employing dictionary definitions to discern
legislative intent. For example, Black’s Law Dictionary
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(8th ed) articulates one definition of “occupancy” as
“the use to which property is put,” which bears some
relation to the third Webster’s definition: “to fill up,
employ, or engage.”
1
The majority cursorily dismisses
three of the alternative Webster’s definitions as “clearly
not relevant,” but accuses me of selectively quoting
from Black’s Law Dictionary. Ante at 57, 59. However, I
have not presented alternative dictionary definitions to
argue that “my” dictionary is more authoritative than
the majority’s dictionary; rather, I raise them to draw
attention to the inadequacy of a dictionary-driven ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. The practice of
reaching for a dictionary to define common words in a
statute risks serving to merely confirm the writer’s
assumed meaning of the word, rather than to actually
advance the writer’s legal analysis.
2
While dictionaries
are certainly useful tools of statutory interpretation,
there are circumstances in which consulting a diction-
ary will not itself resolve the proper meaning of a
statutory word or phrase.
This case presents such a circumstance—in which
consulting dictionaries yields a number of possible
meanings of the term “occupied.” As a result, discern-
ing the most appropriate meaning requires further
1
The other four alternative definitions include:
1. The act, state, or condition of holding, possessing, or residing
in or on something; actual possession, residence, or tenancy,
[especially] of a dwelling or land....2.Theactoftakingposses-
sion of something that has no owner (such as abandoned property)
so as to acquire legal ownership....3.Theperiodorterm during
which one owns, rents, or otherwise occupies property. 4. The
state or condition of being occupied. [Black’s Law Dictionary (8th
ed).]
2
See Hoffman, Parse the sentence first: Curbing the urge to resort to the
dictionary when interpreting legal texts, 6 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol’y 401
(2003).
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analysis. Several principles of statutory construction
aid in determining how the term “occupied” should be
understood in MCL 211.7o(1). A phrase must be con-
strued in light of the phrases around it, not out of
context. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304,
318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Similarly, when construing a
statute, a court must read it as a whole. G C Timmis &
Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW2d
710 (2003). Particularly relevant here is the common-
sense principle that “ ‘ “[i]dentical language should
certainly receive identical construction when found in
the same act.” ’ ” Empire Iron Mining Partnership v
Orhanen, 455 Mich 410, 426 n 16; 565 NW2d 844
(1997), quoting Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451
Mich 129, 155; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (R
ILEY
, J., dissent-
ing).
When a statute repeats terms, it is logical to infer
that they have the same meaning in each instance. The
statute at issue here uses the term “occupied” twice
within the same sentence: “Real or personal property
owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institu-
tion while occupied by that nonprofit charitable insti-
tution solely for the purposes for which that nonprofit
charitable institution was incorporated is exempt from
the collection of taxes under this act.” MCL 211.7o(1)
(emphasis added). The statute’s two uses of the term
“occupied” should be consistent in meaning. But inter-
preting “occupied” to relate to residency, as the major-
ity opinion suggests, is incongruous with the statute’s
second use of the term “occupied.” That interpretation
would require that an institution resided in property
solely for a particular purpose. One’s residency of
property does not commonly have any purpose other
than residency, or dwelling, itself. By contrast, the use
of property might be for a particular purpose. It would
be entirely appropriate to state that an institution used
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property solely for a particular purpose, such as a
medical, educational, or recreational purpose. The sec-
ond instance of “occupied” should be understood as
synonymous with “used,” because it is the most appro-
priate definition for that context. Interpreting “occu-
pied” to relate to use would also be appropriate for the
first instance of the term, which confirms that the
Legislature intended this meaning.
Additionally, interpreting “occupied” as synonymous
with “used” comports with the function of the statute,
whereas interpreting “occupied” to relate to residency
does not. The exemption described in MCL 211.7o(1)
applies only to nonprofit charitable institutions; it
never applies to individuals. Applying the term “reside”
to an institution is a strained and odd interpretation.
Unlike people, institutions are inanimate and do not
typically reside in a place. Notably, the majority articu-
lates the following definition of “reside” from Webster’s:
“1. to dwell permanently or for a considerable time; live.
2. (of things, qualities, etc.) to be present habitually; be
inherent ([usually followed] by in).” Ante at 58. The
first definition of “reside” clearly does not apply to
institutions, because institutions do not dwell or live
anywhere. The second definition of “reside” does not
apply because an institution would not be inherent in a
particular piece of property.
Further, the statute applies broadly to “real or per-
sonal” property, not simply residential property. Not all
property that is eligible for exemption is susceptible to
being resided in. For example, if a nonprofit charitable
institution owned land that contained a swimming pool,
it would be inapt to state that the institution occupied
the swimming pool in that it resided in the pool. But it
would be entirely appropriate to state that the institu-
tion occupied the swimming pool in that it operated the
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pool and, further, that it operated the pool in fulfillment
of its charitable purpose.
3
Thus, the term “occupied”
must be construed so that it applies to the broad range
of property that could be exempt under MCL 211.7o(1).
Finally, Michigan caselaw supports interpreting the
term “occupied” to mean “used” in the context of this
exemption. In Oakwood Hosp Corp v State Tax Comm,
374 Mich 524; 132 NW2d 634 (1965), the predecessor of
MCL 211.7o was at issue. The statute exempted from
taxation property that was “owned and occupied” by
“library, benevolent, charitable, educational or scien-
tific institutions...while occupied by them solely for
the purposes for which they were incorporated.” Id.at
528. This Court held that houses owned by the plaintiff
hospital, which were used for dwelling purposes for
resident physicians and their families, were exempt
under this provision. Id. at 530-532. The hospital
charged the residents $100 a month to defray the cost of
the housing, which was located at the edge of the
hospital property and fronted a public street in a
residential neighborhood. This Court reasoned that the
houses were built to be necessary accessories to the
hospital, because there was a shortage of housing close
to the hospital and the resident physicians needed to be
available to serve at the hospital on short notice. Id.at
527. It concluded that “[t]he houses are used as part of
the hospital operation and are incidental thereto. Ex-
emption under the statute applies.” Id. at 532 (empha-
sis added).
4
Clearly, Oakwood interpreted the term
3
Despite its devotion to the dictionary, the majority departs from its
chosen definition when it is convenient or necessary to do so, such as
in the swimming-pool hypothetical. The shortcomings of its chosen
dictionary definition lead the majority to craft its own definition of
“occupy”—to maintain a regular physical presence. Ante at 60.
4
The majority’s argument that Oakwood and the other cases address-
ing this exemption did not concern the “owned and occupied” element of
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“occupied” to mean the use of the property. The focus in
Oakwood was not simply who physically “resided in”
the property, but whether the use of the property was
within the hospital’s scientific purpose. This Court
viewed the resident physicians as an extension of the
hospital because they were so integral to the hospital’s
purpose; accordingly, their tenancy and use of the
housing was attributed to the hospital.
Therefore, if the term “occupied” is understood to
relate to the use to which property is put, the question
here is whether Liberty Hill occupied the properties
when it leased them to these particular tenants. The
relationship between Liberty Hill and its tenants is
analogous to the relationship between the hospital and
the medical residents in Oakwood. A hospital’s narrow
purpose is to provide medical care at the hospital, but
Oakwood recognized that enabling medical residents to
get to the hospital quickly was necessary to that pur-
pose. Accordingly, even though actual medical care did
not occur in the houses, the relationships between the
medical residents, their housing, and the hospital were
so intertwined that this Court regarded housing the
medical residents as an operation of the hospital that
was within its scientific purpose. The fundamental
purpose of Liberty Hill is to enable low-income or
disabled people to live independently, rather than in
institutions or group homes. The physical manifesta-
tion of Liberty Hill’s operations is not just its central
office, but also in having Liberty Hill’s tenants occupy
the houses. If Liberty Hill’s tenants do not live in the
houses, Liberty Hill’s purpose is not fulfilled.
Further, the tenancy arrangements demonstrate a
unique relationship between Liberty Hill and its ten-
the exemption statute is irrelevant because the term “occupied” should
have the same meaning in both instances in the statute.
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ants. All Liberty Hill tenants are referred by Commu-
nity Living Services, Liberty Hill’s parent corporation.
Liberty Hill’s sample lease appears to be a standard
lease, except that it includes a provision that “Commu-
nity Living Services shall assist the tenant in complying
with the terms of this lease.” Unlike a standard
landlord-tenant relationship, Liberty Hill has specifi-
cally agreed to work with the tenant to fulfill the lease
requirements. Further, Community Living Services
contracts to provide a number of services to Liberty Hill
tenants at the properties. Support services include
transportation, personal-care assistance, support for
work, recreation, community involvement, and health-
care service. The aid given in a particular tenant’s home
could amount to care being provided 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, depending on the tenant’s needs.
Thus, between assisting the tenant with complying
with the lease and providing support services, it is clear
that Liberty Hill operates in the properties, even
though the tenants physically reside in them.
In addition to the services that Liberty Hill provides
through Community Living Services, the financial ar-
rangements indicate that Liberty Hill does not have a
standard landlord-tenant relationship with its tenants.
All of Liberty Hill’s tenants qualify for Supplemental
Security Income, which amounts to approximately $600
a month and is usually the only source of income for
each tenant. Tenants pay no more than one-third of
their income to rent, usually about $200 a month.
Liberty Hill receives governmental funds and donations
that offset the remainder of the housing-related ex-
penses, such as the mortgage, insurance, and mainte-
nance. But in four of the last five years, Liberty Hill has
operated at a deficit. The financial circumstances indi-
cate that Liberty Hill is not leasing the houses as a
typical landlord, but is leasing the houses as an integral
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IBERTY
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ORP V
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IVONIA
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,J.
part of its mission. Just as the houses in Oakwood
would not have been exempted from taxation if they
had been rented to people unrelated to the hospital, the
Liberty Hill houses would not be exempt if they were
rented to tenants who were not referred by Community
Living Services and who did not meet Liberty Hill’s
criteria.
Leasing the properties to particular low-income or
disabled tenants and maintaining a relationship with
them was integral to Liberty Hill’s operation. Thus,
Liberty Hill occupied the properties within the meaning
of MCL 211.7o(1) because it used the properties as part
of its institutional mission. Moreover, it occupied the
properties solely for the purposes for which it was
incorporated, as required by MCL 211.7o(1). I would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
K
ELLY
, J., concurred with C
AVANAGH
,J.
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WESCHE v MECOSTA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION
KIK v SBRACCIA
Docket Nos. 129282 and 132849. Argued October 4, 2007 (Calendar Nos.
10 and 11). Decided April 3, 2008.
Daniel J. and Beverly Wesche brought an action in the Mecosta
Circuit Court against the Mecosta County Road Commission.
Daniel Wesche sought damages for personal injury after a Gradall
hydraulic excavator driven by the road commission’s employee
struck Wesche’s vehicle. Beverly Wesche claimed loss of consor-
tium. The court, Richard I. Cooper, J., granted the road commis-
sion summary disposition on Beverly Wesche’s loss-of-consortium
claim, determining that governmental immunity barred it. The
Court of Appeals, H
OEKSTRA
,P.J., and J
ANSEN
and K
ELLY
,JJ.,
affirmed, holding that the motor-vehicle exception to governmen-
tal immunity, MCL 691.1405, applies only to claims for bodily
injury and property damage and does not waive governmental
immunity for loss-of-consortium claims, which are not for bodily
injury or property damage but derive from a spouse’s injuries.
Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 267 Mich App 274 (2005). The
Wesches sought leave to appeal.
Rebecca and Robert Kik, individually and as personal corepre-
sentatives of the estate of their deceased daughter, Sharon Kik,
brought an action in the Chippewa Circuit Court against John-
Christopher Sbraccia, Kinross Charter Township EMS, and Kin-
ross Charter Township after a township ambulance driven by
township EMS employee Sbraccia overturned while transporting
Rebecca Kik, who was pregnant. Sharon Kik was born prema-
turely and died the same day. The damages that the Kiks sought
included damages for the loss of society and companionship of
their daughter and damages for Robert Kik’s loss of consortium
with Rebecca Kik. The defendants moved for partial summary
disposition, contending that the Kiks’ derivative claims for loss of
consortium and the like were barred by governmental immunity.
The court, Nicholas J. Lambros, J., denied the motion, and the
defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, O’C
ONNELL
,P.J., and
S
AWYER
and M
URPHY
, JJ., affirmed with regard to all claims against
Sbraccia and with regard to the Kiks’ claims for loss of society and
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75
companionship, given that the action was a wrongful-death action.
With regard to Robert Kik’s loss-of-consortium type claims against
the township and the township EMS, however, the panel reversed
because it was required to follow the holding in Wesche that
damages for loss of consortium are not recoverable in an action
brought under MCL 691.1405. Had it not been obligated to follow
Wesche, however, the panel would have concluded that MCL
691.1405 does not limit the right to recover damages for derivative
claims, such as a claim for loss of consortium. 268 Mich App 590
(2005). The Court of Appeals convened a special panel to resolve
the conflict between this case and Wesche and vacated part III of
its prior opinion in the case. 268 Mich App 801 (2005). The special
panel, C
AVANAGH
,S
MOLENSKI
,F
ORT
H
OOD
,andB
ORRELLO
,JJ.,
(W
ILDER
,P.J., and Z
AHRA
and S
CHUETTE
, JJ., dissenting), held that
MCL 691.1405 does not limit the right to recover damages for
loss-of-consortium and similar claims arising from a bodily injury
and overruled part III of the Wesche opinion. Kik v Sbraccia, 272
Mich App 388 (2006). The township defendants and Sbraccia
sought leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in Wesche, 478
Mich 860 (2007), and Kik, 478 Mich 861 (2007), and consolidated
the appeals for oral argument.
In an opinion by Justice C
ORRIGAN
, joined by Chief Justice
T
AYLOR
and Justices Y
OUNG
and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
The motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity does
not waive immunity from a loss-of-consortium claim. Because the
motor-vehicle exception would not permit a plaintiff to pursue a
loss-of-consortium claim if a death had not ensued, that plaintiff is
also barred from pursuing the claim in a wrongful-death action. A
governmental employee is not immune from liability for loss-of-
consortium damages, however, if the plaintiff can satisfy all the
requirements set forth in the gross-negligence exception to the
governmental immunity of employees.
1. The language of MCL 691.1405 clearly imposes liability and
waives governmental immunity only for bodily injury and property
damage. “Bodily injury” means physical or corporeal injury to a
body. Loss of consortium is a nonphysical injury and does not fall
within the categories of damage for which the motor-vehicle
exception waives immunity.
2. Loss of consortium is an independent cause of action deriva-
tive of the underlying bodily injury and is not merely an item of
damages. MCL 691.1405 does not create a threshold for liability.
76 480 M
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Thus, it does not provide that governmental agencies are liable for
any damages once a plaintiff makes a showing of bodily injury or
property damage.
3. The wrongful-death statute, MCL 600.2922(1), makes liabil-
ity contingent on whether the party injured would have been
entitled to maintain an action and recover damages if a death had
not ensued. Because the Kiks would not have been entitled to
pursue their loss-of-consortium claim for Sharon Kik if her death
had not ensued, MCL 600.2922(1) does not authorize that claim in
their wrongful-death action.
4. Endykiewicz v State Hwy Comm, 414 Mich 377 (1982),
which held that the highway exception to governmental immunity,
MCL 691.1402(1), is ambiguous and an expansive provision that
permits recovery for loss of companionship and society in a
wrongful-death action, is overruled to the extent that it is incon-
sistent with the decision in these cases.
5. Because he is a governmental employee, Sbraccia’s liability
is premised on MCL 691.1407(2)(c) rather than the motor-vehicle
exception. MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provides that a governmental em-
ployee is immune from tort liability if his or her conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the
injury or damage. The exception to governmental immunity for
gross negligence does not limit the waiver of immunity to cases of
bodily injury or property damage and does not shield an employee
from liability for loss-of-consortium damages.
Wesche affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Kik affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
further proceedings.
Justice W
EAVER
, joined by Justice C
AVANAGH
, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, agreed that the immunity available to
governmental employees is not available to an employee who is
grossly negligent and that a plaintiff can seek recovery from that
employee for loss-of-consortium damages. She disagreed, however,
that the motor-vehicle exception prohibits a claim for loss of
consortium and would allow recovery of damages for that claim as
long as the injured party from whom the loss-of-consortium claim
derived sustained some legally cognizable harm or injury. Under
the exception, a governmental agency is liable for damages that
flow from the bodily injury, and this includes damages for loss of
consortium, just as it includes damages for medical expenses and
lost wages. MCL 691.1405 does not expressly abrogate the
common-law right to claim damages for loss of consortium, and the
statute cannot be extended by implication to abrogate that right.
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Justice K
ELLY
, joined by Justice C
AVANAGH,
concurring in part and
dissenting in part, agreed that governmental employees can be held
liable for loss of consortium under the gross-negligence exception.
She would also hold, however, that governmental agencies may be
liable for those damages under the motor-vehicle exception when the
loss-of-consortium claim arises directly out of bodily injury suffered in
a collision. MCL 691.1405 refers to liability for bodily injury or
property damage, but is silent with regard to damages. Once liability
for bodily injury is established by showing the negligent operation of
a government-owned vehicle, a plaintiff can recover all damages
arising from the bodily injury. The loss of consortium and the loss of
society and companionship that the plaintiffs alleged in these cases
derive from bodily injuries suffered in the accidents. The majority’s
interpretation of the motor-vehicle exception will lead to absurd
results by excluding recovery for loss-of-consortium damages that
derive from the bodily injury suffered, while allowing recovery for
other damages such as emotional distress and lost wages, that could
also derive from the bodily injury.
1. G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY —
M
OTOR
-V
EHICLE
E
XCEPTION —
L
OSS OF
C
ONSOR-
TIUM
.
The motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity does not
waive immunity from a claim of loss of consortium (MCL
691.1405).
2. G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY —
M
OTOR
-V
EHICLE
E
XCEPTION —
W
RONGFUL
-D
EATH
A
CTIONS —
L
OSS OF
C
ONSORTIUM
.
The wrongful-death statute does not expand the waiver of immunity
set forth in the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity to
include liability for loss-of-consortium claims (MCL 600.2922[1],
691.1405).
3. G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY —
G
OVERNMENTAL
E
MPLOYEES —
G
ROSS
N
EGLI-
GENCE —
L
OSS OF
C
ONSORTIUM
.
A governmental employee whose gross negligence while acting in the
course of employment causes personal injury may be liable for
loss-of-consortium damages if the plaintiff can satisfy all the
requirements set forth in the gross-negligence exception to the
governmental immunity of employees (MCL 691.1407[2][c]).
Warba Law Offices, P.C. (by Mark J. Warba), for
Daniel J. and Beverly Wesche.
Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge (by William L. Henn,
Charles F. Behler, and Thomas R. TerMaat) for the
Mecosta County Road Commission.
78 480 M
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75 [Apr
Petrucelli & Petrucelli, P.C. (by Jonny L. Waara), for
Rebecca and Robert Kik.
Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge (by William L. Henn
and Mark P. Bickel) for John-Christopher Sbraccia,
Kinross Charter Township EMS, and Kinross Charter
Township.
Amici Curiae:
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, and Mark E. Donnelly and Ann M.
Sherman, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attor-
ney General.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross and Hilary
A. Dullinger) for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel.
Thomas A. Biscup for the Michigan Association for
Justice.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. We granted leave to appeal in these two
cases to determine whether the motor-vehicle exception
to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, authorizes a
claim for loss of consortium against a governmental
agency. The motor-vehicle exception permits recovery of
damages only for “bodily injury” and “property dam-
age.” A loss of consortium is not a physical injury to the
body. Moreover, a claim for loss of consortium is an
independent, albeit derivative, cause of action. There-
fore, the motor-vehicle exception does not waive immu-
nity from such a claim.
In Kik, we also must determine whether the
wrongful-death act, MCL 600.2922, permits a loss-of-
consortium claim against a governmental agency. The
availability of a wrongful-death action hinges on
whether the injured party would have been entitled to
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maintain an action and recover damages had a death
not ensued. Because the motor-vehicle exception would
not have permitted plaintiffs to pursue a loss-of-
consortium claim if their daughter’s death had not
ensued, plaintiffs are also barred from pursuing such a
claim in their wrongful-death action.
Finally, in Kik, we must also resolve whether a
governmental employee is immune from liability for
loss-of-consortium damages. We hold that a governmen-
tal employee is not immune if the plaintiff can satisfy all
the requirements set forth in the gross-negligence ex-
ception to the governmental immunity of employees.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in Wesche, affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in Kik, and remand
both cases for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. WESCHE
Plaintiff Daniel Wesche was seated in his automobile at
a red light when defendant Mecosta County Road Com-
mission’s vehicle, a Gradall hydraulic excavator,
1
rear-
ended him. Plaintiffs alleged that the accident injured
Daniel’s cervical spine. Plaintiff Beverly Wesche,
Daniel’s wife, was not present at the accident scene and
suffered no bodily injury. She claimed a loss of consor-
tium as a result of Daniel’s injury.
2
1
The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s Gradall is a motor vehicle for
the purposes of MCL 691.1405. Defendant challenged this aspect of the
Court of Appeals decision in a separate application for leave to appeal, which
we denied. 477 Mich 1030 (2007). Thus, this issue is no longer before us.
2
Specifically, Beverly alleged that she had “been damaged by being
denied the normal marital companionship and services from the date of
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The trial court granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) for defendant regarding Beverly’s loss-
of-consortium claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the motor-vehicle exception does not waive gov-
ernmental immunity from loss-of-consortium claims.
3
We
granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and
directed that this case be argued and submitted with
Kik.
4
B. KIK
Plaintiff Rebecca Kik, who was pregnant, was being
transported in an ambulance owned by defendant Kin-
ross Charter Township and operated by defendant
John-Christopher Sbraccia, a township employee.
Sbraccia lost control of the ambulance, which over-
turned in a ditch. Rebecca suffered injuries and went
into premature labor, delivering the baby, Sharon Kik,
who allegedly died the same day.
5
Rebecca and her husband, plaintiff Robert Kik, filed
this action individually and as personal corepresenta-
tives of Sharon’s estate. Their complaint alleged: (1)
Rebecca’s personal-injury claim, (2) Robert’s claim for
loss of consortium arising from Rebecca’s injuries, and
Daniel’s physical injuries up to the present, with their [sic] being a
reasonable likelihood/probability that some element of same will be
permanent.”
3
Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 267 Mich App 274; 705 NW2d 136
(2005).
4
478 Mich 860 (2007).
5
The original Court of Appeals panel noted that the complaint was not
entirely clear regarding whether Sharon was stillborn or born alive and
thereafter died. Like the original Court of Appeals panel, we will assume
for purposes of our analysis that Sharon was born alive, but our opinion
should not be read as resolving that issue if a dispute on the subject arises
below. See Kik v Sbraccia, 268 Mich App 690, 693 n 2; 708 NW2d 766
(2005) (Kik I), vacated in part 268 Mich App 801 (2005).
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(3) a wrongful-death claim on behalf of Sharon’s estate,
including Robert and Rebecca’s claims for loss of society
and companionship.
Defendants moved for partial summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that they are immune
from all claims other than for bodily injury and property
damage. Kinross Charter T ownship and Kinross Charter
T ownship EMS argued that (1) the motor-vehicle excep-
tion does not waive immunity from loss-of-consortium
claims and (2) the limitations on the underlying motor-
vehicle exception claim apply to the wrongful-death ac-
tion. Sbraccia argued that he was immune because the
governmental agency that employed him was immune.
The trial court rejected defendants’ arguments and denied
the motion. The original Court of Appeals panel affirmed
in part and reversed in part.
6
On Robert’s loss-of-
consortium claim based on Rebecca’s injuries, the panel
stated that it was bound by the decision in Wesche
barring such a claim, but that it would have decided the
issue differently if Wesche had not been controlling.
7
On
the wrongful-death claim, the panel held that the
wrongful-death act controlled the damages that could be
recovered and that the claims for loss of society and
companionship arising from the infant’s death could pro-
ceed despite the language of the motor-vehicle exception.
Finally, the panel held that MCL 691.1407(2)(c) permitted
plaintiffs to pursue loss-of-consortium claims against
Sbraccia if they could establish gross negligence.
A special panel of the Court of Appeals convened
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J) to resolve the conflict be-
6
Kik I, supra at 711-712.
7
The three-judge panel in Kik I was bound to follow Wesche because it
was a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after
November 1, 1990, that had not been reversed or modified by this Court
or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.215(J)(1).
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tween Wesche and the decision of the original panel in
Kik.
8
The special panel’s majority overruled Wesche and
held that loss-of-consortium claims are permitted under
the motor-vehicle exception. Three members of the
special panel opined in dissent that the Wesche panel
had correctly decided the issue.
Defendants applied for leave to appeal in this Court.
We granted the application and directed that the case be
argued and submitted with Wesche.
9
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo motions for summary
disposition. Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are also reviewed de novo by this
Court.” Renny v Dep’t of Transportation, 478 Mich 490,
495; 734 NW2d 518 (2007). Our goal in interpreting a
statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent as
reflected in the statutory language. Id. “When the
language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature’s
intent is clear and judicial construction is neither
necessary nor permitted.” Griffith v State Farm Mut
Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 526; 697 NW2d 895
(2005).
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE MOTOR-VEHICLE EXCEPTION DOES NOT WAIVE
IMMUNITY FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL
691.1401 et seq., provides: “Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this act, a governmental agency is immune
from tort liability if the governmental agency is en-
8
Kik v Sbraccia, 272 Mich App 388; 726 NW2d 450 (2006) (Kik II).
9
478 Mich 861 (2007).
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gaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental
function.” MCL 691.1407(1). This grant of immunity is
subject to six statutory exceptions.
10
These cases hinge on the proper interpretation of the
motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, which pro-
vides:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury
and property damage resulting from the negligent opera-
tion by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental
agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental
agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public
Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923
of the Compiled Laws of 1948.
This language is clear: it imposes liability for “bodily
injury” and “property damage” resulting from a gov-
ernmental employee’s negligent operation of a
government-owned motor vehicle. The waiver of immu-
nity is limited to two categories of damage: bodily injury
and property damage.
Although the GTLA does not define “bodily injury,”
the term is not difficult to understand. When consider-
ing the meaning of a nonlegal word or phrase that is not
defined in a statute, resort to a lay dictionary is appro-
priate. Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575
NW2d 762 (1998). The word “bodily” means “of or
pertaining to the body” or “corporeal or material, as
contrasted with spiritual or mental.” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2000). The word “injury”
refers to “harm or damage done or sustained, [espe-
10
The six statutory exceptions are: the highway exception, MCL
691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-
building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception,
MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4);
and the sewage-disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and
(3).
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cially] bodily harm.” Id. Thus, “bodily injury” simply
means a physical or corporeal injury to the body. It is
beyond dispute that a loss of consortium is not a
physical injury to a body. “A claim for loss of consortium
is simply one for loss of society and companionship.”
Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 29; 427 NW2d 488
(1988). Thus, because loss of consortium is a nonphysi-
cal injury, it does not fall within the categories of
damage for which the motor-vehicle exception waives
immunity.
Moreover, loss of consortium is not merely an item of
damages. Rather, this Court has long recognized that a
claim for loss of consortium is an independent cause of
action. Id., at 29, citing Montgomery v Stephan, 359
Mich 33, 41; 101 NW2d 227 (1960), and Prosser &
Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 125, pp 931-934. Although a
loss-of-consortium claim is derivative of the underlying
bodily injury, it is nonetheless regarded as a separate
cause of action and not merely an item of damages.
Eide, supra at 37. The motor-vehicle exception does not
waive immunity from this independent cause of action;
the waiver of immunity is limited to claims for bodily
injury and property damage.
11
We reject the Kik II panel’s conclusion that the
motor-vehicle exception creates a threshold for liability
that, once met, permits the recovery of damages for loss
of consortium. MCL 691.1405 plainly states that gov-
ernmental agencies “shall be liable for bodily injury and
property damage” resulting from the negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. It does not state or suggest that
11
Justice K
ELLY
asserts that our application of the statutory text will
lead to absurd results, but we respectfully disagree, particularly in light
of the independent nature of a loss-of-consortium claim. We simply are
not convinced that the Legislature’s decision to waive immunity only
from bodily-injury and property-damage claims, but not for independent
loss-of-consortium claims, is absurd.
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governmental agencies are liable for any damages once
a plaintiff makes a threshold showing of bodily injury or
property damage.
Moreover, the Legislature knows how to create a statu-
tory threshold when it wishes to do so. For example,
Michigan’s no-fault act provides: “A person remains sub-
ject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or
her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
only if the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of a body function, or permanent serious
disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). The no-fault act thus
retains “tort liability for noneconomic loss” if one of the
required categories of damage is established. By contrast,
the motor-vehicle exception contains no such language. It
merely provides that governmental agencies “shall be
liable for bodily injury and property damage” and says
nothing to suggest that a separate cause of action, such as
one for loss of consortium, may be asserted once a thresh-
old of “bodily injury” has been met.
The Kik I panel’s reliance on Endykiewicz v State
Hwy Comm, 414 Mich 377; 324 NW2d 755 (1982), was
misplaced. In Endykiewicz, this Court found the lan-
guage of the highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1), to be
ambiguous and thus read it broadly to permit recovery
for loss of companionship and society in a wrongful-
death action. The Endykiewicz Court stated that the
highway exception is “an expansive provision defining
the liability of a governmental agency.” Id.at389
(emphasis added).
We reject the analysis in Endykiewicz because the
statutory language at issue here is not ambiguous. As
we have explained, the statutory text permits recovery
of damages only for bodily injury and property damage,
and loss of consortium does not fall within either of
those categories.
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For these reasons, we hold that a loss of consortium
is not a “bodily injury” for which the motor-vehicle
exception waives immunity. Because no statutory ex-
ception applies, the governmental agencies in these
cases are entitled to governmental immunity on the
plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims.
12
B. THE WRONGFUL-DEATH ACT DOES NOT EXPAND
THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
The wrongful-death act does not waive a governmen-
tal agency’s immunity beyond the limits set forth in the
underlying statutory exception. The three-judge panel
in Kik I ruled that even if the motor-vehicle exception
does not waive immunity, the wrongful-death act none-
theless allows a claim for loss of consortium. This
conclusion contravenes both the language of the
wrongful-death act and this Court’s caselaw.
At the applicable time, MCL 600.2922(1) provided:
Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in
death shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or fault of
another, and the act, neglect, or fault is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages, the person who
or the corporation that would have been liable, if death had
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
12
Justice W
EAVER
concludes that the motor-vehicle exception to gov-
ernmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, “does not expressly abrogate the
right to claim damages for loss of consortium under Michigan’s common
law....”Post at 96. However, she disregards MCL 691.1407(1), which
states: “Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency
is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” Because governmental
agencies are immune from tort liability unless one of the statutory
exceptions applies, and because the motor-vehicle exception applies only
to liability for “bodily injury and property damage,” governmental
agencies are not liable for loss of consortium. Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent
entirely misapprehends the nature of the burden on a party seeking to
avoid governmental immunity.
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notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death was caused under circumstances that
constitute a felony. [Emphasis added.]
Another provision of the wrongful-death act stated:
In every action under this section, the court or jury may
award damages as the court or jury shall consider fair and
equitable, under all the circumstances including reasonable
medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses for which the
estate is liable; reasonable compensation for the pain and
suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased person
during the period intervening between the time of the injury
and death; and damages for the loss of financial support and
the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased.
[MCL 600.2922(6) (emphasis added).]
The Kik I panel reasoned that even if the motor-
vehicle exception does not waive immunity, the
wrongful-death act expressly authorizes damages for
loss of society and companionship. But that analysis
fails to give effect to language in MCL 600.2922(1)
making liability contingent on whether the party in-
jured would have been entitled to maintain an action
and recover damages if death had not ensued.
In Kik, the motor-vehicle exception would not have
entitled plaintiffs to maintain an action and recover
damages for loss of consortium if Sharon’s death had
not ensued. As discussed, the motor-vehicle exception
does not waive immunity from loss of consortium be-
cause “bodily injury” does not encompass such claims.
Thus, because plaintiffs would not have been entitled to
pursue a loss-of-consortium claim if Sharon’s death had
not ensued, MCL 600.2922(1) does not authorize such a
claim in this wrongful-death action.
Our textual analysis is supported by caselaw stating
that the wrongful-death act is essentially a “filter”
through which the underlying claim may proceed. In
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Hardy v Maxheimer, 429 Mich 422, 439; 416 NW2d 299
(1987), this Court noted that the survival act, MCL
600.2921, provides: “All actions and claims survive
death. Actions on claims for injuries which result in
death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the
injured person except pursuant to” the wrongful-death
act. The Hardy Court explained:
We, therefore, believe that since 1846 the law in Michi-
gan has evolved to the point where it may now be held that
the right to recovery for wrongful death “survives by law.”
Consequently, a wrongful death action will no longer be
regarded as one created at the time of death, but as one that
“survives by law.” We believe this interpretation fosters the
legislative purpose behind both our [MCL 600.5852] saving
provision and the current wrongful death act, MCL
600.2922[.] [Id. at 440 (emphasis added).]
Because an underlying claim “survives by law” and
must be prosecuted under the wrongful-death act, this
Court has held that any statutory or common-law
limitations on the underlying claim apply to a wrongful-
death action. In Jenkins v Patel, 471 Mich 158; 684
NW2d 346 (2004), we held that the medical-malpractice
cap on noneconomic damages applies in a wrongful-
death action when the underlying claim is for medical
malpractice. This Court explained:
Clearly, the wrongful death act is not the only act that is
pertinent in a wrongful death action. “The mere fact that our
legislative scheme requires that suits for tortious conduct
resulting in death be filtered through the so-called ‘death act’,
[MCL 600.2922], does not change the character of such
actions except to expand the elements of damage available.”
Hawkins [v Regional Med Laboratories, PC, 415 Mich 420,
436; 329 NW2d 729 (1982).] That is, a wrongful death action
grounded in medical malpractice is a medical malpractice
action in which the plaintiff is allowed to collect damages
related to the death of the decedent. [Id. at 165-166.]
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Although MCL 600.2922(6) sets forth the damages
available in wrongful-death actions, we rejected the
plaintiff’s argument in Jenkins that the medical-
malpractice noneconomic-damages cap does not apply
to a wrongful-death action:
Plaintiff argues that [MCL 600.2922(6)] governs dam-
ages in wrongful death claims, in such a manner that other
provisions are rendered inapplicable. However, this Court
has held that other statutory and common-law limitations
on the amount of damages apply to wrongful death actions.
For instance, comparative negligence principles and the
collateral source setoff rule, MCL 600.6303(1), apply to
wrongful death actions. Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104;
457 NW2d 669 (1990); Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125; 579
NW2d 840 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Robinson
v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). [Id. at 171.]
Indeed, this Court has long held that a statutory or
common-law limitation on the underlying claim applies
to a wrongful-death action. In Maiuri v Sinacola Constr
Co, 382 Mich 391; 170 NW2d 27 (1969), the plaintiffs’
son was killed in the course of his employment. The
plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death action against the
employer. Quoting the language of MCL 600.2922(1),
this Court explained: “As a condition to a successful
action under the wrongful death act, it must be shown
that the decedent, if death had not ensued, could have
maintained an action and recovered damages for his
injuries.” Id. at 395. This Court concluded:
Since the cause of action of a proper plaintiff under the
wrongful death act is a derivative one in that the personal
representative of the deceased stands in his shoes and is
required to show that the deceased could have maintained
the action if death had not ensued, and since, in this case,
the decedent would have been barred from an action for
injuries resulting in death because of the exclusive remedy
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provisions of the workmen’s compensation act, the trial
court did not err in granting an accelerated judgment for
the defendant. [Id. at 396.]
See also Mehegan v Boyne City, G&ARCo, 178 Mich
694; 141 NW 905 (1913) (holding that the decedent’s
execution of a release of liability barred his widow’s
recovery in a wrongful-death action).
The same reasoning applies in Kik. If Sharon had not
died, the claims available under the motor-vehicle ex-
ception would have been limited to those for “bodily
injury” and “property damage.” Because a loss of con-
sortium is not a “bodily injury,” no such claim could
have been pursued had her death not ensued. Thus, the
limitation on damages in the motor-vehicle exception
must apply in this wrongful-death action.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
in Kik I relied on Endykiewicz. But Endykiewicz reflects
a repudiated understanding of the wrongful-death act.
The Endykiewicz Court stated that a wrongful-death
action “exists not as ‘a cause of action which survives’ the
decedent, but as ‘a new action * * * which can be
brought, not for the benefit of the estate, but solely for the
benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute.’ ”
Endykiewicz, supra at 387 (citations omitted). In light of
Hardy and Jenkins, however, it is now clear that the
underlying claim survives by law and that the limitations
in the underlying cause of action apply to the wrongful-
death action. Because of this, we believe that Hardy
silently overruled the analysis of the wrongful-death act in
Endykiewicz. For this reason, we now explicitly hold that
Endykiewicz is overruled to the extent that it is inconsis-
tent with our decision.
13
13
Our decision to overrule Endykiewicz is warranted under the doc-
trine of stare decisis, as set forth in Robinson, supra at 463-464.
Endykiewicz was incorrectly decided because it erroneously treated a
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Accordingly, we hold that the wrongful-death act
does not expand the waiver of immunity set forth in the
motor-vehicle exception to include loss-of-consortium
claims.
C. MCL 691.1407(2)(c) DOES NOT SHIELD GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYEES FROM LOSS-OF-CONSORTIUM CLAIMS
Finally, we agree with the Kik I panel that govern-
mental employees are not immune from loss-of-
consortium claims if the requirements of MCL
691.1407(2)(c) are met. Because he is a governmental
employee, Sbraccia’s liability is premised not on the
motor-vehicle exception, but on MCL 691.1407(2)(c).
That provision states that a governmental employee is
immune from tort liability if his “conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause
of the injury or damage.” Unlike the motor-vehicle
exception for governmental agencies, the gross-
negligence exception for employees does not limit the
waiver of immunity to cases of bodily injury or property
damage.
Defendants argue that an employee cannot be subject
to liability if the governmental agency itself is immune.
But this argument has no basis in the text of the GTLA.
The Legislature has prescribed different standards for
determining whether immunity is afforded to govern-
mental agencies and employees. It therefore follows
that the extent of their respective immunities may not
always be coextensive. As the Kik I panel explained:
wrongful-death claim as a “new” cause of action rather than a continu-
ation of the decedent’s underlying claim. Endykiewicz, supra at 387.
Moreover, overruling Endykiewicz will not lead to practical real-world
dislocations. On the contrary, adhering to a decision that contravenes
well-settled principles of our jurisprudence would undermine the interest
in a stable and predictable body of law, as demonstrated by the Kik I
panel’s error in relying on Endykiewicz.
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The Legislature chose to use different standards to deter-
mine the immunity of the governmental entities and the
governmental employee. Such a choice may have the effect in
certain cases that the employee may not be immune when the
governmental employer is immune. The Legislature could
have avoided such a situation by providing in MCL
691.1407(2) that an individual employee is immune whenever
the governmental entity is immune, but it did not. Whether it
makes sense to hold the individual employee liable in a
situation in which the governmental entity itself is immune is
a question to be addressed by the Legislature, not this Court.
The Legislature presumably had a reason to treat govern-
mental employees and governmental entities differently, and
it would be presumptuous of us to void that legislative
determination. [Kik I, supra at 697.]
The Kik I panel’s analysis of this issue is sound.
Because MCL 691.1407(2)(c) does not limit its waiver of
immunity to bodily injury and property damage, we
reject defendants’ argument on this issue.
14
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we hold that loss of consortium is
not a bodily injury for which governmental immunity is
waived under the motor-vehicle exception. Moreover,
the wrongful-death act does not authorize a loss-of-
consortium claim when a plaintiff would not have been
entitled to seek damages for that claim under the
motor-vehicle exception if a death had not ensued.
Finally, MCL 691.1407(2) does not shield governmental
employees from liability for loss-of-consortium dam-
ages.
14
We do not address whether Sbraccia is entitled to summary disposi-
tion on other grounds, e.g., that plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Sbraccia acted with gross negligence as defined in the applicable version
of MCL 691.1407(2)(c) or that his gross negligence was “the proximate
cause” of the injuries or death under the standard set forth in Robinson.
Those issues are not before us.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in Wesche, affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in Kik, and remand
both cases to the trial courts for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and Y
OUNG
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred
with C
ORRIGAN
,J.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in
part). I concur only in the decision by the majority of
four (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,
Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
) that, in a negligence action
against a governmental employee, the immunity avail-
able to governmental employees under the motor-
vehicle exception is not available to a governmental
employee who was grossly negligent and that a plaintiff
can seek recovery for loss-of-consortium damages.
I dissent from the majority of four’s decision that the
motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity,
MCL 691.1405, prohibits a claim for loss of consortium
against a governmental agency. Because the statute
does not bar a claim for loss of consortium as long as the
plaintiff seeking damages for loss of consortium can
show that the injured party sustained some legally
cognizable harm or injury, I would hold that such
damages may be awarded, and I dissent from that part
of the majority opinion that holds otherwise.
Because the right of a plaintiff who was not physi-
cally injured to recover from a tortfeasor for loss of
consortium as a result of injuries sustained by the
injured plaintiff is well established in Michigan’s com-
mon law, I dissent from the majority of four’s decision
that loss-of-consortium damages are not available in a
claim brought under the motor-vehicle exception to
governmental immunity.
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A claim for loss of consortium is a separate legal
claim for damages suffered not by the injured party, but
by a spouse, parent, or child who claims damages for the
loss of the injured party’s society and companionship. It
is a derivative claim in that it does not arise at all unless
the injured party has sustained some legally cognizable
harm or injury. The right of a person to recover from a
tortfeasor for loss of consortium as a result of injuries
sustained by his or her spouse is well established in
Michigan’s common law.
1
A statute that expressly extinguishes a right estab-
lished at common law is a proper exercise of legislative
power; however, a statute in derogation of the common
law must be strictly construed.
2
Importantly, such a
statute will not be extended by implication to abrogate
an established rule of common law.
3
The motor-vehicle exception to governmental immu-
nity, MCL 691.1405, provides:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury
and property damage resulting from the negligent opera-
tion by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental
agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental
agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public
Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923
of the Compiled Laws of 1948.
The statute does not define “bodily injury,” nor does
it expressly state that a plaintiff who was not physically
injured may not recover derivative damages for loss of
consortium. The majority mistakenly alleges, ante at 87
n 12, my supposed disregard of MCL 691.1407(1), which
states: “Except as otherwise provided in this act,a
1
Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 504;
309 NW2d 163 (1981).
2
Id. at 507-508.
3
Id. at 508.
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governmental agency is immune from tort liability if
the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or
discharge of a governmental function.” (Emphasis
added.)
There is no such disregard. As indicated by the
language emphasized in the statute, it appears that it
is in fact the majority that “misapprehends” the
statute, because MCL 691.1405 is one of the exceptions
to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1405 explicitly
states that governmental agencies “shall be liable for
bodily injury and property damage arising from the
negligent operation” of a governmental vehicle. Thus,
as long as the physically injured party can establish a
legally cognizable claim for bodily injury, a plaintiff is
entitled to recovery for all damages flowing from that
injury, including damages for loss of consortium. Evi-
dently, the majority does not understand the actual
and inseparable connection between “bodily injury”
and the damages that flow from that injury. The
governmental agency is liable for damages that flow
from bodily injury, including loss-of-consortium dam-
ages, which flow from bodily injury just as damages
for medical expenses and lost wages also flow from a
bodily injury.
Because the statute does not expressly abrogate the
right to claim damages for loss of consortium under
Michigan’s common law, the majority of four errs in
abolishing this right by implication. The majority of
four does so by creatively implying such a prohibition in
its own definition of “bodily injury.” There is nothing in
the language of the statute justifying the majority of
four’s creative construction, and the majority’s decision
to construe the language of the statute in this manner
is another example of the majority of four’s judicial
activism by unrestrained statutory interpretation.
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C
AVANAGH
, J., concurred with W
EAVER
,J.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
These two cases require us to decide two issues. The
first concerns the spouse or parent of an individual who
sustains bodily injury in a motor vehicle collision. The
issue is whether that person can recover damages from
a governmental agency for loss of consortium under the
motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.
1
The majority decides that a person cannot recover these
damages. I disagree. When a loss of consortium claim
arises directly out of bodily injury suffered in a collision,
I would hold that such damages are recoverable. Ac-
cordingly, I dissent from the part of the majority opinion
that holds to the contrary.
The other issue is whether a claim for loss of consor-
tium can be asserted against a governmental employee.
The majority decides that the employee is liable for such
damages “if the plaintiff can satisfy all the require-
ments set forth in the gross-negligence exception to the
governmental immunity of employees.”
2
Because I
agree that governmental employees can be held liable
for loss of consortium, I concur in the result reached in
that part of the majority opinion.
FACTS
WESCHE v MECOSTA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION
3
Plaintiff Daniel Wesche stopped his vehicle at a red
light. He was then struck from behind by a Gradall
hydraulic excavator owned by defendant Mecosta
1
MCL 691.1405.
2
Ante at 80.
3
Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 267 Mich App 274; 705 NW2d 136
(2005).
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County Road Commission. As a result of the collision,
he suffered injury to his spine. Plaintiff Beverly Wesche,
Daniel’s wife, was not present when the incident oc-
curred.
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant, asserting
numerous causes of action. Among their claims was one
brought by Beverly for loss of consortium. Defendant
moved for summary disposition on this claim. The trial
court granted the motion, concluding that the claim was
barred by governmental immunity. In a published opin-
ion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
KIK v SBRACCIA
4
A pregnant Rebecca Kik was being transported in an
ambulance owned by defendant Kinross Charter Town-
ship. Defendant John-Christopher Sbraccia, an em-
ployee of defendant Kinross Charter Township Emer-
gency Medical Services, was driving the ambulance. He
lost control of it and overturned in a ditch. As a result
of the crash, Rebecca sustained numerous injuries. She
also went into premature labor, causing her to deliver
her daughter, Sharon Kik. Sharon died the same day.
Plaintiffs Rebecca and Robert Kik, who is Rebecca’s
husband and Sharon’s father, brought suit against the
township, the emergency medical service, and Sbraccia.
Included among the causes of action were claims for loss
of consortium. One was filed on behalf of Robert seek-
ing damages for the injuries suffered by his wife. And
one was filed on behalf of Robert and Rebecca because
of the death of their daughter.
Defendants moved for summary disposition, claiming
that governmental immunity barred the loss of consor-
tium claims. The trial court denied the motion. The
4
Kik v Sbraccia, 268 Mich App 690; 708 NW2d 766 (2005) (Kik I).
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Court of Appeals reversed with respect to the denial of
summary disposition for the governmental agencies on
Robert’s loss of consortium claim arising out of the
injuries suffered by his wife. The Court determined
regarding this claim that it was bound by its prior
decision in Wesche and had to reverse the denial of
summary disposition to the governmental agencies.
5
But the panel also concluded that Wesche had been
incorrectly decided and declared that it would have
decided the issue differently were it not for Wesche.
6
The panel reasoned that Wesche had confused the
concepts of liability and damages.
7
It concluded that the
Wesche panel had erred because, once a plaintiff has
shown bodily injury, liability is established and the
plaintiff may recover whatever damages arise from the
bodily injury.
8
And it would have found that loss of
consortium is one such damage.
9
After the Kik I panel determined that Wesche had
been incorrectly decided, a special panel of the Court of
Appeals was convened. A majority of the special panel
concluded that Wesche had been incorrectly decided and
overruled it.
10
In Kik II, the majority expressly adopted
the Kik I panel’s reasoning as its own.
11
ANALYSIS
After the special panel issued its decision in Kik II,
we granted leave to appeal in both Kik and Wesche and
5
Id. at 711-712.
6
Id. at 711.
7
Id. at 709.
8
Id. at 710.
9
Id.
10
Kik v Sbraccia, 272 Mich App 388, 391; 726 NW2d 450 (2006) (Kik
II).
11
Id.
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directed that the two cases be argued together.
12
Now,
the Court decides that loss of consortium is unavailable
to the spouse or parent of an individual injured in a
collision under the motor vehicle exception to govern-
ment immunity. The majority also decides that a gov-
ernmental employee whose gross negligence causes
bodily injury is subject to personal liability for loss of
consortium. I agree with the second decision, but I part
company with the majority on the first.
The motor vehicle exception to governmental immu-
nity provides: “Governmental agencies shall be liable
for bodily injury and property damage resulting from
the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or em-
ployee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of
which the governmental agency is owner....”
13
Contrary to the majority decision, this exception does
not state that plaintiffs can recover damages only for
bodily injury or property damage.
14
Instead, the excep-
tion provides that governmental agencies are “liable for
bodily injury and property damage.” Importantly, the
statute speaks of liability, but it says nothing about
damages. In Kik I, the Court of Appeals correctly
recognized this point and aptly summarized its effect:
[The motor vehicle exception] concerns the issue of
liability and describes one of the conditions for which the
government does not enjoy immunity: when the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle owned by a governmental
agency causes bodily injury or property damage. The stat-
ute does not limit or otherwise establish the types of
damages that are recoverable from the government when
12
Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 478 Mich 860 (2007); Kik v Sbraccia,
478 Mich 861 (2007).
13
MCL 691.1405.
14
This Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Brown
v Detroit Mayor, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007).
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liability is established. For that matter, the statute does
not address, in either terms of inclusion or exclusion,
who may recover damages arising from such bodily
injury. In other words, the appropriate reading of MCL
691.1405 is that the government is not immune from suit
when the negligent operation of a government-owned
motor vehicle results in bodily injury. Once such liability
is established, the statute is silent regarding damages,
meaning that the plaintiff may recover whatever dam-
ages arise from the bodily injury.
[15]
Accordingly, under a proper interpretation of the
motor vehicle exception, plaintiffs establish liability by
showing that the negligent operation of a government-
owned motor vehicle resulted in bodily injury. But once
that liability has been established, plaintiffs can recover
all damages that arise from the bodily injury. “Had the
Legislature intended to prohibit the recovery of conse-
quential or incidental damages which arise directly
from the infliction of injury to person or property at the
hands of the government, it would have affirmatively
done so in specific language....”
16
Loss of consortium damages derive from “some other
legally cognizable harm suffered by the individual
whose consortium the plaintiff has lost as a result of
that harm.”
17
Michigan law has long allowed recovery of
these damages for injuries to a spouse.
18
And the
15
Kik I, 268 Mich App at 709-710.
16
Endykiewicz v State Hwy Comm, 414 Mich 377, 389; 324 NW2d 755
(1982). In Endykiewicz, a unanimous Court suggested that the exceptions
to governmental immunity should be construed expansively in order to
accomplish the legislative purpose of “provid[ing] an opportunity to
obtain redress from the responsible governmental agency for those
injured as a result of the negligence of the government....” Id. at
388-389. This appears to me to be the appropriate rule when interpreting
an exception to governmental immunity.
17
31 Michigan Law & Practice (2d ed), Torts, § 72, p 179.
18
See Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 49; 101 NW2d 227 (1960).
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wrongful death act allows parents to bring a claim for
loss of companionship based on the death of their
child.
19
In these cases, the “other legally cognizable harm”
from which plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claims derive
is the bodily injury suffered by the spouse or child in the
motor vehicle collision. In Wesche, plaintiff Beverly
Wesche’s loss of consortium claim arose from the inju-
ries suffered by her husband in the motor vehicle
collision. In Kik, plaintiff Robert Kik’s loss of consor-
tium claims are based on the injuries to his wife and the
death of his child, both of which were caused by the
motor vehicle collision. And plaintiff Rebecca Kik’s
claim is based on the death of her child. Accordingly,
each plaintiff can recover loss of consortium damages
because the damages arose directly from the bodily
injury suffered in a motor vehicle collision.
The correctness of finding that the motor vehicle
exception allows recovery for loss of consortium is
confirmed when one examines the motor vehicle excep-
tion in light of the highway defects exception. In rel-
evant part, the highway defects exception provides:
A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or
her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency
to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel
may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the
governmental agency.
[20]
This exception expressly limits recovery to the “per-
son who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her
property.” The Legislature used express limiting lan-
guage in this exception, but did not use such language
19
MCL 600.2922(6).
20
MCL 691.1402(1).
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in the motor vehicle exception. This is strong evidence
that the Legislature did not intend to limit recovery
under the motor vehicle exception to the individual who
actually suffered bodily injury.
21
Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation of the
exception will lead to absurd results. The damages
recoverable for loss of consortium, like those for
emotional distress and lost wages, can derive from
the bodily injury suffered, as in this case, in a motor
vehicle collision. Did the Legislature intend to single
out loss of consortium damages, of all the damages
recoverable for bodily injury from a collision, as
excluded from the remedy that the statute confers?
Absent any reason to believe that the Legislature
intended such a result, this absurd interpretation
must be rejected.
22
CONCLUSION
I believe that the majority errs by deciding that loss
of consortium damages cannot be recovered under the
motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.
The exception establishes only a threshold for liability
and does not limit the type of damages that may be
recovered once liability is established. For that reason, I
21
It could be argued that the difference in the language used in the
highway defects exception and the motor vehicle exception can be
explained by this fact: The highway defects exception has been amended
twice, whereas the motor vehicle exception has never been amended.
However, this fact does not explain the difference in language, since each
version of the highway defects exception has included language strictly
limiting recovery to the person suffering bodily injury.
22
See McAuley v Gen Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282
(1998); see also Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55, 78-79; 718
NW2d 784 (2006) (M
ARKMAN
, J., concurring); id.at103n12(C
AVANAGH
,J.,
dissenting); id.at104n1(W
EAVER
, J., dissenting); id. at 109-130 (K
ELLY
,
J., dissenting).
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ECOSTA
C
O
R
D
C
OMM
103
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ELLY
,J.
would hold that loss of consortium damages can be
recovered in these two cases.
C
AVANAGH
, J., concurred with K
ELLY
,J.
104 480 M
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75 [Apr
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ELLY
,J.
LATHAM v BARTON MALOW COMPANY
Docket No. 132946. Decided April 14, 2008.
Douglas Latham, an employee of a subcontractor for a building
project, brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against
Barton Malow Company, the construction manager for the project,
alleging negligent performance of a contract and negligence under
the common-work-area doctrine after he fell from a height while
moving drywall sheets without a fall-protection device. The court,
Michael Warren, J., dismissed the negligent-performance count,
but denied the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the
common-work-area claim, concluding that questions of material
fact existed regarding the number of workers using the area where
the plaintiff fell. The Court of Appeals, F
ITZGERALD
,P.J., and
M
ARKEY
and T
ALBOT
, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per
curiam, issued October 17, 2006 (Docket No. 264243). The defen-
dant applied for leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court ordered
and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or
take other peremptory action. 477 Mich 1118 (2007).
In an opinion by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, joined by Justices
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG,
and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
The danger for which a duty attaches under the common-work-
area doctrine is an avoidable danger to which a significant number
of workers are exposed. The lower courts erred in ascertaining the
relevant danger in this case, requiring a remand for further
proceedings.
1. The elements of a claim for negligence under the common-
work-area doctrine are that (1) a defendant contractor failed to
take reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating
authority (2) to guard against readily observable and avoidable
dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to a significant
number of workers (4) in a common work area. The doctrine is an
exception to the rule that, in the absence of its own active
negligence, a general contractor is not liable for the negligence of
a subcontractor or a subcontractor’s employee and that a construc-
tion worker’s immediate employer is responsible for the worker’s
job safety.
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105
2. The defendant was the general contractor in this case.
The lower courts erred, however, by concluding that the el-
evated mezzanine on which the plaintiff worked, which at the
time of the injury was necessarily without perimeter protection
because the plaintiff was moving drywall onto it, itself created
a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers.
Working at heights is generally an unavoidable condition of
construction work and cannot, by itself, be the sort of avoidable
danger described in the elements of the common-work-area
doctrine as set forth in Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91
(1974). The proper danger to focus on in this case was working
at dangerous heights without any protection from falls, and the
proper analysis concerned whether a significant number of
workers were exposed to this avoidable risk.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceed-
ings.
Justice K
ELLY
, joined by Justice C
AVANAGH
, dissenting, dis-
agreed with the majority’s definition of the danger presented in
this case. In reaching its conclusion, the majority assumed that
personal fall protection was the only reasonable way to avoid
the danger of falling in this case and essentially presumed that
the general contractor took reasonable steps to protect the
workers from that danger by requiring the use of safety
equipment and procedures. The majority’s resolution of the
issue will thus distort the law of negligence by making an
injured worker’s failure to wear a fall-protection device disposi-
tive under the common-work-area doctrine. The majority also
misread Funk, which involved a general contractor’s failure to
take reasonable steps to protect construction personnel who
worked at dangerous elevations. Funk identified several reason-
able steps the contractor could have taken. It did not reach the
conclusion that personal fall protection is the only way to guard
against the risk of falling, and it did not redefine the danger
posed by working at heights as the danger of confronting
heights without personal fall protection. Even assuming that
the plaintiff could have used a personal fall-protection device,
questions of material fact exist concerning whether the defen-
dant took reasonable steps within its supervisory authority to
require the use of that device and whether the defendant’s
construction supervisor should have been expected to enforce
the defendant’s safety policy by inquiring about the safety
protection available. The judgments of the lower courts should
be affirmed, and the case should be remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings.
106 480 M
ICH
105 [Apr
Jon R. Garrett, P.C. (by Jon R. Garrett), and Gross,
Nemeth & Silverman, P.L.C. (by Steven G. Silverman),
for the plaintiff.
Cardelli, Lanfear & Buikema, P.C. (by Anthony F.
Caffrey, III), for the defendant.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. In this case, we analyze what comprises
the element of “readily observable and avoidable dan-
gers” in a lawsuit involving a “common work area” of a
construction site. In Funk v Gen Motors Corp,
1
this
Court established the common-work-area doctrine,
which by its elements is not a strict-liability tort but is
instead one that imposes liability only if the general
contractor itself fails to prevent negligence.
2
Thus, the
danger cannot be just the unavoidable, perilous nature
of the site itself. Rather, the danger for which a duty
attaches is an avoidable danger to which a significant
number of workers are exposed, such as—in Funk and
this case—failure to have fall-protection devices to
protect workers from falling from a height on the
project. The lower courts erred in ascertaining the
relevant danger, basing their analyses on the conclusion
that an elevated mezzanine, which at the time of the
injury was necessarily without perimeter protection,
itself created a high degree of risk to a significant
number of workers. Instead, the proper danger to focus
on was working at dangerous heights without any
protection from falls, and the proper analysis concerned
whether a significant number of workers were exposed
to this avoidable risk.
1
Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974),
overruled in part on other grounds by Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem
Sys, Inc, 414 Mich 29 (1982).
2
Funk, supra at 108.
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Because both lower courts misapprehended the ap-
propriate danger to examine and decided the case on
that erroneous basis, they also erred on the issue
whether a significant number of workers would be
exposed to the relevant peril. With the appropriate
danger clarified, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Plaintiff was a carpenter employed byB&HCon-
struction to work on the construction of a new school
building. Defendant Barton Malow Company was the
construction manager on the project.
3
On the day of
plaintiff’s injury, plaintiff and a coworker were moving
sheets of drywall from a scissors lift to the mezzanine
level of the project. They raised the lift to the height of
the mezzanine and removed the cable barrier around
the perimeter of the mezzanine, an action required to
allow ingress. When they began carrying the first sheet
of drywall from the lift to the mezzanine, plaintiff was
not wearing a fall-protection harness, contrary to job-
site rules of which he was aware. As plaintiff was
moving onto the mezzanine, the sheet of drywall
cracked and plaintiff lost his balance, falling 13 to 17
feet to the floor. He was injured, but undisputedly
would not have been had he been wearing the required
protective harness.
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligent performance of
a contract
4
and negligence under the common-work-
area doctrine, under which a general contractor may be
3
For purposes of its summary disposition motion, defendant conceded
that it served as general contractor for the project. Accordingly, the trial
court made no decision regarding that issue.
4
This claim was dismissed by the trial court and is not at issue here.
108 480 M
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held liable for injuries caused by dangers in common work
areas. The elements of such a claim are: (1) the defendant
contractor failed to take reasonable steps within its super-
visory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against
readily observable and avoidable dangers (3) that created
a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers (4)
in a common work area.
5
Plaintiff asserted that defen-
dant had failed to ensure that plaintiff would use proper
fall protection while working on the lift and the mezza-
nine, despite knowing that such protection was neces-
sary when the perimeter cable was lowered.
Because numerous other workers from other trades
would be required to use the lift to access the mezza-
nine and lower the cable to enter the mezzanine,
plaintiff argued that the situation created a high degree
of risk to a significant number of workers.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact),
arguing that plaintiff had not shown the existence of a
high degree of risk to a significant number of workers
because the area was not accessible to a significant
number of workers at the time of the accident and
because plaintiff’s individual failure to use fall protec-
tion did not create a high degree of risk to a significant
number of workers. Defendant also argued that because
plaintiff’s own employer was contractually responsible
for its workers’ observing proper safety procedures,
plaintiff had not shown that defendant failed to act
reasonably.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for sum-
mary disposition, concluding that plaintiff had suffi-
ciently created a question of material fact regarding the
number of workers using the area. The court did not
5
Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 57; 684 NW2d 320
(2004); Funk, supra at 104.
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discuss the nature of the danger or whether there existed
a high degree of risk. The trial court determined that no
dispute existed regarding whether a fall was readily avoid-
able if personal fall protection had been used and that
defendant’s safety supervisor knew this.
6
While acknowl-
edging that defendant had presented a serious challenge
to plaintiff’s allegation of unreasonable action, the court
held that this was properly a question for the jury.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
7
It agreed with the
trial court that “plaintiff faced the danger of working on
an elevated platform that did not have any permanent
perimeter protection to protect him from falling while
loading materials onto the mezzanine.”
8
It said that the
trial court properly focused on the mezzanine’s lack of
perimeter protection, not plaintiff’s failure to use per-
sonal fall protection, even though the Court acknowl-
edged that such protection would have prevented plain-
tiff’s injuries. The Court determined that a significant
number of workers from other trades would be exposed
to the same hazard of having to use the unprotected
mezzanine opening when entering and leaving the lift
and disagreed with defendant that the number of work-
ers present at the specific time of the injury was
relevant.
9
The Court concluded that defendant had
supervisory and controlling authority over the jobsite
and that the mezzanine was a common work area.
10
The
6
Notably, in its discussion of plaintiff’s active-negligence claim, the trial
court observed that “[p]laintiff had tools of the trade available to protect
himself and [sic] which should have been provided by his employer, or which
he should have been trained to use by his employer.”
7
Latham v Barton Malow Co, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2006 (Docket No. 264243).
8
Id. at 3.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 4. Because defendant had conceded for purposes of the motion
hearing that the mezzanine was a common work area, the trial court
made no finding on the issue.
110 480 M
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105 [Apr
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Court held that the four elements of the common-work-
area doctrine were met because a question of material
fact existed regarding whether defendant took reason-
able steps to guard against the danger.
Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we or-
dered oral argument on whether to grant the applica-
tion or take other action, directing the parties to
address (1) whether the proofs presented in the trial
court were sufficient to satisfy the standard for general
contractor liability set forth in Ormsby v Capital Weld-
ing, Inc
11
and (2) whether defendant’s motion for sum-
mary disposition should have been granted.
12
II
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or
denial of a motion for summary disposition.
13
We review
a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by consid-
ering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.
14
Summary disposition is appro-
priate if there is no genuine issue regarding any mate-
rial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
15
III
In Funk, this Court, exercising its common-law au-
thority, expanded the duties of those ultimately in
control of a construction project worksite (most often
11
Ormsby, n5supra.
12
Latham v Barton Malow Co, 477 Mich 1118 (2007).
13
Ormbsy, supra at 52.
14
GreenevAPProducts, Ltd, 475 Mich 502, 507; 717 NW2d 855
(2006).
15
Id.
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the general contractor) by creating the common-work-
area doctrine. This doctrine was described as follows:
We regard it to be part of the business of a general
contractor to assure that reasonable steps within its super-
visory and coordinating authority are taken to guard
against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common
work areas which create a high degree of risk to a signifi-
cant number of workmen.
[16]
The doctrine is understood as an exception to the
general rule that, in the absence of its own active
negligence, a general contractor is not liable for the
negligence of a subcontractor or a subcontractor’s em-
ployee
17
and that the immediate employer of a construc-
tion worker is responsible for the worker’s job safety.
18
Essentially, the rationale behind the Funk doctrine is
that the law should be such as to discourage those in
control of the worksite from ignoring or being careless
about unsafe working conditions resulting from the
negligence of subcontractors or the subcontractors’
employees. This Court explored the history of the
doctrine in depth in Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co,
19
in
which we observed that “ ‘in many cases only the
general contractor is in a position to coordinate work or
provide expensive safety features that protect employ-
ees of many or all of the subcontractors.’ ”
20
Subcon-
tractors and their employees, even if they are aware of
hazards, may be unable to rectify the situation them-
selves or to compel others to do so.
21
In cases in which
normal safety precautions can reduce a hazardous con-
16
Funk, supra at 104.
17
Ormsby, supra at 53.
18
Funk, supra at 102.
19
Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co, 473 Mich 16; 699 NW2d 687 (2005).
20
Id. at 20, quoting Funk, supra at 104.
21
Funk, supra at 104.
112 480 M
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dition so that it no longer creates a high degree of risk
to workers, the general contractor’s duty is to take
reasonable steps to ensure that those safety precautions
are taken.
22
In such cases, in order to state a cause of
action against a general contractor under the common-
work-area doctrine, the plaintiff must show that the
general contractor’s failure to reasonably ensure that
workers were observing safety procedures resulted in a
significant number of workers being exposed to a high
degree of risk in a common work area.
The fundamental question presented in this case, in
which the general contractor was in control of the
worksite, is: What was the danger creating a high
degree of risk that is the focus of the general contrac-
tor’s responsibility? Funk itself provides assistance in
answering this question. There, this Court analyzed a
similar common-work-area fall. In Funk, as here, the
plaintiff would not have been injured had he worn a
fall-protection device or had netting been provided.
This Court agreed with the Funk plaintiff that the
defendants had
exposed him to avoidable injury by allowing subcontractors
to order the men to work at dangerous heights without any
protection from falls in a job environment in which labor-
ers were expected to complete their assigned tasks without
regard to the absence of safety equipment guarding against
injury in the event of a mishap.
[23]
The Court in Funk was clear that the danger at issue
was not the height itself, but the fact that the men were
required to work “at dangerous heights without any
protection from falls.” To hold that the unavoidable
height itself was a danger sufficient to give rise to a duty
would essentially impose on a general contractor strict
22
Ormsby, supra at 54, quoting Funk, supra at 106-107.
23
Funk, supra at 100.
2008] L
ATHAM V
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liability for any injury resulting from a fall from an
elevated common work area. This has never been the
law. Moreover, because working at heights is generally
an unavoidable condition of construction work, it can-
not, by itself, be the avoidable danger Funk described.
Hazards, including dangerous heights, are common-
place in construction worksites. In some situations, a
general contractor may be able to remove a particular
hazard, but general contractors simply cannot remove
all potential hazards from a construction workplace. If
a hazard cannot be removed, the general contractor can
take reasonable steps to require workers to use safety
equipment and procedures, thereby largely reducing or
eliminating the risk of harm in many situations.
Accordingly, in this case, as in Funk, the danger that
created a high degree of risk is correctly characterized
as the danger of working at heights without fall-
protection equipment. It is this danger to which a
significant number of workers must be exposed in order
for a claim to exist.
24
IV
With the relevant danger correctly perceived, the
error of the lower courts’ analyses becomes apparent.
24
The dissent’s formulation of the common-work-area doctrine is hard
to understand. As we grasp it, its central failing is that the dissent does
not concede that Funk applies only to avoidable dangers. Heights on
construction projects, we conclude, as did the Funk Court, are not
avoidable. Thus, heights are not by themselves hazards addressed by
Funk. We have never said what fall-protection gear is needed at heights.
The question is whether fall protection was available and whether the
general contractor took reasonable steps to see that it was used. The
dissent appears to assert that the issue is, however, one of strict liability
for the general contractor, not an issue of taking reasonable steps. In
short, under the dissent’s analysis, Funk would be not a negligence rule,
as it was designed to be, but would instead be a strict-liability rule.
114 480 M
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While defendant’s motion for summary disposition
identified the correct danger and further raised the
issue that plaintiff’s own failure to wear a fall-
protection device did not create a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workers, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred by misidentifying the danger
and inevitably erred in the subsequent analysis regard-
ing how many other workers were exposed to the risk.
25
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN,
Y
OUNG,
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., con-
curred with T
AYLOR
, C.J.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). With its opinion in this case,
the majority injects further confusion into the area of
negligence law. It does so by defining the danger that
was present in this case as “working at heights without
fall-protection equipment.”
1
This definition conflates
the questions posed by the first two elements of the
common-work-area doctrine: (1) whether the defendant
contractor took reasonable steps within its supervisory
and coordinating authority and (2) whether the danger
was readily observable and avoidable.
2
25
Although we focus here on only one of the common-work-area
elements, we note that plaintiff must satisfy all the elements that give
rise to a duty owed by a general contractor. Funk also requires plaintiff to
show that the failure of a significant number of workers to take safety
precautions was readily observable and that the failure was avoidable.
Finally, the plaintiff must, of course, also show that the defendant failed
to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance and that the danger existed
in a common work area.
1
Ante at 114.
2
In Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 54; 684 NW2d 320
(2004), the Court listed the four elements of the common-work-area
doctrine: (1) the general contractor failed to take reasonable steps within
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The majority quotes with approval defendant’s argu-
ment that “plaintiff’s own failure to wear a fall-
protection device did not create a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workers....”
3
This presumes,
without explanation, that wearing personal fall protec-
tion was the only reasonable way to avoid the danger of
falling from the mezzanine. The majority makes the
injured worker’s failure to wear personal fall protection
dispositive under the common-work-area doctrine. It
does so even though, under our system of comparative
negligence, a worker’s negligence is separate from the
negligence of the general contractor.
4
The majority’s resolution of this case may cause
unexpected undesirable repercussions in future negli-
gence cases. This is because it divides the question
whether reasonable measures were taken to protect
against a foreseeable risk into (1) whether a risk existed
in the first place and (2) whether plaintiff failed to
protect himself against it. The Court should avoid
distorting the law of negligence in this fashion.
I
As a rule, general contractors are not liable for the
negligence of independent subcontractors and the sub-
contractors’ employees.
5
In Funk v Gen Motors Corp,
6
its supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against readily
observable and avoidable dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workers (4) in a common work area.
3
Ante at 115.
4
In Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Sys, Inc, 414 Mich 29, 39; 323
NW2d 270 (1982), the Court held that a general contractor could not
avoid liability “ ‘by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the injured
worker....’”(Citation omitted.)
5
Ormsby, 471 Mich at 53.
6
Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974),
overruled in part on other grounds by Hardy.
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the Court set forth the common-work-area exception to
this rule. The majority bases its rationale on a passage
from Funk in which the Court summarized the Funk
plaintiff’s argument that the defendants had
exposed him to avoidable injury by allowing subcontractors
to order the men to work at dangerous heights without any
protection from falls in a job environment in which labor-
ers were expected to complete their assigned tasks without
regard to the absence of safety equipment guarding against
injury in the event of a mishap.
[7]
Using this passage, the majority concludes:
The Court in Funk was clear that the danger at issue
was not the height itself, but the fact that the men were
required to work “at dangerous heights without any pro-
tection from falls.” To hold that the unavoidable height
itself was a danger sufficient to give rise to a duty would
essentially impose on a general contractor strict liability
for any injury resulting from a fall from an elevated
common work area. This has never been the law. Moreover,
because working at heights is generally an unavoidable
condition of work, it cannot, by itself, be the avoidable
danger Funk described. Hazards, including dangerous
heights, are commonplace in construction worksites.
[8]
The majority misreads the passage from Funk in sev-
eral respects. First, the Court in Funk specifically referred
to the heights as “dangerous heights.” T o say that eleva-
tions that create a foreseeable injury from falling are not
inherently dangerous defies common sense. If such eleva-
tions were not inherently dangerous, there would be no
duty to protect the people who work there.
Second, according to Funk, while dangerous heights
on construction projects may be unavoidable, injury
from a fall is avoidable if reasonable measures are taken
7
Id. at 100.
8
Ante at 113-114 (emphasis deleted).
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to prevent it. Funk recognized that reasonable measures
can be taken to prevent injuries from falls. That recogni-
tion places the common-work-area doctrine in the negli-
gence regime rather than the strict-liability regime.
9
The passage on which the majority relies faulted the
general contractor for allowing subcontractors to send
their men to elevated locations “without any protection
from falls” and in “the absence of safety equipment
guarding against injury in the event of a mishap.”
10
The
passage essentially shows that the general contractor
did not take reasonable steps to protect those who
worked at elevations. The various reasonable steps
identified in Funk were to make provisions for “suspend-
ing nets, scaffolding, bucket cranes, safety belts or har-
9
In her dissent in Funk, Justice C
OLEMAN
reviewed Michigan law on
inherently dangerous activities and came to the following conclusion:
The Michigan cases are uniform in holding that generally an
employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor.
An exception has been developed for activities or tasks which
reasonably can be foreseen as dangerous to third parties, with a
few cases extending the exception to employees. These activities
include those dangerous despite use of all reasonable care and
those dangerous unless reasonable care is exercised.... Itisclear
that this doctrine imposes a form of strict liability upon the owner
or employer of the independent contractor. However, such liability
is not absolute. [Funk, 392 Mich at 135 (C
OLEMAN
, J. dissenting).]
Justice C
OLEMAN
correctly recognized that some dangerous activities
cannot be made safe, whereas others can be if reasonable care is
exercised. She incorrectly concluded, however, that either type of danger
exposes a general contractor to strict liability. The majority in Funk held
that working on elevations at construction sites can be made safe through
reasonable precautions. In recognizing the various reasonable precau-
tions that could be taken, the majority imposed on a general contractor a
duty of reasonable care rather than an absolute duty to make safe.
In Ormsby, 471 Mich at 56, the Court noted that the common-work-
area doctrine had not resulted in the imposition of strict liability on
general contractors, despite Justice C
OLEMAN
’s prediction.
10
Funk, 392 Mich at 100 (emphasis added).
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6-foot-long safety cable blocking the opening onto the
mezzanine had to be eased in order for them to bring up
the drywall. With the safety cable lowered, a three-foot
wide open space was left unprotected. On their first
run, plaintiff’s coworker stepped from the scissor lift
onto the mezzanine holding one end of a sheet of
drywall. Plaintiff came behind him. When plaintiff
stepped onto the mezzanine, he lost his balance. The
drywall that he was holding broke, and he fell through
the unprotected space to the level below.
There should be no dispute that the mezzanine was
dangerously high, given that as it was 12 to 17 feet
above the lower level. Because it was more than 6 feet
high, fall protection was required for the workers’
safety. The lower courts correctly noted that workers
from several trades had to work at the mezzanine level
at the same time. Hence, an issue of fact was created
concerning whether the mezzanine was a common area.
Various subcontractors needed to get onto the mezza-
nine numerous times over several days in order to work
and load materials and equipment. By a rough estimate,
a dozen workers, including carpenters, electricians,
plumbers, painters, and at least four people to load
heating, ventilation, and cooling equipment needed to
get onto the mezzanine. After the wooden frame for the
drywall was put in, there were only two ways to reach
the mezzanine: by ladder and by scissor lift. All these
workers faced the danger of falling from the mezzanine
while loading materials or equipment. Accordingly, an
issue of material fact arose about whether a significant
number of workers employed by various subcontractors
were exposed to the same risk.
There is no dispute that the safety cable did not
provide sufficient protection, given that it had to be
lowered to enable access to the mezzanine. One of the
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,J.
questions that plaintiff raised is whether any other type
of perimeter protection was feasible. In response to
defendant’s “Safety Hazard Notification,” plaintiff’s
employer indicated that a wood-framed structure with a
removal gate should have been used. The structure
could have protected people from falling through the
open space left after the cable was lowered. It is unclear
whether such protection was feasible. Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly decided that a question of material
fact existed about the availability of adequate perimeter
protection.
Defendant argues that the only feasible safety pro-
tection was the use of a personal fall-protection device,
such as a double-lanyard harness system hooking the
worker to an anchorage point. It is undisputed that
plaintiff was not wearing such a device. Plaintiff’s
supervisor expressed doubt about a lanyard, saying
that, if plaintiff had worn one, he could not have
stepped off the scissor lift onto the mezzanine.
Assuming that a personal fall-protection device could
have been used, the question arises whether defendant
took reasonable steps within its supervisory authority
to require such a device. The project-manual provisions
for defendant’s “On-Site Project Safety and Loss Con-
trol Program” state that each subcontractor “will sup-
ply the proper equipment, take the necessary precau-
tions to maintain the equipment according to current
regulations and specifications, and accept responsibility
to ensure that the necessary safety equipment is sup-
plied and used when required.” The manual further
states: “The use of safety belts/harnesses and lanyards
securely attached to an approved anchorage point when
working from unprotected high places is mandatory.”
Defendant’s manual makes clear that defendant re-
quired that personal fall protection be used when no
122 480 M
ICH
105 [Apr
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ISSENTING
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ELLY
,J.
other protection was available. It shifted to the subcon-
tractors the responsibility for providing all such safety
equipment and ensuring its use.
In Funk, the Court observed that, from an economic
and practical standpoint, placing the responsibility for
work safety in common areas on the general contractor
will “render it more likely that the various subcontrac-
tors...will implement or that the general contractor
will himself implement the necessary precautions and
provide the necessary safety equipment in those ar-
eas.”
14
It is doubtful that, under Funk, a general con-
tractor can entirely absolve itself of liability by shifting
to its subcontractors all responsibility for implementing
workplace safety and for providing safety equipment.
Furthermore, a question of material fact exists con-
cerning whether, under his supervisory authority, de-
fendant’s construction supervisor should have been
expected to enforce defendant’s safety policy. The con-
struction supervisor knew that plaintiff and his co-
worker planned to use the scissor lift to hoist drywall
onto the mezzanine. He also knew that they needed to
lower the safety cable to do so. The question is whether
the construction supervisor should have inquired about
the safety protection that the carpenters planned to use
when the safety cable was down.
Defendant argues that its supervisor had no author-
ity to tell the workers how to do their jobs. That is not
the issue. Rather, the issue is whether the construction
supervisor had authority to supervise the workers’
safety and to enforce the general contractor’s safety
policy.
Defendant also argues that a general contractor
cannot be expected to monitor whether each worker on
14
Funk, 392 Mich at 104.
2008] L
ATHAM V
B
ARTON
M
ALOW
C
O
123
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PINION BY
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ELLY
,J.
the jobsite wears individual safety protection. Were
such monitoring at issue, defendant might be correct
because of the burden it would place on the general
contractor. But, on the facts of this case, defendant’s
construction supervisor was in direct personal contact
with plaintiff and his coworker. He spoke with them
personally as they prepared to ascend to the mezzanine.
It might not be unreasonable to expect the supervisor to
inquire after their safety under the circumstances.
More importantly, such an expectation is hardly
unreasonable in light of defendant’s safety policy. Its
safety-and-loss-control program makes a difference
only if it is enforced. Certainly, a safety policy can be
enforced by issuing a citation to a subcontractor after
an injury occurs, which is what defendant did here. But
it is reasonable to expect that a general contractor will
enforce its own policy to prevent noncompliance and to
avoid injury before it occurs.
III
I would affirm the lower courts’ judgments denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition and would
remand the case to the trial court for further proceed-
ings. This resolution of the case would not be tanta-
mount to imposing strict liability on the general con-
tractor. On the contrary, it acknowledges that
reasonable minds can differ about the sufficiency of the
steps the general contractor took in this case. Certainly,
a jury could find that the general contractor took
reasonable steps, but I would not make that determi-
nation as a matter of law. It is properly an issue for the
trier of fact to resolve.
C
AVANAGH
, J., concurred with K
ELLY
,J.
124 480 M
ICH
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ELLY
,J.
PEOPLE v BARRETT
Docket No. 133128. Decided April 14, 2008.
David C. Barrett was charged in the 53rd District Court with
domestic assault, second offense, and with felonious assault. In
accordance with People v Burton, 433 Mich 268 (1989), the district
court, Michael K. Hegarty, J., ruled that the victim’s statements to
her neighbor, a 911 operator, and a police officer were not admis-
sible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule,
MRE 803(2), because there was no evidence of a startling event
independent of the victim’s statements. The district court dis-
missed the charges, and the Livingston Circuit Court, David J.
Reader, J., affirmed. The prosecution appealed by leave granted,
and the Court of Appeals, S
ERVITTO
,P.J., and F
ITZGERALD
and
T
ALBOT
, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion,
issued December 19, 2006 (Docket No. 261382). The Supreme
Court ordered oral argument on whether to grant the prosecu-
tion’s application for leave to appeal or take other peremptory
action and directed the parties to address whether Burton should
be overruled. 478 Mich 875 (2007).
In an opinion by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, joined by Justices
C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
The plain language of MRE 803(2) does not require that a
startling event or condition be established solely with evidence
independent of an out-of-court statement before the out-of-court
statement may be admitted as an excited utterance. Rather, MRE
104(a) and MRE 1101(b)(1) allow a court making a determination
under MRE 803(2) about the existence of a startling event or
condition to consider the out-of-court statement itself, along with
other evidence, in concluding whether the startling event or
condition has been established. The Burton Court erred by apply-
ing an incorrect understanding of the requirements of MRE
802(2). Burton must be overruled to the extent that it held that a
court could not consider the statement itself along with evidence
independent of the statement to decide admissibility. The victim’s
statements in this case were admissible as excited utterances.
2008] P
EOPLE V
B
ARRETT
125
Justice W
EAVER
, concurring, agreed with the result of the
majority opinion for the reasons stated in part V of that opinion
and those stated in Justice B
OYLE
’s dissent in Burton.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Justice C
AVANAGH
, joined by Justice K
ELLY
, dissenting, would
not overrule Burton because it is a prudent decision that defends
the integrity of the evidence admitted in courts. Burton was not
decided incorrectly, but properly sought to effectuate the intent of
the body that formulated MRE 803(2) by applying a reasonable
construction that promoted the provision’s purpose, using inter-
pretations of its common-law predecessor and analogous common-
law hearsay provisions. The foundational elements of the excited
utterance exception are that the statement related to the startling
event or condition and that the same event or condition to which
the statement related caused the declarant’s excitement. The
requirement of independent proof of the startling event or condi-
tion ensures that these foundational elements are met and that
admission of the statement furthers the exception’s underlying
rationale. If no evidence of the nature of the startling event or
condition exists other than the statement itself, it is impossible to
prove these requirements. There is no inconsistency between the
independent-proof requirement and MRE 104(a), because MRE
803(2) fundamentally requires independent proof. A court could
still consider other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether
to admit a statement under MRE 803(2). The content of the
statement itself would be excluded only from the court’s determi-
nation concerning the need for independent proof of the startling
event or condition. The majority’s approach will permit a state-
ment to bootstrap itself into admissibility and permit the admis-
sion of statements that do not carry the inherent trustworthiness
sought by the exception. Furthermore, Burton bars admission only
in the most extreme cases: those in which insufficient independent
evidence of the underlying startling event or condition exists. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
E
VIDENCE —
H
EARSAY —
E
XCITED
U
TTERANCE
E
XCEPTION —
I
NDEPENDENT
P
ROOF
OF
S
TARTLING
E
VENT OR
C
ONDITION
.
The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule does not require
that a startling event or condition be established solely with
evidence independent of an out-of-court statement before the
out-of-court statement that relates to the startling event or
condition may be admitted, and a court may consider the state-
ment itself, along with other evidence, in determining whether the
startling event or condition has been established (MRE 104[a],
803[2], 1101[b][1]).
126 480 M
ICH
125 [Apr
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, David L. Morse, Prosecuting Attor-
ney, and William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., Assistant Pros-
ecuting Attorney, for the people.
Patrick K. Ehlmann for the defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
Charles H. Koop, K ym L. Worthy, and Timothy A.
Baughman for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of
Michigan.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. At issue in this case is whether MRE
803(2),
1
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule, requires as a prerequisite to the admission of an
out-of-court statement that a startling event or condi-
tion be established without considering the out-of-court
statement itself. We conclude that the plain language of
the rule, when applied as instructed by MRE
1101(b)(1)
2
and MRE 104(a),
3
allows the court to con-
1
MRE 803(2) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
***
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition.
2
MRE 1101(b)(1) provides:
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules [of evidence] other than those
with respect to privileges do not apply in the following situations
and proceedings:
(1) Preliminary Questions of Fact. The determination of ques-
tions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the
issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 104(a).
3
MRE 104(a) provides:
2008] P
EOPLE V
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ARRETT
127
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sider the statement along with other evidence to prove
the existence of a startling event or condition. Accord-
ingly, we overrule People v Burton, 433 Mich 268; 445
NW2d 133 (1989), to the extent that it held that the
statement itself could not be considered along with the
independent evidence to decide admissibility. This ex-
clusion of any consideration of the statement was an
incorrect understanding of the requirements of MRE
803(2). For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and the order of the trial court that
relied on Burton, and we remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On May 17, 2004, Suzanne Bartel, defendant’s long-
time, live-in girlfriend, pounded on her neighbors’ door,
said that defendant was chasing her with an ax, and
asked to use their phone. She was hysterical and crying.
Her hysteria continued as she reported to the 911
operator that defendant had kicked the door in, beaten
her, tried to strangle her, and brandished a hatchet. At
one point, the 911 operator advised her to calm down
and gain control of her breathing. Bartel informed the
911 operator that defendant had told her never to call
the police or he would kill her.
When the first responding officer arrived, Bartel
similarly told him that defendant had punched a hole in
the bedroom door, pinned her to the bed, and begun
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b). In making its determination it is not bound by the Rules of
Evidence except those with respect to privileges.
128 480 M
ICH
125 [Apr
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hitting her face; shortly afterward, defendant had
picked up a hatchet, grabbed her around the neck,
raised the hatchet, and said he was going to kill her. The
officer observed that Bartel was so agitated that she
could not sit down and that it was apparent that Bartel
had been crying. When he and other officers searched
Bartel’s house, they found the hatchet in the house and
a 12-inch hole in one of the doors. The officers observed
marks on Bartel’s shoulders and one arm and a cut on
the inside of her mouth.
Defendant was charged with domestic assault (sec-
ond offense) and felonious assault. At the preliminary
examination, Bartel refused to testify. Faced with the
prospect of a dismissal of the charges because of insuf-
ficient proofs, the prosecuting attorney attempted to
have admitted, as excited utterances under the hearsay
4
exception provided in MRE 803(2), the statements
Bartel made to the 911 operator, one of the neighbors,
and the police officer. The defense countered that
Burton requires that the startling event be established
by evidence solely apart from an excited utterance
before the excited utterance can be admitted and that
insufficient independent evidence had been offered in
this case. The examining magistrate agreed with defen-
dant that Burton’s requirements for independent evi-
dence of the assault had not been met and thus dis-
missed the charges. The prosecution appealed in the
circuit court, asserting that MRE 803(2), as written,
does not require that the startling event be established
only with evidence independent of the statement itself
and that the Burton Court had unwarrantedly read the
requirement into the rule. The circuit court affirmed on
4
A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement made by someone
other than a declarant at trial and offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. MRE 801(c).
2008] P
EOPLE V
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ARRETT
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the basis of Burton, and the prosecution then sought
leave to file an appeal in the Court of Appeals, again
arguing that Burton had been incorrectly decided. The
Court of Appeals heard the case and concluded that,
whatever the merits of the prosecution’s argument, it
had no authority to revise or alter in any fashion a
decision of the Supreme Court.
5
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court,
and we ordered oral argument on whether to grant the
application and directed the parties to address whether
Burton should be overruled. People v Barrett, 478 Mich
875 (2007).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether MRE 803(2) contains a requirement that
the startling event or condition be established without
consideration of the statement itself is a question of law,
which is reviewed de novo. Waknin v Chamberlain, 467
Mich 329, 332; 653 NW2d 176 (2002) (stating that the
meaning of a Michigan rule of evidence is examined in
the same manner as a court rule or statute is examined:
they all present questions of law, which are reviewed de
novo).
III. ANALYSIS
Evidentiary rulings in Michigan courts are controlled
by the Michigan Rules of Evidence, which this Court
adopted in 1978. When we adopted the rules of evi-
dence, they were closely patterned after the Federal
Rules of Evidence, People v Kreiner, 415 Mich 372, 378;
329 NW2d 716 (1982), but we did not adopt all the
federal rules verbatim. One that we adopted verbatim
5
People v Barrett, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued December 19, 2006 (Docket No. 261382).
130 480 M
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125 [Apr
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was MRE 803(2), the excited utterance rule at issue in
this case. Both the federal and state versions of the rule
state simply that, although hearsay, a statement will
not be excluded by the hearsay rule if it is “[a] state-
ment relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.”
Thus, while both rules require that there be a star-
tling event or condition, they indisputably do not pre-
clude consideration of the statement itself for the
purpose of establishing the startling event or condition.
Nevertheless, in 1989, the Burton Court, over the
dissent of Justice B
OYLE
and without invoking the
rules-amendment process,
6
concluded that a proffered
excited utterance could not be used to satisfy the
6
The amendment process, as outlined in MCR 1.201, provides:
(A) Notice of Proposed Amendment. Before amending the
Michigan Court Rules or other sets of rules within its jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court will notify the secretary of the State Bar of
Michigan and the state court administrator of the proposed
amendment, and the manner and date for submitting comments.
The notice also will be posted on the Court’s website, www.supre-
mecourt.state.mi.us.
(B) Notice to Bar. The state bar secretary shall notify the
appropriate state bar committees or sections of the proposed
amendment, and the manner and date for submitting comments.
Unless otherwise directed by the Court, the proposed amendment
shall be published in the Michigan Bar Journal.
(C) Notice to Judges. The state court administrator shall notify
the presidents of the Michigan Judges Association, the Michigan
District Judges Association, and the Michigan Probate and Juve-
nile Court Judges Association of the proposed amendment, and the
manner and date for submitting comments.
(D) Exceptions. The Court may modify or dispense with the
notice requirements of this rule if it determines that there is a
need for immediate action or if the proposed amendment would
not significantly affect the delivery of justice.
2008] P
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ARRETT
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conditions for its own admissibility. Burton, supra at
294. In reaching this conclusion, the Burton Court
initially focused on the notion that there must be
evidence independent of the statement itself to estab-
lish the existence of a startling event or condition before
the statement could be admitted as an excited utter-
ance.
7
We deal with a situation in this case for which
there clearly was independent evidence to corroborate
the existence of the startling event or condition.
8
There-
fore, we do not need to reach the question whether the
statement standing alone could supply the evidence of
the startling event.
9
(E) Administrative Public Hearings. The Court will conduct a
public hearing pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order
1997-11 before acting on a proposed amendment that requires
notice, unless there is a need for immediate action, in which event
the amendment will be considered at a public hearing following
adoption. Public hearing agendas will be posted on the Court’s
website.
7
The Burton Court relied on a passage in Rogers v Saginaw-Bay City
RCo, 187 Mich 490, 494-495; 153 NW 784 (1915), in which the Rogers
Court held that a decedent’s statement could not be used to establish its
own spontaneity because the statement had not yet been admitted.
Burton, supra at 280-281. Because Rogers was decided before MRE
104(a) was adopted, and MRE 104(a) effectively superseded the Rogers
decision, this Court’s adoption of MRE 104(a) essentially rejected the
reasoning in Rogers. Thus, the Burton Court’s reliance on Rogers 11
years after the adoption of MRE 104(a) was in error.
8
There was a plethora of independent evidence indicating that Bartel
had been exposed to a startling event or condition, namely, the neighbor’s
testimony that Bartel pounded frantically on the neighbors’ door, Bar-
tel’s panicked state when speaking to the 911 operator, the responding
officer’s observation that Bartel was so hysterical when he arrived that
she could not sit down, the hatchet inside the house, the 12-inch hole in
one of the doors, the marks on Bartel’s shoulders and arm, and the cut
inside her mouth.
9
Concerning that question, the 1972 advisory committee’s notes to
FRE 803(2) indicated in relevant part that “[w]hether proofofthe
startling event may be made by the statement itself is largely an academic
132 480 M
ICH
125 [Apr
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Instead, we focus on Burton’s wholesale preclusion
of the use of the statement to establish the existence
of the startling event or condition. The Burton Court,
without any citation to authority and, in fact, ignor-
ing the significance of the other rules of evidence we
have cited here, stated: “[T]he excited utterance
must not be used to substantiate the event from
which the utterance must be shown to have arisen. In
order to guard against this ‘bootstrapping,’ we must
determine whether the nonexcited-utterance evi-
dence independently furnishes proof of the underly-
ing event.” Id. at 295.
It is this unsupported notion that is the subject of
controversy in the instant case, and it is with this notion
that we take issue precisely because of the Burton Court’s
failure to recognize and follow established rules of evi-
dence that had guided the prevailing practice of determin-
ing evidentiary admissibility for the 11 years preceding
the Burton decision. Of particular importance in the
context of excited utterances are MRE 1101(b)(1) and
MRE 104(a). MRE 1101(b)(1) provides:
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules [of evidence] other
than those with respect to privileges do not apply in the
following situations and proceedings:
(1) Preliminary Questions of Fact. The determination of
questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence
when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule
104(a).
Clearly, the existence of a startling event or condition
is a question of fact that a trial court must decide before
it may admit a statement under MRE 803(2) as an
excited utterance. Thus, MRE 1101(b)(1) directs the
question, since in most cases there is present at least circumstantial
evidence that something of a startling nature must have occurred.”
(Emphasis in original.)
2008] P
EOPLE V
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ARRETT
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court to comply with MRE 104(a) when deciding
whether a startling event or condition exists. And MRE
104(a), which, like MRE 803(2), is identical to its federal
counterpart, FRE 104(a), provides:
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary ques-
tions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it
is not bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with
respect to privileges. [Emphasis added.]
Had the Burton Court read MRE 1101(b)(1) and
MRE 104(a) together and applied those rules to its
interpretation of MRE 803(2), as it was constrained to
do, the Court would have come to the inescapable
conclusion, as we do now, that a trial court may consider
any evidence regardless of that evidence’s admissibility
at trial, as long as the evidence is not privileged, in
determining whether the evidence proffered for admis-
sion at trial is admissible. In the context of an excited
utterance, then, this means that even though an out-
of-court statement may not be admitted at trial without
adequate indicia of reliability, i.e., the existence of a
startling event or condition, the trial court can consider
the statement when determining whether the indicia of
reliability have been met, i.e., that the startling event or
condition has been established.
Although the Burton Court referred to MRE 104(a)
when it stated that “a trial judge ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence need not confine his review to
admissible evidence only” under this rule, Burton,
supra at 295, the Court inexplicably declined to allow
the consideration of an excited utterance itself on the
ground that to do so would allow a hearsay statement to
be lifted “ ‘ “by its bootstraps to the level of competent
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ICH
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evidence,” ’ ” id. at 281-282, quoting People v Vega, 413
Mich 773, 780; 321 NW2d 675 (1982), quoting Glasser v
United States, 315 US 60, 75; 62 S Ct 457; 86 L Ed 680
(1942), even though such a result was permissible
under MRE 104(a).
10
The problem with relying on Vega, which relied on
Glasser for the proposition that an inadmissible state-
ment may not bootstrap its way into admissibility, is
that just as Rogers v Saginaw-Bay City R Co, 187 Mich
490; 153 NW 784 (1915), was decided before the Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence were adopted, Glasser was de-
cided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted. And the adoption of these rules changed the
process governing a trial court’s admissibility determi-
nations.
In Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171, 178; 107 S
Ct 2775; 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court considered the continued viability of
Glasser’s bootstrapping analysis in light of the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and concluded
that to the extent that Glasser was inconsistent with
10
The dissent acknowledges that “[t]he court [is] free under MRE
104(a) to consider other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether
to admit a statement under MRE 803(2),” but states that the court
may not consider the statement itself. Post at 145. However, the
dissent does not explain why MRE 104(a) allows the court to consider
any evidence, including inadmissible evidence, but not the statement
sought to be admitted. Similarly, the dissent contends that “while
MRE 104(a) provides that the court is not bound by the rules of
evidence while making determinations concerning admissibility, MRE
104(a) does not permit the court to disregard the criteria for admis-
sibility inherent in the rule of evidence under consideration.” Post at
145 . This statement makes no sense: MRE 104(a) provides that the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence while making admissibility
determinations, but the court is bound by MRE 803(2). Either the
court is bound by the rules of evidence when making admissibility
determinations or it is not. The dissent cannot have it both ways.
2008] P
EOPLE V
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ARRETT
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FRE 104, which is identical to MRE 104, Glasser was
overruled. The Court specifically held that “a court, in
making a preliminary factual determination under
[FRE] 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the hearsay state-
ments sought to be admitted.” Bourjaily, supra at 181.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
FRE 104 on its face permits the trial court to “consider
any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of
privilege.” Id. at 178. Nevertheless, even though Bour-
jaily overruled the very same proposition that Burton
relied on, and even though Burton was decided two
years after Bourjaily, the Burton Court chose to follow
overruled precedent rather than follow the guidance
provided by the United States Supreme Court.
11
11
Vega, Glasser, and Bourjaily all involved the admission of a cocon-
spirator’s statement against a defendant. At the time Bourjaily was
decided, FRE 801(d)(2)(E) did not provide, as MRE 801(d)(2)(E) did, that
the conspiracy must be established with independent proof. In 1997, 10
years after the Bourjaily decision, FRE 801(d)(2)(E) was amended to
provide that “[t]he contents of the statement shall be considered but are
not alone sufficient to establish...theexistence of the conspiracy and
the participation therein....”According to the relevant portion of the
1997 advisory committee’s notes,
[FRE] 801(d)(2) has been amended in order to respond to three
issues raised by [Bourjaily]. First, the amendment codifies the
holding in Bourjaily by stating expressly that a court shall
consider the contents of a coconspirator’s statement in determin-
ing “the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein
of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is
offered.” According to Bourjaily, [FRE] 104(a) requires these
preliminary questions to be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Second, the amendment resolves an issue on which the Court
has reserved decision. It provides that the contents of the
declarant’s statement do not alone suffice to establish a conspiracy
in which the declarant and the defendant participated. The court
must consider in addition the circumstances surrounding the
statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which
the statement was made, or evidence corroborating the contents of
136 480 M
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125 [Apr
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Properly understood then, MRE 104(a) permits a
trial court to consider any evidence, unless it implicates
a privilege, when making preliminary determinations
concerning the admissibility of proffered evidence, and
MRE 803(2), when applied in accordance with MRE
104(a), does not premise the admissibility of an excited
utterance on the proponent’s ability to establish the
existence of a startling event or condition without
considering the utterance itself. In the instant case,
Bartel’s statement to her neighbor that defendant was
chasing her with an ax; her statements to the 911
operator that defendant had kicked the door down,
beaten her, tried to strangle her, and threatened her
with a hatchet; and her similar statements to the
responding police officer, as corroborated by the neigh-
bor’s observation that Bartel was hysterical and crying,
the transcript of the 911 call in which the operator
advised Bartel to calm down and gain control of her
breathing, the first responding officer’s observation
the statement in making its determination as to each preliminary
question. This amendment is in accordance with existing practice.
Every court of appeals that has resolved this issue requires some
evidence in addition to the contents of the statement. [Citations
omitted.]
The dissent claims that “[t]he amendment...indicatedaprevailing
policy against allowing the type of bootstrapping that the majority’s
approach will permit in the context of MRE 803(2).” Post at 148. This is
clearly incorrect, given that the amended version of FRE 801(d)(2)
expressly states that “[t]he contents of the statement shall be consid-
ered....”Thedissent also suggests that we are permitting a statement
to serve as the only proof of a startling event or condition. Post at 146. In
doing so, the dissent asserts that “Burton provides a modest protection
against admitting unsupported hearsay statements when there is no
other independent evidence establishing that the underlying event oc-
curred.” Post at 150 (emphasis in the original). As explained on p 132 of
this opinion, given the plethora of independent evidence in this case, “we
do not need to reach the question whether the statement standing alone
could supply the evidence of the startling event.”
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ARRETT
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OURT
that Bartel was so agitated that she could not sit
down and that she had been crying, the hatchet in the
house, a 12-inch hole in one of the doors, the marks
on her shoulders and arm, and the cut on the inside of
her mouth, all support that hers were excited utter-
ances pertaining to a startling event or condition.
Thus, the out-of-court statements were admissible
under the excited utterance exception to the rule
against hearsay.
IV. STARE DECISIS
In assessing whether to overrule a prior decision,
we must consider whether the earlier decision was
incorrectly decided and whether overruling the deci-
sion would work an undue hardship because of reli-
ance interests or expectations that have arisen. Rob-
inson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 465-466; 613 NW2d 307
(2000). For the reasons previously discussed, we
conclude that Burton was incorrectly decided. “As to
the reliance interest, the Court must ask whether the
previous decision has become so embedded, so ac-
cepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations
that to change it would produce not just readjust-
ments, but practical real-world dislocations.” Id. at
466. The decision in Burton has not become so
fundamental that overruling it will interfere with any
legitimate reliance or expectation interests. “[T]o
have reliance the knowledge must be of the sort that
causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his
conduct to a certain norm before the triggering
event.” Id. at 467. The Burton Court’s decision can-
not be said to have caused people to alter their
conduct in any way. Therefore, overruling Burton will
create no “practical real-world dislocations.”
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V. CONCLUSION
The plain language of MRE 803(2), the excited utter-
ance exception to the hearsay rule, does not require that a
startling event or condition be established solely with
evidence independent of an out-of-court statement before
the out-of-court statement may be admitted. Rather, MRE
1101(b)(1) and MRE 104(a) instruct that when a trial
court makes a determination under MRE 803(2) about the
existence of a startling event or condition, the court may
consider the out-of-court statement itself in concluding
whether the startling event or condition has been estab-
lished. Because Burton failed to consider MRE 1101(b)(1)
and MRE 104(a) when interpreting MRE 803(2), it
reached the wrong result and must be overruled with
respect to this issue. Because the lower courts in this case
relied on Burton, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and the order of the trial court, and we remand
this case to the trial court for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court.
C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred with
T
AYLOR
, C.J.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the result of the
majority opinion for the reasons stated in part V of the
opinion and for the reasons stated in Justice B
OYLE
’s
dissent in People v Burton, 433 Mich 268, 305; 445
NW2d 133 (1989).
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I
would not overrule People v Burton, 433 Mich 268; 445
NW2d 133 (1989), because it is a prudent decision that
defends the integrity of the evidence we admit in our
courts.
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EOPLE V
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ARRETT
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PINIONS BY
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EAVER AND
C
AVANAGH
,JJ.
Overruling precedent is a grave measure that should
occur only after serious consideration. Before this Court
overrules a deliberately made decision, it should be
convinced not only that the case was incorrectly de-
cided, but also that overruling it will cause less injury
than following it. McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich
172, 178; 98 NW 1006 (1904). In deciding whether to
overrule established precedent, this Court must exam-
ine whether (1) the earlier case was incorrectly decided,
(2) the earlier case defies practical workability, (3)
reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the
earlier case were overruled, and (4) changes in the law
or facts no longer justify the earlier decision. Robinson
v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464-465; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
In light of these factors, I am convinced that Burton
should not be overruled. In particular, I believe that the
first Robinson factor weighs strongly against overruling
Burton and its rule that a startling event or condition
must be established by independent proof before a
statement emanating from the event or condition may
be admitted under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule.
The Federal Rules of Evidence codified a number of
exceptions to the hearsay rule that had been recognized
at common law. The advisory committee’s notes to FRE
803 described the rule as a synthesis of common-law
hearsay exceptions, “with revision where modern devel-
opments and conditions are believed to make that
course appropriate.” In 1978, Michigan adopted the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, MRE
803(2), stating that it was identical with FRE 803(2). At
the time we adopted the Michigan Rules of Evidence,
whether MRE 803(2) and FRE 803(2) required indepen-
dent proof of the startling event was an unsettled
question. The advisory committee’s notes to FRE
803(2) declined to resolve the issue “[w]hether proof of
140 480 M
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AVANAGH
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the startling event may be made by the statement
itself,” dismissing it as “largely an academic ques-
tion....”
Accordingly, when this issue arose in Burton, this
Court was addressing an unsettled question of law that
was a matter of first impression in Michigan.
1
We stated
that “the specific question in this case—whether [a
proffered excited utterance] may establish the underly-
ing startling event—has not been considered by Michi-
gan courts....” Burton, supra at 280. The Burton
Court properly sought to effectuate the intent of the
formulating body by applying a reasonable construction
that promoted the purpose of the provision. In discern-
ing the intent of the formulating body, we appropriately
interpreted MRE 803(2) consistently with Michigan
cases that had applied its common-law predecessor.
In particular, Burton consulted Rogers v Saginaw-
Bay City R Co, 187 Mich 490; 153 NW 784 (1915), a case
that predated the Michigan Rules of Evidence but
addressed the common-law spontaneous exclamation
exception to the hearsay rule, which was analogous to
MRE 803(2). Statements were admissible under the
spontaneous exclamation exception if they met three
conditions:
(1) that there is a startling occasion, startling enough to
produce nervous excitement, and render the utterance
1
Because the issue was one of first impression in Michigan and the
advisory committee’s notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence indicated
that courts had come to different conclusions, this Court was well within
its authority to adopt the position that MRE 803(2) requires independent
proof of the underlying startling event or condition. I disagree with the
majority’s assertion that this Court was required to invoke the amend-
ment process rather than holding in Burton that MRE 803(2) required
independent proof of the startling event or condition. The independent-
proof requirement is consistent with the language of MRE 803(2) and
was not a departure from previous Michigan law.
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AVANAGH
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spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) that the statement must
have been made before there has been time to contrive and
misrepresent; and (3) the statement must relate to the
circumstances of the occurrence preceding it. [Rogers,
supra at 494, citing 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1750 et seq.]
[2]
Rogers involved a wrongful-death action in which the
decedent was allegedly injured by the negligent opera-
tion of a street car. Rogers, supra at 491. The only
witness to the apparent incident was the decedent
himself, so the case hinged on the admission of the
decedent’s statements to his son. The son witnessed his
father limping home with a drawn face, so he asked his
father what was the matter. Id. at 492. The son prof-
fered testimony that the decedent told him that “ ‘while
he was in the act of alighting from the car one foot was
on the running board and the other foot was nearly on
the ground, and the car started and threw him to the
pavement on his right hip.’ ” Id. at 492-493. The issue
presented was whether the decedent’s statement fit
within the hearsay exception that permitted the admis-
sion of spontaneous exclamations. Id. at 493.
This Court held that the proffered statement failed to
meet the second condition—that the statement must
have been made before there has been time to contrive
and misrepresent. Rogers asked, “[H]ow can the second
condition be met without direct and independent evi-
dence of the time of the startling occasion with refer-
2
These conditions are virtually identical to the criteria for admissibil-
ity of statements under MRE 803(2), which are derived from the text of
the exception:
To come within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule, a statement must meet three criteria: (1) it must arise out of
a startling occasion; (2) it must be made before there has been time
to contrive and misrepresent; and (3) it must relate to the
circumstances of the startling occasion. [People v Gee, 406 Mich
279, 282; 278 NW2d 304 (1979) (citations omitted).]
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ence to the making of the statement?” Id. at 494. In
other words, the foundation of the spontaneous excla-
mation exception required independent evidence of the
statement’s temporal relationship to the event to show
that the statement arose spontaneously from the event.
In rejecting the notion that a statement alone could
establish its own spontaneity for the purpose of this
hearsay exception, Rogers illustrates our historical pro-
hibition of the admission of hearsay evidence and
disinclination to permit the circular practice of relying
solely on the content of the statement to establish its
foundation for admissibility. Notably, Rogers actually
required independent proof that the event and the
statement were so closely related in time as to establish
that the statement was a spontaneous reaction to the
event. Rogers recognized that the independent-proof
requirement was necessary to meet the foundational
elements of the exception. The foundational elements of
a hearsay exception ensure that admission of the state-
ment would fulfill the fundamental rationale of the
exception.
Using the same reasoning, Burton determined that
the first and third conditions of the excited utterance
exception—that a statement arose out of a startling
event or condition and related to the circumstances of
the startling occasion—require proof independent of
the content of the statement itself. Just as in Rogers,
the independent-proof requirement in Burton ensures
that the foundational elements of the exception are met
and that admission of the statement furthers the un-
derlying rationale of the exception.
The foundational elements of the excited utterance
exception embody its underlying rationale—the reason
why, although it is hearsay, a statement is deemed
trustworthy enough for admission. It is widely accepted
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that the “premise underlying the exception for excited
utterances is that a person under the influence of
excitement precipitated by an external startling event
will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabri-
cation. Thus, any utterance made under such circum-
stances will be spontaneous and trustworthy.” 5 Wein-
stein, Federal Evidence (2d ed), § 803.04[1], pp 803-18.1
to 803-19. The excited utterance exception is based on
the principle that hearsay statements are only suffi-
ciently reliable when they are spontaneous reactions to
a startling event or condition. But the exception does
not encompass any statement arising from any startling
occasion. Only a statement “relating to a startling event
or condition” is admissible under the exception. MRE
803(2) (emphasis added). “The statement need not
elucidate or explain the occurrence in order to qualify as
an excited utterance. It must, however, relate to the
event in some manner.” 5 Weinstein, § 803.04[5], p
803-29. In addition, at the time the statement is made,
the declarant must be “under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.” MRE 803(2) (empha-
sis added). The excited utterance exception, therefore,
specifically requires that the statement related to the
startling event or condition and that the same event or
condition to which the statement related caused the
declarant’s excitement. These two foundational ele-
ments are precisely why Burton’s independent-proof
requirement is invoked. The proponent of the evidence
must show that the statement satisfies the foundational
elements of the excited utterance exception. If there is
no independent evidence of the nature of the startling
event or condition, it is impossible to adequately prove
that the statement related to the starting event or
condition or to establish that the occasion caused the
declarant’s excitement.
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AVANAGH
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The majority claims that Burton’s independent-proof
requirement is inconsistent with MRE 104(a). I dis-
agree. The independent-proof requirement can be ap-
plied along with MRE 104(a) because independently
establishing the existence of the startling event or
condition is fundamental to the elements of MRE
803(2). This Court determined in Burton that the
independent-proof requirement is integral to the foun-
dational elements of the exception; thus, the relevant
preliminary factual question for purposes of determin-
ing admissibility is whether a statement arose out of
and related to a startling occasion for which there is
independent evidence. As such, there is no inconsis-
tency between the independent-proof requirement and
the latitude that MRE 104(a) gives a trial court to
consider inadmissible evidence in resolving preliminary
questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. The
court would still be free under MRE 104(a) to consider
other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether to
admit a statement under MRE 803(2); the content of
the statement itself would be excluded only from the
court’s determination of whether independent proof of
the startling event or condition exists. In sum, while
MRE 104(a) provides that the court is not bound by the
rules of evidence while making determinations concern-
ing admissibility, MRE 104(a) does not permit the court
to disregard the criteria for admissibility inherent in
the rule of evidence under consideration.
The majority’s approach elevates MRE 104(a) over
the other rules of evidence by concluding that MRE
104(a) grants the court unfettered authority to consider
any evidence, aside from privileged evidence, while
ignoring that the foundational requirements of the rule
under consideration can direct what evidence the court
may consider in making determinations concerning
admissibility. The majority accuses me of trying to
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EOPLE V
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ARRETT
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AVANAGH
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“have it both ways” by asserting that the court is not
bound by the rules of evidence while making admissi-
bility determinations, but is bound by MRE 803(2).
Ante at 135 n 10. But the majority fails to recognize that
the fundamental duty that MRE 104(a) entails is deter-
mining admissibility under the rules of evidence. MRE
104(a) permits the court to consider inadmissible evi-
dence in making determinations concerning admissibil-
ity, but it does not excuse the court from ensuring that,
ultimately, the conditions for admissibility are met. In
this case, the content of the statement is not excluded
from consideration because it is inadmissible hearsay
under the rules of evidence; it is excluded because
independent proof of the startling event or condition is
fundamentally required to establish admissibility under
MRE 803(2).
The majority dismisses the suggestion that its opin-
ion will permit a statement to bootstrap itself into
admissibility by allowing the statement alone to estab-
lish a startling event or condition. Though declining to
reach the question, the majority cannot conceal that the
natural extension of its construction of MRE 104(a) and
MRE 803(2) would allow such bootstrapping. The ma-
jority suggests that if this Court had interpreted MRE
104(a) and MRE 803(2) properly in Burton, it would
have followed Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171;
107 S Ct 2775; 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987), which held that
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence abrogated
the prohibition against bootstrapping in the context of
admissions by coconspirators. Ante at 135-136. Given
that the majority opinion endorses applying Bourjaily
to MRE 803(2), it is notable that both the majority and
Bourjaily shy away from addressing the disturbing
consequence of their rulings. The majority states that
“we do not need to reach the question whether the
statement standing alone could supply the evidence of
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the startling event.” Ante at 132. Similarly, in Bourjaily,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
court may consider an alleged coconspirator’s state-
ments in determining whether the statements are ad-
missible as a party admission under FRE 801(d)(2)(E).
Bourjaily, supra at 178-179. However, the Court de-
clined to resolve whether an alleged coconspirator’s
statements could, by themselves, satisfy the propo-
nent’s burden, stating that “[w]e need not decide in this
case whether the courts below could have relied solely
upon [the declarant’s] hearsay statements to determine
that a conspiracy had been established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.” Id. at 181. Thus, the Court left
open the issue whether some independent proof of the
conspiracy was required.
But it is apparent from their reaction to Bourjaily
that the United States Judicial Conference, the Court,
and Congress understood that Bourjaily’s ruling would
logically permit bootstrapping under FRE 801(d)(2)(E).
Significantly, in response to Bourjaily, these bodies
proposed and approved an amendment of FRE
801(d)(2)(E).
3
The rule was amended to provide that the
“contents of the statement shall be considered but are
not alone sufficient to establish . . . the existence of the
conspiracy and the participation therein of the
declarant and the party against whom the statement is
offered....”(Emphasis added.) The advisory commit-
tee’s notes observed that the amendment accorded with
existing practice, because every court of appeals that
had addressed the issue required some evidence in
addition to the contents of the statement. The amend-
ment of FRE 801(d)(2)(E) in response to Bourjaily
3
The advisory committee’s notes to the 1997 amendment of FRE
801(d)(2)(E) stated: “Rule 801(d)(2) has been amended in order to
respond to three issues raised by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987).”
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EOPLE V
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reflected the recognition that Bourjaily’s reasoning—on
which the majority’s opinion relies—opened the door to
bootstrapping; otherwise, it would not have been neces-
sary to add an explicit protection against bootstrapping to
FRE 801(d)(2). The amendment also indicated a prevail-
ing policy against allowing the type of bootstrapping that
the majority’s approach will permit in the context of MRE
803(2).
Moreover, the amendment makes clear that FRE
104(a) does not permit the court to overlook the foun-
dational requirements of the particular rule of evidence
under consideration. In other words, if the foundational
elements of a rule of evidence prohibit the court from
relying on a particular piece of evidence, FRE 104(a)
does not override the rule and grant the court authority
to rely on the prohibited evidence. Accordingly, there is
no contradiction between MRE 104(a) and Burton’s
independent-proof rule because MRE 803(2) fundamen-
tally requires independent proof of the startling event
or condition.
The majority’s rule will undoubtedly permit the
admission of statements under this exception that do
not meet its criteria and, consequently, do not carry the
inherent trustworthiness sought by the exception.
Without independent evidence of the startling event or
condition, there will be inadequate proof that the state-
ment related to the startling event or condition and that
the declarant’s excitement was caused by the same
event or condition referred to in the statement.
Burton illustrates the peril of operating without
independent proof of the event, thereby neglecting
these criteria. In Burton, a police officer encountered a
woman “running down the street wearing a twisted
dress and no shoes, looking over her shoulder as if
someone might be pursuing her.” Burton, supra at 272.
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The officer stopped and let her into his squad car, where
she reported that she had been sexually assaulted by
defendant Burton when she had gone with an acquain-
tance to Burton’s house. Id. at 272-273. She stated that
she had escaped by asking permission to use the bath-
room, then using the opportunity to pull her dress on
and run out of the house. Id. at 274. The woman’s trial
testimony provided an entirely different account of
events. She testified that she had accompanied an
acquaintance to Burton’s house, where she expected to
be paid for having sex with Burton. After she disrobed,
she requested money from Burton, but he refused and
accused her of having taken money from him. They got
into a heated argument, prompting Burton to slap her.
She got angry, cried, and ran out, expecting Burton to
come after her and try to talk to her. Id. She testified
that she decided to tell the police that Burton had raped
her in order to get back at him for having slapped her.
Id. at 275. At trial, Burton objected to the admission of
the woman’s original statements to the police officer
under the excited utterance exception. We held that the
statements were inadmissible without independent
proof that the purported startling event—a sexual
assault—took place. Id. at 294. We found that the
independent evidence—the woman’s demeanor, physi-
cal condition, and appearance at the time of the state-
ment; Burton’s attempt to remove the woman’s shoes
and panties from his house; the discovery of the wom-
an’s brassiere in the house; and the testimony of the
other eyewitness—only established at most a stressful
event with sexual overtones. Id. at 297-298.
Burton provides an excellent illustration of the ne-
cessity of proving with independent evidence the exist-
ence of a startling event or condition. Burton presented
two potentially startling events according to two differ-
ent versions of facts: either a sexual assault or an act of
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ARRETT
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AVANAGH
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prostitution turned assault. Either event could explain the
declarant’s demeanor, disarray, and presence at the defen-
dant’s home, but only one version of events supported the
content of the declarant’s statements. The concern ad-
dressed by Burton was not that a declarant might wholly
invent a startling event and feign agitation; it was that a
declarant who had been legitimately agitated by an event
could make a statement reflecting an entirely different
event. Without independent evidence of the underlying
event, the statement could not adequately prove two of
the conditions for admissibility under the excited utter-
ance exception: that the statement related to the event
and that the declarant’s excitement was caused by that
very event. The declarant’s agitation could have been
caused by an actual startling event, but if the declarant’s
statement reflected a different startling event, the state-
ment did not “relate to” the actual startling event, and
thus failed a necessary condition for admissibility. Fur-
ther, in such a case, the declarant’s excitement would not
have been caused by the same event that was reflected in
the statement, which is also a condition for admissibility.
It is rarely disputed that some kind of startling event or
condition has occurred in cases like Burton and the
instant case. Independent evidence of some startling
event or condition will usually be apparent from the
declarant’s demeanor. But the criteria for the excited
utterance exception demand more than just any startling
occasion—they require that the statement had a certain
relationship with the particular event or condition that
caused the excitement. And given that the hearsay state-
ment is presumptively unreliable before it meets the
criteria, it cannot alone establish the other criteria.
In practice, Burton provides a modest protection
against admitting unsupported hearsay statements
when there is no other independent evidence establish-
ing that the underlying event occurred. Burton bars
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admission only in the most extreme cases, when there
is insufficient independent evidence of the underlying
startling event or condition. In such cases, these
proffered statements might be considered particu-
larly valuable evidence, as they perhaps comprise the
only proof of a criminal act; but, for the same reason,
they are the most dangerous evidence if they are
allowed to supply their own foundation for admissi-
bility. As a rule that guards against the admission of
untrustworthy evidence in rare cases, Burton should
not be overruled.
In sum, Burton was not incorrectly decided. Burton’s
independent-proof requirement is compelled by the
plain language of MRE 803(2) and the rationale of the
excited utterance exception. It was consistent with our
treatment of the analogous common-law spontaneous
exclamation exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover,
the independent-proof requirement does not contradict
MRE 104(a); it simply requires a court to abide by the
foundational elements of MRE 803(2).
I believe that Burton should not be overruled, given
the strength of the first Robinson factor: Burton was
not incorrectly decided. To complete the Robinson
analysis, Burton’s independent-proof requirement does
not defy practical workability; it simply requires a trial
court to make a specific evidentiary finding. Reliance
interests do not appear to be significantly involved here,
except inasmuch as overruling established precedent
disrupts the certainty of the law. I would also argue that
there has been no change in the law or facts that would
vitiate Burton’s rule. It seems to me a squandering of
resources to be rearguing the intricacies of a decision
made nearly 20 years ago, a debate that excludes the
original parties and nearly all the members of the Court
at the time.
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This case presented a direct challenge to Burton on
facts similar to those in that case. The prosecution did
not appeal on the ground that the district court’s
evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion, but asked
this Court to overrule Burton. Because I would not
overrule Burton, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
K
ELLY
, J., concurred with C
AVANAGH
,J.
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ROSS v BLUE CARE NETWORK OF MICHIGAN
Docket No. 131711. Decided April 23, 2008.
Blue Care Network of Michigan (BCN) denied a claim for coverage for
Douglas G . Ross’s out-of-network cancer treatment. After Ross died,
his wife, Desiree E. Ross, as personal representative of his estate,
requested the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance
Services, now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation, to
review the denial under the P atient’s Right to Independent Review
Act (PRIRA), MCL 550.1901 et seq. The commissioner assigned the
case to an independent review organization (IRO), which concluded
that the decedent’s care constituted emergency care covered under
BCN’s certificate and that BCN’s denial of coverage should be
reversed. Despite this recommendation, the commissioner partially
upheld the denial of coverage. The Wayne Circuit Court, Michael J.
Callahan, J., on a petition for judicial review filed by Desiree Ross,
reversed the commissioner’s decision with regard to the denial. The
Court of Appeals, S
CHUETTE
,P.J., and B
ANDSTRA
and C
OOPER
,JJ.,
affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the commis-
sioner’s authority under PRIRA extended only to determining
whether the IRO’s recommendations were contrary to the terms of
coverage under the benefit plan and that the commissioner was not
authorized to reach independent conclusions regarding the IRO’s
medical or clinical findings. Thus, the commissioner’s decision, which
substituted her independent conclusions for those of the IRO, was not
authorized by law. 271 Mich App 358 (2006). BCN sought leave to
appeal, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on
the application. 477 Mich 960 (2006).
In an opinion by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, joined by Justices
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
An independent review organization’s recommendation con-
cerning whether the commissioner should uphold or reverse a
health carrier’s adverse decision concerning coverage is not bind-
ing on the commissioner.
1. To make a “recommendation,” the term used repeatedly in
the PRIRA provision concerning external review of an adverse
decision by a health carrier, MCL 550.1911, means to suggest or
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propose something. “Recommendation” is not a word that con-
notes mandatory compliance, and MCL 550.1911(16)(b) expressly
allows the commissioner to decline to follow the IRO’s recommen-
dation as long as the commissioner explains his or her reasons for
doing so.
2. The Court of Appeals erred by characterizing as dictum the
statement in English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 263
Mich App 449, 464 (2004), that an IRO’s recommendation is not
binding on the commissioner. That conclusion was not dictum
because it was necessary to determine an issue in English.
3. The Court of Appeals decision in this case created a bifur-
cated system of review under PRIRA in which the IRO would be
the final authority on issues of medical or clinical-review criteria,
while the commissioner would be the ultimate authority on purely
contractual issues. The Legislature, however, did not intend a
bifurcated review, having authorized the commissioner to review
issues of medical necessity pertaining to the terms of coverage in
the course of ensuring that the IRO’s recommendation was
consistent with those terms.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Justice K
ELLY
, dissenting, disagreed that the commissioner is
never bound by the recommendations of an IRO on issues of
medical necessity and clinical review. Under PRIRA, the commis-
sioner’s review is limited to ensuring that an IRO’s recommenda-
tions are not contrary to the terms of coverage under the health-
benefit plan of the person covered. The IRO’s recommendation in
this case was consistent with the terms of the plan’s coverage.
Therefore, the commissioner’s decision to ignore that recommen-
dation was not authorized by law. Moreover, the commissioner is
not a physician. As a result, her decision to reject the recommen-
dation of the IRO and its well-qualified physician on issues that
require the exercise of medical judgment and to substitute her own
opinion was arbitrary and capricious. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be affirmed.
Justice C
AVANAGH
would deny leave to appeal.
I
NSURANCE —
M
EDICAL
C
OVERAGE —
P
ATIENT
’
S
R
IGHT TO
I
NDEPENDENT
R
EVIEW
A
CT —
C
OMMISSIONER OF THE
O
FFICE OF
F
INANCIAL AND
I
NSURANCE
S
ER-
VICES
.
An independent review organization’s recommendation under the
Patient’s Right to Independent Review Act concerning whether
the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Ser-
154 480 M
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153 [Apr
vices should uphold or reverse a health carrier’s adverse determi-
nation concerning coverage is not binding on the commissioner
(MCL 550.1911).
Wachler & Associates, P.C. (by Andrew B. Wachler
and Adrienne Dresevic), for Desiree E. Ross.
Dickinson Wright PLLC (by Joseph A. Fink, Phillip
J. DeRosier, and Trent B. Collier) and Colleen C. Cohan
for Blue Care Network of Michigan.
Amicus Curiae:
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, and William A. Chenoweth, Assistant
Attorney General, for the Commissioner of the Office of
Financial and Insurance Services.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. At issue in this action brought pursuant to
the P atient’s Right to Independent Review Act (PRIRA),
MCL 550.1901 et seq., is whether the Commissioner of the
Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS)
1
is
bound by the recommendations of an independent
review organization (IRO) on issues of medical neces-
sity and clinical review. We conclude that the act pro-
vides that the commissioner is not bound by such
recommendations. Accordingly, we reverse the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals and the order of the trial
court that held to the contrary and remand this matter
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Douglas Ross was covered under the health mainte-
nance organization (HMO) health plan of respondent
1
OFIS is now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation,
effective April 6, 2008. Executive Order No. 2008-2.
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Blue Care Network of Michigan (BCN). The certificate
of coverage excluded out-of-network services that were
not preauthorized.
2
However, it did provide coverage for
medically necessary services without prior authoriza-
tion in cases of immediate and unforeseen medical
emergency, but only until such time as it became
medically feasible to transfer the person covered under
the health plan to an in-network provider.
3
2
Section 2.01 of the certificate provided:
The Health Plan is not an insurance company but a health
maintenance organization which operates on a direct service basis.
Health, medical, hospital, and other services obtained by a Mem-
ber outside of the Health Plan and not pre-authorized by a Plan
Physician are not a covered benefit under this Certificate and
cannot be reimbursed to the Member or paid for by the Health
Plan.
3
Section 1.05 of the certificate provided:
A....Coverage is provided for medically necessary emergency
services when they are needed immediately because of an acciden-
tal injury or sudden illness, and the time required to contact your
Primary Care Physician could result in permanent damage to your
health. All benefits under this Certificate must be provided or
authorized by your Primary Care Physician or BCN, except in the
case of an immediate and unforeseen medical emergency.
***
2. Medical Emergency means a sudden and immediate medical
condition which could be expected to result in permanent damage
to your health if not treated immediately.
***
C. All follow-up care to initial emergency treatment... is
covered only when provided or approved by BCN or by your
Primary Care Physician.
D. If a Member is hospitalized for emergency care in a non-
affiliated hospital or outside of the BCN service area, BCN may
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In March 2002, Ross contracted an acute form of
multiple myeloma. Ross was referred to the University
of Michigan Medical Center, an in-network provider,
which in a May 28, 2002, letter recommended to Dr.
Stephen Goldfarb, one of Ross’s oncologists, that Ross
receive a stem-cell transplant and advised that it had
given R oss information on bone-marrow transplants
and instructed Ross to discuss this option with Dr.
Goldfarb. According to Desiree Ross (petitioner), who is
Ross’s wife and the personal representative of his
estate, Ross’s condition began to spiral out of control
toward the end of June 2002, Ross’s oncologist told him
that he was no longer eligible for treatment at the
University of Michigan Medical Center because the
cancer had spread to his soft tissue, and Ross was
consigned to palliative treatment. She also claimed that
Dr. Ronald Lutsic, a radiation oncologist, told her in
June 2002 that Ross’s prognosis was dismal and that if
he were Ross, he would go to the Myeloma Institute in
Little Rock, Arkansas (the facility), one of two facilities
in the world at the forefront of treating multiple my-
eloma.
Petitioner called Ross’s primary care physician
(PCP), Dr. Michael Silverstone, to ask for a referral to
the facility, which was not a BCN in-network provider.
BCN advised that it needed to review the facility’s
treatment plan and that it would take 10 to 14 days to
review the request. The facility said that it could not
provide a treatment plan without first evaluating Ross.
On July 2, 2002, Ross went to Arkansas and began an
evaluation at the facility without B CN’s approval. On
July 8, 2002, Dr. Frits van Rhee, the evaluating doctor,
admitted Ross to the hospital, noting that without
require that the Member be transferred to an affiliated hospital or
other facility within the service area as soon as medically feasible.
[Emphasis added.]
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aggressive intervention, R oss had only about seven days
to live. Ross was hospitalized from July 8, 2002, to July
23, 2002. The July 23, 2002, discharge summary indi-
cated that Ross was “stable for discharge and outpa-
tient followup ....” In the meantime, Ross had re-
ceived notices from BCN on July 9, July 15, and July 16
denying coverage for treatment at the facility because
either the services were available in-network or there
was no referral from his PCP, and advising Ross to
contact his PCP for a referral to an in-network provider.
Although petitioner claimed that BCN never in-
formed her of any in-network providers that could treat
Ross’s condition, she did not indicate that she had
contacted Ross’s PCP as advised by BCN for such a
referral, and she did not present any evidence that the
University of Michigan Medical Center was unable to
administer the same treatment R oss received at the
facility. Ross continued with both outpatient and inpa-
tient treatment at the facility without BCN’s authori-
zation until March 2003. He died on April 6, 2003. BCN
refused to cover any evaluation or treatment at the
facility.
On December 18, 2002, pursuant to BCN’s internal
procedures, petitioner initiated a “step one” appeal of
the denial of coverage for Ross’s treatment at the
facility that had begun on June 30, 2002. BCN denied
the appeal on January 9, 2003, because (1) the PCP had
not referred Ross, (2) BCN had not authorized the
services and there was no indication that the services
were not available in-network, and (3) BCN considered
the facility’s services to be experimental. On February
6, 2003, petitioner filed a “step two” internal appeal,
which BCN denied. On April 28, 2003, petitioner ap-
pealed to OFIS under PRIRA. The commissioner ac-
cepted the request and assigned the case to an IRO.
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The IRO’s initial report, dated May 16, 2003, indi-
cated that “this must be considered an emergency
evaluation and admission in the mind of a prudent
patient,” that attempts were made to use in-network
providers, that Ross was not offered a reasonable alter-
native plan of care that would address his condition,
and that the treatment he received at the facility should
not have been considered experimental. After receiving
the initial report, the commissioner repeatedly sought
to compel the IRO to apply the contractual and statu-
tory standards rather than the IRO -imposed prudent-
patient standard for evaluating an emergency,
4
sending
4
We quote here one of the questions in the commissioner’s October
2004 request for clarification of the IRO’s recommendation and the IRO’s
November 2004 response to that question as just one example of how the
commissioner repeatedly sought to compel the IRO to apply the statutory
standards and how the IRO unwarrantedly declined to do so:
[Q.] Michigan law requires coverage for emergency treatment
up to the point of stabilization. At what point after Mr. Ross’
admission on July 8, 2002 was he stabilized. Dr. VanRhee, the
admitting and treating physician stated Mr. Ross began DT PACE
chemotherapy on July 10, 2002 and within 7 days Myeloma was
back under control. Can it be assumed that Mr. Ross was stable by
July 18, 2002?
[A.] The patient subsequently developed severe and life-
threatening complications of his disease process, requiring admis-
sion to the University of Arkansas Medical Center July 8, 2002.
Blue Care Network’s policy on Emergency Care Section 1.04 D.
[sic] states, “If a Member is hospitalized for emergency care in a
nonaffiliated hospital or outside of the BCN service area, BCN may
require that the member be transferred to an affiliated hospital or
other facility within the services area as soon as medically fea-
sible.[”] It is the opinion of this reviewer that it was not medically
feasible or appropriate to transfer the enrollee to another facility,
which was not involved with the patient’s course of treatment. It
would have been inappropriate to attempt to transfer the patient
across the country for treatment at a network facility at any time
during his July 8 – July 23, 2002 inpatient admission episode.
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the IRO three requests for clarification whether the
June 30, 2002, outpatient consultation, the July 8,
2002, to July 23, 2002, inpatient admission, the August
1, 2002, to August 2, 2002, inpatient admission, and the
He required treatment for his condition at a center that was
familiar with his condition under the supervision of his treating
physician.
This reviewer does not have adequate clinical information
about the August 1 – August 2, 2002 inpatient admission; there-
fore, no decision can be rendered regarding this episode.
The follow-up testing was to evaluate the health of the patient
and the effectiveness of the treatment given to this patient. This
reviewer does not have the specifics as to the care provided, but it
would be inappropriate to “transfer” this responsibility to another
facility, which was not involved with this patient’s course of
treatment. It is the opinion of this reviewer that it is inappropriate
to unbundle the care provided to this patient for his refractory
myeloma and that it is appropriate to look at the global care
provided for this illness. Given the sense of emergency and
life-threatening nature of the patient’s condition without effective
therapy, the care, provided at the University of Arkansas Medical
Center, was appropriate treatment.
When viewing the question and the answer in its entirety, it is clear
that the IRO’s statement that “it was not medically feasible or appropri-
ate to transfer [Ross] to another facility” referred to the July 8, 2002, to
July 23, 2002, admission, while the remainder of the IRO’s answer
addressed the subsequent periods of treatment. The IRO did not indicate
with respect to these subsequent periods that transfer would have been
medically infeasible; rather, the IRO indicated only that it would have
been inappropriate to transfer Ross to another facility. Justice K
ELLY
argues, post at 188 n 23: “Given that the IRO is made up of doctors, not
lawyers, it is not surprising that [the IRO] did not use the legalistic
language that the majority is looking for.” In response, we note that the
term “medically feasible” used in the certificate of coverage was not
defined in such a manner that a doctor, who has extensive education,
would be unable to understand or apply the term. Moreover, the IRO
demonstrated in its November 2004 response that the IRO’s physician
reviewer was perfectly capable of using the term “medically feasible” and
applying, even citing, the language in BCN’s certificate when the
reviewer deemed it appropriate to do so.
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September 9, 2002, to November 17, 2002, follow-up
testing constituted emergency care, which would be
covered under the certificate of coverage, as well as
under MCL 500.3406k,
5
and whether Ross became
stabilized at any point so as to make it medically
feasible to transfer him to an in-network facility.
The IRO responded that Ross was admitted to the
facility on an emergency basis and that it was not
appropriate to transfer him to an in-network facility for
treatment or follow-up because the in-network facility
was not involved in Ross’s treatment. In the IRO’s last
two responses, it stated that it was not medically
feasible to transfer Ross from July 8, 2002, to July 23,
5
MCL 500.3406k of the Insurance Code provides that an HMO
must, if it provides a certificate of medical coverage, cover emergency
medical services until the insured is stabilized and defines “stabiliza-
tion”:
(1)... [A] health maintenance organization contract shall
provide coverage for medically necessary services provided to an
insured for the sudden onset of a medical condition that manifests
itself by signs and symptoms of sufficient severity...suchthatthe
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be ex-
pected to result in serious jeopardy to the individual’s health...,
serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of
any bodily organ or part. An insurer shall not require a physician
to transfer a patient before the physician determines that the
patient has reached the point of stabilization. An insurer shall not
deny payment for emergency health services up to the point of
stabilization provided to an insured under this subsection because
of either of the following:
(a) The final diagnosis.
(b) Prior authorization was not given by the insurer before
emergency health services were provided.
(2) As used in this section, “stabilization” means the point at
which no material deterioration of a condition is likely, within
reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during
transfer of the patient.
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2002, and that it was inappropriate to unbundle the
remaining care provided. The only time the IRO stated
that it was not medically feasible to transfer Ross was in
response to the commissioner’s question regarding the
July 8, 2002, to July 23, 2002, admission. The IRO
recommended on three separate occasions that BCN’s
denial of petitioner’s claim be overturned.
The commissioner found that only the inpatient
admission to the facility from July 8, 2002, to July 23,
2002, was a medical emergency under the definition of
“emergency care” in BCN’s health plan. She upheld the
denial regarding the remainder of the services on the
grounds that (1) out-of-network services were not cov-
ered, (2) BCN did not approve the out-of-network
services, (3) there was no evidence that treatment was
unavailable within the network, given that Ross’s PCP
had referred him to the University of Michigan Medical
Center, a multidisciplinary cancer treatment center,
and (4) other than the July 8, 2002, to July 23, 2002,
hospitalization, the care was not emergency care under
the policy or Michigan law.
Petitioner appealed the commissioner’s decision in
the circuit court, arguing alternatively (1) that it was
not medically feasible to transfer Ross to an in-network
facility because of the emergency nature of his condi-
tion, (2) that Ross had a referral from his PCP,sothe
services did not need to constitute emergency medical
care, and (3) that the services were not available in-
network. Focusing on the argument that the services
were emergency services, the circuit court reversed the
part of the commissioner’s decision that upheld BCN’s
denial of coverage, reasoning that the commissioner’s
conclusion—that some but not all of the facility’s ser-
vices were emergency services—was not authorized by
law.
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The Court of Appeals granted BCN’s application for
leave to appeal and affirmed with respect to the services
provided through November 17, 2002. Ross v Blue Care
Network of Michigan, 271 Mich App 358; 722 NW2d 223
(2006). It reasoned that the commissioner had failed to
comply with the requirements of PRIRA and exceeded
her authority when she discounted the IRO’s medical
recommendations and replaced them with her own
independent determinations. Id. at 371. The panel
concluded that the statement in English v Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Michigan, 263 Mich App 449, 464; 688
NW2d 523 (2004)—that an IRO’s recommendation was
not binding on the commissioner—was merely dictum
because the English panel was never actually presented
with the question whether an IRO’s recommendation is
binding on the commissioner. Ross, supra at 373-375.
Alternatively, the Court concluded that even if the
statement in English were binding on the Court, the
English panel had recognized that the commissioner’s
independent review of the IRO’s recommendation un-
der MCL 550.1911(15) was limited to confirming that
the recommendation did not contradict the health-plan
provisions. Id. at 375. However, the Ross panel agreed
with BCN that the circuit court erroneously required it
to pay for evaluation and treatment after November 17,
2002, because the commissioner had not considered the
care Ross received after that date. Id. at 380-381.
BCN applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We
ordered oral argument on the application and specifi-
cally directed the parties to address whether the Court
of Appeals paid sufficient attention to the provisions of
PRIRA that require an IRO to provide a “recommenda-
tion” to the commissioner, and whether the Court of
Appeals properly characterized as dictum the statement
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in English that indicated that the IRO’s recommenda-
tion was not binding on the commissioner. 477 Mich 960
(2006). The commissioner has filed an amicus curiae
brief in support of BCN’s application.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of statutes presents an issue of law,
which is reviewed de novo. Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer
Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559, 566; 640 NW2d 567 (2002).
Decisions of an administrative agency or officer, in cases in
which no hearing is required, are reviewed to determine
whether the decisions are authorized by law. Const 1963,
art 6, § 28.
III. ANALYSIS
PRIRA is a relatively recent addition to our state’s
laws. Enacted in 2000 as part of the Legislature’s
across-the-board attempt to regulate HMOs and other
insurance providers consistently,
6
PRIRA was intended
6
PRIRA was introduced as HB 5576, enacted as 2000 PA 251, and
amended by 2000 PA 398. HB 5576 was considered in conjunction with
HB 5573, HB 5574, and HB 5575. At the same time that the House bills
were being considered, SB 1211 and SB 1209 were also being considered.
2000 PA 252 (SB 1209) repealed part 210 of the Public Health Code (MCL
333.21001 through 333.21098), which had previously regulated HMOs;
brought HMOs under the authority of the OFIS commissioner by adding
chapter 35, entitled “Health Maintenance Organizations” to the Insur-
ance Code; and amended MCL 500.2213 to provide that HMOs must
establish an internal review procedure and that insurers must notify
insureds of the right to independent review under PRIRA. 2000 PA 253
(SB 1211) amended MCL 333.20106, MCL 333.20124, MCL 333.20161,
and MCL 333.22205 of the Public Health Code to make technical changes
regarding HMOs in light of the transfer of the regulatory framework
pertaining to HMOs from the Public Health Code to the Insurance Code.
2000 PA 250 (HB 5573) amended MCL 550.1404 of the Nonprofit Health
Care Corporation Reform Act to provide for independent external review
under PRIRA.
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to standardize the external review process designed to
resolve disputes over covered benefits, establish IRO
qualifications, and provide for penalties in cases of
wrongful denial of benefits.
Under PRIRA, the external review process for ad-
verse determinations made by health carriers is gov-
erned by MCL 550.1911, which provides:
(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of receipt of a
notice of an adverse determination..., a covered per-
son...mayfile a request for an external review with the
commissioner....
(2) Not later than 5 business days after the date of
receipt of a request for an external review, the commis-
sioner shall complete a preliminary review of the request to
determine all of the following:
(a) Whether the individual is or was a covered person in
the health benefit plan....
(b) Whether the health care service...reasonably ap-
pears to be a covered service under the covered person’s
health benefit plan.
(c) Whether the covered person has exhausted the
health carrier’s internal grievance process....
(d) The covered person has provided all the information
and forms required....
(e) Whether the health care service... appears to in-
volve issues of medical necessity or clinical review criteria.
(3) Upon completion of the preliminary review under
subsection (2), the commissioner immediately shall provide
a written notice...astowhether the request is complete
and whether it has been accepted for external review.
(4) If a request is accepted for external review, the
commissioner shall do both of the following:
(a) Include in the written notice under subsection (3) a
statement that the covered person...maysubmit to the
commissioner... additional information and supporting
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documentation that the reviewing entity shall consider
when conducting the external review.
(b) Immediately notify the health carrier in writing of
the acceptance of the request for external review.
(5) If a request is not accepted for external review
because the request is not complete, the commissioner
shall inform the covered person... what information or
materials are needed to make the request complete. If a
request is not accepted for external review, the commis-
sioner shall provide written notice...tothecovered per-
son...andthehealth carrier of the reasons for its nonac-
ceptance.
(6) If a request is accepted for external review and appears
to involve issues of medical necessity or clinical review crite-
ria, the commissioner shall assign an independent review
organization ....Theassigned independent review organiza-
tion shall be approved . . . to conduct external reviews and
shall provide a written recommendation to the commissioner
on whether to uphold or reverse the adverse determina-
tion ....
(7) If a request is accepted for external review, does not
appear to involve issues of medical necessity or clinical
review criteria, and appears to only involve purely contrac-
tual provisions of a health benefit plan, such as covered
benefits or accuracy of coding, the commissioner may keep
the request and conduct his or her own external review or
may assign an independent review organization as pro-
vided in subsection (6)....Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (16), if the commissioner keeps a request, he
or she shall review the request and issue a decision...
within the same time limits and subject to all other
requirements of this act for requests assigned to an inde-
pendent review organization. If at any time during the
commissioner’s review of a request it is determined that a
request does appear to involve issues of medical necessity
or clinical review criteria, the commissioner shall immedi-
ately assign the request to an independent review organi-
zation....
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(8) In reaching a recommendation, the reviewing entity
is not bound by any decisions or conclusions reached
during the health carrier’s utilization review process or the
health carrier’s internal grievance process.
(9) Not later than 7 business days after the date of the
notice under subsection (4)(b), the health carrier...shall
provide...thedocuments and any information considered
in making the adverse determination....
(10) Upon... notice from the assigned independent
review organization that the health carrier...hasfailed to
provide the documents and information within 7 business
days, the commissioner may terminate the external review
and make a decision to reverse the adverse determina-
tion....
(11) The reviewing entity shall review all of the infor-
mation and documents received under subsection (9) and
any other information submitted....
***
(13) In addition to the documents and information
provided under subsection (9), the reviewing entity...
shall consider the following in reaching a recommendation:
(a) The covered person’s pertinent medical records.
(b) The attending health care professional’s recommen-
dation.
(c) Consulting reports from appropriate health care pro-
fessionals and other documents submitted by the health
carrier, the covered person, the covered person’s authorized
representative, or the covered person’s treating provider.
(d) The terms of coverage under the covered person’s
health benefit plan with the health carrier.
(e) The most appropriate practice guidelines, which may
include generally accepted practice guidelines, evidence-
based practice guidelines, or any other practice guidelines
developed by the federal government or national or profes-
sional medical societies, boards, and associations.
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(f) Any applicable clinical review criteria developed and
used by the health carrier or its designee utilization review
organization.
(14) The assigned independent review organization shall
provide its recommendation to the commissioner not later
than 14 days after the assignment by the commissioner of the
request for an external review. The independent review
organization shall include in its recommendation all of the
following:
(a) A general description of the reason for the request
for external review.
(b) The date the independent review organization re-
ceived the assignment from the commissioner to conduct
the external review.
(c) The date the external review was conducted.
(d) The date of its recommendation.
(e) The principal reason or reasons for its recommenda-
tion.
(f) The rationale for its recommendation.
(g) References to the evidence or documentation, includ-
ing the practice guidelines, considered in reaching its
recommendation.
(15) Upon receipt of the assigned independent review
organization’s recommendation under subsection (14), the
commissioner immediately shall review the recommenda-
tion to ensure that it is not contrary to the terms of
coverage under the covered person’s health benefit plan
with the health carrier.
(16) The commissioner shall provide written notice...
to the covered person... and the health carrier of the
decision to uphold or reverse the adverse determination...
not later than 7 business days after the date of receipt of
the selected independent review organization’s recommen-
dation.... The commissioner shall include in a notice
under this subsection all of the following:
(a) The principal...reasons for the decision....
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(b) If appropriate, the principal... reasons why the
commissioner did not follow the assigned independent
review organization’s recommendation. [Emphasis added.]
To summarize, under MCL 550.1911, the commis-
sioner has discretion to accept or reject a request for an
external review, MCL 550.1911(3). If a request is ac-
cepted, the covered person is permitted to submit
“additional information and supporting documenta-
tion,” MCL 550.1911(4)(a), and the health carrier is
required to submit “the documents and any informa-
tion considered in making the adverse determination,”
MCL 550.1911(9).
If an accepted request “involve[s] purely contractual
provisions,” the commissioner has discretion to conduct
his or her own external review, MCL 550.1911(7). If,
however, an accepted request “involve[s] issues of medi-
cal necessity or clinical review criteria,”
7
the commis-
sioner must assign an IRO to conduct the external
review, MCL 550.1911(6). IROs conduct their external
reviews through clinical peer reviewers, who must be
physicians or meet the requirements found in MCL
550.1919(2)
8
for health-care professionals. In reaching a
recommendation, the IRO is not bound by any prior
7
“Clinical review criteria” is defined as “the written screening proce-
dures, decision abstracts, clinical protocols, and practice guidelines used
by a health carrier to determine the necessity and appropriateness of
health care services.” MCL 550.1903(f).
8
MCL 550.1919(2) provides in relevant part:
A clinical peer reviewer... shall be a physician or other
appropriate health care professional who meets all of the following
minimum qualifications:
(a) Is an expert in the treatment of the covered person’s
medical condition that is the subject of the external review.
(b) Is knowledgeable about the recommended health care...
treatment because he or she devoted in the immediately preceding
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decision or conclusion, MCL 550.1911(8). After re-
viewing all information, the IRO makes a recommen-
dation concerning whether the commissioner should
uphold or reverse the health carrier’s decision, MCL
550.1911(6). This recommendation must be provided
within 14 days of receiving the assignment, MCL
550.1911(14).
The commissioner, who is not required to have any
medical knowledge, then reviews the recommendation
to ensure that it is not contrary to the terms of coverage
under the covered person’s health benefit plan with the
health carrier, MCL 550.1911(15). The commissioner
has seven days to decide whether to uphold or reverse
the health carrier’s decision, MCL 550.1911(16). The
commissioner must provide the reasons for his or her
decision, including the reasons why he or she decided
not to follow the IRO’s recommendation, MCL
550.1911(16)(b). Finally, a party aggrieved by the com-
missioner’s decision may seek judicial review, MCL
550.1915(1).
9
As can be seen from this statutory scheme, it is hard
to imagine a more comprehensive review process. And
year a majority of his or her time in an active clinical practice
within the medical specialty most relevant to the subject of the
review.
(c) Holds a nonrestricted license... and, for physicians, a
current certification by a recognized American medical specialty
board in the...areasappropriateto...theexternalreview.
(d) Has no history of disciplinary actions... that raise a
substantial question as to the clinical peer reviewer’s physical,
mental, or professional competence or moral character.
9
MCL 550.1915(1) provides in relevant part: “An external review
decision and an expedited external review decision are the final admin-
istrative remedies available under this act. A person aggrieved by [such a]
decision may seek judicial review....”
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this comprehensive scheme in MCL 550.1911 refers 13
times to an IRO’s recommendation.
10
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals neither defined
the term “recommendation” nor considered the signifi-
cance of its use by the Legislature. “Recommendation”
is defined as “the act of recommending.” Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary (2005). “Recom-
mending” is the gerund form of “recommend,” which is
defined as “to urge or suggest as appropriate....”Id.
“Suggest” is defined as “to mention, introduce, or
propose (an idea, plan, person, etc.) for consideration,
possible action, or some purpose or use.” Id. Clearly, to
make a “recommendation” means to suggest or propose
something; “recommendation” is not a word that con-
notes mandatory compliance. Nowhere in the statute
does it say that the IRO’s recommendation is binding in
any way, so there is nothing that would require us to
impute a meaning other than the plain meaning of the
term “recommendation.” Moreover, the nature of the
term “recommendation” as connoting a suggestion is
reinforced by MCL 550.1911(16)(b), which expressly
allows the commissioner to decline to follow the IRO’s
recommendation as long as the commissioner explains
his or her reasons for doing so.
11
10
In response to Justice K
ELLY
’s analysis using the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, we point out that MCL 550.1911(16) expressly
gives the commissioner authority to uphold or reverse an insurer’s
adverse determination. Nowhere in the statute is there a similar provi-
sion that grants an IRO comparable authority. Thus, Justice K
ELLY
’s
application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
unpersuasive because it leads to an interpretation that is contrary to the
unambiguous language of the statute. See Luttrell v Dep’t of Corrections,
421 Mich 93, 107; 365 NW2d 74 (1984).
11
According to Justice K
ELLY
, the commissioner acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner when she rejected the IRO’s conclusions about
medical necessity. In reaching this conclusion, Justice K
ELLY
claims: “The
IRO determined that (1) the initial treatment was a medical emergency,
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In the only Michigan case before this one to address
PRIRA, English, the Court of Appeals likewise noted
that an IRO’s recommendation was not binding on the
commissioner. English, supra at 464. In English, the
commissioner partially reversed Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Michigan’s denial of coverage for various blood tests
because she found, consistently with the IRO’s recom-
mendation, that the tests were medically necessary. Id.
at 453. In response to Blue Cross’s argument that it was
denied due process because it did not know the identity,
and could not challenge the recommendation, of the
IRO, the Court of Appeals distinguished the authority
(2) it was not appropriate to transfer Ross to an in-network facility, and
(3) Ross was not stabilized before November 17, 2002.” Post at 187. We
disagree that the IRO concluded that Ross was not stabilized. The term
“stabilization,” as defined by MCL 500.3406k(2), means “the point at
which no material deterioration of a condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during transfer of the patient.”
(Emphasis added.) On July 23, 2002, Ross was discharged from the
facility, and the discharge summary indicated Ross was “stable for
discharge.” It is axiomatic that if a patient is stable for discharge, the
patient may be transferred without the likelihood of a material deterio-
ration in the patient’s condition resulting from or occurring during
transfer. We emphasize that the only period for which the IRO specifically
indicated that it was not medically feasible to transfer Ross was from July
8, 2002, to July 23, 2002, even when specifically asked at what point Ross
was stabilized for transfer. With respect to the subsequent periods, the
IRO merely characterized the possibility of a transfer as improper. The
IRO’s rationale for finding that transfer was improper was not because
Ross’s medical condition would likely have deteriorated during transfer
(the standard required under MCL 500.3406k), but because it would have
been inappropriate to “unbundle” the remaining care. Thus, Justice
K
ELLY
’s characterization of the IRO’s finding—that Ross was not stabi-
lized before November 17—is faulty. Nevertheless, had the IRO found on
these facts that Ross was not stabilized before November 17, i.e., that his
condition was likely to deteriorate if he were transferred, such a finding
would itself have been arbitrary and capricious, and, if the commissioner
had blindly accepted such a finding, the commissioner’s actions would
likewise have been arbitrary and capricious. However, according to
Justice K
ELLY
’s reasoning, this is exactly what the commissioner would be
required to do.
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cited by Blue Cross because in those cases, which held
that due process had been denied, the evidence was
unknown to the parties, while in English, the IRO’s
recommendation was not evidence, but was merely a
tool to aid the commissioner, and the recommendation
was not binding on the commissioner. Id. at 464.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case declared
that this statement in English did not bind the Court
because whether an IRO’s recommendation was bind-
ing on the commissioner was not at issue in English,
given that the commissioner agreed with the IRO’s
recommendation. Ross, supra at 374. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize or
address the significance of the reason the English
panel made the statement in the first place, which
was to distinguish the cases cited by Blue Cross in
support of its argument on denial of due process, an
issue that most certainly was before the Court. The
English panel held in part that PRIRA did not violate
the parties’ due process rights because the IRO’s
recommendation is not binding on the commissioner.
Thus, its conclusion that an IRO’s recommendation is
not binding on the commissioner is clearly not dic-
tum. Instead, it was one of the reasons that the panel
held that PRIRA did not violate the parties’ due
process rights. When necessary to determine an issue
in a case, a statement of law cannot be dictum. Wold
Architects & Engineers v Strat, 474 Mich 223, 232 n 3;
713 NW2d 750 (2006).
In sum, by failing to recognize the significance of the
use of the term “recommendation” and declining to
follow English, the Court of Appeals applied a flawed
construction of the statute to conclude that
while the Legislature intended that the OFIS Commis-
sioner would review the IRO’s recommendation for consis-
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tency and compliance with the health plan itself , the Legisla-
ture did not intend that the OFIS Commissioner would
review or reevaluate the IRO reviewer’s specific medical or
clinical findings. Instead, the language of PRIRA indicates
that the Legislature intended the OFIS Commissioner to
defer to the IRO’s recommendation on medical issues that do
not implicate the language of the health plan itself. [Ross,
supra at 377-378.]
This construction essentially created a judicially de-
fined bifurcated system of review in which the IRO
would be the final authority on issues of medical or
clinical-review criteria, while the commissioner would
be the ultimate authority on purely contractual issues.
Such a construction was not supported by the plain and
unambiguous language of the act itself. Given the
all-encompassing, comprehensive scheme set forth in
PRIRA, the absence of such a bifurcated review process
in the statute convincingly demonstrates that the Leg-
islature did not intend that the review authority be
bifurcated. In fact, as previously noted, the opposite
intent is demonstrated by the frequent use of the term
“recommendation,” as well as by MCL 550.1911(16)(b),
which provides that the commissioner must give the
principal reasons why he or she did not follow the IRO’s
recommendation.
Furthermore, the Legislature has contemplated in
MCL 550.1911(7) that there may be situations involv-
ing purely contractual issues over which the commis-
sioner has sole authority. Similarly, the Legislature has
treated medical issues as implicating contractual mat-
ters also and has not established that the commission-
er’s authority is different. That is, the commissioner
has identical authority over both contractual and medi-
cal issues. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize this
and erred in concluding that “medical issues” were to
174 480 M
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be treated differently. The act provides for no such
bifurcation. Rather, when the Legislature charged the
commissioner with ensuring that the IRO’s recommen-
dation was consistent with the terms of coverage, it
necessarily authorized the commissioner to review is-
sues of medical necessity pertaining to those terms of
coverage.
In any event, the commissioner’s determination was
consistent with the IRO’s recommendation to the ex-
tent that the recommendation did not contradict the
policy provisions or MCL 500.3406k.
12
The only period
for which the IRO stated that it was not medically
12
Justice K
ELLY
asserts that the only reasonable way to read the IRO’s
response to the commissioner’s last request for clarification is that the
IRO concluded that “Ross was necessarily not ‘stabiliz[ed]’ for transfer as
that term is defined by MCL 500.3406k(2).” Post at 188 n 23. From this
response, Justice K
ELLY
claims that the IRO concluded that Ross was not
stabilized before November 17, 2002. Again, this requires us to include
the relevant question from the commissioner’s January 26, 2005, request
for clarification and the IRO’s March 9, 2005, response to that question
in their entirety:
[Q.] The Michigan statute governing emergency health ser-
vices, MCL 500.3406k, requires coverage for “medically necessary
services” to the insured “for the sudden onset of a medical
condition that manifests itself by signs and symptoms of sufficient
severity, including severe pain, such that the absence of immediate
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in serious
jeopardy to the individual’s health... serious impairment to
bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or
part.” The statute further provides that “an insurer shall not
require a physician to transfer a patient before the physician
determines that the patient has reached the point of stabilization.”
Stabilization is defined as “the point at which no material dete-
rioration of a condition is likely, within reasonable medical prob-
ability, to result from or occur during transfer of the patient”.
Based on the available records, at which point after [Ross] was
hospitalized on July 8, 2002 would no material deterioration of his
condition likely result from or occur during transfer of [Ross] to a
network hospital? What medical services were necessary to stabi-
lize [Ross] under the statute’s definition of stabilization?
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feasible—the standard required in the policy—to move
Ross to an in-network facility was the period from July
8, 2002, to July 23, 2002, and it was for services
provided during this period that the commissioner
reversed BCN’s denial of coverage.
13
The IRO’s finding
that it was “inappropriate” to move Ross to another
[A.] This issue was addressed in a conference call on Wednes-
day, February 9, 2005 by Dr. David Sand, Medical Director,
Permidion. [Ross] had methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
septicemia following his DT-PACE chemotherapy. The University
Hospital of Arkansas discharge summary dictated September 15,
2002 documents [Ross’s] clinical status from August 16, 2002
through September 9, 2002. [Ross] could not have been trans-
ferred or released prior to his discharge date.
Notwithstanding the fact that the period of August 16, 2002, through
September 9, 2002, was not a period the IRO was ever asked to address,
we include this question and answer for two reasons. First, it is an
excellent illustration of the IRO’s unresponsive answers to the commis-
sioner’s increasingly more specific questions, which prompted the com-
missioner to seek clarification of the IRO’s recommendation on three
separate occasions. Second, it illustrates how unreasonable it is to assert
that the IRO concluded that Ross was not stabilized before November 17,
2002, when the IRO’s answer, which relied on a September 15, 2002,
discharge summary, is completely silent with respect to any time after
September 9, 2002. Although we agree with Justice K
ELLY
that the IRO
repeatedly responded that BCN should be required to pay for the
services, we disagree that the only way to read the IRO’s reports is to
conclude that the treatment at issue fell within the terms of coverage.
Rather, given that the IRO demonstrated it was capable of understanding
and applying the standards with respect to the July 8, 2002, to July 23,
2002, hospitalization, and that it repeatedly refused to apply the stan-
dards with respect to the remaining periods of care, we think it clear that
the IRO thought BCN should pay for the services regardless of whether
they fell within the terms of coverage.
13
The Court of Appeals determination—that the IRO specifically
concluded it was not medically feasible to transfer Ross before November
17, 2002, Ross, supra at 379—was clearly in error because it contradicted
the IRO’s own statements as well as the facility’s July 23, 2002, discharge
summary, which indicated that Ross was “stable for discharge and
outpatientfollowup....”
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facility after July 23, 2002, was not based on a standard
set forth in either the policy or the statute. Those
standards were that it be medically feasible to move the
patient or that the patient be stabilized before being
moved, respectively. Thus, the IRO’s error was one that
involved contractual and statutory construction—error
that the commissioner correctly rectified.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the PRIRA provisions for an independent
external review of an adverse determination regarding
coverage, an IRO’s recommendation concerning
whether to uphold or reverse a health carrier’s adverse
determination is merely a recommendation and is not
binding on the commissioner. We reverse the judgments
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, which held
otherwise, and remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court.
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., con-
curred with T
AYLOR
, C.J.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). The majority correctly frames
the issue. It is “whether the Commissioner of the Office
of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) is bound by
the recommendations of an independent review organi-
zation (IRO) on issues of medical necessity and clinical
review.”
1
But the majority errs by deciding that the
commissioner is never bound by such recommenda-
tions.
I conclude that the commissioner’s review is limited
to ensuring that an IRO’s recommendations are not
1
Ante at 155.
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contrary to the terms of coverage under the covered
person’s health-benefit plan.
2
In this case, the IRO’s
recommendation that respondent Blue Care Network of
Michigan be required to pay for services provided before
November 17, 2002, was consistent with the terms of
coverage. Therefore, I would affirm the well-reasoned
decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
Respondent insured petitioner’s decedent, Douglas
Ross. In February 2002, Ross began experiencing back
and leg pain. By April, he could no longer walk or stand.
He was diagnosed as suffering from numerous condi-
tions, the most serious being a severe form of multiple
myeloma.
3
Ross underwent a variety of treatments, including
chemotherapy, to combat the disease. In May 2002, he
was advised to seek treatment from the Bone Marrow
Transplant Clinic at the University of Michigan (U of
M). Unfortunately, he was unable to begin treatment at
the U of M immediately because his blood-sugar level
was elevated.
By early June, Ross’s multiple myeloma had become
increasingly severe and resulted in tumors in his leg,
neck, and eye. Ross was advised by his treating physi-
cians that he had an extremely aggressive strain of the
disease. Dr. Lutsic, his radiation oncologist, character-
ized his condition as the most severe form of the disease
he had ever seen. As a result of his deterioration, Ross
was told that he was no longer a candidate for a
2
MCL 550.1911(15).
3
Multiple myeloma is a cancer of the plasma cell. See Multiple
Myeloma Research Foundation, About Myeloma <http://www.
multiplemyeloma.org/about_myeloma> (last visited January 7, 2008).
178 480 M
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bone-marrow transplant and that the U of M would no
longer treat him. He was advised that the only remain-
ing course of treatment was medication to handle the
pain as he died.
In a final effort to prolong Ross’s life, petitioner
contacted the University of Arkansas for Medical Sci-
ences (UAMS), a leader in the treatment of myeloma.
Dr. Lutsic had told petitioner that he would pursue this
option if he were in the same position as Ross. UAMS
advised petitioner that it had successfully treated the
condition Ross had, but, if he were to have any chance
of survival, he would have to start treatment promptly.
Ross immediately requested a referral to UAMS, which
was not an in-network provider. Respondent told Ross
that it needed time to review UAMS’s treatment plan
before it took action. However, UAMS stated that it
could not provide a treatment plan without first evalu-
ating Ross.
On June 30, 2002, Ross traveled to U AMS for an
evaluation. The doctors at UAMS found Ross to be close to
death and decided that, without aggressive treatment, he
would die very soon. On July 9, 2002, Dr. van Rhee of
U AMS provided respondent with an explanation of Ross’s
condition and the proposed treatment. Dr. van Rhee
informed respondent that, without treatment, Ross had
only days to live. Ross’s certificate of coverage included
medically necessary services without prior authorization
in cases of immediate and unforeseen medical emergency.
This coverage was available until it became medically
feasible to transfer the covered person to an in-network
provider. Nonetheless, respondent informed U AMS that it
intended to deny coverage. And, ultimately, it did refuse to
pay for any services provided by UAMS .
The treatment administered at UAMS immediately
showed marked success. On July 23, 2002, Ross was
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discharged. Ross continued outpatient treatment with
UAMS, and he was also readmitted on numerous occa-
sions. On December 23, 2002, Ross was admitted to
UAMS for the last time. He remained an inpatient until
March 2003. He died on April 6, 2003, at 46 years of age.
In regard to R oss’s insurance claims, respondent
categorized UAMS’s services into four periods: (1)
outpatient facility services commencing on June 30,
2002, (2) inpatient admission from July 8 through
July 23, 2002, (3) inpatient admission on August 1
and 2, 2002, and (4) follow-up testing from September
9 to November 17, 2002. On December 18, 2002, R oss
initiated an internal appeal with respondent. When
respondent denied the appeal, Ross took the second
step in the internal appeal process. R espondent up-
held its denial. On April 28, 2003, petitioner filed a
request for external review with the Office of Finan-
cial and Insurance Services (OFIS)
4
under the Pa-
tient’s Right to Independent Review Act (PRIRA).
5
The Commissioner of OFIS
6
accepted the request and
assigned the case to Permidion, an independent review
organization. The IRO submitted its initial decision on
May 16, 2003. It concluded that Ross’s evaluation and
admission to UAMS was an emergency and that it
would have been inappropriate for Ross to have re-
ceived care elsewhere. The IRO also concluded that the
treatment provided was not experimental or investiga-
tional.
The commissioner asked the IRO for clarification in
July 2003. She asked the IRO to consider four periods of
care: (1) the June 30, 2002, outpatient consultation, (2)
4
OFIS is now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation,
effective April 6, 2008. Executive Order No. 2008-2.
5
MCL 550.1901 et seq.
6
The commissioner in this case was Linda A. Watters.
180 480 M
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the July 8 to July 23, 2002, inpatient admission, (3) the
August 1 to August 2, 2002, inpatient admission, and
(4) the September 9 to November 17, 2002, follow-up
testing. The IRO recognized that the commissioner had
specifically asked it to review “whether each of the . . .
four episodes meet[s] the criteria for emergency care
under the insured’s policy, and at what point, if any,
would the patient have been stabilized to make it
‘medically feasible’ to transfer care to an in-network
facility.”
The IRO determined that it did not have the infor-
mation required to offer an opinion about the August 1
and 2 treatment. But the IRO concluded that, with
respect to the other periods, the treatment was appro-
priate. The IRO concluded that the initial consultation
was emergency care and that it would have been
improper to have transferred Ross to another facility
because the “patient required ongoing treatment for a
period of time under the supervision of his treating
physician and it would have been inappropriate for the
patient to receive treatment elsewhere.” Accordingly,
the IRO recommended that respondent’s denial be
reversed.
The commissioner requested even more review in
October 2004. The October 2004 request was almost
identical to the July 2003 request, and the IRO re-
sponded in kind. Specifically, the IRO reiterated its
conclusion that the initial treatment constituted emer-
gency services due to lack of a reasonable alternative at
an in-network facility. It also again concluded that Ross
“required ongoing treatment for his condition at a
center that was familiar with his condition under the
supervision of his treating physician.”
The commissioner made a final request for clarifica-
tion in January 2005. She asked the IRO to again
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consider whether Ross had been in an acute medical
state in June 2002 and to clarify when Ross had been
stabilized for transfer. The IRO responded by noting
that Ross was one week away from death when he
arrived at UAMS. The IRO also attached its response to
the October 2004 request for review, in which it had
concluded that it would have been inappropriate to
have transferred Ross to another facility. Ultimately,
the IRO again recommended that respondent’s denial of
coverage be overturned for the periods at issue.
On March 30, 2005, nearly two years after petitioner
requested external review, the commissioner issued her
decision. She disregarded the IRO’s conclusions and found
that only Ross’s July 8 through July 23, 2002, inpatient
admission was covered treatment. She decided that this
treatment alone constituted emergency care. Accordingly,
the commissioner upheld respondent’s denial of coverage
with respect to the remainder of UAMS’s services.
Petitioner filed an appeal in the Wayne Circuit Court.
The circuit court reversed the commissioner’s decision
and ordered respondent to pay for all the services
rendered by UAMS. The circuit court reasoned that,
because the commissioner had concluded that the July
8 to July 23 hospitalization constituted emergency
services, all the services that UAMS provided were
emergency services.
Respondent filed an application for leave to appeal in
the Court of Appeals. The Court granted leave to appeal
and, in a published opinion, affirmed in part and
reversed in part the circuit court’s order.
7
The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision requiring respondent to
pay for services rendered after November 17, 2002,
7
Ross v Blue Care Network of Michigan, 271 Mich App 358; 722 NW2d
223 (2006).
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because the commissioner had not addressed these
services.
8
But the Court affirmed with respect to ser-
vices provided before November 17, 2002.
9
It held that
the commissioner had erred by discounting the IRO’s
medical recommendations and replacing them with her
own independent conclusions.
10
THE PATIENT’S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW ACT
This case requires us to consider the final decision of an
administrative agency and the correct interpretation of a
statute. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo.
11
In cases where no hearing is required, final
decisions of administrative agencies are reviewed to
determine whether the decision was authorized by
law.
12
“[A]n agency’s decision that ‘is in violation of
statute [or constitution], in excess of the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the agency, made upon
unlawful procedures resulting in material prejudice, or
is arbitrary and capricious,’ is a decision that is not
authorized by law.”
13
We have been asked to interpret the Patient’s Right
to Independent Review Act. Under PRIRA, when an
individual believes that a health-care coverage determi-
nation is incorrect, he or she has the right to request an
independent review.
14
When the commissioner accepts a
8
Id. at 381.
9
Id. at 371.
10
Id.
11
Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich 36, 40; 709 NW2d 589
(2006).
12
Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
13
Northwestern Nat’l Cas Co v Ins Comm’r, 231 Mich App 483, 488;
586 NW2d 563 (1998), quoting Brandon School Dist v Michigan Ed
Special Services Ass’n, 191 Mich App 257, 263; 477 NW2d 138 (1991).
14
MCL 550.1911(1).
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request for external review and the review involves
questions of medical necessity or clinical review, the
commissioner is required to appoint an IRO to assess
the services.
15
The IRO is directed to consider the
relevant materials and recommend either upholding or
reversing the earlier determination.
16
Upon receipt of
the recommendation, the commissioner is authorized to
review the IRO’s recommendation “to ensure that it is
not contrary to the terms of coverage under the covered
person’s health benefit plan with the health carrier.”
17
Accordingly, under PRIRA, if a case accepted for
external review involves an issue of medical necessity,
an IRO must be appointed to make a recommendation.
The commissioner, however, has the power to review
the IRO’s recommendation. But that power is not
unlimited. The issue here is whether the commissioner
exceeds her power when she substitutes her opinion for
the conclusion of the IRO on issues that require the
exercise of medical judgment.
For many years, this Court has recognized the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
18
This maxim says
that the “express mention in a statute of one thing
implies the exclusion of other similar things.”
19
So well
established is this maxim that it can be assumed that
legislators are fully aware the courts will utilize it when
construing their words. Accordingly, by expressly giving
the commissioner the authority to review the recom-
mendation to “ensure that it is not contrary to the
15
MCL 550.1911(6).
16
MCL 550.1911(6), (11), and (13).
17
MCL 550.1911(15).
18
E.g., PetervChicago&WMRCo, 121 Mich 324, 329; 80 NW 295
(1899).
19
Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 298;
565 NW2d 650 (1997).
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terms of coverage,” the Legislature implicitly barred
the commissioner from reviewing the recommendation
for any other purpose. As explained by the Court of
Appeals:
[W]hile the Legislature intended that the OFIS Commis-
sioner would review the IRO’s recommendation for consis-
tency and compliance with the health plan itself , the Legisla-
ture did not intend that the OFIS Commissioner would
review or reevaluate the IRO reviewer’s specific medical or
clinical findings. Instead, the language of PRIRA indicates
that the Legislature intended the OFIS Commissioner to
defer to the IRO’s recommendation on medical issues that do
not implicate the language of the health plan itself.
[20]
Thus, the commissioner is specifically authorized to
review the IRO’s recommendation to ensure that it is
not contrary to the “terms of coverage.” In this respect,
the recommendation is not binding. But the commis-
sioner is not allowed to substitute her lay opinion for
the medical conclusions of the IRO.
21
Therefore, in
20
Ross, 271 Mich App at 377-378.
21
The majority argues that my analysis using expressio unius est
exclusio alterius leads to an interpretation that is contrary to the
language of the statute. The majority claims that I fail to recognize that
the commissioner is given the power to uphold or reverse an adverse
determination, whereas the IRO is not. What the majority overlooks is
that the commissioner’s power to review the IRO’s recommendation is
limited to “ensur[ing] that it is not contrary to the terms of cover-
age....” Thus, the commissioner is authorized to reject the IRO’s
recommendation only if it is contrary to the terms of coverage. It
necessarily follows that the commissioner must adopt the IRO’s recom-
mendation when it is not contrary to the terms of coverage. I recognize
this point. The majority does not. Hence, it is the majority’s interpreta-
tion that is contrary to the language of the statute, not mine.
The interpretation of the statute advanced by the members of the
majority is another example of their belief that the answer to all
questions of statutory interpretation lies in a dictionary. As a result of
this belief, they focus on the dictionary definition of the word “recom-
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order to determine whether the commissioner exceeded
the scope of her powers in this case, it is necessary to
examine the “terms of coverage.”
Here, the IRO’s recommendation was consistent
with the terms of coverage. Ross’s health-benefit plan
covered services in cases of immediate and unforeseen
medical emergency until such time as it was medically
feasible to transfer him to an in-network provider. The
IRO concluded that Ross’s initial treatment was a
medical emergency. It also found that Ross “required
ongoing treatment for a period of time under the
supervision of his treating physician and it would have
been inappropriate for [Ross] to receive treatment
elsewhere.”
Also, as recognized by the Court of Appeals,
[respondent’s] schedule of benefits provides that respondent
will provide treatment for “medical emergenc[ies].” The
schedule of benefits also provides coverage for related medi-
cally necessary services and related ancillary services. The
IRO specifically concluded that Ross’s initial evaluation from
June 30, 2002, until July 7, 2002, and his hospitalization of
July 8 to 23, 2002, both constituted emergency services.
Further, as recognized by the OFIS Commissioner in her
final opinion and order, Michigan law requires a health
maintenance organization certificate, which otherwise pro-
vides coverage for emergency health services, to
“provide coverage for medically necessary services pro-
vided to an insured for the sudden onset of a medical
condition that manifests itself by signs and symptoms of
mendation” to resolve the case. But the majority ignores the fact that the
commissioner’s power of review is limited. Regardless of how the
majority defines the word “recommendation,” the commissioner exceeds
the scope of her power when she performs an act that she is not
empowered to do. As I have explained, PRIRA gives the commissioner the
power to review the recommendation solely to ensure that it is not
contrary to the terms of coverage.
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sufficient severity, including severe pain, such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably
be expected to result in serious jeopardy to the individual’s
health[,]... serious impairment to bodily functions, or
serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. An insurer
shall not require a physician to transfer a patient before
the physician determines that the patient has reached the
point of stabilization. An insurer shall not deny payment
for emergency health services up to the point of stabiliza-
tion provided to an insured under this subsection because
of either of the following:
“(a) The final diagnosis.
“(b) Prior authorization was not given by the insurer
before emergency health services were provided. [MCL
500.3406k(1).]”
MCL 500.3406k(1) goes on to define “stabilization” as “the
point at which no material deterioration of a condition is
likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result from
or occur during transfer of the patient.” The IRO reviewer
in this case specifically concluded that it would not have
been medically feasible to transfer Ross at any time before
November 17, 2002, because his condition had not been
sufficiently stabilized and because his follow-up treatments
at the Arkansas facilities were medically necessary.
[22]
In summary, the plan covered medical emergencies
up to the point where it was medically feasible to
transfer the patient to an in-network facility. Michigan
law also requires coverage for emergency health ser-
vices until stabilization. The IRO determined that (1)
the initial treatment was a medical emergency, (2) it
was not appropriate to transfer Ross to an in-network
facility, and (3) Ross was not stabilized before Novem-
ber 17, 2002.
23
Therefore, the IRO’s recommendation
that respondent be ordered to pay for the services was
22
Ross, 271 Mich App at 378-379 (citations omitted).
23
The majority claims that the IRO never concluded that Ross was not
“stabiliz[ed]” as defined by MCL 500.3406k(2). I disagree. In her final
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consistent with the terms of coverage.
24
For this reason,
the commissioner’s decision to ignore the IRO’s recom-
mendation was not authorized by law.
Aside from this inconsistency with the statutory
language, an additional reason exists for not allowing
the commissioner to substitute her opinion for the
request for clarification, the commissioner specifically asked the IRO to
consider whether Ross was stabilized as provided in MCL 500.3406k(2).
In light of the commissioner’s specific request, there is only one reason-
able way to read the IRO’s conclusion that respondent should be required
to pay for the services: Ross was necessarily not “stabiliz[ed]” for transfer
as that term is defined by MCL 500.3406k(2).
It seems to me that the majority’s problem with the IRO’s recommen-
dation can be boiled down to two points. The first lies in the language
that the IRO used in its reports. The majority goes so far as accusing the
IRO of responding to the commissioner’s requests with “unresponsive
answers.” Ante at 176 n 12. Given that the IRO is made up of doctors, not
lawyers, it is not surprising that it did not use the legalistic language that
the majority is looking for. But we have a duty to look beyond the
language that is used to understand what the IRO was really saying. The
commissioner repeatedly cited the relevant standards and asked the IRO
to reevaluate its conclusion that respondent be required to pay for the
services. Repeatedly, the IRO concluded that respondent should be
required to pay for the services at issue. The commissioner made
repeated requests citing the relevant standards and the IRO repeatedly
replied that respondent should be required to pay for the services.
Everything considered, the only way to read the IRO’s reports is to find
that the IRO concluded that the treatment at issue fell within the terms
of coverage.
The second point is that the majority apparently believes that the IRO
decided that it was going to recommend that respondent be required to
“pay for the services regardless of whether they fell within the terms of
coverage.” Ante at 176 n 12. I find nothing to indicate bias on the part of
the IRO. Accordingly, I find it inappropriate for the majority to make this
assumption. This faulty assumption lies at the heart of the majority’s
decision.
24
An example of a recommendation that would be contrary to the terms
of coverage would be an IRO’s determination that mental-health services
were medically necessary when the plan excluded coverage for mental-
health services. In such a situation, the commissioner could reject the
recommendation because the plan did not cover mental-health services.
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conclusions of the IRO on issues requiring medical
judgment. The commissioner is not a physician.
25
Her
expertise is banking. By contrast, for an IRO to be
approved, the IRO and its physicians must meet certain
standards designed to ensure quality and credentials.
26
The commissioner is not a doctor, whereas the IRO is
made up of very well-qualified doctors. I do not see how
the commissioner’s decision to reject the IRO’s medical
conclusions in favor of her own uneducated opinion is
anything other than arbitrary and capricious. And a
decision that is arbitrary and capricious is not author-
ized by law.
27
In this case, the IRO’s physician, who is board-
certified in internal medicine, medical oncology, and
hematology, concluded that Ross’s initial evaluation
constituted emergency services. The physician also con-
cluded that it was not appropriate to transfer Ross to
another facility before November 17, 2002. And Ross’s
condition had not stabilized to the point where he could
have been transferred to an in-network facility. Ross’s
health plan covered medical emergencies until it was
medically feasible to transfer him to an in-network
provider. Michigan law also provides that “[a]n insurer
shall not deny payment for emergency health services
up to the point of stabilization ....”
28
It follows that
respondent was required to pay for the services pro-
vided through November 17, 2002.
29
25
MCL 500.202 sets forth the qualifications of the commissioner.
Notably absent is any requirement that the commissioner have any
medical degree or license.
26
MCL 550.1919.
27
Northwestern Nat’l Cas, 231 Mich App at 488.
28
MCL 500.3406k(1).
29
The majority claims that “the commissioner’s determination was
consistent with the IRO’s recommendation to the extent that the
recommendation did not contradict the policy provisions or MCL
500.3406k.” Ante at 175. As I have explained, this simply is not true.
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Yet the commissioner found that only the July 8 to
July 23, 2002, services were covered. In so doing, she
necessarily rejected the medical findings of the IRO in
favor of her own uneducated opinion. Not only was
there no medical evidence supporting her decision, she
is completely unqualified to offer a medical opinion.
There could be no clearer example of an arbitrary and
capricious decision.
30
CONCLUSION
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the commis-
sioner exceeds the scope of her power when she substi-
tutes her opinion for the conclusion of an IRO on issues
that require the exercise of medical judgment. This
result is not only mandated by the statutory language,
it is also necessary to avoid allowing the commissioner,
a banker, to make medical decisions. Accordingly, I
dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
30
The majority takes the position that a conclusion that Ross was not
stabilized for transfer is arbitrary and capricious, given that UAMS
discharged Ross on July 23, 2002. But the fact that Ross was discharged
does not mean that it would have been appropriate to have transferred
him to another facility. In fact, in its discharge summary UAMS specifi-
cally indicated that Ross required “outpatient followup.” The IRO’s
physician, who is a medical expert, reviewed the relevant materials and
reached the medical conclusion that it would have been inappropriate to
have transferred Ross to another facility. As the IRO uses physicians
medically trained to reach such conclusions, the majority’s suggestion
that the IRO’s conclusion was arbitrary and capricious is preposterous.
In addition, there is no evidence that the services Ross required were
offered by an in-network provider. Without proof that an in-network
provider offered the requisite services, it is impossible to conclude that
transfer would have been appropriate.
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McDONALD v FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 132218. Argued October 2, 2007 (Calendar No. 1). Decided
April 23, 2008.
Mary E. McDonald brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court
against Farm Bureau Insurance Company after it denied her claim
for underinsured motorist benefits. Although McDonald’s attor-
ney and Farm Bureau had exchanged a series of letters concerning
the underinsured motorist coverage and permission to settle the
case, Farm Bureau denied the claim after the policy’s one-year
limitations period for bringing a legal action expired. The court,
Robert M. Ransom, J., denied Farm Bureau’s summary disposition
motion and granted McDonald summary disposition, concluding in
part that, under Tom Thomas Org, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich
588 (1976), the limitations period was tolled from the time the
attorney’s letter notified Farm Bureau of the claim until Farm
Bureau denied the claim. Farm Bureau sought leave to appeal, and
the Court of Appeals initially held the application in abeyance
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Rory v Continental Ins
Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005). After the Rory decision, the Court of
Appeals, S
MOLENSKI
,P.J., and H
OEKSTRA
and M
URRAY
, JJ., affirmed in
an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 24, 2006
(Docket No. 259168). The Court of Appeals concluded that Rory
should be applied prospectively only and relied on the decision in
West v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co (On Remand), 272 Mich App 58
(2006), to apply the doctrine of judicial tolling to this case. The
Supreme Court granted Farm Bureau’s application for leave to
appeal. 477 Mich 996 (2007).
In an opinion by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, joined by Justices
C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG,
and M
ARKMAN
, the Supreme Court held:
An express limitations period in an optional insurance contract
is not automatically tolled by the filing of a claim unless the
contract so provides.
1. Rory expressly overruled Tom Thomas, which had applied a
judicial tolling doctrine to insurance contracts. Devillers v Auto
Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 (2005), precluded the automatic
tolling of statutory limitations periods. Contrary to the Court of
Appeals decisions in West and this case, the reasoning in Devillers
2008] M
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applies equally to similar contractual limitations periods. The
express limitations period in this optional insurance contract for
underinsured motorist coverage was not automatically tolled as a
matter of law by McDonald’s filing of a claim.
2. The trial court erred by ruling that the phrase “a legal
action” in the contract’s limitations provision was ambiguous. The
phrase undisputedly means “a lawsuit.”
3. The trial court also erred by holding that the one-year time
limit was unreasonable. The facts of Rory, which also involved a
one-year limitations period, are squarely on point with this case,
and, for the reasons given in Rory, the parties’ contract in this case
should not be rewritten.
4. Traditional contract doctrines such as waiver and estoppel
can apply to contractual limitations periods when the facts support
them. Farm Bureau, however, did not voluntarily relinquish its
right to enforce the limitations period, which is a requirement for
a waiver, and McDonald did not establish the requirements for
equitable estoppel to apply. Specifically, there was no evidence that
McDonald relied on Farm Bureau’s conduct or statements.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in
Farm Bureau’s favor.
Justice W
EAVER
, dissenting, concurred fully with and joined
Justice K
ELLY
’s opinion and also stated that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Judicial tolling of limitations
periods found in insurance contracts, a long-established doctrine,
should not be abolished, Tom Thomas should not be further
overruled, and the holdings of Rory and Devillers should not be
extended. Insurance contracts, which the parties do not typically
negotiate, require specialized rules of construction and specialized
rules of equity, such as judicial tolling, that account for the
difference in bargaining power between an insured and an insurer.
The holding in this case will eliminate a doctrine that has allowed
for fairness in insurance-claim negotiation and leave nothing in
place to ensure prompt action by insurers to afford their insureds
reasonable time to make decisions regarding legal action or
settlement.
Justice K
ELLY
, joined by Justices W
EAVER
and C
AVANAGH
, dis-
senting, disagreed with the majority’s decision to abolish the use of
the judicial tolling doctrine adopted in Tom Thomas. The doctrine
is a pragmatic one that is fair to both insurers and insureds. It
promotes fairness, efficiency, and certainty in the claims-
adjustment process. The doctrine encourages insureds to give
prompt notice of their claims to insurers, and it eliminates any
192 480 M
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191 [Apr
incentive insurers might have to wait until the contractual limi-
tations period expires before denying claims. An insured should
not be forced to choose between filing a premature lawsuit and
trusting that the insurance company will consider the claim after
the contractual limitations period has expired. Neither Rory nor
Devillers directly overruled judicial tolling of a contractually
shortened limitations period, the circumstance found in this case.
Because the trial court properly applied the judicial tolling doc-
trine, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed. Moreover, even if the doctrine cannot be
applied to save the plaintiff’s claim, she has shown the facts
necessary to establish that the defendant is estopped from relying
on the contractually shortened limitations period.
I
NSURANCE —
L
IMITATION OF
A
CTIONS —
C
ONTRACTUAL
L
IMITATIONS
P
ERIODS —
T
OLLING —
E
STOPPEL AND
W
AIVER —
U
NDERINSURED
M
OTORIST
B
ENEFITS
.
An express contractual limitations period in an optional insurance
contract, such as a policy for underinsured motorist coverage, is
not automatically tolled by the filing of a claim unless the contract
so provides, but traditional contract doctrines such as waiver and
estoppel can apply when the facts support them.
Donald M. Fulkerson for Mary E. McDonald.
Willingham & Coté, P.C. (by John Yeager, Anthony S.
Kogut, Curtis R. Hadley, and Matthew K. Payok), for
Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. In this case, we must decide whether a
contractual limitations period in an insurance policy is
tolled from the time a claim is made until the insurance
company denies the claim and, if it is not, whether the
limitations period may be avoided under the doctrines
of waiver or estoppel. Consistently with long-
established contract law, we hold that there is no
automatic tolling when a claim is filed unless the
contract so provides. Traditional contract doctrines
such as waiver and estoppel can apply when the facts
support them. However, in the present case plaintiff has
not shown that she relied on any misconduct by defen-
dant; therefore, defendant cannot be estopped from
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applying the limitations period to plaintiff’s claim.
Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of
summary disposition in favor of defendant.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The policy at issue in this case is one for underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage. These policies are not
mandated by statute; individuals contract for such
coverage voluntarily. When an insured is injured by a
tortfeasor motorist whose own policy is insufficient to
cover all of the insured’s damages, the insured can seek
coverage from his or her UIM policy for damages that
exceed the tortfeasor’s policy limits. Thus, the insured
generally must first determine how much of his or her
damages will be covered by the tortfeasor and enter into
a settlement with the tortfeasor, and then seek further
payment from his or her UIM provider for the balance.
In this case, plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident on November 29, 2001. The policy under which
she was covered included UIM coverage. However, it
contained an endorsement that provided: “No claimant
may bring a legal action against the company more than
one year after the date of the accident.” The policy also
had a clause prohibiting the insured from settling
without defendant’s written consent and stating that
defendant “shall be obligated” to respond within 30
days to the insured’s request to settle.
On May 10, 2002, plaintiff’s attorney notified defen-
dant by mail that plaintiff had an underinsured motor-
ist claim, acknowledging that the policy had a limita-
tions period that would expire on November 29, 2002.
Defendant responded that it needed answers to inter-
rogatories (concerning collectibility of the underinsured
motorist) before it could give permission to settle and
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that defendant’s claims representative needed to review
the medical records. The claims representative’s letter
indicated that after the medical records were reviewed,
“I will be getting back in touch with you.”
On August 2, 2002, plaintiff’s attorney sent another
letter, asking for a decision regarding consent to settle “so
that I can determine if I need to sue Farm Bureau or not.”
On August 16, he sent a third letter stating that he
intended to “commence the process of negotiating the
UIM claim” as soon as he received written permission to
settle. The claims representative sent written permission
to settle for $20,000.
1
The record indicates no further
action by either party before November 29, 2002, when
the period of limitations expired. On December 10,
2002, defendant sent plaintiff a letter indicating that
the one-year limitations period had expired and that
defendant would no longer consider the UIM claim.
Plaintiff filed this action five months later. Defen-
dant moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and 2.116(C)(10)
(no material question of fact). The trial court denied
defendant’s motion and granted summary disposition
to plaintiff, holding that (1) the one-year period was
unreasonable and thus unenforceable as a matter of
law, (2) defendant was estopped from asserting the
limitation because of its dilatory conduct, (3) pursuant
to Tom Thomas Org, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich
588; 242 NW2d 396 (1976), the limitations period was
1
In her brief and in her opposition to defendant’s trial court motion for
summary disposition, plaintiff argued that the written permission, dated
August 14, 2002, was later revoked in a telephone conversation on
August 16, 2002. However, plaintiff’s counsel in oral argument before
this Court conceded that the August 14 date on the letter was incorrect.
The record indicates that the date was a clerical error; the letter should
have been dated August 24, 2002. Thus, there is no dispute that written
permission to settle was given and not revoked.
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tolled by plaintiff’s May 10, 2002, letter until defendant
denied the claim, and (4) the limitations period was too
ambiguous to enforce.
On appeal in the Court of Appeals, the application for
leave was first held in abeyance for this Court’s decision
in Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d
23 (2005). After the Rory decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the trial court had correctly ruled
that the contractual limitations period was tolled by
plaintiff’s May 10, 2002, letter to defendant until the
denial of plaintiff’s claim on December 10, 2002. Mc-
Donald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 24, 2006
(Docket No. 259168). In so holding, the panel relied on
the decision in West v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of
Michigan (On Remand), 272 Mich App 58, 65-67; 723
NW2d 589 (2006), which held that multiple recent
decisions of this Court limiting the doctrine of judicial
tolling were inapplicable to insurance contract claims
and that Rory should be applied prospectively only.
McDonald, supra at 2. Because this single issue was
dispositive, the panel did not address the issues of
reasonableness, contractual ambiguity, or estoppel. Id.
This Court granted defendant’s application for leave to
appeal, directing the parties to include among the issues
to be briefed (1) whether a contractual limitations period
may be avoided on the basis of the doctrines of waiver or
estoppel and (2) whether the one-year limitations period
contained in the insurance policy is tolled from the time a
claim is made until the insurance company denies the
claim. 477 Mich 996 (2007).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision
to grant or deny summary disposition. Rory, supra at
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464. Questions involving the proper interpretation of a
contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are
also reviewed de novo. Id. When reviewing a grant of
equitable relief, an appellate court will set aside a trial
court’s factual findings only if they are clearly errone-
ous, but whether equitable relief is proper under those
facts is a question of law that an appellate court reviews
de novo. Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 473
Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005).
III. JUDICIAL TOLLING
This Court has addressed the issue of tolling the
limitations periods of insurance policies several times in
the recent past. In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473
Mich 562, 564; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), this Court held
that the “one-year-back” limitation provided for in
MCL 500.3145(1) for recovering no-fault personal pro-
tection insurance benefits could not be automatically
tolled because that was contrary to the express lan-
guage of the statute. In so holding, we overruled L ewis
v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93; 393
NW2d 167 (1986), which had applied to the statutory
limitations period the “judicial tolling” doctrine that
Tom Thomas had used in the context of optional
insurance contracts. Devillers, supra at 564. We noted
in Devillers that Tom Thomas departed from the well-
established legal principle that courts cannot rewrite
the parties’ contracts if the terms are expressly stated.
Id. at 567. The Tom Thomas Court declined to apply
traditional contract doctrines such as waiver and estop-
pel because it concluded that “[w]aiver and estoppel
analysis results in considerable uncertainty concerning
the ‘reasonableness’ of the time remaining for suit.”
Tom Thomas, supra at 597 n 10 (citation omitted).
Without explaining why this would create a problem,
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the Court simply disregarded the one-year contractual
provision because some of that time would undoubtedly
be taken up in processing the claim. Instead, it declared
that the “appropriate resolution” was “to toll the run-
ning of the limitation from the time the insured gives
notice until the insurer formally denies liability.” Id.at
596-597. Because the action had been filed less than 12
months after the insurer denied liability, the Court held
that it was timely, even though more than one year had
passed since notice of the claim was given. Id. The
dissent noted that the insured “was guilty of sleeping
on its bargained-for rights” for more than six months of
the elapsed time and that, under standard contract law,
a one-year period was a one-year period. Id.at601
(L
INDEMER
, J. dissenting).
Devillers set forth this reasoning and explained how
the Tom Thomas tolling doctrine was expanded from
contractual limitations periods to the statutory limita-
tions period provided by MCL 500.3145(1) in the con-
text of automobile no-fault statutes. Reversing caselaw
that had adopted the doctrine, the Court noted that it
was “unable to perceive any sound policy basis for the
adoption of a tolling mechanism with respect to the
one-year-back rule.” Devillers, supra at 583. The Court
expressly agreed with the dissents in the cases reversed
and in Tom Thomas, stating: “Statutory—or
contractual—language must be enforced according to
its plain meaning, and cannot be revised or amended to
harmonize with the prevailing policy whims of mem-
bers of this Court.” Id. at 582. The Court concluded by
holding that the statutory limitations period should be
enforced as written by the Legislature.
Similarly, in Rory, supra at 468, this Court empha-
sized that “unambiguous contracts are not open to
judicial construction and must be enforced as written.”
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Judicial conclusions regarding the “reasonableness” of
unambiguous contractual provisions cannot be used to
evade enforcement of the contract as written. Rory
expressly overruled Tom Thomas and its progeny. Id.at
470. Rory also concluded that the one-year limitation
was not contrary to public policy, noting that “the
Legislature has assigned the responsibility of evaluat-
ing the ‘reasonableness’ of an insurance contract to . . .
the Commissioner of Insurance” and that because the
commissioner had approved the policy at issue in that
case, which included a one-year limitation, the courts
were not free to determine de novo whether the policy
was reasonable. Id. at 475-476.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff solely on the basis of its conclusion that the
limitations period was tolled pursuant to Tom Thomas.
In so doing, the Court cited, but then expressly ignored,
language in Devillers, supra at 582. Instead, the Court
preferred to follow its own precedent, West, which
stated that Devillers concerned “statutory claims
brought pursuant to the no-fault act” and so was “not
instructive” in a case that did not involve that act, even
while the West panel acknowledged that Devillers had
held that Tom Thomas was incorrectly decided. Mc-
Donald, supra at 2; West, supra at 64-65. The Court of
Appeals also followed West’s determination that Rory
applies prospectively only and ignored the substance of
Rory’s analysis that concluded that Tom Thomas was
incorrectly decided. McDonald, supra at 2.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that our case-
law has already declared that Tom Thomas was incor-
rectly decided. Just as courts are not to rewrite the
express language of statutes, it has long been the law in
this state that courts are not to rewrite the express
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terms of contracts. See, e.g., Mann v Pere Marquette R
Co, 135 Mich 210, 219; 97 NW 721 (1903), citing
Baltimore&OSRCovVoigt, 176 US 498, 504; 20 S Ct
385; 44 L Ed 560 (1900) (“[T]he usual and most
important function of courts of justice is rather to
maintain and enforce contracts, than to enable parties
thereto to escape from their obligation on the pretext of
public policy . . . .”). Rather than blindly following
West’s questionable disregard for Devillers’s clear state-
ment, the Court of Appeals should have, at least, sought
conflict-panel resolution of the question. MCR 7.215(J).
As was made clear in Devillers, supra at 567, and
Rory, supra at 470, Tom Thomas disregarded long-
established caselaw requiring that we read unambigu-
ous contract provisions as they are written. By allowing
automatic tolling, it made a nullity of express contract
language, and parties were unable to rely on unambigu-
ous contract provisions. The reasoning we applied in
Devillers, precluding automatic tolling of statutory limi-
tations periods, applies equally to similar contractual
limitations periods.
Moreover, we are not as convinced as Justice K
ELLY
that judicial tolling of these claims “promotes the quick
resolution of insurance claims outside the courts.” Post
at 213. Tolling removes from both sides the incentive to
speedily resolve the claim: until a decision is made to
deny a claim, the plaintiff may have little basis for a
claim. Certainly, tolling muddies what rights and re-
sponsibilities exist under the contract, given that the
express terms of the contract no longer control in that
situation. We believe the better position is for parties to
determine their own contractual provisions and then
bear the responsibility of enforcing them as written.
We reiterate that Rory overruled Tom Thomas and
its progeny and conclude that express limitations peri-
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ods in optional insurance contracts are not automati-
cally tolled as a matter of law by filing a claim. Under
the plain language of the contract, plaintiff was re-
quired to bring an action against defendant by Novem-
ber 29, 2002, unless she can point to a legally supported
reason why that deadline was not effective.
Plaintiff argues that, since our decision in Rory,
public policy has changed to preclude limitations provi-
sions shorter than three years and, therefore, that this
provision should not be enforced because it is against
public policy. Specifically, plaintiff points to a “Notice
and Order of Prohibition” issued by the Office of
Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS)
2
on December
16, 2005, prohibiting uninsured motorist benefits poli-
cies with limitations periods of less than three years.
However, the “Notice and Order” also expressly states
that it does not prohibit insurers from continuing to use
policies that were legally in use before December 16,
2005.
3
Moreover, the general rule is that contracts are
interpreted in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of their formation. See, e.g., Byjelich v John
Hancock Mut Life Ins Co, 324 Mich 54, 61; 36 NW2d 212
(1949). Thus, the one-year limitation was valid at the
time the parties entered into the contract. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition to plaintiff on this basis.
In her dissent, Justice K
ELLY
asserts that the OFIS
order should persuade us to invalidate unambiguous
contracts like the one at issue here on the ground that
they are against good public policy. However, we are of
the view that our role is fundamentally different from
2
OFIS is now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation,
effective April 6, 2008. Executive Order No. 2008-2.
3
OFIS issued a similar order specifically addressing underinsured
motorist benefits on April 4, 2006.
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that of OFIS. OFIS determines whether an insurance
contract is valid. If it is, it is then the responsibility of
this Court to enforce the valid contract as written.
The OFIS order expressly left in force contracts
already in effect. While the Court is, of course, free to
adopt a policy that would apply a blanket invalidation
to countless existing insurance contracts, the major-
ity of this Court is of the view that we follow the law
established by the lawgiver. That is, when a statute is
at issue, the law is established by the Legislature, and
we are compelled to follow it as written. Similarly,
when a contract is at issue, the law we must follow is
the unambiguous terms established by the parties to
the contract. Justice K
ELLY
consistently has preferred
a more aggressive and invasive role for the Court,
particularly when construing contracts and statutes.
The rule that she wishes is for the Court to serve as
an ombudsman, rewriting contracts and statutes in
the name of “public policy” whenever it appears that
the plain terms of the text work some perceived
inequity. See, e.g., Herweyer v Clark Hwy Services,
Inc, 455 Mich 14; 564 NW2d 857 (1997), overruled by
Rory, supra at 488-489; Husted v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
459 Mich 500, 517; 591 NW2d 642 (1999) (K
ELLY
,J.,
dissenting); Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 342; 597
NW2d 15 (1999) (K
ELLY
, J., dissenting); Nawrocki v
Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 186; 615 NW2d
702 (2000) (K
ELLY
, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466
Mich 304, 325; 645 NW2d 34 (2002) (K
ELLY
,J.,
dissenting); Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478
Mich 28, 46; 732 NW2d 56 (2007) (K
ELLY
, J., dissent-
ing). Yet this approach replaces the rule of law by the
rule of men, which is the very peril we believe that
courts are expected to stand against. We will continue
to do so.
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IV. TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
In the interests of judicial efficiency, because we hold
that the one-year contractual limitations period was not
automatically tolled by filing a claim, we address the
trial court’s other bases for granting summary disposi-
tion. The trial court held that the contract was ambigu-
ous because it did not define “legal action,” and the trial
court was persuaded by plaintiff’s assertion that she
thought contacting an attorney, who then sent a letter
to defendant, constituted “legal action.” We disagree.
The phrase “a legal action” undisputedly means “a
lawsuit.” CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass’n,
465 Mich 549, 554-555; 640 NW2d 256 (2002); see also
United States v El-Ghazali, 142 Fed Appendix 44, 46
(CA 3, 2005) (citing numerous cases and dictionaries
and concluding that “[t]he widespread use of the word
‘action’ in both the civil and criminal context refutes
[the defendant’s] argument that there is disagreement
among reasonable people as to the meaning of ‘legal
actions’ ”); Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) (defining
“action” by noting that the “[t]erm in its usual legal
sense means a lawsuit brought in a court”). Even if
plaintiff herself thought that contacting an attorney
was a “legal action,” her attorney, once contacted,
would have understood that “legal action” is synony-
mous with “lawsuit.” See, e.g., Michigan Millers Mut
Ins Co v Bronson Plating Co, 445 Mich 558, 568; 519
NW2d 864 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds
by Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41 (2003).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
ruling that the phrase “legal action” was ambiguous.
The trial court also held that the one-year time limit
was unreasonable, concluding that the present case was
directly analogous to Rory. We agree that the facts of
Rory are squarely on point with this case, and for the
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same reason that we reversed the Court of Appeals
decision in Rory, we decline to rewrite the parties’
contract here.
V. EQUITABLE RELIEF
The trial court also held that defendant was estopped
from seeking enforcement of the one-year limitations
provision because of its “conduct in the case at bar
which resulted in numerous delays.” Defendant con-
cedes that the traditional contract doctrines of waiver
and estoppel are still viable and that nothing in Rory or
Devillers changed basic contract law. Equitable tolling,
unlike judicial tolling, has a legal basis arising out of
our common law, and it may be invoked when tradi-
tional equitable reasons compel such a result.
4
However,
defendant argues that neither doctrine should be ap-
plied under the present facts. We agree with defendant.
“A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known
right.” Dahrooge v Rochester German Ins Co, 177 Mich
442, 451-452; 143 NW 608 (1913). Neither party dis-
putes that waiver is inapplicable here because defen-
dant did not voluntarily relinquish its right to enforce
the one-year time limit. For equitable estoppel to apply,
plaintiff must establish that (1) defendant’s acts or
representations induced plaintiff to believe that the
limitations period clause would not be enforced, (2)
plaintiff justifiably relied on this belief, and (3) she was
prejudiced as a result of her reliance on her belief that
4
Justice K
ELLY
asserts that a claim of waiver or estoppel requires
“ ‘wider ranging investigation and proof’ ” than a claim that judicial
tolling applies. Post at 213, quoting 17 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 238:1, pp
238-8 to 238-9. However, the difficulty of proving waiver or estoppel is
immaterial to the question whether the law, as agreed to by the parties
themselves, requires enforcement of the one-year provision. It is not for
this Court to conjure up new laws whenever we believe that such might
be more favorable to one party or another.
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the clause would not be enforced. See Grosse Pointe
Park v Michigan Muni Liability & Prop Pool, 473 Mich
188, 204, 224; 702 NW2d 106 (2005) (opinions by
C
AVANAGH
, J., and Y
OUNG
, J.); Dahrooge, supra at 452.
The trial court’s factual finding that defendant caused
delays is insufficient to grant estoppel because there is
no evidence that plaintiff relied on anything defendant
did or said. To the contrary, plaintiff’s attorney clearly
expressed an awareness of the cutoff date, acknowledg-
ing it in his May 10, 2002, letter. He also pursued the
claim in August when, not having heard from the claims
representative for some time, he sent a letter stating
that he needed to know what the settlement decision
was so he could “determine if I need to sue Farm
Bureau or not.” Defendant responded by sending writ-
ten confirmation of the settlement decision.
Finally, plaintiff’s assertion that she relied on Tom
Thomas and delayed bringing suit because she thought
the one-year limitation was tolled is not a reason to
estop defendant, because defendant’s “acts or represen-
tations” did not induce plaintiff’s delay. Grosse Pointe
Park, supra at 204, 224. Therefore, we find that waiver
or estoppel did not operate to entitle plaintiff to sum-
mary disposition.
VI. RETROACTIVITY
Plaintiff asserts that if Tom Thomas is overruled, we
should apply our holding prospectively only because her
counsel, relying on Tom Thomas, believed that the
limitations period was tolled by his filing the claim. We
need not reach the issue in this case, however. Although
the general rule is that our decisions are given full
retroactive effect, this Court has indicated that prospec-
tive application may be warranted if “injustice might
result from full retroactivity.” Pohutski v City of Allen
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Park, 465 Mich 675, 696; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). In this
case, when plaintiff’s counsel notified defendant of the
claim, he expressly acknowledged that the limitations
period would expire on November 29, 2002. Therefore,
counsel’s post hoc assertions of reliance are belied by
his own communications to defendant that indicated he
did not expect tolling to occur. Because plaintiff’s attor-
ney did not rely on Tom Thomas, no injustice would
result from applying our decision to plaintiff. Accord-
ingly, even if reliance on Tom Thomas justified prospec-
tive application in general, the facts specifically pre-
sented in this case do not warrant that application.
VII. CONCLUSION
When interpreting insurance contracts, standard con-
tract laws apply. Tom Thomas erroneously refused to read
the parties’ unambiguous contract as written and, for this
reason, has been overruled. Because the contract in this
case unambiguously and not unreasonably required suit
to be filed within one year of the accident, defendant
properly denied the claim when plaintiff failed to meet
that deadline. Standard contract doctrines remain, and
waiver or estoppel may be applied if the facts support it.
Plaintiff has not shown any reliance on the conduct of or
statements by defendant, however, so estoppel does not
relieve plaintiff of the duty to timely file suit. We reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this
matter to the trial court for entry of summary disposition
in favor of defendant.
C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred with
T
AYLOR
, C.J.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the erroneous
decision of the majority of four (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
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and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
) to extend
its unjust and unfair holdings in Rory v Continental Ins
Co, 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d 23 (2005), and Devillers v
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562; 702 NW2d 539
(2005), to the facts of this case. Rather than join the
injustice of the majority opinion, I concur fully with,
and join in, Justice K
ELLY
’s thoughtful dissenting opin-
ion. I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals judgment,
which affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny defen-
dant’s motion for summary disposition and grant the
plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.
As it did in Rory
1
and Devillers,
2
the majority of four
continues to overrule and undermine years of this
Court’s well-developed and sound jurisprudence that
has guided lower courts in cases involving disputes
about insurance coverage. Under the guise of enforcing
contracts as written, the majority abolishes judicial
tolling of limitations periods in insurance contracts, a
doctrine of fairness that has been in place since 1976,
when this Court decided Tom Thomas Org, Inc v
Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588; 242 NW2d 396 (1976).
The majority of four now overrules Tom Thomas,
explaining that insurance contracts are not open to
judicial construction.
1
In Rory, the majority of four first held that insurance contracts are to
be enforced using the same legal principles that are applied to any other
contract. The Rory holding overruled at least 50 years of this Court’s
precedent outlining how lower courts were to construe insurance-
contract provisions using specialized interpretive rules.
2
In Devillers, the majority of four overruled L ewis v Detroit Auto-
mobile Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), a case that
had allowed judicial tolling of the no-fault one-year-back provision of
MCL 500.3145(1). Despite the practical hardships that the majority’s
decision would inflict upon the insureds who had relied on the judicial
tolling doctrine under Lewis, the majority gave its decision retroactive
effect.
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However, as I explained in my dissent in Rory,
3
an
insurance contract is a unique form of contract that
requires specialized rules of construction because the
individual terms and clauses of an insurance contract
are not typically subject to negotiation. In Rory,I
stated:
These specialized rules recognize that an insured is not
able to bargain over the terms of an insurance policy;
indeed, it is common practice for the insured to receive the
actual terms of the contract, the insurance policy itself,
only after having purchased the insurance. Further, in
most cases the average consumer will not read the policy;
the consumer will rely on the agent’s representations of
what is covered in the policy. Even if the insured were to
read the policy, insurance policies are not easy to under-
stand and contain obscure provisions, the meaning of
which requires legal education to grasp.
[4]
The doctrine of judicial tolling in insurance contracts is
one of the specialized rules of equity that acknowledge
and account for the difference in bargaining power, or
lack thereof, between an insured and an insurer. As
Justice K
ELLY
aptly states, “it is a pragmatic doctrine
that is fair to both insurers and insureds.”
5
By extend-
ing its decision from Devillers
6
to overrule Tom Thom-
3
Rory, 473 Mich at 516.
4
Id. at 516-517.
5
Post at 210.
6
I note that the majority is extending its decision from Devillers and
not, as the majority alludes, ante at 200, simply restating its position from
Devillers. The resolution of Devillers hinged on statutory interpretation.
The instant case involves contractual interpretation. Thus, any state-
ments made in Devillers regarding contractual interpretation were dicta
and not binding on this case. If the majority in Devillers intended to
create a one-size-fits-all rule of law to apply no matter what set of facts
is before a court, then the majority was legislating from the bench. Courts
interpret laws and apply the laws to the facts before them. The Court of
Appeals correctly applied the law from Tom Thomas to the facts of this
208 480 M
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as, the majority of four does away with a doctrine that
allowed for fairness in the insurance-claim negotiation
process and leaves nothing in its place to ensure that
insurers promptly take action to afford their insureds
reasonable time to make decisions regarding legal ac-
tion or the settlement of claims.
In this case, the latest example of the majority of
four’s judicial activism in no-fault insurance cases, the
majority of four abolishes judicial tolling of contractual
limitations periods for insurance contracts. In doing so,
the majority of four overrules more than 30 years of this
Court’s precedent. Or, to borrow the majority’s rheto-
ric, the majority of four has replaced the “rule of law”
7
with the “rule of four justices.” Accordingly, I dissent.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s
decision to abolish the use of the judicial tolling
1
doc-
case because this case involves an insurance contract, for which Tom
Thomas was binding precedent. The Court of Appeals followed the
precedent of Tom Thomas and Court of Appeals precedent distinguishing
Devillers’s statutory interpretation from cases involving the interpreta-
tion of contracts, such as West v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan
(On Remand), 272 Mich App 58; 723 NW2d 589 (2006). When the
majority criticizes the Court of Appeals for “blindly following West’s
questionable disregard for Devillers’s clear statement,” ante at 200, the
majority shows a complete disregard for the basic proposition that
different sets of facts necessitate different analyses of laws.
7
Ante at 202.
1
What I call “judicial tolling” is often also referred to as “equitable
tolling” and “intervening tolling.” See In re Certified Question (Ford
Motor Co v Lumbermens Mut Cas Co), 413 Mich 22, 30; 319 NW2d 320
(1982); Feldman, Zariski & Eaton, The equitable tolling doctrine in first
party insurance coverage matters: Analysis, benefits, and an illustrative
case study,41TortTrial&InsPracLJ61(2005).
Insurance policies often include a limitation-of-suit provision that
bars the insured from bringing an action for coverage unless the suit is
filed within a certain period. These provisions may shorten the time an
insured would otherwise have to file suit under state law. Judicial tolling
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trine adopted by this Court more than 30 years ago in
Tom Thomas.
2
Michigan courts have applied judicial
tolling without serious contention for more than three
decades because it is a pragmatic doctrine that is fair to
both insurers and insureds. It does not create insurance
coverage where none exists. Nor does it deprive insur-
ers of other defenses they might have. Rather, it encour-
ages insureds to give prompt notice of their claims to
their insurers. And it eliminates any incentive insurers
might have to wait until the contractual limitations
period expires before denying claims.
THE JUDICIAL TOLLING DOCTRINE
Thirty-two years ago, in the Tom Thomas case, this
Court construed an inland marine insurance policy
that contained a 12-month limitations period.
3
We
noted that, although a 12-month period might “repre-
sent a reasonable balance between the insurer’s inter-
est in prompt commencement of action and the in-
sured’s need for adequate time to bring an action, the
insured usually does not have the full 12 months within
which to commence an action.”
4
In fact, because of
delays built into standard insurance policies, an insured
usually has substantially less time to decide whether to
commence an action against an insurer. These delays
include the time dedicated to filing a proof of loss and
the period allowed for payment or settlement of the
claim.
5
suspends the elapse of time under the limitation-of-suit provision from
the date the insured gives notice of the loss until the insurer formally
denies liability. Feldman, Zariski & Eaton, 41 Tort Trial & Ins Prac L J
at 61-63.
2
Tom Thomas Org, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588; 242 NW2d 396
(1976).
3
Id. at 591.
4
Id. at 592.
5
Id.
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To reconcile the proof-of-loss and payment-of-claims
provisions with the limitations provision, this Court
adopted the approach of the New Jersey Supreme
Court. It allows the contractual period of limitations in
which to bring a lawsuit against an insurance company
to run until the insured gives notice of a claim to the
insurer. Then, the limitations period is tolled until the
insurer formally denies liability.
6
The New Jersey court
found that this was the best way to give effect to “the
literal language of the limitation provision ....”
7
For good reason, Michigan and New Jersey are not
alone in having adopted the tolling doctrine.
8
As the
leading treatise on insurance law, Couch on Insurance,
states, those courts’ adoption of the tolling doctrine
stems from the pragmatic knowledge that there simply is
no reason to bring suit until the insurer has either formally
denied the claim or delayed so long that the delay itself
becomes the basis for a suit. This rule also avoids the
possibility that the insurer may drag out negotiations while
the period passes, leading either to insureds losing their
rights in a questionable manner or to costly evidentiary
battles over whether the insureds’ actions should be
deemed to be a waiver of the defense, or to estop the
insurer from raising it.
[9]
6
Id. at 593-597, citing Peloso v Hartford Fire Ins Co, 56 NJ 514; 267
A2d 498 (1970).
7
Peloso, 56 NJ at 521.
8
See Guam Housing & Urban Renewal Auth v Dongbu Ins Co, Ltd,
2001 Guam 24; 2001 WL 1555206 (2001); Prudential-LMI Commercial
Ins v Superior Court , 51 Cal 3d 674; 274 Cal Rptr 387; 798 P2d 1230
(1990); Fed S&L Ins Corp v Aetna Cas & Surety Co, 701 F Supp 1357,
1362 (ED Tenn, 1988); Nicholson v Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co, 517 F
Supp 1046, 1051 (ND Ga, 1981); Christiansen v First Ins Co of Hawaii,
Ltd, 88 Hawaii 442; 967 P2d 639 (Hawaii App, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part on other grounds, 88 Hawaii 136 (Hawaii, 1998); Clark v Truck
Ins Exch, 95 Nev 544, 546-547; 598 P2d 628 (1979).
9
17 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 237:39, p 237-45.
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The majority’s decision to abolish the judicial tolling
doctrine inserts insureds between Scylla and Charyb-
dis. If they bring a claim too soon, the court may dismiss
it as unripe. If they wait for the insurer to decide the
claim, they risk a technical forfeiture under a
limitation-of-suit provision.
An insured should not be forced to choose between
filing a premature lawsuit and trusting that the insur-
ance company will consider the claim after the contrac-
tual limitations period has expired. Choosing the first
option may unnecessarily poison the relationship be-
tween the parties. It may create unnecessary litigation
that serves only to burden our overtaxed judicial sys-
tem. Such a result has been accurately called both
“anomalous and inefficient.”
10
Yet choosing the second
option gives insurance companies the opportunity to
avoid coverage on timeliness grounds.
Under the majority’s decision, the insured must not
only file a timely claim, he or she may have to make the
hard decision to sue rather than await a reply. Absent
judicial tolling, the burden on the insured is greatly
increased.
On the contrary, use of the judicial tolling doctrine
guarantees that the insurer shares the burden. The
insurer must pay or deny the claim. The doctrine has
other merits. Under it, the insured has no reason to
delay filing a claim because the limitations period will
not run uninterrupted. And the insurer can take the
necessary time to investigate the claim and decide on
coverage while relevant information is fresh. Removed
is any incentive the insurer would have in the absence
of tolling to prolong the investigation period “in order
to invoke a technical forfeiture of the policy’s ben-
10
Guam Housing, 2001 Guam 24 at 11.
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efits.”
11
Thus, use of the judicial tolling doctrine pro-
motes the quick resolution of insurance claims outside
the courts.
It has been argued that the judicial tolling doctrine is
unnecessary, given the availability of waiver and estop-
pel. It is asserted that these doctrines can alleviate the
harsh result that may occur when an insured allows the
insurer to adjust the claim after the limitations period
expires. However, Couch on Insurance opines that as-
sertion of a claim of waiver or estoppel
may require a discovery and evidentiary side trip from the
substance of the underlying dispute between the parties to
establish who said and did what, when, and to whom. While
this may be the plaintiff’s last hope of being able to bring
the underlying action, in which case the added effort and
expense may still make it worthwhile, it generally calls for
a wider ranging investigation and proof than would be
required for a claim that the same actions effectively
“tolled” the period for some time.
[12]
Moreover, as Tom Thomas recognized, reliance on
the application of waiver or estoppel results in consid-
erable uncertainty about how much time is reasonable
to allow the insurer to bring suit.
13
Conversely, under
the judicial tolling doctrine, the insurance company
“can conclusively determine exactly when the tolling
period will terminate simply by denying the claim after
it completes its investigation.”
14
The majority’s attempt to return the parties to the
certainty of the contractual language actually leaves
them in a state of greater uncertainty. As stated more
than 30 years ago by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
11
Id.at12.
12
17 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 238:1, pp 238-8 to 238-9.
13
Tom Thomas, 396 Mich at 597 n 10.
14
Feldman, Zariski & Eaton, 41 Tort Trial & Ins PracLJat77(2005).
2008] M
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Peloso, judicial tolling “is more satisfactory, and more
easily applied, than the pursuit of the concepts of
waiver and estoppel in each of the many factual pat-
terns which may arise.”
15
RORY
16
AND DEVILLERS
17
Tom Thomas, the case in which this Court first
adopted the judicial tolling doctrine, was recently dis-
cussed in Rory and Devillers. In Rory, the same Su-
preme Court majority as the one in this case held that
judicial assessments of reasonableness cannot be relied
on to invalidate a shortened period of limitations con-
tractually agreed to.
18
In so holding, the majority over-
ruled Tom Thomas to the extent that Tom Thomas
allowed a standard of reasonableness to abrogate un-
ambiguous contractual terms.
19
However, the Rory ma-
jority specifically recognized that the judicial tolling
doctrine was the basis for the Tom Thomas decision,
not whether the contractual limitations period in which
to bring suit was reasonable.
20
Thus, although Rory
rejected Tom Thomas to the extent that it relied on the
“reasonableness” rule, it did not specifically overrule
the judicial tolling doctrine.
Devillers concerned the tolling of a statutory one-
year period in which to bring claims, MCL
500.3145(1).
21
The same majority as the one in this case
reasoned that no authority permitted the judiciary to
15
Peloso, 56 NJ at 521.
16
Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d 23 (2005).
17
Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562; 702 NW2d 539 (2005).
18
Rory, 473 Mich at 470.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 466.
21
Devillers, 473 Mich at 564.
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provide for a tolling of the statutory period.
22
According
to the majority, judicial tolling, as applied to the Devil-
lers case, represented “an unconstitutional usurpation
of legislative authority.”
23
In the case at bar, a contrac-
tual rather than a statutory period of limitations is at
issue. Application of the doctrine of judicial tolling
cannot be said to present an issue of usurpation of
legislative authority. Consequently, neither Rory nor
Devillers controls this case.
It is interesting to note that one of the explanations
given in Devillers for rejecting judicial tolling was the
alleged lack of a sound policy reason for its use there.
However, such a reason exists in this case. The Michi-
gan Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS)
24
has now prohibited the use of contractual one-year
limitations periods in insurance contracts that provide
for uninsured motorist benefits.
25
OFIS found the Court
of Appeals analysis in Rory compelling, although it was
overturned by a majority of this Court.
26
The Court of
Appeals had found that a one-year limitations period is
unreasonable because it does not provide claimants
with sufficient time to investigate potential claims.
27
As
noted by the majority, OFIS has allowed insurance
companies to continue using policy provisions that
22
Id. at 581-583.
23
Id. at 593.
24
OFIS is now the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation,
effective April 6, 2008. Executive Order No. 2008-2.
25
OFIS Order No. 05-060-M, entered December 16, 2005. On April 4,
2006, OFIS issued a similar order addressing underinsured motorist
benefits. And, in May 2007, OFIS added an administrative rule voiding
shortened limitation-of-action clauses in new and revised policies. Mich
Admin Code, R 500.2212.
26
OFIS Order No. 05-060-M, pp 2-4, citing Rory v Continental Ins Co,
262 Mich App 679; 687 NW2d 304 (2004), rev’d Rory, 473 Mich at 491.
27
Rory, 262 Mich App at 685-687.
2008] M
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became part of contracts with insureds before the OFIS
order of prohibition entered. However, the reasoning
adopted in the order of prohibition still persuasively
suggests that application of the one-year period in this
case is against public policy.
The majority believes that courts must stand against
the peril of rule by men instead of law. I agree. Yet I also
believe that courts must stand against the peril of
injustice, because injustice undermines the rule of law.
If the process we adopt for determining liability allows
absurdity to reign and inequity to prevail, people will
look outside the rule of law for the “justice” they
demand.
All too often, the same Supreme Court majority as
that in this case dismisses legitimate legal arguments
by labeling them contrary to the “plain language” of a
statute or contract. But no matter how it is labeled, a
rose is still a rose. In this case, the law in effect when
the parties entered into their contract required judicial
tolling. The one-year limitation-of-suit provision was
not valid. To take from either party the benefit of that
rule of law undermines the rule of the law.
The majority appears to conclude that, because Rory
and Devillers criticized Tom Thomas, the decision in
this case overturns no precedent. It takes the position
that the judicial tolling doctrine is no longer good law.
For the reasons stated earlier, I disagree.
Judicial tolling of a contractually shortened period of
limitations was not directly overruled in Rory or in
Devillers. It promotes the efficient and effective resolu-
tion of insurance claims, and it is fair to insurers and
their insureds. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of
Appeals decision that the limitations period in plain-
tiff’s contract with defendant was tolled by plaintiff’s
216 480 M
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May 10, 2002, letter to defendant until defendant
denied plaintiff’s claim on December 10, 2002.
28
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
It is presumably because the majority believes that
Tom Thomas has already been overruled that it fails to
articulate its reasons to not adhere to stare decisis in this
case. It recognizes that the question whether today’s
decision should apply only prospectively is a legitimate
issue. But it declines to address the question because
plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that plaintiff was aware
of the contractual limitations period before it expired.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that ac-
knowledgement of the existence of the contractual
provision is equivalent to an admission that counsel did
not expect tolling to occur. The acknowledgement was
most likely intended to accelerate the processing of the
claim. In any event, when he wrote it, counsel had good
reason to expect that the judicial tolling doctrine this
Court had endorsed for many years would continue to
be applied. He was entitled to rely on the doctrine when
deciding to allow the insurance company to adjust
plaintiff’s claim without regard to the limitation-of-suit
contractual provision. Thus, I conclude that the major-
ity errs when it refuses to address whether today’s
decision should be given prospective application only.
ESTOPPEL
Finally, plaintiff asserts that her claim should go
forward even if this Court rejects the continued viabil-
28
To the extent that the Court of Appeals concluded in this case and in
West v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan (On Remand), 272 Mich App
58; 723 NW2d 589 (2006), that Rory and Devillers effectively abrogated
the judicial tolling doctrine of Tom Thomas, I disagree.
2008] M
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ity of judicial tolling and gives that decision retroactive
effect. She contends that defendant should be estopped
from asserting the one-year limitations period. She
points out that the trial court found that defendant
engaged in dilatory conduct in processing her claim.
The trial court relied on the facts that defendant (1)
required plaintiff to send interrogatories to the tortfea-
sor to determine if he was collectible before defendant
would respond to the claim, (2) required that plaintiff
not settle with the tortfeasor until defendant approved
the settlement, and (3) after approving the settlement,
purposefully failed to communicate with plaintiff to
negotiate her claim in good faith.
With regard to the last allegation, defendant’s claims
representative noted in an internal status report ap-
proximately one month before the limitations period
expired: “1 yr runs 11-29-02.” Then, the claims repre-
sentative took no further action on the file until after
that date had passed. The next action taken was to
notify plaintiff’s attorney that the claim was being
rejected because the one-year period of limitations had
expired. Notably, defendant’s claims representative ad-
mitted that she had access to the information necessary
to determine the value of plaintiff’s claim before the
limitations period expired, but neglected to act on it.
“It is a familiar rule of law that an estoppel arises when
one by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
through culpable negligence induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.”
[29]
29
Hetchler v American Life Ins Co, 266 Mich 608, 613; 254 NW 221
(1934), quoting Kole v Lampen, 191 Mich 156, 157-158; 157 NW 392
(1916).
218 480 M
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The facts of this case are an example of exactly what
the judicial tolling doctrine was adopted to prevent.
Plaintiff had every reason to expect that her claim
would be processed once she had taken all the steps
requested by defendant. Instead, defendant refrained
from processing the claim and making a decision about
it until after the one-year limitations period had ex-
pired. By sitting on plaintiff’s claim, defendant invoked
a technical forfeiture of the policy’s benefits. A majority
of the justices of this Court has allowed itself to be made
a willing after-the-fact accomplice to defendant’s
wrongdoing.
In August 2002, plaintiff’s counsel inquired of the
claims representative whether she had heard if the
tortfeasor’s 401(k) plan was protected from creditors.
The information was relevant to whether defendant
would grant permission to plaintiff to settle with the
tortfeasor. Plaintiff’s counsel requested that he be in-
formed of the answer so he could decide whether to sue
defendant. In response, defendant advised plaintiff that
it was granting permission to settle the claim against
the tortfeasor. This was the last communication be-
tween the parties until defendant notified plaintiff’s
counsel that the one-year period had expired.
Granting permission to plaintiff to settle with the
tortfeasor could easily have led plaintiff’s counsel to
believe that defendant was still adjusting the claim. It
likely lulled him into believing that defendant would
not enforce the limitations period. Defendant’s silence,
knowing that this was likely plaintiff’s belief, caused
plaintiff to reasonably believe something that was not
true.
Given the state of the law at the time, plaintiff relied
on this belief: judicial tolling prevented plaintiff’s claim
from being lost due to the passage of time. For estoppel
2008] M
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to apply, it was not necessary that plaintiff take any
affirmative action in reliance on the beliefs that defen-
dant induced in plaintiff. “Nonaction in reliance [on the
representations made], resulting in injury, is suffi-
cient.”
30
Obviously, under the majority’s position that
judicial tolling is impermissible, plaintiff was prejudiced
as a result of her reliance on the false belief induced by
defendant’s silence. Thus, plaintiff has shown the facts
necessary to establish estoppel.
31
Contrary to the deci-
sion of the majority, the trial court correctly held that
defendant should be “estopped from seeking shelter in
the one-year limitation given their conduct in the case
atbar....”Accordingly, I conclude in the alternative
that equitable estoppel entitled plaintiff to summary
disposition.
CONCLUSION
Judicial tolling is a pragmatic doctrine that promotes
fairness, efficiency, and certainty in the claims-
adjustment process. It has been used in this and other
states for more than 30 years. The majority’s decision to
abolish the doctrine in Michigan should be lamented by
both insurers and their insureds. Because neither Rory
nor Devillers expressly overruled the use of judicial
tolling in the circumstances presented in this case, I
would hold that the trial court properly applied the
judicial tolling doctrine. Moreover, even if the doctrine
cannot be used to save plaintiff’s claim, I would hold
30
Hetchler, 266 Mich at 614.
31
Id. at 613; Grosse Pointe Park v Michigan Muni Liability & Prop
Pool, 473 Mich 188, 204; 702 NW2d 106 (2005); see also Barbour v
Slaughter, 36 Ill App 3d 857, 862-863; 345 NE2d 113 (1976) (holding that,
by arbitrarily withholding consent to the insured’s personal-injury suit,
the insurer waived the policy requirement that no judgment be taken
against the tortfeasor without the insurer’s consent).
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that defendant is estopped from relying on the contrac-
tually shortened period of limitations.
I would affirm the decisions of the lower courts in
favor of plaintiff.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ., concurred with K
ELLY
,J.
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PEOPLE v HOLLEY
Docket No. 133264. Decided April 23, 2008.
Julias Holley was tried in the Wayne Circuit Court, Thomas E.
Jackson, J., on charges of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and
preventing or attempting to prevent the report of a crime, MCL
750.483a(1)(b). The basis of the charges was the defendant’s
threats to his girlfriend while armed with a knife and his cutting
the telephone cord when she told the defendant that she was going
to call the police. The court found the defendant not guilty of
felonious assault, but convicted him of preventing the report of a
felonious assault, concluding that the prosecution did not need to
prove the felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt. The
defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, Z
AHRA
,P.J., and
C
AVANAGH
,J.(S
CHUETTE
, J., dissenting), reversed in an unpublished
opinion per curiam, issued January 25, 2007 (Docket No. 264584),
essentially concluding that MCL 750.483a(1)(b) requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that a person committed or attempted
to commit the crime sought to be reported. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether an
actual crime was committed or attempted. The prosecution applied
for leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other
peremptory action. 478 Mich 863 (2007).
In an opinion by Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, joined by Justices
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
,andY
OUNG
, the Supreme Court held:
The prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the crime sought to be reported was committed or
attempted by another person in order to obtain a conviction under
MCL 750.483a(1)(b).
1. MCL 750.483a(1)(b) states that it is a crime to “[p]revent or
attempt to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force
another person from reporting a crime committed or attempted by
another person.” The Legislature’s concern in enacting the statute
was to prevent interference with the report of a crime, not with
whether the crime sought to be reported was actually committed
or attempted. Given the placement of this crime in the statutory
scheme and the grammatical context in which the phrase “crime
222 480 M
ICH
222 [Apr
committed or attempted” is used, the prosecution is not required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that another person commit-
ted or attempted to commit the crime sought to be reported.
2. The elements of a violation of MCL 750.483a(1), which the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are (1) that a
defendant prevented or attempted to prevent (2) through the
unlawful use of physical force (3) someone from reporting a crime
committed or attempted by another person.
3. A report of a crime necessarily entails the subjective percep-
tion of the person who is reporting. It is the perception of the
person seeking to report the crime or attempt that is significant,
not whether the crime was actually committed or attempted.
Reversed; conviction reinstated.
Justice K
ELLY
, joined by Justices C
AVANAGH
and M
ARKMAN
,
dissenting, would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of a crime. MCL 750.483a(1)(b) prohibits a person from
unlawfully using physical force to prevent or attempt to prevent
another person from reporting a crime committed or attempted by
another person. Thus, the third element of the offense is that another
person sought to report a crime that had been committed or at-
tempted by another person. The statute does not prohibit preventing
or attempting to prevent another person from reporting a possible or
alleged crime or a crime that the person perceived as having been
committed. If another person has not committed or attempted a
crime, a defendant cannot be convicted under the statute. Because it
is not clear that the prosecution proved the third element beyond a
reasonable doubt in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed
the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
C
RIMINAL
L
AW —
R
EPORTS OF
C
RIMES —
I
NTERFERENCE WITH
R
EPORTS OF
C
RIMES
—
P
ROSECUTING
A
TTORNEYS —
B
URDEN OF
P
ROOF
.
The prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the crime sought to be reported was attempted or committed in
order to obtain a conviction for the offense of preventing or attempt-
ing to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force a person
from reporting a crime attempted or committed (MCL
750.483a[1][b]).
Michael A. Cox, A ttorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney,
Timothy A Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and
Appeals, and David A. McReedy, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for the people.
2008] P
EOPLE V
H
OLLEY
223
State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac) for
the defendant.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. At issue is whether MCL 750.483a(1)(b),
which provides that a “person shall not...[p]revent or
attempt to prevent through the unlawful use of
physical force another person from reporting a crime
committed or attempted by another person,” requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that someone committed or attempted to commit the
crime that was sought to be reported, in this case
felonious assault, in order to secure a conviction.
Because we conclude that neither the placement of
subsection 1(b) in the statutory scheme of MCL
750.483a nor the grammatical construction of subsec-
tion 1(b) requires such proof, we reverse the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals that held to the contrary
and reinstate defendant’s conviction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 7, 2005, defendant arrived at the house of
his child’s mother, Peggy Gordon. Defendant had been
drinking, and he and Gordon began to argue. After
Gordon asked defendant to leave, defendant went to the
kitchen and returned with a knife. While approaching
Gordon with the knife, defendant said, “I’ll hurt you.”
Gordon replied, “No you won’t.” When Gordon reached
for the telephone and told defendant that she was going
to call the police, defendant grabbed the telephone and
cut the telephone cords with the knife. Defendant then
threw the knife on the stool where the telephone was
located. Although defendant never pointed the knife
directly at Gordon, she testified that defendant was
within arm’s reach of her with the knife in his hand and
224 480 M
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that she believed that he was going to hurt her. After
defendant left Gordon’s home, she summoned the po-
lice.
Defendant was charged with felonious assault and
the offense of preventing or attempting to prevent the
report of a crime. Following a bench trial, the trial court
found defendant not guilty of felonious assault. How-
ever, with regard to the charge of preventing or at-
tempting to prevent the report of a crime, the court
concluded that the prosecution did not need to prove
felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, in a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction. In analyzing MCL
750.483a(1)(b), the Court, focusing only on the phrase
“a crime committed or attempted” in isolation and not
recognizing the structure of the entire statute or the
specific criminal act prohibited by subsection 1(b),
essentially concluded that MCL 750.483a(1)(b) requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person commit-
ted or attempted to commit the crime sought to be
reported.
1
It remanded the case with instructions to the
trial court to determine whether an actual crime was
committed or attempted. The dissenting judge would
have affirmed the conviction.
The prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this
Court. After directing the parties to address whether
MCL 750.483a(1)(b) requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a person committed or attempted to commit
a crime, we heard oral argument on whether to grant
the application or take other peremptory action, as
permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1).
2
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 25, 2007 (Docket
No. 264584).
2
478 Mich 863 (2007).
2008] P
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether MCL 750.483a(1)(b) requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that a person committed or at-
tempted to commit a crime is a question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo.
3
When inter-
preting statutory language, a court must keep in mind
the plain meaning of the language employed, as well as
its placement in the statutory scheme and the gram-
matical context in which it is used.
4
III. ANALYSIS
The statutory scheme at issue in this case involves
MCL 750.483a, which broadly criminalizes attempts to
interfere with the reporting, investigating, or prosecu-
tion of crimes. MCL 750.483a(1)(a)
5
forbids, generally,
the withholding of testimony, information, or docu-
ments. Next, MCL 750.483a(1)(b)
6
forbids, generally,
interference with a person seeking to report a crime.
MCL 750.483a(1)(c)
7
forbids, generally, retaliation
against a person who reported a crime. The statute
3
People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 116; 734 NW2d 548 (2007).
4
People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 114-115; 712 NW2d 419 (2006).
5
MCL 750.483a(1)(a) provides that a person shall not “[w]ithhold or
refuse to produce any testimony, information, document, or thing after
the court has ordered it to be produced following a hearing.”
6
MCL 750.483a(1)(b) provides that a person shall not “[p]revent or
attempt to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force another
person from reporting a crime committed or attempted by another
person.”
7
MCL 750.483a(1)(c) provides that a person shall not
[r]etaliate or attempt to retaliate against another person for
having reported or attempted to report a crime committed or
attempted by another person. As used in this subsection,
“retaliate” means to do any of the following:
(i) Commit or attempt to commit a crime against any person.
226 480 M
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continues with MCL 750.483a(3),
8
which criminalizes
the bribing, threatening, or influencing of those who
give information to the police. Finally, MCL
750.483a(5)
9
concerns tampering with and destroying
evidence.
As is evident, all the offenses described attempt to
prevent interference, of one sort or another, with the
investigation of a crime or the administration of justice.
By including MCL 750.483a(1)(b) and its criminaliza-
tion of the interference with the report of a crime
within this statutory scheme, the Legislature has made
clear that its concern was to prevent interference with
the report of a crime and not with whether the crime
being reported was actually committed or attempted.
(ii) Threaten to kill or injure any person or threaten to cause
property damage.
8
MCL 750.483a(3) provides:
A person shall not do any of the following:
(a) Give, offer to give, or promise anything of value to any person
to influence a person’s statement to a police officer conducting a
lawful investigation of a crime or the presentation of evidence to a
police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime.
(b) Threaten or intimidate any person to influence a person’s
statement to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a
crime or the presentation of evidence to a police officer conducting
a lawful investigation of a crime.
9
MCL 750.483a(5) provides:
A person shall not do any of the following:
(a) Knowingly and intentionally remove, alter, conceal, destroy,
or otherwise tamper with evidence to be offered in a present or
future official proceeding.
(b) Offer evidence at an official proceeding that he or she
recklessly disregards as false.
2008] P
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227
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This conclusion is harmonious with the proper con-
struction of the statute, MCL 750.483a(1)(b), which
lays out the elements of the offense of preventing the
reporting of a crime. As defined by the Legislature in
MCL 750.483a(1)(b), the elements that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are (1) that a
defendant prevented or attempted to prevent, (2)
through the unlawful use of physical force, (3) someone
from reporting a crime committed or attempted by
another person.
The criminal action that MCL 750.483a(1)(b) prohib-
its is found in the phrase “[p]revent or attempt to
prevent.” As used in the statute, the verb “prevent” is
transitive in nature,
10
which means that there must be
something that is prevented or sought to be prevented.
11
In MCL 750.483a(1)(b), what is actually prevented or
sought to be prevented is a report of a crime by another
person and not “a crime committed or attempted by
another person.”
This is significant because a report will necessarily
entail the subjective perception of the person who is
reporting. “R eport” is relevantly defined as “a detailed
account of an event, situation, etc., [usually] based on
observation or inquiry.”
12
And “observation” is defined
as “an act or instance of noticing or perceiving.”
13
Therefore, although the term “perceived” is not ex-
pressly stated in MCL 750.483a(1)(b), it is inherently
implied by the use of the term “report,” which is the
10
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).
11
Sabin, The Gregg Reference Manual, Ninth Edition (New York: Glen-
coe McGraw-Hill, 2001), pp 556, 561; Weinhold, The Tongue Untied, A guide
to grammar, punctuation, and style <http://grammar.uoregon.edu/verbs/
transitive.html> (accessed December 5, 2007).
12
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).
13
Id. (emphasis added).
228 480 M
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focus of the criminal act proscribed by the statute, and
it is the perception of the person reporting that “a crime
[has been] committed or attempted by another person”
that is significant, not whether the crime was actually
committed or attempted.
14
Finally, defendant argues that, because the statute
specifically refers to a crime “committed or attempted,”
it must require proof of the actual commission or
attempted commission of a crime and that any other
interpretation would render this phrase superfluous.
15
14
Although the dissent accuses the majority of reading words into the
statute, the dissenting justice cannot challenge the unmistakable fact
that the verb “prevent” is transitive in nature and that it focuses on the
action of reporting. And she cannot meaningfully challenge the meaning
of the term “report.” Nor has she explained why the language “commit-
ted or attempted” is included in MCL 750.483a(1)(b) when the word
“crime,” by itself, implicates a completed act. See MCL 750.5 (“ ‘Crime’
means an act or omission forbidden by law....”).Instead, the dissenting
justice adds her own words to the construction of the statute by adding an
additional verb: “crime... was committed or attempted.” It is only
through this unwarranted addition that the dissenting justice is able to
effectively create the additional element that she would like the prosecu-
tion to prove.
15
To support this argument, defendant relies on this Court’s interpre-
tation in People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305; 353 NW2d 444 (1984), of a
phrase found in the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b. The current
version of the phrase is “[a] person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a
felony.” Apparently defendant’s argument is fairly effective, because it
convinced not only the Court of Appeals majority but also the dissenting
justice in this Court. It is fallacious to conclude as the dissent does that
Burgess has any relevance to the interpretation of the statute before us,
MCL 750.483a(1)(b), for several reasons. First, to reach such a conclu-
sion, we would have to assume that the Legislature, in enacting MCL
450.483a(1)(b), was aware of this Court’s judicial construction of MCL
750.227b, an entirely unrelated statute. Such an assumption would
impose on the Legislature the unreasonable burden of keeping abreast of
all judicial pronouncements involving the construction of all statutes,
even those that are unrelated. Cf. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 509
n 20; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). Second, the context in which the words
“commits or attempts” are used in the felony-firearm statute, specifically
2008] P
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OLLEY
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This assertion cannot be correct because although de-
fendant here was the one who was accused of commit-
ting the crime that was being reported, the statute does
not require that the person accused of interfering with
the report of a crime be the person who also committed
the crime being reported. Rather, the statute’s plain
language criminalizes preventing or attempting to pre-
vent the reporting of “a crime committed or attempted
by another person.” The statute does not state that it
criminalizes preventing or attempting to prevent the
reporting of a crime committed or attempted by the
person who is preventing the reporting. This distinction
is significant because whether another person—who is
not on trial for the offense of interfering with the report
of a crime—committed or attempted to commit the
crime being or sought to be reported is irrelevant to
whether the person who is on trial for interfering with
the report of a crime actually interfered or attempted to
interfere with the report of a crime. For example, if
person A commits a crime, and person B tries to report
the crime, but person C prevents person B from making
the report, whether person C is guilty of interfering
with the report has nothing to do with whether the
prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
person A committed the crime being reported. In other
in conjunction with the term “when,” makes it clear that a defendant
must actually be committing the underlying felony at the time he or she
possesses the firearm; as previously discussed, the context in which
“committed or attempted” is used in MCL 450.483a(1)(b) does not
require a similar conclusion. Third, the felony-firearm statute requires
that the person who possessed the firearm also be the person who
committed or attempted to commit the crime; as will be discussed, MCL
450.483a(1)(b) does not require that the person who interfered with the
report of a crime also be the person who committed or attempted to
commit the crime being or sought to be reported, and the culpability of
the person who interfered with the report cannot hinge on the guilt of
another person.
230 480 M
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words, the culpability of the person accused of interfering
with the report of a crime cannot hinge on the guilt of
another person. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the
phrase “committed or attempted” is necessary to establish
that the reporter need not be attempting to report an
accomplished crime; interference with the report of an
attempted crime is enough. The statute would not achieve
its purpose if it merely referred to a report of “a crime”
because this implies a completed crime. It therefore fol-
lows that the prosecution is not required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the crime being reported was
committed or attempted.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the prosecution is not re-
quired to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime
sought to be reported was attempted or committed by
another person in order to obtain a conviction under MCL
750.483a(1)(b) because the placement of § 483a(1)(b) in
the statutory scheme and the grammatical context in
which the phrase “crime committed or attempted” is used
do not require such an interpretation and the plain
language of the statute can be interpreted to reach a result
that is consistent with the statutory scheme. Accordingly,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals that held
otherwise and reinstate defendant’s conviction.
Reversed.
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
, and Y
OUNG
, JJ., concurred with
T
AYLOR
, C.J.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). After a bench trial, defendant
was convicted of interfering with the report of a crime.
1
1
MCL 750.483a(1)(b).
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The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Now the
majority reinstates it, and I dissent from that decision.
Prosecutors are still required to prove each element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because it is not clear
that the third element of the crime was proved in this
case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
stand.
THE FACTS
The alleged facts are as follows. Defendant and the
complainant, P eggy Gordon, had a child together. On
March 7, 2005, defendant arrived at Gordon’s home. An
argument ensued. At one point in the argument, defen-
dant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and told Gordon
that he was going to hurt her. Gordon told him, “No you
won’t.” As Gordon moved to pick up the phone to call the
police, defendant cut the telephone cord. He then stated,
“That’s not me,” put down the knife, and left the home.
Gordon substituted a different phone cord and called the
police.
Defendant was arrested and charged with assault
with a dangerous weapon and interfering with the
report of a crime. He opted for a bench trial before
Judge Thomas E. Jackson of the Wayne Circuit Court.
Judge Jackson found that the prosecution had not met
its burden to prove assault with a dangerous weapon,
and he acquitted defendant of this charge. On the
charge of interfering with the report of a crime, the
judge entered a provisional verdict of guilty. But he
asked the parties to address whether the statute pro-
hibiting interference with the report of a crime requires
that a crime actually had been committed or attempted.
Specifically, the judge stated:
[I]f , in fact, [Gordon] only has to perceive a crime being
committed and that is in her mind . . . if, it’s enough that she
232 480 M
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perceived it, then that’s enough for that charge to stand. If, in
fact, it has to be an actual crime for that particular one to
stand, then I would find that that doesn’t stand.
After considering the parties’ arguments, Judge Jack-
son accepted the prosecution’s position that the statute
requires only that the person reporting the crime perceive
that a crime had been committed or attempted. Relying on
this interpretation, he found defendant guilty of interfer-
ing with the report of a crime.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s
conviction in a split, unpublished opinion.
2
The majority
held that the offense of interfering with the report of a
crime does not require the defendant to have been
convicted of the underlying crime. But it does require
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a crime had been committed or attempted. Because
the trial judge thought that the complainant’s percep-
tion that a crime had been committed or attempted was
sufficient to convict, the majority reversed defendant’s
conviction and remanded the case. Judge S
CHUETTE
dissented.
Following the Court of Appeals decision, the prosecu-
tion applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We heard
argument on the application to consider whether MCL
750.483a(1)(b) requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a person committed or attempted to commit
a crime.
3
ADEQUATE PROOF OF THE THIRD ELEMENT MAY BE LACKING
The most basic rule of criminal procedure is that a
defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the
2
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 25, 2007 (Docket
No. 264584).
3
478 Mich 863 (2007).
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prosecution has proved each element of it beyond a
reasonable doubt.
4
The issue in this case is whether the
offense of interfering with the report of a crime requires
the prosecution to prove that another person commit-
ted or attempted to commit a crime.
MCL 750.483a(1)(b) provides:
(1) A person shall not do any of the following:
***
(b) Prevent or attempt to prevent through the unlawful
use of physical force another person from reporting a crime
committed or attempted by another person.
Under the statutory definition of this crime, the
prosecution must prove the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction: (1) the
defendant used unlawful physical force, (2) the unlaw-
ful physical force prevented or attempted to prevent
another person from reporting a crime, and (3) the
crime sought to be reported was committed or at-
tempted by another person.
5
It follows, therefore, that a
4
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368
(1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.”); People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 629; 625 NW2d 10
(2001) (“Together, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘indisputably
entitle a criminal defendant to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ”) (citations omitted).
5
The majority claims that my construction adds a word to the third
element of the statute. It is true that I use the word “was.” However, I use
the word for the sake of clarity, not to alter the meaning of the statutory
language. This is illustrated by the fact that I can omit the word and
reach the same result. There is another way to phrase the elements of the
crime that does not use the word “was”: (1) the defendant used unlawful
physical force (2) to prevent or attempt to prevent another person from
234 480 M
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defendant cannot be convicted of interfering with the
report of a crime unless the prosecution proves beyond
a reasonable doubt the third element of that crime: (a)
that another person sought to report a crime and (b)
that the crime had been committed or attempted by
another person.
6
Here, the finder of fact, the trial judge, assumed that
the statute requires only that the person seeking to
report a crime perceived that a crime had been commit-
ted or attempted. Because this is an incorrect interpre-
tation of the statute, defendant’s conviction cannot
stand. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that reversed defendant’s conviction.
The Court of Appeals was correct in remanding the case
to the trial court. That court should consider whether
the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant or another person committed or attempted to
commit the crime sought to be reported.
7
reporting a crime (3) committed or attempted by another person. Under
this rephrasing of the elements, the prosecution still must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that another person committed or attempted to
commit the crime sought to be reported.
The majority also claims that my interpretation does not give effect to
the phrase “committed or attempted.” I disagree. This language is
included to make clear that one violates the provision by interfering with
the reporting of a committed crime or an attempted crime. My interpre-
tation recognizes this fact.
6
The statute specifies “a crime committed or attempted by another
person.” It does not require that defendant or another person be
convicted of the underlying crime. Therefore, the prosecution need prove
beyond a reasonable doubt only that the crime sought to be reported was
committed or attempted by another person. It need not prove that
defendant or another person was convicted of the underlying crime.
7
In making this determination, the trial court normally would consider
whether the behavior of defendant that prompted the alleged victim to
call the police constituted a crime. But the judge was the trier of fact here.
And a judge, unlike a jury, is not allowed to reach inconsistent verdicts.
Hence, the judge cannot find defendant guilty of interfering with the
2008] P
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ELLY
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The majority concludes that the prosecution need not
prove that an actual crime was committed or attempted
because “[i]n MCL 750.483a(1)(b), what is actually
being prevented or sought to be prevented is a report of
a crime by another person and not ‘a crime committed
or attempted by another person.’ ”
8
It is accurate to
state that the statute prohibits preventing or attempt-
ing to prevent another person from reporting a crime.
However, the statute also requires that the crime
sought to be reported was committed or attempted by
another person. If any one of the statutory require-
ments is not satisfied, there can be no conviction. Thus,
if no crime has been committed or attempted by an-
other person, the statute cannot be violated. It is that
simple.
THE MAJORITY’S ERROR
The glaring weakness in the majority’s interpreta-
tion is that, in order to justify its conclusion, it reads
language into the statute. The majority essentially
interprets the statute as providing that a person is
guilty of interfering with the report of a crime if the
person “prevents or attempts to prevent through the
unlawful use of physical force another person from
reporting a crime that the reporter perceives to have been
committed or attempted by another person.”
Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the statute
does not prohibit preventing or attempting to prevent
another from reporting a “perceived” crime, or a “pos-
report of a crime using the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon as
the underlying crime. The judge has already acquitted defendant of that
charge. See People v Ellis, 468 Mich 25, 26; 658 NW2d 142 (2003). The
judge could consider, however, whether defendant committed a crime that
is a lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.
8
Ante at 228.
236 480 M
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sible” crime, or an “alleged” crime. It prohibits prevent-
ing or attempting to prevent another person “from
reporting a crime committed or attempted by another
person.” The majority’s opinion is defective because it
fails to read the statute as it is actually written.
9
Holding that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported
was committed or attempted by another person is
consistent with this Court’s decision in People v Bur-
gess.
10
In Burgess, the defendant’s underlying convic-
tion of felonious assault had been reversed. The issue
was whether, in light of the reversal, his conviction for
the offense of possessing a firearm during the commis-
sion of a felony could stand.
At the time, the felony-firearm statute
11
provided in
relevant part: “(1) A person who carries or has in his
possession a firearm at the time he commits or attempts
to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 or
section 227a, is guilty of a felony, and shall be impris-
oned for 2 years.”
The Burgess Court held that an element of felony-
firearm was that a defendant committed or attempted
to commit a felony.
12
The language used in the felony-
9
It is possible that some may find the majority opinion compelling
because of the facts alleged and the verdict of not guilty of assault with a
dangerous weapon. As alleged, the facts could well have supported a
guilty verdict for this charge. But that is not the issue before this Court.
Rather, our task is limited to ascertaining the elements of interfering
with the report of a crime and deciding whether the prosecution proved
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. As I have demonstrated, a
remand is required. It is not clear that the prosecution satisfied its
burden, given the trial court’s verdict of not guilty of the crime of assault
with a dangerous weapon.
10
People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305; 353 NW2d 444 (1984).
11
MCL 750.227b.
12
Burgess, 419 Mich at 310.
2008] P
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firearm statute and the language used in the statute
prohibiting interference with the report of a crime are
similar. The felony-firearm statute prohibits a person
from carrying a firearm when he or she “commits or
attempts to commit a felony....”Thestatute prohib-
iting interference with the report of a crime prohibits
an individual from preventing or attempting to prevent
another person from reporting “a crime committed or
attempted ....”
The Burgess Court concluded that the felony-firearm
statue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony.
This logic supports holding that the statute under
consideration here requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the crime sought to be reported was com-
mitted or attempted by another person.
13
CONCLUSION
The statute prohibiting interference with the report
of a crime prohibits a person from unlawfully using
physical force to prevent or attempt to prevent “an-
other person from reporting a crime committed or
13
Contrary to the implications of the majority opinion, I do not claim
that Burgess is controlling. The language of the statute at issue is
controlling. My interpretation is consistent with that language. The
majority’s is not. While Burgess is not controlling, I believe that it is
relevant to highlight a weakness in the majority’s position. My interpre-
tation is consistent with decisions of this Court interpreting similar
language, whereas the majority’s is not.
The majority argues that we should not assume that the Legislature
was aware of the interpretation that the Burgess Court gave the
felony-firearm statute when it enacted the instant statute. But I do not
need to make such an assumption to find Burgess relevant. Even if the
majority were correct that we should not assume this fact, this Court is
obligated to be aware of its own judicial construction of the similarly
worded felony-firearm statute. And the Court should take guidance from
that interpretation in this case.
238 480 M
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attempted by another person.” It necessarily follows
that, if no crime has been committed or attempted by
another person, a defendant cannot be convicted under
this statute. Because the majority opinion holds to the
contrary, I dissent.
C
AVANAGH
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred with K
ELLY
,J.
2008] P
EOPLE V
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ELLY
,J.
PEOPLE v COUZENS
Docket No. 135248. Decided April 23, 2008.
James Couzens III was convicted by a jury in the Macomb Circuit
Court, Diane M. Druzinski, J., of embezzlement of $20,000 or
more, MCL 750.174(5)(a), for removing and retaining assets that
he had transferred into an account created in his son’s name under
the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act (UTMA), MCL 554.521 et seq.
The Court of Appeals, B
ANDSTRA
,P.J., and Z
AHRA
and F
ORT
H
OOD
,
JJ., affirmed the conviction, holding in part that transfers made
pursuant to the UTMA are irrevocable and that custodial property
placed in such an account is indefeasibly vested in the minor.
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 24, 2007 (Docket No.
269379). The defendant sought leave to appeal.
In a unanimous opinion per curiam, the Supreme Court, in lieu
of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument,
held:
Transfers made pursuant to the UTMA are irrevocable, and the
custodial property placed in such an account is indefeasibly vested
in the minor.
1. The defendant’s argument that following the formalities of
the UTMA created only the presumption of a gift is not supported
by the plain language of the statute, which makes no mention of a
rebuttable presumption of donative intent. Further, even if such a
presumption existed, the defendant presented no evidence that
would have rebutted it.
2. A reasonable trier of fact could have determined that the
defendant’s access to and control over the assets in question after
the transfer was only by virtue of his role as custodian of the
account. Although the defendant owned the stocks before he
transferred them to the UTMA account, once they were trans-
ferred, the plain language of the UTMA indicates that they became
an irrevocable gift.
3. The UTMA provision authorizing a custodian to retain
custodial property received from a transferor did not entitle the
defendant to retain property that had been transferred to the
account in light of the provisions requiring custodians to hold and
240 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
invest the property and to observe the standard of care that is
appropriate when dealing with the property of another.
4. Because the defendant retained all proceeds of the UTMA
account, retransferred the assets from the account to his own
personal account, and left nothing in the account for his son, a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he converted the assets
to his own use rather than using them as a reimbursement for
expenses he incurred as custodian of the UTMA account, particu-
larly in light of the fact that the provision allowing such expenses
to be reimbursed specifically prohibits reimbursement to the
person who transferred the assets. This evidence was also suffi-
cient to support a finding that, at the time the defendant converted
the assets, he intended to defraud or cheat the account principal.
Affirmed.
S
TATUTES —
U
NIFORM
T
RANSFER TO
M
INORS
A
CT —
I
RREVOCABILITY
.
Transfers made pursuant to the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act are
irrevocable, and the custodial property placed in such an account
is indefeasibly vested in the minor (MCL 554.521 et seq.).
Gary L. Kohut for the defendant.
P
ER
C
URIAM.
At issue in this case is whether assets
deposited by the custodian in an account established
under the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act, MCL
554.521 et seq., become the property of the principal or
whether they may be withdrawn by the account’s
custodian for his own use. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that transfers made pursuant to the act are
irrevocable and the custodial property placed in such an
account is indefeasibly vested in the minor. We agree,
and accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals decision on
this issue. Defendant’s application for leave to appeal
on the remaining issues is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be re-
viewed by this Court. In affirming the Court of Appeals,
we adopt as our own the relevant part of its unpub-
lished opinion per curiam, issued July 24, 2007 (Docket
No. 269379):
2008] P
EOPLE V
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OUZENS
241
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of
embezzlement of $20,000 or more, MCL 750.174(5)(a), for
which he was sentenced to two years’ probation. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Defendant’s conviction arises out of his embezzlement
of funds deposited into an account created pursuant to the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (“UTMA”), MCL 554.521
et seq.
1
Barbara Couzens, defendant’s ex-wife, testified that
she and defendant married in 1971 and divorced in 1990.
They had two children during their marriage, Kelly
Couzens and James Couzens IV, or “T.J.” Barbara had sole
physical custody of T.J. after the divorce. The last time that
defendant visited T.J. following the divorce was in the
summer of 1990.
On March 16, 1999, defendant opened an account with
Brown & Company, a financial institution, pursuant to the
UTMA in T.J.’s name, naming himself as the custodian of
the account. T.J. was living with Barbara at that time and
both were unaware of the account until T.J. filed his first
income tax return [and] the IRS contacted him regarding
the assets.
At the time that defendant opened the UTMA account,
he had a preexisting Brown & Company account in his
name only. The UTMA account statement covering the
period during which the UTMA account was opened indi-
cated that on March 31, 1999, certain shares of stock were
transferred into the account from defendant’s personal
account, including 300 shares of Bemis stock, 2,000 shares
of Reynolds [and] Reynolds Company stock, 200 shares of
DTE stock, 1,243 shares of Comerica stock, and 100 shares
of Exxon Mobil stock. Likewise, the statement of defen-
dant’s personal account covering the same time period
indicated that these stocks had been transferred to the
UTMA account.
In June 1999, Brown & Company issued a check in the
amount of $11,989.60 payable to “James Couzens III cus-
todian for James Couzens IV.” Neither Barbara nor T.J.
received proceeds from that check. In the same month,
242 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
Brown & Company issued a check in the amount of
$8,789.70 payable to “James Couzens III custodian for
James Couzens IV.” Neither Barbara nor T.J. received any
portion of those funds. Defendant endorsed both checks as
“James Couzens III Cust James Couzens IV.” The state-
ment of the UTMA account covering April 30, 1999,
through June 25, 1999, indicates that the amounts of the
checks represented sales of Bemis and DTE stock. At some
point, similar checks were issued in the amounts of
$6,330.50 and $539.62, none of which funds T.J. received.
The value of defendant’s personal account on February 25,
2000, was $153,021.95. At some point thereafter, defendant
wrote a letter authorizing the transfer of certain shares of
Comerica, Exxon Mobil, and Reynolds and Reynolds Com-
pany stock from the UTMA account back to his personal
account. A statement of the UTMA account covering the
dates July 28, 2000, through August 25, 2000, indicated that
the approximate value of the account was $187,019.31 at that
time. A statement of the account for the following period,
August 25, 2000, through September 29, 2000, however,
indicated an approximate value of $5,750.72. In addition, a
statement of defendant’s personal account covering the same
period indicated that shares of Comerica, Exxon Mobil, and
Reynolds and Reynolds Company stock were transferred to
that account from the UTMA account as indicated in defen-
dant’s letter. The statement also indicated that defendant’s
personal account had grown to $641,449.49 by September 29,
2000.
T.J. received approximately $20,000 from accounts that
he discovered in his name at Comerica Bank and Wells
Fargo, but received nothing from the Brown & Company
UTMA account. Further, Barbara never received any
money from the UTMA account to use for T.J.’s benefit. At
one point, defendant issued a check in the amount of
$12,911.00 to “T.J. and Bonnie,”
2
only $6,455.50 of which
was intended for T.J. He did not cash the check because it
did not account for all the money that had been in the
UTMA account. According to T.J., the remaining assets in
the UTMA account were transferred back to defendant’s
personal account before T.J. turned 18, and nothing re-
2008] P
EOPLE V
C
OUZENS
243
mained in the UTMA account when T.J. turned 18. At the
time of trial, T.J. was still involved with the IRS, which
viewed the assets deducted from the UTMA account as
income and required T.J. to pay taxes on it.
Robert Kish testified that he worked with defendant for
15 years before Kish retired. Kish signed two demand notes
as a witness to defendant’s signature on the notes. The
demand notes list “James Couzens IV” as the borrower and
defendant as the lender and purport to lend certain shares
of stock to the borrower. “Custodian for James Couzens
IV” is listed as the signature of the borrower. Kish testified
that although he signed the demand notes, he did not read
them in detail. Defendant’s theory of defense at trial was
that he did not intend to give T.J. the stocks, but rather, in
accordance with the demand notes, the stocks were in-
tended only as a loan for the purpose of tax planning.
The jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense.
Thereafter, he moved for a directed verdict of acquittal or,
in the alternative, for a new trial, both of which the trial
court denied. Defendant also moved to disallow restitution,
and the trial court denied that motion as well. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
1. DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motions for a directed verdict made during and
after trial. We disagree. When reviewing a trial court’s
decision denying a motion for a directed verdict, made
either during trial or after conviction, we review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the offense were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105,
113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006); People v Burgenmeyer, 461
Mich 431, 434; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
At the time that defendant committed the offense, MCL
750.174
3
provided, in pertinent part:
244 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
“(1) A person who as the agent, servant, or employee of
another person, governmental entity within this state, or
other legal entity or who as the trustee, bailee, or custodian
of the property of another person, governmental entity
within this state, or other legal entity fraudulently disposes
of or converts to his or her own use, or takes or secretes
with the intent to convert to his or her own use without the
consent of his or her principal, any money or other personal
property of his or her principal that has come to that
person’s possession or that is under his or her charge or
control by virtue of his or her being an agent, servant,
employee, trustee, bailee, or custodian, is guilty of em-
bezzlement.
***
“(5) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of
a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10
years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00 or 3 times the
value of the money or property embezzled, whichever is
greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:
“(a) The money or personal property embezzled has a
value of $20,000.00 or more.”
In People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 683; 660 NW2d 322
(2002), this Court articulated the elements of embezzle-
ment by an agent pursuant to the statute as follows:
“(1) the money in question must belong to the principal,
(2) the defendant must have a relationship of trust with the
principal as an agent or employee, (3) the money must
come into the defendant’s possession because of the rela-
tionship of trust, (4) the defendant dishonestly disposed of
or converted the money to his own use or secreted the
money, (5) the act must be without the consent of the
principal, and (6) at the time of conversion, the defendant
intended to defraud or cheat the principal.”
An additional element of the crime charged in this case is
that the property embezzled be worth $20,000 or more.
MCL 750.174(5)(a). Defendant argues that the prosecutor
failed to establish elements (1), (3), (4), and (6).
2008] P
EOPLE V
C
OUZENS
245
Regarding the first element, defendant contends that
stocks used to fund the UTMA account did not belong to
the principal, his son T.J., because there was no valid
common-law gift of the stocks and no valid account was
created pursuant to the UTMA. The prosecutor’s theory
was not that there existed a valid common-law gift of the
stocks, but rather, that defendant conveyed the stocks to
T.J. via a lawful UTMA account. The prosecutor presented
as evidence the account documents showing that defendant
opened the account in T.J.’s name and that defendant
identified himself as the custodian of the account. The
prosecutor also presented as evidence the statements of
both the UTMA account and defendant’s personal account,
showing that, to fund the account, defendant transferred
certain shares of stock from his personal account into the
UTMA account.
Defendant argues that no valid UTMA account existed
because following the formalities of the UTMA created only
the presumption of a gift, which may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence showing a lack of donative intent.
In support of his argument, defendant relies on case law
from other jurisdictions.
4
The plain language of the UTMA,
however, makes no mention of a rebuttable presumption of
donative intent. Rather, it states that custodial property is
created and a transfer is made pursuant to procedures
enumerated in MCL 554.533. Defendant does not argue
that he did not satisfy those procedures. In addition,
Robert Huth, the prosecutor’s expert witness, testified that
deposits made into a UTMA account are irrevocable. Be-
cause the language of the UTMA cannot be read as creating
a rebuttable presumption of donative intent regarding
transfers under the act, and the prosecutor presented
evidence as such at trial, defendant’s argument that such a
presumption exists lacks merit.
Even if a rebuttable presumption of donative intent did
exist, however, defendant did not present evidence that,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
rebutted such a presumption. Defendant relies on two
demand notes, which he argues shows that the stocks were
intended merely as loans and not as gifts. Robert Kish,
246 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
defendant’s former coworker and friend, testified that he
signed the demand notes as a witness, but did not read
them in detail. He further testified that he thought that he
signed the demand notes on the same day, although he was
not sure. Because the demand notes cover transfers that
were made several months apart, Kish’s testimony tended
to support the prosecutor’s argument that the demand
notes were a sham.
Further supporting the prosecutor’s argument is that,
according to the demand notes, “the borrower,” or T.J., is
entitled to dividend income, but both T.J. and his mother,
defendant’s ex-wife, testified that they received nothing
from the UTMA account. In addition, it is questionable
whether the demand notes are dated and, if they are dated,
whether they are dated correctly. The demand note pur-
portedly dated December 1, 1999, pertains to a transfer
that was completed sometime before September 19, 1999,
the date on which the stocks were transferred from the
UTMA account back into defendant’s personal account.
Thus, the shares of stock at issue in the demand note could
not have been loaned to the UTMA account pursuant to the
demand note if it did not yet exist.
[*]
Alternatively, if the
demand note’s reference to “12/1/99” was not meant to
reflect the date of the demand note, then it was simply not
dated. Either alternative tends to support the prosecutor’s
argument that the notes were a sham. Accordingly, even if
following the procedures outlined in the UTMA created
only a rebuttable presumption of donative intent, as defen-
dant argues, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, defendant did not overcome the pre-
sumption. Therefore, a rational trier of fact could have
determined that a valid UTMA account was created and
that the assets placed in the account belonged to T.J., the
principal, and not to defendant.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor failed to
establish the third element, i.e., that the money came into
* While defendant claims that the UTMA assets were retransferred to
his personal account on September 19, 2000 (not September 19, 1999),
the timing of the transfer does not affect the primary issue in this case.
2008] P
EOPLE V
C
OUZENS
247
defendant’s possession because of a relationship of trust.
Defendant asserts that he did not gain access to the assets
because of a relationship of trust because he owned the
stocks before he transferred them to the UTMA account.
Once the assets were transferred, however, the transfer
was irrevocable under MCL 554.528, which provides that
“[a] person may make a transfer by irrevocable gift....”
(Emphasis added.) In addition, MCL 554.536(2) states that
transfers are irrevocable, “and the custodial property is
indefeasibly vested in the minor....” The prosecutor
presented evidence of the irrevocability of transfers when
Huth testified as such. Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact
could have determined that defendant’s access to and
control over the assets after the transfer was only by virtue
of his capacity as custodian.
Defendant also asserts that he was permitted[,] pursu-
ant to his broad authority granted under MCL 554.538 of
the UTMA, to fund the UTMA account with demand notes
that he was able to then permissibly retransfer to his own
account. MCL 554.538 provides:
“A custodian, acting in a custodial capacity, has the
rights, powers, and authority over custodial property that
an unmarried adult owner has over his or her own prop-
erty, but a custodian may exercise those rights, powers, and
authority in that capacity only. This section does not relieve
a custodian from liability for breach of section 17.”
As previously stated, a rational trier of fact could have
determined that the demand notes were a mere sham.
Thus, regardless of whether MCL 554.538 granted defen-
dant broad authority with respect to funding the UTMA
account, a trier of fact could have determined that defen-
dant’s access to the stocks after they were transferred to
the UTMA account was only by virtue of his capacity as
custodian and that the assets came into defendant’s pos-
session because of a relationship of trust.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor failed to
establish the fourth element of embezzlement by an agent
of $20,000 or more, i.e., that he dishonestly disposed of or
converted the money to his own use or secreted the money.
248 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
The prosecutor’s evidence, however, showed that certain
shares of stock from the UTMA account were sold and T.J.
received none of the sale proceeds. Moreover, the evidence
showed that defendant retransferred all assets from the
UTMA account back into his own personal account, leaving
nothing in the UTMA account.
Defendant relies on MCL 554.537(2), which he argues
allowed him to retain any property that he transferred to
the UTMA account. Although defendant relies only on the
italicized language below, subsections (1) and (2) of MCL
554.537 state, in pertinent part:
“(1) A custodian shall do all of the following:
“(a) Take control of custodial property.
“(b) Register or record title to custodial property if
appropriate.
“(c) Collect, hold, manage, invest, and reinvest custodial
property.
“(2) In dealing with custodial property, a custodian shall
observe the standard of care that would be observed by a
prudent person dealing with property of another. If a
custodian has a special skill or expertise or is named
custodian on the basis of representations of a special skill
or expertise, the custodian shall use that skill or expertise.
However, in the custodian’s discretion and without liability
to the minor or the minor’s estate, a custodian may retain
any custodial property received from a transferor. [Empha-
sis added.]”
When interpreting statutory language, courts must as-
certain the legislative intent that may reasonably be in-
ferred from the words in a statute. Koontz v Ameritech
Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).
Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in
a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nuga-
tory or surplusage any part of a statute. Id. Moreover,
words and phrases used in an act should be read in context
with the entire act and assigned such meanings as to
harmonize with the act as a whole. GCTimmis&Cov
Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW2d 710
2008] P
EOPLE V
C
OUZENS
249
(2003). Likewise, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,a
word or phrase should be given meaning by its context or
setting. Id. at 420; Koontz, supra at 318.
Applying these principles and reading the provisions of
subsections (1) and (2) of MCL 554.537 together, defen-
dant’s contention that the above-italicized language per-
mitted him to retain any property transferred to the
UTMA account lacks merit. Under subsection (1), defen-
dant was required to take control of any custodial property,
register or record the property if appropriate, and hold and
invest the property. The use of the word “shall” in subsec-
tion (1) rendered these duties mandatory. In addition,
under subsection (2), defendant was required to observe
the standard of care appropriate when “dealing with [the]
property of another.” These provisions are inconsistent
with defendant’s contention that he was authorized to
retain any custodial property for his own personal use.
Thus, harmonizing the statutory provisions and applying
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, defendant’s argument is
unavailing. Further, defendant’s contention conflicts with
the language of MCL 554.528 and MCL 554.536(2), provid-
ing that transfers are irrevocable.
Defendant also argues that pursuant to MCL
554.540(1), he was permitted to be reimbursed from the
custodial property for reasonable expenses incurred in the
performance of his duties as custodian. MCL 554.540(1)
provides:
“A custodian is entitled to reimbursement from custo-
dial property for reasonable expenses incurred in the
performance of the custodian’s duties. Except for a person
who is a transferor under section 8, a custodian has a
noncumulative election during each calendar year to
charge reasonable compensation for services performed
during that year. [Emphasis added.]”
Because defendant retained all proceeds of the UTMA
account, retransferred the assets from the account to his
own personal account, and left nothing in the account for
T.J., a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he
converted the assets to his own use rather than reimbursed
250 480 M
ICH
240 [Apr
himself for reasonable expenses incurred as custodian of
the UTMA account. At best, defendant offered T.J. only
$6,455.50 of the assets in the account, but T.J. did not cash
defendant’s check because it did not account for all the
funds that were deposited into the UTMA account. More-
over, the language of the italicized provision above specifi-
cally states that defendant was not entitled to reimburse-
ment because he was the transferor of the assets deposited
into the account. Therefore, defendant’s reliance on MCL
554.540(1) is misplaced. Given the facts and circumstances
of this case, a rational trier of fact could have concluded
that defendant dishonestly disposed of or converted the
money to his own use.
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to
prove the sixth element, i.e., that, at the time of conversion,
defendant intended to defraud or cheat the principal. For
the foregoing reasons, a reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded that defendant intended to defraud or cheat T.J.,
the principal. Although defendant argues that any action
with respect to his duties as custodian should have been
pursued in the probate court, he provides no authority that
the probate court provided the only remedy for his conduct
and that he could not also be subject to criminal charges.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, suffi-
cient evidence existed from which a rational trier of fact
could have found that the essential elements of the offense
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Gillis, supra at
113; Burgenmeyer, supra at 434. Accordingly, the trial
court properly denied defendant’s motions for a directed
verdict made during and after trial.
_____________________________________________________
1
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act preceded the UTMA
and was repealed by 1998 PA 433.
2
Identified in defendant’s brief on appeal as a relative.
3
MCL 750.174 was amended by 2006 PA 573, effective
March 30, 2007, but the amendment does not affect this
appeal. Pursuant to the amendment, the act now provides
for different punishments based on whether the amount of
2008] P
EOPLE V
C
OUZENS
251
money embezzled was at least $20,000 but less than
$50,000, at least $50,000 but less than $100,000, or over
$100,000.
4
Specifically, defendant relies on In re Marriage of
Agostinelli, 250 Ill App 3d 492; 620 NE2d 1215 (1993),
Heath v Heath, 143 Ill App 3d 390; 493 NE2d 97 (1986), and
Gordon v Gordon, 70 AD2d 86; 419 NYS 2d 684 (1979).
_____________________________________________________
Affirmed.
T
AYLOR
, C .J., and C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,K
ELLY
,C
ORRIGAN
,
Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
, JJ., concurred.
252 480 M
ICH
240
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
ACTIONS ON APPLICATIONS FOR
LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE
COURT OF APPEALS
Summary Dispositions September 10, 2007:
R
OBERTSON V
A
SCHERL
, No. 132247. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the Court of
Appeals, which ordered dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, and we
remand this case to the Bay Circuit Court for entry of an order dismissing
the complaint without prejudice. See Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581
(2007). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by
this Court. Court of Appeals No. 269752.
P
EOPLE V
B
EVERLY,
No. 132643. The motion for reconsideration of this
Court’s May 2, 2007, order is considered, and it is granted. We vacate our
order dated May 2, 2007. On reconsideration, the application for leave to
appeal the October 6, 2006, order of the Court of Appeals is considered
and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
remand this case to the Saginaw Circuit Court for a determination of
whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, for the appointment of
appellate counsel, in light of Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605 (2005).
Appointed counsel may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals, and/or any appropriate postconviction motions in the trial
court, within six months of the date of the circuit court’s order appoint-
ing counsel. Counsel may include among the issues raised, but is not
required to include, those issues raised by the defendant in his applica-
tion for leave to appeal to this Court. In all other respects, leave to appeal
is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions
presented should now be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 270130.
P
EOPLE V
G
ROSS
, No. 132736. By order of April 11, 2007, the prosecut-
ing attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the
November 15, 2006, order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is
again considered. The defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
bargain that included a prosecutorial recommendation for a sentence at
the “low to middle end of the guidelines.” No such recommendation was
made at sentencing, and the trial court imposed a sentence at the very top
of the guidelines range, without giving the defendant an opportunity to
withdraw his plea. The prosecution has now agreed that the trial court
erred and that a remand is appropriate. Accordingly, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Kent Circuit Court. On remand, the court shall determine whether it
would be appropriate to impose a sentence consistent with the agreed-
upon sentence recommendation. If the court does not follow the recom-
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
851
mendation, it shall give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his
plea of guilty. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we
are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by
this Court. Court of Appeals No. 272031.
P
EOPLE V
A
MOS
, No. 133065. By order of June 20, 2007, the prosecuting
attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the
December 14, 2006, order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is
again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this case
to the Calhoun Circuit Court for the resentencing of the defendant on all
of his criminal sexual conduct convictions. The circuit court erred by
assessing the defendant 50 points under offense variable 11 for penetra-
tions that did not arise out of the particular sentencing offenses. People
v Johnson, 474 Mich 96 (2006). If the defendant is scored points for OV
11, the trial court must indicate that the acts of sexual penetration “arose
out of” the sentencing offenses. MCL 777.41(2)(a). In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 274182.
N
EWSOME V
B
ONO
, No. 133228. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice,
because the dismissal should have been without prejudice. See Kirkaldy
vRim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). Accordingly, we remand this case to the
Oakland Circuit Court for entry of an appropriate order. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court
of Appeals No. 270237.
O
RAM V
O
RAM
, No. 133885. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No. 273162.
P
EOPLE V
S
LOTKOWSKI
, No. 133981. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand these cases to the Oakland
Circuit Court for correction of the judgments of sentence to reflect that
the restitution ordered shall be joint and several with the codefendant. In
all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 274884.
K
ELLY,
J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons stated in my
dissent in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
C
ITY OF
G
RAND
R
APIDS V
G
RAND
R
APIDS
E
MPLOYEES
I
NDEPENDENT
U
NION
,
No. 134013. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary
consideration because the Court of Appeals erred in treating the respon-
852 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
dent’s appeal as an application for leave to appeal rather than as an
appeal as a matter of right. MCL 423.216(e). Court of Appeals No.
274188.
P
EOPLE V
P
ARISH
, No. 134234. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration, as on leave granted, of the issue whether, when resentenc-
ing after the imposition of a sentence that is invalid under MCL 769.9(2),
a court may increase a defendant’s minimum sentence on the basis of
facts that formed the basis for the original sentence. Court of Appeals No.
277867.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
T
ODD
B
ROWN
, No. 134348. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of (1) whether
the defendant was properly assessed 5 points under offense variable 10,
for “exploit[ing] a victim by his or her difference in size or strength[,]”
MCL 777.40(1)(c), where no such physical differences were documented
in the record, but the defendant is male and the victim is female, and (2)
whether the defendant was properly assessed 15 points under offense
variable 19 for the use of “force or the threat of force against another
person...tointerfere with, attempt to interfere with, or that results in
the interference with the administration of justice[,]” MCL 777.49(b),
where the defendant ran from and struggled with ordinary citizens,
rather than law enforcement personnel. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 276405.
Leave to Appeal Denied September 10, 2007:
M
C
E
LHANEY V
H
ARPER
-H
UTZEL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 130916; reported below:
269 Mich App 488.
S
TATE
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
S
HERMAN
, No. 132008; Court of
Appeals No. 265689.
S
CHWARZE V
D
ILWORTH
, Nos. 132025, 132026; Court of Appeals Nos.
257467, 257511.
P
EOPLE V
G
LENN
F
ISHER
, No. 132619; Court of Appeals No. 264764.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARTEN
, No. 132745. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 270124.
C
AMARDA V
C
ITY OF
E
ATON
R
APIDS
, No. 132760; Court of Appeals No.
269046.
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT V
B
AGDASARIAN
, No. 132853; Court of Appeals No.
269375.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICHARD
R
EED
, No. 132855; Court of Appeals No. 272501.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
853
P
EOPLE V
F
AY
, No. 132862; Court of Appeals No. 271763.
P
EOPLE V
J
ONATHAN
J
ONES
, No. 132926. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 271221.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
R
ANDALL
G
RIFFIN
, No. 132935. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 271238.
P
EOPLE V
B
OBBY
S
MITH
, No. 132973. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 270486.
P
EOPLE V
N
ICHOLAS
W
ALKER
, No. 133156; Court of Appeals No. 265366.
P
EOPLE V
G
RUMBLEY
, No. 133168; Court of Appeals No. 261275.
P
EOPLE V
S
PEARS
, Nos. 133266, 134124; Court of Appeals Nos. 274986,
267572.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
S
MITH
, No. 133301. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 270911.
P
EOPLE V
B
ELCOURT
, No. 133516; Court of Appeals No. 265275.
P
EOPLE V
B
ATES
, No. 133550; Court of Appeals No. 265578.
P
EOPLE V
C
RABTREE
, No. 133573; Court of Appeals No. 275279.
H
ARTER V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 133580; Court of Appeals
No. 273278.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
H
ALL
, No. 133607; Court of Appeals No. 265458.
P
EOPLE V
K
EWAYNE
C
ARTER
, No. 133614; Court of Appeals No. 266550.
P
EOPLE V
P
ARKER
, No. 133638; Court of Appeals No. 263276.
P
EOPLE V
T
OBIN
, No. 133664; Court of Appeals No. 275988.
P
EOPLE V
W
INBUSH
, No. 133667; Court of Appeals No. 264012.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTWAIN
T
ERRY
, No. 133674; Court of Appeals No. 275814.
P
EOPLE V
N
IXON
, No. 133678; Court of Appeals No. 266033.
P
EOPLE V
V
ERNICE
R
OBINSON
, No. 133681; Court of Appeals No. 265197.
P
EOPLE V
N
ATHANIEL
L
EE
, No. 133683. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272315.
P
EOPLE V
R
AND
G
OULD
, No. 133684; Court of Appeals No. 274982.
854 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
Y
OWELL
, No. 133702. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272166.
P
EOPLE V
S
TANLEY
D
AVIS
, No. 133727; Court of Appeals No. 266809.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
C
LARK
, No. 133749; Court of Appeals No. 266088.
P
EOPLE V
R
UMMINS
, No. 133753. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272262.
P
EOPLE V
J
ERMAINE
U
NDERWOOD
, No. 133754; Court of Appeals No.
265066.
P
EOPLE V
M
UZYK
, No. 133765; Court of Appeals No. 272342.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLLAND,
No. 133777. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 275108.
N
EWMAN V
B
LUE
C
ROSS &
B
LUE
S
HIELD OF
M
ICHIGAN
, Nos. 133790, 133791;
Court of Appeals Nos. 266627, 269983.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARKEY
, No. 133806; Court of Appeals No. 264005.
W
ILSON V
P
LYLER
, No. 133808; Court of Appeals No. 268577.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal to consider Waltz v Wyse, 469
Mich 642 (2004).
P
EOPLE V
P
ROPHET
, No. 133811; Court of Appeals No. 272644.
P
EOPLE V
S
TANFORD
T
HOMPSON
, No. 133812. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 276557.
M
C
A
LPINE V
E
INSTANDIG
, No. 133818; Court of Appeals No. 266428.
P
EOPLE V
L
AVONN
B
ROWN
, No. 133820; Court of Appeals No. 267044.
P
EOPLE V
T
EDDY
A
LEXANDER
, No. 133823; Court of Appeals No. 267478.
P
EOPLE V
G
OODMAN
, No. 133824; Court of Appeals No. 276303.
P
EOPLE V
D
AWKINS
, No. 133838; Court of Appeals No. 265579.
P
EOPLE V
D
ADO
, No. 133845; Court of Appeals No. 266962.
P
EOPLE V
K
ALAJ,
No. 133848; Court of Appeals No. 266514.
P
EOPLE V
H
APEMAN
, No. 133851; Court of Appeals No. 267039.
P
EOPLE V
O
RT
, No. 133855; Court of Appeals No. 276163.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
J
ACKSON
, No. 133861; Court of Appeals No. 266369.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons stated in my
dissent in People v Bell, 473 Mich 275 (2005).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
855
P
EOPLE V
O
LIVER
, No. 133875. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272224.
D
ELAY V
B
URNS
I
NTERNATIONAL
S
ECURITY
S
ERVICES
C
ORPORATION
, No.
133879; Court of Appeals No. 273118.
P
EOPLE V
B
URREL
, No. 133882; Court of Appeals No. 275877.
P
EOPLE V
A
LTON
H
UBBARD
, No. 133886; Court of Appeals No. 263361.
P
EOPLE V
G
REGORY
G
IBSON
, No. 133888. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 275512.
M
ITAN V
R
EZNICK
, No. 133890; Court of Appeals No. 271644.
P
EOPLE V
T
RAKHTENBERG
, No. 133891; Court of Appeals No. 268416.
P
EOPLE V
B
AUMER
, No. 133892; Court of Appeals No. 267373.
P
EOPLE V
D
ENNIS
R
HODES
, No. 133894. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273152.
P
EOPLE V
C
RON
, No. 133896; Court of Appeals No. 265576.
D
OUGLAS V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 133899; Court of Appeals
No. 273659.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
H
UMPHREY
II, No. 133901; Court of Appeals No.
276305.
P
EOPLE V
E
LY
, No. 133903; Court of Appeals No. 266080.
P
EOPLE V
D
OBSON
, No. 133908; Court of Appeals No. 276489.
P
EOPLE V
H
ERHOLTZ
, No. 133910; Court of Appeals No. 276735.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
D
OUGLAS
, No. 133913. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 272950.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARVIN
R
OBINSON AND
P
EOPLE V
N
OBLE
, Nos. 133917, 133966;
Court of Appeals No. 273214.
P
EOPLE V
P
LANES
, No. 133918. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272814.
P
EOPLE V
P
ROPES
, No. 133922; Court of Appeals No. 275596.
P
EOPLE V
C
LAY
, No. 133932; Court of Appeals No. 275610.
P
EOPLE V
K
IM
M
OSS
, No. 133936. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272802.
856 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
R
AY
, No. 133938; Court of Appeals No. 268602.
P
EOPLE V
S
MART
, No. 133942. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272195.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTONIO
D
AVIS
, No. 133945. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272270.
P
EOPLE V
B
INYARD
, No. 133946; Court of Appeals No. 268956.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILDER
, No. 133951. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272877.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
H
ARRIS,
No. 133953. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273785.
P
EOPLE V
L
AROME
S
MITH
, No. 133954. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273648.
P
EOPLE V
L
ARI
, No. 133957. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 276252.
P
EOPLE V
K
INT
, No. 133958; Court of Appeals No. 276293.
R
OGOW V
C
OMERICA
B
ANK
, No. 133960; Court of Appeals No. 266430.
P
EOPLE V
S
ANDOVAL
, No. 133964. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272230.
P
EOPLE V
K
EYS
, No. 133969; Court of Appeals No. 264387.
H
IAR V
S
TRONG
, No. 133970; Court of Appeals No. 274247.
S
CHULTZ V
D
EPARTMENT OF
E
NVIRONMENTAL
Q
UALITY
, No. 133973; Court of
Appeals No. 271285.
B
AZZETTA V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 133974; Court of Appeals
No. 275989.
T
OMASI V
T
OMASI
, No. 133976; Court of Appeals No. 272889.
P
EOPLE V
B
ROYLES
, No. 133977. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 276333.
P
EOPLE V
L
AMBERT
, No. 133978; Court of Appeals No. 267765.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
R
EED
, No. 133980. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
277091.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
857
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
H
OFFMAN
, No. 133982. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273827.
P
EOPLE V
D
ISNEY
, No. 133983; Court of Appeals No. 267082.
M
ERCER V
C
ITY OF
L
ANSING
, No. 133987; reported below: 274 Mich App
329.
P
EOPLE V
S
TADTFELD
, No. 133996; Court of Appeals No. 274198.
P
EOPLE V
P
EOPLES
, No. 133997; Court of Appeals No. 265481.
P
EOPLE V
M
ONTGOMERY
, No. 133998; Court of Appeals No. 276494.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIDGES
, No. 134002. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274381.
P
ROVOST V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134004; Court of Appeals
No. 268856.
P
EOPLE V
T
YLER
, No. 134005; Court of Appeals No. 273886.
P
EOPLE V
A
LPHONZO
W
RIGHT
, No. 134006. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 272948.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDRE
M
ATHIS
, No. 134007; Court of Appeals No. 268149.
P
EOPLE V
A
NNE
S
MITH
, No. 134008; Court of Appeals No. 276500.
B
RANFORD
T
OWNE
H
OUSES
C
OOPERATIVE V
C
ITY OF
T
AYLOR
, No. 134015;
Court of Appeals No. 265398.
P
EOPLE V
P
HILLIPS
, No. 134021; Court of Appeals No. 264889.
P
EOPLE V
L
UGO
, No. 134023; Court of Appeals No. 276490.
P
EOPLE V
H
ARLAN
, No. 134026; Court of Appeals No. 265241.
P
EOPLE V
G
ALKA
, No. 134028; Court of Appeals No. 276324.
A
ZAR V
A
ZAR
, No. 134029; Court of Appeals No. 265876.
P
EOPLE V
J
OSEPH
R
OBINSON
, No. 134031. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273666.
P
EOPLE V
W
ROBLEWSKI
, No. 134032; Court of Appeals No. 267946.
P
EOPLE V
K
ORPI
, No. 134034; Court of Appeals No. 266712.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONNIE
T
HOMAS
, No. 134036; Court of Appeals No. 267334.
W
ARREN V
B
ROWN
, No. 134037; Court of Appeals No. 269247.
P
EOPLE V
S
TERHAN
, No. 134038; Court of Appeals No. 276248.
858 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons given in my
dissent in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
I
DOLSKI V
A
MERICAN
A
XLE &
M
ANUFACTURING OF
M
ICHIGAN,
I
NC,
No. 134041;
Court of Appeals No. 273029.
P
EOPLE V
G
LASSBROOK
, No. 134043; Court of Appeals No. 265845.
P
EOPLE V
R
ANIS
H
ILL,
No. 134045. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273202.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
LELLAND
, No. 134047; Court of Appeals No. 277181.
P
EOPLE V
A
TKINS
, No. 134048; Court of Appeals No. 268461.
P
EOPLE V
D
OSS
, No. 134050; Court of Appeals No. 266375.
P
EOPLE V
B
ROADNAX
, No. 134051; Court of Appeals No. 277361.
P
EOPLE V
J
ACQUELINE
C
OLE,
No. 134052. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 272559.
M
ILLER V
A
UTO
Z
ONE,
I
NC
, No. 134054; Court of Appeals No. 267651.
P
EOPLE V
G
OINS
, No. 134057; Court of Appeals No. 266830.
P
EOPLE V
G
RAY,
No. 134058; Court of Appeals No. 267647.
P
EOPLE V
C
ANNON
, No. 134060; Court of Appeals No. 276605.
P
EOPLE V
N
ORMAN
A
LLEN
, No. 134063. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273478.
R
OMEO V
A
LLSTATE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 134066; Court of Appeals
No. 274794.
P
EOPLE V
M
ASSEY
, No. 134068; Court of Appeals No. 267115.
G
IVANS V
P
AROLE
B
OARD
, No. 134070; Court of Appeals No. 276852.
P
EOPLE V
M
ILBOURN
, No. 134071; Court of Appeals No. 276975.
P
EOPLE V
S
ULLIVAN
, No. 134073; Court of Appeals No. 276797.
P
EOPLE V
T
IGNEY
, No. 134078; Court of Appeals No. 267187.
K
HURANA V
K
HURANA
, No. 134082; Court of Appeals No. 268792.
P
EOPLE V
I
DOLTHUS
H
UBBARD
, No. 134083; Court of Appeals No. 263127.
P
EOPLE V
D
ETRICK
D
AVIS
, No. 134085. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272468.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
859
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
J
ACKSON
, No. 134086. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273562.
P
EOPLE V
M
ETRAS
, No. 134088; Court of Appeals No. 275409.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal limited to the question whether
defendant is entitled to sentencing credit for the time served awaiting
sentence for the reasons stated in my dissent in People v Conway, 474
Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
W
ILSON
, No. 134090; Court of Appeals No. 268808.
P
EOPLE V
E
RNEST
H
ALL
, No. 134091; Court of Appeals No. 260771.
P
EOPLE V
F
AWAZ
, No. 134100; Court of Appeals No. 264703.
P
EOPLE V
L
IVINGSTON
, No. 134106; Court of Appeals No. 267575.
P
EOPLE V
M
IGUEL
G
ONZALEZ
, No. 134107; Court of Appeals No. 267568.
P
EOPLE V
B
AYS
, No. 134110; Court of Appeals No. 276627.
P
EOPLE V
L
ITTLE
, No. 134114. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272387.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMAL
K
ING
, No. 134115; Court of Appeals No. 267296.
P
EOPLE V
C
ONRAD
S
ANDERS
, No. 134116. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274116.
P
EOPLE V
K
ERSEY
, No. 134122; Court of Appeals No. 267372.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
D
AVID
, No. 134127; Court of Appeals No. 276640.
J
OHNSON V
M
ILLENNIUM
T
REATMENT
S
ERVICES,
LLC, No. 134128; Court of
Appeals No. 271705.
P
EOPLE V
B
ARNARD
, No. 134132; Court of Appeals No. 265068.
P
EOPLE V
R
OLLSTON
, No. 134135; Court of Appeals No. 276652.
P
EOPLE V
K
ESTNER
, No. 134138; Court of Appeals No. 263213.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
C
OLLINS
, No. 134140; Court of Appeals No. 268412.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONELLE
L
EE
, No. 134157; Court of Appeals No. 269100.
P
EOPLE V
O
RLANDO
M
ORGAN
, No. 134158; Court of Appeals No. 268080.
P
EOPLE V
D
AMAINE
G
RIFFIN
, No. 134164; Court of Appeals No. 267567.
P
EOPLE V
B
RANDON
J
OHNSON
, No. 134165; Court of Appeals No. 268413.
F
AHEY V
F
AHEY
, No. 134171; Court of Appeals No. 273700.
P
EOPLE V
L
ALONE
, No. 134174; Court of Appeals No. 275950.
860 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
F
ISHER
, No. 134176; Court of Appeals No. 276356.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILKE
, No. 134181. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274248.
P
EOPLE V
H
ATCHETT
, No. 134185; Court of Appeals No. 265238.
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
J
OHNSON
, No. 134186; Court of Appeals No. 267293.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCIA
W
ILSON
, No. 134188; Court of Appeals No. 276920.
G
ARRELL V
S
UBURBAN
M
OBILITY
A
UTHORITY FOR
R
EGIONAL
T
RANSPORTATION
,
No. 134190; Court of Appeals No. 275632.
P
EOPLE V
O
RTIZ
, No. 134192; Court of Appeals No. 269032.
P
EOPLE V
A
DAMS
, No. 134193; Court of Appeals No. 277046.
P
EOPLE V
M
ANNION
, No. 134195; Court of Appeals No. 269293.
G
OJCAJ V
J
ENKINS
C
ONSTRUCTION,
I
NC,
No. 134197; Court of Appeals No.
267929.
K
ENDALL V
S
TATE
B
AR OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 134199; Court of Appeals No.
277779.
P
EOPLE V
F
LUCKES
, No. 134203; Court of Appeals No. 274203.
P
EOPLE V
J
OSEPH
G
ROESBECK,
No. 134204; Court of Appeals No. 276966.
J
ACOBONI V
R
OYAL
O
AK
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 134209; Court of Appeals No.
277285.
P
EOPLE V
B
LOSSER
, No. 134220; Court of Appeals No. 276433.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRANCE
H
ARRIS
, No. 134224; Court of Appeals No. 267047.
P
EOPLE V
P
IONTEK
, No. 134226; Court of Appeals No. 268048.
P
EOPLE V
R
ASHAAN
C
OLE
, No. 134230; Court of Appeals No. 276355.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICK
, No. 134231; Court of Appeals No. 270214.
P
EOPLE V
B
RADLEY
, No. 134233; Court of Appeals No. 269568.
P
EOPLE V
M
AYBERRY
, No. 134240; Court of Appeals No. 276922.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons given in my
dissent in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
C
ARTER V
H
&
MD
EMOLITION
C
OMPANY,
No. 134248; Court of Appeals No.
274561.
P
EOPLE V
B
URKES,
No. 134252; Court of Appeals No. 268950.
P
EOPLE V
K
NOWLES
, No. 134254; Court of Appeals No. 267260.
P
EOPLE V
E
ARNEST
W
HITE
, No. 134258; Court of Appeals No. 277489.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
861
P
EOPLE V
D
EVAUGHN
W
ILSON
, No. 134269; Court of Appeals No. 269033.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALD
P
ARKS
, No. 134271; Court of Appeals No. 266713.
G
IBBS V
G
IBBS
, No. 134272; Court of Appeals No. 266718.
S
HIELDS V
D
EPEW
, No. 134273; Court of Appeals No. 273555.
P
EOPLE V
A
LONZO
N
ELSON
, No. 134279; Court of Appeals No. 275367.
P
EOPLE V
C
LEMMONS
, No. 134283; Court of Appeals No. 266331.
S
EMAN V
G
RAHAM
, No. 134326; Court of Appeals No. 265969.
P
EOPLE V
B
EACHAM
, No. 134334; Court of Appeals No. 277940.
P
EOPLE V
F
ARRAJ
, No. 134351; Court of Appeals No. 264235.
P
EOPLE V
A
LFIERO
, No. 134356. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 275418.
P
EOPLE V
M
ADDOX
, No. 134359; Court of Appeals No. 270344.
P
EOPLE V
D
ANIEL
S
PENCER,
No. 134381; Court of Appeals No. 277759.
In re K
EAST
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
A
TWOOD
)(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
C
OPPESS
), No. 134443; Court of Appeals No. 277354.
P
EOPLE V
E
DDIE
L
EWIS
, No. 134504; Court of Appeals No. 273234.
Interlocutory Appeals
Leave to Appeal Denied September 10, 2007:
M
ILLER V
R
UBIN
, No. 133656; Court of Appeals No. 273742.
H
UGHES V
J
ACKSON
C
OUNTY
R
OAD
C
OMMISSION
, No. 134003; Court of
Appeals No. 256652 (on remand).
Reconsideration Denied September 10, 2007:
S
TATE
A
UTOMOBILE
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
F
IEGER
, No. 130456.
Summary disposition entered at 477 Mich 1068. Court of Appeals No.
254461.
P
EOPLE V
L
A
F
OUNTAIN
, No. 131484. Leave to appeal denied at 477 Mich
1124. Court of Appeals No. 265709.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
G
AINES V
K
ERN
, No. 131726. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
866. Court of Appeals No. 266049.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
862 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
M
ARKMAN,
J
.
I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the
application or take other peremptory action.
S
WEATT V
G
ARDOCKI
, No. 131969. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
924. Court of Appeals No. 259272.
S
ICKLES V
H
OMETOWN
A
MERICA,
LLC, No. 131984. Summary disposition
entered at 477 Mich 1076. Court of Appeals No. 266722.
J
ONES V
R
IBBRON
, No. 132165. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
901. Court of Appeals No. 260040.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration and grant
leave to appeal.
P
APADELIS V
C
ITY OF
T
ROY
, No. 132366. Summary disposition entered at
478 Mich 934. Court of Appeals No. 268920.
B
EUS V
B
ROAD,
V
OGT &
C
ONANT,
I
NC,
No. 132413. Leave to appeal denied
477 Mich 1063. Court of Appeals No. 258995.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
B
ROWN V
A
MERITECH
C
ORPORATION,
I
NC
, Nos. 132574, 132575. Leave to
appeal denied at 477 Mich 1087. Court of Appeals Nos. 262420, 263469.
P
EOPLE V
T
HEODORE
L
EE
, No. 132677. Leave to appeal denied at 477
Mich 1087. Court of Appeals No. 273288.
P
RUDENTIAL
P
ROPERTY &
C
ASUALTY
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY AND
P
RUDENTIAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY
,
Nos. 132698, 132699. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich 889. Reported
below: 272 Mich App 269.
P
EOPLE V
B
ERG
, No. 132719. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
866. Court of Appeals No. 272715.
P
EOPLE V
L
YLE
, No. 132771. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
924. Court of Appeals No. 273845.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
C
OLEMAN
, No. 132806. Leave to appeal denied at 478
Mich 867. Court of Appeals No. 270148.
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
RANSPORTATION V
A
LIBRI,
No. 132922. Leave to appeal
denied at 477 Mich 1114. Court of Appeals No. 260821.
R
ONAN V
H
OFMANN
, No. 132962. Leave to appeal denied at 477 Mich
1115. Court of Appeals No. 263106.
P
EOPLE V
C
HESTER
P
ATTERSON
, No. 132974. Leave to appeal denied at
478 Mich 868. Court of Appeals No. 274219.
J
OHNSON V
F
ORD
M
OTOR
C
OMPANY
, No. 133026. Leave to appeal denied at
477 Mich 1115. Court of Appeals No. 271344.
P
EOPLE V
S
ORLIEN
, No. 133062. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
870. Court of Appeals No. 264593.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
863
P
EOPLE V
H
ASTINGS
, No. 133095. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
914. Court of Appeals No. 262698.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would
grant leave to appeal for the reasons stated in Justice M
ARKMAN
’s previous
statement in this case.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my statement at
People v Hastings, 478 Mich 914 (2007).
P
EOPLE V
D
ENNIS
, No. 133111. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
870. Court of Appeals No. 274277.
P
EOPLE V
H
OUGHTALING
, No. 133176. Leave to appeal denied at 478
Mich 910. Court of Appeals No. 274040.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would
remand this case to the trial court for preparation of a corrected
presentence report that omits the information that defendant challenged.
MCR 6.425(E)(2).
P
EOPLE V
C
ARICO
, No. 133186. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
926. Court of Appeals No. 263155.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
P
EOPLE V
L
OREN
G
REENE
, No. 133201. Leave to appeal denied at 478
Mich 926. Court of Appeals No. 262676.
P
EOPLE V
P
AUL
C
LARK
, No. 133345. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich
851. Court of Appeals No. 265776.
K
AMMERAAD V
A
UTO
S
PORTS
U
NLIMITED,
I
NC
, No. 133363. Leave to appeal
denied at 478 Mich 928. Court of Appeals No. 262166.
A
MERICAN
A
XLE &
M
ANUFACTURING,
I
NC V
M
URDOCK
, Nos. 133439, 133440.
Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich 929. Court of Appeals Nos. 262786,
265111.
C
ONN V
A
SPLUNDH
T
REE
E
XPERT
C
OMPANY
, No. 133483. Leave to appeal
denied at 478 Mich 930. Court of Appeals No. 272563.
H
ODGES V
R
ENAISSANCE
C
ENTER
, No. 133721. Leave to appeal denied at
478 Mich 931. Court of Appeals No. 272157.
N
UCKOLS V
B
LUE
C
ROSS
B
LUE
S
HIELD OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 133955. Leave to
appeal denied at 478 Mich 931. Court of Appeals No. 277137.
Leave to Appeal Granted September 12, 2007:
S
IDUN V
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER
, No. 131905. The parties shall
include among the issues to be briefed whether the defendant’s efforts to
provide notice satisfied due process, in light of Jones v Flowers, 547 US
220 (2006). Court of Appeals No. 264581 (on remand).
864 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Summary Dispositions September 12, 2007:
R
AZZOOK’S
P
ROPERTIES,
LLCvY
ONO
, No. 132831. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the
Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
order. The defendant was evicted from the store when, on the plaintiffs’
request, the Genesee Circuit Court issued the November 6, 2003,
temporary restraining order that precluded defendant from operating a
grocery store on the premises. The defendant was thereafter deprived of
all beneficial use of the property by plaintiffs’ actions, and, when
defendant vacated the premises, any lease agreement then operating was
terminated. Thus, when the fire occurred, plaintiffs had no obligations to
defendant under the lease and defendant likewise had no obligations to
plaintiffs under the lease. Court of Appeals No. 263010.
P
EOPLE V
S
TINNETT
, No. 133531. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgments of the Court of
Appeals and the Genesee Circuit Court and we remand this case to the
Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
The Court of Appeals committed plain error by finding that this Court’s
decision in People v Williams, 475 Mich 245 (2006), did not apply to this
case. The prosecutor’s appeal raised and preserved the question whether
the trial court erred by finding a violation of MCL 780.131(1) and
dismissing the information with prejudice. In light of the record and the
Court of Appeals conclusion that “it is not clear when, or even if, the
[D]epartment of [C]orrections provided to the prosecutor ‘written notice
of the placement of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final
disposition of the [criminal charge]’ as envisioned by MCL 780.131(1),”
defendant did not establish on the existing record that the Department of
Corrections caused to be delivered by certified mail to the prosecuting
attorney the written notice, request, and statement as required by MCL
780.131(1). See People v Holt, 478 Mich 851 (2007). On remand, the
Genesee Circuit Court is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine if and when the Department of Corrections caused to be
delivered by certified mail to the prosecuting attorney the written notice,
request, and statement required by MCL 780.131(1). We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 265713.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
A
NDERSON
, No. 133561. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Oakland Circuit Court to amend the judgment of sentence to reflect 259
days of sentence credit, as conceded by the prosecutor at the sentence
hearing for the defendant’s probation violation. Time incarcerated pur-
suant to a probationary sentence must be credited against a subsequent
prison sentence imposed for the violation of probation. See People v
Sturdivant, 412 Mich 92 (1981). Court of Appeals No. 276065.
P
EOPLE V
M
ELISSA
F
LETCHER
, No. 133566. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals
No. 274838.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
865
P
EOPLE V
P
ODLASZUK
, No. 133670. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals
for consideration of the defendant’s alternate ground for affirming the
Wayne Circuit Court’s order granting his motion to withdraw his plea.
The defendant was not required to file a cross-appeal to urge that
ineffective assistance of counsel caused his plea to be involuntary as an
alternative ground for affirmance. Middlebrooks v Wayne Co, 446 Mich
151, 166 n 41 (1994); Cacevic v Simplimatic Engineering Co, 463 Mich
997 (2001). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be re-
viewed by this Court. The Court notes, however, that contrary to the
Court of Appeals conclusion that the defendant’s motion to withdraw his
plea was untimely under MCR 6.310(C), and was therefore properly
characterized as a motion for relief from judgment, the defendant’s
motion to withdraw his plea was timely. The amendment of MCR
6.310(C) reducing the time from 12 months to 6 months to file a motion
to withdraw a plea is not applicable to cases in which the order
appointing appellate counsel was entered on or before December 31,
2005. See Administrative Order No. 2005-2. In this case, appellate
counsel was appointed before December 31, 2005, so the defendant had
12 months from the date of the order appointing appellate counsel to file
a motion to withdraw his plea. Because the defendant’s motion was filed
within 12 months of the order appointing appellate counsel, the defen-
dant’s motion was timely, and should not have been characterized as a
motion for relief from judgment. Court of Appeals No. 273554.
P
EOPLE V
H
EAD
, No. 133691. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate that portion of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that reversed the defendant’s conviction for maintain-
ing a drug house. MCL 333.7405(d). The evidence presented was suffi-
cient to establish that the defendant exercised authority or control over
the house. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139 (1998). Articles of clothing
belonging to the defendant were found in a dresser drawer in an upstairs
bedroom. In an upstairs closet, police officers found a loaded handgun
tucked into a mattress, as well as a money order receipt made out to the
defendant. While the defendant told the officers that he did not live in the
house, he was unable to provide an address on the road where he claimed
to reside. A controlled drug buy involving a person fitting the codefen-
dant’s description was made at the house in question. When a search
warrant was executed at the house only several hours later, over $500 in
cash and the marked $20 bill that was used in the controlled buy were
found in the defendant’s pocket. As to the claim that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that the house was used continuously for an
appreciable period of time for the purpose of conducting drug-related
activities, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsidera-
tion in light of People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146 (2007). If, upon
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirms the defendant’s conviction
for maintaining a drug house, it shall address the defendant’s final
argument on direct appeal that was left unresolved in view of its reversal
of the maintaining a drug house conviction. That argument was that the
trial court imposed a sentence for the drug-house conviction that
866 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
departed from the statutory guidelines without articulating a substantial
and compelling reason for the departure. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 265844.
P
EOPLE V
R
OLAND
, No. 133707. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals, we
vacate the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court, and we remand this case
to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court improperly imposed the
defendant’s sentence for felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f,
consecutively to his sentences for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. On remand, the trial court shall impose the felony-
firearm sentence to be served consecutively only to the sentence for felon
in possession of a firearm and shall order concurrent sentences for the
defendant’s convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and felon in
possession of a firearm. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied,
because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 271058.
R
UDD V
B
EDFORD
P
UBLIC
S
CHOOLS
, No. 133817. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC). The Court of Appeals
clearly erred by failing to affirm the decision of the WCAC, where that
decision was supported by the record. MCL 418.861a(14); Mudel v Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691 (2000). Court of Appeals No.
266633.
F
ERRARI V
A
RAMARK
S
ERVICES
M
ANAGEMENT OF
M
ICHIGAN,
I
NC
, No. 134019.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirming the
magistrate’s award of benefits for a closed period. The Court of Appeals
erred in adopting the opinion of the WCAC dissenting commissioner
where there was support in the record for the decision of the WCAC.
Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691 (2000). We
remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider the plaintiff’s
application for leave to appeal on the issue of whether the defendants
may recoup benefits they voluntarily paid. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 273557.
K
ELLY
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
H
ENLEY V
H
ERSCHELMAN
, No. 134629. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. We further order that the
proceedings in the Oakland Circuit Court are stayed pending the comple-
tion of this appeal. On motion of a party or on its own motion, the Court
of Appeals may modify, set aside, or place conditions on the stay if it
appears that the appeal is not being vigorously prosecuted or if other
appropriate grounds appear. Court of Appeals No. 278285.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
867
Leave to Appeal Denied September 12, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
E
DWARD
W
OODS
, No. 132844; Court of Appeals No. 262681.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
R
USNAK V
W
ALKER
, No. 133052; reported below: 273 Mich App 299.
S
UTTON V
D
IANE
J, No. 133763; Court of Appeals No. 273519.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
R
USSELL V
R
AMSEY
H
OLDING,
LLC, No. 133849; Court of Appeals No.
273144.
P
EOPLE V
H
OSKINS
, No. 134064; Court of Appeals No. 277723.
K
ELLY
, J. I would vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the defendant’s
delayed application for leave to appeal.
Reconsideration Denied September 12, 2007:
M
ETRO V
A
MWAY
A
SIA
P
ACIFIC
L
TD,
No. 132318. Leave to appeal denied
at 477 Mich 1031. Court of Appeals No. 258902.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal September 14, 2007:
C
OMMUNITY
R
ESOURCE
C
ONSULTANTS,
I
NC V
P
ROGRESSIVE
M
ICHIGAN
I
NSUR-
ANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133416. We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument
on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action.
MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall submit supplemental briefs within 42
days of the date of this order addressing whether, for purposes of MCL
500.3145(1), a loss is incurred at the time the treatment or services are
provided, rather than at the time a bill is submitted for the treatment or
services in question. The parties should not submit mere restatements of
their application papers. Court of Appeals No. 269726.
G
EE V
A
RTHUR
BM
YR
I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC,
No. 133762. We direct the clerk to
schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other
peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall file supplemental
briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission’s (WCAC’s) April 19,
2002, opinion and order denying plaintiff’s claim for attendant care
services under MCL 418.315(1) was a final decision; (2) whether plain-
tiff’s second claim for attendant care services alleged a change in
condition as a justification for an award of attendant care services; (3)
whether the WCAC’s April 12, 2005, opinion and order awarding atten-
dant care services was based on a change in the plaintiff’s condition; and
(4) whether the WCAC’s April 12, 2005, opinion and order awarded
attendant care services based on the plaintiff’s application or on the
868 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
applications filed by the attendant care providers. The parties should not
submit mere restatements of their application papers. Court of Appeals
No. 269351.
Leave to Appeal Granted September 14, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
S
ARGENT
, No. 133474. The parties shall address whether the
analysis of offense variable (OV) 6 scoring under the former judicial
sentencing guidelines, set forth in People v Chesebro, 206 Mich App 468
(1994), should be applied to OV 9 scoring under the current legislative
sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.39. We further order the Allegan Circuit
Court, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 2003-3, to determine
whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel to
represent the defendant in this Court. The Prosecuting Attorneys
Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan
are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups inter-
ested in the determination of the issue presented in this case may move
the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No.
263392.
Summary Dispositions September 14, 2007:
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH V
D
YKSTRA
, No. 132549.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. We note that a similar issue is presented in Dep’t of Labor &
Economic Growth v Jordan (Docket No. 133017), which we remanded to
the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated
September 14, 2007. Court of Appeals No. 271535.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I concur with the majority. However, I write
to reconcile my position with that in Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth
v Jordan, Docket No. 133017, in which I do not participate. In Jordan,I
do not participate because my wife was a member of the Board of Review
at the time of the decision being appealed, although she did not review
that case, did not participate in its consideration, and took no position on
its merits. In this case, I do participate because my wife was no longer a
member of the Board of Review and had no involvement in the case.
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH V
J
ORDAN
, No. 133017.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. We note that a similar issue is presented in Dep’t of Labor &
Economic Growth v Dykstra, (Docket No. 132549), which we remanded to
the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated
September 14, 2007. Court of Appeals No. 272634.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur with the order to remand this case to
the Court of Appeals but write separately to state again that a justice has
a duty to supply the public, and thereby future litigants, with his or her
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
869
reasons for nonparticipation. Further, contrary to Justice M
ARKMAN
’s
erroneous assertion, it is my right and duty to write separately to keep
the public informed of what, when, and how justices conduct the Court’s
business.
It will be noteworthy when Justice M
ARKMAN
agrees that this Court
should be as forthcoming with information about a justice’s reasons for
deciding to participate, or not participate, in a case, just as he properly
urges the Court should be with the disclosure of information about the
Court’s use of tax dollars. Specifically, Justice M
ARKMAN
recently and
properly stressed the importance of this Court’s duty to provide the
public with full access to how tax dollars are expended:
[T]here is no information that must be more transparent than
the use of tax dollars; the public is entitled to the fullest possible
access to information concerning the expenditure of tax dollars
and there is no obligation upon those seeking such information to
make any specific showing of need.
[
1
]
In the matter of disqualification, transparency, rather than secrecy, is
vital and is as necessary as the information pertaining to the use of tax
dollars. The public has an equally important right to know a justice’s
reason for participation or nonparticipation in a case.
Initially, Justice M
ARKMAN
indicated that he was not participating in
this case but he refused to provide reasons for his nonparticipation.
Justice M
ARKMAN
has now circulated a statement providing his reasons
for nonparticipation and, therefore, has complied with his constitutional
obligation to provide reasons for each decision.
As I wrote over two years ago (in 2005) in Scalise v Boy Scouts of
America, 473 Mich 853, 854 (2005) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting):
Const 1963, art 6, § 6, which states that “Decisions of the
supremecourt...shallbeinwriting and shall contain a concise
statement of the facts and reasons for each decision . . .” requires
that justices give written reasons for each decision.
[
2
]
There is no
more fundamental purpose for the requirement that the decisions
of the Court be in writing than for the decisions to be accessible to
1
Statement of Justice S
TEPHEN
J
.
M
ARKMAN
in a July 11, 2007, press
release, Michigan Supreme Court website, <http://www.courts.
michigan.gov/supremecourt/Press/SalaryInfo.pdf> (accessed August 2,
2007).
2
Article 6,§6ofthe1963 Michigan Constitution states, in full:
Decisions of the supreme court, including all decisions on
prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise
statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons
for each denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole
or in part he shall give in writing the reasons for his dissent.
870 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
the citizens of the state. Because a justice’s decision to not
participate in a case can, itself, change the outcome of a case, the
decision is a matter of public significance and public access and
understanding regarding a justice’s participation or nonparticipa-
tion is vital to the public’s ability to assess the performance of the
Court and the performance of the Court’s individual justices.
Thus, the highest and best reading of art 6,§6requiresthata
justice’s self-initiated decision not to participate, or a challenged
justice’s decision to participate or not participate, should be in
writing and accessible to the public.
As summarized in my dissenting statement in the order denying the
motion for stay in Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 477 Mich 1228, 1240
(2006), I first raised the issue of justice recusal (participation or nonpar-
ticipation) over four (4) years ago when, in In re JK, 468 Mich 202 (2003),
I had reason to examine the rules governing my own participation in that
case:
During the consideration of In re JK, I was informed that
unwritten “traditions” governed the decision and that MCR 2.003,
the court rule concerning disqualification of all other Michigan
judges, did not apply to justices of the Michigan Supreme Court. I
was further informed that it was a “tradition” of the Court that
the decision whether a justice would disqualify himself or herself
was left to the individual justice and that no reasons for the
decision whether to participate or not participate in a case were to
be given.
I concluded that these unwritten traditions and the unfettered
discretion violate Michigan’s Constitution, which requires justices
to give written reasons for each decision, including a decision to
participate in or be disqualified from a case.
My position on justice recusals has not been directed only toward any one
justice. I also requested that Chief Justice T
AYLOR
provide reasons for his
decision not to participate in Neal v Dep’t of Corrections, 477 Mich 1049
(2007). Because Chief Justice T
AYLOR
refused to provide any reason for his
decision not to participate, I wrote separately on this issue.
3
Also, I raised
3
Although I specifically requested Chief Justice T
AYLOR
’s reasons for
not participating in this case at the October 25, 2006, conference, he
refused to provide them in writing or verbally.
My request that Chief Justice T
AYLOR
give reasons on the record for
his nonparticipation is not trivial. Nor is it motivated by resentment or
personal ill will. A justice has a duty to supply the parties, the public, and
thereby future litigants, with his or her reasons for nonparticipation.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
871
the issue of the importance of providing the reasons for nonparticipation
to Justice C
AVANAGH
,inWhite v Hahn, 477 Mich 1037 (2007), a case in
which Justice C
AVANAGH
’s daughter represented one of the parties.
4
I also
raised the issue in People v Parsons, 477 Mich 1065 (2007), after Justice
C
ORRIGAN
indicated she was not participating but did not, initially, provide
reasons for her nonparticipation.
5
A justice’s decision to participate or not participate in a case implicates a
bedrock principle of our judicial system—the impartiality of the judiciary.
Without a record of a justice’s reasons to not participate in a case, how can
future litigants be guaranteed that the same reasons are not present in their
cases? Moreover, how can the people of Michigan be sure that a justice is not
simply refusing to work on a case to avoid some controversy that the case
might involve—for example, a controversy that might call into question his
or her impartiality on an issue or make reelection more difficult? The
impartiality of the judiciary preserves the ethics of judicial administration,
protects decision-making, and ensures the public’s, and thereby future
litigants’, trust and confidence in the judiciary.
What are needed are clear, fair, enforceable, written, and published
rules concerning the participation, nonparticipation, or disqualification
of justices. Such rules would enhance the accountability of justices to the
public. They would provide a way for the public to have some knowledge
about how justices conduct the public’s business so that the public could
accurately assess the justices’ performance of their duties.
Further while it appears to continue to be for some justices a
“tradition” of this Court for a justice who disqualifies himself from a case
to not give written reasons, it is a “tradition of secrecy” that must for all
Where, as here, a justice decides on his own motion not to
participate in a case, the justice should be accountable to the
parties and the public for his decision. Chief Justice T
AYLOR
still
has not given his reason for not participating in this case. While
his reasons likely support his decision to not participate, his
decisions need to be in writing, on the record, and available to the
parties, the public, and thereby future litigants. [Neal, supra at
1049 (citation omitted).]
4
In Hahn, supra at 1037, I noted that Justice C
AVANAGH
had not
included his reason for recusal, but had informed me he would do so in
future cases. And in fact, in Murry v Yuchasz, 478 Mich 851 (2007),
Justice C
AVANAGH
included a statement with the order indicating he was
“not participating, due to a familial relationship with counsel of record.”
Further, Justice K
ELLY
has also indicated to me that in the future, she
will request that her reasons for not participating be included with her
decisions on the orders.
5
Ultimately, Justice C
ORRIGAN
did provide a statement indicating her
reasons for not participating, Parsons, supra, 728 NW2d 66 (2007).
872 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
justices end now. An impartial judiciary is “ill served by casting a cloak of
secrecy around the operations of the courts....”
6
M
ARKMAN
, J. I do not participate in this case. However, I write to
reconcile my position with that in Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v
Dykstra, Docket No. 132549, in which I do participate. Here, I do not
participate because my wife was a member of the Board of Review at the
time of the decision being appealed, although she did not review this case,
did not participate in its consideration, and took no position on its merits.
In Dykstra, I do participate because my wife was no longer a member of
the Board of Review and had no involvement in the case.
1
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH
vN
ASH
, No. 134077. Pursu-
ant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand
this case to the Court of Appeals, which shall hold this case in abeyance
pending its decision in Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Jordan
(Court of Appeals Docket No. 272634) and Dykstra v Dep’t of Labor &
Economic Growth (Court of Appeals Docket No. 271535). After Jordan
and Dykstra are decided, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider this case
in light of those cases. Court of Appeals No. 275069.
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH
vK
AMINSKI
, No. 134079.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand
this case to the Court of Appeals, which shall hold this case in abeyance
pending its decision in Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Jordan (Court
of Appeals Docket No. 272634) and Dykstra v Dep’t of Labor & Economic
Growth v Dykstra (Court of Appeals Docket No. 271535). After Jordan and
Dykstra are decided, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider this case in light
of those cases. Court of Appeals No. 275070.
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH
vM
ORALEZ
, No. 134081.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand
this case to the Court of Appeals, which shall hold this case in abeyance
pending its decision in Dep’t of Labor & Economic Growth v Jordan (Court
of Appeals Docket No. 272634) and Dykstra v Dep’t of Labor & Economic
Growth (Court of Appeals Docket No. 271535). After Jordan and Dykstra
are decided, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider this case in light of those
cases. Court of Appeals No. 276164.
Leave to Appeal Denied September 14, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
E
RNEST
J
ACKSON
, No. 133154. The denial is without prejudice
to the defendant’s right to file a motion for relief from judgment pursuant
6
Scott v Flowers, 910 F2d 201, 213 (CA 5, 1990).
1
Once again, Justice W
EAVER
has chosen to breach the confidentiality of
this Court’s deliberative process—a confidentiality that has character-
ized every appellate court from time immemorial. The adverse conse-
quences of her singular conduct on the candor and fullness of discussion
occurring within this process have been considerable.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
873
to MCR 6.500 et seq. Moreover, if defendant chooses to file such a motion,
the trial court, and not the Attorney Grievance Commission, would be the
appropriate forum to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding defen-
dant’s claim that his counsel had a conflict of interest, should it
determine that an evidentiary hearing is required. Court of Appeals No.
274819.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case to the trial court
for treatment of the defendant’s motions as a motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to MCR 6.500 et seq. and, if necessary, for an
evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant’s claim that his counsel had
a conflict of interest.
P
EOPLE V
T
HURMAN
J
ONES
, No. 133317; Court of Appeals No. 273193.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). Defendant indicated that he wished to speak
to a police officer. When asked whether he understood that he had a right
to an attorney, defendant responded, “Yes...canIhaveonenowwhile
we talk?” The officer then explained that defendant could either waive
his right to an attorney and talk to the officer now or wait to talk to an
attorney. Defendant then stated that he wished to waive his right to an
attorney, signed a form waiving his right to an attorney, and spoke with
the officer. Because defendant clearly indicated that he wished to waive
his right to an attorney, defendant’s statements to the officer should not
have been suppressed. Therefore, I dissent from this Court’s order
denying leave to appeal; instead, I would reverse the judgment of the trial
court.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
H
OFFMAN
, No. 133536; Court of Appeals No. 266560.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal to determine
(1) whether a criminal defendant, by pleading no contest, waives the
ability to challenge an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right
of self-representation; (2) whether the right of self-representation
extends to a plea hearing; and (3) whether a denial of the right of
self-representation renders a subsequent plea involuntary as a matter
of law.
In re T
HOMAS
(P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
T
HOMAS
), No. 133801; Court of Appeals
No. 264549.
W
EAVER,
C
ORRIGAN
, and Y
OUNG
, JJ. We would vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration of its analysis in light of the respondent’s statements
admitting that he touched the complainant. The prosecutor submitted
evidence at trial that the respondent admitted to the police and to his
mother that he accidentally touched the complainant’s vaginal area when
he picked her up to remove her from his home. The Court of Appeals did
not discuss this evidence in its opinion when evaluating the effect of the
evidentiary errors on the outcome of the respondent’s trial.
F
IEGER V
C
OX
, Nos. 133961; 133962; reported below: 274 Mich App 449.
In this case, petitioners seek a recusal of Chief Justice T
AYLOR
, and
Justices C
ORRIGAN
,M
ARKMAN
,andY
OUNG
.
874 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
In the recent past, petitioner Fieger has filed numerous motions for the
recusal of one or more Michigan Supreme Court justices, either in his
capacity as a party or as an attorney on behalf of his clients. Each of the prior
motions for recusal has involved various allegations of claimed bias, princi-
pally stemming from Michigan Supreme Court judicial campaigns. All of the
previous motions for recusal have been denied. Graves v Warner Bros, 469
Mich 853 (2003); Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich 883 (2003);
Harter v Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles, 693 NW2d 381 (2005);
Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 472 Mich 1244 (2005); McDowell v
Detroit, 474 Mich 999 (2006); Stamplis v St John Health Sys, 474 Mich 1017
(2006); Heikkila v North Star Trucking, Inc, 474 Mich 1080 (2006); Lewis
v St John Hosp, 474 Mich 1089 (2006); Johnson v Henry Ford Hosp, 477
Mich 1098 (2007); and Tate v City of Dearborn, 477 Mich 1101 (2007).
The pending motion asserts no new basis for recusal. Rather, the
motion is predicated entirely on allegations made in the previous 10
motions that have been considered and denied.
Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
and Y
OUNG
state that, as
we have each done in connection with these past motions, and as justices
must do in connection with every motion for disqualification, we have
each looked into our consciences in this case and concluded that we are
able to accord fair, impartial, and equal treatment to petitioners.
Further, the motion is predicated on the erroneous notion that disquali-
fication of a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court is governed by the
disqualification procedure set forth in MCR 2.003. On the contrary, this
procedure has never been held applicable to disqualification of justices. See,
e.g., Adair v Michigan, 474 Mich 1027, 1043 (2006) (statement of C
AVANAGH
,
J.), 1029 n 2, (statement of T
AYLOR
, C .J., and M
ARKMAN
, J.); In re JK, 468 Mich
202, 220 (2003) (statement of W
EAVER
, J.). Throughout its history, the
disqualification procedure followed in the Michigan Supreme Court is
similar to the one followed in the United States Supreme Court. See
Statement of Recusal Policy, United States Supreme Court, November 1,
1993; Laird v Tatum, 409 US 824, 833, 837 (1972); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp
v Local 6167, 325 US 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
There being no new asserted basis, the motion for recusal and for
evidentiary hearing is denied.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I cannot participate in the decision regarding the motion
for recusal and for an evidentiary hearing because current Court
practices—with which I disagree—only allow the individual justice who is
the subject of the motion to decide the motion. Thus, I can offer no
opinion about the validity of the motion for recusal and for an evidentiary
hearing that was filed.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the participation of Chief
Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
and Y
OUNG
in this case in which Mr.
Geoffrey N. Fieger is a party.
1
For my reasons in detail, see my dissent in
Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich 231, 328-347 (2006) (W
EAVER
1
I note that Justice M
ARKMAN
has properly decided not to participate in
this case and has also complied with his constitutional duty to provide
reasons for his nonparticipation. Const 1963, art 6, § 6.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
875
J., dissenting), and my dissent to the denial of the motion for a stay in
Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 477 Mich 1228, 1231-1271 (2006)
(W
EAVER
, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, although MCR 2.003 is inadequate and in need of
reform, which reform I have urged
2
this Court to undertake for almost
four years, without success, the disqualification of justices is nonetheless
governed by the disqualification procedure contained in MCR 2.003. Al-
though the majority of four asserts the contrary, the past four years have
exposed inconsistencies in the standards that individual justices apply to
themselves when making the decision to participate, or not to participate,
in a case. At times the justices have applied the court rule governing the
disqualification of judges, MCR 2.003, to themselves,
3
and at times they
have not.
For example, in Adair v Michigan, 474 Mich 1027, 1043 (2006), Chief
Justice T
AYLOR
and Justice M
ARKMAN
stated that “[p]ursuant to MCR
2.003(B)(6), we would each disqualify ourselves if our respective spouses
were participating as lawyers in this case, or if any of the other
requirements of this court rule were not satisfied.” Justice Y
OUNG
concurred fully in this legal analysis. Id. at 1053. Similarly, in Grosse
Pointe Park v Michigan Muni Liability & Prop Pool, 473 Mich 188 (2005),
2
Since May 2003, I have repeatedly called for this Court to recognize,
publish for public comment, place on a public hearing agenda, and
address the need to have clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures
concerning the participation or disqualification of justices. See, e.g., my
statements and opinions in Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich 883
(2003); Advocacy Org for Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 472
Mich 91, 96 (2005); McDowell v Detroit, 474 Mich 999, 1000 (2006);
Stamplis v St John Health Sys, 474 Mich 1017 (2006); Adair v Michigan,
474 Mich 1027, 1044 (2006); Heikkila v North Star Trucking, Inc, 474
Mich 1080, 1081 (2006); Lewis v St John Hosp, 474 Mich 1089 (2006);
People v Parsons, 728 NW2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v Clara’s Parlor, Inc, 477
Mich 1044 (2007); Neal v Dep’t of Corrections, 477 Mich 1049 (2007);
State Automobile Mut Ins Co v Fieger, 477 Mich 1068, 1070 (2007); Ansari
v Gold, 477 Mich 1076, 1077 (2007); Short v Antonini, 729 NW2d 218, 219
(2007); Flemister v Traveling Med Services, PC, 729 NW2d 222, 223
(2007); Johnson v Henry Ford Hosp, 477 Mich 1098, 1099 (2007); Tate v
City of Dearborn, 477 Mich 1101, 1102 (2007); and Dep’t of Labor &
Economic Growth v Jordan, 480 Mich 869 (2007).
3
Most recently, in People v Parsons, supra at 66-67 and n 10, and after
my urging, Justice C
ORRIGAN
disclosed in her statement of nonparticipa-
tion that her son was working for the law firm retained by the defendant,
that she was personally biased in favor of her son, and, further, that there
was a “distinct likelihood” that she had “extrajudicial knowledge of this
very case.” Accordingly, under both MCR 2.003(B)(1) and (2), it was
appropriate for Justice C
ORRIGAN
to disqualify herself from hearing the
case.
876 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Justice C
ORRIGAN
used the remittal of disqualification process of MCR
2.003(D). At other times, however, the same justices have not followed the
provisions of MCR 2.003. For example, in Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler
Corp, 469 Mich 883, 889 (2003), then-Chief Justice C
ORRIGAN
and Justices
T
AYLOR
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
denied a motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s order denying the motion for disqualification and did not refer
the motion to the State Court Administrator for the motion to be
assigned to another judge for review de novo, as would be proper under
MCR 2.003(C)(3).
Assertions that justices can continue to look into their consciences
and conclude they are able to accord fair, impartial, and equal treatment
to the parties and their counsel without any independent check on the
justices’ decisions are incorrect. This method is insufficient and inad-
equate to meet the due process rights of parties and their counsel.
Further, while it appears to continue to be for some justices a “tradition”
of this Court for a justice who disqualifies himself or herself from a case
to not give written reasons, and to sometimes apply MCR 2.003 to himself
or herself, and to sometimes not, it is a “tradition of secrecy” and
inadequacy that must for all justices end now. An impartial judiciary is
“ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around the operations of the
courts....”
4
K
ELLY
, J. I do not participate in the decision regarding the motion for
recusal. The Court’s established procedure is to leave the decision to the
discretion of the challenged justice. However, I continue to urge the Court
to establish and put in writing a better procedure to handle motions to
disqualify a Supreme Court justice from participation in a case.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I will not participate in this case because it directly
pertains to the Attorney General’s investigation of petitioners’ financial
conduct undertaken in connection with my reelection campaign in 2004.
B
AILEY V
K
HALID
, No. 134809; Court of Appeals No. 278049.
Reconsideration Denied September 14, 2007:
A
NSARI V
G
OLD
, No. 131161. Leave to appeal denied at 477 Mich
1076. Court of Appeals No. 263920.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant the motion for reconsidera-
tion.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s order denying
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because the plaintiff is entitled to a
stay pending the resolution of attorney Geoffrey Fieger’s lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, see
Fieger v Ferry, 471 F3d 637 (CA 6, 2006). I would grant the motion for
stay.
I further object to the continued participation of the majority of four,
Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN,
Y
OUNG,
and M
ARKMAN
,inthis
4
Scott v Flowers, 910 F2d 201, 213 (CA 5, 1990).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
877
case in which Mr. Fieger’s law firm represents the plaintiff. For my
reasons in detail, see my dissent in Ansari v Gold, 477 Mich 1076 (2007),
set forth in its entirety below.
1
____________________________________________________________
1
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the participation of the
majority of four, Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,
Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
in this case, where Mr. Geoffrey N. Fieger’s
law firm represents the plaintiff. For my reasons in detail, see my
dissent in Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich 231, 328-
347 (2006) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting), and my dissent to the denial of
the motion for stay in Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 477 Mich
1228, 1231-1271 (2006) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting).
I also dissent from the order denying plaintiff’s motion for stay
of proceedings pending Mr. Fieger’s lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concerning
Michigan’s disqualification rules governing Supreme Court jus-
tices. See Fieger v Ferry, 471 F3d 637 (CA 6, 2006). I would grant
the motion to stay.
Furthermore, although MCR 2.003 is inadequate and in need of
reform, which reform I have urged,
1
without success for almost
four years, this Court to undertake action and achieve, the
disqualification of justices is governed by the disqualification
procedure contained in MCR 2.003. Although the majority of four
asserts the contrary, the past four years have exposed inconsisten-
cies in the standards that individual justices apply to themselves
when making their decision to participate, or not to participate, in
a case. At times the justices have applied the court rule governing
the disqualification of judges, MCR 2.003, to themselves, and at
times they have not.
For example in Adair v Michigan, 474 Mich 1027, 1043 (2006),
Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justice M
ARKMAN
stated that “[p]ursuant
to MCR 2.003(B)(6), we would each disqualify ourselves if our
respective spouses were participating as lawyers in this case, or if
any of the other requirements of this court rule were not satis-
fied.” Justice Y
OUNG
concurred fully in this legal analysis. Id. at
1053. Similarly, in Grosse Pointe Park v Michigan Muni Liability
& Prop Pool, 473 Mich 188 (2005), then-Chief Justice C
ORRIGAN
used the remittal of disqualification process of MCR 2.003(D). At
other times, however, the same justices have not followed the
provisions of MCR 2.003. For example, in Gilbert v Daimler-
Chrysler Corp, 469 Mich 883, 889 (2003), then-Chief Justice
C
ORRIGAN
and Justices T
AYLOR
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
denied a
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying the
motion for disqualification and did not refer the motion to the
878 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
State Court Administrator for the motion to be assigned to
another judge for review de novo, as would be proper under MCR
2.003(C)(3).
Assertions that justices can continue to look into their con-
sciences and conclude they are able to accord fair, impartial, and
equal treatment to parties’ counsel and clients without any
independent check on justices’ decisions are incorrect. This
method is insufficient and inadequate to meet the due process
rights of parties and their counsel. Further while it appears to
continue to be for some justices a “tradition” of this Court for a
justice who disqualifies himself or herself from a case to not give
written reasons, and to sometimes apply MCR 2.003 to himself or
herself, and to sometimes not, it is a “tradition of secrecy” and
inadequacy that must for all justices end now. An impartial
judiciary is “ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around the
operations of the courts....”
2
____________________________________________________________
1
Since May 2003, I have repeatedly called for this Court to
recognize, publish for public comment, place on a public hearing
agenda, and address the need to have clear, fair, orderly, and public
procedures concerning the participation or disqualification of
justices. See, e.g., statements of W
EAVER
, J., in In re JK, 468 Mich
202 (2003); Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich 883 (2003);
Advocacy Org for Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 472
Mich 91 (2005); McDowell v Detroit, 474 Mich 999 (2006); Stamplis
v St John Health Sys, 474 Mich 1017 (2006); Heikkila v North Star
Trucking, Inc, 474 Mich 1080 (2006); LewisvStJohnHosp, 474
Mich 1089 (2006); Adair v Michigan, 474 Mich 1027 (2006);
Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich 231 (2006); Grievance
Administrator v Fieger, 477 Mich 1228 (2006); People v Parsons,
728 NW2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v Clara’s Parlor, 477 Mich 1044 (2007);
and Neal v Dep’t of Corrections, 477 Mich 1049 (2007).
2
Scott v Flowers, 910 F2d 201, 215 (CA 5, 1990).
_____________________________________________________________
[Ansari, supra at 1077-1079.]
C
HAPIN V
A
&
LP
ARTS,
I
NC
, Nos. 133178, 133410, 133412. Leave to
appeal denied at 478 Mich 916. Reported below: 274 Mich App 122.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). For the reasons set forth in my dissenting
statement at 478 Mich 916 (2007), I would grant appellants’ motion for
reconsideration and grant leave to appeal. Few recent appeals have raised
issues of greater long-term consequence for the integrity of this state’s
legal system than the instant appeal. It is unfortunate—indeed it is
A
CTIONS ON
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879
inexplicable—that the highest court of this state would not view this case
as warranting its attention. The practical and legal reverberations of
today’s decision will be felt for years to come in Michigan.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal September 21, 2007:
D
ETROIT
F
IREFIGHTERS
A
SSOCIATION,
IAFF, L
OCAL
344vC
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
,
No. 131463. We direct the clerk to set this case for reargument in the
November 2007 session. Arguments should address the issues identified
in this Court’s June 15, 2007, order, and the parties will be limited to 15
minutes per side. Following the arguments by the parties, amici curiae
Michigan Municipal League/Michigan Association of Counties and Michi-
gan State AFL-CIO shall be permitted oral argument of 10 minutes each.
Reported below: 271 Mich App 457.
Leave to Appeal Granted September 21, 2007:
D
AIMLER
C
HRYSLER
C
ORPORATION V
S
TATE
T
AX
C
OMMISSION,
F
ORD
M
OTOR
C
OMPANY V
S
TATE
T
AX
C
OMMISSION, AND
D
ETROIT
D
IESEL
C
ORPORATION V
S
TATE
T
AX
C
OMMISSION
, Nos. 133394, 133396, 133400-133406; reported below:
274 Mich App 108.
Summary Dispositions September 21, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
M
C
D
ANIEL
, No. 132805. We direct the Oakland County
Prosecuting Attorney to answer the defendant’s application for leave to
appeal within 28 days after the date of this order. In addition, we invite
the Attorney General to respond on behalf of the Michigan Department
of Corrections. We invite the prosecutor and the Attorney General to
address the questions (1) whether the defendant began serving his
sentence in this case no later than the date of his original sentencing
proceeding on September 26, 2003, which sentence was later vacated as
an unwarranted departure from the statutory sentencing guidelines, and
(2) assuming the defendant began serving his sentence on September 26,
2003, whether the trial court was required to grant the defendant credit
for time served on a void sentence, i.e., for time served between the date
of the original sentencing and the date of the resentencing. MCL 769.11a.
Court of Appeals No. 264706.
K
ELLY
, J. I would have expected the prosecutor to answer the appli-
cation for leave to appeal without an order from this Court.
L
AMAR V
R
AMADA
F
RANCHISE
S
YSTEMS,
I
NC
, No. 133575. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the order of the Oakland Circuit
Court granting summary disposition to the defendants. The Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that any questions about when a fight
started and how long it had been going on before the defendants’
employees contacted the police created a genuine issue of material fact as
880 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
to whether the defendants took reasonable measures to respond to that
fight. MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 336 (2001). Court of Appeals
No. 272966.
K
ELLY
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
WAFFORD
, No. 133897. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsid-
eration of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers issue in light of the
documentation that the defendant attached to his application for leave to
appeal and motion in this Court. In all other respects, leave to appeal is
denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question
presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for miscella-
neous relief is denied. We further direct the Court of Appeals to first
remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court, in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 2003-3, so that the circuit court can determine
whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel to
represent the defendant in the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals No.
268499.
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
(concurring). I concur with the order remanding this case
to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the issue concerning the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), MCL 780.601 et seq. I write
separately to raise the following questions that the case presents: (1) Was
the panel correct that People v Monasterski, 105 Mich App 645 (1981),
and People v Wilden (On Rehearing), 197 Mich App 533 (1992), hold that
“a detainer filed against a jail inmate before he begins serving a prison
sentence is insufficient to implicate the IAD,” and, if so, (2) are the
holdings in Monasterski and Wilden consistent with the language of
article III of the IAD?
I
In Monasterski, supra at 653, the Court of Appeals, citing the purpose
of the IAD, the language of article IV of the IAD, and Anno: Validity,
construction, and application of interstate agreement on detainers,98
ALR3d 160, 185, explained that in order to trigger the IAD, the prisoner
must be “actually serving a term of imprisonment in the sending state.”
The panel held that the IAD did not apply in that case because the
defendants were being held in jail in Indiana pending extradition and had
not embarked on a program of rehabilitation when the detainer was
lodged. Monasterski, supra at 653. Although the defendants were tried
and sentenced after the detainer was lodged, it appears that the defen-
dants were never imprisoned in Indiana before being sent to Michigan on
the detainer; they were merely held in an Indiana jail pending extradi-
tion. Similarly in Wilden, supra at 539, the Court of Appeals held that the
IAD did not apply because at the time the detainer was filed, the
defendant had not “entered upon a term of imprisonment,” but was
merely a parolee awaiting a hearing on his parole revocation. The
defendant never entered upon a term of imprisonment before his transfer
to Michigan on the detainer.
A
CTIONS ON
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881
Because the defendants in Monasterski and Wilden never began terms
of imprisonment before being extradited on the detainers, it appears that
those holdings apply only in cases in which the defendant was not
imprisoned when he sent to the prosecutor written notice of his place of
imprisonment and a request for final disposition of the indictment,
information, or complaint. Article III(a) clearly requires that the defen-
dant be imprisoned at the time he causes the notice to be delivered to the
prosecutor. MCL 780.601 (The 180-day period of the IAD applies “[w]hen-
everapersonhasentereduponatermofimprisonment....”).Seealso
People v Butcher, 46 Mich App 40, 44-45 (1973) (“[T]he interstate
agreement requires that a person have entered on a term of imprison-
ment in a prison in a state a party to the agreement when the required
notice is given ....”).Intheinstant case, defendant was imprisoned in
the federal system after the alleged detainer was lodged. During his
imprisonment, he caused written notice of the place of his imprisonment
to be delivered to the prosecutor. Thus, Monasterski and Wilden may be
distinguishable from the instant case.
II
If on remand the Court of Appeals again interprets Monasterski and
Wilden to mean that the IAD is never implicated when the detainer was
filed against a person before he begins his term of imprisonment, then
the holdings of Monasterski and Wilden appear contrary to the language
of article III of the IAD. Article III(a) of the IAD provides that the 180-day
period applies “whenever during the continuance of the term of impris-
onment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner....”(Emphasis added.) The use of the phrase
“has been lodged” in article III seems to mean that the detainer could
have been lodged before the defendant was imprisoned. In other words,
under article III(a), the IAD applies when a defendant who enters into a
term of imprisonment has had a detainer lodged against him, whether
the detainer was lodged before or during the defendant’s imprisonment.
This interpretation is consistent with the language of articles I and IV of
the IAD. Nothing in the IAD suggests that the detainer must have been
lodged while the defendant was imprisoned before the IAD applies. Thus,
application of the IAD appears broader under the plain language of
article III than it is under the Court of Appeals interpretation of
Monasterski and Wilden.
If the Court of Appeals determines that Monasterski and Wilden are
applicable but were wrongly decided, then the panel must address
whether the prosecutor properly relied on those cases, which were the
governing law at the time. Even if the Court of Appeals determines that
Monasterski and Wilder are distinguishable, any holding by the Court of
Appeals that the IAD applies even when the detainer was lodged before
the defendant’s imprisonment would be a novel interpretation of article
III. Such a holding would broaden the previous interpretation of the
application of the IAD. Because prosecutors up to this point have
reasonably relied on the narrower application of the IAD under Monas-
882 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
terski and Wilder, the panel should consider whether to give such a
holding limited retroactive effect. See People v Williams, 475 Mich 245,
255 (2006).
G
LISSON V
G
ERRITY
, No. 133991. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse part IV(A) of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, and we vacate parts III and IV(B) of the
judgment as unnecessary in light of our reversal of part IV(A). The
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s June 2, 2004, complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Geralds v Munson
Healthcare, 259 Mich App 225 (2003), and Mouradian v Goldberg, 256
Mich App 566 (2003). We overruled Geralds and Mouradian in
Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). As Kirkaldy states, “[u]nder
MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2912d, the period of limitations is
tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on
the defendant.” Kirkaldy, 478 Mich 585. Even a defective affidavit of
merit will “toll the period of limitations until the validity of the
affidavit is successfully challenged in ‘subsequent judicial proceed-
ings.’ ” Id. at 586. In this case, the limitations period was tolled when
the plaintiff filed and served the June 2, 2004, complaint and affidavit
of merit. As a result, the limitations period had not expired when the
plaintiff filed and served the August 9, 2005, amended complaint,
accompanied by the June 3, 2005, amended affidavit of merit. Accord-
ingly, we dismiss without prejudice those claims concerning Dianne
Gerrity, M.D., in the June 2, 2004, complaint, and we remand this case
to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings with regard to the
amended pleadings. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied,
because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. R eported below: 274 Mich App 525.
Leave to Appeal Denied September 21, 2007:
A
MERISURE,
I
NC V
B
RENNAN
, No. 133061; Court of Appeals No. 270736.
A
MMEX,
I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY
, No. 133302; reported below: 273
Mich App 623.
P
EOPLE V
R
EDMOND
, No. 133334; Court of Appeals No. 261458.
T
AIG V
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 133418; Court of Appeals No.
272144.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal. I would remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on
leave granted because the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commis-
sion (WCAC) improperly applied Miklik v Michigan Special Machine
Co, 415 Mich 364 (1982), for the governing standard of review. The
WCAC’s application of Miklik ignores the correct “substantial evi-
dence” standard of review, which includes a “qualitative and quanti-
tative” analysis of the evidence. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co, 462 Mich 691 (2000).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
883
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The 47-year-old plaintiff worked as a repairman and assembler for
defendant. Plaintiff apparently felt that he was being harassed by his
supervisor, because he wrote a letter to management criticizing quality
control. On his last day of work, after being notified of impending
disciplinary proceedings, plaintiff locked himself in an empty office where
he stabbed himself in the hand with a screwdriver.
Dr. Yatinder Singhal diagnosed plaintiff as having severe depression
and anxiety and concluded that plaintiff was unable to return to work.
Dr. Singhal concluded that the alleged harassment of plaintiff at work
significantly contributed to his preexisting emotional difficulties. Dr.
Michael Freedman agreed that plaintiff was unable to return to work, but
concluded that plaintiff’s mental problems were completely unrelated to
his employment.
The magistrate held that plaintiff was disabled under Sington v
Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144 (2002), and was entitled to an open award
of benefits. The magistrate did not expressly state which doctor was more
credible or which doctor’s testimony she was relying on, but her conclu-
sion that events at plaintiff’s work significantly aggravated plaintiff’s
preexisting emotional problems indicates that the magistrate relied on
Dr. Singhal’s testimony.
The WCAC affirmed in a split opinion. The majority stated that the
case involved a credibility contest between the doctors and that the
magistrate had to choose which doctor to believe. The majority held that
although the magistrate did not directly state why she relied on Dr.
Singhal’s testimony, she had a “reasonable basis” for doing so. The Court
of Appeals thereafter denied the defendant employer’s application for
leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant correctly argues that the WCAC majority erred as a matter
of law when it used Miklik
1
to describe the standard of review of the
magistrate’s factual findings. While relying on Miklik, the WCAC major-
ity merely cited Mudel, supra at 698-699, in which this Court held that
the WCAC reviews the magistrate’s findings of fact to determine if they
are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. “Substantial evidence” means such evidence as a reason-
able mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Id. at 699,
citing MCL 418.861a(3). This review must, according to MCL
418.861a(13), include both a “qualitative and quantitative analysis” of
1
In Miklik, supra at 367-368, this Court held: “The factfinder in a
workers’ compensation case ordinarily is free to accept the most persua-
sive medical testimony. However, should the medical testimony advance
a theory which conflicts with the law, the factfinder would be precluded
from adopting that testimony.”
884 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
the evidence. In other words, the WCAC need not necessarily defer to all
of the magistrate’s findings of fact. Mudel, supra at 703. The WCAC has
certain fact-finding powers that permit it in some circumstances to
substitute its own findings of fact for those of the magistrate if the WCAC
accords different weight to the quality or quantity of evidence presented.
Id. at 699-700.
Although the WCAC’s citations of Mudel were correct, the WCAC
then made the following questionable statement in the standard of
review section: “Ultimately, the analysis comes down to which doctor the
magistrate chose to believe and, as long as there is a reasonable basis for
the choice that she did make, Miklik v Michigan Special Machine Co, 415
Mich 364, 367-368 (1982), the inquiry is at an end.” In applying the
standard of review to the facts, the WCAC apparently relied on this
“reasonable basis” standard when it stated three times that the magis-
trate’s findings were “reasonable.” The WCAC concluded that because
there was a “reasonable basis” for the magistrate’s findings, there was
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record to
support the magistrate’s decision.
2
I question the WCAC’s application of Miklik. First, Miklik was
decided before the WCAC was even created. Thus, the Miklik Court was
necessarily working under a different standard of review. Second, the
WCAC’s standard of review was later clarified in Mudel. Mudel does not
instruct the WCAC to affirm the magistrate’s factual findings when there
is merely a “reasonable basis” for those findings. Under Mudel,the
WCAC need not defer to the magistrate’s findings, but has the authority
and obligation to engage in a qualitative and quantitative analysis to
determine whether to affirm those findings. Rather than engaging in a
qualitative and quantitative review, the WCAC held that because there
was a “reasonable basis” for the magistrate’s decision, “the inquiry is at
an end.” By doing so, the WCAC effectively ignored the Mudel standards
and misapplied an outdated standard purportedly based on Miklik.I
would remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted to apply the correct standard of review or to direct the WCAC to
do so.
P
EOPLE V
O
TIS
F
RAZIER
, No. 133441. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 271346.
2
This is not the first time the WCAC has relied on Miklik for this
proposition. See, e.g., Lee v ACE Hardware & Lumber/MRHA-SIWCF,
1993 Mich ACO 585,p2(“ItiswellwithintheMagistrate’s discretion to
accept the medical testimony he finds most persuasive and as long as
there is a reasonable basis for his findings,...wewillnotdisplace them.
Miklik v Michigan Special Machine Co, 415 Mich 364 (1982)....”);
Weible v Bra Con Industries, Inc, 1998 Mich ACO 357, p 6 (“[W]e
recognize that the magistrate is free to select the medical testimony he
finds most persuasive, when, as here, there is a reasonable basis for his
choice. Miklik, supra, p 367.”).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
885
E
RICKSON V
E
VANS
, No. 133556; Court of Appeals No. 272328.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
Z
ELLER
, No. 133558; Court of Appeals No. 264137.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTONIO
B
AILEY
, No. 133562; Court of Appeals No. 274556.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for resentencing.
P
EOPLE V
O
TIS
, No. 133569; Court of Appeals No. 275876.
K
ELLY
and C
ORRIGAN
, JJ. We would remand this case to the trial court
to clarify the basis for the scoring of offense variable 19.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
G
ROESBECK
, No. 133590; Court of Appeals No. 272091.
P
EOPLE V
B
URCH
, No. 133652; Court of Appeals No. 275178.
M
ELBOURNE V
L
AWN
W
ORKS AND
M
ELBOURNE V
W
AYNE
B
OWLING AND
R
ECRE-
ATION,
I
NC
, Nos. 133658, 133659; Court of Appeals Nos. 263783, 263819.
P
EOPLE V
C
ASCHERA
, No. 133693; Court of Appeals No. 275833.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case to the trial court for correction of
the presentence report.
P
EOPLE V
H
AREMZA
, No. 133700; Court of Appeals No. 274479.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
L
EGG V
D
AIMLER
C
HRYSLER
C
ORPORATION
, No. 133744; Court of Appeals
No. 272752.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHNIGAN
, No. 133755; Court of Appeals No. 267727.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for resentencing.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDRE
M
OORE
, No. 133773; Court of Appeals No. 265069.
P
EOPLE V
W
INTERS
, No. 133798; Court of Appeals No. 275975.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for resentencing.
V
EUCASOVIC V
S
TATE
F
ARM
M
UTUAL
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
133815; Court of Appeals No. 271771.
P
EOPLE V
W
INSTEAD
, No. 133852; Court of Appeals No. 276412.
A
LBER V
B
IG
R
APIDS
A
UTOMOTIVE,
I
NC
, No. 133869; Court of Appeals No.
274872.
P
EOPLE V
D
INOFFRIA
, No. 133873. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272266.
P
EOPLE V
T
ODOROVSKI
, No. 133933; Court of Appeals No. 276868.
H
ARDY V
S
AFEWAY
F
OOD
C
ENTER,
I
NC
, No. 133989; Court of Appeals No.
272962.
In re M
OON
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
M
OON
), No. 134795;
Court of Appeals No. 276349.
886 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
In re O
LLIE
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
O
LLIE
), No. 134796; Court
of Appeals No. 269029.
Summary Dispositions September 24, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
V
AN
C
LEVE
, No. 133295. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Genesee Circuit
Court for resentencing. Because the penetrations in this case did not
“arise out of” the sentencing offense, offense variable 11 should not have
been scored at 50 points. People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96 (2006). Court of
Appeals No. 274849.
P
EOPLE V
T
AMERRA
W
ASHINGTON
, No. 134151. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals
No. 273808.
P
EOPLE V
R
IDDLE
, No. 134198. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Kalamazoo Circuit
Court for amendment of the presentence report. The circuit judge stated
at the sentencing hearing on December 11, 2006, that he would make a
note in the presentence report that the defendant denies that his family
fears him, but the presentence report was not amended in accordance
with that statement. Therefore, the circuit court shall direct the proba-
tion officer to amend the presentence report to note that the defendant
denies that his family fears him. MCR 6.425(E)(2). The circuit court is
further ordered to ensure that the amended presentence report is
transmitted to the Department of Corrections. In all other respects, leave
to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 277673.
S
ANBORN V
D
OCKETT’S
M
OBILE
H
OME
S
ALES
, No. 134245. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of
Appeals No. 275066.
Leave to Appeal Denied September 24, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
H
AMMOND
, No. 132141; Court of Appeals No. 260837.
W
OOD V
B
EDIAKO
, No. 132603; reported below: 272 Mich App 558.
P
EOPLE V
W
HEETLEY
, No. 132863. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 270967.
P
EOPLE V
F
LOYD
, No. 133323; Court of Appeals No. 274642.
M
C
E
LROY V
M
ICHIGAN
S
TATE
P
OLICE
C
RIMINAL
J
USTICE
I
NFORMATION
C
EN-
TER
, No. 133340; reported below: 274 Mich App 32.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
887
P
EOPLE V
B
UTLER
, No. 133359; Court of Appeals No. 272857.
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY,
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY V
S
CHILS,
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OMMUNITY
H
EALTH
O
RGANIZATION, AND
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY
O
FFICE OF THE
S
HERIFF
, Nos. 133427, 133497, 133498, 134113,
134290, 134291; Court of Appeals Nos. 263938, 267650, 273104, 273428,
274231, 274664.
P
EOPLE V
R
IKER
, No. 133449; Court of Appeals No. 263726.
P
EOPLE V
D
WAYNE
W
HITE,
No. 133479; Court of Appeals No. 275044.
P
EOPLE V
P
HILIP
T
HOMPSON
, No. 133494; Court of Appeals No. 262054.
D
ULIC V
P
ROGRESSIVE
M
ICHIGAN
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133526; Court
of Appeals No. 271275.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
R
OGERS
, No. 133611; Court of Appeals No. 275740.
P
EOPLE V
H
ILTON
, No. 133648. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 275572.
S
VOBODA V
C
UNNINGHAM
, No. 133677; Court of Appeals No. 271797.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANKIE
H
ALL
, No. 133720. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
275600.
P
EOPLE V
W
HITLEY
, No. 133724; Court of Appeals No. 265482.
P
EOPLE V
R
UIZ
, No. 133850; Court of Appeals No. 262699.
P
EOPLE V
S
EAMAN
, Nos. 133865, 133866; Court of Appeals Nos. 260816,
265572.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
R
OGERS
, No. 133919; Court of Appeals No. 276336.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
H
UBBARD
, No. 133993. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273749.
P
EOPLE V
E
VA
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 133994; Court of Appeals No. 267732.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARL
S
MITH
, No. 134001. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272793.
P
EOPLE V
S
OUSA
, No. 134027. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272682.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLMES
, No. 134030. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273213.
P
EOPLE V
K
RAJEWSKI
, No. 134035; Court of Appeals No. 276915.
888 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
R
UFFIN
, No. 134039. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273091.
P
EOPLE V
D
ELMAR
G
OWING
, No. 134044. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 277961.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALD
G
OWING
, No. 134046. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 277962.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
P
HIPPS
, No. 134055; Court of Appeals No. 265388.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHENS
, No. 134061. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274379.
P
EOPLE V
D
WAYNE
B
ERRY
, No. 134074. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272500.
R
ESPESS V
I
RWIN
M
ORTGAGE
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134076; Court of Appeals
No. 273902.
P
EOPLE V
W
OODMAN
, No. 134098; Court of Appeals No. 276752.
P
EOPLE V
P
ERDUE
, No. 134103; Court of Appeals No. 276650.
P
EOPLE V
V
AN
R
EYENDAM
, No. 134104; Court of Appeals No. 266511.
P
EOPLE V
O
UTLEY
, No. 134105; Court of Appeals No. 277209.
P
EOPLE V
F
REDERICK
F
IELDS
, No. 134108. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274140.
P
EOPLE V
B
URKE
, No. 134111. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275110.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONNIE
D
AVIS
, No. 134112. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273092.
P
EOPLE V
R
AMIE
L
EWIS
, No. 134117. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273610.
P
EOPLE V
G
UTHRIE
, No. 134121. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273296.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICHARDS
, No. 134129. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272696.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
889
P
EOPLE V
D
ILSWORTH
, No. 134130. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273207.
P
EOPLE V
J
ULIAN
B
ROOKS
, No. 134134; Court of Appeals No. 266082.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENNETH
P
ATTERSON
, No. 134136; Court of Appeals No.
266945.
H
UBBERT V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134144; Court of Appeals
No. 275949.
P
EOPLE V
I
SCARO
, No. 134152; Court of Appeals No. 273031.
S
ANDBERG V
D
EPARMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134160; Court of Appeals
No. 273073.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANKLIN
B
ALLARD
, No. 134161. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273321.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRELL
, No. 134168. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275115.
P
EOPLE V
B
ELCHER
, No. 134169. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273068.
P
EOPLE V
E
AREGOOD
, No. 134178; Court of Appeals No. 269300.
P
EOPLE V
T
ITLOW
, No. 134183. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273274.
P
EOPLE V
S
HEDRICK
L
EE
, No. 134184. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275281.
P
EOPLE V
D
ENSON
, No. 134187. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272584.
P
EOPLE V
A
L
-K
HALIL
, No. 134189; Court of Appeals No. 266096.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.
P
EOPLE V
O
LATUNJI
K
EAN
, No. 134191; Court of Appeals No. 264236.
P
EOPLE V
W
OODALL
, No. 134194. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274073.
P
EOPLE V
K
IERZAK
, No. 134196. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275563.
890 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
K
EITH
S
TINSON
, No. 134201. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274637.
P
EOPLE V
T
ONY
B
ERRY
, No. 134202. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275488.
P
EOPLE V
F
LOOD
, No. 134210. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 277681.
P
EOPLE V
H
ARDIN
, No. 134212. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274820.
K
HEMMORO
I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
OMMUNITY
H
EALTH
, No. 134216; Court
of Appeals No. 275286.
P
EOPLE V
A
RTHUR
R
OBINSON
, No. 134223; Court of Appeals No. 276155.
P
EOPLE V
M
ATEO
-C
ASTELLANOS
, No. 134232; Court of Appeals No.
267335.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARMICHAEL
, No. 134235. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275489.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHEN
A
NDREWS
, No. 134238. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273525.
P
EOPLE V
M
AKI
, No. 134243; Court of Appeals No. 268038.
N
ARDI V
S
ATELLITE
S
ERVICES,
I
NC
, No. 134246; Court of Appeals No.
269197.
P
EOPLE V
G
IDRON
, No. 134253; Court of Appeals No. 277205.
C
OMPEAU V
C
URRIER
, No. 134278; Court of Appeals No. 274495.
P
OTTS V
S
TIEVE
, No. 134281; Court of Appeals No. 268581.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
M
ILLS
, No. 134286; Court of Appeals No. 268528.
P
EOPLE V
G
REGORY
W
ASHINGTON
, No. 134294; Court of Appeals No.
274768.
P
EOPLE V
M
ILES
, No. 134301. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275648.
S
MART V
N
ATIONWIDE
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 134302; Court of
Appeals No. 266797.
P
EOPLE V
C
ALHOUN
, No. 134303. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274822.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
891
P
EOPLE V
V
ALLADOLID
, No. 134304. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273286.
B
RONIAK V
C
LENDENING
, No. 134305; Court of Appeals No. 274584.
P
EOPLE V
N
ORMAN
, No. 134307. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274114.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCUS
M
ARTIN
, No. 134310; Court of Appeals No. 277125.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
C
OOPER
, No. 134312; Court of Appeals No. 277628.
P
EOPLE V
B
OBBY
P
ERRY
, No. 134315; Court of Appeals No. 277593.
S
ALMON V
S
MITH
, No. 134317; Court of Appeals No. 276573.
P
EOPLE V
M
ACK
M
C
K
INNEY
, No. 134318. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274446.
B
URTON V
H
ELEN
N
EWBERRY
J
OY
H
OSPITAL
, No. 134323; Court of Appeals
No. 274440.
P
EOPLE V
O
LA-
T
OKUMBO
U
NGER
, No. 134324; Court of Appeals No.
275246.
P
EOPLE V
Y
AX
, No. 134345; Court of Appeals No. 276861.
P
EOPLE V
H
ILLIARD
, No. 134346. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273928.
V
AN
E
MAN V
CARS P
ROTECTION
P
LUS,
I
NC
, No. 134349; Court of Appeals
No. 267473.
H
ENDRICK V
S
TATE
F
ARM
M
UTUAL
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
134353; Court of Appeals No. 275318.
G
RUBER V
C
OLE’S
C
ORNER
R
ESTAURANT &
C
ATERING,
I
NC
, No. 134355; Court
of Appeals No. 273248.
P
EOPLE V
H
ULL
, No. 134360; Court of Appeals No. 270190.
P
EOPLE V
H
ORNE
, No. 134362; Court of Appeals No. 269788.
P
EOPLE V
A
LPHONSO
M
ILLS
, No. 134364. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274880.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALD
P
ATTERSON
, No. 134365. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 275948.
C
ARTER V
I
NGHAM
C
OUNTY
C
ONCEALED
W
EAPONS
L
ICENSING
B
OARD
, No.
134370; Court of Appeals No. 275024.
892 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
K
EITH
B
ELL
, No. 134371. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276503.
P
EOPLE V
L
ASSETTI
, No. 134375. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275002.
P
EOPLE V
B
RODIE
, No. 134376. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274374.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
W
HEELER
, No. 134379; Court of Appeals No. 269790.
P
EOPLE V
M
ANSON
, No. 134380; Court of Appeals No. 276064.
P
EOPLE V
T
YSZKOWSKI
, No. 134387; Court of Appeals No. 275328.
P
EOPLE V
W
EST
, No. 134401; Court of Appeals No. 269294.
P
EOPLE V
L
OCKLEAR
, No. 134404; Court of Appeals No. 267116.
P
EOPLE V
D
ALE
S
MITH
, No. 134405; Court of Appeals No. 277410.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTOPHER
M
ORGAN
, No. 134411; Court of Appeals No.
275990.
P
EOPLE V
A
LPHONSO
C
LARK
, No. 134423; Court of Appeals No. 267188.
P
EOPLE V
D
USTIN
M
ILLER
, No. 134425. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274881.
P
EOPLE V
T
REMAIN
J
ONES
, No. 134428; Court of Appeals No. 277677.
P
EOPLE V
G
WIZDALA
, No. 134429; Court of Appeals No. 277030.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRISE
J
OHNSON
, No. 134430; Court of Appeals No. 278226.
P
EOPLE V
B
RANDON
M
ILLER
, No. 134433; Court of Appeals No. 267083.
P
EOPLE V
W
ARE
, No. 134438; Court of Appeals No. 270441.
P
EOPLE V
K
ITTKA
, No. 134441; Court of Appeals No. 269425.
D
ETROIT
L
IONS,
I
NC V
C
ITY OF
D
EARBORN
, No. 134447; Court of Appeals
No. 266260.
K
UCZMERA V
S
APPI
F
INE
P
APER
N
ORTH
A
MERICA
, No. 134463; Court of
Appeals No. 275758.
P
EOPLE V
G
LOSTER
, No. 134466; Court of Appeals No. 277831.
P
EOPLE V
E
DMUNDS
, No. 134467; Court of Appeals No. 277850.
P
EOPLE V
L
APINE
, No. 134498; Court of Appeals No. 273971.
P
EOPLE V
M
OUGRABI
, No. 134520; Court of Appeals No. 276294.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
893
O
TTOBRE V
H
OPE
N
ETWORK
N
ORTH
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 134528; Court of
Appeals No. 276681.
P
EOPLE V
C
EDRIC
S
MITH
, No. 134532; Court of Appeals No. 267114.
P
EOPLE V
P
OSEY
, No. 134535; Court of Appeals No. 270379.
S
IMS V
D
ELPHI
A
UTOMOTIVE
S
YSTEMS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134544; Court of
Appeals No. 275454.
P
EOPLE V
H
ILTON
, No. 134556. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275572.
O
SBORNE V
W
ASHTENAW
C
IRCUIT
J
UDGE
, No. 134741. The complaint for
superintending control, treated as an application for leave to appeal the
July 20, 2007, order of the Court of Appeals, is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 279204.
Reconsideration Denied September 24, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
G
ARRETT
, No. 133325. Leave to appeal denied at 478 Mich
927. Court of Appeals No. 265913.
P
RICE V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
RANSPORTATION
, No. 133358. Leave to appeal
denied at 478 Mich 928. Court of Appeals No. 257577 (on remand).
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would grant leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
P
EOPLE V
S
TALLWORTH
, No. 133540. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich
852. Court of Appeals No. 266833.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
P
EOPLE V
L
IGE
, No. 133610. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich
863. Court of Appeals No. 271757.
In re B
ELL
(K
ING V
D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES
), Nos. 133768-
133770. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich 852. Court of Appeals Nos.
271845-271847.
Leave to Appeal Granted September 26, 2007:
A
LLISON V
AEW C
APITAL
M
ANAGEMENT,
LLP, No. 133771. The parties
shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the Court of
Appeals violated MCR 7.215(J)(1) by not following the precedent of
Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 429n1(2005); (2) whether
sidewalks and parking lots in leased residential areas are “common
areas” under MCL 554.139(1)(a); and (3) whether natural accumulation
of snow and ice is subject to the lessor’s duty established in MCL
554.139(1)(a) and (b). The clerk of the Court is directed to place this case
894 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
on the January 2008 session calendar for argument and submission.
Appellants’ brief and appendix must be filed no later than November 16,
2007, and appellee’s brief and appendix, if appellee chooses to submit an
appendix, must be filed no later than December 17, 2007. Reported
below: 274 Mich App 663.
B
UCKNER
E
STATE V
C
ITY OF
L
ANSING
, No. 133772. The parties shall
include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the children’s
decision to risk walking in the street prevents the plaintiffs from
establishing proximate causation; (2) whether the city of Lansing is
entitled to governmental immunity because the injuries did not occur on
the sidewalk that the city allegedly failed to maintain, i.e., the injuries
were not the direct result of the allegedly unmaintained condition; and
(3) whether the statutory duty to “maintain the highway in reasonable
repair,” MCL 691.1402(1), imposes obligations relating only to
structural-type defects, or whether it includes a duty not to place
temporary obstacles on a highway that render it impassable. The clerk of
the Court is directed to place this case on the January 2008 session
calendar for argument and submission. Appellant’s brief and appendix
must be filed no later than November 16, 2007, and appellees’ brief and
appendix, if appellees choose to submit an appendix, must be filed no
later than December 17, 2007. The Michigan Association of Justice,
Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., and Michigan Municipal League
are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups inter-
ested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move
the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. The application for
leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Reported
below: 274 Mich App 672.
S
TONE V
W
ILLIAMSON
, No. 133986. The application for leave to appeal
the April 17, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is granted limited to
the following issues: (1) whether the requirements set forth in the second
sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) apply in this case; (2) if so, whether the
“loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better
result” should be determined by considering the aggregate increased risk
posed by the alleged malpractice, including risks associated with injuries
that the patient did not suffer and any increased risk of death, or whether
the only consideration should be the increased risk of the specific injury
or injuries suffered by the patient; (3) whether Fulton v William
Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 (2002), was correctly decided, or
whether a different approach is required to correctly implement the
second sentence of § 2912a(2), such as that described in Roy W. Waddell,
M.D.’s A Doctor’s View of Opportunity to Survive: Fulton’s Assumptions
and Math are Wrong, published in the March 2007 edition of the
Michigan Bar Journal at 32; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it determined that the plaintiffs met the requirements of §
2912a(2). The clerk of the Court is directed to place this case on the
January 2008 session calendar for argument and submission. Appellants’
brief and appendix must be filed no later than November 16, 2007, and
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
895
appellees’ brief and appendix, if appellees choose to submit an appendix,
must be filed no later than December 17, 2007. Court of Appeals No.
265048.
B
RAVERMAN V
G
ARDEN
C
ITY
H
OSPITAL
, Nos. 134445, 134446. The parties
are directed to include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether there
are any circumstances, other than the expiration of the three-year ceiling
in MCL 600.5852, under which the appointment of a successor personal
representative would not trigger the start of a new two-year saving
period, despite Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468
Mich 29 (2003), and (2) whether a successor personal representative may
rely on a notice of intent filed by a predecessor personal representative.
The clerk of the Court is directed to place this case on the January 2008
session calendar for argument and submission. Appellants’ brief and
appendix must be filed no later than November 16, 2007, and appellee’s
brief and appendix, if appellee chooses to submit an appendix, must be
filed no later than December 17, 2007. The Michigan Association for
Justice and the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., are invited to file
briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determi-
nation of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for
permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Reported below: 275 Mich App
705.
Summary Dispositions September 26, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
B
UTZ
, No. 133704. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and
we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the
defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal under the standard
applicable to such appeals. The Court of Appeals erred in denying the
defendant’s application for failure to persuade the Court of the need for
immediate appellate review because this appeal was not interlocutory.
Within 28 days of the date of this order, the Court of Appeals shall
reconsider the defendant’s delayed application under the appropriate
standard and decide whether it should be granted. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 275792.
M
ARONEK V
W
AL
-M
ART
S
TORES,
I
NC
, No. 133709. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals
No. 274253.
K
ELLY
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
O
VERALL V
H
OWARD
, No. 134056. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, and, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion, we remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for entry of
judgment in favor of defendant Lincoln Consolidated Schools. Court of
Appeals No. 274588.
896 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
F
RYE V
C
ONSOLIDATED
R
AIL
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134277. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the
Court of Appeals and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for the
consideration of the plaintiff’s issues as an appeal of right. The plaintiff
timely filed his motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the trial
court’s December 19, 2006, summary disposition order within the time
provided in the trial court’s order of January 8, 2007, and the plaintiff
then timely filed his claim of appeal within 21 days of the trial court’s
February 22, 2007, order denying his motion for rehearing or reconsid-
eration. MCR 7.204(A)(1)(b). Court of Appeals No. 276834.
Leave to Appeal Denied September 26, 2007:
S
WEARINGER V
D
AIMLER
C
HRYSLER
C
ORPORATION
, No. 133341; Court of
Appeals No. 272158.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
ELODY
H
ARRIS
, No. 133355; Court of Appeals No. 273970.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
M
ILLER
, No. 133377; Court of Appeals No. 275112.
P
EOPLE V
D
OBEK
, No. 133503; reported below: 274 Mich App 58.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
URETON
, Nos. 133619, 133621. The defendant claims that he
is being wrongfully detained on a sentence for an offense that occurred in
1995, from which he was paroled and discharged. If the defendant is
correct, the proper cause of action would be a complaint for a writ of
habeas corpus against the Department of Corrections for the illegal
detention. Court of Appeals Nos. 275698, 276097.
Summary Disposition September 28, 2007:
D
ETROIT
B
UILDING
A
UTHORITY V
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER
, Nos. 129741,
129743, 129745; Court of Appeals No. 253479. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the order of the Wayne Circuit
Court setting aside the foreclosure sale and quieting title to the property
in the plaintiff. The foreclosure sale of publicly owned property is
prohibited. MCL 211.78g(1). Contrary to the Court of Appeals majority’s
conclusion, the Wayne County Treasurer had reason to know that the
property was publicly owned because there is no dispute that plaintiff
Detroit Building Authority, which was incorporated by intervening
plaintiff city of Detroit, MCL 123.951, was the owner of record and had
filed both a deed and an affidavit of property transfer notifying the
county that the property was tax-exempt.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the decision to reverse the Court
of Appeals; however, I would do so on different grounds. It is undisputed
that the city of Detroit was the taxpayer of record in the local assessor’s
office at the time of the foreclosure. Because the city’s interest was
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
897
“identifiable by reference to...[t]ax records in the office of the local
assessor,” MCL 211.78i(6)(c), the Wayne County Treasurer was required
to send notice by certified mail. MCL 211.78i(2). Moreover, because the
city’s interest was “reasonably identifiable” under the records of the local
assessor, merely posting a foreclosure notice and publishing such notice
in a newspaper was not constitutionally adequate. Mennonite Bd of
Missions v Adams, 462 US 791, 798-799 (1983). Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals erred by concluding that the treasurer “afforded the City the
required due process.”
Leave to Appeal Denied September 28, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
R
ODNEY
H
UBBARD
, No. 133360; Court of Appeals No. 263300.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). Because defendant has failed to make any
showing that voiceprint evidence would demonstrate that the voice on
the recording was not his own, I concur in the order denying leave to
appeal. I write separately to observe that this Court, in an appropriate
case, should revisit its conclusion in People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141, 148
(1977), that voiceprint evidence is inadmissible because it has not
“achieved general scientific acceptance as a reliable identification de-
vice....”SinceTobey was decided, 11 other states have addressed the
admissibility of voiceprint evidence: five states have admitted such
evidence, see, e.g., People v Coon, 974 P2d 386 (Alas, 1999), and six states
have rejected such evidence, see, e.g., State v Gortarez, 141 Ariz 254
(1984). Coon is the only decision of a state supreme court that has
addressed voiceprint evidence under the test of Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579 (1993), which is now the relevant
standard in Michigan under MRE 702. In light of these legal develop-
ments, as well as potential technological improvements in voiceprint
technology over the past three decades, this Court should revisit the
admissibility of voiceprint evidence on an appropriate occasion.
D
ELENE V
B
ARAGA
C
IRCUIT
C
OURT
, No. 133810; Court of Appeals No.
274706. Costs of $250 are assessed against the plaintiffs in favor of the
defendants under MCR 7.316(D)(1) for filing a vexatious appeal. The
plaintiffs are barred from submitting additional filings in this Court until
they offer proof that they have paid all of their outstanding court-
imposed sanctions.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERANCE
H
ICKS
, No. 133827; Court of Appeals No. 266510.
K
ELLY
, J. I would hold this case in abeyance pending the outcome of
any appeal that may be taken to the United States Supreme Court from
this Court’s decision in People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672 (2007).
Reconsideration Granted September 28, 2007:
T
KACHIK V
M
ANDEVILLE
, No. 132710. Leave to appeal denied at 477 Mich
1057. Court of Appeals No. 270253. The motion for reconsideration of
this Court’s March 26, 2007, order is granted. We vacate our order dated
March 26, 2007. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal
the November 16, 2006, order of the Court of Appeals is considered and,
pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
898 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave
granted, of the legal question whether a contribution claim against the
defendant, based on an unjust enrichment theory, is appropriate under
the facts of the case. See, e.g., Crawford v Crawford, 293 Md 307 (1982);
Turner v Turner, 147 Md App 350 (2002); Cagan v Cagan, 56 Misc 2d
1045 (1968). We do not retain jurisdiction.
Reconsideration Denied September 28, 2007:
In re P
EOPLES
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
P
EOPLES
), No. 134327.
Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich 854. Court of Appeals No. 272972.
In re G
ARCIA
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
G
ARCIA
), No. 134442.
Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich 869. Court of Appeals No. 273626.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal October 3, 2007:
D
IMMITT &
O
WENS
F
INANCIAL
I
NC V
D
ELOITTE &
T
OUCHE
(ISC), LLC, No.
134087. We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to
grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
At oral argument, the parties shall address: (1) assuming that the
defendants breached their contract with the plaintiffs to review the
plaintiffs’ financial statements, what “original injury” did the plaintiffs
suffer as a result of that breach, under MCL 600.1629(1), and where did
the plaintiffs suffer that injury; and (2) whether the record below is
sufficiently developed to make such a determination. The parties may file
supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order, but they
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The
Michigan Association of Justice and the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel,
Inc., are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups
interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may
move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Reported
below: 274 Mich App 470.
Summary Dispositions October 3, 2007:
L
ONG V
C
HILDREN’S
H
OSPITAL OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 132029. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reason that the insanity saving
provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to the plaintiff’s medical malprac-
tice claims. Vega v Lakeland Hospitals at Niles and St Joseph, Inc, 479
Mich 243 (2007). We remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for
further proceedings consistent with this order. Court of Appeals No.
266948.
P
ANDY V
B
OARD OF
W
ATER AND
L
IGHT
, No. 132891. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. In this case, Lansing City Charter § 5 202.1
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
899
provides that the Director of the Board of Water and Light shall serve “at
its pleasure.” The parties entered into a contract that specifically stated
that the agreement could be terminated any time during its term “with
or without cause.” That means that the plaintiff served “at the pleasure”
of the board. The remaining provisions governing the plaintiff’s termi-
nation define the severance pay owed to the plaintiff depending on
whether his termination was for cause, as defined by the contract, or
without cause. We remand this case to the Ingham Circuit Court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 259784.
P
EOPLE V
S
TRAWTHER
, No. 133446. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
defendant’s convictions for both assault with intent to commit great
bodily harm (MCL 750.84) and felonious assault (MCL 750.82) violated
his double jeopardy protections. Because the crimes have different
elements, the defendant may be punished for each. People v Smith, 478
Mich 292 (2007). Due to the prosecutor’s confession of error regarding
the scoring of prior record variable 7 in the Court of Appeals, the
defendant remains entitled to resentencing. Accordingly, we remand this
case to the Wayne Circuit Court for resentencing. Court of Appeals No.
265911.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
ADARETTE
, No. 133844. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for further
proceedings consistent with this order. The record makes clear that the
trial judge provided a preliminary sentence evaluation in chambers, off
the record. At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor disclaimed any plea
agreement. Defense counsel indicated that there was a discussion in
chambers regarding an agreement for a minimum sentence that was
within the guidelines and comported with the “two-thirds” rule and for a
maximum sentence no greater than 32 years. The court specifically
stated that it would sentence within the guidelines, to which the parties
had agreed in chambers, but failed to specifically affirm or disclaim the
agreement concerning the maximum sentence. At the outset of the
sentencing proceeding, defense counsel again recited the deal, and the
trial judge again failed to affirm the agreement for a maximum term no
greater than 32 years. The record therefore demonstrates an attempt to
reach an agreement under People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993), but there
is no clear agreement on the record as to the terms of the alleged
agreement. On remand the court shall give the defendant the opportu-
nity to withdraw his plea of guilty. In all other respects, leave to appeal is
denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question
presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 267500.
S
ADOWY V
D
ETROIT
E
DISON
C
OMPANY
, No. 134752. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of the question
whether, in light of this Court’s holding in Trentadue v Buckler Auto-
900 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
matic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378 (2007), and Jackson Co Hog
Producers v Consumers Power Co, 234 Mich App 72, 81-83 (1999), the
plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. The
motion for peremptory reversal is denied. We further order that trial
court proceedings are stayed pending the completion of this appeal. On
motion of a party or on its own motion, the Court of Appeals may modify,
set aside, or place conditions on the stay if it appears that the appeal is
not being vigorously prosecuted or if other appropriate grounds appear.
Court of Appeals No. 278789.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s decision to
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted in light of Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co,
479 Mich 378 (2007).
I would grant the application for leave to appeal, and request that the
majority of four reconsider its decision eliminating the common-law
discovery rule on the basis of my dissent in Trentadue, supra at 407-430.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 3, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
S
NYDER
, No. 132865; Court of Appeals No. 273652.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case for resentencing.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
E
VANS
, No. 132950. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 271169.
P
EOPLE V
A
LFRED
J
ACKSON,
J
R
, No. 132952. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 271170.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
S
ANDERS
, No. 133238; Court of Appeals No. 263092.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
TRAWTHER
, No. 133560; Court of Appeals No. 265911.
P
EOPLE V
B
ALDWIN
, No. 133689; Court of Appeals No. 275109.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
S
ANDERS
, No. 133792; Court of Appeals No. 267264.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
D
OLPH
-H
OSTETTER
, No. 133911; Court of Appeals No. 262858.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EARS V
R
AMSEY
, No. 134211; Court of Appeals No. 271820.
C
HAPMAN V
P
HIL’S
C
OUNTY
L
INE
S
ERVICE,
I
NC
, No. 134385; Court of
Appeals No. 269150.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
901
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
U
NDERWOOD
II, No. 134457; Court of Appeals No.
268034.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Granted October 5, 2007:
S
TATE
N
EWS V
M
ICHIGAN
S
TATE
U
NIVERSITY
, No. 133682. The motion for
leave to file an amicus curiae brief is granted. The application for leave to
appeal the March 6, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is granted,
limited to the issue whether the Court of Appeals erred in instructing the
Ingham Circuit Court, on remand, regarding the “personal nature” of
public records covered by the Freedom of Information Act privacy
exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(a), or the law enforcement purposes privacy
exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(b)(iii), including whether the “personal na-
ture” of such records may be affected by the contemporaneous or later
public status of some or all of the information. In all other respects, leave
to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court prior to the
completion of the proceedings ordered by the Court of Appeals. Reported
below: 274 Mich App 558.
M
ICHIGAN
F
EDERATION OF
T
EACHERS AND
S
CHOOL
R
ELATED
P
ERSONNEL,
AFT,
AFL-CIO v U
NIVERSITY OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 133819. The parties shall include
among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether this Court should reconsider
its construction of MCL 15.243(1)(a)’s statutory phrase “information of a
personal nature” as meaning information that “reveals intimate or
embarrassing details of an individual’s private life,” as set forth in
Bradley v Saranac Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 294 (1997); (2) whether, on
the facts presented in this case, information that might otherwise be
considered “ordinarily impersonal...might take on an intensely per-
sonal character,” (quoting Kestenbaum v Michigan State Univ, 414 Mich
510, 547 [1982]), such that the privacy exemption might properly be
asserted as argued by the defendant; and (3) if the Bradley test is not
modified, whether the advent of the National Do-Not-Call Registry, PL
108-82, § 1, 117 Stat 1006, as well as the creation of the host of methods,
unknown to the Court in 1997, which are designed for illicit purposes
such as identity theft, have any impact on whether the disclosure of the
home addresses and telephone numbers requested is inconsistent with
“the customs, mores, or ordinary views of the community” (quoting
Bradley, at 294) by which the applicability of the privacy exemption is
evaluated. The motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae are granted.
Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No. 258666.
Summary Disposition October 5, 2007:
E
LLS V
E
ATON
C
OUNTY
R
OAD
C
OMMISSION
, No. 130732. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we grant the motion for
peremptory reversal and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
902 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
The plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant as required by MCL
691.1404. Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197 (2007). We
remand this case to the Eaton Circuit Court for entry of an order
granting summary disposition to the defendant. Court of Appeals No.
264635.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s decision to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the
Eaton Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary disposition
to the defendant.
I would deny defendant’s application for leave to appeal the February
7, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Eaton
Circuit Court’s order denying summary disposition to defendant. I would
deny the application on the basis that this Court’s decision in Rowland v
Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197 (2007), should be applied
prospectively, not retroactively. It is unfair to this plaintiff to apply our
decision in Rowland to plaintiff’s case because plaintiff relied on the law
in effect at the time plaintiff filed this case. The law in effect before
Rowland was that the 120-day notice rule
1
did not bar a plaintiff from
filing suit unless the defendant could establish that the defendant was
actually prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to provide timely notice.
2
Because defendant was unable to show actual prejudice from plain-
tiff’s failure to provide timely notice, the circuit court denied defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. While this case was pending, a majority
of this Court decided in Rowland to overrule Hobbs and Brown and
thereby eliminate the actual-prejudice rule.
3
Because MCL 691.1404 does
not contain any requirement that a defendant be actually prejudiced by
a complainant’s failure to provide timely notice, I do not disagree with
the majority’s decision to apply the statute as written. However, given
that the law in effect both at the time plaintiff’s decedent died and at the
time plaintiff filed this action was that untimely notice did not bar a claim
1
MCL 691.1404(1) provides:
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason
of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from
the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in
subsection (3) shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of
the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify
the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained
and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.
2
Hobbs v Dep’t of State Hwys, 398 Mich 90 (1976), overruled by
Rowland, supra; Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354 (1996),
overruled by Rowland, supra.
3
But see Rowland, supra at 247 (W
EAVER
, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See, also, Rowland, supra at 248 (K
ELLY
, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
903
unless a defendant could demonstrate actual prejudice, plaintiff should
be allowed to rely on the law in existence at that time.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 5, 2007:
H
EALING
P
LACE,
L
TD V
F
ARM
B
UREAU
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 133764; Court of Appeals No. 272438.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). Because the Court of Appeals ultimately
reached the right result in this unpublished opinion, I concur in the order
denying leave to appeal. I write separately to point out two legal flaws in
the Court of Appeals opinion.
First, the Court of Appeals grossly misinterpreted Nasser v Auto Club
Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33 (1990), as standing for the shocking proposition
that a defendant in a no-fault case is never entitled to summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when a plaintiff has failed to prove
that a medical expense was reasonable or necessary. The Court of Appeals
erred as a matter of law by ruling that a plaintiff claiming reimbursement
for reasonable and necessary medical expenses need not respond to a
defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
The Court of Appeals cited no authority for this novel proposition, and it
contravenes the no-fault act and this Court’s decision in Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121 (1999). Nasser merely held that “if it
could be ‘said with certainty’ that an expense was both reasonable and
necessary, the court could make the decision as a matter of law.” Nasser,
supra at 55 (citation omitted). This quotation cannot reasonably be
construed to hold as a matter of law that only a no-fault plaintiff has a
right to summary disposition on the issue of medical reasonableness and
necessity.
Second, the Court of Appeals failed to review the trial court’s ruling
on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration under an abuse of discretion
standard. Tinman v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 264 Mich App
546, 556-557 (2004).
M
ARKMAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice C
ORRIGAN
.
In re J
AMES
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
J
AMES
), No. 134693;
Court of Appeals No. 274866.
S
ELLERS V
S
MITH
, No. 134724; Court of Appeals No. 275592.
Reconsideration Denied October 5, 2007:
G
RANT V
AAA M
ICHIGAN
/W
ISCONSIN,
I
NC
, No. 132211; reported below:
272 Mich App 142 (on remand).
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We would grant reconsideration.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the no-fault act’s one-year statute of limitations,
1
and not the
1
MCL 500.3145.
904 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Michigan Consumer Protection Act’s (MCPA) six-year statute of limita-
tions,
2
applies to plaintiff’s MCPA claim. This decision is obviously
incorrect. Although amendments of the MCPA will prevent a recurrence
of this error, I would grant the motion for reconsideration and grant leave
to appeal to correct the faulty decision.
FACTS
Jeanine Grant was paralyzed in a March 1995 automobile accident.
She initially received professional care but, after a month, her family
assumed responsibility. Defendant, Jeanine’s no-fault insurer, informed
Jeanine’s husband that family members would be paid at the rate of $10
an hour for attendant care services. Family members were paid at this
rate until November 1998, when the rate was increased to $11 an hour.
In 1999, Jeanine’s husband incorporated a home-care company, which
employed him and his daughters to provide care for Jeanine and billed
defendant at the higher agency rate.
Plaintiff brought this action in 2001 to recover the difference between
the amount defendant had paid Jeanine’s family from 1995 through 1999
and the amount due at the agency rate.
3
The complaint contained six
counts, only one of which is relevant here. That claim arose under the
MCPA.
4
Plaintiff alleged that defendant had concealed and misrepre-
sented facts regarding the rate at which family members could be
compensated for providing attendant care services. Plaintiff also asserted
that the MCPA’s six-year statute of limitations governed rather than the
one-year statute of limitations of the no-fault act.
5
Defendant moved for summary disposition on the MCPA claim. The
motion was denied, and defendant sought interlocutory review. When the
Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, this Court remanded the case for
consideration as on leave granted.
6
On first remand, the panel found that
the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period applied.
7
And, because all of
plaintiff’s claims had been incurred more than one year before she filed
the complaint, the Court decided that defendant was entitled to summary
disposition.
8
Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we remanded a
second time,
9
asking the Court of Appeals to reconsider the decision in
2
MCL 445.911(7).
3
Initially, plaintiff was Jeanine Grant. Since the suit was filed, she has
passed away. Her estate has been substituted as plaintiff.
4
MCL 445.901 et seq.
5
MCL 500.3101 et seq.
6
468 Mich 948 (2003).
7
Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, Inc, 266 Mich App 597, 599 (2005).
8
Id.
9
Grant v AAA Michigan, Wisconsin, Inc, 474 Mich 988 (2005).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
905
light of Smith v Globe Life Ins Co.
10
We had specifically held in Smith
that the MCPA permits private actions against an insurer pursuant to
MCL 445.911.
11
MCL 445.911(7) contains the MCPA’s six-year limita-
tions period. Therefore, the remand was for the Court of Appeals to
consider whether its decision that the no-fault act’s statute of limitations
applied was consistent with Smith. On second remand, the Court of
Appeals completely failed to consider this point. Instead, it decided that
plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the version of MCL 445.904(3) that
was amended by 2000 PA 432.
12
Considering that the parties stipulated
that the 2000 amendment did not bar plaintiff’s claim, it is baffling that
the Court of Appeals thought we had remanded to consider this issue
only. Regardless, this is the issue that it reconsidered.
Plaintiff again filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court.
This time the Court denied leave by a vote of 4 to 3.
13
The denial order
showed that I, as well as Justices C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, would have
granted leave to appeal.
14
Plaintiff has now filed this motion for recon-
sideration.
ANALYSIS
The key issue is whether the no-fault act’s one-year statute of
limitations or the MCPA’s six-year statute of limitations applies to
plaintiff’s MCPA claim. The Court of Appeals conclusion that the no-fault
act’s one-year statute of limitations applies is obviously incorrect. Plain-
tiff does not merely assert a claim for benefits under the no-fault act.
Rather, plaintiff asserts a claim under the MCPA that includes the
additional elements of deceit, misrepresentation, and concealment of
facts. Therefore, the MCPA’s six-year statute of limitations applies, and
not the no-fault act’s one-year statute of limitations, as found by the
Court of Appeals. A majority of this Court, however, apparently feels that
this error is not worth correcting because the Legislature amended the
MCPA in 2000 to prevent it from recurring.
15
What the majority
overlooks is (1) that this is a real case involving real people and the Court
of Appeals decision creates an injustice to those people that should be
corrected and (2) that, because the Court of Appeals decision is published,
other courts could improperly rely on its reasoning in interpreting other
statutes.
10
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999).
11
Id. at 467.
12
Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin, Inc (On Remand), 272 Mich App
142, 148-149 (2006).
13
477 Mich 1043 (2007).
14
Id.
15
The MCPA was amended to remove from its scope actions based on
conduct proscribed by the unfair trade practices act applicable to insur-
ance companies. Plaintiff’s claim was not affected by the amendments
because it arose before the 2001 effective date of that amendment.
906 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
A plaintiff can recover damages for mental distress when the claim is
a statutory action sounding in tort.
16
Mental distress is also recoverable
in fraud cases if such damages are the natural consequence of the
wrongful act and reasonably could have been anticipated.
17
And, unlike
the no-fault act, which precludes attorney fees if the claim was reason-
ably in dispute, the MCPA attorney-fee provision does not contain the
same limitation.
18
Courts could rely on the Court of Appeals reasoning to improperly bar
a plaintiff from recovering these damages by finding that the claim,
though alleging deception, is actually one for no-fault benefits. And,
although the error that occurred here has been addressed by legislative
action, the published opinion could be relied on to apply an incorrect
statute of limitations in non-MCPA claims involving misrepresentation.
Rather than waiting for this to happen, we should correct the Court of
Appeals decision now.
CONCLUSION
This Court should not allow the simplistic, superficial, and obviously
incorrect Court of Appeals opinion to stand. To do so is to allow a
miscarriage of justice to go uncorrected and to invite other courts to rely
on this published opinion to reach similar incorrect results. I would grant
the motion for reconsideration and grant leave to appeal to correct the
Court of Appeals erroneous, unjust decision.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal October 12, 2007:
P
APPAS V
B
ORTZ
H
EALTH
C
ARE
F
ACILITIES,
I
NC
, No. 128864. We direct the
clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or
take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall submit
supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing:
(1) whether, assuming that the six-month discovery provision in MCL
600.5838a(2) applies in this case because the plaintiff’s decedent was
insane from the time the claim accrued until her death, the claim is
barred where the plaintiff did not bring this action within one year after
the insanity disability was removed through death pursuant to MCL
600.5851(1); and (2) whether the wrongful death saving statute, MCL
600.5852, is controlling under the circumstances of this case. The parties
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. Court
of Appeals No. 251144.
16
Phillips v Butterball Farms Co, Inc (After Second Remand), 448 Mich
239, 251 (1995).
17
Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 532 (1997).
18
Compare MCL 500.3148(1) with MCL 445.911(2).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
907
B
OODT V
B
ORGESS
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 132688. We direct the clerk to
schedule oral argument on whether to grant the applications or take
other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the parties
shall address whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court and holding that the notice of intent met the requirements of MCL
600.2912b with regard to defendant Lauer. The parties may file supple-
mental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order, but they should not
submit mere restatements of their application papers. Reported below:
272 Mich App 621.
S
TOYKA
E
STATE V
M
T
C
LEMENS
G
ENERAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 134020. We direct
the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application
or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the
parties shall address whether the plaintiffs’ notices of intent met the
requirements set forth in MCL 600.2912b(4) and Roberts v Mecosta Co
Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679 (2004). The parties may file
supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order, but they
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. Court
of Appeals No. 271970.
Leave to Appeal Granted October 12, 2007:
R
ODRIGUEZ V
ASE I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC
, No. 133686. The application for leave
to appeal the March 22, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is
granted, limited to the issues: (1) whether the trial court properly made
independent findings in avoidance of the cap on noneconomic damages
provided for in MCL 600.2946a(1) after the jury had made contrary
findings; and (2) if the damages cap applies, whether the trial court
properly applied the apportionment of fault between defendant and
American Axle before applying the damages cap. The clerk of the Court
is directed to place this case on the January 2008 session calendar for
argument and submission. Appellant’s brief and appendix must be filed
no later than November 16, 2007, and appellees’ brief and appendix, if
appellees choose to submit an appendix, must be filed no later than
December 17, 2007. The Michigan Association of Justice, the Michigan
Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and
the Michigan Manufacturers Association are invited to file briefs amicus
curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the
issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file
briefs amicus curiae. Reported below: 275 Mich App 8.
C
AVANAGH
, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with
counsel of record.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 12, 2007:
In re O
STRANDER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
O
STRANDER
), No.
134890; Court of Appeals No. 274901.
908 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Summary Dispositions October 17, 2007:
B
AILEY V
P
ORNPICHIT
, No. 132087. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals remanding this case to the trial court for entry of an
order dismissing the case with prejudice, and remand this case to the
Wayne Circuit Court for entry of an order dismissing the case without
prejudice. See Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 267546.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
W
OOLSEY
, No. 133654. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Macomb Circuit
Court and we remand this case to the circuit court for resentencing under
properly scored sentencing guidelines. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305
(2004). A defendant is entitled to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
information, which includes accurately scored guidelines. People v Fran-
cisco, 474 Mich 82, 88-89 (2006). The defendant argues that he should
have received zero points for offense variable (OV) 3, as is appropriate
when “[n]o physical injury occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1)(f). Here,
the evidence was insufficient to support a score of 5 points for OV
3. While resentencing would not be required where the trial court has
clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regard-
less of the scoring error and the sentence falls within the appropriate
guidelines range, People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 51 (2003), the trial court
neither gave a reason to deny the defendant’s objection to the scoring of
OV 3 nor did it state that it would impose the same sentence regardless
of the scoring error. On remand, the trial court shall sentence the
defendant within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, or articu-
late on the record a substantial and compelling reason for departing from
the sentencing guidelines range in accordance with People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247 (2003). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because
we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
No. 274110.
W
ALLINGTON V
W
OLVERINE
E
NGINEERS AND
S
URVEYORS,
I
NC
, No. 133698.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
vacate that part of the Court of Appeals opinion discussing an issue not
raised by the parties, specifically, the issue of whether defendant Wolver-
ine Engineers and Surveyors, Inc., might not be entitled to summary
disposition of claims that the plaintiff never pleaded. We remand this case
to the Ingham Circuit Court for entry of an order granting Wolverine’s
motion for summary disposition. The motion to supplement the appellate
record is denied as moot. Court of Appeals No. 263758.
K
ELLY
T
RUST V
A
DKISON,
N
EED,
G
REEN &
A
LLEN,
PLLC, No. 134101.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons
stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and we remand this
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
909
case to the Oakland County Probate Court for entry of an order granting
summary disposition to the respondents. In all other respects, leave to
appeal and leave to appeal as cross-appellant are denied, because we are
not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this
Court. Court of Appeals No. 268550.
A
USLANDER V
C
HERNICK
, No. 134147. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion, and we remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for entry
of a judgment granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Court of Appeals No. 274079.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
Reconsideration Granted October 17, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
Q
UEEN
, No. 132473. We vacate our order dated April 13,
2007. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the Sep-
tember 21, 2006, order of the Court of Appeals is considered and,
pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement and consid-
eration of defendant’s claim of appeal and motion for remand. Aspects of
defendant’s appeal relate to offenses allegedly committed before Decem-
ber 27, 1994. See People v Monaco, 474 Mich 48 (2006). Court of Appeals
No. 265914.
Y
PSILANTI
F
IRE
M
ARSHAL V
K
IRCHER
and B
ARNES V
K
IRCHER
, Nos. 133240
to 133243. We vacate our order dated May 30, 2007. On remand, the
Washtenaw Circuit Court may utilize evidence and testimony already in
the record and it need not duplicate such evidence and testimony. In all
other respects, the application for leave to appeal the January 9, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The
motion requesting judicial notice is denied. Reported below: 273 Mich
App 496 (on reconsideration).
Leave to Appeal Denied October 17, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
J
ONATHAN
H
ILL
, No. 132149; Court of Appeals No. 271746.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand the case for resentencing.
A
RMADA
T
OWNSHIP V
M
ARAH
, No. 132402; Court of Appeals No. 268142.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
G
OODGER
, No. 132663; Court of Appeals No. 273204.
P
EOPLE V
E
VERETTE
, No. 132858. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 270063.
A
LLSTATE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
V
AUGHAN
, No. 133077; Court of Appeals
No. 268908.
910 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for
the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and
remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the Court of Appeals dissent.
P
EOPLE V
D
OBRA
, No. 133464. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 271567.
P
EOPLE V
P
AUS
, No. 133889; Court of Appeals No. 266883.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
ALVADOR
M
ARTIN
, No. 134067; Court of Appeals No. 265385.
P
EOPLE V
K
AREEM
R
HODES
, No. 134109; Court of Appeals No. 261276.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
T
URRENTINE
, No. 134118; Court of Appeals No. 261277.
P
EOPLE V
I
SSAC
H
ARRIS
, No. 134126; Court of Appeals No. 265230.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIAN
L
OTT,
No. 134143; Court of Appeals No. 265051.
P
EOPLE V
S
HAWN
M
ARTIN
, No. 134155; Court of Appeals No. 277043.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
P
ATTERSON
, No. 134170; Court of Appeals No. 267113.
L
ENAWEE
C
OUNTY V
W
AGLEY,
L
ENAWEE
C
OUNTY V
G
ARDENER,
L
ENAWEE
C
OUNTY V
H
ALSTEAD,
L
ENAWEE
C
OUNTY V
S
ELLERS, AND
L
ENAWEE
C
OUNTY V
B
ARON
, Nos. 134260-134264; Court of Appeals Nos. 268819-268823.
Interlocutory Appeal
Leave to Appeal Denied October 17, 2007:
M
C
G
UIRE V
C
ITY OF
D
EARBORN
, No. 134956; Court of Appeals No.
279309.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal October 19, 2007:
B
URRIS V
A
LLSTATE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 132949. We direct the clerk
to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take
other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties may file supple-
mental briefs within 28 days of the date of this order, but they should not
submit mere restatements of their application papers. Court of Appeals
No. 261505.
H
AAS V
D
EAL
, No. 133370. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on November 14, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., on whether to grant the
application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The
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CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
911
parties may file supplemental briefs no later than November 7, 2007, but
they should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
Court of Appeals No. 262987.
M
ANZELLA V
S
TATE
F
ARM
M
UTUAL
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
133620. We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to
grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
At oral argument, the parties shall address the dissenting opinion in the
Court of Appeals. The parties may file supplemental briefs within 28 days
of the date of this order, but they should not submit mere restatements
of their application papers. Court of Appeals No. 271365.
Summary Dispositions October 19, 2007:
M
AUER V
T
OPPING
, No. 128676. By order of March 31, 2006, the
application for leave to appeal the April 7, 2005, judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Rowland v
Washtenaw Co Rd Comm (Docket No. 130379). The case was decided on
May 2, 2007, 477 Mich 197 (2007). On May 29, 2007, the defendant Board
of County Road Commissioners of Manistee County filed a motion for
peremptory reversal. On order of the Court, the application and the
motion for peremptory reversal are considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we grant, in part, the
motion for peremptory reversal and reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals with respect to the defendant’s motion for summary disposition
regarding the claims of individual plaintiffs Joseph Mauer, Minde Mauer,
Carl Mauer, and Cory Mauer. The plaintiffs’ notice to the defendant
board was untimely under MCL 691.1404 as to these plaintiffs. Rowland,
supra. We remand this case to the Manistee Circuit Court for entry of an
order granting summary disposition to the defendant board with respect
to these individual plaintiffs. With respect to the claims brought on
behalf of the estate of Kristiana Leigh Mauer, the application and motion
for peremptory reversal are denied, because we are not persuaded that
the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 250858.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the majority’s decision because, as
was the case in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197
(2007), the notice provided by the plaintiffs in this case was insufficient
under the statute in that it failed to provide “the exact location and
nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses
known at the time by the claimant.” MCL 691.1404(1). Consequently, the
defendant road commission need not show actual prejudice arising from
the untimeliness of the notice because, even if the notice had been timely,
it was deficient under the statute.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). I continue to adhere to the views expressed
in my dissent in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197,
270-279 (2007).
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I continue to adhere to the views expressed in
my dissent in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197,
248-270 (2007).
912 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
D
YKEMA
G
OSSETT,
PLLC v A
JLUNI
, No. 133251. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the result
reached by the Court of Appeals, but we vacate part II of the Court of
Appeals opinion and judgment, for the reasons stated in the separate
Court of Appeals opinion of Judge J
ANSEN
, who concurred in part and
dissented in part. Reported below: 273 Mich App 1.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
M
ICHIGAN
R
EHABILITATION
C
LINIC,
I
NC,
PCvA
UTO
C
LUB
G
ROUP
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133671. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals erred by holding that defendant was obligated to pay benefits
when the health insurers did not cover plaintiffs’ services, because the
relevant contractual language exempts defendant from paying benefits if
a health insurer offers “comparable services.” On remand, the Court of
Appeals shall order the trial court to consider whether the insureds’
health insurers offered “comparable services.” If so, then defendant is
not required to pay benefits under the actual language of the contract.
Only if “comparable services” were not offered should the trial court
consider whether the services were “reasonably necessary.” We do not
retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 263835.
P
EOPLE V
H
AWTHORNE
, No. 133729. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Oakland
Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s speedy trial
claims. At that hearing, the court shall take testimony and other
evidence, and make findings of fact, regarding (1) all of the factors
specified in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530 (1972); (2) whether the
defendant knew that the charges in this case were pending against him
when he was released from the Wayne County jail in November 1994, or
whether he otherwise became aware of such charges before the prosecu-
tion commenced further action in 2001; and (3) any other factors relevant
to the question whether the charges against the defendant must be
dismissed for a violation of his speedy trial rights. We further order the
Oakland Circuit Court, within 28 days of the conclusion of the hearing, to
file with the clerk of the Supreme Court a transcript of the hearing and
the court’s findings of fact. We retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No.
265473.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would deny the application for leave to appeal.
The Court has already remanded this case to the trial court for a hearing
on defendant’s speedy trial motion. At that time, the prosecution failed to
explain its failure over a period of nine years to bring defendant to trial.
I see no reason for a second remand.
C
AVANAGH
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 19, 2007:
G
RACE V
L
EITMAN
, No. 131035. On order of the Court, leave to appeal
having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties
having been considered by the Court, we vacate our order of March 30,
2007. The application for leave to appeal the March 16, 2006, judgment
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
913
of the Court of Appeals is denied, because we are no longer persuaded
that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 257896.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
An attorney’s exercise of judgment on matters of trial strategy, including
which witnesses to call, does not ipso facto immunize the attorney from
malpractice liability. Rather, counsel must exercise the same reasonable
professional judgment “as would an attorney of ordinary learning,
judgment, or skill under the same or similar circumstances.” Simko v
Blake, 448 Mich 648, 658 (1995). The defendants here have not shown as
a matter of law that attorney Leitman exercised reasonable judgment
such that no rational jury could grant plaintiff relief.
Y
OUNG
, J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
M
ICHIGAN
R
EHABILITATION
C
LINIC,
I
NC,
PCvA
UTO
C
LUB
G
ROUP
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133673; Court of Appeals No. 263835.
Summary Dispositions October 24, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
B
LANKS
, No. 129807. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate that part of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals that excused the 180-day-rule violation based on the prosecu-
tor’s good-faith efforts to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days. We
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of
People v Williams, 475 Mich 245 (2006). In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 255257.
D
UBE V
S
T
J
OHN
H
OSPITAL &
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 131534. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse part VI
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint with prejudice, and we remand this case to the Wayne
Circuit Court for entry of an order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. See Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court
of Appeals No. 265887.
X
IAOXIN V
B
ROWN
, No. 133101. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we modify the Court of Appeals order remand-
ing this case for entry of an order dismissing the complaint to provide
that any order dismissing the complaint should be without prejudice. See
Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). In the event that the Washtenaw
Circuit Court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice
because the Court of Appeals gave its order immediate effect, that order
is vacated and the court is directed to enter an order consistent with this
order. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by
this Court. Court of Appeals No. 273015.
914 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
In re B
ALDWIN
T
RUST
(S
HOAFF V
W
OODS
), Nos. 133622, 133623. Pursuant
to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals but we reject the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals majority to the extent it is inconsistent with the partially
dissenting opinion. Under the facts of this case, which the probate judge
viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, even if the respon-
dent owed a duty to the petitioner, the probate judge did not err in
granting summary disposition to the respondent in both the estate
proceeding and the trust proceeding, because there was no evidence of
wrongdoing by the respondent. The petitioner received ample opportu-
nity to set forth a genuine issue of material fact. MCR 2.116(I)(1).
Reported below: 274 Mich App 387.
P
OTTER V
M
C
L
EARY
, Nos. 133867, 133868. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the portion of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint with prejudice, because the
dismissal should have been without prejudice as to the affidavit of merit
issue. See Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007). Accordingly, we remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the defendants’ other
issues that were not addressed in its opinion. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question
presented should be reviewed by this Court. Reported below: 274 Mich App
222.
M
ALOY V
S
T
J
OHN
D
ETROIT
R
IVERVIEW
H
OSPITAL
, No. 134099. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Wayne
Circuit Court for entry of an order granting the defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. The lower courts erred in finding that the plain-
tiff’s amended complaint sounded in ordinary negligence. First, there
was a professional relationship between the plaintiff’s decedent and the
defendant hospital. Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich
411, 422 (2004). Second, the claim raises questions of medical judgment.
Id. The record indicates that the continuing patient care (CPC) form at
issue was prepared on the order of, and reviewed by, the decedent’s
surgeon and related only to aftercare for the plaintiff’s decedent’s
colostomy. The decedent was given separate discharge orders from the
doctor who was treating her for her diabetes. That physician would have
exercised his own medical judgment to assess whether the decedent was
capable of administering her own insulin and thus needed home health
care for this condition. It is not within the scope of jurors’ common
knowledge to know what information must be included on a CPC form, or
whether there is some standard or requirement that all patient informa-
tion be contained in a single form, rather than in a separate form from
each treating physician. Because expert medical testimony would be
required to establish the standard of care, the claim sounds in medical
malpractice. Bryant, supra at 423. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with
the expert testimony requirements relating to such claims required that
the defendant’s motion for summary disposition be granted. Court of
Appeals No. 273292.
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CTIONS ON
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PPLICATIONS
915
W
EST
M
ICHIGAN
M
ECHANICAL,
I
NC V
W
EST
M
ICHIGAN
M
ECHANICAL
S
ERVICES,
LLC, No. 134217. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave
to appeal, we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and remand this
case to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration. Because the
February 12, 2007, order of the Ottawa Circuit Court is a postjudgment
order awarding attorney fees and costs, it is a final order under MCR
7.202(6)(a)(iv) that is appealable as a matter of right under MCR
7.203(A)(1). We note that there is nothing in the language of MCR
7.202(6)(a)(iv) that distinguishes between postjudgment orders awarding
attorney fees incurred prior to a final judgment and such orders awarding
attorney fees incurred after final judgment has entered. Moreover, the
phrase “other law or court rule” cannot be read as limiting the scope of
the rule to orders involving attorney fees incurred prior to entry of a final
judgment. Had this Court intended the rule to limit appeals of right from
postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees to those involving attorney
fees incurred after a final judgment, it would have included language to
that effect in the court rule. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 276613.
F
ELDKAMP V
F
ARM
B
UREAU
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 134322. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of
Appeals No. 272855.
S
TONE V
RWL
APINE,
I
NC
, No. 134516. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No.
275684.
P
ROASSURANCE
C
ORPORATION V
N
EFCY
, No. 134568. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals that the plaintiff failed to prove it was free from active
negligence and that, for this reason, it may not seek indemnification from
the defendant. Courts primarily look to the plaintiff’s complaint in the
underlying lawsuit to determine whether a prospective indemnitee was
actively negligent. Hill v Sullivan Equipment Co, 86 Mich App 693, 696-697
(1978). The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the underlying
complaint alleged both active and passive negligence against the defendant.
At all stages of the underlying litigation, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was vicariously liable for the acts of its agent, not its own active
negligence. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider the trial
court’s other grounds for denying summary disposition to the plaintiff and
granting summary disposition to the defendant. We do not retain jurisdic-
tion. Court of Appeals No. 272963.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 24, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
C
OTTRELL
, No. 133383; Court of Appeals No. 264991.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal.
916 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
S
TONEMAN V
C
ARSON
C
ITY
H
OSPITAL
, No. 133467; Court of Appeals No.
263637.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons
stated in my dissent from the denial of leave to appeal in Sturgis Bank &
Trust Co v Hillsdale Community Health Ctr, 268 Mich App 484 (2005).
See 479 Mich 854 (2007).
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 133545. The motion to remand is denied.
The denial is without prejudice to the defendant’s right to file a motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR Subchapter 6.500, raising the
issue whether the affidavit of Andrew Miller, in which he confesses to the
crimes for which the defendant was convicted, constitutes newly discov-
ered evidence under the test established in People v Cress, 468 Mich 678,
691-692 (2003), and, if so, whether the defendant is entitled to some form
of relief. Court of Appeals No. 265109.
T
RZCIENSKI V
M
APLE
R
IDGE
B
UILDING,
I
NC
, No. 133712; Court of Appeals
No. 273209.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
M
ACKLEY V
G
RAY
, No. 134102; Court of Appeals No. 272409.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
J
IM
W
ALKER
, No. 134133; Court of Appeals No. 276610.
P
EOPLE V
G
REENHILL
, No. 134156; Court of Appeals No. 267576.
P
EOPLE V
R
AYNELLE
J
OHNSON
, No. 134250; Court of Appeals No. 266901.
P
EOPLE V
G
OGINS
, No. 134285; Court of Appeals No. 267371.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal October 26, 2007:
In re C
REDIT
A
CCEPTANCE
C
ORPORATION
(C
REDIT
A
CCEPTANCE
C
ORPORATION
V
46
TH
D
ISTRICT
C
OURT
), No. 133292. We vacate our order dated April 24,
2007. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the
January 16, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We
direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the
application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The
parties may file supplemental briefs within 28 days of the date of this
order, but they should not submit mere restatements of their applica-
tion papers. The Michigan Creditors Bar Association, the Michigan
Financial Institutions Bureau, the National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business, and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce are invited to
file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the
determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court
for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. R eported below: 273 Mich
App 594.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
917
Leave to Appeal Denied October 26, 2007:
D
RAKE V
C
ITIZENS
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 130855; reported below: 270
Mich App 22.
F
LEISCHFRESSER V
P
ETERSON
T
OWING,
I
NC
, No. 133730; Court of Appeals
No. 274353.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I reluctantly concur in the Court’s decision. I
concur because it is in accord with this Court’s decision in Day v W A Foote
Mem Hosp, 412 Mich 698 (1982), and that decision has not been challenged.
I concur reluctantly because the result of Day is that the caselaw in our state
now bears no relationship to the statutory law. Whereas the Legislature in
enacting MCL 418.331 specified that a person in claimant’s position (a
deserted wife) should, for purposes of workers’ compensation survivor
benefits be “conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon
a deceased employee,” Day has nullified this presumption and substituted a
case-by-case factual determination. Claimant likely would have been en-
titled to survivor benefits under the statute enacted by the Legislature, but
not under the present judicially rewritten statute. While I agree with Day
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wengler v Druggists
Mut Ins Co, 446 US 142 (1980), is controlling and requires that MCL
418.331 be held violative of the Equal Protection Clause, I do not believe that
this Court had, as it asserted in Day,achoice to determine “the appropriate
remedy for this unconstitutional gender-based presumption: invalidation,
extension to widowers, or preservation of the statute for a short period of
time to enable the Legislature to forge its own solution.” Day, supra at
703. Rather, this Court had only one proper option in light of Wengler and
that was to strike down MCL 418.331 as unconstitutional and leave it to the
Legislature to enact a different and constitutionally valid provision if it
chose to do so. See North Ottawa Hosp v Kieft, 457 Mich 394, 408 n 14
(1998) (rejecting the approach of Day and instead “await[ing] the judgment
of the Legislature regarding which is the better policy for the state to adopt”
in the wake of an equal protection violation). This Court does not have the
authority to rewrite a statute, even if it does so wisely.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
, and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
A
MERICAN
F
AMILY
A
SSOCIATION OF
M
ICHIGAN V
M
ICHIGAN
S
TATE
U
NIVERSITY
B
OARD OF
T
RUSTEES
, No. 134214; reported below: 276 Mich App 42.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal to consider
the standing issue.
W
EAVER
, J. I would grant plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to
reconsider Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs,
1
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,
2
Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,
3
and Michi-
1
Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001).
2
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608
(2004).
3
Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336 (2007).
918 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
gan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc.
4
These erroneously decided cases created new standing law in Michigan
that denies Michigan citizens access to the courts. Lee, Nat’l Wildlife,
Rohde, and Michigan Citizens represent examples of judicial activism by
the majority of four justices of this Court (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and
Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
).
In re H
OYT
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
H
OYT
), No. 135030; Court
of Appeals No. 276729.
Summary Dispositions October 29, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
A
LSPAUGH
, No. 132725. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Baraga Circuit
Court, and we remand this case to the circuit court for resentencing. The
defendant’s sentence is a departure from the 12-month maximum jail
sentence required by MCL 769.34(4)(a). On remand, the circuit court
shall either sentence the defendant to an intermediate sanction or state
on the record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the
defendant to the Department of Corrections, in accordance with MCL
769.34(4)(a). People v Harper, 479 Mich 599 (2007). In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do
not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 273354.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLOWESKI
, No. 134686. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No.
278029.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 29, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
F
RASURE
, No. 131828; reported below: 271 Mich App 280.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
S
WANIGAN
, No. 132145; Court of Appeals No. 270096.
P
EOPLE V
J
ONATHAN
H
ILL
, No. 132400; Court of Appeals No. 271732.
P
EOPLE V
D
EVORE
, No. 132753. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 269800.
P
EOPLE V
G
OLDEN
, No. 132909; Court of Appeals No. 260020.
P
EOPLE V
B
ROWNLOW
, No. 133027; Court of Appeals No. 273875.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARTH
, No. 133104; Court of Appeals No. 273534.
4
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North
America Inc, 479 Mich 280 (2007).
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
919
C
ARGAS V
B
EDNARSH
, Nos. 133224, 133225; Court of Appeals Nos.
263869, 263870.
F
ORNARI V
H
OOVER
, No. 133460; Court of Appeals No. 265813.
P
EOPLE V
B
ERNARD
, No. 133579; Court of Appeals No. 264825.
P
EOPLE V
G
ERMAIN
, No. 133593; Court of Appeals No. 265372.
P
EOPLE V
C
LARENCE
S
COTT
, No. 133785; reported below: 275 Mich App
521.
P
EOPLE V
D
ARRYL
J
OHNSON
, No. 133803; Court of Appeals No. 265371.
P
EOPLE V
D
EALS
, No. 133821; Court of Appeals No. 266619.
In re H
EINZ
E
STATE
(H
EINZ V
H
EINZ
), No. 133835; Court of Appeals No.
264155.
P
ORTFOLIO
R
ECOVERY
A
SSOCIATES V
K
NUBBE
, No. 133874; Court of Ap-
peals No. 273362.
P
EOPLE V
T
AUREEN
H
ARRIS
, No. 133909; Court of Appeals No. 266275.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
A
LEXANDER
, No. 133990. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 272122.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONTRELL
S
MITH
, No. 134009. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273743.
P
EOPLE V
R
EGINALD
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134016; reported below: 275 Mich
App 194.
P
EOPLE V
J
EROME
L
EWIS
, No. 134062. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272595.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
Q
UEEN
, No. 134089. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272761.
P
EOPLE V
B
YRD
, No. 134096. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274189.
P
EOPLE V
L
EROY
S
COTT
, No. 134125. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273532.
P
EOPLE V
K
ELLEY
, No. 134146; Court of Appeals No. 276940.
S
AM’S
T
OWN AND
C
OUNTRY
M
ARKET,
I
NC V
M
IHELICH &
K
AVANAUGH,
PLC, No.
134149; Court of Appeals No. 270940.
920 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALDSON
, No. 134153. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272647.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
M
OSS
, No. 134182; Court of Appeals No. 274118.
F
IRST
N
ATIONAL
B
ANK OF
C
RYSTAL
F
ALLS V
K
OSKI
, No. 134225; Court of
Appeals No. 277396.
P
EOPLE V
M
ORTON
, No. 134236. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 277688.
P
EOPLE V
B
URGER
, No. 134239. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275184.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
P
ORTER
, No. 134241. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
277676.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFERY
P
HIPPS
, No. 134242; Court of Appeals No. 277514.
P
EOPLE V
R
ODNEY
H
ICKS
, No. 134247. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274181.
D
ALE
O
SBURN,
I
NC V
A
UTO
-O
WNERS
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 134249;
Court of Appeals No. 267927.
P
EOPLE V
G
OLLMAN
, No. 134255. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275047.
P
EOPLE V
S
ONES
, No. 134256. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275626.
P
EOPLE V
C
RISTON
, No. 134257. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275574.
P
EOPLE V
K
RZYZANIAK
, No. 134259; Court of Appeals No. 276623.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
G
ILL
, No. 134265. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274698.
P
EOPLE V
L
EONARD
S
TEWART
, No. 134270. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 278066.
P
EOPLE V
K
ERR
, No. 134274. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275872.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
921
P
EOPLE V
G
REGORY
P
OINDEXTER
, No. 134282. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273792.
P
EOPLE V
G
RANDBERRY
, No. 134284. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275725.
P
EOPLE V
P
ELICHET
, No. 134288. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274979.
P
EOPLE V
D
AMIEN
T
AYLOR
, No. 134289. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273253.
P
EOPLE V
R
ECTOR
, No. 134293; Court of Appeals No. 266553.
P
EOPLE V
R
ILEY
F
ORD
, No. 134298; Court of Appeals No. 266891.
P
EOPLE V
F
REDERICK
M
ILLER
, No. 134311. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274477.
P
EOPLE V
C
AUVIN
, No. 134313. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274212.
P
EOPLE V
J
ULIUS
C
LAYTON
, No. 134314. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274270.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARVIN
J
OHNSON
, No. 134333; Court of Appeals No. 267660.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
B
AKER
, No. 134335; Court of Appeals No. 277792.
P
EOPLE V
J
ERRY
S
TEELE
, No. 134341; Court of Appeals No. 267337.
P
EOPLE V
E
RNEST
G
REEN
, No. 134342. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
278324.
P
EOPLE V
E
ATMON
, No. 134343; Court of Appeals No. 277208.
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
G
REEN,
S
R
, No. 134344; Court of Appeals No. 266616.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARSHALL
W
RIGHT
, No. 134347; Court of Appeals No. 268339.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
ORMICK
, No. 134352; Court of Appeals No. 266329.
P
EOPLE V
C
ASTANEDA
, No. 134354. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274319.
G
ERMAN V
L
EFORGE
, No. 134357; Court of Appeals No. 274224.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
E
VANS
, No. 134361; Court of Appeals No. 267300.
922 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
S
TEWART
, No. 134366. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274292.
P
EOPLE V
H
USTON
, No. 134367. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275014.
P
EOPLE V
C
ASEY
P
ERRY
, No. 134372; Court of Appeals No. 266509.
M
ENEFEE V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134373; Court of Appeals
No. 276906.
In re R
USIECKI
E
STATE
(J
ENSEN V
R
USIECKI
), No. 134374; Court of Appeals
No. 266145.
P
EOPLE V
H
UNTER
, No. 134378. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275607.
P
EOPLE V
C
ASTLE
, No. 134390; Court of Appeals No. 265379.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
UTCHEON
, No. 134395. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274815.
P
EOPLE V
E
L
A
MIN
M
UHAMMAD
, No. 134397. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274640.
BMJ E
NGINEERS &
S
URVEYORS,
I
NC V
N
ATURE’S
W
AY
P
ROPERTIES,
LLC, No.
134403; Court of Appeals No. 272835.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
S
COTT
, No. 134407. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
275430.
P
EOPLE V
G
IFFORD
O
WENS
, No. 134412. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273811.
P
EOPLE V
K
ALASHO
, No. 134413. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274272.
P
EOPLE V
P
ANOUSOPOULOS
, No. 134416. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275243.
P
EOPLE V
F
ABIAN
, No. 134419. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274457.
P
EOPLE V
B
RASWELL
, No. 134424. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275714.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
923
B
ALLARD V
A
LPENA
S
URGICAL
A
SSOCIATES,
PLLC, No. 134426; Court of
Appeals No. 275344.
P
EOPLE V
R
AMIREZ
, No. 134435. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275062.
K
ANDALAFT V
J
OHN
MP
ETERS,
PLC and J
OHN
MP
ETERS,
PLCvK
AN-
DALAFT
, Nos. 134439 and 134440; Court of Appeals Nos. 267471 and
267497.
T
AYLOR V
M
USE
, No. 134448; Court of Appeals No. 274655.
P
EOPLE V
S
HERWOOD
, No. 134451; Court of Appeals No. 259303.
P
EOPLE V
E
ARLAND
C
OLLINS
, No. 134454; Court of Appeals No. 269468.
P
EOPLE V
H
ENRY
L
OTT
, No. 134455; Court of Appeals No. 267265.
B
ROMLEY V
A
EROPOSTALE,
I
NC
, Nos. 134459 and 134594; Court of Appeals
No. 278143.
P
EOPLE V
R
OSAS
, No. 134469; Court of Appeals No. 267866.
P
EOPLE V
E
DMONDS
, No. 134471; Court of Appeals No. 267292.
A
UKEMAN V
A
UKEMAN
, No. 134476; Court of Appeals No. 267326.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARZA
, No. 134480; Court of Appeals No. 277679.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
LENTON
, No. 134487; Court of Appeals No. 277943.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCUS
W
ALLACE
, No. 134488; Court of Appeals No. 267724.
P
EOPLE V
H
UFF
, No. 134489; Court of Appeals No. 270556.
P
EOPLE V
S
HANE
M
OORE
, No. 134492; Court of Appeals No. 277886.
P
EOPLE V
L
ENNY
W
ALKER
, No. 134497. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276459.
P
EOPLE V
C
LARENCE
M
C
K
INNEY
, No. 134503; Court of Appeals No.
276561.
P
EOPLE V
N
ATHANIEL
J
ENKINS
, No. 134506; Court of Appeals No. 270013.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
D
AVIS
, No. 134507; Court of Appeals No. 278127.
P
EOPLE V
V
ANHORN
, No. 134509. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276637.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
EJ
OHNSON
, No. 134511; Court of Appeals No. 277453.
P
EOPLE V
R
ANIS
H
ILL
, No. 134513. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276460.
924 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
A
COSTA
, No. 134521; Court of Appeals No. 266373.
P
EOPLE V
D
ENTON
, No. 134522; Court of Appeals No. 267790.
P
EOPLE V
C
ROWE
, No. 134523; Court of Appeals No. 266908.
P
EOPLE V
S
OUTHWARD
, No. 134525. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272444.
P
EOPLE V
B
RINKER
, No. 134527; Court of Appeals No. 274590.
P
EOPLE V
A
MARO
, No. 134530; Court of Appeals No. 269692.
P
EOPLE V
E
DMUND
F
IELDS
, No. 134539; Court of Appeals No. 266738.
P
EOPLE V
D
ODAJ
, No. 134542; Court of Appeals No. 278325.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
W
ALLACE,
J
R
, No. 134543; Court of Appeals No. 277565.
P
EOPLE V
S
HELTON
, No. 134546; Court of Appeals No. 268078.
P
EOPLE V
B
RADDOCK
, No. 134550. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277045.
P
EOPLE V
S
ONYA
C
OLEMAN
, No. 134551; Court of Appeals No. 278128.
P
EOPLE V
W
INER
, No. 134553; Court of Appeals No. 267299.
P
EOPLE V
F
RY
, No. 134557; Court of Appeals No. 278015.
P
EOPLE V
J
EREMY
B
ANKS
, No. 134558; Court of Appeals No. 277073.
P
EOPLE V
O
RTEGA
, No. 134563. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277279.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
AJ
OHNSON
, No. 134565; Court of Appeals No. 277719.
J
UDGE V
J
UDGE
, Nos. 134569, 134570; Court of Appeals Nos. 276007,
278640.
C
OHEN V
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134571; Court of Appeals
No. 268239.
P
EOPLE V
C
RAWFORD
, No. 134579; Court of Appeals No. 267728.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
B
AILEY
, No. 134580; Court of Appeals No. 270061.
P
EOPLE V
K
ANE
, No. 134583; Court of Appeals No. 267899.
P
EOPLE V
S
TREETER
, No. 134596; Court of Appeals No. 276951.
P
EOPLE V
R
OMONDA
L
EWIS
, No. 134597; Court of Appeals No. 269200.
P
EOPLE V
O
LMAN
, No. 134598; Court of Appeals No. 268464.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
925
ETM
AC
K
ENZIE
C
OMPANY V
L
ONG
I
NVESTMENT
C
OMPANY,
L
TD
, Nos.
134602, 134604; Court of Appeals No. 265811.
P
EOPLE V
C
EASOR
, No. 134605; Court of Appeals No. 268150.
N
OLEN V
N
OLEN
, No. 134606; Court of Appeals No. 271111.
P
EOPLE V
J
UAN
W
ALKER
, No. 134609; Court of Appeals No. 278126.
P
EOPLE V
C
HOYCE
, No. 134611; Court of Appeals No. 277210.
P
EOPLE V
J
ALOVEC
, No. 134614; Court of Appeals No. 278448.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHAN
C
LARK
, No. 134616; Court of Appeals No. 277906.
P
EOPLE V
B
RYANT
, No. 134617; Court of Appeals No. 265908.
P
EOPLE V
D
ARIUS
C
ARTER
, No. 134626; Court of Appeals No. 270680.
P
EOPLE V
G
ALES
, No. 134630; Court of Appeals No. 269803.
P
EOPLE V
R
INCKEY
, No. 134634; Court of Appeals No. 276972.
P
EOPLE V
A
KANS
, No. 134636; Court of Appeals No. 268805.
P
EOPLE V
W
AGNER
, No. 134637; Court of Appeals No. 267646.
P
EOPLE V
J
ALVELYN
L
EE
, No. 134638; Court of Appeals No. 267566.
P
EOPLE V
D
EMARIO
R
ICHARDSON
, No. 134639; Court of Appeals No.
278157.
P
EOPLE V
F
REDDIE
W
ATKINS
, No. 134642; Court of Appeals No. 276550.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
R
IDDELL
, No. 134647; Court of Appeals No. 262413.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
R
OSS
, No. 134651; Court of Appeals No. 278113.
P
EOPLE V
W
ATSON
W
ARD
, No. 134654; Court of Appeals No. 267726.
P
EOPLE V
D
ESMONE
S
TINSON
, No. 134656; Court of Appeals No. 278359.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALTERS
, No. 134657; Court of Appeals No. 278198.
P
EOPLE OF
F
ARMINGTON
H
ILLS V
H
OOPS
, No. 134658; Court of Appeals No.
274656.
P
EOPLE V
W
IGFALL
, No. 134662; Court of Appeals No. 267645.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTONIO
C
OLEMAN
, No. 134672; Court of Appeals No. 268770.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
J
ONES
, No. 134678; Court of Appeals No. 278199.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
J
AMES
, No. 134679; Court of Appeals No. 266653.
P
EOPLE V
D’A
NTONIO
, No. 134685; Court of Appeals No. 277839.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANK
S
MITH
, No. 134688; Court of Appeals No. 277842.
926 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
R
EDICK
, No. 134692; Court of Appeals No. 275285.
P
EOPLE V
O
RLANDO
G
ONZALEZ
, No. 134697; Court of Appeals No. 269761.
P
EOPLE V
D
AMON
J
OHNSON
, No. 134704; Court of Appeals No. 267149.
E
PICENTRE
S
TRATEGIC
C
ORPORATION
-M
ICHIGAN V
J
ENKINS
C
ONSTRUCTION,
I
NC
, No. 134719; Court of Appeals No. 277836.
D
ONAHUE V
C
ATERAID,
I
NC
, No. 134721; Court of Appeals No. 276103.
P
EOPLE V
H
AYES
, No. 134722; Court of Appeals No. 277627.
P
EOPLE V
P
RATER
, No. 134725; Court of Appeals No. 278720.
P
EOPLE V
M
ATTHEW
S
MITH
, No. 134736; Court of Appeals No. 278633.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
UNE
, No. 134755; Court of Appeals No. 278327.
P
EOPLE V
K
EITH
T
HOMPSON
, No. 134765; Court of Appeals No. 258336
(on remand).
Interlocutory Appeal
Leave to Appeal Denied October 29, 2007:
M
AURINO V
S
TERN
, No. 134549; Court of Appeals No. 275858.
Reconsideration Denied October 29, 2007:
C
ELLEY V
S
TEVENS
, No. 132851. Leave to appeal denied at 477 Mich
1113. Court of Appeals No. 273846.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
K
ENNEDY
, No. 132990. Leave to appeal denied at 478
Mich 869. Court of Appeals No. 252104.
W
OODS V
W
ILLIAMS &
S
ON
P
LUMBING &
H
EATING,
I
NC,
No. 133553. Leave to
appeal denied at 479 Mich 862. Court of Appeals No. 256394.
P
EOPLE V
M
ACK
, No. 133618. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich
863. Court of Appeals No. 266374.
P
EOPLE V
R
OUMMEL
I
NGRAM
, No. 133841. Leave to appeal denied at 479
Mich 867. Court of Appeals No. 275786.
O
RR V
W
ILSHIRE
C
REDIT
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134166. Leave to appeal
denied at 479 Mich 868. Court of Appeals No. 276809.
Summary Dispositions October 31, 2007:
S
TANKE V
S
TANKE
, No. 133834. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On
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927
remand, the Court shall review the plaintiff’s appeal of the Isabella
Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition with respect to the attorney
judgment rule solely under the standards applicable to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
The defendant brought its motion solely under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and, as
a result, the reviewing court must limit its review to the well-pleaded
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
119-120 (1999). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we
are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should now be
reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
No. 263446.
P
EOPLE V
M
AGUIRE
, No. 134159. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the trial court’s assessment of $100
in court costs against the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal
is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question
presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 275836.
C
ORRIGAN,
J. I would simply deny leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied October 31, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
H
ANS
T
HOMAS
, No. 130182; Court of Appeals No. 257557.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would remand this case for correction of the judgment of
sentence.
H
ASTINGS
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
M
OSHER,
D
OLAN,
C
ATALDO &
K
ELLY,
I
NC
, No. 131546. The order of May 23, 2007, which granted leave
to appeal, is vacated and leave to appeal is denied, because we are no
longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this
Court. Court of Appeals No. 265621 (on reconsideration).
P
EOPLE V
R
AVIS
A
NDREWS
, No. 131908; Court of Appeals No. 259834.
M
ORRIS
P
UMPS V
C
ENTERLINE
P
IPING,
I
NC AND
RV
ANDER
L
IND &
S
ON,
I
NC V
C
ENTERLINE
P
IPING,
I
NC
, Nos. 133013, 133014; reported below: 273 Mich
App 187.
P
EOPLE V
D
EANDRE
W
OODS
, No. 133496; Court of Appeals No. 262939.
W
OLVERINE
W
ORLD
W
IDE,
I
NC V
L
IBERTY
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
,No.
133697; Court of Appeals No. 260330.
P
EOPLE V
C
HITTICK
, No. 133921; Court of Appeals No. 264033.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would remand this case for a hearing
pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973).
P
EOPLE V
M
ARQUIS
F
ISHER
, No. 133984; Court of Appeals No. 274813.
P
EOPLE V
B
ALES
, No. 134179; Court of Appeals No. 267756.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
L
AWRENCE
W
OODS
, No. 134215; Court of Appeals No. 274210.
F
AUROT V
M
ILLER
, No. 134229; Court of Appeals No. 265476.
928 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal to reconsider DeShambo v
Anderson, 471 Mich 27 (2004), and Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471
Mich 45 (2004).
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
S
COTT,
J
R
, No. 134251; Court of Appeals No. 277406.
Z
ACHARSKI V
W
AL
-M
ART
S
TORES,
I
NC
, No. 134296; Court of Appeals No.
274410.
P
EOPLE V
K
ONE
, No. 134332; Court of Appeals No. 278008.
P
EOPLE V
C
OMPEAU
, No. 134538; Court of Appeals No. 277908.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for resentencing.
P
EOPLE V
J
OAN
M
UHAMMAD
, No. 134703; Court of Appeals No. 278440.
M
USKEGON
C
OUNTY
P
ROSECUTOR V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
,No.
135139. We direct the Court of Appeals to issue a decision on the appeal
before November 30, 2007. Court of Appeals No. 281321.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal November 2, 2007:
M
ANUEL V
G
ILL
, No. 131103. The motion for reconsideration of this
Court’s April 4, 2007, order is granted. We vacate our order dated April
4, 2007. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the
March 23, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct
the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application
or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the
parties shall address: (1) whether, in light of the statement in the Court
of Appeals judgment that a breach of contract action against Tri-County
Metro Narcotics Squad (TCM) was possibly viable in the Court of Claims,
TCM was an aggrieved party entitled to appeal, despite the Court of
Appeals affirmance of the Ingham Circuit Court’s grant of summary
disposition on all grounds; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that TCM is equivalent to a state agency. The parties may file
supplemental briefs within 35 days of the date of this order, but they
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense
Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other
persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented
in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus
curiae. Reported below: 270 Mich App 355.
P
EOPLE V
B
LACKSTON
, No. 134473. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
action. MCR 7.302(G)(l). At oral argument, the parties shall address: (1)
considering that the grounds for evidentiary error that defendant as-
serted at trial, citing MRE 613, differ from the grounds he now advances
upon appellate review, whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct
standard of review when addressing admissibility under MRE 806 and
MRE 403; (2) whether the trial court could properly exclude two
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
929
witnesses’ inconsistent statements, which were made after they had
testified in the defendant’s first trial but before the defendant’s second
trial; (3) whether exclusion of this evidence, if error and if the claim of
error was properly preserved, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt;
and (4) whether exclusion, if error but the claim of error was not
preserved through a sufficient objection at trial, is plain error requiring
reversal. The parties may file supplemental briefs within 28 days of the
date of this order, but they should not submit mere restatements of their
application papers. The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan
and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs
amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination
of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to
file briefs amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No. 245099 (on remand).
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
Summary Dispositions November 2, 2007:
J
OHNSON V
S
UBURBAN
M
OBILITY
A
UTHORITY
R
EGIONAL
T
RANSPORTATION
, No.
133743. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. Court of Appeals No. 273010.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur with the order remanding to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. I write separately
to point out that the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission
(WCAC) majority reversed the magistrate’s decision on the basis of a
faulty legal premise. The WCAC held that the magistrate’s decision
granting defendant’s petition to stop benefits must be reversed because it
was not supported by the medical expert testimony. But the law does not
require that a petition to stop workers’ compensation benefit payments
be supported by affirmative expert medical testimony. For example, if an
employee collecting benefits for a torn rotator cuff is videotaped bench-
pressing 300 pounds, no medical testimony confirming the employee’s
recovery is necessary. In any case, both medical and nonmedical testi-
mony were available to the magistrate to support his decision that
plaintiff no longer had a work-related mental disability in 1999. First,
plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment through most of 1999, and
defendant filed its petition to stop in May 2000. Second, the magistrate
stated that plaintiff’s anger at defendant for opposing her claim for
workers’ compensation benefits did not disable her from returning to her
former job, because “neither Dr. Lingam nor Dr. Rubin felt her anger in
itself was disabling, while Dr. Kezlarian found her expression of anger
bizarre and disproportionate.” Defendant’s expert, Dr. Kezlarian, ex-
pressed skepticism about plaintiff’s claims of a work-related condition,
and the magistrate apparently gave more credence to Dr. Kezlarian’s
opinion after learning that plaintiff had repeatedly lied about her work
and treatment history and had neglected to tell her treating physician
that she had secured a new job at a different company. Thus, the WCAC’s
decision appears to contain some serious flaws. In any case, on remand,
the Court of Appeals should closely scrutinize the WCAC majority’s
ill-reasoned and apparently result-driven decision.
930 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
In re E
NGLE
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
E
NGLE
), No.
134801. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we reinstate
the November 21, 2006, opinion, and November 27, 2006, order of the
Oakland Circuit Court, Family Division, terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights to the minor children. The Court of Appeals
misapplied the clear error standard by substituting its judgment for that
of the trial court, MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331 (1989), failed
to acknowledge that the applicable statutes and court rules do not require
efforts for reunification or provision of services under the circumstances
of this case, see, e.g., MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) and (2); MCL 712A.19a(2)(b);
MCR 3.965(D)(2), and rendered a decision that was contrary to the clear
and convincing evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termina-
tion and the best interests of the minor children, MCR 3.977(J); In re
Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341 (2000). We remand this case to the Oakland
Circuit Court, Family Division, for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this order. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No.
275064.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 2, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
V
ILLEGAS
, No. 129981; Court of Appeals No. 253447.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). Defendant used a hammer to break a jewelry
case at a flea market and stole the jewelry inside. He then swung the
hammer at a vendor who tried to stop him, but missed. His codefendant,
Ernest Chapman, cut a security guard with a box cutter to get away, and
another codefendant, Quentin Johnston, served as the getaway driver.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery,
conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, and felonious assault. Chapman
was convicted of unarmed robbery, conspiracy to commit unarmed
robbery, and two counts of assault with the intent to commit great bodily
harm less than murder. Johnston was convicted of larceny from the
person and conspiracy to commit larceny from the person. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.
Defendant argues that offense variables (OVs) 1 (aggravated use of
weapon), 2 (lethal potential of weapon possessed), and 3 (physical injury
to victim) were scored on the basis of the assault with intent to commit
great bodily harm committed by his codefendant, Chapman, but not by
defendant himself. Chapman was scored 25 points for OV 1 because he
cut the security guard with a box cutter, 5 points for OV 2 because he used
a box cutter, and 25 points for OV 3 because the injury was life
threatening. In multiple offender cases, if one offender is assessed points
under OV 1, OV 2, and OV 3, all offenders must be assessed the same
number of points. MCL 777.31(2)(b); MCL 777.32(2); MCL 777.33(2)(a).
This case was held in abeyance for the companion case of People v
Johnston, 478 Mich 903, 904 (2007), in which we held:
[D]efendant was the only offender convicted of larceny from
the person and conspiracy to commit larceny from the person.
Thus, his was not a “multiple offender case” for either of these
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A
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931
crimes. Accordingly, the multiple offender provision does not apply
to the scoring of defendant’s guidelines in this case.
In the instant case, although both defendant and Chapman were con-
victed of unarmed robbery, both were not convicted of an assault with
intent to commit great bodily harm. That is, Chapman was convicted of
using a box cutter to perpetrate an assault with the intent to commit
great bodily harm, while defendant was not convicted of using a box
cutter to perpetrate an assault with the intent to commit great bodily
harm. Therefore, this case is not a “multiple offender case.” Accordingly,
I would remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
The majority’s position is not only incompatible with Johnston, it will
inevitably lead to an understanding of the sentencing guidelines in which
defendants who are not truly similarly situated are required to be
sentenced similarly.
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
P
EOPLE V
L
AMAR
R
OBERTS
, No. 130207; Court of Appeals No. 252100.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I join the order denying leave to appeal. I
write separately only to observe that, in an appropriate case, this Court
should address whether to apply the rationale of People v Smith, 478
Mich 292 (2007), to a case where the defendant was convicted of felony
murder and the predicate felony. In light of our decision in Smith, the
holding in People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328 (1981), is now in question. But
because the defendant in Smith had not been convicted of the predicate
felony, we did not in that case consider whether Wilder should be
overruled. Although we should address this issue in an appropriate case,
defendant here failed to preserve the Wilder issue. Therefore, I concur in
the denial of leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for correction of the judgment of
sentence.
K
OULTA V
C
ITY OF
C
ENTERLINE
, No. 131891; Court of Appeals No.
266886.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). The Court denies leave to appeal in this case
because it has construed the phrase “the proximate cause” as the “one
most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury” for purposes of
the gross-negligence exception to governmental immunity, MCL
691.1407(2)(c).
1
I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether the
gross negligence of the defendant police officers was the most direct cause
of the injury here.
Plaintiff’s case has never gone to trial. If allowed to do so, plaintiff
would present evidence that the defendant police officers, responding to
an unwanted-person call, ordered Chrissy Lucero to leave her boyfriend’s
property. Lucero told the officers that she had been drinking. When she
got in her car but refused to drive because she was drunk, an officer told
her that she had 10 seconds to leave. She then drove away. Six minutes
1
See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 462 (2000).
932 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
later, she ran a red light and killed plaintiff’s decedent. Lucero had
consumed two 40-ounce bottles of beer and had taken antidepressant
medication. The combination caused her to black out at the time of the
accident.
The truth of these allegations, including what the officers should have
known about Lucero’s condition, constitutes jury questions. However, the
case cannot get to a jury if, under the current definition of “proximate
cause,” Lucero’s act of driving while intoxicated is deemed the proximate
cause of the collision. Plaintiff’s position is that the proximate cause was
the officers’ insistence that Lucero drive while drunk.
This Court borrowed its current definition of “proximate cause” from
the 1913 decision of Stoll v Laubengayer.
2
In Stoll, a five-year-old girl
sledding down a hill lost control of her sled and was trampled by horses
and a wagon left unattended at the bottom of the hill. The Court
determined that the “immediate cause” of the injury was the act of the
child in voluntarily starting her sled run down the hill. But for this act,
which took place after the defendant had negligently left the horses
unattended, no accident could have occurred.
3
The Court concluded that
the girl’s loss of control of her sled was irrelevant because the proximate
cause of the injury was her initial voluntary act of initiating the sled run.
Thus, the most direct cause of the injury in Stoll occurred at the
voluntary beginning of the child’s journey and not in the collision that
occurred at its end.
Were we to apply Stoll’s direct-cause rule to the facts at hand, we
would have to consider whether Lucero began driving voluntarily or was
forced to drive against her will. In an interview on the morning after the
accident, Lucero told the police that she blacked out after she drove away
from her boyfriend’s property. She stated that she might have driven
through more than one red light before she crashed into decedent’s car.
Under Stoll’s reasoning, the direct cause of the accident was not her loss
of control of her car. It was her beginning to drive by the order of the
defendant police and against her will.
Because of the possible involuntariness of Lucero’s decision to drive,
this case presents a different factual situation than Stoll. It also differs
from Robinson,inwhichStoll’s direct-cause rule was applied in the
context of a high-speed chase. Robinson held that, if a suspect involves
the police in a high-speed chase, it is the suspect’s voluntary decision to
flee that directly causes the injury. It is not the suspect’s later loss of
control of the car. In a chase, the police do not order the suspect to drive
at a high speed; on the contrary, the police’s intent is that the suspect
stop.
I would grant leave to appeal in this case to consider whether, under
Stoll, direct causation requires a voluntary initial act and whether there
was such a voluntary act here. I would also consider the relevance of the
traditional tort concepts of foreseeability and intervening and supersed-
ing causation to the theory of direct or sole proximate causation. In
2
Stoll v Laubengayer, 174 Mich 701 (1913).
3
Id. at 706.
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CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
933
Stoll,
4
the Court reviewed a series of decisions in which the foreseeabil-
ity of injury was crucial to proximate cause. But we did not explain
how foreseeability meshed with the theory of direct causation. Robin-
son was silent on the issue of foreseeability, and the Court of Appeals
has since interpreted that silence as foreclosing discussion of the
issue.
5
In her dissent in Cooper v Washtenaw Co, Judge C
OOPER
suggested
that this Court’s silence about such a fundamental tort concept leaves
it an open question.
6
Judge C
OOPER
’s position merits attention. In
multiple-causation cases, a government employee’s gross negligence
arguably can be the sole proximate cause of injury if it supersedes and
cuts off liability for the negligent acts of others. This Court needs to
examine superseding causation, which focuses on the foreseeability of
injury caused by an intervening force. We need to consider its relevance
to the sole-proximate-cause analysis based on direct causation, which
focuses on the voluntariness of the original act.
In this case, Lucero had drunk beer and driven earlier in the
evening. Had an accident occurred at the time, her voluntary decision
to drink and drive could have been the direct cause. However, by the
time she encountered the police, Lucero had realized that she was
incapable of driving safely. A police officer’s ultimatum that she drive
in her impaired condition would have superseded her earlier negli-
gence because such police intervention would have been an unreason-
able order. If Lucero drove because of any such order, the injury that
resulted would have been foreseeable at the time of the order. Hence,
her driving would not have intervened to cut off the police officers’
liability. Thus, traditional causation principles are not incompatible
with direct-causation analysis on the facts of this case.
I would grant leave to appeal to clarify whether these causation
principles are relevant under the Court’s current definition of “proxi-
mate cause” and thus answer the question left open in Robinson.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
G
UTLERREZ
, No. 132607; Court of Appeals No. 272497.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). For the reasons stated in my dissenting
statement in People v Villegas, 480 Mich 931 (2007), I would remand this
case to the trial court for resentencing.
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
P
EREZ V
O
AKLAND
C
OUNTY
, No. 133854; Court of Appeals No. 271406.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
4
Id. at 704-706.
5
See Cooper v Washtenaw Co, 270 Mich App 506, 510 (2006).
6
Id. at 513 (C
OOPER
,P.J., dissenting).
934 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). The Court denies leave to appeal in yet another
case of inmate suicide.
1
Once again, it declines to resolve the open
question whether it is relevant to consider the foreseeability of such a
suicide when determining proximate cause. In this case, a jail employee
removed Mr. Perez from a suicide watch despite her knowledge that he
had recently tried to kill himself while in the jail’s custodial care. This
Court should put to rest the question whether, in so doing, the employee
committed gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the inmate’s
death.
2
This Court has acknowledged that a custodial relationship is a special
relationship that gives rise to a duty to protect an inmate from harm,
including self-inflicted harm.
3
In an inmate-suicide case, is that duty not
meaningless if the failure to protect the inmate from himself can never be
the proximate cause of his death? This question should not remain
unanswered.
T
WITCHELL V
T
WITCHELL
, No. 134941; Court of Appeals No. 278805.
In re B
OSHAW
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
B
OSHAW
), No. 135061;
Court of Appeals No. 275465.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 9, 2007:
In re B
RANCH
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
S
COTT
), No. 135119;
Court of Appeals No. 274738.
H
ONIGMAN,
M
ILLER,
S
CHWARTZ &
C
OHN,
LLPvC
OGAN
, No. 135144; Court
of Appeals No. 281189.
W
ELLS
F
ARGO
H
OME
M
ORTGAGE,
I
NC V
B
RAMLAGE
, No. 135148; Court of
Appeals No. 276935.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal November 14, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
R
EAM
, No. 134913. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on December 13, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., on whether to grant the
prosecutor’s application or take other peremptory action. MCR
7.302(G)(1). Court of Appeals No. 268266.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 14, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
C
OREY
F
RAZIER
, No. 135035; Court of Appeals No. 280475.
1
See the recent order denying leave to appeal in Cooper v Washtenaw
Co, 477 Mich 953 (2006).
2
See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 462 (2000).
3
Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 438 (1992).
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CTIONS ON
A
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935
Summary Disposition November 16, 2007:
M
ARTIN V
T
HE
R
APID
I
NTER
-U
RBAN
P
ARTNERSHIP
, No. 132164. In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. MCL 691.1405 states that governmental agencies “shall be
liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent
operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency,
of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner....”In
this case, the plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell down the steps of
a shuttle bus owned and operated by the defendants as she was
attempting to exit the bus. The loading and unloading of passengers is an
action within the “operation” of a shuttle bus. Accordingly, the plaintiff
has satisfied the exception to governmental immunity set forth in MCL
691.1405. We remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court for reinstate-
ment of the order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposi-
tion, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.
Reported below: 271 Mich App 492.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
peremptory order of reversal. I believe the issue presented in this case
requires a fuller analysis than the majority’s short order provides. In
particular, we should more carefully analyze the distinction between the
“operation” and “maintenance” of a motor vehicle.
Plaintiff claims that she slipped and fell on an icy or snowy step on
defendant’s bus. Defendant is the governmental agency that operated
and maintained the bus. Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to install
step heaters or to scrape the steps to eliminate snow and ice.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s
allegations amounted to claims of negligent maintenance rather than
negligent operation and, thus, that the motor vehicle exception to
governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, did not apply. The trial court
denied summary disposition on this issue, but the Court of Appeals
reversed. Martin v Rapid Inter-Urban Transit Partnership, 271 Mich App
492 (2006). Applying the definition of “operation” set forth in Chandler
v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315 (2002), the Court of Appeals concluded that
defendant’s failure to remove ice or snow from the steps was not an
activity directly associated with the driving of the bus. In other words,
plaintiff’s allegations amounted to a claim of negligent maintenance
rather than negligent operation.
Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court. After hearing oral
argument regarding whether to grant leave to appeal or take other
peremptory action, the Court now issues an order peremptorily reversing
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The majority finds that “[t]he
loading and unloading of passengers is an action within the ‘operation’ of
a shuttle bus” and thus that the motor vehicle exception is satisfied.
I believe this question is more complex than the majority’s order
suggests. The motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, provides: “Gov-
ernmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage
resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee
of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental
agency is owner....”
936 480 M
ICHIGAN
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In Chandler, supra at 321, we held that the phrase “operation...ofa
motor vehicle” in MCL 691.1405 “encompasses activities that are directly
associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” We further noted that
“the Legislature clearly intended that ‘operation’ was distinct from-
. . . maintenance...anduse.” Id. at 320 n 7, citing MCL 550.3105.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, we stated in Chandler that
negligent maintenance is distinct from negligent operation. Installing
step heaters and scraping ice from steps may be maintenance activities
that are distinct from “operation” under Chandler. Thus, it is not clear
that plaintiff has established a connection between the “operation” of the
bus and her injuries.
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the majority reasons that a bus is
used to transport passengers, who must use the steps to get on and off the
bus. But all motor vehicles require a means of ingress and egress. The
majority does not explain why we must analyze a bus differently from
other types of motor vehicles.
More fundamentally, the majority’s order does not explicate the
appropriate analytic framework to distinguish between “operation” and
“maintenance” of a motor vehicle. Indeed, the majority’s order raises
more questions than it answers. For example, suppose that a governmen-
tal agency fails to repair a broken seat or a loose handrail on a bus. Would
these omissions now constitute “operation” within the motor vehicle
exception? After all, a passenger must use a seat to sit on a bus and must
grasp a handrail to safely walk or stand. Thus, would the majority
analyze a broken seat or a loose handrail differently than a slippery step?
If not, then how would the existence of these defects arise from the
negligent “operation” of the bus?
These questions arise because the majority’s short order seems to
conflate the location of the slip and fall with the conduct that caused it.
The majority is certainly correct that a passenger must use the steps to
get on and off the bus. But the question remains whether a slip and fall
in this location resulted from the negligent operation of the bus. Negli-
gent operation certainly could cause a plaintiff to fall on the steps if, for
example, the driver prematurely released the brakes. In that situation,
the driver’s negligent operation would have caused the fall.
But that is not what occurred here. Plaintiff fell because defendant
allegedly failed to remove ice and snow from the steps. The majority has
not explained how such an omission constitutes operating the bus. This
failure to distinguish the mere location of the fall from the conduct that
caused it will generate confusion.
If “operation” means something more than driving, then the Court
should answer the next logical question: What precisely does “operation”
mean? Does the size of the vehicle in question define “operation”? Does
“operation” include maintenance activities? How does the majority
convey meaning to “operation” independent of the word “use” and
consistent with our analysis in Chandler? The current order offers no
answers to these questions. I predict that this order will spawn future
litigation on these points.
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For these reasons, in lieu of resolving this case by peremptory order,
I would more fully address the appropriate analytic framework for
distinguishing between operation and maintenance of a motor vehicle.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. I join the statement of Justice C
ORRIGAN
.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal November 21, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
S
TEVEN
C
ARTER
, No. 134687. We direct the clerk to place the
matter on the January 2008 session calendar for argument on whether to
grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
The parties shall submit supplemental briefs no later than December 18,
2007, addressing whether the constitutional underpinnings of People v
Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240 (2004), are sound. They should avoid
submitting mere restatements of their application papers. The Prosecut-
ing Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attor-
neys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae no later than
December 18, 2007. Other persons or groups interested in the determi-
nation of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for
permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No. 270195.
Leave to Appeal Granted November 21, 2007:
M
ILLER V
A
LLSTATE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, Nos. 134393, 134406. The
parties shall include among the issues to be briefed whether PT Works,
Inc., must be incorporated under the Professional Services Corporations
Act (PSCA), MCL 450.221 et seq., and, if so, whether the failure of PT
Works to properly incorporate under the PSCA means that the physical
therapy treatment it provided to the defendant’s insured was not lawfully
rendered under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. In addressing the
latter issue, the parties are invited to consider the possible application of
MCL 450.229, MCL 450.233, and MCL 450.1271(c). The Attorney Gen-
eral, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, the Michigan
Association for Justice, the Michigan Insurance Federation, the Insur-
ance Institute of Michigan, and the Business Law and Health Care Law
sections of the State Bar of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus
curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the
issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file
briefs amicus curiae. Reported below: 275 Mich App 649.
Summary Dispositions November 21, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
D
IPZINSKI
, No. 133641. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Midland Circuit
Court, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. The
prosecutor acknowledges errors in the scoring of offense variables 1 and
9, which errors alter the guidelines sentence ranges for both convictions.
Resentencing is therefore warranted. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82
(2006). On remand, the trial court shall make a record explaining the
938 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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reasons for scoring each offense variable. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 276029.
P
EOPLE V
U
PHAUS
, No. 133928. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals holding that Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296 (2004),
applies to a trial court’s factual determinations underlying a decision to
depart from the sentencing guidelines. People v Harper, 479 Mich 599
(2007). We remand this case to the Court of Appeals to address the
defendant’s remaining arguments. In all other respects, leave to appeal is
denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions
presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Reported below: 275 Mich App 158.
K
ELLY
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
K
ASETA V
B
INKOWSKI
, No. 134728. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion, and we remand this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry
of a judgment of summary disposition in favor of the defendants. Court of
Appeals No. 273215.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
G
REBNER V
S
TATE OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 135274. On order of the Court, the
motions for immediate consideration and to file briefs amicus curiae are
granted. The application for leave to appeal the November 16, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, generally for the reasons stated in the Court of
Appeals dissenting opinion, and we remand this case to the Ingham
Circuit Court for entry of an order denying the plaintiffs’ motions and
dismissing the complaint. The motion for stay is denied as moot.
(A) The issue here is whether MCL 168.615c, which was enacted by
the Legislature with a vote of less than two-thirds of the members of each
house, violates Const 1963, art 4, § 30.
(B) MCL 168.615c provides, in pertinent part:
(1) In order to vote at a presidential primary, an elector shall
indicate in writing, on a form prescribed by the secretary of state,
which participating political party ballot he or she wishes to vote
when appearing to vote at a presidential primary.
***
(3) The secretary of state shall develop a procedure for city and
township clerks to use when keeping a separate record at a
presidential primary that contains the printed name, address, and
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qualified voter file number of each elector and the participating
political party ballot selected by that elector at the presidential
primary.
***
(5) To ensure compliance with the state and national political
party rules of each participating political party and this section,
the records described in subsection (3) shall be provided to the
chairperson of each participating political party as set forth in
subsection (6).
***
(8) A participating political party may only use the information
transmitted to the participating political party under subsection (6)
to support political party activities by that participating political
party, including, but not limited to, support for or opposition to
candidates and ballot proposals.
(C) Const 1963, art 4, § 30 provides: “The assent of two-thirds of the
members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature shall be
required for the appropriation of public money or public property for
local or private purposes.”
(D) This Court “must presume a statute is constitutional and con-
strue it as such, unless the only proper construction renders the statute
unconstitutional.” In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer, 478 Mich 1, 9
(2007).
(E) If an appropriation predominantly serves a public purpose, it is
not an appropriation for a private purpose. Advisory Opinion on Consti-
tutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465, 496 (1976).
“The fact that certain individuals benefit from the appropriation does not
necessarily imply that the appropriation is lacking a public purpose. The
question is whether society at large has an interest in having those
individuals benefited.” Id.
(F) Because “the determination of what constitutes a public purpose
for which an appropriation of public money may be made is primarily the
responsibility of the Legislature,” id. at 495-496, considerable deference
is owed to the Legislature’s determination. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217
(1962). “[D]etermination of what constitutes a public purpose involves
consideration of economic and social philosophies and principles of
political science and government. Such determinations should be made
by the elected representatives of the people.” Gregory Marina, Inc v
Detroit, 378 Mich 364, 394 (1966).
(G) Political parties unquestionably serve a public purpose. As the
United States Supreme Court explained, “parties and their representa-
tives have become the custodians of official power...;andthatifheedis
940 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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to be given to the realities of political life, they are now agencies of the
state, the instruments by which government becomes a living thing.”
Nixon v Condon, 286 US 73, 84 (1932). See also generally Smith v
Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944), and Terry v Adams, 345 US 461 (1953), on
the uniquely “public functions” carried out by political parties within the
electoral process.
(H) As a consequence of MCL 168.615c, the political parties are given
access to certain information gathered at public expense in order to
support or oppose candidates and ballot proposals. The debate engen-
dered as the result of that access is integral to the operation of our
democracy, our electoral process, and our political campaigns and thus
serves a public purpose by “enlighten[ing] the public and encourag[ing]
an informed decision-making process.” Advisory Opinion, supra at
494. “Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualification of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our constitution.” Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 14 (1976).
(I) Whether there are better means of serving these same interests,
and whether the costs of permitting that access are warranted in light of
their benefits, are principally matters for legislative, not judicial, deter-
mination. “[I]t is well within the legislature’s powers to so determine.”
Advisory Opinion, supra at 497.
(J) We respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals majority that
the public purpose served here is merely “incidental[].” Instead, the
“predominant” role that political parties serve in our system of govern-
ment is informing the public about candidates and ballot proposals and
facilitating public debate in the context of such candidates and ballot
proposals. This is indisputably a “public purpose” and such purpose
appears central to the legislative judgment. Indeed, it is hard to compre-
hend what alternative purpose the Legislature might have contemplated
in enacting MCL 168.615c.
(K) The consideration and balancing of “public” and “private” inter-
ests in this case do not require that this Court construe these or any other
terms in a “broad” or “narrow” manner, as asserted by the Court of
Appeals dissent. Rather, such terms need only be interpreted in a
reasonable manner.
(L) For the reasons discussed above, MCL 168.615c does not violate
Const 1963, art 4, § 30.
(M) In addition, MCL 168.615c is not violative of Const 1963, art 2, §
4, which provides, in part: “The legislature shall enact laws to preserve
the purity of elections....”Plaintiffs argue that § 615c violates the
Purity of Elections Clause because only the two major political parties,
having each received “20% of the total vote cast in this state for the office
of president in the last presidential election,” MCL 168.613a(3), at
present qualify to obtain the information gathered under this act.
However, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “the
States’ interest permits them to enact reasonable election regulations
that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system ....”
Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351, 367 (1997). States
have a “strong interest” in the stability of their political systems and,
while they may not enact “unreasonably exclusionary restrictions,” they
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“need not remove all of the many hurdles third parties face in the
American political arena today.” Id. See also Buckley, supra at 97-98.
Further, it may conceivably be argued that MCL 168.615c, in fact,
“preserve[s] the purity of elections” by preventing so-called “party
raiding” “whereby voters in sympathy with one party designate them-
selves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine the
results of the other party’s primary,” Rosario v Rockefeller, 410 US 752,
760 (1973).
(N) We agree with plaintiffs that there is standing and that the issues
are ripe. Plaintiff Practical Political Consulting is a political consulting
firm whose business will be directly affected by the fact that, pursuant to
MCL 168.615c, a part of the market research for the two major political
parties will be provided to the parties by the state, and, thus, this plaintiff
has standing to challenge § 615c. In addition, the challenges to this law
are ripe because § 615c has been enacted without the assent of two-thirds
of both houses, and if § 615c violates Const 1963, art 4, § 30, the state
cannot conduct the January 15, 2008, presidential primary election
because of the nonseverability provision of 2007 PA 52, enacting § 1.
(O) This order addresses only the question whether MCL 168.615c
violates Const 1963, art 2, § 4 and art 4, § 30, the only issues addressed
by the lower courts. In particular, this order does not address the validity
of MCL 168.615c under any other provision of the federal or the state
constitution, and it does not address whether MCL 168.615c is inconsis-
tent with any other provision of federal or state law. Reported below: 277
Mich App 220.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal because:
A. There is no express public purpose for the granting of access to the
lists. MCL 168.615c states two purposes for the list provision: (1) to ensure
compliance with the state and national political party rules and (2) to
support political party activities by that participating political party. MCL
168.615c(5) and (8). Neither purpose has any relation to the public interest.
The express purposes apply exclusively to the political parties, which are
concededly private entities. While political parties undoubtedly serve a
public purpose, as do many private entities, the question here is whether this
public appropriation serves a public interest.
It is possible that an incidental benefit would accrue to the public if
“support for or opposition to candidates and ballot proposals,” MCL
168.615c(8), leads to public discussion or exchange of ideas, as the Court
of Appeals dissent assumes it will. But nothing in the statute ensures this
result. Support could take the exclusive form of financial support.
Discourse, if there were any, would be entirely within the particular
party. There is simply no express benefit to the public.
B. Speculation that a benefit may trickle down to the public is not
enough. The Court of Appeals dissent asserts that Advisory Opinion on
Constitutionality of 1975 PA 277 (Questions 2 — 10), 396 Mich 465 (1976),
“appears” to stand for the proposition that any public purpose is
sufficient for a constitutional appropriation. I believe that this is a
misstatement. Advisory Opinion actually states that “[t]he question is
whether society at large has an interest in having those individuals
benefited.” 396 Mich at 496. I read this as a primary purpose test.
942 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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Advisory Opinion does not stand for the proposition that any atten-
dant public benefit amounts to a public purpose; the benefit must be one
that is closely and clearly related to the welfare of the public to amount
to a public purpose. The goals of MCL 168.615c are closely and clearly
related to the welfare of the qualifying political parties. Any benefit to the
public is speculative at worst and attenuated at best.
C. The “any public purpose” test of the Court of Appeals dissent is
unworkable and dangerous. If any slight public benefit is sufficient, as
the dissent would have it, the distinction between public and private
purpose loses all meaning. As the Court of Appeals majority observes,
appropriating property and funds for a shopping mall involves some
public benefit, if only in increased tax revenues. Adopting the Court of
Appeals dissent’s translation of the public purpose test invites bad
consequences for Michigan citizens in the future.
D. The purposes of MCL 168.615c are inapposite, arguably inimical, to
those in the cases on which the dissent relies. The legislation at issue in
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 91 (1976), public presidential campaign
funding, had a public purpose “to reduce the deleterious influence of
large contributions on our political process....”Thelegislation at
issue in Advisory Opinion, public gubernatorial campaign funding, had a
public purpose “[t]o allow gubernatorial candidates to become less
dependent upon financial support from special-interest groups....”
396 Mich at 497. So both had a purpose to mitigate the influence of
highly funded private entities or special interest groups.
The effect of MCL 168.615c appears to be the opposite. It enables
increased funding and influence in particular groups. Significantly, this
influence and funding benefit is not just in the parties themselves; the list
may be provided to “another person, organization, or vendor for the
purpose of supporting political party activities by that participating
political party,” in other words, special interest groups. MCL 168.615c(8).
The fact that MCL 168.615c directly benefits not only the parties but
unnamed subgroups somehow loosely connected to the “political party
activities” drives a stake through the heart of any attenuated public
purpose as far as I am concerned.
E. Plaintiffs’ contention that the act implicates the “purity of elec-
tions” is not wholly without merit. Const 1963, art 2, § 4 states in part:
“The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, to
preserve the secrecy of the ballot, [and] to guard against abuses of the
elective franchise....”The“purity of elections” clause has been
interpreted by this Court to require that “ ‘any law enacted by the
Legislature which adversely affects the purity of elections is constitution-
ally infirm.’ ” Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571,
596 (1982), quoting Wells v Kent Co Board of Election Comm’rs, 382 Mich
112, 123 (1969). “The phrase, ‘purity of elections,’ is one of large
dimensions. It has no single, precise meaning.” Wells, supra at 123. “Al-
though the ‘purity of elections’ concept has been applied in different
factual settings, it unmistakably requires...fairnessandevenhanded-
ness in the election laws of this state.” Socialist Workers, supra at
598. “The touchstone [of Const 1963, art 2, § 4] is whether the election
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procedure created affords an unfair advantage to one party or its
candidates over a rival party or its candidates.” Id. at 598-599.
Arguably, supplying a list of voters to secondary vendors of political
parties adversely affects the purity of elections and creates an unfair
advantage. Further, it is not clear to me that the general reasonableness
of favoring the two-party system for the stability of elections applies
when the purported good, as the Court of Appeals dissent suggests, is
“ ‘to assure the unfettered exchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people....’”Monitor
Patriot Co v Roy, 401 US 265, 272 (1971) (citation omitted).
Finally, the very idea of supplying lists of voters to private parties,
when the voters must either be on the list or not vote, strikes me as an
abuse of the elective franchise.
For these reasons, I would deny leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice C
AVANAGH
.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority of four’s (Chief
Justice T
AYLOR
, and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
) order
reversing the Court of Appeals majority opinion and generally adopting
the flawed dissent. Justice C
AVANAGH
’s dissent has correctly explained
some of the flaws of this Court’s majority of four’s mistaken decision and
reasoning.
I would deny leave to appeal because the Court of Appeals correctly
held that 2007 PA 52 is unconstitutional because it violates the Michigan
Constitution by appropriating public property for private purposes
without the assent of “two-thirds of the members elected to and serving
in each house of the legislature.” Const 1963, art 4, § 30.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 21, 2007:
R
UMFIELD V
H
ENNEY
, No. 132755; Court of Appeals No. 260540.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
A
MERIQUEST
M
ORTGAGE
C
OMPANY V
A
LTON
, Nos. 132889, 132890; re-
ported below: 273 Mich App 84.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
RESERVE THE
D
UNES,
I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
E
NVIRONMENTAL
Q
UALITY
, No.
133083; Court of Appeals No. 273932.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,andK
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
T
INGLEY V
W
ARDROP
, No. 133583; reported below: 274 Mich App 335 (on
remand).
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,andK
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
OON
, No. 133613; Court of Appeals No. 266327.
C
AVANAGH,
J. I would grant leave to appeal.
C
ITIFINANCIAL
M
ORTGAGE
C
OMPANY,
LLCvC
OMERICA
B
ANK,
No. 133645;
Court of Appeals No. 270453.
B
YZEWSKI V
B
AUMBACH
, No. 133778; Court of Appeals No. 272441.
944 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ILBURN V
P
ROGRESSIVE
M
ICHIGAN
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133881;
Court of Appeals No. 272379.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONEY
, No. 133959; Court of Appeals No. 265071.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
S
MITH V
M
ARTINREA
I
NTERNATIONAL,
I
NC
, No. 134080; Court of Appeals
No. 275860.
L
ANG V
F
LINT
B
OARD OF
E
DUCATION
, No. 134329; Court of Appeals No.
274635.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
A
YLWARD
, No. 134453; Court of Appeals No. 269693.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
H
ASSELBRING
, No. 134478; Court of Appeals No. 257846 (on
remand).
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
H
OMECOMINGS
F
INANCIAL
N
ETWORK V
C
RYSTAL
H
OMES,
I
NC
, No. 134502;
Court of Appeals No. 267095.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
T
ESEN
, No. 134572; reported below: 276 Mich App 134.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
G
ERALD
B
ASS
, No. 134589; Court of Appeals No. 277941.
P
EOPLE V
W
AYNE
B
ROWN
, No. 134698; Court of Appeals No. 277675.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the Court’s decision to deny
leave to appeal. I write separately to address two points.
First, the prosecutor challenged the circuit court’s sentencing deci-
sions at a probation revocation hearing. The prosecutor did not attend
the hearing or raise the issues now advanced in his application to this
Court. Therefore, the prosecutor did not preserve the issues for review or
take any action to persuade the circuit court to impose a new sentence
instead of discharging defendant from probation and permitting him to
relocate outside the state. For these reasons, I agree that we must decline
to address the prosecutor’s arguments.
Second, I do believe that the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the
question at issue in this case in People v Robinson, unpublished opinion
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 28, 2006 (Docket No.
255672). Here, as in Robinson, the defendant entered a plea pursuant to
a Killebrew agreement that fixed his minimum sentence range. See
People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189 (1982). The legislative sentencing
guidelines prescribed a minimum sentence range of 78 to 130 months.
But, pursuant to the plea deal, defendant was sentenced, within an
agreed-to range of 5 to 23 months, to 12 months’ jail time and 36 months’
probation. Defendant violated the terms of his probation within a few
months of his release from jail. He pleaded guilty of violating probation,
yet the trial judge discharged him from probation and did not impose any
additional jail time. The judge was under the impression that, if she
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resentenced defendant, she was bound to adhere to the originally
agreed-to 5- to 23-month minimum range.
The legislative guidelines apply “whether or not the sentence is
imposed after probation revocation.” People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555,
560 (2005). Under MCL 771.4, when a defendant violates the terms of his
probationary sentence,
the court may continue, extend, or revoke probation. In the event
that the court revokes a defendant’s probation, it may sentence
the defendant “in the same manner and to the same penalty as the
court might have done if the probation order had never been
made.” A judge, however, is not required to sentence the defendant
“in the same manner.” [Id. at 562 (emphasis in original).]
Indeed, as we recently observed in People v Harper, 479 Mich 599,
630-631 (2007), the permissive language in MCL 771.4 reflects the nature
and purpose of probation. We noted, for example, that “if a judge may
never impose additional imprisonment, he is [effectively] unable to
revoke probation.” Id. at 630. In other words, for a probationary sen-
tence to have its intended effect, a judge must have the ability to
resentence a probation violator to additional jail or prison time. Accord-
ingly, a judge must be able to exceed the original minimum sentence
range if appropriate and necessary. See id. at 631 (judge must be able to
exceed the original, 12-month limit on jail time for intermediate sanc-
tions); cf. Hendrick, supra at 562-563 (a judge may depart upward from
the original guidelines range on the basis of postprobation factors).
Here, defendant received the benefit of his plea bargain at his original
sentencing. In spite of the favorable sentence, he chose to violate the
terms of his probation. The judge in this case erred when, after defendant
pleaded guilty of violating the terms of his probation, she concluded that
she was constrained to resentence him within the same minimum
sentence range prescribed by his plea agreement.
Leave to Appeal Granted November 27, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
G
ERACER
T
AYLOR
, No. 134206. The parties shall include among
the issues to be briefed: (1) whether Lasater’s identifications were
testimonial or nontestimonial under Davis v Washington, 547 US 813
(2006); (2) whether, if the statements were testimonial, they constitute
dying declarations; and (3) “whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates
an exception for testimonial dying declarations.” See Crawford v Wash-
ington, 541 US 36, 56 n 6 (2004). The Prosecuting Attorneys Association
of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited
to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the
determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for
permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Reported below: 275 Mich App
177.
946 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Summary Dispositions November 27, 2007:
H
AAS V
D
EAL
, No. 133370. On November 14, 2007, the Court heard oral
argument on the application for leave to appeal the January 25, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application
is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to
the trial court for entry of an order denying the motion for sanctions filed
by defendants Wade H. Deal and Sarah J. Deal. On the facts and law of
this case, the plaintiffs’ civil action cannot be considered devoid of
arguable legal merit. MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(iii). Court of Appeals No.
262987.
P
EOPLE V
K
EENAN
R
OBINSON
, No. 134840. In lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we reverse the July 17, 2007, order of the Court of Appeals
denying the motion to file a supplemental brief, and we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration of the issue raised in the
defendant’s supplemental brief: whether the trial court’s upward depar-
ture from the applicable sentencing guidelines range and extent of
departure were supported by substantial and compelling reasons. People
v Babcock, 469 Mich 247 (2003). The Court of Appeals shall issue an order
permitting the prosecutor to respond. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 269605.
W
EAVER
J. I would deny leave to appeal.
Y
OUNG
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from this Court’s order
reversing the order of the Court of Appeals denying defendant’s motion
to file a supplemental brief and remanding this case to the Court of
Appeals for plenary consideration of the issue raised in defendant’s
supplemental brief. A party may not file a supplemental brief in the Court
of Appeals except “by leave of the Court.” MCR 7.212(G). With the
assistance of counsel, defendant filed his initial brief on September 5,
2006. Upon defendant’s request, his counsel filed in the trial court a
motion to withdraw, which was granted on February 15, 2007. Substitute
counsel was appointed on April 19, 2007. On July 9, 2007, the day before
this case was submitted on the case call, substitute counsel moved to file
a supplemental brief. On July 17, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied
defendant’s motion and returned the supplemental brief. I disagree with
the majority that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by denying
defendant’s 11th hour motion to add issues to his appeal. Therefore, I
would deny his application and require him to raise these issues in a
motion for relief from judgment.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice Y
OUNG
.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 27, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
H
AROLD
B
ELL
, No. 134402; Court of Appeals No. 269517.
P
EOPLE V
S
PANGLER
, No. 134431; Court of Appeals No. 266078.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
947
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal in this case to
consider when offense variable (OV) 19 is properly scored. Ten points are
scored for OV 19 where the defendant has “interfered with or attempted
to interfere with the administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). In this
case, defendant hid himself and items used in methamphetamine pro-
duction in a closet when the police arrived at the house to investigate a
crime committed by another person. For doing so, he was scored 10 points
under OV 19. Given that it would be extraordinary for a criminal
perpetrator not to attempt to hide evidence of his or her crime or to make
such crime less detectable, it would seem that OV 19 would almost always
be scored under the trial court’s interpretation. Perhaps this is consistent
with OV 19, but, if that was the Legislature’s intention, it would seem
that it would have simply increased the base level for theft offenses and
other criminal offenses involving contraband. Because the guidelines are
more than hortatory, and must be construed in the same fashion as any
other binding law of this state, I would grant leave to enable a closer
review of the Legislature’s intentions. See People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283
(2004).
S
PIRES V
B
ERGMAN
, No. 134977; reported below: 276 Mich App 432.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
Summary Disposition November 28, 2007:
M
ULLINS V
S
T
J
OSEPH
M
ERCY
H
OSPITAL
, No. 131879. We reverse the July
11, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(G)(1). We
conclude that this Court’s decision in Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004),
does not apply to any causes of action filed after Omelenchuk v City of
Warren, 461 Mich 567 (2000), was decided in which the saving period
expired, i.e., two years had elapsed since the personal representative was
appointed, sometime between the date that Omelenchuk was decided and
within 182 days after Waltz was decided. All other causes of action are
controlled by Waltz. In the instant case, because the plaintiff filed this
action after Omelenchuk was decided and the saving period expired
between the date that Omelenchuk was decided and within 182 days after
Waltz was decided, Waltz is not applicable. Accordingly, we remand this
case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for entry of an order denying the
defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this order. Reported below: 271 Mich App 503.
Summary Dispositions November 29, 2007:
W
AR
-A
G
F
ARMS,
LLCvF
RANKLIN
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 133298. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of
Appeals No. 270242.
P
EOPLE V
V
ADEN
, No. 133632. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Berrien Circuit
Court, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. The
prosecuting attorney concedes that the defendant should have been
948 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
scored zero points for offense variable 9 in light of People v Melton, 271
Mich App 590 (2006), and that the defendant is entitled to resentencing.
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006). In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions
presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 275598.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARC
S
ANDERS
, No. 134049. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No.
273929.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALTON
, No. 134470. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted of: (1) whether the defendant was
denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to
object when the Oakland Circuit Court did not sentence the defendant
pursuant to the legislative sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq., and
(2) whether the defendant is entitled to postappeal relief under MCR
6.501 et seq. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be re-
viewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No.
276161.
P
EOPLE V
B
OBBY
P
ERRY
, No. 134829. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of whether the trial court
erred in scoring 10 points on offense variable 4 for serious psychological
injury to a victim under MCL 777.34(1)(a). In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 278484.
Leave to Appeal Denied November 29, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
S
TANLEY
M
C
C
RAY
, No. 132245. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 268557.
D
I
V
ERGILIO V
W
EST
B
LOOMFIELD
C
HARTER
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 133174; Court of
Appeals No. 261766.
H
ALL V
C
OHEN
, No. 133735; Court of Appeals No. 270949.
B
RIGGS
T
AX
S
ERVICE,
LLC v D
ETROIT
P
UBLIC
S
CHOOLS
, No. 133737; Court
of Appeals No. 271631.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
F
LETCHER
, No. 133877; Court of Appeals No. 266827.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDREW
M
ILLER
,J
R
, No. 133926; Court of Appeals No. 274999.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
949
P
EOPLE V
B
OURNE
, No. 133956. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272178.
P
EOPLE V
S
ALLIS
, No. 134000; Court of Appeals No. 267261.
P
EOPLE V
M
EEKS
, No. 134025. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 277468.
L
ANGE V
L
ANGE
, No. 134093; Court of Appeals No. 274197.
P
EOPLE V
Y
ANT
, No. 134119. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272991.
P
EOPLE V
P
ALADINO
, No. 134123. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274704.
P
EOPLE V
L
ARRY
S
MITH
, No. 134131. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 272946.
P
EOPLE V
J
ORDAN
, No. 134139; reported below: 275 Mich App 659.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHEN
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134167. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274191.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
H
ARPER
, No. 134218. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273601.
P
EOPLE V
D
ARIN
S
MITH
, No. 134221. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273160.
M
ICHIGAN
S
TATE
E
MPLOYEES
A
SSOCIATION V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
,
No. 134228; reported below: 275 Mich App 474.
P
EOPLE V
C
ORNELIUS
B
ROWN
, No. 134266. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273027.
R
OOYAKKER &
S
ITZ,
PLLC v P
LANTE &
M
ORAN,
PLLC, No. 134268; re-
ported below: 276 Mich App 146.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCEL
S
MITH
, No. 134292. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273898.
P
EOPLE V
R
AMSEY
, No. 134299; Court of Appeals No. 274641.
P
EOPLE V
P
OWELL
, No. 134300. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275633.
950 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
M
ILSTEAD
, No. 134306. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273714.
P
EOPLE V
D
URAND
C
LINIC,
PC, Nos. 134308, 134309. The defendant has
failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals Nos. 271104, 272736.
P
EOPLE V
J
ARRETT
D
ORSEY
, No. 134325. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274770.
P
EOPLE V
J
EREMIAH
B
ROOKS
, No. 134331. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274956.
P
EOPLE V
L
AWRENCE
S
MITH
, No. 134337. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 275573.
P
EOPLE V
T
YRONE
B
ELL
, No. 134377; Court of Appeals No. 266277.
P
EOPLE V
H
ARDY
, No. 134388. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272479.
P
EOPLE V
C
HILDS
, No. 134391. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276673.
P
EOPLE V
G
OREE
, No. 134392. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276638.
P
EOPLE V
N
ALI
, No. 134396. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276743.
P
EOPLE V
D
OWELL
, No. 134398. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274984.
P
EOPLE V
W
INGO
, No. 134399; Court of Appeals No. 268697.
P
EOPLE V
T
RAPP
, No. 134400. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275396.
P
EOPLE V
G
ALVIN
, No. 134409; Court of Appeals No. 264598.
P
EOPLE V
H
ENDRICKS
, No. 134414. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272764.
P
EOPLE V
S
IROIS
, No. 134415; Court of Appeals No. 269645.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
951
P
EOPLE V
A
RMSTRONG
, No. 134434. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275003.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
S
WANIGAN
, No. 134436. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 276253.
P
EOPLE V
G
LEASON
, No. 134468. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275637.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
R
OMANDO
S
MITH
, No. 134475. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 275282.
P
EOPLE V
D
EWON
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134479. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 275423.
P
EOPLE V
E
RIC
M
ARTIN
, No. 134484. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276403.
P
EOPLE V
M
ORRIS
F
OSTER,
No. 134485; Court of Appeals No. 273987.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRENCE
M
OORE
, No. 134486; Court of Appeals No. 268465.
P
EOPLE V
F
AIDLEY
, No. 134495. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276302.
P
EOPLE V
C
OLEY
, No. 134499. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275923.
H
ILGENDORF V
L
EE
, No. 134501; Court of Appeals No. 270335.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALLAGER
, No. 134510. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274275.
P
EOPLE V
J
USTIN
W
ATKINS
, No. 134518. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 275037.
P
EOPLE V
D
ON
G
IBSON
, No. 134534. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276897.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARLTON
, No. 134536. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 278767.
P
EOPLE V
C
LEVELAND
C
OLEMAN
, No. 134541; Court of Appeals No.
269372.
952 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
S
HULICK
, No. 134555. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275793.
M
ICHIGAN
C
OMMUNITY
A
CTION
A
GENCY
A
SSOCIATION V
P
UBLIC
S
ERVICE
C
OMMISSION
, No. 134559; Court of Appeals No. 263262.
P
EOPLE V
S
ILVA
, No. 134561. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275601.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
P
ARKS
, No. 134562. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277250.
P
EOPLE V
B
ERNARD
J
ONES
, No. 134566; Court of Appeals No. 267111.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALDEN
, No. 134575. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275643.
P
EOPLE V
B
ROYLES
, No. 134581. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276332.
P
EOPLE V
L
UMPKIN
, No. 134584. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276810.
P
EOPLE V
C
OX
, No. 134585; Court of Appeals No. 278629.
P
EOPLE V
F
ANNIN
, No. 134586. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276781.
P
EOPLE V
S
TRAYHORN
, No. 134587. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276280.
H
ARRIS V
B
OTSFORD
C
ONTINUING
C
ARE
C
ORPORATION
, Nos. 134591, 134592;
Court of Appeals Nos. 267997, 269452.
P
EOPLE V
M
ONTEZ
S
TOVALL
, No. 134610. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 273612.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCUS
H
ARVEY
, No. 134612. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 278524.
P
EOPLE V
D
ANIEL
J
ENKINS
, No. 134613; Court of Appeals No. 266236.
P
EOPLE V
L
ONG
, No. 134622. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275853.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
953
F
AIRVIEW
B
UILDERS,
I
NC V
B
IRETA
, No. 134632; Court of Appeals No.
266197.
M
ASSE V
H
ARDING
, No. 134633; Court of Appeals No. 273798.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
H
AMILTON
, No. 134635. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277936.
P
EOPLE V
S
OSA
, No. 134643. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276063.
P
EOPLE V
M
URPHY
, No. 134644. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275916.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
S
TEWART
, No. 134646. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276740.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHEN
J
OHNSON
,J
R
, No. 134649. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274195.
P
EOPLE V
D
OWNING
, No. 134650; Court of Appeals No. 276016.
P
EOPLE V
D
IXON
, No. 134652. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274435.
C
OMPLETE
A
UTO &
T
RUCK
P
ARTS,
I
NC V
C
ITY OF
F
LINT
, No. 134664; Court
of Appeals No. 268485.
P
EOPLE V
A
LTOONIAN
, No. 134681; Court of Appeals No. 267398.
P
EOPLE V
D
EAN
J
OHNSON
, No. 134683. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276073.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONNIE
A
NDERSON
, No. 134684; Court of Appeals No. 268463.
P
EOPLE V
T
RAVIS
U
NDERWOOD
, No. 134690; Court of Appeals No. 266714.
P
EOPLE V
D
EAN
, No. 134691; Court of Appeals No. 275925.
P
EOPLE V
R
ITCHIE
, No. 134700. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277167.
P
EOPLE V
L
ARRY
S
TOVALL
, No. 134702; Court of Appeals No. 278119.
P
EOPLE V
G
ROSSNICKLE
, No. 134705. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277290.
954 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
F
REDERICK
T
ERRY
, No. 134708. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 278504.
P
EOPLE V
L
EROY
T
AYLOR
, No. 134709. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276182.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
N
AMEE
, No. 134710. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273736.
P
EOPLE V
S
HAWN
D
AVIS
, No. 134713. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277009.
P
EOPLE V
D
ESMOND
S
HAW
, No. 134714; Court of Appeals No. 269864.
P
EOPLE V
V
IEAU
, No. 134715. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 277228.
P
EOPLE V
J
ASON
G
REEN
, No. 134716; Court of Appeals No. 277841.
P
EOPLE V
C
IESLINSKI
, No. 134723; Court of Appeals No. 278355.
P
EOPLE V
G
OZA
, No. 134727. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276870.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENDELL
L
EE
, No. 134729; Court of Appeals No. 278521.
P
EOPLE V
R
USHELL
, No. 134730. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277563.
P
EOPLE V
C
OBAS
, No. 134731. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 278650.
P
EOPLE V
S
IMPSON
, No. 134732. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 278921.
W
OZNIAK V
V
ENTURE
I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC
, No. 134734; Court of Appeals No.
274026.
P
EOPLE V
A
RTIS
J
OHNSON
, No. 134737; Court of Appeals No. 278305.
P
EOPLE V
P
ENDERGRASS
, No. 134738; Court of Appeals No. 260633.
P
EOPLE V
K
NIFF
, No. 134740; Court of Appeals No. 278702.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
C
HAPMAN
, No. 134742; Court of Appeals No. 266736.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLZER
, No. 134744; Court of Appeals No. 269142.
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
A
NDERSON
, No. 134745. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277630.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
955
P
EOPLE V
B
REELOVE
C
OLLINS
, No. 134746. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277810.
P
EOPLE V
P
RINTICE
S
MITH
, No. 134754; Court of Appeals No. 278884.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
T
AYLOR,
J
R
, No. 134757; Court of Appeals No. 277840.
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
H
AMILTON
, No. 134760. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277113.
P
EOPLE V
W
ENDELL
G
REEN
,J
R
, No. 134762. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277122.
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
F
ERGUSON
, No. 134763. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 277821.
P
EOPLE V
M
ANNING
, No. 134764. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277169.
P
EOPLE V
M
URDOCK
, No. 134768; Court of Appeals No. 278437.
P
EOPLE V
V
ALENTINE
, No. 134769; Court of Appeals No. 278883.
B
URGESS V
B
ERNHARDT
, No. 134770; Court of Appeals No. 268569.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARTINEZ
, No. 134772. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276608.
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
R
EYNOLDS
, No. 134773. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 276272.
P
EOPLE V
O
HLENDORF
, No. 134774; Court of Appeals No. 278462.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEVENS
, No. 134775. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276216.
P
EOPLE V
P
HILIP
S
MITH
, No. 134776. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276122.
P
EOPLE V
L
AQUAN
J
AMES
, No. 134778. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278116.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALTON
, No. 134779. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276160.
956 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
E
RLICH
, No. 134783. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275384.
P
EOPLE V
G
ENO
, No. 134784. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 278886.
P
EOPLE V
L
A
R
OSA
, No. 134785. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274290.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
Y
OUNG
, No. 134786; Court of Appeals No. 278889.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALD
W
RIGHT
, No. 134788. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 278754.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
C
OOPER
, No. 134789. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276602.
P
EOPLE V
B
ONNELL
, No. 134790; Court of Appeals No. 277111.
P
EOPLE V
C
OBURN
, No. 134792; Court of Appeals No. 279036.
P
EOPLE V
H
EMP
, No. 134794; Court of Appeals No. 277171.
Y
OUNG V
F
AREMOUTH
, No. 134803; Court of Appeals No. 269730.
P
EOPLE V
H
EARN
, No. 134804; Court of Appeals No. 278677.
P
EOPLE V
P
IOTTER
, No. 134808. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278579.
A
NDERSON V
S
ENGER
, No. 134811; Court of Appeals No. 266941.
P
EOPLE V
G
ATLIN
, No. 134813; Court of Appeals No. 278369.
P
EOPLE V
L
AWTON
, No. 134823; Court of Appeals No. 266674.
P
EOPLE V
P
ARDEE
, No. 134824; Court of Appeals No. 278598.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
J
ACKSON
, No. 134826; Court of Appeals No. 270014.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134828; Court of Appeals No. 269794.
P
EOPLE V
T
EEL
, Nos. 134832, 134833; Court of Appeals Nos. 264588,
273860.
P
EOPLE V
R
OUNDTREE
, No. 134836. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277220.
P
EOPLE V
S
CHORLING
, No. 134839; Court of Appeals No. 268026.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICHARD
, Nos. 134842, 134843; Court of Appeals Nos. 269203,
272072.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
957
S
PENCER V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134844; Court of Appeals
No. 278922.
P
EOPLE V
D
AWSON
, No. 134849. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278159.
P
EOPLE V
L
AMKIN
, Nos. 134852, 134854; Court of Appeals Nos. 276696,
276698.
B
ARNWELL V
C
ITY OF
P
ETOSKEY
, No. 134853; Court of Appeals No.
277195.
P
EOPLE V
R
YDER
, No. 134855; Court of Appeals No. 277523.
P
EOPLE V
M
ORRIS
, No. 134858; Court of Appeals No. 279097.
P
EOPLE V
J
OEY
H
UMPHREY
, No. 134860; Court of Appeals No. 270450.
P
EOPLE V
L
ARRY
J
ONES
, No. 134861; Court of Appeals No. 279099.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALTONEN
, No. 134862; Court of Appeals No. 278851.
P
EOPLE V
R
OXIE
A
LLEN
, No. 134864; Court of Appeals No. 279317.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENNEY
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134868; Court of Appeals No. 278844.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
C
HAPMAN
, No. 134871; Court of Appeals No. 265064.
P
EOPLE V
W
ITCZAK
, No. 134873; Court of Appeals No. 278752.
P
EOPLE V
L
YONS
, No. 134874; Court of Appeals No. 278775.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
H
UMPHREY,
II, No. 134875; Court of Appeals No.
270451.
P
EOPLE V
D
ALGLIESH
, No. 134878; Court of Appeals No. 278971.
E
RBY V
D
ELPHI
A
UTOMOTIVE
S
YSTEMS
, No. 134881; Court of Appeals No.
276051.
P
EOPLE V
S
LEEP
, No. 134883; Court of Appeals No. 278999.
P
EOPLE V
C
ATHRON
, No. 134884. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275974.
P
EOPLE V
D
ANA
K
ENNEDY
, No. 134886; Court of Appeals No. 269102.
P
EOPLE V
D
ILLAHUNTY
, No. 134892; Court of Appeals No. 269691.
P
EOPLE V
H
URT
, No. 134903; Court of Appeals No. 275886.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANTA
, No. 134905; Court of Appeals No. 279164.
P
EOPLE V
R
UTHERFORD
, No. 134911; Court of Appeals No. 269690.
P
EOPLE V
D
AWAN
N
EAL,
No. 134916; Court of Appeals No. 278441.
958 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
L
ESTER
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134918; Court of Appeals No. 279148.
P
EOPLE V
F
ULTON
, No. 134920; Court of Appeals No. 278848.
P
EOPLE V
D
UNSON
, No. 134927; Court of Appeals No. 268124.
P
EOPLE V
E
RIC
A
NDERSON
, No. 134929; Court of Appeals No. 268491.
P
EOPLE V
P
URIFOY
, No. 134930; Court of Appeals No. 279197.
P
EOPLE V
D
EANGELO
J
ONES
, No. 134931. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 278624.
P
EOPLE V
T
ESLEY
, No. 134932. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 280021.
P
EOPLE V
A
URICH
, No. 134933; Court of Appeals No. 277964.
V
AUGHN V
S
EVERSTAL
N
ORTH
A
MERICA,
I
NC
, No. 134937; Court of Appeals
No. 276695.
P
EOPLE V
B
RUCE
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 134938. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 279566.
P
EOPLE V
O
RLANDO
M
AY
, No. 134947. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277116.
P
EOPLE V
T
URNER
, No. 134970; Court of Appeals No. 279618.
P
EOPLE V
S
UNDE
, No. 134972; Court of Appeals No. 278849.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
W
RIGHT
, No. 134973; Court of Appeals No. 279030.
P
EOPLE V
S
HANE
S
MITH
, No. 134983; Court of Appeals No. 279312.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
W
RIGHT
, No. 134985; Court of Appeals No. 270538.
P
EOPLE V
D
OMINE
, No. 134988; Court of Appeals No. 278703.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIAN
A
NDERSON
, No. 134990; Court of Appeals No. 279290.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARETHERS
, No. 134991; Court of Appeals No. 278366.
P
EOPLE V
J
ACOBSEN
, Nos. 134999, 135014; Court of Appeals Nos.
279564, 279565.
P
EOPLE V
S
COTT
-P
ARKIN
, No. 135002; Court of Appeals No. 279315.
P
EOPLE V
S
HAWN
W
ILSON
, No. 135003; Court of Appeals No. 267945.
M
OORE &
C
ARTER
L
UMBER
R
EAL
E
STATE
C
OMPANY V
H
ASSLER
, No. 135005;
Court of Appeals No. 267883.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
B
ROWN
, No. 135045. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 279697.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
959
Interlocutory Appeal
Leave to Appeal Denied November 29, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
D
ALTON
, No. 134753; Court of Appeals No. 276386.
Reconsideration Denied November 29, 2007:
S
CHWARZE V
D
ILWORTH
, Nos. 132025, 132026. Leave to appeal denied at
480 Mich 853. Court of Appeals Nos. 257467, 257511.
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT V
17526 R
IOPELLE
, No. 133316. Leave to appeal denied
at 479 Mich 860. Court of Appeals No. 269377.
P
EOPLE V
T
HURMAN
J
ONES
, No. 133317. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 874. Court of Appeals No. 273193.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would reverse the judgment of the trial court for the reasons set forth in
my dissenting statement in People v Thurman Jones, 480 Mich 874
(2007).
P
EOPLE V
R
EDMOND
, No. 133334. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
883. Court of Appeals No. 261458.
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY,
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OMMUNITY
H
EALTH
O
RGANIZATION, AND
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY
O
FFICE OF THE
S
HERIFF
, Nos.
133427, 133497, 133498, 134113, 134290, 134291. Leave to appeal denied
at 480 Mich 888. Court of Appeals Nos. 263938, 267650, 273104, 273428,
274231, 274664.
P
EOPLE V
O
TIS
, No. 133569. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 886.
Court of Appeals No. 275876.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
P
EOPLE V
P
ARKER
, No. 133638. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 854.
Court of Appeals No. 263276.
P
EOPLE V
W
INBUSH
, No. 133667. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
854. Court of Appeals No. 264012.
P
EOPLE V
N
IXON
, No. 133678. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 854.
Court of Appeals No. 266033.
P
EOPLE V
R
AND
G
OULD
, No. 133684. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
854. Court of Appeals No. 274982.
R
OGERS V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 133799. Leave to appeal
denied at 479 Mich 866. Court of Appeals No. 273287.
J
ENSEN V
C
OCA
C
OLA
E
NTERPRISES,
I
NC
, No. 133828. Leave to appeal
denied at 479 Mich 866. Court of Appeals No. 272641.
P
EOPLE V
D
ADO
, No. 133845. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 855.
Court of Appeals No. 266962.
960 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
B
AZZETTA V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 133974. Leave to appeal
denied at 480 Mich 857. Court of Appeals No. 275989.
P
EOPLE V
M
ASSEY
, No. 134068. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 859.
Court of Appeals No. 267115.
P
EOPLE V
B
URKE
, No. 134111. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 889.
Court of Appeals No. 275110.
P
EOPLE V
B
ARNARD
, No. 134132. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
860. Court of Appeals No. 265068.
P
EOPLE V
B
RANDON
J
OHNSON
, No. 134165. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 860. Court of Appeals No. 268413.
P
EOPLE V
O
LA-
T
OKUMBO
U
NGER
, No. 134324. Leave to appeal denied at
480 Mich 892. Court of Appeals No. 275246.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
W
HEELER
, No. 134379. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 893. Court of Appeals No. 269790.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal November 30, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
O
SANTOWSKI
, No. 134244. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall address whether, under MCL
777.49a, a threat must itself constitute an “act of terrorism,” as defined
by MCL 750.543b, in order for 100 points to be assessed under offense
variable 20. The parties shall submit supplemental briefs within 42 days
of the date of this order addressing this limited issue. The parties should
avoid submitting mere restatements of their application papers. Court of
Appeals No. 264368.
Leave to Appeal Granted November 30, 2007:
H
ERMAN V
B
ERRIEN
C
OUNTY
, No. 134097. The motion to file brief amicus
curiae is granted. The clerk of the Court is directed to place this case on
the March 2008 session calendar for argument and submission. Appel-
lants’ brief and appendix must be filed no later than January 14, 2008,
and appellee’s brief and appendix, if appellee chooses to submit an
appendix, must be filed no later than February 7, 2008. Other persons or
groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this
case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae, with
such briefs to be filed no later than February 21, 2008. Court of Appeals
No. 273021.
W
HITE V
T
AYLOR
D
ISTRIBUTING
C
OMPANY,
I
NC
, No. 134751. The parties
shall include among the issues to be briefed whether the Court of Appeals
majority correctly ruled that MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits a trial court to
deny summary disposition to the moving party even though the opposing
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
961
party did not present countervailing evidence, on the ground that
judgment is not appropriate under MCR 2.116(G)(4). The clerk of the
Court is directed to place this case on the March 2008 session calendar for
argument and submission. Appellants’ brief and appendix must be filed
no later than January 14, 2008, and appellees’ brief and appendix, if
appellees choose to submit an appendix, must be filed no later than
February 7, 2008. The Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., and the
Michigan Association of Justice are invited to file briefs amicus curiae, to
be filed no later than February 21, 2008. Other persons or groups
interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may
move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Court of
Appeals No. 272114.
Summary Dispositions December 5, 2007:
E
NGLISH
G
ARDENS
C
ONDOMINIUM,
LLC v H
OWELL
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 132859.
On November 8, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the application
for leave to appeal the November 28, 2006, judgment of the Court of
Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR
7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We reverse the
holding that the township acted beyond the scope of § 20.15 of its
ordinance in drawing on the letter of credit without first incurring
compensable expenses. The ordinance did not prohibit the township from
retaining some form of security to ensure compliance with the contract.
The township did not violate its ordinance when it drew on the letter of
credit. We affirm the Court of Appeals in all other respects. Accordingly,
we reinstate the judgment of the Livingston Circuit Court. Reported
below: 273 Mich App 69.
F
ROHRIEP V
F
LANAGAN
, No. 134227. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the
Court of Appeals only with regard to defendants Jeremy Hughes and
Frank Ciloski. MCL 691.1407(2) does not apply to these defendants
because they are individual government employees who are not provided
immunity under MCL 691.1407(5), and because the plaintiffs alleged
intentional torts for which liability was imposed before July 7,
1986. MCL 691.1407(3) and Sudul v Hamtramck, 221 Mich App 455, 458
(C
ORRIGAN
, J.); 480-481 (M
URPHY
, J.) (1997). We remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration of these defendants’ remaining
arguments. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be re-
viewed by this Court. The motion for oral argument is denied. Reported
below: 275 Mich App 456.
P
EOPLE V
S
TAPLETON
, No. 134912. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion,
and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
defendant’s remaining issues. Court of Appeals No. 264175.
962 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
CHMITT
, No. 134914. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and we
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
defendant’s remaining issues. Court of Appeals No. 264176.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
T
ROY
D
AVIS
, No. 135048. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of
Appeals may, at its option, remand to the trial court for further
proceedings, e.g., for factual determinations concerning the reasonable
and customary hourly fees paid to experts of the type sought by the
defendant, the hourly fees paid to the proposed defense expert by the
prosecution in prior cases, and whether the fee cap set in this case
effectively precludes the defendant from access to an expert witness. We
further order that the trial not occur until the completion of this appeal.
We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 277870.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARKOS
, No. 135387. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted, and we direct that court to decide the
case on an expedited basis. The motion for stay is granted in part. We
order that the previously scheduled trial not occur until the completion of
this appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 282211.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 5, 2007:
C
OOPER
-R
EID V
S
TATE OF
M
ICHIGAN
T
HIRD
J
UDICIAL
C
IRCUIT
, No. 133802;
Court of Appeals No. 269254.
P
EOPLE V
T
IPTON
, No. 133931; Court of Appeals No. 276799.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTOINE
T
HOMAS
, No. 134280; Court of Appeals No. 277305.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIAN
R
OGERS
, No. 134287. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276801.
D
OWELL V
M
ARSACK
, No. 134316; Court of Appeals No. 274532.
P
EOPLE V
R
OEDER
, No. 134432. Although the trial court improperly
instructed the jury that it could consider MRE 404(b) testimony for the
limited purpose of judging the believability of the testimony contrary to
this Court’s explicit instruction in People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43, 69-70 (2000), defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudicial
error where the prosecution presented a strong case against him, and the
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
963
MRE 404(b) evidence was properly admitted to show defendant’s system,
plan, or scheme in committing the acts. Court of Appeals No. 269785.
P
EOPLE V
P
EREZ
-G
ARCIA
, No. 134452; Court of Appeals No. 275747.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
IDDLETON
, No. 134512; Court of Appeals No. 268265.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
H
ANSEND
, No. 134519; Court of Appeals No. 275068.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARVIS
R
OBERTS
, No. 134645; Court of Appeals No. 266650.
P
EOPLE V
F
ISH
, No. 134694; Court of Appeals No. 269784.
Summary Dispositions December 7, 2007:
S
IMPSON V
B
ORBOLLA
C
ONSTRUCTION &
C
ONCRETE
S
UPPLY,
I
NC
, No. 133274.
On November 8, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the application
for leave to appeal the January 25, 2007, judgment of the Court of
Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR
7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the opinion of
the Court of Appeals because the panel erroneously held that Rakestraw
v Gen Dynamics Land Sys, Inc, 469 Mich 220 (2003), does not apply to the
facts of this case. We affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals for
the reasons stated in the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission
opinion. Reported below: 274 Mich App 40.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order vacating the Court of
Appeals opinion but affirming the result of the opinion for the reasons
stated in the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission opinion.
Although I dissented in Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land Sys, Inc, 469
Mich 220, 234 (2003), my dissent in that case is not inconsistent with the
order.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in that
part of the order affirming the result reached by the Court of Appeals.
But I dissent from the order to the extent that it vacates the Court of
Appeals decision. I believe that the Court of Appeals panel correctly
analyzed the issue, and I would not vacate its published opinion.
A
NSPAUGH V
I
MLAY
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 133351. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the Lapeer Circuit
Court for further hearing, if necessary, and further findings of fact. The
Court of Appeals engaged in appellate fact-finding when it concluded that
“we too find that the I-2 zoning provided for by defendants is exclusion-
ary,” because “there is no direct route of travel” to the property zoned for
I-2 use, and consequently “the I-2 land use siting provided by the
township is not appropriate to foster the commercial uses to which land
designated for I-2 uses must be put.” 273 Mich App at 129-130. On
remand, the Lapeer Circuit Court shall determine whether, as the Court
of Appeals held, “the township’s zoning ordinance effectively excludes
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lawful and otherwise appropriate I-2 uses for which there is a demon-
strated need,” owing to the unsuitability for I-2 uses of the available
routes of access to the I-2 zoned property within the township. In making
this determination, the Lapeer Circuit Court shall consider whether
there are available indirect routes that provide reasonably suitable access
to the I-2 zoned property. We do not retain jurisdiction. Reported below:
273 Mich App 122.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
W
HEELER
, No. 134552. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and we vacate the defendant’s felonious assault convictions.
The prosecution originally charged the defendant with four counts of
felonious assault, but later successfully moved to amend the information
to instead charge four counts of assault with intent to commit murder.
The defendant subsequently conceded in his opening statement before
the jury that the conduct forming the basis of the charges against him
might have amounted to felonious assault, but he contended that it did
not amount to assault with intent to murder. The defendant’s testimony
was premised on his contention that, though firing his weapon in the air
to convey to those he believed to be burglars that he was armed
constituted felonious assault, he did not have the intent to commit
murder. Felonious assault is a cognate lesser offense to assault with
intent to commit murder. People v Vinson, 93 Mich App 483, 486 (1979).
Where the defendant was no longer charged with felonious assault, it was
error for the trial court to grant the prosecution’s request to instruct on
this cognate lesser offense. People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 353-359
(2002). Moreover, even if the defendant’s repeated objections to instruct-
ing the jury on felonious assault were insufficiently specific to preserve
this issue, reversal is warranted because the instruction on felonious
assault was plain error. People v Otterbridge, 477 Mich 875 (2006). Court
of Appeals No. 267445.
C
AVANAGH,
J. I would vacate the conviction for possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony as well as the felonious assault
convictions.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would vacate defendant’s convictions of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and felonious
assault. In People v Vaughn,
1
this Court held that juries may convict a
defendant of felonious assault while acquitting him of a related felony-
firearm charge. It noted that one element of the jury’s power is its
capacity for leniency. In People v Lewis,
2
this Court further explored the
relationship between a felony-firearm offense and the underlying felony.
It held that it is not necessary that a defendant be convicted of the
underlying felony before a sentence for a felony-firearm conviction may
be imposed. In doing so, this Court again cited the jury’s power to be
lenient.
3
1
409 Mich 463 (1980).
2
415 Mich 443 (1982).
3
Id. at 449-453.
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However, the jury’s power to be lenient is not at issue here because
the jury convicted defendant of both felony-firearm and the underlying
felony. Therefore, the rationale of Lewis and Vaughn is inapplicable. In
addition, this Court has noted that “Lewis does not grant an appellate
court the option of reaching an inconsistent result.”
4
However, the
majority’s decision in this matter does precisely that.
In this case, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction is premised on a
finding that he was guilty of an offense, felonious assault, for which he
could not be properly charged. The jury should not have been instructed
on that offense. Because defendant’s felonious assault convictions should
be vacated, the felony-firearm conviction should be vacated as well
because it is necessarily premised on the felonious assault convictions. We
should not base our decision here on the theory that it was permissible
for the jury to render an inconsistent verdict. To do so overlooks this
Court’s responsibility to identify a logical interpretation for verdicts
where possible.
5
A logical interpretation is possible in this case.
The jury could have found defendant guilty of felony-firearm in one of
three ways: (1) by finding that he committed assault with intent to
commit murder, even though it did not convict him of the crime, and by
tying the felony-firearm conviction to that assault; (2) by finding that he
committed assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, even though
it did not convict him of that crime, and by tying the felony-firearm
conviction to that assault; or (3) by finding that he committed and should
be convicted of felonious assault and by tying the felony-firearm convic-
tion to that crime.
Because this Court must presume consistent verdicts, it must pre-
sume that the jury followed the latter reasoning. This is the most logical
explanation for the jury verdict, and it avoids a determination that the
jury acted inconsistently.
Given that the jury should not have been instructed on felonious
assault, the felonious assault convictions should be vacated. Because the
felonious assault convictions should be vacated, the felony-firearm con-
viction, which is premised on the felonious assault convictions, should be
vacated as well.
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
I would deny leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 7, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
P
ISCOPO
, No. 127129. Leave to appeal having been granted
and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered
by the Court, we vacate our order of May 23, 2007. The application for
leave to appeal the June 24, 2004, judgment of the Court of Appeals is
denied, because we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 245835.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Defendant, a pastor of
a church, was accused of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC)
4
People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 311 (1984) (emphasis added).
5
See People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 462-463 (2005).
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after allegedly touching the complainant in a sexual manner during a
religious ceremony. Although an estimated 100 people were present at
the time of the alleged incident, no one corroborated the complainant’s
testimony that the touching occurred. Moreover, four eyewitnesses, as
well as defendant, testified that the touching never happened. Because no
physical evidence supported the complaint, the prosecutor’s case boiled
down to a credibility contest between the alleged victim on one side and
the four eyewitnesses and defendant on the other side.
Defendant sought to admit evidence that the complainant had made
prior false allegations of sexual abuse against another pastor and that the
complainant also claimed to have been raped by a “demon.” Although
this evidence would almost certainly have cast light on the complainant’s
credibility, and despite the obvious relevance of her credibility, the trial
court refused to admit this evidence. This decision was based, in
significant part, on its conclusion that the rape-shield statute, MCL
750.520j, prevented the admission of defendant’s proffered evidence.
Defendant was eventually convicted on the lesser-included charge of
fourth-degree CSC after the jury deliberated for 4
1
/2 days.
This Court’s decision to allow this conviction to stand effects a
remarkable deprivation of justice by affirming a trial court decision that
has denied defendant his fundamental right to mount an effective
defense to the charges against him. If the trial court had admitted
defendant’s evidence suggesting that the complainant had made prior
false allegations of sexual abuse and indicating that the complainant
claimed to have been raped by a demon, a reasonable juror might well
have considered this evidence relevant in assessing the credibility of the
complainant, who was the exclusive source of evidence against defendant.
To ensure that a defendant can adequately defend himself, to safe-
guard the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial, and to prevent the
conviction of an innocent person, criminal defendants are constitution-
ally guaranteed the right to confront witnesses against them, by subject-
ing adverse witnesses to “testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”
Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 61 (2004). Ordinarily, a defendant
may engage in the most rigorous cross-examination to demonstrate a
witness’s bias or improper motivation to testify, or the witness’s general
or specific lack of credibility. This right of cross-examination constitutes
the linchpin by which our criminal justice system facilitates the search
for truth. Our decision today undermines this first principle of our
judicial system by preventing defendant from offering evidence that
might well have suggested to a reasonable juror that the principal
evidence against defendant was unreliable or incredible.
The instant decision singles out one class of criminal defendants—
those accused of sex offenses—and affords them a substantially diluted
right of cross-examination, impeding the search for truth in these cases.
In criminal trials, “ ‘[t]he special concern with fairness for the defendant
. . . stems from the special abhorrence of erroneous conviction.’ ” People
v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 456 (2006) (citation omitted). “The American
criminal justice system rightly sets the ascertainment of truth and the
protection of innocence as its highest goals.” Harvey v Horan, 285 F3d
298, 299 (CA 4, 2002). “[A] basic premise of our judicial system [is that]
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providing more, rather than less, information will generally assist the
jury in discovering the truth.” Anstey, supra at 457.
I would reverse the trial court’s decision that barred the admission of
defendant’s evidence. The trial court erred by concluding that the
rape-shield statute applied to this case. It further erred by ruling that
defendant’s proposed evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. As a result,
defendant was deprived of any effective defense and denied his constitu-
tional right of confrontation under the constitutions of the United States
and Michigan.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was the pastor of a church. In 2001, the complainant
attended a “deliverance” ceremony at the church, a ceremony that was
intended to expel evil spirits from the participants. An estimated 100
people were present. Of those present, about 20 to 30 were participants
from whom evil spirits were to be expelled; the remaining persons were
church workers and volunteers who were facilitating the ceremony. On
the morning of the deliverance, the complainant filled out a question-
naire at the church about herself. In the questionnaire, the complainant
alleged that her father, who was also a pastor, had sexually abused her for
a 10-year period. The questionnaire also indicated that the complainant
alleged that she had been raped by a demon as a teenager, and that
demons continued to torment her by grabbing her ankles in the base-
ment.
During the deliverance, all 100 persons present for the deliverance
congregated in a room. Each person to be “delivered” would sit on a
folding chair, while church workers would either sit across from each
participant or stand to either side. During the three-hour deliverance,
church workers prayed with and yelled at participants, and lightly struck
them to drive out the evil spirits. Participants apparently were expected
to shake, cry, and possibly vomit. The complainant stated that, during the
deliverance, she refused to participate by screaming or crying. As a
consequence, she alleged that defendant approached her with two other
male church workers. These two workers held her by the arms, while
defendant stood behind her. According to the complainant, defendant
then rubbed her arms, legs, hair, breasts, and vaginal area.
Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree CSC with
regard to the complainant. Defendant was also charged with three counts
of fourth-degree CSC with regard to two other alleged victims, who also
alleged improper touching by defendant during previous religious cer-
emonies. Defendant sought to admit the questionnaire into evidence, as
well as evidence that suggested that the allegations against the complain-
ant’s pastor-father were false. Defendant sought to introduce the state-
ments regarding the demon-rape to suggest that the complainant’s
testimony was unreliable. The trial court refused to admit any of this
evidence, citing the rape-shield statute. The trial court also held that the
evidence was not relevant and constituted inadmissible hearsay.
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Although defendant acknowledged that he had touched the complain-
ant’s arms and legs, and had placed his hands on her head to pray,
defendant denied having touched her breasts or vaginal area. Four other
eyewitnesses, who had been immediately present while defendant was
near the complainant, testified that no such touching occurred. None of
the other estimated 100 people in the conference room testified that they
had seen any inappropriate touching. After deliberating for 4
1
/2 days, the
jury acquitted defendant of the five charges brought against him;
however, defendant was convicted of one count of fourth-degree CSC with
regard to complainant, that offense being a lesser-included offense of
second-degree CSC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that the disputed evidence
was not relevant because the demon-rape and the allegations against
complainant’s father were “markedly different from [complainant’s]
allegations against defendant.” People v Piscopo, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 24, 2004 (Docket No.
245835), p 6. Hence, the trial court had “properly excluded the question-
naire evidence as irrelevant and contrary to the rape-shield laws.” Id.
Defendant appealed to this Court, and this case was held in abeyance for
People v Jackson, 477 Mich 1019 (2007). After Jackson was decided, this
Court granted leave to appeal. 478 Mich 860 (2007).
II. RAPE-SHIELD LAW
The first issue is whether the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j,
categorically bars the admission of defendant’s proffered evidence, con-
sisting of the complainant’s allegations of prior abuse and description of
the demon-rape. MCL 750.520j states:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct,
opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under
sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge
finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the
source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
Whether particular evidence implicates the rape-shield statute thus
hinges on whether that evidence constitutes “specific instances of the
victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct,
[or] reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct....”The
statute does not define the term “conduct.” See MCL 750.520a (defining
other statutory terms for the chapter of the Michigan Penal Code
concerning criminal sexual conduct). Hence, it is appropriate to consider
relevant dictionary definitions to determine the actual meaning of the
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term. Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 561 (2006). The term “conduct”
is defined as “personal behavior; way of acting; deportment.” Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). The term “behavior” means
“the manner of conducting oneself.” Id. These definitions suggest that
“conduct” refers to volitional actions undertaken by a person; such
actions would constitute “personal behavior” and “conducting oneself.”
Thus, “conduct” does not seem to encompass prior sexual abuse, which is
involuntary and not a person’s “behavior.”
This conclusion is buttressed by further analysis of the statute. The
term “conduct” is given meaning by its other uses in statutes in the same
chapter of the penal code that criminalize “criminal sexual conduct.” For
example, MCL 750.520d states that a person is guilty of “criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree” if that person
engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of
the following circumstances exist:
(a) [t]hat other person is at least 13 years of age and under 16
years of age.
If “conduct” referred to passive or involuntary activity, then a girl who
was raped by a 15-year-old boy would herself be guilty of third-degree
CSC under the law. However, such an outcome would obviously be absurd
and illogical. Hence, the use of “conduct” throughout the relevant statute
suggests strongly that the Legislature must have intended “conduct” to
refer to volitional behavior and that the term does not encompass
involuntary sexual abuse.
Finally, MCL 750.520j distinguishes between “sexual conduct” and
“sexual activity” by preventing the admission of “specific instances of the
victim’s sexual conduct” but permitting the admission of “specific in-
stances of the victim’s sexual activity showing the source or origin of
semen, pregnancy, or disease.” (Emphasis added.) By using the different
terms “conduct” and “activity,” the Legislature distinguished between
two types of actions. The term “activity” means “1. the state or quality
of being active; 2. energetic activity; animation; liveliness.” Random
House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). “Activity” thus refers to a
significantly broader sphere of events than “conduct,” because “conduct”
connotes volition, while “activity” merely connotes some degree of action.
By using these terms, the Legislature further indicated that “conduct”
refers to volitional activity. This understanding is consistent with the
motivating idea of the rape-shield statute, which was to prevent irrel-
evant inquiries into the sexual histories of victims of criminal sexual
conduct.
Because “conduct” requires some volitional element, the rape-shield
statute does not apply at all to defendant’s proffered evidence. The
alleged abuse by the complainant’s father and the alleged demon-rape did
not implicate voluntary activity on the part of the complainant, and
hence could not fairly be described as “conduct” on the part of the
complainant within the scope of MCL 750.520j.
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Moreover, “testimony concerning prior false allegations does not
implicate the rape shield statute.” Jackson, supra at 1019. Defendant
offered evidence that the pastor-father denied the allegations made
against him by the complainant, thereby raising the question whether
the allegations against the pastor-father were false. Similarly, with
regard to the demon-rape, jurors should have been permitted to deter-
mine whether this allegation was true or false. In neither case did such
evidence even implicate the rape-shield statute, and both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the statute barred
admission of the evidence.
III. RELEVANCE
Even though the rape-shield statute does not bar the admission of
defendant’s evidence, the proposed evidence must still be relevant in
order to be admitted. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals also
held that defendant’s evidence was not relevant. “A trial court’s decision
to admit evidence is...reviewedforanabuse of discretion.” Barnett v
Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158-159 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of
principled outcomes.” Id. at 158.
MRE 401 states:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Following this definition of “relevant evidence,” MRE 402 then states
that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible....”However, MRE 403
creates exceptions to the admissibility of relevant evidence:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Even if defendant’s proposed evidence is not barred by MCL 750.520j,
defendant must nonetheless demonstrate that the evidence is relevant
and not rendered inadmissible under MRE 403.
With regard to the complainant’s allegations against her father,
defendant argued at trial that this evidence was admissible because it
suggested that the complainant had made prior false allegations. Prior
false allegations shed obvious light on a complainant’s credibility. Be-
cause the complainant’s credibility was the critical issue at trial, and
indeed virtually the dispositive issue, evidence bearing on her credibility
would clearly “make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
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the determination of the action more probable or less probable,” and
hence would be relevant under MRE 401. See Jackson, supra; People v
Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 348 (1984) (stating that evidence of prior false
allegations would “not only be relevant, but its admission may be
required to preserve a defendant’s constitutional right to confronta-
tion”).
Defendant also contends that the prior allegations against the com-
plainant’s father were relevant to demonstrate the victim’s state of mind,
namely, to support an inference that the victim may associate men of the
cloth, exercising religious authority over her, with abuse, and that she
transferred her experiences or perceptions with regard to her father to
her experience with defendant. Jurors thus might conclude that the
complainant would be prone to viewing innocent actions of this pastor
through a sexual prism. Defendant asserts that on the basis of this theory
as well, the complainant’s credibility might be called into question and
therefore the evidence would be relevant.
Concerning the demon-rape, defendant similarly offered this evidence
to demonstrate that the complainant had made prior false allegations.
The complainant stated on the day of her “deliverance” that she had been
raped by a demon in her attic when she was 17 years old. Jurors are
entitled to assess the complainant’s credibility using such evidence. See
United States v Jones, 49 MJ 85, 88 (CAAF, 1998) (holding that evidence
that the complainant used a Ouija board and saw demons and spirits was
relevant for determining “defects in [the complainant’s] capacity to
observe events, remember them, and communicate them”).
Because the evidence proffered by defendant was clearly relevant to
the central issue in his criminal trial—the credibility of the lone witness
against him—the trial court’s determination to the contrary, in my
judgment, was well outside the range of principled outcomes and there-
fore constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Once evidence is found to be relevant, a court must determine
whether MRE 403 nonetheless excludes the relevant evidence as “un-
fairly prejudicial.” “ ‘Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a
danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury.’ ” Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329,
334 n 3 (2002), quoting People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398 (1998). In
this case, the proffered evidence cannot reasonably be described as
merely “marginally probative.” Rather, the central issue in this case was
credibility—the complainant’s word against the word of defendant and
four eyewitnesses. Hence, any evidence bearing on the credibility of
complainant or defendant would have been extremely probative one way
or the other. Moreover, because of the critical nature of evidence
regarding credibility, the jury could hardly have given such evidence
“undue weight” in this case. Instead, the probative value of the evidence
was high and the potential prejudice was low. Further, any potential
prejudice resulting from the admission of the evidence could have been
cured by an appropriate limiting instruction from the trial court. There-
fore, the prejudicial nature of the proffered evidence did not “substan-
tially outweigh” its probative value.
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For these reasons, I continue to believe that the trial court abused its
discretion in preventing the jury from evaluating defendant’s evidence.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial at which defendant
would be allowed to present his proffered evidence on cross-
examination.
1
IV. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
This case presents more than an abuse of discretion by the trial court,
however. Even if one disagrees with the analysis of the rape-shield statute
offered above, reversal of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence is still
required because that exclusion violated defendant’s constitutional right
of confrontation, thereby depriving defendant of the ability to adequately
defend himself against complainant’s accusations. Further, the trial
court’s understanding of the rape-shield statute, as well as this Court’s
apparent understanding of that statute, threatens to deprive future
defendants in sexual-offense cases of the ability to fully respond to
allegations made against them.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses
against him[.]” See also Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The United States
Supreme Court has held that “ ‘[t]he main and essential purpose of
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.’ ” Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 315-316 (1974) (citation
omitted). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believ-
ability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Id.at
316. A defendant must be “permitted to expose to the jury the facts from
which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Id. at 318. In
other words, “the right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to
show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable.” Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 US 39, 51-52 (1987). The
Confrontation Clause is “designed to prevent improper restrictions on
the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-
examination.” Id. at 52. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
concluded, the Confrontation Clause “affords the right to impeach a
witness...,subjecttothetrial court’s discretion to impose reasonable
limitations to prevent harassment and annoyance of the witness,” even if
such impeachment evidence “goes only to the witness’s credibility.”
Vasquez v Jones, 496 F3d 564, 571 (CA 6, 2007). Of course, the
Confrontation Clause does not “prevent[] a trial judge from imposing any
limits on defense counsel’s inquiry ....”Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475
1
The trial court also ruled that defendant’s evidence constituted
hearsay. Once again, I disagree. To the extent that the evidence was
offered to suggest that the complainant had made false allegations of
sexual abuse, such evidence was not offered “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” MRE 801(c).
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US 673, 679 (1986). A trial court may still “impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id.
In the instant case, the trial court prevented defendant from cross-
examining the complainant with regard to evidence that might have
reflected adversely on the complainant’s credibility. Thus, the trial court
denied defendant the ability to show that the complainant’s testimony
was “exaggerated or unbelievable,” and denied the jurors, “the sole triers
of fact and credibility,” the ability to “draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness.” Because the prosecutor’s case hinged solely on
the credibility of the complainant, defendant was not given the opportu-
nity to effectively cross-examine the complainant’s testimony. Moreover,
the proffered evidence was highly relevant, not cumulative of other
evidence, and would not have been unfairly prejudicial. Any possibility of
“confusion of the issues” could have been alleviated in the normal course
by a proper jury instruction. Thus, by unduly restricting defendant’s
ability to cross-examine the complainant on the most critical issue in this
case, the trial court violated defendant’s rights under the confrontation
clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
A Confrontation Clause error does not require reversal if the error
was harmless. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends
upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.
These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in
the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution’s case. [Van Arsdall, supra at 684.]
In this case, the complainant’s testimony was central to the prosecutor’s
case, and no other evidence corroborated the complainant’s version of
events. The defendant’s testimony suggesting the falsity of the complain-
ant’s prior allegations of sexual abuse in this sexual-abuse prosecution
were in no way cumulative of any other evidence offered at trial and could
not have been more relevant to the jury in determining the truthfulness
of the complainant’s testimony. In short, the prosecutor’s case depended
on the credibility of the complainant, and it is reasonable to conclude that
admission of the defendant’s evidence would likely have caused a
different result. Hence, the Confrontation Clause error was not harmless.
By violating defendant’s right of confrontation, the trial court denied
defendant the ability to respond fully to the criminal charges against him.
Consequently, I would reverse the trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s
evidence even if the rape-shield statute precludes the admission of such
evidence, which I do not believe it does.
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V. CONCLUSION
Today’s decision denies to defendant, an accused sex offender, the
same constitutional right to fully defend himself that is granted to
accused murderers, burglars, arsonists, and carjackers. It is precisely
because sex offenses are so destructive to their victims and so under-
standably stigmatizing to their perpetrators that the law cannot permit
persons to be convicted of these offenses by applying something other
than traditional standards of due process. By holding that leave was
improvidently granted, this Court rejects the opportunity to authorita-
tively resolve how the rape-shield statute should be interpreted. Under
the contorted and unconstitutional interpretation of the rape-shield
statute now countenanced by this Court, the accused sex offender, alone
among criminal defendants, is to be restricted in his ability to defend
himself—even in a case in which it is his word against the word of
another—by being deprived of the ability to fully call into question the
credibility of his accuser. And, make no mistake about it, the accuser’s
credibility in this case is highly dependent on what is made of her
allegations of sexual abuse against her father and her claim of having
been subject to a demon-rape. I cannot conceive of a reasonable juror—
whatever ultimate effect he might accord to this evidence—who would
not find it pertinent and helpful in forming a judgment.
Our adversarial system of justice “is premised on the well-tested
principle that truth—as well as fairness—is ‘best discovered by powerful
statements on both sides of the question.’ ” Penson v Ohio, 488 US 75, 84
(1988) (citation omitted). To accomplish this goal of ascertaining guilt,
the right of defendants to cross-examine adverse witnesses has been
protected as the “ ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.’ ” California v Green, 399 US 149, 158 (1970) (citation omitted). If
the truth cannot be discovered, then the guilty cannot be punished and
the innocent cannot be set free, and the criminal justice system cannot
succeed in its essential mission.
I would reverse the trial court’s decision that barred the admission of
defendant’s evidence and remand for a new trial.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
C
ARTER V
C
ITY OF
A
NN
A
RBOR
, No. 131823; reported below: 271 Mich
App 425.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). The veterans’ preference act states that
“[i]n every public department and upon the public works of the state and
of every county and municipal corporation thereof[,] honorably dis-
charged veteran[s]...shall be preferred for appointment and employ-
ment.” MCL 35.401 (emphasis added). However, to be “preferred,” a
veteran must possess “other requisite qualifications.” Id. This Court has
never fully considered the nature and extent of the veterans’ preference.
Is a veteran to be preferred only if all things are “equal and comparable”
between applicants? Are things ever truly “equal and comparable”
between applicants when a public employer may consider subjective
factors and not merely objective factors such as test scores? If the
preference pertains to circumstances in which applicants are not “equal
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A
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975
and comparable,” when would this be so? How substantial would the
preference be in such circumstances? Are “requisite qualifications” to be
viewed in an “either/or” sense, such that an applicant is either qualified
or not qualified, or are qualifications to be evaluated along a continuum,
such that an applicant may be viewed as being better or less qualified than
another? If the latter is the proper understanding, when would the
preference apply and how substantial would it be? Are standards re-
quired to ensure that the preference is given genuine effect, or is it
sufficient that courts defer to the judgments of individual public employ-
ers? Is greater or lesser judicial scrutiny required of employment deci-
sions implicating the veterans’ preference than is required of other public
employment decisions, such as those pertaining to nondiscrimination
laws? The veterans’ preference act is worthy of thorough review and of an
authoritative interpretation that gives it practical and effective meaning.
Accordingly, I would grant leave to appeal.
In re B
ORGHESE
(B
ORGHESE V
M
ICHIGAN
C
HILDREN’S
I
NSTITUTE
), No.
135134; Court of Appeals No. 274337.
M
ETCALF
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
N
IEMINEN
), Nos. 135275,
135276; Court of Appeals Nos. 276846, 276847.
P
ETTINEO V
S
CIENTIFIC
I
MAGE
C
ENTER
S
TAFFING,
I
NC
, No. 135391; Court of
Appeals No. 281729.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would stay the trial and remand this case to the Court
of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal December 13, 2007:
M
INTER V
C
ITY OF
G
RAND
R
APIDS
, No. 133988. We direct the clerk to
schedule oral argument during the January 2008 session on whether to
grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
At oral argument, the parties shall address whether the Court of Appeals
majority correctly applied Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004), in
partially reversing the Kent Circuit Court’s order granting the defen-
dants’ motion for summary disposition. The parties may file supplemen-
tal briefs no later than January 4, 2008, but they should not submit mere
restatements of their application papers. Reported below: 275 Mich App
220.
Leave to Appeal Granted December 13, 2007:
In re M
ILTENBERGER
E
STATE
(E
IFLER V
S
WARTZ
), No. 133847. The parties
are to discuss whether the dower election in MCL 700.2202(2)(c), as
defined in MCL 558.1, violates the equal protection clauses of the
Michigan and federal constitutions as set forth in Const 1963, art 1, § 2
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
clerk of the Court is directed to place this case on the April 2008 session
calendar for argument and submission. Appellants’ brief and appendix
must be filed no later than January 28, 2008, and appellees’ brief and
976 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
appendix, if appellees choose to submit an appendix, must be filed no
later than February 21, 2008. Persons or groups interested in the
determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for
permission to file briefs amicus curiae, to be filed no later than March 6,
2008. Reported below: 275 Mich App 47.
SBC M
ICHIGAN V
P
UBLIC
S
ERVICE
C
OMMISSION
, Nos. 134493, 134500. The
parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) what legal
framework appellate courts should apply to determine the degree of
deference due an administrative agency in its interpretation of a statute
within its purview; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in deferring to
the Michigan Public Service Commission’s interpretation of MCL
484.2502(1)(a); (3) whether the commission abused its discretion in
applying this statutory provision to a carrier’s diagnostic mistakes; and
(4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the commission
lacks the jurisdiction to prohibit the imposition of a fee for a carrier’s
inspection of its own services when that inspection eliminates the carrier
as the cause of a service disruption. The parties shall detail the relation-
ship between state regulatory authority and federal authority regarding
deregulation in addressing the last question. The clerk of the Court is
directed to place this case on the March 2008 session calendar for
argument and submission. Appellants’ brief and appendix must be filed
no later than January 25, 2008, and appellees’ brief and appendix, if
appellees choose to submit an appendix, must be filed no later than
February 15, 2008. Persons or groups interested in the determination of
the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to
file briefs amicus curiae, to be filed no later than February 27, 2008. Re-
ported below: 276 Mich App 55.
Summary Dispositions December 14, 2007:
G
OWER V
H
ARKEMA
, Nos. 128158, 128159. By order of April 13, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the January 25, 2005, and February 1,
2005, orders of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the
decision in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On
order of the Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007,
480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
orders of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the order of the Ingham Circuit
Court denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and remand
this case to the Ingham Circuit Court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins. Court of Appeals
Nos. 256824, 257967.
M
C
C
LENDON V
A
POSTOLOU
, No. 129228. By order of April 13, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the June 28, 2005, order of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application
is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals, reinstate
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CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
977
the order of the Wayne Circuit Court denying the defendants’ motion for
summary disposition, and remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 260583.
C
OSTA V
G
AGO
, No. 130318. By order of April 13, 2007, the application
for leave to appeal the December 6, 2005, judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application
is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
reinstate the order of the Washtenaw Circuit Court denying the defen-
dant’s motion for summary disposition, and remand this case to the
Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this order and the order in Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 256673.
M
C
L
EAN V
M
C
E
LHANEY
, No. 130376. By order of April 4, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the December 13, 2005, judgment of the
Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v
St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the
case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007),
the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the Chippewa Circuit Court for entry of
an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed
by this Court. Reported below: 269 Mich App 196.
P
OWELL V
O
AKWOOD
H
EALTHCARE,
I
NC
, No. 130452. By order of April 13,
2007, the application for leave to appeal the December 22, 2005, judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision
in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the
Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948
(2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court
for entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order
and the order in Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 263639.
C
AVANAGH
, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with
counsel of record.
A
MON V
B
OTSFORD
G
ENERAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 130484. By order of April 13,
2007, the application for leave to appeal the December 27, 2005, judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision
in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the
Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948
(2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
978 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the order of the Oakland Circuit Court
denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and remand
this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 260252.
J
ORDAN V
M
ERCY
M
EMORIAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 131670. By order of April 13,
2007, the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2006, judgment of
the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in
Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the
Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948
(2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Monroe Circuit Court
for entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order
and the order in Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 259224.
F
ORSYTH V
H
OPPER
, No. 132446. By order of April 4, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the August 3, 2006, judgment of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St
Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case
having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the
application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, reinstate the order of the Wayne Circuit Court denying the
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and remand this case to the
Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
order and the order in Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 263378.
W
ARD V
S
IANO
, No. 132797. By order of April 4, 2007, the application
for leave to appeal the November 14, 2006, judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application
is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case to the Ingham Circuit Court for entry of an order
denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins.
Reported below: 272 Mich App 715.
G
REEN V
P
IERSON
, No. 132917. By order of May 30, 2007, the applica-
tion for leave to appeal the November 30, 2006, judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application
is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case to the Berrien Circuit Court for entry of an order
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979
denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins.
Court of Appeals No. 257802.
T
AYLOR V
Y
ALAMANCHI
, Nos. 133305-133307. By order of May 30, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the January 18, 2007, judgment of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is
again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave
to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the
order of the Oakland Circuit Court denying defendants’ motion for sum-
mary disposition, and remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. Court of Appeals Nos. 262763, 262771, 262777.
H
ADDAD V
M
AMMO
, No. 133597. By order of September 24, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the February 27, 2007, judgment of the
Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v
St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the
case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007),
the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for entry of
an order denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 266646.
J
ONES V
D
ETROIT
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, Nos. 133626, 133627. By order of
September 24, 2007, the application for leave to appeal the January 4,
2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the
decision in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On
order of the Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007,
480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the order of the Wayne
Circuit Court denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition,
and remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court
of Appeals Nos. 262343, 262347.
B
ROOKSHIRE V
P
ATEL
, Nos. 133750, 133751. By order of September 24,
2007, the application for leave to appeal the March 15, 2007, judgment of
the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in
Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the
Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948
(2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the order of the Washtenaw Circuit
Court denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and
980 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins. Court of
Appeals Nos. 257214, 257629.
H
OFFMAN V
B
ARRETT
, No. 134295. By order of October 29, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2007, judgment of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St
Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case
having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the
application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the Calhoun Circuit Court for entry of
an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 258982.
In re P
ETITION OF
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER FOR
F
ORECLOSURE
(W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER V
W
ATSON
), No. 134608. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and we reinstate the June 10, 2005, order of the Wayne Circuit
Court that set aside the foreclosure sale and provided other relief. The
foreclosure sale of publicly owned property is prohibited. MCL 211.7l;
MCL 211.78g(1). The Wayne County Treasurer had reason to know that
the property was publicly owned during the tax years that led to the tax
foreclosure, because the county was engaged in litigation with the state
of Michigan concerning tax liability and other matters pertaining to the
property. Further, prior to the property being sold to the respondent, a
settlement of the litigation required removal and rescission of the
assessments that were the basis for the foreclosure sale. Court of Appeals
No. 265426.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal in this case
because the state of Michigan received notice of the action to foreclose its
property and failed to protect its interests. The trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant relief under MCR 2.612(C) when there was no due
process violation.
The state purchased the property at issue in 1989, and the warranty
deed was recorded. The Wayne County Treasurer mistakenly taxed the
property and, in June 2003, instituted foreclosure proceedings based on
the 2001 tax year and some previous tax years. In December 2003, the
state filed a complaint to quiet title and to settle the tax issue. On March
5, 2004, while the case was pending, the county treasurer was granted a
foreclosure of the property. On April 21, 2004, the state’s case was settled,
with property taxes being rescinded and the county being obligated to
take steps to reverse the sale of the foreclosed property. Despite this, the
county treasurer auctioned the property on April 27, 2004, and respon-
dent Watson purchased the property. Watson recorded the deed on
November 1, 2004.
On January 20, 2005, the county treasurer filed a motion to set aside
the foreclosure judgment and the auction sale. The state also filed a
motion to set aside the foreclosure judgment on February 25, 2005. The
trial court granted these motions. The Court of Appeals reversed,
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981
concluding that the trial court lacked the authority to set aside the
foreclosure. The Court of Appeals agreed that the property was exempt
from taxation and should not have been subject to foreclosure. However,
the state was aware of the foreclosure proceedings and did not object,
failing to avail itself of its rights under the General Property Tax Act
(GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial
court’s authority under MCR 2.612(C) to set aside a foreclosure judgment
is limited to proceedings that are invalidated by a due process violation.
MCL 211.78g(1) states, in pertinent part:
A county treasurer shall withhold a parcel of property from
forfeiture for any reason determined by the state tax commission.
The procedure for withholding a parcel of property from forfeiture
under this subsection shall be determined by the state tax com-
mission.
The state cites an April 17, 2002, State Tax Commission bulletin,
which provides:
A property owned by the U.S. Government, the State of
Michigan, a county, a city, a village or a township shall be withheld
from foreclosure.
Procedure: If the property is forfeited in error, the County
Treasurer removes all of the fees attached to the parcel, files a
certificate of cancellation of forfeiture (form 3839) with the
Register of Deeds. Notifies the State Treasurer and the Contractor
of the error. The State Treasurer will withhold the parcel from
foreclosure and stop all title work on the parcel.
In this case, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the county
treasurer had failed to comply with the bulletin, but found that even if
public property should be withheld from foreclosure, that did not mean
that it cannot be foreclosed under the GPTA. I agree. In this case, the
property was forfeited in error, the county treasurer did not cancel the
forfeiture, the property was foreclosed, and the property was sold to a
third party. The bulletin does not provide a remedy for property fore-
closed in error that is sold to a third party. There is no language stating
that such a foreclosure is void or that the foreclosure falls outside the
realm of the GPTA. And there is nothing in the GPTA exempting state
property from its provisions. Indeed, should the State Tax Commission
revoke its bulletin, state property would then be treated no differently
under the GPTA than any other property. Once the property was
foreclosed, the county treasurer had fee simple title to the property,
which was transferred to Watson pursuant to MCL 211.78k.
MCL 211.78k(6) provides, in pertinent part:
[F]ee simple title to property set forth in a petition for
foreclosure filed under section 78h on which forfeited delinquent
982 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
taxes, interest, penalties, and fees are not paid...shall vest
absolutely in the foreclosing governmental unit, and the foreclos-
ing governmental unit shall have absolute title to the prop-
erty....Theforeclosing governmental unit’s title is not subject
to any recorded or unrecorded lien and shall not be stayed or held
invalid except as provided in subsection (7) or (9).
The state did not pursue the remedy available in subsection 7 by
appealing the foreclosure judgment in the Court of Appeals. Subsection 9
provides:
After the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under
this section, if the property has not been transferred under section
78m to a person other than the foreclosing governmental unit, a
foreclosing governmental unit may cancel the foreclosure by
recording with the register of deeds for the county in which the
property is located a certificate of error in a form prescribed by the
department of treasury, if the foreclosing governmental unit
discovers any of the following:
(a) The foreclosed property was not subject to taxation on the
date of the assessment of the unpaid taxes for which the property
wasforeclosed....[MCL211.78k(9).]
The county treasurer did not cancel the foreclosure in this case before the
property was sold to Watson.
This Court considered the constitutionality of MCL 211.78k(6) in In
re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer, 478 Mich 1 (2007) (Perfecting Church).
In Perfecting Church, the county treasurer failed to comply with the
notice provisions of the GPTA when it foreclosed the church’s property.
Id. at 5. This Court considered whether MCL 211.78k(6) deprived the
circuit court of jurisdiction to alter the judgment of foreclosure under
MCR 2.612(C) when a property owner does not redeem the property or
appeal the foreclosure judgment within 21 days:
[The intervening parties] argue that MCL 211.78k(6) precludes
the circuit court from staying or holding the governmental unit’s
title invalid. Furthermore, because the church did not avail itself
of the redemption or appeal provision contained in subsections 6
and 7, it is limited to an action for monetary damages under MCL
211.78l.
The intervening parties accurately construe these provisions of
the GPTA. If a property owner does not redeem the property or
appeal the judgment of foreclosure within 21 days, then MCL
211.78k(6) deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to alter the
judgment of foreclosure. MCL 211.78k(6) vests absolute title in the
foreclosing governmental unit, and if the taxpayer does not
redeem the property or avail itself of the appeal process in
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983
subsection 7, then title “shall not bestayedorheldinvalid....”
This language reflects a clear effort to limit the jurisdiction of
courts so that judgments of foreclosure may not be modified other
than through the limited procedures provided in the GPTA.
13
The
only possible remedy for such a property owner would be an action
for monetary damages based on a claim that the property owner did
not receive any notice. In the majority of cases, this regime provides
an appropriate procedure for foreclosing property because the
statute requires notices that are consistent with minimum due
process standards.
____________________________________________________________
13
The recent amendments of the GPTA add further support to
this conclusion. See MCL 211.78k(5)(g).
___________________________________________________________
[Id. at 8 (third emphasis added).]
[
1
]
This Court went on to hold that, to the extent the statute limited the
trial court’s jurisdiction to modify judgments of foreclosure when prop-
erty owners are denied due process, the statute is unconstitutional:
[I]n cases where the foreclosing entity fails to provide consti-
tutionally adequate notice, MCL 211.78k permits a property owner
to be deprived of the property without due process of law. Because
the Legislature cannot create a statutory regime that allows for
constitutional violations with no recourse, that portion of the
statute purporting to limit the circuit court’s jurisdiction to modify
judgments of foreclosure is unconstitutional and unenforceable as
applied to property owners who are denied due process.[Id.at
10-11 (second emphasis added).]
Perfecting Church did not purport to rule that MCL 211.78k was
unconstitutional in any respect other than cases in which there is a due
process violation.
1
MCL 211.78k(5)(g) provides:
A judgment entered under this section is a final order with
respect to the property affected by the judgment and except as
provided in subsection (7) shall not be modified, stayed, or held
invalid after the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a
judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or for
contested cases 21 days after the entry of a judgment foreclosing
the property under this section.
984 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
There is no due process claim in this case. The state knew about the
foreclosure proceedings and auction and chose to file a separate suit
rather than objecting to the foreclosure action. While the property should
never have had property taxes assessed in the first place, MCL 211.7l,
and the county treasurer auctioned the property in violation of the
settlement agreement in the separate case, I agree with the Court of
Appeals that the state neglected to pursue its available remedies under
the GPTA to protect its interest.
2
Given the holding in Perfecting Church,
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief under MCR
2.612(C) when there was no due process violation.
In conjunction with Perfecting Church, the instant decision renders
the purchase of foreclosed property less certain and more tentative.
However, while Perfecting Church was compelled by the constitution,
there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory imperative for the
present decision.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 14, 2007:
U
MBARGER V
H
AYES
G
REEN
B
EACH
M
EMORIAL
H
OSPITAL
C
ORPORATION
, No.
134011. By order of September 24, 2007, the application for leave to
appeal the March 1, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in
abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp
(Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having been decided
on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again
considered, and it is denied, because the plaintiff is not within the class
of plaintiffs entitled to relief under this Court’s order in Mullins. Court
of Appeals No. 264699.
E
RNSTING V
A
VE
M
ARIA
C
OLLEGE
, No. 134444. We are not persuaded
that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We
take this opportunity to note that, although we generally agree with
the approach in the Court of Appeals majority opinion, it was
unnecessary for that opinion to state, 274 Mich App 506, 518 (2007),
that “remedial statutes like the WPA [Whistleblowers’ Protection Act]
are liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be ben-
efited, Brown v Mayor of Detroit, 271 Mich App 692, 706; 723 NW2d
464 (2006).” R ather, as this Court later stated in its own opinion in
Brown, 478 Mich 589, 593-594, when addressing the same statutory
provision that is at issue in this case, MCL 15.361(d), “[t]he statutory
language in this case is unambiguous,” and “[i]f the statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended
the meaning expressed in the statute and judicial construction is not
permissible.” R eported below: 274 Mich App 506.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
2
This case can be distinguished from Detroit Bldg Authority v Wayne
Co Treasurer, 480 Mich 897 (2007), in which the plaintiff city did not
receive notice and was therefore deprived of an opportunity to protect
its interests under the GPTA.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
985
W
EAVER
, J. I would simply deny leave to appeal because I am not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the
decision to deny leave to appeal. But I dissent from that part of the order
admonishing the Court of Appeals majority for utilizing the canon of
construction that calls for remedial statutes to be construed liberally. I
disagree with including that statement for two reasons. First, because it
is completely unnecessary to the resolution of the case, it has no force
and, therefore, adds nothing to the order. Second, the canon that
remedial statutes must be liberally construed is one of the oldest and
most respected tools of construction in all the law. It was perfectly
appropriate for the Court of Appeals majority to employ it in this case.
This canon of statutory construction can be traced to the 1584
decision in Heydon’s Case.
1
That decision set forth the rule that, when
statutes are enacted in response to “defect[s] for which the common law
did not provide,”
2
courts should identify the problem prompting the
legislative enactment and apply the statute in a manner that would
“suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy....”
3
The decision in
Heydon’s Case was expanded on by Blackstone, who declared that
statutes are “ ‘either declaratory of the common law, or remedial of some
defects therein.’ ”
4
Blackstone reasoned that, when statutes are remedial
in purpose, courts should give them a liberal interpretation in order to
carry out the intent the lawmakers had in enacting them.
5
Today, the canon that remedial statutes shall be liberally construed is
deeply embedded in American jurisprudence. As I discussed in my
concurring opinion in Haynes v Neshewat,
6
courts in all 50 states and in
each federal circuit have utilized it. The United States Supreme Court
has also used the canon to interpret numerous federal laws. And this
Court has employed the rule for nearly 150 years.
7
Given this canon’s long history and wide acceptance, and because the
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is remedial in nature, it was entirely
appropriate for the Court of Appeals majority to apply the canon in this
case. And although the members of the majority can reject the tool for
themselves, they should not scold other judges for choosing not to do the
same.
1
Blake A. Watson, Liberal construction of CERCLA under the remedial
purpose canon: Have the lower courts taken a good thing too far?,20Harv
Envtl L Rev 199, 229 (1996).
2
Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng Rep 637, 638 (Ex 1584).
3
Id.
4
Watson, supra at 230, quoting 1 Blackstone, Commentaries.
5
Id.
6
Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 42-44 (2007) (K
ELLY
, J., concurring).
7
See Shannon v People, 5 Mich 36, 48 (1858) (“[A] remedial statute-
...should be construed liberally for the advancement of the remedy.”).
986 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Reconsideration Denied December 17, 2007:
G
RACE V
L
EITMAN
, No. 131035. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 913.
Court of Appeals No. 257896.
K
ELLY
and Y
OUNG
, JJ. We would grant reconsideration.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal December 20, 2007:
W
ILLER V
T
ITAN
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133596. We direct the clerk to
schedule oral argument during the March 2008 session calendar on
whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR
7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the parties shall address whether the
defendant was entitled to summary disposition because of the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the causal connection
between the plaintiff’s injuries and her scraping the windshield of her
vehicle was anything beyond “incidental, fortuitous or ‘but for’ ” such
that the injuries arose out of the “ownership, operation, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” within the meaning of MCL
500.3105(1). The parties may file supplemental briefs no later than
February 7, 2008, but they should not submit mere restatements of their
application papers. Court of Appeals No. 273805.
Leave to Appeal Granted December 20, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
H
ORTON
, No. 135021. The parties shall address: (1) whether
the serologist’s testimony regarding nontestifying technicians’ findings
and reports was “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford v Wash-
ington, 541 US 36 (2004); (2) whether the defendant waived the Crawford
issue; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
defendant’s substantial rights were affected by the error, if any, and that
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in
this case was seriously affected by the error, if any. The clerk of the Court
is directed to place this case on the April 2008 session calendar for
argument and submission. Appellant’s brief and appendix must be filed
no later than January 31, 2008, and appellee’s brief and appendix, if
appellee chooses to submit an appendix, must be filed no later than
February 21, 2008. The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan
and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs
amicus curiae, to be filed no later than March 6, 2008. Other persons or
groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this
case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae, with
such briefs to be filed no later than March 6, 2008. Court of Appeals No.
268264.
Summary Dispositions December 20, 2007:
HAS
MITH
L
UMBER &
H
ARDWARE
C
OMPANY V
D
ECINA
, No. 128560. On
November 8, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the application for
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
987
leave to appeal the April 27, 2005, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On
order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. To be awarded attorney fees as a “prevailing party” under
MCL 570.1118(2), the party must prevail on the lien foreclosure action.
In this case, the unpaid subcontractors filed a lien foreclosure action
against the property owners and a breach of contract action against the
general contractor. The subcontractors lost on their lien claim, but
prevailed on the breach of contract claim. While the statute allows a lien
claimant to bring an underlying contract action at the same time as the
lien foreclosure action, it does not preclude the option of bringing the two
actions separately. MCL 570.1117(5). If the subcontractors had chosen to
bring their breach of contract claims against the general contractor as a
separate action, they would not have been allowed to recover attorney
fees. The language of MCL 570.1118(2) does not permit recovery of
attorney fees on the contract action merely because it was brought
together with the lien foreclosure action. Accordingly, we vacate the
portion of the Oakland Circuit Court order granting attorney fees to
plaintiff H.A. Smith Lumber & Hardware Company and defendant
William Gardella, doing business as Williams Glass Company. Reported
below: 265 Mich App 380 (on remand).
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). The majority’s order vacating the award of
attorney fees is flawed because it fails to address the actual language of
the Construction Lien Act (CLA), MCL 570.1101 et seq., and it fails to
honor the CLA’s provision that it “shall be liberally construed to secure
the beneficial results, intents, and purposes of this act.” MCL
570.1302(1). A purpose of the CLA is to prevent subcontractors from
bearing the costs of litigation every time their work goes uncompensated.
I presume that subcontractors will often be in the position where they
must pursue their claims against a general contractor who has been paid,
as here. To do so, subcontractors must plead the underlying contract.
The statute appears to include such claims in its attorney-fee provi-
sion. It does not expressly preclude them. It states that “[i]n each action
in which enforcement of a construction lien through foreclosure is
sought, the court shall examine each claim and defense that is presented,
and determine the amount, if any, due to each lien claimant....”MCL
570.1118(2). “Each claim” must include more than just the lien claim.
The statute further provides that “[t]he court may allow reasonable
attorneys’ fees to a lien claimant who is the prevailing party.” Id. The
subcontractors here were “lien claimants.” The trial court found that
their liens were valid, but simply did not attach because the owners had
paid the general contractor. The subcontractors were prevailing parties:
they prevailed on the underlying contract claims against the general
contractor. Because the general contractor had been paid, the contract
claims were the subcontractors’ only recourse for the payment that the
lien was meant to secure.
Guided by the statute’s aim to relieve unpaid contractors of the
financial burden of litigation, I would deny leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice C
AVANAGH
.
988 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s order reversing
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Instead, I would affirm the Court
of Appeals affirmance of the trial court’s grant of attorney fees to H. A.
Smith Lumber and Hardware Company and William Gardella, for the
reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion.
P
EOPLE V
M
EANS
, No. 133486. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals.
That court shall treat the defendant’s application as having been filed
within the deadline set forth in MCR 7.205(F) and shall decide whether
to grant, deny, or order other relief, in accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2).
The defendant’s attorney acknowledges that the defendant did not
contribute to the delay in filing and admits his sole responsibility for the
error. Accordingly, the defendant was deprived of his appeal as a result of
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-
Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000); Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28
(1999). Costs are imposed against appellate counsel, only, in the amount
of $250, to be paid to the clerk of this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 274888.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
OY
, No. 133695. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals.
That court shall treat the defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal as having been filed within the deadline set forth in MCR 7.205(F)
and shall decide whether to grant, deny, or order other relief, in
accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). The defendant’s attorney acknowl-
edges that the defendant did not contribute to the delay in filing and
admits his sole responsibility for the error. Accordingly, the defendant
was deprived of his direct appeal as a result of constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000);
Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999). Costs are imposed against
the attorney, only, in the amount of $250, to be paid to the clerk of this
Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 275627.
P
EOPLE V
A
RTHUR
R
ODGERS
, No. 134040. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals. That court shall treat the defendant’s delayed applica-
tion for leave to appeal as having been timely filed and shall decide
whether to grant, deny, or order other relief, in accordance with MCR
7.205(D)(2). The defendant was deprived of his direct appeal as a result
of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-
Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000); Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28
(1999). Costs are imposed against the attorney, only, in the amount of
$250, to be paid to the clerk of this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 277412.
M
ULLEN V
Z
ERFAS
, No. 134418. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Eaton Circuit Court
for reconsideration of the defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
The Court of Appeals in O’Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569 (2003),
erred by indicating that MCL 554.139(1) establishes a duty on the part of
owners of leased residential property to invitees or licensees generally.
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CTIONS ON
A
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989
The covenants created by the statute establish duties of a lessor or
licensor of residential property to the lessee or licensee of the residential
property, most typically of a landlord to a tenant. By the terms of the
statute, the duties exist between the contracting parties. The defendant
landlord did not have a duty under MCL 554.139(1) to the plaintiff, a
social guest of the tenant. On remand, the circuit court must decide the
defendant’s motion for summary disposition under common-law pre-
mises liability principles. Court of Appeals No. 275262.
P
EOPLE V
K
IPFER
, No. 134797. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals.
That court shall treat the defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal as having been filed within the deadline set forth in MCR 7.205(F)
and shall decide whether to grant, deny, or order other relief, in
accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). The defendant’s attorney acknowl-
edges that the defendant did not contribute to the delay in filing and
admits his sole responsibility for the error. Accordingly, the defendant
was deprived of his direct appeal as a result of constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000);
Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999). Costs are imposed against
the attorney, only, in the amount of $250, to be paid to the clerk of this
Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 279981.
L
OOS V
JBI
NSTALLED
S
ALES,
I
NC
, No. 134957. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals
No. 275704.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 20, 2007:
I
NGHAM
C
OUNTY V
C
APITOL
C
ITY
L
ODGE
N
O
141
OF THE
F
RATERNAL
O
RDER OF
P
OLICE
, No. 133900; reported below: 275 Mich App 133.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
G
RILLO V
P
OSEN
C
ONSTRUCTION,
I
NC,
No. 133965; Court of Appeals No.
273985.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
L
AUREL
W
OODS
A
PARTMENTS V
R
OUMAYAH
, Nos. 134150, 134154; reported
below: 274 Mich App 631.
K
ELLY,
J. I would grant leave to appeal.
S
WEET
A
IR
I
NVESTMENT,
I
NC V
K
ENNEY
, No. 134267; reported below: 275
Mich App 492.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER,
JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
W
ILLIAMS V
B
OLDON’S
B
ODY
S
HOP
, LLC, Nos. 134449, 134450; Court of
Appeals Nos. 265901, 269022.
A
TTORNEY
G
ENERAL V
P
HILIP
M
ORRIS
USA, No. 134464; Court of Appeals
No. 273665.
990 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
T
HE
G
EO
G
ROUP,
I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, Nos. 134573,
134574; Court of Appeals Nos. 273466, 273492.
B
ASQUIN V
M
ENKEN
, No. 134659; Court of Appeals No. 274855.
WJO’N
EIL
C
OMPANY V
B
ARTON
M
ALOW
C
OMPANY
, No. 134666; Court of
Appeals No. 277502.
P
EOPLE V
S
TOKES
, No. 134717; Court of Appeals No. 269345.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLDER
, Nos. 134761, 134894; Court of Appeals Nos. 278965,
278967.
P
EOPLE V
D
ALAYNARD
J
ACKSON
, No. 134787; Court of Appeals No.
278935.
P
EOPLE V
N
ASH
, No. 134819; Court of Appeals No. 270382.
P
EOPLE V
R
OSENBERG
, No. 134846; Court of Appeals No. 262673 (on
remand).
P
EOPLE V
P
RINCE
, No. 134850; Court of Appeals No. 268084.
P
EOPLE V
K
ELLY
, No. 134857; Court of Appeals No. 269918.
P
EOPLE V
H
ODO
, No. 134971; Court of Appeals No. 279252.
P
EOPLE V
S
AARI
, No. 135037; Court of Appeals No. 279028.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Summary Dispositions December 21, 2007:
S
HORT V
A
NTONINI
, No. 130442. By order of April 6, 2007, the applica-
tion for leave to appeal the December 20, 2005, judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the case is
again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals
with regard to its affirmance of the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition to defendant Antonini on the basis of WaltzvWyse, 469 Mich
642 (2004), and remand this case to the Jackson Circuit Court for entry
of an order denying defendant Antonini’s motion for summary disposi-
tion and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the
order in Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because
we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be
reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 256423.
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
D
OWNTOWN
D
EVELOPMENT
A
UTHORITY V
US O
UTDOOR
A
DVERTISING,
I
NC
, No. 133992. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment that
held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Detroit Board of
Zoning Appeals decision regarding the variance for the property located
at 124 Cadillac Square. This Court has adopted a three-part test for
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CTIONS ON
A
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991
standing that requires (1) an injury in fact that is concrete, particular-
ized, and actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between that injury
and the complained of conduct; and (3) that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v
Nestle Waters of North America Inc, 479 Mich 280, 294-295 (2007). In this
case, plaintiff has shown that it has made substantial investments in the
area surrounding the variance, that it owns nearby buildings, and that it
has supervisory authority over the development district that encom-
passes the variance. Further, plaintiff has shown that the variance will
potentially cause economic injury to its interests. Because a judgment in
favor of plaintiff will eliminate these injuries, plaintiff has established
standing to challenge the variance. We remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining issues. Court of
Appeals No. 262311.
C
AVANAGH
,J
.
I concur in the reversal.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order reversing the Court of
Appeals judgment and remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of defendant’s remaining issues, because I agree that the
plaintiff has standing to challenge the Detroit Board of Zoning Appeals
decision regarding the variance for the property located at 124 Cadillac
Square.
I write separately because I disagree with the application of the
majority of four’s (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,
and M
ARKMAN
) erroneously created standing test in Lee v Macomb Co Bd
of Comm’rs,
1
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,
2
Rohde
v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,
3
and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
v Nestlé Waters North America Inc.
4
In those cases, the majority of four
systematically dismantled Michigan’s standing law and replaced years of
precedent with its own test that denies Michigan citizens access to the
courts.
5
I would hold that the plaintiff has standing under the pre-Lee
prudential test for standing because the plaintiff has demonstrated “that
the plaintiff’s substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a
manner different from the citizenry at large.” House Speaker v State
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554 (1993).
K
ELLY
, J. I concur in the result only.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). It is by now a customary part of Justice
W
EAVER
’s separate statements to condemn some purported judicial “as-
1
Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001).
2
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608
(2004).
3
Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336 (2007).
4
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North
America Inc, 479 Mich 280 (2007).
5
See my opinions chronicling the majority of four’s assault on standing
in Lee, 464 Mich at 742; Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 651; Rohde, 479 Mich
at 366; and Michigan Citizens, 479 Mich at 310.
992 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
sault” by the “majority of four.” Here, the object of the Court’s assault is
denying “citizens access to the courts” and stems from the Court
reaffirming, over Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent, that the “judicial power” in
Michigan requires that the parties have standing. While I am content to
rely on this Court’s previous opinions, see, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Federation
v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608 (2004), as well as those of the
United States Supreme Court, see, e.g., Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504
US 555 (1992), in support of the necessity of standing, Justice W
EAVER
’s
statement prompts me to remind the bench and bar of the constitutional
and other values served by the standing doctrine. This is the doctrine
that parties to a lawsuit must have a concrete and particularized interest
in that lawsuit distinct from the interest of the people as a whole.
(1) The requirement of standing ensures that the judiciary will
exercise only the “judicial power” by resolving actual “cases and contro-
versies,” rather than also exercising the powers of the Governor and the
executive branch by addressing matters of policy and law enforcement
that are appropriately part of the “executive power.”
(2) The requirement of standing ensures that the judiciary will
exercise only the “judicial power” by resolving actual “cases and contro-
versies,” rather than deciding matters in which there are no coherent
legal standards or rules but simply policy judgments to be exercised.
(3) The requirement of standing ensures that citizens will have
genuine “access” to government by preserving decision-making authority
in the most representative and accountable branches of government and
thereby allowing citizens to effectively exercise their constitutional right
to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” US Const, Am
I; see also Const 1963, art 1, § 3.
(4) The requirement of standing ensures that the constitution ratified
by “we the people” of Michigan will be accorded respect by restricting
institutions of government to the exercise of their proper powers and by
upholding the principle of the separation of powers.
(5) The requirement of standing ensures that the Legislature will not
diminish the powers of the executive branch by transferring its powers to
the judiciary. “To permit [the Legislature] to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’ ” Lujan, supra at 577 (citation omitted).
(6) The requirement of standing ensures that ours will not become a
government of lawyers by lawyers and that the power of judges will be
restricted to matters traditionally within the authority of the courts and
not extended to matters traditionally within the authority of the execu-
tive.
(7) The requirement of standing ensures that citizens will continue to
have meaningful control over their own government by reposing policy
decisions in the branches of government that are the most directly
representative and accountable to the people. To dilute standing is not to
A
CTIONS ON
A
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993
enhance the access of ordinary citizens to their own government, but only
to enhance the role of judges, lawyers, and litigating organizations in the
formulation of public policy.
(8) The requirement of standing ensures that policy will be estab-
lished on the basis of information, derived in the course of legislative and
executive hearings and investigations from the testimony of individuals
and organizations of a broad range of interests and perspectives, rather
than only from the plaintiff and the defendant in a lawsuit.
(9) The requirement of standing ensures that historical constitutional
restraints and limitations on the judiciary will be maintained to balance
the judiciary’s authority with that of the other branches of government
within our system of separated powers.
By seeking to erode the standing doctrine in Michigan, Justice W
EAVER
does not facilitate “access” by citizens, but only the establishment of a
more powerful judiciary. In the end, such an establishment would
inevitably undermine access by the people to the most representative and
accountable institutions of their own government.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 21, 2007:
In re A
RCHER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
N
IERESCHER
), No.
135280; reported below: 277 Mich App 71.
T
HIRD
J
UDICIAL
C
IRCUIT
C
OURT V
T
HE
J
UDICIAL
A
TTORNEYS
A
SSOCIATION
,
Nos. 129500, 129501. By order of January 13, 2006, we remanded this
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted,
retaining jurisdiction. On August 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued an
unpublished per curiam opinion. On order of the Court, the application
for leave to appeal is again considered, and it is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this
Court. The stay of proceedings ordered on September 29, 2005, and
continued by order of January 13, 2006, is dissolved, except that the
sanctions ordered by the trial court at the September 28, 2005, contempt
hearing shall not be imposed if the plaintiff initiates compliance with its
obligations under the July 17, 2000, order of the trial court by April 15,
2008. Court of Appeals Nos. 262586, 263412.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the Court’s order. I note that
plaintiff persuasively argues that the collective-bargaining agreement in
this case, which was executed in accordance with the public employment
relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., could not include a provision
constraining a chief judge’s power to appoint judicial referees. See, e.g.,
MCL 552.507(1). Such a provision appears to offend the constitutional
separation of powers provision, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, because the
legislatively enacted PERA may not be construed to interfere with the
power of the judiciary to appoint judicial officers whose duties are derived
from article 6 of the Michigan Constitution. But plaintiff stipulated to
dismiss its appeal from the trial court’s final decision in the earlier
dispute concerning the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that plaintiff waived any chal-
lenges to the validity of the collective-bargaining agreement.
994 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in its entirety.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I would affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
I dissent from the majority’s decision declining to immediately impose
the sanctions ordered by the trial judge and instead conditioning the
imposition of sanctions on whether the plaintiff initiates compliance with
this Court’s order by April 15, 2008. In effect, years after the plaintiff
was found in contempt of court and sanctions were ordered, this Court is
providing the plaintiff with yet another chance to avoid sanctions for its
deliberate disobedience in refusing to abide by the arbitration agreement
andacourtordertodoso.
The Court’s order supplies no written reasons for the majority’s
decision to conditionally impose the ordered sanctions, as required by
Const 1963, art 6, § 6, because no legal reason exists to justify the
majority’s decision.
1
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff, the
Third Judicial Circuit Court, in contempt because of the deliberate
actions of Chief Judge Mary Beth Kelly. The material facts and law in this
case are not in dispute.
2
As chief judge, Judge Kelly violated the
arbitration award in November 2004 and has knowingly continued to do
so since March 2005. In June 2001, almost five years earlier, the Third
Judicial Circuit Court, through the actions of its then-chief judge, had
stipulated in writing to the dismissal with prejudice of its appeal
regarding the validity of the arbitration order. The arbitration award and
stipulation order had been res judicata for almost five years.
As chief judge, Judge Kelly knew of and should have obeyed the
arbitration award and stipulation order. Because of res judicata, Judge
Kelly did not have the option of not following the trial court’s order in
2005 simply because she disagreed with the order. Her actions have
caused defendant to accrue over two years of unnecessary costs and
efforts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions
against the plaintiff for Chief Judge Kelly’s noncompliance with the court
1
For a more detailed analysis of this Court’s duty to provide written
reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v
Fieger, 477 Mich 1228, 1231 (2006); People v Parsons, 728 NW2d 62
(2007); Ruiz v Clara’s Parlor Inc, 477 Mich 1044 (2007); Neal v Dep’t of
Corrections, 477 Mich 1049 (2007); State Automobile Mut Ins Co v Fieger,
477 Mich 1068, 1070 (2007); Ansari v Gold, 477 Mich 1076, 1077 (2007);
Short v Antonini, 729 NW2d 218, 219 (2007); Flemister v Traveling Med
Services, PC, 729 NW2d 222, 223 (2007); McDowell v Detroit, 477 Mich
1079, 1084 (2007); Johnson v Henry Ford Hosp, 477 Mich 1098, 1099
(2007); Tate v Dearborn, 477 Mich 1101, 1102 (2007); Dep’t of Labor &
Economic Growth v Jordan, 480 Mich 869 (2007); Cooper v Auto Club Ins
Assn, 739 NW2d 631 (2007).
2
Seen3ofthisstatementforamoredetailed recitation of the facts.
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995
order. Therefore, sanctions are appropriate and properly and legally
within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court should not dilute
the trial court’s contempt power by now conditionally reversing the
imposed sanctions.
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision to issue an order of contempt. In re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257
Mich App 96, 99 (2003). A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. McFerrenvB&BInvestment Group, 253 Mich App 517, 522
(2002).
The circuit court executes the judicial power of the state of Michigan
under Const 1963, art 6,§1andhasbroadjurisdiction under Const 1963,
art 6, § 13. Kirby v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 459 Mich 23, 40
(1998). Michigan courts of record have the inherent common-law right to
punish all contempts of court. In re Contempt of Robertson, 209 Mich App
433, 436 (1995); In re Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich App 153, 157
(2000). Additionally, the Legislature has statutorily recognized that the
circuit courts, and all other courts of record, have contempt powers. MCL
600.1701 et seq. A party must obey an order entered by a court with
proper jurisdiction, even an incorrect order, or risk being held in
contempt and facing possible sanctions. Kirby, supra at 40.
In the present case, there is no factual dispute that the plaintiff, the
Third Judicial Circuit Court, through the actions of Chief Judge Mary
Beth Kelly, did not follow the arbitration order or the trial court’s order
requiring compliance with the arbitration order. The plaintiff, in answer-
ing the defendant’s motion for an order to show cause why the plaintiff
should not be held in contempt, only argued the merits of the underlying
arbitration order. However, the plaintiff’s option for remedying a defec-
tive arbitration order was appellate review, which the plaintiff exhausted
in 2001 when the plaintiff and the defendant stipulated the dismissal
with prejudice of the appeal to the arbitration order. The plaintiff did not
have the option of simply not following the trial court’s order in 2005
because it thought that the order was wrong.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in
contempt. The plaintiff was required by court order to follow the
arbitration award, and Chief Judge Kelly admitted at the September 28,
2005, hearing in front of the trial judge that the Third Judicial Circuit
Court was not in compliance with the arbitration award and that she, as
chief judge acting for the Third Judicial Circuit Court, had not followed
the trial court’s previous contempt order. See Kirby, supra at 40. The
trial court ordered sanctions against the plaintiff because the plaintiff,
through Chief Judge Kelly, had expressly refused to comply with the trial
court’s previous order. This Court did not issue a stay of proceedings until
after the trial court had ordered sanctions against the plaintiff. This
Court should not interfere with a trial court’s execution of its judicial
power and overturn a contempt order and sanctions imposed unless the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sanctions. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in exercising its inherent authority to hold
parties in contempt for not following a court order, and the trial court was
correct to subsequently order sanctions for noncompliance with its order.
Steingold, supra at 157.
996 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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The majority’s arbitrary decision not to impose the trial court’s
sanctions as long as the plaintiff initiates compliance by April 15, 2008,
does not provide an explanation of whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering the sanctions.
Although I concur with this Court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s
application for leave to appeal in this case, I dissent from the majority’s
decision to not immediately impose the sanctions ordered by the trial
judge, but to instead condition the imposition of sanctions on whether the
plaintiff initiates compliance with this Court’s order by April 15,
2008. The Court’s order supplies no written reasons for the majority’s
decision, as required by Const 1963, art 6, § 6, because no legal reason
exists to justify the majority’s decision. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for
noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the
trial court’s contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions
imposed.
3
3
The plaintiff, the Third Judicial Circuit Court, employs Friend of the
Court attorneys, some of whom are represented by the defendant,
Judicial Attorneys Association (JAA), a labor organization. The parties’
employment relationship has been governed by a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) since 1982. In 1998, during renegotiation of the CBA,
the plaintiff agreed to a provision giving the defendant’s members hiring
preference over nonmembers for the position of domestic relations
referee. The plaintiff subsequently combined the duties of its domestic
relations referees and its juvenile referees to form the single position of
“family division referee.” In early 1999, immediately after the CBA was
implemented, the plaintiff appointed a non-JAA member attorney to the
position of family division referee. Although the newly hired attorney was
assigned to the juvenile division, the plaintiff shortly thereafter trans-
ferred another referee from the court’s juvenile division to the family
division. The plaintiff, through its chief judge, subsequently appointed
two other non-JAA attorneys as family division referees assigned to the
juvenile division.
The defendant filed a grievance, asserting that the plaintiff was trying
to circumvent the CBA by appointing referees to the juvenile division
(calling them “family division referees” as opposed to “domestic relations
referee”) and then transferring the newly appointed referees to the
domestic relations division. The grievance was arbitrated, and, in a
January 2000 ruling, the arbitrator found that the plaintiff’s appoint-
ment of non-JAA member attorneys to the position of family division
referee circumvented the requirements of the CBA. The arbitrator
ordered that the defendant’s members be appointed to the next three
family division referee vacancies.
The plaintiff posted its first family division referee vacancy after the
arbitration award in August 2004. The plaintiff, through Chief Judge
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997
M
ILLER V
P
ROGRESSIVE
C
ORPORATION
, No. 131987; Court of Appeals No.
259504.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). “[T]he person named in the policy” may be
entitled to personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act.
Mary Beth Kelly, appointed a non-JAA attorney to the post in November
2004. At the time, there was at least one JAA member qualified for the
referee position. In December 2004, the defendant filed a motion to
enforce the arbitration award and a motion for an order to show cause
why the plaintiff should not be held in contempt for violating the
arbitration award. The plaintiff did not deny that it had violated the
arbitration award, but argued instead that none of the JAA members had
the requisite experience to qualify for a position as a family division
referee. In March 2005, almost five years after the arbitration award was
entered, the plaintiff argued for the first time that it should be relieved
from the arbitration award.
In April 2005, the trial court issued an order denying the plaintiff’s
request for relief from the arbitration order and granting the defendant’s
motion for an order to show cause why the plaintiff should not be held in
contempt. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order denying relief
from the arbitration award. While the appeal was pending, the trial court
conducted a show cause hearing and issued an order and memorandum of
law finding the plaintiff in civil contempt. On May 26, 2005, the trial
court held that in addition to filling the referee position with a JAA
member, the plaintiff must pay any difference in compensation to the
JAA member from the compensation that would have resulted had the
JAA member been hired according to the original arbitration order. The
trial court also held that the plaintiff must pay the defendant reasonable
attorney fees and costs under MCR 2.625 and MCR 2.626 because the
defendant had prevailed.
The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s contempt order as of right in
the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals denied the appeal on
September 15, 2005, for lack of merit in the grounds presented. The
plaintiff appealed in this Court, and this Court entered a stay of
proceedings on September 29, 2005. On September 28, 2005, Chief Judge
Kelly appeared before the trial court and admitted that the plaintiff was
still not in compliance with the trial court’s order. The trial court
assessed fines and sanctions. The trial court’s contempt sanctions were
imposed before this Court’s stay order.
This Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consider-
ation as on leave granted, while continuing the stay of proceedings. The
Court of Appeals consolidated the plaintiff’s pending appeals on the
substantive issue of the validity of the arbitration order and the contempt
order and affirmed the trial court on both issues. The plaintiff filed for
leave to appeal in this Court.
998 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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MCL 500.3114(1). Plaintiff contends that she is “the person named in the
policy” in which her parents are the named insureds because she is listed
as an occasional driver on the declarations sheet, and the policy states
that the “Declarations, endorsements and application are hereby incor-
porated into and made a part of this policy.” However, the following
statement immediately precedes the portion of the declarations sheet
that lists plaintiff as an occasional driver: “Your Policy Premium Is Based
On The Following Information Which Is Not Part Of The Policy.”
Therefore, it is clear that the portion of the declarations sheet that lists
plaintiff as an occasional driver is not part of the policy, and thus plaintiff
is not “the person named in the policy.” Because plaintiff is not “the
person named in the policy,” it is unnecessary to address whether it is
possible for a person who is not a named insured in the policy to be “the
person named in the policy” under MCL 500.3114(1). For these reasons,
I concur in this Court’s order denying leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s denial of leave to
appeal in this case. I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether
plaintiff can recover personal injury protection benefits from the defen-
dant pursuant to the insurance policy and the plain language MCL
500.3114(1) of the no-fault act.
MCL 500.3114(1) states that a “person named in the [automobile
insurance] policy” is entitled to personal injury protection benefits.
Plaintiff in this case is a nonresident child of the policy owners and is
listed as an occasional driver on the policy declarations page. The
insurance policy has a clause incorporating the declarations page as part
of the policy. The issue in this case is whether MCL 500.3114(1) requires
that the insurance company provide personal injury protection coverage
for a person who is named in the policy but is not a named insured.
The question presented in this case is a jurisprudentially significant
one for no-fault insurance litigants, and I would grant leave to appeal for
consideration of this issue.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
Reconsideration Granted December 21, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
C
RON
, No. 133896. On order of the Court, the motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s September 10, 2007, order is considered,
and it is granted. We vacate our order dated September 10, 2007. On
reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the March 22, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals to the extent it affirms the defendant’s conviction
for fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, we vacate the defendant’s
conviction and sentence for fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, and
we remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court for resentencing on the
defendant’s remaining conviction. In this case, the jury should not have
been instructed on fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, because that
offense is not a necessarily included lesser offense of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. See People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112 (2007). In all
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999
other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 265576.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would deny the motion for reconsideration.
Reconsideration Denied December 21, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
H
AWTHORNE
, No. 133729. Summary disposition entered at 480
Mich 913. Court of Appeals No. 265473.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would grant the motion for reconsideration
and deny the application for leave to appeal. The Court has already
remanded this case to the trial court for a hearing on defendant’s
speedy-trial motion. At that time, the prosecution failed to explain its
failure over a period of nine years to bring defendant to trial. I see no
reason for a second remand.
C
AVANAGH
and M
ARKMAN
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
Summary Dispositions December 27, 2007:
L
EWIS V
B
RIDGMAN
P
UBLIC
S
CHOOLS
, No. 134631. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the teacher tenure act, MCL 38.101 et
seq., does not require the State Tenure Commission to apply a “clear
error,” rather than a “de novo,” standard of review to its consideration of
the preliminary decisions of administrative law judges. We remand this
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the commis-
sion’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; or
unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(1)(d), (e). The
motion to stay is denied. We do not retain jurisdiction. Reported below:
275 Mich App 435.
N
EUHAUS V
P
EPSI
C
OLA
M
ETROPOLITAN
B
OTTLING
C
OMPANY
, No. 134661.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave
granted, of whether the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission
(WCAC) properly awarded an attorney fee on plaintiff’s medical benefits
award. In answering this question, the Court of Appeals shall consider
whether the WCAC correctly construed the term “prorate,” as it is used
in MCL 418.315(1). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied,
because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented
should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 274960.
S
CHORNAK V
D
AIMLER
C
HRYSLER
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134924. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. The Court
of Appeals shall include among the issues addressed whether the plain-
tiff’s medical proofs satisfied his burden of proving that the damage done
to his heart by the work he performed during the course of his heart
attack was medically distinguishable and that the condition of his heart
1000 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
was made significantly worse than it would have been without perfor-
mance of the work. If the Court of Appeals answers this question in the
affirmative, it shall specifically identify the evidence it relied upon to
reach that conclusion. MCL 418.301(2); Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc, 469 Mich 220 (2003); Fahr v Gen Motors Corp, 478 Mich 922
(2007). We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 277024.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 27, 2007:
B
OIK V
A
LPENA
G
ENERAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 131097; Court of Appeals No.
258158.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons
stated in my dissent from the denial of leave to appeal in Sturgis Bank &
Trust Co v Hillsdale Community Health Ctr, 268 Mich App 484 (2005).
See 479 Mich 854 (2007).
B
RADSHAW V
W
EST
S
HORE
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, Nos. 131210, 131588; Court
of Appeals No. 258764.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons
stated in my dissent from the denial of leave to appeal in Sturgis Bank &
Trust Co v Hillsdale Community Health Ctr, 268 Mich App 484 (2005).
See 479 Mich 854 (2007).
K
ENNEDY V
F
ARM
B
UREAU
G
ENERAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY OF
M
ICHIGAN
,No.
132295; Court of Appeals No. 268021.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
E
LEZOVIC V
B
ENNETT
, No. 133369. The application for leave to appeal
the January 25, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and
it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court prior to the completion of the proceed-
ings ordered by the Court of Appeals. We note, however, that without
expressly finding a section of the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101
et seq., ambiguous, the Court of Appeals majority determined that the
statute is remedial and thus must be liberally construed. In this respect,
the Court of Appeals majority erred. Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land
Systmes, Inc, 469 Mich 220, 232 n 12 (2003). In addition, the Court of
Appeals erred by mixing its analysis of defendant’s agency and liability.
Under the plain terms of the statute, the threshold issue is whether
defendant is an agent. After that issue is resolved in the affirmative,
defendant’s liability is based on the Civil Rights Act and his liability
thereunder is direct. Therefore, agency principles of authority relating to
the principal’s vicarious liability for the acts of the agent are irrelevant.
We take special care to emphasize that agency principles of authority and
liability still apply when the defendant is “a person who has 1 or more
employees” and did not personally participate in the harassment. We
acknowledge that the use of the term “employer” to mean both “a person
who has 1 or more employees” and “an agent of that person” is ripe for
confusion. However, where the Court of Appeals stated that “when the
claim of sexual harassment against an employer is for direct liability, and
not vicarious liability, intent need not be inferred through a respondeat
A
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1001
superior analysis,” it should not be interpreted to mean that the principal
is strictly liable for its agent’s actions. Although a principal’s agent may
be directly liable, a respondeat superior analysis is still required for a
principal that did not directly participate in the harassment. The motions
to dismiss and to strike are denied. Reported below: 274 Mich App 1.
W
EAVER
, J. I would deny leave to appeal because I am not persuaded
that this Court should review the questions presented at this time.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the
decision to deny leave to appeal. But, for the reasons explained in my
statement in Ernsting v Ave Maria College,
1
I dissent from that part of
the order scolding the Court of Appeals majority for using the canon of
construction that remedial statutes shall be liberally construed. Because
the statute at issue, the Civil Rights Act,
2
is a remedial statute,
3
it was
appropriate for the Court of Appeals majority to apply the canon to this
case.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
P
IONEER
S
TATE
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
W
AGNER
, No. 133816;
Court of Appeals No. 273080.
C
ORRIGAN
and Y
OUNG,
JJ. We would reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion.
P
EOPLE V
C
AROEN
, No. 133915; Court of Appeals No. 261929.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
H
AYMER
, No. 134237; Court of Appeals No. 275756.
C
ITY OF
M
ADISON
H
EIGHTS V
E
LGIN
S
WEEPER
C
OMPANY
, No. 134619; Court
of Appeals No. 266333.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTOPHER
J
ACKSON
, No. 134675; Court of Appeals No.
269071.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
B
ACKUS
, No. 134726; Court of Appeals No. 278548.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHENSON
, No. 134735. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
279250.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
ERVI
, No. 134758; Court of Appeals No. 276927.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
1
480 Mich 985, 986 (2007).
2
MCL 37.2101 et seq.
3
Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 36 (1988).
1002 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
M
ETAMORA
W
ATER
S
ERVICE,
I
NC
, No. 134949; reported below:
276 Mich App 376.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied December 28, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
M
ARSHALL
, No. 132985. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 270359.
P
EOPLE V
A
BBY
, No. 133694; Court of Appeals No. 262365.
K
LOIAN V
V
AN
F
OSSEN
, No. 134321; Court of Appeals No. 262953.
P
EOPLE V
D
ICKSON
, No. 134386. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272952.
P
EOPLE V
E
FFINGER
, No. 134410. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275787.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTINE
J
ACKSON
, No. 134420. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 275785.
P
EOPLE V
D
EYONTA
R
OBINSON
, No. 134421. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274566.
P
EOPLE V
Y
BARRA
, No. 134456. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 276803.
P
EOPLE V
B
OLER
, No. 134462. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275141.
P
EOPLE V
S
HAWN
B
URNETT
, No. 134472. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 274692.
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
T
HOMPSON
, No. 134483. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 276358.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIAN
J
ONES
, No. 134494. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274553.
P
EOPLE V
D
EAN
A
NDREWS
, No. 134515. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274365.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
S
WANIGAN
, No. 134517. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278457.
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1003
P
EOPLE V
M
ALTOS
, No. 134529. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 278117.
P
EOPLE V
A
MOR
B
ASS
, No. 134533. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
275091.
P
EOPLE V
N
EWSON
, No. 134537. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276361.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTONIO
T
AYLOR
, No. 134548; Court of Appeals No. 277914.
P
EOPLE V
B
RADFORD
R
OSS
, No. 134554; Court of Appeals No. 267338.
P
EOPLE V
T
RAYLOR
, No. 134560. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 273844.
P
EOPLE V
W
ALLEMAN
, No. 134582; Court of Appeals No. 277492.
P
EOPLE V
T
RUELOVE
, No. 134588. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275951.
P
EOPLE V
M
ASON
, No. 134590. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274896.
P
EOPLE V
L
AVELL
, No. 134593. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275745.
P
EOPLE V
M
URRAY
, No. 134599. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274506.
P
EOPLE V
C
LOY
, No. 134603. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276066.
W
HITE V
S
ECRETARY OF
S
TATE
, No. 134615; Court of Appeals No. 276010.
P
EOPLE V
H
OUSTON
, No. 134618. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275644.
P
EOPLE V
P
IERRE
M
C
C
ALL
, No. 134620. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276974.
P
EOPLE V
H
ARDRICK
, No. 134621; Court of Appeals No. 276250.
P
EOPLE V
R
ATAJCZAK
, No. 134624. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278055.
1004 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
R
EA
, No. 134625. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277026.
P
EOPLE V
D
ELMAREY
M
ITCHELL
, No. 134655; Court of Appeals No. 270581.
P
EOPLE V
K
INT
, Nos. 134689, 134707. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals Nos. 275273, 275874.
P
EOPLE V
D
WAYNE
J
ONES
, No. 134695. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277504.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEPHAN
C
OCHRANE
, No. 134699. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277008.
P
EOPLE V
C
ALVIN
H
ARPER
, No. 134701. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276526.
P
EOPLE V
H
ENNING
, No. 134759; Court of Appeals No. 268651.
L
AHTINEN V
M
ICHIGAN
E
DUCATION
S
UPPORT
P
ERSONNEL —
WUPEA/MEA-
NEA, No. 134771; Court of Appeals No. 266907.
P
EOPLE V
A
MBROSE
, No. 134777. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275571.
P
EOPLE V
J
ONATHON
H
ILL
, No. 134791; Court of Appeals No. 269095.
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
G
ILLAM
, No. 134793; Court of Appeals No. 266893.
P
EOPLE V
P
ERRY
D
AVIS
, No. 134800. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274796.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTLE
, No. 134806; Court of Appeals No. 267374.
P
EOPLE V
L
LANES
, No. 134807. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277242.
L
IVONIA
B
UILDING
M
ATERIALS
C
OMPANY V
H
ARRISON
C
ONSTRUCTION
C
OM-
PANY
, Nos. 134810, 134812; reported below: 276 Mich App 514.
P
EOPLE V
H
AROLD
S
HAW
, No. 134815. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277613.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
W
ARD
, No. 134817; Court of Appeals No. 278538.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
L
AUGHLIN
, No. 134818. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
278224.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1005
P
EOPLE V
T
HEODORE
W
ATKINS
, No. 134820; Court of Appeals No. 278670.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARRISON
, No. 134830. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277524.
P
EOPLE V
P
HILLIP
J
ONES
, No. 134831. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
279095.
B
RIGGS V
O
AKLAND
C
OUNTY,
No. 134837; reported below: 276 Mich App
369.
P
EOPLE V
R
OMMELL
S
ANDERS
, No. 134838; Court of Appeals No. 267953.
P
EOPLE V
O
NUMONU
, No. 134848. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278938.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTOPHER
H
OPKINS
, No. 134856. The defendant has failed
to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 276899.
P
EOPLE V
F
OUNTAIN
, No. 134863. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277241.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
LELLAN
, No. 134866. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 279129.
P
EOPLE V
B
USHEY
, No. 134867; Court of Appeals No. 264849.
P
EOPLE V
S
HEMANSKI
, No. 134869; Court of Appeals No. 278301.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
R
OGER
T
HOMPSON
, No. 134870; Court of Appeals No. 269035.
P
EOPLE V
E
LIJAH
F
ORD
, No. 134872. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276907.
P
EOPLE V
H
OLLIS
, No. 134876. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276211.
Reconsideration Denied December 28, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
B
LANKS
, No. 129807. Summary disposition entered at 480
Mich 914. Court of Appeals No. 255257.
P
EOPLE V
R
ODNEY
H
UBBARD
, No. 133360. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 898. Court of Appeals No. 263300.
1006 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
L
AKE
S
TATES
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY V
M
ASON
I
NSURANCE
A
GENCY,
I
NC
, No.
133587. Leave to appeal denied at 479 Mich 863. Court of Appeals No.
271666.
R
ESPESS V
I
RWIN
M
ORTGAGE
C
ORPORATION
, No. 134076. Leave to appeal
denied at 480 Mich 889. Court of Appeals No. 273902.
P
EOPLE V
C
ONRAD
S
ANDERS
, No. 134116. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 860. Court of Appeals No. 274116.
Summary Disposition January 8, 2008:
E
VANISH V
L
EDIS
, No. 135006. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
because the plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief
identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948
(2007). We remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for entry of an
order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed
by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 259995.
F
OWLER V
B
OTSFORD
G
ENERAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 135008. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the plaintiff falls within the class of
plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We remand this case to the Oakland
Circuit Court for entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion for
summary disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this order and the order in Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal
is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question
presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 259325.
L
ANGE V
S
T
J
OSEPH
M
ERCY
H
OSPITAL
, No. 135054. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the Washtenaw Circuit
Court denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition because
the plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief identified
in our order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We
remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 259496.
P
EOPLE V
A
BRAHAM
, No. 135108. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Macomb Circuit
Court, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. For
the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting statement, and
considering the particular circumstances of this case, the circuit court on
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1007
remand is directed to either allow the defendant to withdraw her plea or
resentence her to a minimum of 19 months. Court of Appeals No. 279561.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 8, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
C
OREY
J
ACKSON
, No. 134877; Court of Appeals No. 268940.
M
ENDEZ V
M
ENDEZ
, No 134880; Court of Appeals No. 268610.
P
EOPLE V
H
AMPTON
, No. 134882; Court of Appeals No. 268812.
P
EOPLE V
L
EITERMAN
, No. 134885; Court of Appeals No. 265821.
W
ILSON V
D
EPARTMENT OF
M
ANAGEMENT AND
B
UDGET
, No. 134887; Court of
Appeals No. 277265.
B
AKER V
HBI, No. 134888; Court of Appeals No. 265994.
P
EOPLE V
N
ORTHERN
, No. 134889; Court of Appeals No. 268809.
P
EOPLE V
L
INDENSMITH
, No. 134891. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No.277052.
P
EOPLE V
P
ETTIGREW
, No. 134895. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276741.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
M
OORE
, Nos. 134896, 134898, 134900; Court of
Appeals Nos. 278544-278546
P
ARAMOUNT
P
ROPERTIES
G
ROUP
LLC v M
C
S
HANE &
B
OWIE
, No. 134899;
Court of Appeals No. 275331.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
S
PENCER
, No. 134904. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 279167.
P
EOPLE V
B
OSS
, No. 134906; Court of Appeals No. 267013.
P
EOPLE V
H
ANKS
, No. 134909; reported below: 276 Mich App 91.
P
EOPLE V
N
OLAN
H
ALL
, No. 134910; Court of Appeals No. 269990.
P
EOPLE V
S
WANSON
, No. 134919. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 270995.
P
EOPLE V
V
ERNON
S
IMMONS
, No. 134921; Court of Appeals No. 274214.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
C
ARL
N
EAL
, No. 134923. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
277083.
P
EOPLE V
S
HELDON
, No. 134926; Court of Appeals No. 268659.
1008 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
H
ANNA
, No. 134935. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277668.
P
EOPLE V
E
RVIN
, No. 134942; Court of Appeals No. 268199.
P
EOPLE V
D
OVE
, No. 134944; Court of Appeals No. 277546.
P
EOPLE V
S
UEING
, No. 134945; Court of Appeals No. 268490.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENA
B
ANKS
, No. 134946; Court of Appeals No. 278888.
P
EOPLE V
M
ISSOURI
, No. 134955. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277754.
P
EOPLE V
A
LFORD
, No. 134959. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 279000.
P
EOPLE V
B
OOTH
, No. 134960; Court of Appeals No. 268085.
P
EOPLE V
S
ILLIVAN
, No. 134961; Court of Appeals No. 269501.
P
EOPLE V
A
RRAHMAAN
, No. 134962; Court of Appeals No. 278030.
P
EOPLE V
D
ENNIS
M
ATHIS
, No. 134963. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277786.
P
EOPLE V
S
PEARMAN
, No. 134964; Court of Appeals No. 278983.
P
EOPLE V
M
ALONE
, No. 134965; Court of Appeals No. 278885.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARROLL
, No. 134966; Court of Appeals No. 270544.
F
IFTH
T
HIRD
B
ANK V
T
AYLOR
, No. 134968; Court of Appeals No. 269872.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
S
MITH
, No. 134974; Court of Appeals No. 279052.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
C
ALEB
, No. 134975; Court of Appeals No. 279253.
L
IGON V
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
, No. 134976; reported below: 276 Mich App
120.
P
EOPLE V
H
ALE
, No. 134980. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 279956.
P
EOPLE V
S
EID
, No. 134982; Court of Appeals No. 267900.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
G
INNIS
, No. 134984; Court of Appeals No. 279018.
P
EOPLE V
P
ONIEDZIALEK
, No. 134987; Court of Appeals No. 277456.
M
ILLER V
S
CHUCHARD
, No. 134992; Court of Appeals No. 275540.
P
EOPLE V
J
ACOBY
, No. 134994; Court of Appeals No. 268804.
J
ACQUES V
D
EPARTMENT OF
E
NVIRONMENTAL
Q
UALITY
, No. 134996; Court of
Appeals No. 268016.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1009
P
EOPLE V
B
LUNT
, No. 135000; Court of Appeals No. 272632.
P
EOPLE V
L
UDY
, No. 135004. For purposes of MCR 6.502(G)(1), the
Court notes that contrary to the Court of Appeals characterization of the
defendant’s application as a motion for relief from judgment, the defen-
dant filed an application for leave to appeal that should have been denied
for lack of merit in the grounds presented. Court of Appeals No. 277969.
P
EOPLE V
J
AHED
, No. 135009; Court of Appeals No. 279784.
P
EOPLE V
R
ANGE
, No. 135012; Court of Appeals No. 270831.
P
EOPLE V
L
OWN
, No. 135015; Court of Appeals No. 269363.
P
EOPLE V
T
YRONE
J
ACKSON
, No. 135016; Court of Appeals No. 271506.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
M
C
D
ONALD
, No. 135017. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279722.
P
EOPLE V
J
ILES
, No. 135018. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 279355.
P
EOPLE V
G
OLDRING
, No. 135020; Court of Appeals No. 278050.
P
EOPLE V
A
PPLEWHITE
, No. 135022; Court of Appeals No. 279318.
P
EOPLE V
F
RITZ
, No. 135024; Court of Appeals No. 278354.
P
EOPLE V
A
LEX
M
ORGAN
, No. 135026; Court of Appeals No. 276556.
P
EOPLE V
P
HRAXAYAVONG
, No. 135027; Court of Appeals No. 270381.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDRE
N
ELSON
, No. 135031. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
279877.
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
, No. 135032; Court of Appeals No. 269465.
P
EOPLE V
A
BDELLATIF
, No. 135034; Court of Appeals No. 280059.
P
EOPLE V
D
RAIN
, No. 135039; Court of Appeals No. 271059.
P
EOPLE V
V
AN
B
ROCKLIN
, No. 135040; Court of Appeals No. 279636.
P
EOPLE V
H
UCKABY
, No. 135041; Court of Appeals No. 265200.
P
EOPLE V
E
CHOLS
, No. 135042. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278675.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRY
D
AVIS
, No. 135043; Court of Appeals No. 269096.
P
EOPLE V
L
YNN
D
AVIS
, No. 135044; Court of Appeals No. 279271.
P
EOPLE V
C
OLEMAN
W
ALKER
, No. 135046; Court of Appeals No. 263278.
1010 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
S
TEVEN
C
ARTER
, No. 135047; Court of Appeals No. 270195.
P
EOPLE V
J
ON
M
ULLINS
, No. 135051. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 279361.
P
EOPLE V
H
ORAN
, No. 135055; Court of Appeals No. 279360.
P
EOPLE V
C
HEATHAM
, No. 135057; Court of Appeals No. 278774.
P
EOPLE V
L
ONYE
J
ONES
, No. 135058; Court of Appeals No. 279886.
P
EOPLE V
B
IRD
, No. 135060; Court of Appeals No. 269154.
P
EOPLE V
R
EDINGER
, No. 135063; Court of Appeals No. 269139.
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
S
MITH,
J
R
, No. 135065; Court of Appeals No. 267942.
P
EOPLE V
A
USTIN
, No. 135071; Court of Appeals No. 279513.
P
EOPLE V
A
NGELO
P
ARKS
, No. 135072; Court of Appeals No. 271291.
P
EOPLE V
P
AGE
, No. 135073; Court of Appeals No. 268541.
P
EOPLE V
S
CHAUB
, No. 135075; Court of Appeals No. 278708.
P
EOPLE V
F
UQUA
, No. 135076; Court of Appeals No. 279195.
B
AUBLITZ V
I
NGHAM
C
IRCUIT
J
UDGE
, No. 135077; Court of Appeals No.
277798.
P
EOPLE V
V
AUGHN
, No. 135079. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 279940.
P
EOPLE V
D
UNLAP
, No. 135081. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277059.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
G
REEN
, No. 135082; Court of Appeals No. 279198.
P
EOPLE V
R
AWLS
, No. 135083; Court of Appeals No. 271472.
P
EOPLE V
W
ESTERFIELD
, No. 135085; Court of Appeals No. 279635.
P
EOPLE V
K
ISSNER
, No. 135086; Court of Appeals No. 271977.
P
EOPLE V
M
EJIA
, No. 135087; Court of Appeals No. 279205.
P
EOPLE V
P
ALAZZOLO
, No. 135088; Court of Appeals No. 269098.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRY
M
ITCHELL
, No. 135092; Court of Appeals No. 279316.
P
EOPLE V
S
TOKES
, No. 135093; Court of Appeals No. 271714.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
A
NTHONY
Y
OUNG
, No. 135094; Court of Appeals No.
272465.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1011
P
EOPLE V
A
LFREY
, No. 135096; Court of Appeals No. 269644.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
D
ARBY
, No. 135101; Court of Appeals No. 270420.
P
EOPLE V
M
YOTT
, No. 135103; Court of Appeals No. 279357.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTJUAN
O
WENS
, No. 135104; Court of Appeals No. 271064.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
J
ONES
, No. 135105. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 277244.
P
EOPLE V
E
RTMAN
, No. 135106; Court of Appeals No. 274360.
P
EOPLE V
B
ERNARD
M
ARTIN
, No. 135109. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277726.
E
VANS V
D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES
, No. 135110; Court of Appeals
No. 277004.
P
EOPLE V
J
OSEPH
F
LOWERS
, No. 135112; Court of Appeals No. 267943.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRY
S
MITH
, No. 135113; Court of Appeals No. 270761.
P
EOPLE V
M
EIER
, No. 135116; Court of Appeals No. 278155.
P
EOPLE V
Y
OUNGER
, No. 135121; Court of Appeals No. 269299.
P
EOPLE V
V
ARGAS
J
OHNSON
, No. 135127. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 277968.
P
EOPLE V
T
ALLEY
, No. 135128; Court of Appeals No. 271178.
P
EOPLE V
H
OBSON
, No. 135129; Court of Appeals No. 279779.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEVENSON
B
ELL
, No. 135130; Court of Appeals No. 279440.
P
EOPLE V
K
EITH
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135131. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 279642.
P
EOPLE V
C
ONELY
, No. 135135; Court of Appeals No. 276792.
P
EOPLE V
T
REYVEON
W
ILSON
, No. 135136; Court of Appeals No. 272240.
P
EOPLE V
O
TIS
N
ELSON
, No. 135142; Court of Appeals No. 269958.
P
EOPLE V
L
EONARD
R
OBINSON
, No. 135143; Court of Appeals No. 270687.
P
EOPLE V
A
LTONEY
B
AKER
, No. 135145; Court of Appeals No. 271084.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
D
ANIELS
, No. 135153; Court of Appeals No. 279190.
P
EOPLE V
D
USTIN
H
ICKS
, No. 135154; Court of Appeals No. 270898.
1012 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
G
RADY
B
ROWN
, No. 135155. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278843.
P
EOPLE V
T
ATUM
, No. 135174; Court of Appeals No. 272249.
P
EOPLE V
K
EMP
, No. 135175. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278291.
P
EOPLE V
B
REWER
, No. 135177; Court of Appeals No. 279686.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
B
ELL
, No. 135180; Court of Appeals No. 279883.
P
EOPLE V
A
RDITO
, No. 135181. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278432.
P
EOPLE V
G
REG
D
ARBY
, No. 135182; Court of Appeals No. 278609.
P
ETSCH V
C
ONVENTION &
S
HOW
S
ERVICES
, No. 135183; Court of Appeals
No. 278313.
H
UGHES V
T
IMKO
, No. 135186; Court of Appeals No. 255229 (on
remand).
P
EOPLE V
S
WANSBROUGH
, No. 135188; Court of Appeals No. 271126.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
L
EWIS
, No. 135192. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
279450.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
M
ULLINS
, No. 135194; Court of Appeals No. 279659.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
G
EE
, No. 135196; Court of Appeals No. 278637.
P
EOPLE V
B
RUCE
H
OWARD
, No. 135197. The defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No.
277843.
P
EOPLE V
B
ANKSTON
, No. 135198; Court of Appeals No. 271676.
P
EOPLE V
M
AYBEE
, No. 135205; Court of Appeals No. 279664.
P
EOPLE V
A
LGEROW
W
RIGHT
, No. 135216; Court of Appeals No. 279620.
P
EOPLE V
T
ONY
K
EAN
, No. 135218; Court of Appeals No. 279987.
P
EOPLE V
K
LEMAS
, No. 135239; Court of Appeals No. 280561.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal January 11, 2008:
O
RAM V
O
RAM
, No. 134670. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1013
action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the parties shall address
whether the circuit court properly imposed the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice and whether the dismissal order was a “verdict” as defined in
MCR 2.403(O)(4) for purposes of ordering case evaluation sanctions. The
parties may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this
order, but they should not submit mere restatements of their application
papers. Court of Appeals No. 267077.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
S
MITH
, No. 134682. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the parties shall address: (1)
whether the upward departure from the recommendation of the sentenc-
ing guidelines is proportionate, see People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264,
273 (2003); and (2) whether the trial court fulfilled its obligation to
“articulate on the record a substantial and compelling reason for its
particular departure, and explain why this reason justifies that depar-
ture.” Babcock, supra at 272 (emphasis in original). We further order the
Wayne Circuit Court, in accordance with Administrative Order No.
2003-3, to determine whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to
appoint counsel to represent the defendant in this Court. The parties
may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of either the
appointment of counsel or the determination that the defendant is not
entitled to appointed counsel, but they should not submit mere restate-
ments of their application papers. Court of Appeals No. 267099.
Y
OUNG
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order scheduling oral argument
on the application, but write separately because I fear that this Court is
embarking on an impossible mission. This case raises the question
whether a trial judge who articulates substantial and compelling reasons
to depart from the sentencing guidelines range must sentence the
defendant with such mathematical precision, by comparing the facts and
circumstances of the defendant’s crime against a hypothetically better or
worse fact pattern, that the severity of his crime is perfectly matched
with the extent of the departure. I do not believe that there is a principled
way to achieve this mathematical precision, nor do I think that the
guidelines statutes, properly construed, impose this burden on the trial
judge.
W
EAVER
and C
ORRIGAN
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice Y
OUNG
.
Summary Dispositions January 11, 2008:
J
AMES V
S
TATE
F
ARM
F
IRE &
C
ASUALTY
C
OMPANY
, No. 130460. On Decem-
ber 5, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave
to appeal the November 8, 2005, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On
order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and the judgment of the St. Clair Circuit Court granting
defendant-appellee Gasowski and plaintiff-appellee Safeco Insurance
Company summary disposition, and we remand this case to the St. Clair
Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.
The “Release and Settlement Agreement” resolving the underlying
action specifically contemplated litigating the identity of the driver of the
1014 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
jet-ski in this case. Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting
summary disposition to Gasowski and Safeco against defendant-
appellant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company on collateral estoppel
grounds. Court of Appeals No. 262805.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTIAN
-B
ATES
, No. 134922. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals shall address whether
the trial judge’s admitted error in cutting off defense counsel’s closing
argument was harmless, taking into consideration that the defendant
admitted shooting at the victim, the only question for the jury was the
defendant’s intent, and the defendant was convicted of the lesser offense
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 269919.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 11, 2008:
O
DOM V
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
, No. 133433; Court of Appeals No. 270501.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). The defendant police officer has several
years of experience in arresting prostitutes. She suspected plaintiff of
being a prostitute because of the way she was walking back and forth on
the street and making eye contact with drivers in an area known for
prostitution. Defendant eventually saw plaintiff get into a vehicle. She
followed the vehicle, stopped it, and arrested plaintiff for disorderly
conduct. In my judgment, defendant appears to have conducted herself in
a conscientious and responsible manner. However, when the charges were
subsequently dismissed, plaintiff sued defendant for false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for
summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
MCL 691.1407 provides, in pertinent part:
(2) [E]ach officer and employee of a governmental agency...is
immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to
property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the
course of employment or service...ifallofthefollowingaremet:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or
reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or
her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or
discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct
does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of
the injury or damage.
(3) Subsection (2) does not alter the law of intentional torts as
it existed before July 7, 1986. [Emphasis supplied.]
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1015
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that defendant was grossly
negligent. The trial court held that “[t]his does not amount to a claim of
an intentional act” and that the issue was whether defendant was grossly
negligent, defining this in terms of whether defendant had “probable
cause” to arrest plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that a question of
fact existed regarding whether defendant acted in an “objectively reason-
able” manner. Defendant now argues that imposing liability for “unrea-
sonable” conduct contravenes the Legislature’s grant of governmental
immunity.
In Stewart v Haan, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued September 25, 1998 (Docket No. 201250), slip op at 2, the
Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he law of governmental immunity and
alleged intentional torts by government agents is beset by confusion.” As
that Court explained,
[t]he governmental immunity statute provides an exception for
gross negligence. MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3[.]996(107)(2). The
statute also contains the cryptic provision that “[s]ubsection (2)
shall not be construed as altering the law of intentional torts as it
existed before July 7, 1986.” MCL 691.1407(3); MSA
3[.]996(107)(3). Researching the interplay between these two
provisions, we encountered two seemingly contradictory authori-
ties on immunity for officers charged with intentional torts. Bell v
Fox, 206 Mich App 522; 522 NW2d 869 (1994), held that officers
sued for false arrest were entitled to immunity because they had
acted within the scope of their authority (implicitly referring to
Subsection [2]) and stated that “contrary to plaintiff’s argument,
there is no intentional tort exception to the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity.” Id. at 525. In contrast, in Sudul v Hamtramck,
221 Mich App 455, 482; 562 NW2d 478 (1997), this Court held that
“an individual employee’s intentional torts are not shielded by our
governmental statute, a proposition that too frequently is mired in
confusion.” Id. at 458. [Id., slip op at3n2.]
Because the law in this area is in such disarray, I would grant leave to
appeal. Although this appeal is interlocutory, if defendant is entitled to
immunity, she should not have to expend time and resources to defend
herself. “[A] ‘central purpose’ of governmental immunity is ‘to prevent a
drain on the state’s financial resources, by avoiding even the expense of
having to contest on the merits any claim barred by governmental
immunity.’ ” Costa v Community Emergency Med Services, 475 Mich 403,
410 (2006), quoting Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 203 n 18 (2002).
“Allowing governmental employee defendants to raise an immunity
defense while simultaneously requiring that they disrupt their duties and
expend time and taxpayer resources to prepare an unnecessary affidavit
of meritorious defense, would render illusory the immunity afforded by
the [governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.].” Costa, supra
at 410.
1016 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Further, this is an issue not only of jurisprudential confusion, but also
of considerable substantive significance given the potential deterrent
effect of this decision on police officers undertaking legitimate arrests.
Not every arrest leads to a criminal conviction, and not every arrest
proves in the end to have been well-founded. The “gross negligence”
standard for immunity affords a significantly greater level of protection
for police officers in carrying out their responsibilities than does the
“probable cause” standard of the trial court, the “objectively reasonable”
standard of the Court of Appeals, or the “intentional conduct” standard.
Police officers are entitled to know the standard of liability applicable to
their conduct, as is the Legislature, which enacted the governmental
immunity statute. If the liability of police officers is to be judged by a
standard other than gross negligence, this should be made clear. It is hard
to imagine a legal proposition more damaging to effective law enforce-
ment activity than that a mistaken arrest will expose a police officer to
personal civil liability. There are many things that a police officer should
be evaluating when he or she makes an arrest; the threat of civil liability
if he or she makes a wrong decision should not be at the top of this list.
D
ULEMBA V
T
HOMAS
MC
OOLEY
L
AW
S
CHOOL
, No. 134477; Court of
Appeals No. 274811.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). Plaintiff attempted to sue defendant Thomas
M. Cooley Law School in the Ingham Circuit Court alleging a violation of
the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act.
1
The complaint was
delivered to the clerk of the court on September 19, 2005, the day that the
statutory period of limitations expired. However, the complaint was not
signed. The clerk informed plaintiff of the error a few days later. On
September 27, plaintiff corrected the error. Defendant subsequently
moved for summary disposition on the basis that the claim was barred by
the statute of limitations. The circuit court agreed and granted defen-
dant’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion
per curiam, issued June 12, 2007 (D
OCKET
N
O.
274811).
Plaintiff argues that her claim is timely because it was “filed” on
September 19, 2005. I find merit to her argument and would grant leave
to appeal to consider it further.
A claim is untimely unless it is commenced within the period provided
by the applicable statute of limitations.
2
“A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court.”
3
Here, the complaint was delivered to the court within the period of
limitations. But it was not signed until after the limitations period had
expired. Accordingly, the issue is whether delivery of the document to the
clerk of the court was sufficient to “file” the complaint or whether the
complaint was “filed” only after it was signed.
In considering this issue, I find MCR 2.114(C)(2) instructive. That
court rule provides:
1
MCL 37.1101 et seq.
2
MCL 600.5805(1).
3
MCL 600.1901.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1017
Failure To Sign. If a document is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the party.
Hence, an unsigned document will be “stricken unless it is signed
promptly.” The fact that the document may be “stricken” indicates that
it was “filed” when it was delivered to the clerk. If the document had not
been “filed” upon delivery, there would be no need to strike it. Therefore,
it appears that an unsigned complaint is “filed” upon delivery, but it will
be stricken if it is not signed promptly.
In this case, the complaint was delivered to the clerk before the
expiration of the period of limitations, and plaintiff signed it promptly
after she was informed that it was unsigned. Therefore, if the above
argument is correct, the complaint was timely filed. I would grant leave
to consider this argument further.
Besides finding support for plaintiff’s position in MCR 2.114(C)(2), I
find the facts of this case analogous to those in Kirkaldy v Rim.
4
In that
case, the plaintiff filed with the court an affidavit of merit that was
defective.
5
The Court of Appeals determined that the filing did not toll
the period of limitations.
6
This Court unanimously reversed, concluding
that the statutory period of limitations was tolled when the complaint
and affidavit of merit were filed, regardless of whether the affidavit was
defective.
7
Similarly, here, plaintiff filed a complaint but failed to sign it. In
essence, she filed a defective complaint. But just as a defective affidavit of
merit was sufficient in Kirkaldy, so too should a defective complaint be
sufficient here.
Because I find support for plaintiff’s argument in MCR 2.114(C)(2)
and in Kirkaldy, I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether we
should reverse the Court of Appeals decision on this interesting issue.
W
EAVER
, J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
P
EOPLE V
G
OODWIN
, No. 134490. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276338.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). Defendant pleaded guilty of assault with intent
to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
He was sentenced to life in prison, with the possibility of parole, for the
assault conviction. In this motion for relief from judgment, defendant
challenges the legitimacy of that sentence in light of the current
Michigan Parole Board’s “life means life” policy. In Foster-Bey v Rubits-
4
Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007).
5
Id. at 583.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 585-586.
1018 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
chun,
1
Judge Marianne O. Battani of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that changes made to Michigan’s
parole law and polices in 1992 and 1999 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the United States Constitution.
2
For the reasons discussed in my
dissenting statement in People v Scott, 480 Mich 1019 (2008), I believe the
Court should grant leave to appeal in this case as well as in Scott to
consider the jurisprudentially significant issues raised in the Foster-Bey
decision.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
P
EOPLE V
A
LEX
S
COTT
, No. 134743. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). See
People v Hill, 267 Mich App 345 (2005), lv den 474 Mich 1069 (2006).
Court of Appeals No. 278158.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal. In 1987, defen-
dant pleaded guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life in prison with
the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a consecutive
two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Nineteen years later,
defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment. He argues that his plea
was invalid because he made it under a misunderstanding of the
consequences of a parolable life sentence. He also argues that he has a
liberty interest in parole and that the current Michigan Parole Board’s
“life means life” policy violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution.
1
The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of
Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
Defendant’s argument implicates the 2007 decision of Judge Mari-
anne O. Battani of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan in Foster-Bey v Rubitschun.
2
Judge Battani held that
changes made to Michigan’s parole law and policies in 1992 and 1999
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution when
retrospectively applied to prisoners like defendant.
3
1
Unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, issued October 23, 2007 (Docket No.
05-71318).
2
US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1.
1
US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1.
2
Foster-Bey v Rubitschun, unpublished opinion of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued October 23,
2007 (Docket No. 05-71318).
3
The class of prisoners like defendant was stipulated to include
[a]ll parolable lifers in the custody of the Michigan Department
of Corrections who committed crimes (for which they received
a parolable life sentence) before October 1, 1992, and whose
parole the “new” parole board has denied, passed over, ex-
pressed no interest in pursuing, or otherwise rejected or
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1019
The 1992 changes included a statutory reduction in the frequency of
parole interviews for lifers.
4
Previously, interviews were required in the
fourth year of imprisonment and every two years thereafter. The sched-
ule was changed to require the initial interview only after 10 years of
imprisonment and every five years thereafter.
5
The 1992 changes in-
creased the size of the parole board and permitted the victims of crimes
to appeal from a grant of parole.
6
Under the 1999 changes, the requirement for an interview every
fifth year after the initial 10-year period was eliminated.
7
A file or
paper review was deemed sufficient.
8
The 1999 changes also included a
limitation on appeals of parole decisions to state courts. Appeals were
allowed only by the prosecutor or the victim.
9
Finally, under the 1999
changes, when the parole board elects not to provide a public hearing to
a convict serving a life sentence, it is not considered a “decision” of the
board. This exempts the board from the statutory requirement to provide
written reasons for the “denial.”
10
Retroactive changes in a law governing the parole of prisoners may
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if they increase the punishment for a
crime after its commission.
11
To determine if a violation has occurred,
courts must determine if the changes have created ‘ “a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
deferred. Excluded from this definition are so-called “drug
lifers” who were convicted of distribution or possession of
controlled substances, regardless of whether the crime was
originally one subject to parolable life or one converted to
parolable life at a later time. For purposes of this class
definition, the “new” parole board refers to the board that
came into existence pursuant to the 1992 statutory changes in
parole, and that gradually took over from the old board in the
period from c. 1992 to 1994. As before, if further refinement of
the class definition is needed, including the creation of sub-
classes, that issue will be addressed when and if the parties
raise it. [Id. at 3, quoting stipulation and order of class
certification.]
4
See 1992 PA 181.
5
Foster-Bey, supra at 6-7.
6
Id.at7.
7
See 1999 PA 191.
8
Foster-Bey, supra at 7.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Garner v Jones, 529 US 244, 249-250 (2000).
1020 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
crimes.” ’
12
Parole decisions in Michigan are discretionary.
13
In Garner,
14
the United States Supreme Court explained that
where parole is concerned discretion, by its very definition, is
subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then
exercised. The idea of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the
obligation, to change and adapt based on experience. New insights
into the accuracy of predictions about the offense and the risk of
recidivism consequent upon the offender’s release, along with a
complex of other factors, will inform parole decisions.
However, given the 1992 and 1999 changes to Michigan’s parole law
and policies, the parole board appears to have effectively abdicated
exercise of the discretion bestowed on it by statute. The parole board’s
apparent abdication of its discretionary authority is arguably exemplified
by its admission that it believes the imposition of a life sentence means a
prisoner will serve life in prison.
15
Moreover, there is evidence that is
neither attenuated nor speculative that prisoners like defendant serve a
longer sentence as a result of the parole board’s new “life means life”
policy. There is also evidence that the changes have resulted in a
decreased parole rate.
16
In Shabazz v Gabry,
17
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
1992 changes to Michigan’s parole system did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. In doing so, the court rejected the district court’s contrary
holding with regard to two subclasses of prisoners. The Sixth Circuit
found the district court’s analysis unpersuasive because it rested on
anecdotal observations and personal speculation about the risk of in-
creased punishment.
18
In Foster-Bey, Judge Battani carefully evaluated substantial evidence,
including deposition testimony and statistics not available in Shabazz.
That evidence indicates that the implementation of the 1992 and 1999
changes to Michigan’s parole law and policies has resulted in longer
periods of incarceration for parolable lifers.
19
In her well-supported
opinion, Judge Battani concluded that the cumulative effect of the 1992
12
Id. at 250, quoting California Dep’t of Corrections v Morales, 514 US
499, 509 (1995).
13
MCL 791.233(1)(a); MCL 791.234(11).
14
Garner, supra at 253.
15
Foster-Bey, supra at 20.
16
Id. at 34-42.
17
Shabazz v Gabry, 123 F3d 909 (1997).
18
Id. at 914-915.
19
Judge Battani explained the flaws in the analysis used by the Court
of Appeals in People v Hill, 267 Mich App 345 (2005). Foster-Bey, supra at
36-37.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1021
and 1999 changes violated the constitutional rights of a class of prisoners
of which defendant is a member. She held:
20
The change in the make-up of the Michigan Parole Board, the
Board’s understanding of why the change occurred and how it was
to exercise its discretion, its redefining of the eligibility procedure
for nonmandatory lifers, and changes to the timing and intervals
of the interview and review process, when considered in total have
significantly disadvantaged the class and constitute a violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Judge Battani’s opinion raises significant concerns about the consti-
tutionality of this state’s parole system for those sentenced to parolable
life terms before 1992. The Court should grant leave to appeal to
consider this jurisprudentially significant issue.
C
AVANAGH,
J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
In re M
ARSHALL
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
T
HOMPSON
), No.
135120; Court of Appeals No. 274736.
In re W
HITE
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
K
ESSLER
), No. 135520;
Court of Appeals No. 275043.
In re L
ONG
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
L
ONG
), No. 135541; Court
of Appeals No. 278874.
P
EOPLE V
C
AMP
, No. 135545; Court of Appeals No. 281083.
Summary Dispositions January 18, 2008:
H
OUDINI
P
ROPERTIES,
LLCvC
ITY OF
R
OMULUS
, No. 132018. On November
8, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
appeal the June 13, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of
the Court, the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and vacate the Wayne Circuit Court’s orders of
October 19, 2005, granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(6) and (7), on the grounds of failure to comply with MCR
2.203(A) and res judicata. The plaintiff’s claim of appeal pursuant to
MCL 125.585(11) was not a “pleading.” MCR 2.110(A). As the defendant
has acknowledged, the joinder rules of MCR 2.203 therefore do not apply
to a claim of appeal from the decision of a zoning board of appeals. The
decision of the circuit court on appeal from the zoning board of appeals’
denial of a use variance was not res judicata on the plaintiff’s constitu-
tional claims. The zoning board of appeals did not have jurisdiction to
decide the plaintiff’s substantive due process and taking claims. Under
20
Id. at 42.
1022 480 M
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MCL 125.585(11), the circuit court’s review is confined to the record and
decision of the zoning board of appeals. Therefore, the circuit court could
not rule on taking issues in the plaintiff’s appeal. The Court of Appeals
and the Wayne Circuit Court erred in relying on the rationale of the
unpublished decision in Sammut v City of Birmingham, issued January
4, 2005 (Docket No. 250322). We remand this case to the Wayne Circuit
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 266338.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting).
I
I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and vacate the trial court’s orders granting summary
disposition for defendant. Although I concur that the compulsory-joinder
rules of MCR 2.203(A) do not apply, I believe that the decision of the
circuit court on appeal from the zoning board of appeals’ (ZBA) denial of
a use variance was res judicata regarding plaintiff’s taking claim.
Plaintiff, a sophisticated developer, acquired an odd-sized, one-third
acre lot for $25,000 near Detroit Metropolitan Airport in 1998. When
plaintiff acquired the lot, the location was zoned “business transitional”
and prohibited the erection of billboards.
1
Although the city later rezoned
the property as “regional center,” that zoning classification also prohib-
ited billboards. Six years after plaintiff acquired the lot, it sought a use
variance to erect a billboard. Plaintiff asserted various constitutional
claims before the ZBA, including a claim that the denial of the use
variance for a billboard was a taking. The city’s planning consultant
recommended that the ZBA deny the application for the following
reasons:
1. There are no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances or
conditions applicable to the site that are not common to other
similarly zoned lots in the immediate vicinity of this subdivision.
The lots are of a similar size and configuration as the other
surrounding lots within this subdivision and possess the same
access issue.
2. Placing a billboard in this site would convey a special
privilege to this land owner that is not enjoyed by others in the
district and immediate vicinity of this subdivision.
1
A billboard on plaintiff’s lot also required an airport zoning permit
because the property is within Zone A of the airport’s zoning ordinance,
which is the precision instrument zone for 10 runways. There is no
indication that plaintiff ever obtained the permit from the airport to
allow the erection of a billboard on the property.
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3. The billboard will not meet the 20 foot side yard setback
from the north property line and will cast a shadow on the lot to
the north.
4. That granting the variance will not be in harmony with the
purpose and intent of the RC [regional center] District and is
contrary to the recommendations of the Master Plan for develop-
ment of the Metro Center area.
5. There are several other areas of the City that allow bill-
boards.
The ZBA therefore denied the application, on the basis of the
recommendation of the city’s planning consultant.
Plaintiff appealed the ZBA decision in the circuit court, arguing,
among other things, that the ZBA’s denial of the use variance was a
taking. Plaintiff later filed this separate civil action, seeking damages
arising from the same denial by the ZBA. Plaintiff again asserted a taking
claim, a denial of substantive due process, and a 42 USC 1983 civil rights
claim. The circuit court then affirmed the ZBA’s denial of a variance. In
doing so, the circuit court effectively ruled on plaintiff’s taking claim:
[T]he fact that the property involved has very limited use
doesn’t mean that it’s worthless or it can’t be used. There are some
uses that the property can be put to other than having a billboard,
and it’s not been shown to be totally worthless.
Then, in the instant case, the circuit court granted summary disposition
for the city based on compulsory joinder and res judicata. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
In Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412 (2007),
this Court stated the requirements for application of the doctrine of res
judicata:
“The doctrine of res judicata is employed to prevent multiple
suits litigating the same cause of action. The doctrine bars a
second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided on
the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their
privies, and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have
been, resolved in the first. This Court has taken a broad approach
to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims
already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same
transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could
have raised but did not.” [Id. at 418, quoting Adair v Michigan,
470 Mich 105, 121 (2004) (citations omitted).]
Here, there is no question that plaintiff’s ZBA appeal in the circuit court
was decided on the merits and that plaintiff’s ZBA appeal and taking
claim involve the same parties. I disagree with the majority that
plaintiff’s taking claim could not have been resolved with the ZBA appeal
1024 480 M
ICHIGAN
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in the circuit court. The order fails to explain why plaintiff could not have
asserted its taking claim with its ZBA appeal.
The order holds that the circuit court could not rule on plaintiff’s
taking claim because the court’s review under MCL 125.585(11) was
confined to the decision of the ZBA. That MCL 125.585(11) stated that
the circuit court “shall review the record and decision of the board of
appeals,” however, does not mean that the court is precluded from also
reviewing other general jurisdiction claims involving the same facts, such
as a taking claim stemming from the ZBA decision.
The majority also concludes that res judicata does not apply to
plaintiff’s taking claim because the circuit court’s review is confined to
the record created in the ZBA. When taking claims are not brought
within the confines of MCL 125.585(11), however, nothing prevents the
circuit court from taking additional evidence on those claims. Further, in
applying res judicata, Michigan uses the “same transaction” test, not a
“same evidence” test. Adair, supra at 124-125. In Adair, this Court
explained the difference:
“Under the ‘same evidence’ test, a second suit is barred ‘if the
evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained
the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both
actions.’ The ‘transactional’ test provides that ‘the assertion of
different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause
of action if a single group of operative facts give[s] rise to the
assertion of relief.’
***
“[U]nder the same evidence test the definition of what consti-
tutes a cause of action is narrower than under the transactional
test. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the
same evidence test is tied to the theories of relief asserted by a
plaintiff, the result of which is that two claims may be part of the
same transaction, yet be considered separate causes of action
because the evidence needed to support the theories on which they
are based differs. By contrast, the transactional approach is more
pragmatic. Under this approach, a claim is viewed in ‘factual
terms’ and considered ‘coterminous with the transaction, regard-
less of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of
relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the
plaintiff;***andregardlessofthevariationsintheevidence
needed to support the theories or rights.’ ” [Id. at 124, quoting
River Park, Inc v Highland Park, 184 Ill 2d 290, 307-309 (1998).]
Thus, under Michigan’s test, it is not dispositive that the evidence needed
to prove the taking claim is different than what was needed in the ZBA
appeal in the circuit court. Adair, supra at 124-125. In Adair, supra at
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125, this Court held that although the fact that the two claims require
different evidence “may have some relevance, the determinative question
is whether the claims” in the taking case arose as part of the same
transaction as the claims in the ZBA appeal in the circuit court.
“ ‘Whether a factual grouping constitutes a “transaction” for purposes of
res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether
the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether
they form a convenient trial unit....’”Id. at 125, quoting 46 Am Jur
2d, Judgments, § 533, p 801 (emphasis deleted).
Here, a single set of facts gives rise to relief under both the ZBA
appeal and the taking theory. Plaintiff even conceded as much in its
complaint in the civil action when it stated the following: “There is
another civil action pending in the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne
involving the parties hereto that relates [to] the subject matter involved
inthisaction.... That action is the Plaintiff’s appeal of a decision by the
Defendant’s Zoning Board of Appeals.” In the ZBA appeal in the circuit
court, plaintiff argued that the ZBA erred in applying the zoning
ordinance and denying plaintiff’s application for a variance to erect a
billboard. Plaintiff argued that the denial of the variance would result in
a taking because it would deprive plaintiff’s property of all value. In the
civil action, plaintiff argued a taking claim, a violation of substantive due
process, and a violation of 42 USC 1983, all stemming from defendant’s
application of its zoning ordinance and denial of plaintiff’s variance
request. The origin of both actions was plaintiff’s inability to erect a
billboard on the property. Plaintiff’s civil action clearly involves facts that
are closely related in time, space, and origin to the ZBA appeal in the
circuit court. Thus, plaintiff’s taking claim is barred by res judicata
because plaintiff could have brought that claim together with the ZBA
appeal in the circuit court.
II
Not only do I conclude that plaintiff could have asserted its taking
claim along with the ZBA appeal in the circuit court, I also conclude that
plaintiff did assert its taking claim within the confines of MCL
125.585(11) as part of its ZBA appeal. At all times relevant to this appeal,
MCL 125.585(11) provided:
2
The decision of the board of [zoning] appeals is final. However,
a person having an interest affected by the zoning ordinance may
appeal to the circuit court. Upon appeal, the circuit court shall
review the record and decision of the board of appeals to ensure
that the decision meets all of the following requirements:
2
Effective July 1, 2006, MCL 125.585 was repealed by the new
Michigan Zoning Enabling Act, 2006 PA 110, MCL 125.3101 et seq. The
section equivalent to MCL 125.585(11) is now codified as MCL
125.3606(1), which is substantively identical.
1026 480 M
ICHIGAN
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(a) Complies with the constitution and laws of this state.
(b) Is based upon proper procedure.
(c) Is supported by competent, material, and substantial evi-
dence on the record.
(d) Represents the reasonable exercise of discretion granted by
law to the board of appeals. [Emphasis added.]
That MCL 125.585(11) stated that the circuit court “shall review the
record and decision of the board of appeals” does not mean that the court
is precluded from reviewing the constitutional ramifications of the ZBA
decision or other claims involving the same facts, such as a constitutional
challenge to the zoning ordinance. Rather, the unambiguous statutory
language clearly required the circuit court to review the ZBA decision to
ensure that it complied with the constitution. Nothing in the statute
allows a person appealing a ZBA decision to reserve an original civil
action alleging claims related to the ZBA decision. By allowing plaintiff to
file a taking claim separately from the ZBA appeal in the circuit court, the
majority has mandated that extant procedures under our court rules
trump the unambiguous statutory language mandating the circuit court
to review constitutional issues to ensure that the ZBA decision complies
with the constitution.
Perhaps more troubling is that the taking issue was adjudicated in the
appeal. Plaintiff actually raised constitutional claims in the ZBA and its
subsequent appeal in the circuit court. Plaintiff initially made the
following arguments in its brief to the ZBA:
The right to use one’s property is one of the most basic property
rights that an owner enjoys. It has long been the law in Michigan
that the exclusion of an owner’s enjoyment or the partial destruc-
tion or diminution of a property’s value by a governmental agent
may constitute a taking. See e.g. Pearsall v Easton Co Bd of
Supervisors, 74 Mich 558, 561-562 (1889).
The Applicant, unlike other property owners in the RC
zoning district, is being fully deprived of its right to enjoy the
Subject Property solely because of the City’s action in zoning
the Subject Property to a district in which it cannot be devel-
oped in any way....
***
. . . Due to the Zoning Ordinance, the Subject Property literally
cannot be developed in any way. This renders it both unusable and
unmarketable and may constitute a taking. See Pearsall [, supra at
561-562].
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Plaintiff made similar arguments in the circuit court when appealing the
ZBA decision. Plaintiff even argued in the circuit court that the ZBA
“missed” the taking issue and should have addressed it. Plaintiff argued,
in pertinent part, as follows in its circuit court brief:
This Honorable Court is not bound by the findings and
conclusions of the ZBA, but may “negate actions which are so
unreasonable as to rise to the level of unconstitutionality.” Mace-
nas v Michiana, [433 Mich 380, 395 (1989)].
***
The substantial right at issue is the right to use one’s property,
which is one of the most basic property rights that an owner enjoys.
The exclusion of an owner’s enjoyment or the partial destruction or
diminution of a property’s value by a governmental actor may
constitute a taking. See e.g. Pearsall [,supra at 561-562]. Houdini,
which has owed [sic] the Property for years, is being denied this right
and is entitled to a variance as a matter of law. See e.g. Bassey [v
Huntington Woods, 344 Mich 701, 705-706 (1956)].
Despite the fact that Houdini’s Use Variance Application
clearly framed this issue and provided supporting Michigan case
law, the ZBA and the Planning Consultant’s Report again missed
the issue, claiming that the construction of the billboard itself was
the property right at issue.
***
As discussed previously, the ZBA wholly ignored the most
critical fact—that the Property cannot be developed due entirely to
the City’s own actions. This is the exceptional issue that creates an
unnecessary hardship justifying a variance. It is also an unconsti-
tutional use of the City’s police power. See Bassey, supra. [Empha-
sis added; citations omitted.]
Thus, plaintiff actually argued in its appeal of the ZBA’s decision that
application of the zoning ordinance and the denial of the variance
application resulted in a taking. The circuit court affirmed the ZBA’s
denial of plaintiff’s variance application.
3
The Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal that decision.
The circuit court had a duty under MCL 125.585(11) to address the
constitutional implications of the ZBA’s decision. Yet, instead of comply-
ing with MCL 125.585(11), plaintiff filed a separate, duplicative civil
1028 480 M
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action alleging an unconstitutional taking. The majority’s decision en-
courages gamesmanship by allowing a person appealing a ZBA decision a
second bite at the apple by filing a civil suit. If a plaintiff’s constitutional
arguments are unsuccessful in the ZBA appeal in the circuit court, the
separate civil action allows another trip on the same issue.
Even if the facts established in the ZBA record might have been
insufficient for the circuit court to decide the taking claim, both statutory
and court rule solutions exist that permit the taking of additional
evidence so that the taking claim can be made in a ZBA appeal in the
circuit court. Specifically, MCL 125.585(12)
4
and MCR 7.105(I)
5
permit
the circuit court to order the ZBA to take additional evidence. In
Womack-Scott v Dep’t of Corrections, 246 Mich App 70 (2001), the Court
of Appeals explained this procedure as it applies under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq.:
Constitutional issues not within the administrative agency’s
jurisdiction can be raised in the circuit court through the review
procedure in the APA; no separate action is contemplated or
allowed. Indeed, MCR 24.304(3) provides that “[t]he court, on
request, shall hear oral arguments and receive written briefs.”
Moreover, the APA and the applicable court rule provide a method
for taking additional evidence if necessary. MCL 24.305; MCR
7.105(I); cf. In re Nichols, 150 Mich App 1, 9; 388 NW2d 682 (1986)
(“While the APA limits review to the record, it also provides [a
party] a remedy rendering a de novo court hearing unnecessary.”).
4
MCL 125.585(12) provided:
If the court finds the record of the board of appeals inadequate
to make the review required by this section, or that additional
material evidence exists that with good reason was not presented
to the board of appeals, the court shall order further proceedings
before the board of appeals on conditions that the court considers
proper. The board of appeals may modify its findings and decision
as a result of the new proceedings, or may affirm the original
decision. The supplementary record and decision shall be filed
with the court.
5
MCR 7.105(I) provides:
Additional Evidence. An application to present proofs of alleged
irregularity in procedure before the agency, or to allow the taking
of additional evidence before the agency, is timely only if it is filed
with or included in the petition for review. The petitioner shall
promptly notice the request for hearing in the manner for notice of
hearing of motions. If the court orders the taking of additional
evidence, the time for filing briefs is stayed until the taking of the
evidence is completed.
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Further, when there is an appeal from an administrative agency,
the circuit court “may affirm, reverse, remand, or modify the
decision of the agency and may grant the petitioner or the
respondent further relief as appropriate based on the record,
findings, and conclusions.” MCR 7.105(M). This procedure is
sufficient to provide plaintiff relief from an administrative agency
decision and for claims not decided by the administrative agency.
[Womack-Scott, supra at 81 (emphasis added).]
As the Womack-Scott panel explained, this procedure permits a plaintiff
filing a ZBA appeal in the circuit court to also obtain relief on a taking
claim, even though the ZBA did not decide or take evidence on that claim.
Under this procedure, once the ZBA takes additional evidence regarding
the taking claim, the circuit court will have a sufficient factual basis to
decide that claim. Accordingly, constitutional issues that were not within
the ZBA’s jurisdiction can be raised in the circuit court with the ZBA
appeal. “[N]o separate action is contemplated or allowed.” Id.
Caselaw supports the application of res judicata in this case. In Krohn
v City of Saginaw, 175 Mich App 193, 194-195 (1988), the defendant
obtained a variance from the planning commission (acting for the ZBA) to
build a store. The plaintiffs, adjacent landowners, appealed that decision
in the circuit court. Id. at 195. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs’
appeal as untimely, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Id.
at 196-197. The Court of Appeals, however, stated that it was necessary
to consider the plaintiffs’ argument that certain aspects of their com-
plaint should not have been dismissed because they represented different
causes of action not covered by the filing deadline. The Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiffs’ taking and due process claims did not establish
separate causes of action and should be raised in an appeal from the
planning commission:
Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that their state and
federal due process rights were violated and that their property
had been taken without just compensation as protected by the
state constitution.... Withrespect to [this count and two other
counts of plaintiffs’ complaint], we believe that they all raise issues
relative to the decision of the planning commission and the
procedures employed by the planning commission in reaching that
decision. Thus, they do not establish separate causes of action, but
merely address alleged defects in the methods employed by the
planning commission or the result reached by the commission.
Accordingly, those are issues to be raised in an appeal from the
decision of the planning commission. Since plaintiffs were tardy in
claiming their appeal, those counts were properly dismissed. [Id. at
198 (emphasis added).]
Although Krohn did not involve the application of res judicata, the Court
of Appeals discussion of the taking and due process claims as they related
1030 480 M
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to the ZBA appeal supports defendant’s position. Thus, plaintiff’s taking
claim is barred by res judicata because plaintiff could have brought the
taking claim within the confines of the ZBA appeal under MCL
125.585(11).
III
In sum, the majority has failed to adequately explain why res judicata
does not bar plaintiff’s taking claim in its civil suit. Because plaintiff’s
subsequent civil suit involves the same transaction as its ZBA appeal in
the circuit court, plaintiff’s second suit is barred. By allowing plaintiff to
file a second action alleging an unconstitutional taking, the Court
authorizes splitting these actions in all future cases. This is exactly what
the doctrine of res judicata was designed to prevent. As noted by this
Court in A Krolik & Co v Ossowski, 213 Mich 1, 7 (1920): “The law
abhors multiplicity of suits. Attempts to split a claim into separate causes
of action have often met with disfavor.” Therefore, I would deny leave to
appeal.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. I join parts I and III of Justice C
ORRIGAN
’s statement.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 18, 2008 :
In re C
OLLIER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
M
ILLER
), No. 135552;
Court of Appeals No. 278257.
In re A
L
-M
AYAHI
, No. 135578; Court of Appeals No. 282568.
Summary Dispositions January 22, 2008:
H
ARTMAN V
P
ORT
H
URON
H
OSPITAL
, No. 135052. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the plaintiff falls within the class of
plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We remand this case to the St. Clair
Circuit Court for the entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion
for summary disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this order and the order in Mullins. In addition, we direct the St.
Clair Circuit Court to enter an order granting the motion to substitute
the successor personal representative as the plaintiff in this action,
consistent with MCL 700.3613. Court of Appeals No. 257536.
K
IMPSON V
B
OTSFORD
G
ENERAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 135056. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the plaintiff falls within the class of
plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph
Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We remand this case to the Oakland
Circuit Court for the entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion
for summary disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this order and the order in Mullins. In all other respects, leave to
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1031
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 269253.
C
ALDWELL V
W
ASTE
M
ANAGEMENT OF
M
ICHIGAN,
I
NC
, No. 135097. Pursuant
to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Court
of Appeals No. 280386.
C
LEMENS V
K
OZIARSKI AND
M
AC
K
ENZIE V
K
OZIARSKI,
Nos. 135150,
135151. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part because
plaintiff Linda Jean Clemens falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to
relief identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich
948 (2007). We remand this case to the Calhoun Circuit Court for the
entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposi-
tion in Case No. 03-001783-NH and for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this order and the order in Mullins. In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals Nos. 264688, 265619.
P
ONTE V
P
ONTE
, No. 135159. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the August 30, 2007, order of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary
consideration. Because the July 12, 2007, order of the Washtenaw Circuit
Court is a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs, it is a
final order under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) that is appealable as a matter of
right under MCR 7.203(A)(1). We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 279758.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 22, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
B
ONIOR
, No. 130397; Court of Appeals No. 265985.
T
HOMAS V
H
AWKINS
, No. 133825; Court of Appeals No. 273283.
P
EOPLE V
D
EWULF
, No. 134297; Court of Appeals No. 258148.
M
ICHIGAN
E
NVIRONMENTAL
C
OUNCIL V
P
UBLIC
S
ERVICE
C
OMMISSION
, No.
134474; reported below: 275 Mich App 369.
P
EOPLE V
T
OTH
, No. 134540. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275817.
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
C
LARK
, No. 134627. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 274825.
P
EOPLE V
D
ELVRENE
W
ALLACE
, No. 134711; Court of Appeals No. 269202.
P
EOPLE V
B
URKS
, No. 134766; Court of Appeals No. 269569.
1032 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
L
EE
W
HITE
, No. 134928; Court of Appeals No. 269156.
P
EOPLE V
P
OINTER
, No. 135033; Court of Appeals No. 270327.
P
EOPLE V
G
ALINEAU
, No. 135059; Court of Appeals No. 268492.
A
D
H
OC
M
EMBERSHIP
G
ROUP V
Y
ANKEE
A
IR
F
ORCE,
I
NC
, No. 135099; Court
of Appeals No. 276382.
H
ARRINGTON V
M
ICHIGAN
M
ILLERS
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
135118; Court of Appeals No. 270082.
P
EOPLE V
H
INES
, No. 135132; Court of Appeals No. 271154.
T
AYLOR V
C
ITY OF
W
ESTLAND
, No. 135160; Court of Appeals No. 269454.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
P
ARKER
, No. 135178; Court of Appeals No. 268695.
P
EOPLE V
P
RESCOTT
, No. 135179; Court of Appeals No. 270917.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICE
, No. 135189; Court of Appeals No. 272142.
P
EOPLE V
J
IMMIE
Y
OUNG
, No. 135199; Court of Appeals No. 267084.
P
EOPLE V
C
OMONTE
, No. 135204; Court of Appeals No. 270684.
P
EOPLE V
D
AMON
L
OVE
, No. 135206; Court of Appeals No. 271032.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARL
B
ROOKS
, No. 135207; Court of Appeals No. 270062.
P
EOPLE V
B
RYAN
J
ACKSON
, No. 135208; Court of Appeals No. 271158.
P
EOPLE V
G
LOVER
, No. 135209; Court of Appeals No. 271293.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
C
URRIER
, No. 135211; Court of Appeals No. 269564.
P
EOPLE V
R
EBMAN
, No. 135213; Court of Appeals No. 272729.
P
EOPLE V
P
HILLIP
M
OORE
, No. 135214; Court of Appeals No. 271807.
P
EOPLE V
P
ANN
, No. 135217; Court of Appeals No. 271013.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
G
EORGE
, No. 135220; Court of Appeals No. 279411.
P
EOPLE V
J
ENNIFER
C
OLE
, No. 135223; Court of Appeals No. 280163.
P
EOPLE V
B
RANTLEY
, No. 135224; Court of Appeals No. 271677.
P
EOPLE V
G
ERRED
, No. 135225; Court of Appeals No. 280094.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
W
OOD
, No. 135230; reported below: 276 Mich App 669.
P
EOPLE V
C
OLBERT
, No. 135231; Court of Appeals No. 279619.
J
AAKKOLA V
A
UTO
O
WNERS
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 135233; Court of
Appeals No. 279787.
P
EOPLE V
N
ICOLAIDES
, No. 135235; Court of Appeals No. 271804.
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
A
NDREWS
, No. 135246; Court of Appeals No. 279938.
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CTIONS ON
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1033
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
P
OWELL
, No. 135253; Court of Appeals No. 279988.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIGGS
, No. 135273; Court of Appeals No. 281016.
P
EOPLE V
W
EISS
, No. 135286; Court of Appeals No. 280133.
F
LAGSTAR
B
ANK,
FSBvB
AYSIDE
M
ALL,
LLC, No. 135462; Court of
Appeals No. 281880.
Reconsiderations Denied January 22, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
L
AMAR
R
OBERTS
, No. 130207. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 932. Court of Appeals No. 252100.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration and, on
reconsideration, would remand this case for correction of the judgment of
sentence.
B
AILEY V
P
ORNPICHIT,
No. 132087. Summary disposition entered at 480
Mich 909. Court of Appeals No. 267546.
F
LEISCHFRESSER V
P
ETERSON
T
OWING,
I
NC
, No. 133730. Leave to appeal
denied at 480 Mich 918. Court of Appeals No. 274353.
W
EAVER
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration and, on
reconsideration, would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
A
LEXANDER
, No. 133990. Leave to appeal denied at
480 Mich 920. Court of Appeals No. 272122.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
Q
UEEN
, No. 134089. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
920. Court of Appeals No. 272761.
P
EOPLE V
R
ODNEY
H
ICKS
, No. 134247. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 921. Court of Appeals No. 274181.
P
EOPLE V
S
OUTHWARD
, No. 134525. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
925. Court of Appeals No. 272444.
F
ISH V
A
TTORNEY
G
RIEVANCE
C
OMMISSION
, No. 134660.
Summary Dispositions January 24, 2008:
In re B
ARNES
, No. 134934. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion. Court of Appeals No. 269384.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
M
OYER V
S
IELOFF
, No. 134936. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the decision of the Macomb Circuit
Court denying summary disposition to the defendants on the ground that
1034 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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the defendants’ knowledge of an ice hazard rendered the open and
obvious doctrine inapplicable. Because the plaintiff was a licensee, the
defendants only had a duty to warn the plaintiff of hidden dangers known
to the defendants. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life, 462 Mich 591, 596
(2000). The fact that the danger was known to the defendants does not
mean that the danger was hidden to the plaintiff. We remand this case to
the Macomb Circuit Court for further consideration of the defendants’
motion for summary disposition to determine whether the icy condition
that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury was open and obvious. Lugo v
Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 (2001). We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 276154.
P
EOPLE V
K
EITH
, No. 134939. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate that part of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals remanding the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for completion
of a sentence departure evaluation report. Defendant was sentenced on
May 26, 2006, almost a year after the July 13, 2005, effective date of the
amendment of MCR 6.425(D)(1) eliminating the requirement that the
court complete a sentence departure evaluation report on a form pre-
scribed by the State Court Administrator. Therefore, it was sufficient
that the trial court stated on the record a substantial and compelling
reason for an upward departure. In all other respects, leave to appeal is
denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions
presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 270873.
L
INK V
T
HOMAS
E
LECTRIC,
LLC, No. 134958. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the ruling of
the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) that the
magistrate’s order does not provide for an offset to the plaintiff’s
workers’ compensation benefits except in the case of actual earnings. The
magistrate’s order incorporated by reference all the rulings in his
attached opinion. Because that opinion clearly gives the employer credit
for the plaintiff’s ability to earn $8 an hour, 25 hours per week, the WCAC
clearly erred in ruling that the magistrate’s order did not grant such
credit. We remand this case to the WCAC for plenary consideration of the
plaintiff’s cross-appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
No. 276745.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANK
S
TEPHENS
, No. 134993. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and we remand this case to the 50th District Court for a
determination whether the evidence presented at the preliminary exami-
nation was sufficient, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the
corpus of the crime charged in the absence of the statement the
defendant made to the police. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 269-270
(1995) (a defendant’s confession may not be admitted unless there is
direct or circumstantial evidence independent of the confession estab-
lishing [1] the occurrence of the specific injury and [2] some criminal
agency as the source of the injury). The Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the defendant had waived the right to claim error in the district
court’s use of his statement to the police by supposedly stipulating to the
admission of the statement. The Court of Appeals further erred by
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independently determining that the evidence presented at the prelimi-
nary examination was sufficient to create probable cause apart from
defendant’s statement, when such a determination was not made by
either the district court or the Oakland Circuit Court. Court of Appeals
No. 271046.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 24, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
M
OORE
, No. 134142; Court of Appeals No. 267663.
C
APRATHE V
J
UDGES
R
ETIREMENT
B
OARD
, No. 134482; reported below: 275
Mich App 315.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,andK
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
J
AVONTA
W
ALKER
, No. 134524; Court of Appeals No. 278160.
P
EOPLE V
B
ASIL
P
ERRY
, No. 134577; Court of Appeals No. 270283.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case to the trial court for articulation of
the court’s basis for scoring offense variable 11.
P
EOPLE V
G
RABIEC
, No. 134767; Court of Appeals No. 266805.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARCHANT
, No. 134825; Court of Appeals No. 269427.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
K
ELLER
, No. 134851; Court of Appeals No. 266804.
J
ENKINS V
K
OESTER
, No. 135019; Court of Appeals No. 268175.
T
AYLOR
, C.J., and Y
OUNG
, J. We would reverse this case for the reasons
stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion.
Summary Disposition January 25, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
L
ATHROP
, No. 135066. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, we vacate the sentence of the Muskegon Circuit Court, and we
remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. Absent any indica-
tion in the record that the trial judge would have departed upward to the
same extent if the guidelines had been properly scored, the prosecution’s
admission that prior record variable 5, MCL 777.55, was improperly
scored establishes a plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights. Had prior record variable 5 not been scored, the correct guidelines
range would have been 108 to 180 months, rather than the 126 to 210
months on which the decision to depart upward was based. The trial
court believed that it was departing upward by 30 months, when, in fact,
the upward departure was 60 months above the minimum sentence range
under properly scored sentence guidelines. Therefore, the defendant is
entitled to relief under the rationale of People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82
(2006), and People v Horan, 477 Mich 1062 (2007). On remand, the trial
court shall sentence the defendant within the appropriate sentencing
guidelines range, or articulate on the record a substantial and compelling
1036 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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reason for departing from the sentencing guidelines range in accordance
with People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247 (2003). We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 268152.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order remanding this case for
resentencing because the sentencing judge did not specifically state that,
despite the scoring error, he would have imposed the same upward
sentencing departure.
For the reasons stated in my concurrence/dissent in People v Babcock,
469 Mich 247, 280 (2003), I continue to believe that Babcock, People v
Reincke, 469 Mich 957 (2003) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting), and People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 93-95 (2006) (C
ORRIGAN
, J., dissenting, joined by
W
EAVER
, J.), were wrongly decided.
Further, I agree with and join the following portions of Justice
Y
OUNG
’s concurrence in this case:
I write to provide a suggestion to sentencing courts that will
hopefully curtail the cycle of appellate sentencing litigation that
this Court’s prior decisions have created. This Court has, through
a series of recent decisions, construed the statutory sentencing
guidelines in such a fashion that even modal defects necessitate
resentencing. I do not believe that the sentencing guidelines
warrant such a construction or result.
In People v Babcock, this Court held that
“if the trial court articulates multiple reasons, and the Court of
Appeals...determines that some of these reasons are substantial
and compelling and some are not, and the Court of Appeals is
unable to determine whether the trial court would have departed
to the same degree on the basis of the substantial and compelling
reasons, the Court must remand the case to the trial court for
resentencing or rearticulation.”
I joined Justice C
ORRIGAN
in her partial dissent in Babcock
because I shared her belief that the remand requirement stated
therein was inconsistent with the language of MCL
769.34(11).... I respectfully continue to believe that most re-
mands mandated by this Court’s holding in Babcock are unneces-
sary and not mandated by the statutory guidelines.
In a similar vein, this Court, in People v Francisco, mandated a
remand for resentencing anytime an appellate court finds “ ‘an
error in scoring the sentencing guidelines,’ ” regardless [of]
whether the original sentence still falls within the appropriate
sentencing guidelines range upon rescoring. Again, I joined Justice
C
ORRIGAN
dissenting from the majority’s decision because I be-
lieved the holding was contrary to the language of MCL
769.34(10). I continue to believe that scoring errors should be
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reviewed under our harmless error rule, MCR 2.613(A), and that
most remands mandated by this Court’s holding in Francisco are
not required by the statute.
The cumulative effect of remands mandated by Babcock and
Francisco has left this Court in a perpetual state of error correc-
tion....
***
In an effort to provide some relief to sentencing courts that
wish to avoid resentencing orders that this Court’s previous
decisions would otherwise require, I am providing two sentencing
instructions that I recommend all trial court judges cut out and
paste into their bench books and use when they appropriately
reflect the judge’s sentencing intent. First, to avoid unnecessary
remands for cases involving a sentencing departure, I suggest that
all judges read the following passage into the record when appro-
priate:
“Having acknowledged the substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an upward/downward departure from the recommended
sentencing guidelines, I believe a ____ year/month sentence is
sufficiently warranted by each of the substantial and compelling
reasons I have outlined. Moreover, I believe that the ____
year/month sentence I am imposing today is proportionate to the
seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and record and produces a
proportionate criminal sentence, regardless of any potential errors
in scoring the sentencing guidelines that may affect the recom-
mended sentencing guidelines range.”
Second, to avoid unnecessary remands for cases where a sentenc-
ing departure is not necessary, I suggest the following:
“I believe that the ____ year/month sentence I am imposing
today is proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s
conduct and record and produces a proportionate criminal sen-
tence, regardless of any potential errors in scoring the sentencing
guidelines that may affect the recommended sentencing guidelines
range.”
While I do not encourage the trial judges of this state to “game”
the statutory sentencing guidelines, I do encourage judges to
include these statements when a sentencing judge is convinced
that the length of the sentence imposed is appropriate, even if
there may be some undetected minor defect in the calculation of
the recommended sentencing guidelines range.
K
ELLY
,J
.
(concurring). I concur in the order reversing the Court of
Appeals decision and remanding this case to the trial court for resentenc-
1038 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
ing. I write separately to express my concern about the advice of Justices
W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
, and Y
OUNG
to sentencing judges to add an explicit
disclaimer to their judgments of sentence. I believe that this advice
encourages judges to disregard the law that requires them to consider
accurate sentencing guidelines recommendations when sentencing con-
victs.
Generally, a defendant’s minimum sentence must be within the
appropriate sentence range.
1
However, MCL 769.34(3) allows a sentenc-
ing judge to “depart from the appropriate sentence range...ifthecourt
has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure....”
Importantly, this statute allows departure only from “the appropriate
sentence range.”
It follows that a sentence beyond the guidelines range that is based on
an inappropriate range is invalid. Therefore, when a trial judge departs
from a sentence range that is the product of incorrect scoring, the case
must be remanded for resentencing. Of course, the judge could impose
the same sentence on remand if there is a substantial and compelling
reason justifying the particular departure from the sentence range
produced by the correctly scored guidelines. But there are no magic words
that insulate an otherwise improper sentence from challenge.
Justices W
EAVER
,C
ORRIGAN
, and Y
OUNG
express their displeasure with
the current state of sentencing law. Regardless of our personal opinions
on whether a departure from a sentence range based on incorrectly
scored guidelines calls for resentencing, the Legislature, rather than this
Court, has spoken about this matter. It has given sentencing judges the
authority to depart from “the appropriate sentence range” only. A judge
exceeds the scope of this authority and issues an invalid sentence when
he or she departs from a sentence range that results from incorrect
scoring. Harmless-error review is inapplicable to an invalid sentence.
Accordingly, our personal opinions aside, a remand is necessary when a
judge departs from a sentence range incorrectly scored. We should not
encourage judges to violate this statutory requirement by indicating that
they would render a sentence that exceeds the guidelines range regard-
less of whether the range is accurate.
In footnote 13 of his concurrence, Justice Y
OUNG
purports to “high-
light[] for members of the judiciary what this Court has stated in its
decisions concerning the statutory guidelines.” The only overt suggestion
this Court has ever offered sentencing courts had to do with any
substantial and compelling reason for an upward departure about which
a sentencing court may have doubts.
2
This Court has never instructed
sentencing courts to ignore the appropriate sentencing guidelines.
In People v Mutchie,
3
we declined to interpret offense variable (OV) 11
because, in departing upward, the sentencing court “clearly expressed its
view that the sentences imposed in this case were the proper sentences
1
MCL 769.34(2).
2
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 260 n 15 (2003).
3
People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50 (2003).
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without regard to how OV 11 might be scored.”
4
We took into consider-
ation the sentencing court’s clearly expressed intent in Mutchie. But we
did not advise sentencing courts that they should routinely state their
intent to depart upward to the same extent no matter how much the
appropriate guidelines range might change because of scoring errors.
My colleagues caution judges to use their instructions only when
appropriate. But they also direct trial judges to state that the sentence
imposed after an upward departure is proportionate regardless of any
scoring errors that may affect the recommended sentencing guidelines
range. This instruction has the potential of producing upward departures
much greater than the judge contemplated on the basis of the sentencing
range he or she believed to be applicable at sentencing. It precludes the
judge from reviewing the changed sentencing range and reconsidering
the upward departure. What is worse, it gives the judge a choice to
consciously deny himself or herself such a review and reconsideration.
Because the Court has never sanctioned giving such an overt instruction
to sentencing courts, my colleagues’ instruction does not highlight
anything that the Court has stated in its decisions. This is notwithstand-
ing Justice Y
OUNG
’s assertion to the contrary.
In their second instruction regarding sentences without upward
departures, my colleagues again direct judges to state that the sentence
is proportionate regardless of any potential scoring errors that may affect
the recommended guidelines range. This instruction is contrary to the
majority opinion in People v Francisco.
5
Again, in suggesting that
instruction, my colleagues are not highlighting the position of the
majority of this Court. The instruction reflects the position of the dissent
in Francisco, in which my colleagues concurred,
6
rather than the position
of the majority.
Y
OUNG
,J.(concurring). I write to provide a suggestion to sentencing
courts that will hopefully curtail the cycle of appellate sentencing
litigation that this Court’s prior decisions have created. This Court has,
through a series of recent decisions,
1
construed the statutory sentencing
guidelines in such a fashion that even modal defects necessitate resen-
tencing.
2
I do not believe that the sentencing guidelines warrant such a
construction or result.
4
Id. at 52.
5
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 91-92 (2006).
6
Id. at 93-95 (C
ORRIGAN
, J., dissenting).
1
See People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 271 (2003); People v Francisco,
474 Mich 82, 91 (2006).
2
See, e.g., People v Reincke, 469 Mich 957, 957-958 (Y
OUNG
,J.,
dissenting) (explaining that “[t]he nature and extent of the injuries
suffered by the victim in this case epitomize the type of objective and
verifiable reasoning that ‘keenly or irresistibly’ grabs the Court’s atten-
tion,” but a remand was ordered because “a majority of this Court
apparently believes that the justification given by the trial court is
insufficient”); People v Jackson, 474 Mich 996 (2006) (C
ORRIGAN
,J.,
1040 480 M
ICHIGAN
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In People v Babcock, this Court held that
if the trial court articulates multiple reasons, and the Court of
Appeals...determinesthatsomeofthesereasons are substantial
and compelling and some are not, and the Court of Appeals is
unable to determine whether the trial court would have departed
to the same degree on the basis of the substantial and compelling
reasons, the Court must remand the case to the trial court for
resentencing or rearticulation.
[
3
]
I joined Justice C
ORRIGAN
in her partial dissent in Babcock because I shared
her belief that the remand requirement stated therein was inconsistent with
the language of MCL 769.34(11).
4
Although I am obligated to follow the
law as established by this Court, I respectfully continue to believe that
most remands mandated by this Court’s holding in Babcock are unnec-
essary and not mandated by the statutory guidelines.
In a similar vein, this Court, in People v Francisco, mandated a
remand for resentencing anytime an appellate court finds “ ‘an error in
scoring the sentencing guidelines,’ ”
5
regardless whether the original
sentence still falls within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range
upon rescoring.
6
Again, I joined Justice C
ORRIGAN
dissenting from the
majority’s decision because I believed that the holding was contrary to
the language of MCL 769.34(10). I continue to believe that scoring errors
should be reviewed under our harmless error rule, MCR 2.613(A), and
that most remands mandated by this Court’s holding in Francisco are not
required by the statute.
The cumulative effect of the remands mandated by Babcock and
Francisco has left this Court in a perpetual state of error correction.
Fortunately, the trial courts of this state are not hopelessly subject to
endless review by this Court when imposing a criminal sentence. In
Babcock, this Court made the remand requirement contingent on the
appellate court’s ability to “determine the trial court’s intentions.”
7
This
Court even suggested that if a trial court suspects that one of its reasons
for departure may not be “substantial and compelling” to the appellate
courts, the judge may avoid the requisite remand by stating: “I would
impose the same sentence regardless of this reason.”
8
In addition, in
concurring) (explaining that this Court’s holding in Babcock required an
otherwise unnecessary remand because the trial court did not use the
“precise magic language necessary to sustain a departure”).
3
Babcock, supra at 271.
4
Id. at 275 (C
ORRIGAN
, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5
Francisco, supra at 88-91, quoting MCL 769.34(10).
6
Id. at 93 (C
ORRIGAN
, J., dissenting).
7
Babcock, supra at 260.
8
Id. at 260 n 15.
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1041
People v Mutchie,
9
this Court held that the remand that is required by
Francisco is not required when the trial court “clearly expressed its view
that the sentences imposed in [that] case were the proper sentences
without regard to [a potential scoring error].”
10
Thus, it is imperative
that sentencing judges do a more precise job in articulating their
sentencing decisions when they believe that they have imposed a fair
sentence.
In the present case, defendant’s original recommended sentencing
guidelines range was 126 to 210 months. The trial court departed upward
from the original guidelines and sentenced defendant to a minimum
sentence of 240 months in prison. The parties do not dispute that the
trial court gave substantial and compelling reasons for the departure.
11
The prosecutor concedes, however, that prior record variable 5
12
was
incorrectly scored and that the recommended guideline range should
have been 108 to 180 months. However, the trial court did not expressly
state that it would impose the same sentence regardless of any scoring
errors that may change the guidelines range; thus, defendant is entitled
to resentencing under Francisco.
In an effort to provide some relief to sentencing courts that wish to
avoid resentencing orders that this Court’s previous decisions would
otherwise require, I am providing two sentencing instructions that I
recommend all trial court judges cut out and paste into their bench books
and use when they appropriately reflect the judge’s sentencing intent.
First, to avoid unnecessary remands for cases involving a sentencing
departure, I suggest that all judges read the following passage into the
record when appropriate:
Having acknowledged the substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an upward/downward departure from the recommended
sentencing guidelines, I believe a ____ year/month sentence is
sufficiently warranted by each of the substantial and compelling
reasons I have outlined. Moreover, I believe that the ____
9
468 Mich 50, 52 (2003).
10
See also Francisco, supra at 89 n 8 (stating that “[r]esentencing is
also not required where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would
have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error and the
sentence falls within the appropriate guidelines range,” and citing
Mutchie).
11
The court gave three reasons: (1) defendant assaulted the victim, his
wife, in front of their young children; (2) “the testimony in this case that
once—with one of the thrusts into your wife’s abdomen you then moved
the knife. In other words you dragged it through here [sic, her] in a way
that it seems like a hunter might do when he was trying to kill his prey”;
and (3) after his arrest, defendant attempted to manipulate his children
and turn them against their mother, blaming her for his actions.
12
MCL 777.55.
1042 480 M
ICHIGAN
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year/month sentence I am imposing today is proportionate to the
seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and record and produces a
proportionate criminal sentence, regardless of any potential errors
in scoring the sentencing guidelines that may affect the recom-
mended sentencing guidelines range.
Second, to avoid unnecessary remands for cases in which a sentencing
departure is not necessary, I suggest the following:
I believe that the ____ year/month sentence I am imposing today
is proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and
record and produces a proportionate criminal sentence, regardless of
any potential errors in scoring the sentencing guidelines that may
affect the recommended sentencing guidelines range.
While I do not encourage the trial judges of this state to “game” the
statutory sentencing guidelines, I do encourage judges to include these
statements when a sentencing judge is convinced that the length of the
sentence imposed is appropriate, even if there may be some undetected
minor defect in the calculation of the recommended sentencing guide-
lines range.
13
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice Y
OUNG
.
Summary Disposition January 30, 2008:
M
ARTIN V
SMG, No. 134358. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion, and we remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order. We do not retain jurisdic-
tion. Court of Appeals No. 273528.
Leave to Appeal Denied January 30, 2008:
T
URNER V
D
ETROIT
B
OARD OF
E
DUCATION
, No. 134595; Court of Appeals
No. 275575.
P
EOPLE V
S
CHUMACHER
, No. 134712; reported below: 276 Mich App 165.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
R
AMSEY
, No. 134814. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 276031.
13
In her concurrence, Justice K
ELLY
chastises me for highlighting for
members of the judiciary what this Court has stated in its decisions
concerning the statutory guidelines. If the Court no longer subscribes to
the positions it has taken, the Court ought overrule the portions of those
decisions on which I rely to provide counsel to the Michigan trial bench
on sentencing questions.
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1043
P
EOPLE V
G
REGORY
J
ONES
, No. 134847; Court of Appeals No. 277536.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
M
ITCHELL
, No. 134893. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Defendant is entitled to early parole eligibility under MCL
791.234(13). See People v Kelly, 474 Mich 1026 (2006). Court of Appeals
No. 276100.
P
EOPLE V
L
EECLIFTON
M
OORE
, No. 134954; Court of Appeals No. 269246.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
ABO
, No. 135050; Court of Appeals No. 279548.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would remand this case for resentencing.
M
C
C
UMMINGS V
P
IONEER
S
TATE
M
UTUAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 135068;
Court of Appeals No. 269832.
C
ORRIGAN
and M
ARKMAN,
JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
G
RISWOLD
P
ROPERTIES,
LLCvL
EXINGTON
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
135074; reported below: 275 Mich App 543, 801.
P
EOPLE V
T
AFIL
, No. 135078; Court of Appeals No. 279639.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case to the trial court for resentencing
regarding offense variable 2.
G
AINORS
M
EAT
P
ACKING,
I
NC V
H
OME
-O
WNERS
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
135091; reported below: 276 Mich App 551.
D
EPARTMENT OF
E
NVIRONMENTAL
Q
UALITY V
S
OUTH
H
URON
V
ALLEY
U
TILITY
A
UTHORITY
, No. 135098; Court of Appeals No. 265964.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
M
EYERS
, No. 135107; Court of Appeals No. 279092.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
HAMBLESS
, No. 135111; Court of Appeals No. 279100.
P
EOPLE V
D
ONALD
W
HITE
, No. 135157; Court of Appeals No. 280450.
P
EOPLE V
F
ARMER
, No. 135170; Court of Appeals No. 271217.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
D
UQUIL
L
OVE
, No. 135203; Court of Appeals No. 270410.
P
EOPLE V
L
ASCO
, No. 135308; Court of Appeals No. 279277.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for the appointment of appellate
counsel.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal February 1, 2008:
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
RANSPORTATION V
I
NITIAL
T
RANSPORT,
I
NC
,No.
134798. We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to
grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
At oral argument, the parties shall address (1) whether the Motor Carrier
1044 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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Safety Act (MCSA), MCL 480.11 et seq., provides a private cause of action
or remedy for third parties; (2) whether the MCSA, at MCL 480.11a,
implicitly amended the cap on recoverable property damages found in the
Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., at MCL 500.3121; (3)
whether, if the cap has been amended by the MCSA, this has any
relevance to this case, where the applicable financial responsibility
amount found in the MCSA is apparently the same as the property
damage cap established in the no-fault act; and (4) whether the plaintiff
is entitled to any penalty interest pursuant to MCL 500.2006. The
parties may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this
order, but they should avoid submitting mere restatements of the
arguments made in their application papers. Reported below: 276 Mich
App 318.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny the application for leave to appeal.
M
ILJEVICH
C
ORPORATION V
N
ORTH
C
OUNTRY
B
ANK &
T
RUST,
No. 134780. We
direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the
application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral
argument, the parties shall address whether the plaintiff was damaged by
the defendant’s failure to publish its interest rate, and whether the
defendant bank indirectly published its interest rate by telling the
plaintiff that the Wall Street Journal prime rate was the applicable
interest rate. The parties may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of
the date of this order, but they should avoid submitting mere restate-
ments of their application papers. Court of Appeals No. 268356.
Leave to Appeal Granted February 1, 2008:
R
OBERSON
B
UILDERS,
I
NC V
L
ARSON
, No. 132363. The parties shall
address (1) whether a claim for setoff is a counterclaim or an affirmative
defense and (2) whether asserting a claim for a setoff as a defense to
another party’s claim amounts to “bring[ing] or maintain[ing] an action
in a court of this state for the collection of compensation” under MCL
339.2412(1). Court of Appeals No. 260039.
Summary Dispositions February 1, 2008:
M
AZUMDER V
U
NIVERSITY OF
M
ICHIGAN
B
DOF
R
EGENTS
, No. 130836. By
order of April 4, 2007, the application for leave to appeal the February 23,
2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the
decision in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On
order of the Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007,
480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals because the court erred in invoking the
doctrine of equitable tolling under these circumstances. Devillers v Auto
Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 590-591&n65(2005). However, because
the plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief identified
in our order in Mullins, supra, we reinstate the order of the Washtenaw
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1045
Circuit Court denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition
and remand this case to that court for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this order and the order in Mullins. Reported below: 270 Mich
App 42.
The motion to consolidate is denied as moot.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We concur in the result.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). The issue in this case is whether our decision
in Waltz v Wyse
1
bars plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Appeals invoked the
doctrine of equitable tolling to find that plaintiff’s claim was not barred
by Waltz.
2
We affirm that decision, but for a different reason. Plaintiff is
within the class of plaintiffs who are entitled to relief under our
unanimous order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp.
3
For that reason, it
is unnecessary for us invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling to find that
plaintiff’s claim is not barred by Waltz.
I write to point out that, given the state of the law when the Court of
Appeals reached its decision, resort to the doctrine of equitable tolling
was highly appropriate. As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the
doctrine should be invoked “ ‘to ensure fundamental practicality and
fairness and to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of a cause of
action.’ ”
4
The Court of Appeals persuasively concluded that circum-
stances justifying its application existed in this case.
P
EOPLE V
B
ERNAICHE,
No. 131459. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse that part of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court’s order granting the
defendant’s motion for new trial. Although the prosecutors violated their
discovery obligation by failing to disclose their expert witness’s supple-
mental report, the violation amounted to harmless error. We remand this
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised by
defendant in that court but not addressed, in light of its prior disposition.
Leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, because we are not per-
suaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We
do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 261498.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny the prosecution’s application
for leave to appeal.
L
AKE
F
OREST
P
ARTNERS
2, I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY,
No.
132013. On October 3, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on the
application for leave to appeal the June 6, 2006, judgment of the Court of
Appeals. On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is
again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the part of the Court of Appeals judgment that
reversed the Michigan Tax Tribunal order that concluded that petitioner
1
Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004).
2
Mazumder v University of Michigan Bd of Regents, 270 Mich App 42,
62 (2006) (citations omitted).
3
Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007).
4
Mazumder, 270 Mich App at 61 (citations omitted).
1046 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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should have paid the state real estate transfer tax based on the value of
the lots as improved by the homes. The State Real Estate Transfer Tax
Act, MCL 207.521 et seq., taxes recorded instruments. MCL 207.523. In
this case, the only recorded instrument was the deed. The “value”
exchanged for that deed included both the cost of the lot and the home;
thus, the Tax Tribunal correctly held that that value was the proper
measure for taxation.
We reverse the Tax Tribunal’s order imposing penalties against
petitioner. The Department of Treasury did not prove that petitioner
acted negligently or with any intent to defraud when it paid taxes on the
value of the unimproved land. The imposition of penalties is not war-
ranted in the absence of such evidence. MCL 205.23(3); Mich Admin
Code, R 205.1012. We remand this case to the Tax Tribunal for entry of
an order reinstating petitioner’s assessment but reversing the imposition
of penalties. Reported below: 271 Mich App 244.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
J
OHNSON V
H
URLEY
M
EDICAL
G
ROUP,
PC, No. 132953. By order of May
30, 2007, the application for leave to appeal the April 13, 2006, judgment
of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in
Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the
Court, the case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948
(2007), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals because the court erred in invoking the doctrine
of equitable tolling under these circumstances. Devillers v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 590-591 & n 65 (2005). However, because the
plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in
our order in Mullins, supra, we remand this case to the Genesee Circuit
Court for entry of an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order
and the order in Mullins. Reported below: 270 Mich App 575.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We concur in the result.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur with the conclusion that our decision
in Waltz v Wyse
1
does not bar plaintiff’s claim. But, as explained in my
statement in Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
2
given the
state of the law when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, resort
to the doctrine of equitable tolling was highly appropriate.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
B
RIDE
, No. 133142. On November 8, 2007, the Court
heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December
19, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the
application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order. The trial court erred in determining that the
1
Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004).
2
Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 480 Mich 1045 (2008).
A
CTIONS ON
A
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1047
prosecutor failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of her Miranda
1
rights.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reflects
that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her
Miranda rights. Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986). R eported below:
273 Mich App 238.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur with the majority’s partial reversal
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and with the majority’s order
remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings because the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reflects that
the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her
Miranda rights. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
I write separately because viewing the defendant’s videotaped confes-
sion is integral to evaluating whether the defendant knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. Although the defen-
dant’s confession tape should not be posted on the Court’s website before
the trial in this matter, the Court should post the tape after the
conclusion of the trial and all possible appeals.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
L
ONG V
G
OODSON,
Nos. 133197, 133209, 133210, 133212, 133213,
133215-133218. By order of May 30, 2007, the application for leave to
appeal the April 18, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in
abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp
(Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having been decided
on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again
considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the
court erred in invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling under these
circumstances. Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 590-591 &
n 65 (2005). However, because the plaintiff falls within the class of
plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in our order in Mullins, supra,we
remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for entry of an order
denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in Mullins.
Court of Appeals Nos. 261049, 261050, 261051, 261052.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We concur in the result.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur with the conclusion that our decision
in Waltz v Wyse
1
does not bar plaintiff’s claim. But, as explained in my
statement in Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
2
given the
state of the law when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, resort
to the doctrine of equitable tolling was highly appropriate.
H
OPKINS V
G
RAHAM,
Nos. 133208, 133214. By order of May 30, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the April 20, 2006, judgment of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
1
Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004).
2
Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 480 Mich 1045 (2008).
1048 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case
having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the
application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals because the court erred in invoking the doctrine of equitable
tolling under these circumstances. Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473
Mich 562, 590-591&n65(2005). However, because the plaintiff falls
within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in our order in
Mullins, supra, we remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for
entry of an order denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposi-
tion and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the
order in Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 261867.
C
AVANAGH
and W
EAVER
, JJ. We concur in the result.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur with the conclusion that our decision
in Waltz v Wyse
1
does not bar plaintiff’s claim. But, as explained in my
statement in Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
2
given the
state of the law when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, resort
to the doctrine of equitable tolling was highly appropriate.
B
EAVERS V
B
ARTON
M
ALOW
C
OMPANY,
No. 133294. On December 5, 2007,
the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the
January 18, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the
Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and we remand this case to that court for it to exercise its
discretion as to whether to hear the appeal. The Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing the appeal on the basis of MCR 7.205(F)(3) because, in
doing so, it ignored Riza v Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc, 411 Mich
915 (1980), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 483
(1994). This Court plans to open an administrative file to explore
whether to amend MCR 7.205(F)(3), in recognition of the uncertainty
present in cases like this one. Court of Appeals No. 269007.
C
ORRIGAN,
J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent because tolling is not
appropriate in this case under Riza v Niagara Machine & Tool Works,
Inc, 411 Mich 915 (1981), or People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich
App 477 (1994). Riza, a one-paragraph peremptory order of this Court,
stated that the 18-month period for delayed appeal provided in former
GCR 1963, 806.2 was tolled while the plaintiff’s claim of appeal was
pending. Riza, supra at 915. We offered no legal analysis and no
description of the facts in that case. The Court of Appeals opinion in
Kincade in turn cited Riza in the context of a criminal defendant’s
complex series of applications to the Court of Appeals. The defendant
initially filed a claim of right and petition for superintending control in
the Court of Appeals, seeking the appointment of new counsel to appeal
a circuit court order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial.
Kincade, supra at 480. The Court of Appeals dismissed both the claim of
right and the petition. Id. This Court ultimately directed the Court of
1
Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004).
2
Mazumder v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 480 Mich 1045 (2008).
A
CTIONS ON
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1049
Appeals to consider as on leave granted the substantive questions
presented in the defendant’s purported claim of right, which included
whether he was constitutionally entitled to appointment of counsel and
an appeal as of right under the circumstances. 439 Mich 1022 (1992);
Kincade, supra at 481. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the
defendant sought to appeal an order denying a motion for relief from
judgment, he could only seek leave to appeal and any right to counsel was
governed by MCR 6.509(B). Kincade, supra at 483. The panel relied on
Riza to conclude that, if the attorney previously appointed to pursue the
defendant’s postconviction motion concluded that an application for
leave was warranted, she could still file such an application because the
period for late appeal was tolled “during the time the various appellate
proceedings connected with the order denying relief from judgment ha[d]
been pending in [the Court of Appeals] or the Supreme Court.” Id. at
483. The cases cited in the order offer no authority to establish that the
period for late appeal was tolled here. MCR 7.205(F)(1) explicitly prohib-
its tolling under the circumstances of this case. MCR 7.205(F)(1) permits
a party to apply for late appeal “[w]hen an appeal of right or an
application for leave was not timely filed.” (Emphasis added.) Here,
plaintiff did file a timely claim of appeal and his claim was dismissed
because, through his own negligence, he failed to comply with the Court
of Appeals filing requirements. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals appro-
priately declined to give plaintiff a second bite at the apple. I would also
deny leave. I support the Court’s intention to open an administrative file,
however, to address whether and when tolling of the period for late
appeal is appropriate.
P
ATRICK V
S
HAW
, No. 133972. The application for leave to appeal the
April 10, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is
denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. The application for leave to appeal as
cross-appellant is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMPTA), 12 USC
3803(c), does not preempt MCL 438.31c(2), but we disagree with that
part of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that ruled that AMPTA was
inapplicable because the loan here at issue was an extension, rather than
an origination. Rather, AMPTA is inapplicable to this case because the
loan here at issue was not an “alternative mortgage transaction” as
defined by AMPTA in 12 USC 3802. Reported below: 275 Mich App 201.
U
MBARGER V
H
AYES
G
REEN
B
EACH
M
EMORIAL
H
OSPITAL
C
ORPORATION
, No.
134011. On order of the Court and on the Court’s own motion, we vacate
our order dated December 14, 2007. By order of September 24, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the March 1, 2007, judgment of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Mullins v St
Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No. 131879). The case having been decided
on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again
considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the
plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief identified in
our order in Mullins, supra. We remand this case to the Eaton Circuit
1050 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Court for entry of an order denying the defendant’s motion for summary
disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order
and the order in Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied,
because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 264699.
P
EOPLE V
D
E
K
UBBER
, No. 134663. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals.
That court shall treat the defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal as having been filed within the deadline set forth in MCR 7.205(F)
and shall decide whether to grant, deny, or order other relief, in
accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). The defendant’s attorney acknowl-
edges that the defendant did not contribute to the delay in filing and she
knowingly allowed the appellate filing deadline to pass because defen-
dant’s family was unable to pay for her services. We conclude that the
defendant was deprived of his direct appeal as a result of constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470,
477 (2000); Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999). Counsel’s
decision to delay filing and permit the deadline to pass without seeking to
withdraw from representation so that the court could appoint appellate
counsel to prepare defendant’s appeal was the “but for” cause of
defendant’s lost appeal. Costs are imposed against the attorney, only, in
the amount of $250, to be paid to the Clerk of this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 278507.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The defendant’s
retained appellate attorney missed the deadline for late appeal in the
Court of Appeals. As a result, his appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Under Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 486 (2000), a
defendant alleging that ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of
his appeal must show that, “but for counsel’s deficient conduct, he would
have appealed.” Thus, the defendant must establish, as a factual matter,
that his appellate attorney caused him to forgo an appeal by rendering
assistance that fell below professional norms. His attorney may not be
the “but for” cause of his lost appeal if the defendant contributed to the
delay or indicated that he did not wish to appeal. Cf. Peguero v United
States, 526 US 23, 25-26, 28 (1999). Here, the defendant replaced his
appointed appellate attorney by retaining a second attorney almost 11
months after his convictions and sentences were entered. After the
retained attorney filed an unsuccessful motion for resentencing in the
trial court, the defendant’s family did not pay his legal bills on time. His
retained attorney asserts that, although the family’s inability to pay was
“not Defendant’s fault,” she waited to prepare and file his appeal until
she received payment. She also claims that she informed the defendant
and his family that she would not pursue an appeal until the defendant
paid his outstanding legal bills and an additional retainer. Under these
circumstances, questions of fact remain regarding whether the retained
attorney caused the defendant to forgo his appeal by rendering assistance
that fell below professional norms and whether the defendant contrib-
uted to the delay. Accordingly, I would remand for the trial court to
address these questions at a Ginther hearing. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436 (1973).
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CTIONS ON
A
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1051
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
G
OODMAN
, No. 135126. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the defendant’s sentences,
and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for resentencing
under properly scored guidelines. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305 (2004).
The defendant should have been scored zero points for offense variable 11
where there was no record evidence to support a finding that any charged
or uncharged criminal sexual penetration arose out of a sentencing
offense. MCL 777.41(2)(a); People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96 (2006). In all
other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 269620.
C
ORRIGAN
, J., did not participate for the reasons stated in People v
Parsons, 477 Mich 1065 (2007).
B
OARD OF
T
RUSTEES OF
M
ICHIGAN
S
TATE
U
NIVERSITY V
C
OURT OF
C
LAIMS
J
UDGE
, No. 135185. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we direct the Court of Claims to rule on the plaintiff
board’s motion for summary disposition, filed in Docket No. 07-000026-
MZ, within 21 days of the date of this order. In ruling on the motion, the
Court of Claims shall not enter another order merely stating that the
motion is neither granted nor denied. Instead, the Court of Claims shall
enter an order that decides the motion itself. We do not retain jurisdic-
tion. Court of Appeals No. 280103.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order directing the Court of
Claims to rule on the plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.
I would deny leave to appeal because the Court of Appeals properly
denied the complaint for superintending control because the plaintiff had
an adequate legal remedy in the underlying suit. See MCR 7.203(B)(1)
and (4) and MCR 2.116(J)(2)(a).
Writs for superintending control are governed by MCR 3.301, 3.302,
7.206 (Court of Appeals), and 7.304 (Supreme Court). “If another
adequate remedy is available to the party seeking the order, a complaint
for superintending control may not be filed.” MCR 3.302(B). “When an
appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the circuit court, or
the recorder’s court is available, that method of review must be used. If
superintending control is sought and an appeal is available, the complaint
for superintending control must be dismissed.” MCR 3.302(D)(2). Super-
intending control is an extraordinary remedy generally limited to deter-
mining whether a lower court exceeded its jurisdiction, acted in a manner
inconsistent with its jurisdiction, or failed to proceed according to law.
Dep’t of Public Health v Rivergate Manor, 452 Mich 495 (1996).
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
Reconsideration Denied February 1, 2008:
M
ARTIN V
T
HE
R
APID
I
NTER
-U
RBAN
T
RANSIT
P
ARTNERSHIP,
No.
132164. Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich 936. Reported below:
271 Mich App 492.
T
AYLOR,
C.J., and C
ORRIGAN
and Y
OUNG,
JJ. We would grant the motion.
1052 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Leave to Appeal Denied February 1, 2008:
B
ERO
M
OTORS,
I
NC V
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 132540; Court of
Appeals No. 257675.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal. I would grant leave to appeal to address whether plaintiff’s
theories of breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel were properly
questions for the jury on this record.
The parties entered into a dealer’s sales and service agreement
allowing plaintiff, Bero Motors, Inc. (Bero), to sell Pontiac and Buick
cars and General Motors (GM) parts at Bero’s dealership. Bero wanted
to also sell GMC trucks, but another dealership, Town and Country
Motors, had the franchise to sell GMC trucks in that area. After the
Town and Country Motors dealership was offered for sale, two GM
employees allegedly made an oral promise that Bero would have the
opportunity to match any offer other potential buyers made for Town
and Country Motors. After GM approved a sale between Town and
Country Motors and a third party without giving Bero the opportunity
to exercise the right of first refusal, Bero sued defendant GM, alleging
four theories of relief: breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel,
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted GM’s
motion for summary disposition on all four counts. In a split decision,
the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion per curiam, S
AWYER
,
P.J., and S
MOLENSKI
,J.(W
HITBECK
, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), issued October 2, 2001 (Docket No. 224190), affirmed the
dismissal of the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty counts, but
reversed on the breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel
counts. This Court denied leave to appeal on an interlocutory basis.
467 Mich 868 (2002). I dissented from the order because I would have
granted leave to appeal at that time. At the trial after remand, the trial
court instructed the jury that the oral promises could support a jury
verdict, as the first Court of Appeals opinion essentially directed. The
jury entered a verdict of over $3 million for Bero on the breach of oral
contract count.
1
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Unpublished opinion
per curiam, M
URPHY
,P.J., and W
HITE
and M
ETER
, JJ., issued August 10,
2006 (Docket No. 257675).
The issue that the jury considered is before us on final review. The
problem persists from the first appeal. The breach of oral contract and
promissory estoppel theories are not properly jury questions. The written
contract between Bero and GM includes the following provision, entitled
“Sole Agreement of the Parties”:
No agreement between Division [GM] and Dealer [Bero] which
relates to matters covered herein, and no change in, addition to
(except for the filling in of blank lines) or erasure of any printed
portion of this Agreement, will be binding unless permitted under
1
The jury did not decide the promissory estoppel claim because it
found that GM breached the oral contract.
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the terms of this Agreement or related documents, or approved in
a written agreement executed as set forth in Division’s Dealer Sales
and Service Agreement. [Emphasis added.]
The agreement further states that all related agreements are valid
only if signed on behalf of GM by its general sales and service manager or
his authorized representative. An agreement regarding Bero’s right of
first refusal to purchase another dealership appears to be a matter
covered in the written contract that must be reduced to writing and
signed by a GM-authorized representative. The written contract is
comprehensive in nature and expressly provides that it “states the terms
under which Dealer and Division agree to do business together” and
“states the responsibilities of Dealer and Division to each other....”
The contract governed all aspects of the Bero dealership from its
formation to its sale. For example, the contract provides, “No change in
location or in the use of Premises, including addition of any other vehicle
lines, will be made without Division’s prior written authorization.” This
provision gave GM significant authority over decisions concerning the
Bero dealership. Under this provision, for example, the Bero dealership
was prohibited from selling GMC trucks without GM’s prior written
authorization. Additionally, the written contract contained a section
entitled “Right of First Refusal to Purchase—Creation and Coverage,”
which gave GM the right of first refusal to purchase the Bero dealership
if it were to be offered for sale. It appears that this written contract was
meant to govern all aspects of the Bero dealership and its dealings with
GM, including an agreement regarding Bero’s purchase of another
dealership. Thus, an agreement regarding Bero’s right of first refusal to
purchase another dealership appears to be a matter covered in the
written contract that must be reduced to a writing and signed by a
GM-authorized representative. No record evidence establishes that a
GM-authorized representative agreed to waive the writing requirement
for the modifications to the written contract.
2
We have issued some significant opinions regarding written/oral
contracts and promissory estoppel since 2002. For example, in Quality
Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 373 (2003),
this Court held that a party who seeks to prove that a written agreement
prohibiting oral modifications was orally modified must prove by clear
and convincing evidence “that the parties mutually intended to modify
the particular original contract, including its restrictive amendment
clauses such as written modification or anti-waiver clauses.” (Emphasis
deleted.) With such decisions to guide us, I would grant leave to appeal to
consider this case.
2
Neither of the GM employees who allegedly made the oral promise to
Bero regarding a right of first refusal, Jim Dalbec and Dick Loughman,
was a general sales and service manager or his authorized representative.
1054 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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M
ARKMAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice C
ORRIGAN
.
P
EOPLE V
D
UYST
, No. 132763. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 269911.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). I would remand this case to the Kent Circuit
Court for entry of an order granting the defendant’s request for release
and testing of the physical evidence specified in Issue VI of the defen-
dant’s application for leave to appeal to this Court and described in his
motion for testing. After such tests are complete, I would permit
defendant to file a motion in the circuit court seeking the appropriate
evidentiary hearing(s) and to renew his motion for relief from judgment.
I would further hold that the defendant’s application for leave to appeal
any decision by the circuit court regarding motions filed under this order
would not be barred by MCR 6.502(G) or MCR 6.508(D)(2).
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). Defendant moved for forensic testing of evi-
dence and for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court considered these
motions along with defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. It
denied all of them for failure to establish good cause under MCR
6.508(D).
The offer of proof that defendant made is quite extraordinary and
separates his motion from the typical motions for relief from judgment.
Defendant’s offer of proof indicates that the expert testimony at his trial
was unreliable because it was based on incomplete testing. Defendant
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate,
request testing, or provide adequate rebuttal expert testimony. Defen-
dant’s trial counsel represented him on appeal and did not make a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel or raise any issues related to the
handling of expert testimony. Hence, counsel may have been ineffective
at two levels.
I believe that the trial court should not have denied defendant’s
motion for relief from judgment for failure to establish good cause.
Defendant could not establish good cause without testing the evidence. I
would remand the case so that the trial court could order independent
testing of the evidence and hold an evidentiary hearing under MCR
6.508(C) on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Only after that
would the trial court be in a position to rule on defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment.
W
ATTS V
H
ENRY
F
ORD
H
EALTH
S
YSTEMS
, No. 133588. Pursuant to MCL
600.5838a(1), a claim for medical malpractice “accrues at the time of the
act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice.” In
this case, the last date the defendant had any contact with the decedent
was January 2, 2003, as shown by the decedent’s medical records and as
admitted by the plaintiff in his answer to the defendant’s motion in the
trial court. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice accrued no
later than January 2, 2003. Accordingly, the period of limitations would
have expired on January 2, 2005; however, because this was a Sunday,
pursuant to MCR 1.108(1), the notice of intent that was filed on January
3, 2005, was timely. The notice of intent tolled the period of limitations
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for 182 days, and, thus, the complaint that was filed on July 1, 2005, was
also timely. Court of Appeals No. 267551.
R
EEVES V
C
ARSON
C
ITY
H
OSPITAL
, No. 134084; reported below: 274 Mich
App 622.
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
(concurring). This case returns to this Court after the
Court of Appeals reconsidered it in light of Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich
545 (2006). In this medical malpractice case, defendants argue that
plaintiffs’ expert is not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against
defendant Lynn Squanda, D.O. Squanda is board-certified in family
medicine but she treated plaintiff Catherine Reeves in the emergency
room for a presumed ectopic pregnancy. Plaintiffs’ expert is board-
certified in emergency medicine but not in family medicine.
The trial court, relying on Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572 (2004),
struck plaintiffs’ expert because he was not qualified as a board-certified
expert in family medicine. Halloran required that the proposed expert
witness share the same specialty and board certification as the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony was offered. Id. at
579. After striking plaintiffs’ expert witness, the trial court granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed on the basis of Halloran. Reeves v Carson City Hosp, unpub-
lished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 6, 2006
(Docket No. 266469). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, this Court
vacated the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Woodard, which we decided after the Court of
Appeals had issued its opinion in this case. Woodard addressed an issue
not reached in Halloran–whether board certificates that are not relevant
to the alleged malpractice must match. In Halloran, the parties did not
dispute that the relevant specialty was internal medicine. Because
plaintiff’s expert was not board-certified in internal medicine, he was not
qualified to testify under MCL 600.2169. Woodard, however, later held
that a plaintiff’s expert must match only the one most relevant specialty
of the defendant physician.
1
On remand, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the relevant specialty was emergency medicine, the specialty that defen-
dant Squanda was practicing at the time of the alleged malpractice.
Although plaintiffs’ expert did not match defendant Squanda’s board
certification in family medicine, that specialty was irrelevant. Therefore,
1
Woodard, supra at 559, explained:
That is, § 2969(1) addresses the necessary qualifications of an
expert witness to testify regarding the “appropriate standard of
practice or care,” not regarding an inappropriate or irrelevant
standard of medical practice or care. Because an expert witness is
not required to testify regarding an inappropriate or irrelevant
standard of medical practice or care, § 2169(1) should not be
understood to require such witness to specialize in specialties and
possess board certificates that are not relevant to the standard of
medical practice or care about which the witness is to testify.
1056 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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it was sufficient under Woodard that plaintiffs’ expert was board-
certified in emergency medicine.
2
Reeves v Carson City Hosp (On Re-
mand), 274 Mich App 622 (2007).
In my view, the Court of Appeals has complied with Woodard’s
direction to identify the one most relevant specialty. I concur in the denial
of leave to appeal because the Court of Appeals result is consistent with
the Woodard decision. Defendant Squanda was practicing emergency
medicine and could become board-certified in it, so under Woodard she
was practicing the relevant specialty of emergency medicine.
Although I concur in the denial of leave to appeal, I note that other
potential avenues remain available for testing an expert witness’s quali-
fications for testifying. The Court unanimously agreed in Woodard that
“even when a proffered expert meets the criteria contained in § 2169(1),
the expert is subject to further scrutiny under § 2169(2)and (3), [MCL
600.2955], and MRE 702.” A majority specifically agreed that the trial
court may require that other relevant specialties match. Id. at 580, 582
(M
ARKMAN
, J., concurring); id. at 591 (Opinion of T
AYLOR
, C.J.).
Here, plaintiffs’ expert may well match the “one most relevant
specialty” of emergency medicine. Nonetheless, on the basis of Woodard,
an argument may be advanced that an expert lacks expertise in the
additional relevant specialty of family medicine. Defendants here, for
example, may argue that the practice of family medicine was so integral
to the care defendant Squanda provided that plaintiffs’ expert must
specialize in emergency medicine and be board-certified in family medi-
cine. Because Woodard was decided after defendants filed their motion to
strike, the record contains no argument under § 2169(2), § 2955, or MRE
702. Therefore, I join the order denying leave to appeal. Nevertheless, a
potentially viable argument is available, even after Woodard.
P
EOPLE V
A
LPHONZO
W
RIGHT
, No. 135025; Court of Appeals No. 256475
(on remand).
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal. I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether the circum-
stantial evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of
keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle, MCL 333.7405(1)(d), under People
v Thompson, 477 Mich 146 (2007).
In Thompson, supra at 148, 155, this Court held that MCL
333.7405(1)(d) precludes a conviction of keeping or maintaining a drug
vehicle for an isolated incident without other evidence of continuity. “The
phrase ‘keep or maintain’ implies usage with some degree of continuity
that can be deduced by actual observation of repeated acts or circum-
stantial evidence, such as perhaps a secret compartment or the like, that
conduces to the same conclusion.” Thompson, supra at 155.
Here, defendant was arrested after driving a vehicle in which there
was a brick of 125 grams of uncut cocaine worth $25,000. An expert in
drug distribution testified at defendant’s trial that 125 grams of uncut
cocaine is enough to divide into 1,200 individual units. Defendant also
2
Because the Court of Appeals had no record regarding the remaining
statutory requirements, it remanded the case for further consideration.
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1057
had a digital scale in the vehicle but no paraphernalia for personal drug
use. He had his cell phone plugged into the car for battery recharging and
received three phone calls asking for “Al” after his arrest, while he was
being transported to the police station. This circumstantial evidence,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, appears to show
an ongoing drug sales enterprise being conducted in defendant’s car.
Thus, under Thompson, there appears to be sufficient evidence of
continuity to establish that defendant kept or maintained a vehicle for
the purpose of making drug sales and deliveries in violation of MCL
333.7405(1)(d).
P
EOPLE V
H
ARTMAN
, No. 135038; Court of Appeals No. 279313.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). Defendant pleaded guilty of three counts of
making child sexually abusive material. The factual basis for this guilty
plea was defendant’s admission that he downloaded child sexually
abusive material from the Internet and saved it to a flash drive. MCL
750.145c(2) provides, in pertinent part, “A person who...produces,
makes or finances...child sexually abusive material is guilty of a
felony.” I question whether defendant’s admission constitutes a sufficient
factual basis to support a guilty plea to a charge of “producing or making”
child sexually abusive material. While such admission is clearly sufficient
to establish the “possession” of such material, it is less clear that it is
sufficient to establish the “producing or making” of such material.
As in People v Hill, 477 Mich 897 (2006), I would grant leave to appeal
to determine: (a) whether the reasonable meaning of MCL 750.145c(2) is
to punish those who create or originate child sexually abusive material;
(b) whether the majority’s interpretation essentially renders nugatory
the prohibition in MCL 750.145c(4) concerning the “possession” of child
sexually abusive materials, imposing the same penalty on a person who
downloads such material as on a person who actually entices the child to
pose and who thereby creates or originates the material; and (c) whether
the majority’s interpretation of “makes or produces” has legal conse-
quences in other digital contexts. For example, does a person who
downloads a pirated movie from the Internet “make or produce” this
movie and would such person be subject to the same penalty as a person
who originally pirated the movie and placed it on the Internet? Does a
person who downloads a pirated song from the Internet “make or
produce” this song and would such person be subject to the same penalty
as a person who originally pirated the song and made it available on the
Internet? Does a person who downloads a defamatory article from the
Internet “make or produce” this article and would such person be subject
to the same penalty as an original publisher of the defamation?
There is a substantial question whether the Legislature in MCL
750.145c(2) intended to punish a person who downloads pornographic
images of children from the Internet and then places or burns these onto
a flash drive or compact disc for personal use the same as a person who
coerces children into posing for sexual activities in order to create
pornographic images. Moreover, there are significant legal implications
arising from this question for other forms of Internet use.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
1058 480 M
ICHIGAN
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In re F
AULKNER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
F
AULKNER
), No.
135632; Court of Appeals No. 277707.
In re C
OATES
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
C
ONKLE
), No. 135656;
Court of Appeals No. 278680.
Summary Dispositions February 6, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
S
MITH
, No. 135007. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of: (1) whether the circuit
court erred in admitting the testimony of Latrice Lewis under MRE
404(b); (2) whether the error in admitting the testimony, if any, was
reversible; (3) whether the testimony was admissible under MCL
768.27a; and (4) whether the prosecution’s failure to rely on MCL
768.27a precludes sustaining its admission based on that provision. Court
of Appeals No. 277736.
P
EOPLE V
D
ARNELL
W
ALKER,
J
R
, Nos. 135049, 135165. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the second and
third paragraphs of part II(C) and all of part II(D) of the September 6,
2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. These portions of the Court of
Appeals discussion of the notice requirement and the “good-faith excep-
tion” to the 180-day rule statute, MCL 780.131, are dicta. In all other
respects, the application for leave to appeal is denied. We are not
persuaded that the questions presented regarding the 180-day rule
should be reviewed by this Court before the completion of the proceed-
ings ordered by the Court of Appeals, and we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do
not retain jurisdiction. Reported below: 276 Mich App 528.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would simply deny leave to appeal.
In re A
TTORNEY
F
EES
(D
UMAS V
A
UTO
C
LUB
I
NSURANCE
A
SSOCIATION AND
A
NDRIS V
M
ILLER
), No. 135262. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the August 30, 2007, order of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary
consideration. Because the August 2, 2005, order of the Wayne Circuit
Court is a postjudgment order awarding an attorney fee, it is a final order
under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) that is appealable as a matter of right under
MCR 7.203(A)(1). We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No.
279149.
In re H
ROBA
T
RUST
(H
ROBA V
H
ROBA
), No. 135277. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Oakland
County Probate Court. Because the issue of the validity of the amend-
ment to the trust was never litigated in the summary proceedings action
brought in the 52-4 District Court, res judicata did not bar the petition-
er’s action in the Oakland County Probate Court. MCL 600.5750; JAM
Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc, 461 Mich 161 (1999); Sewell v Clean Cut Mgt,
Inc, 463 Mich 569 (2001). Court of Appeals No. 266783.
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1059
Leave to Appeal Denied February 6, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
R
OBERT
P
ARKS
, No. 134172; Court of Appeals No. 265843.
K
ELLY,
J. I would remand this case for a hearing pursuant to People v
Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973).
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
W
ARD
, No. 135141; Court of Appeals No. 271641.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
W
ATTS V
N
EVILS
, No. 135156; Court of Appeals No. 267503.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
B
ELL
, No. 135193; Court of Appeals No. 280514.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case to the trial court
to allow the defendant to move to withdraw his plea.
P
EOPLE V
S
WIFT
, No. 135236; Court of Appeals No. 271105.
O
WCZAREK V
S
TATE OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 135241; reported below: 276 Mich
App 602.
P
EOPLE V
E
NGLISH
, No. 135519; Court of Appeals No. 269887.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would remand this case to the trial court
for reconsideration under the appropriate standard, as explained in the
partially dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, of whether the juror
was excusable for cause.
Interlocutory Appeal
Leave to Appeal Denied February 6, 2008:
S
TRUCK V
K
USMIERZ
, No. 135138; Court of Appeals No. 276219.
F
ORD
M
OTOR
C
REDIT
C
OMPANY V
O
DOM
, No. 135184; Court of Appeals No.
266770.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal February 8, 2008:
F
UNDUNBURKS V
C
APITAL
A
REA
T
RANSPORTATION
A
UTHORITY
, No. 134408.
We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the
application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral
argument, the parties are directed to discuss (1) whether the fact that the
bus driver’s deposition had not been taken was a sufficient reason to deny
her motion for summary disposition and (2) whether there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a trial on the claim that defendant Beard’s conduct,
including her action of closing the doors of the bus while the plaintiff was
attempting to exit the vehicle, constituted gross negligence or whether no
reasonable juror could conclude that defendant Beard’s conduct
amounted to reckless conduct showing a substantial lack of concern as to
whether injury would result, MCL 691.1407(7)(a), and thus that sum-
1060 480 M
ICHIGAN
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mary disposition should have entered for defendant Beard. MCL
691.1407(2)(c). See Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 620-621 (2002).
The parties may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this
order, but they should not submit mere restatements of their application
papers. Court of Appeals No. 274928.
Summary Dispositions February 8, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
H
OPSON
, No. 134018. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals erroneous holding that
the defendant is not an aggrieved party and we remand this case to the
Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Court of Appeals No. 276344.
To have standing on appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the act of a
trial court or appellate court. MCR 7.203(A); Federated Ins Co v Oakland
Co Road Comm, 475 Mich 286, 291-292 (2006). He must show that the act
of which he complains caused an “ ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Nat’l Wild-
life Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 628 (2004)
(citations omitted). He must also show that it is likely, rather than merely
speculative, that the injury will be ”’redressed by a favorable decision.’”
Id. at 629 (citation omitted).
Here, defendant has a right to be tried by a jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community. Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 527
(1975); People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 214 (2000). The November 2, 2006,
order transferred resolution of the defendant’s constitutional challenge
to the jury array to the chief judge, but held resolution of his challenge in
abeyance until after his trial. Accordingly, the chief judge’s order signified
an imminent invasion of a concrete, legally protected interest, and the
potential injury was more than speculative. Further, a favorable decision
on appeal would redress the imminent injury because the defendant
sought reassignment of his jury challenge back to the trial judge for
resolution before trial.
Because the chief judge’s November 2, 2006, order in this case was
entered pursuant to Local Administrative Order 2006-12, we remand this
case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this order
and this Court’s February 8, 2008, administrative order rescinding a
portion of the Third Judicial Circuit Court’s LAO 2006-12. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I concur with the result of the order.
W
EAVER
, J. (concurring). I concur in the order reversing the judgment
of the Court of Appeals that the defendant is not an aggrieved party and
remanding this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings.
I write separately because I disagree with the application of the
erroneous test for standing created by the majority of four (Chief Justice
T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,andM
ARKMAN
)inNat’l Wildlife
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Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.
1
In that case, the majority of four
continued its systematic dismantling of Michigan’s standing law, which
replaced years of precedent with the majority’s own test that denies
Michigan citizens access to the courts.
2
I would hold that the plaintiff has standing under the pre-Lee
prudential test for standing because the plaintiff has demonstrated ”that
the plaintiff’s substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a
manner different from the citizenry at large.” House Speaker v State
Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554 (1993).
K
ELLY
, J. I concur with the result of the order. I would, however,
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on the validity of
Local Administrative Order No. 2006-12 before the Court takes action on
that local administrative order. See my statement dissenting from the
order rescinding in part Local Administrative Order No. 2006-12, 480
Mich cxxxix (2008).
K
WIATKOWSKI V
C
OACHLIGHT
E
STATES OF
B
LISSFIELD,
I
NC,
No. 135036. Pur-
suant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we reinstate the July 10, 2006,
order of the Lenawee Circuit Court denying summary disposition on
plaintiff’s negligence claim for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals
dissenting opinion. We remand this case to the circuit court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order. Court of Appeals No.
272106.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I concur with the analysis and conclusion of
the Court of Appeals and would deny leave to appeal. In particular, I
agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff’s claim sounds in premises
liability, not general or ordinary negligence.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
Leave to Appeal Denied February 8, 2008:
D
AVENPORT V
HSBC B
ANK
USA, No. 134458; reported below: 275 Mich
App 344.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). On October 27, 2005, defendant bank
initiated foreclosure proceedings by publishing notice. On October 31, the
mortgage was assigned to defendant bank and defendant subsequently
purchased the property. The Court of Appeals held that defendant bank
was unable to initiate foreclosure proceedings on October 27 because
1
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608
(2004).
2
See my opinions chronicling the majority of four’s assault on standing
in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 742 (2001), Nat’l
Wildlife, 471 Mich at 651, Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336,
366 (2007), and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters
North America Inc, 479 Mich 280, 310 (2007).
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“one who is not the record holder of a mortgage may not foreclose the
mortgage....”Davenport v HSBC Bank USA, 275 Mich App 344, 347
(2007) (emphasis omitted).
MCL 600.3204(1)(d) states that “[a] party may foreclose a mortgage
by advertisement” when:
The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the
indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage. [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, the Court of Appeals essentially held that the term “foreclosing” in
MCL 600.3204(1)(d) refers to the time that the foreclosure process is
initiated. That is, the party who initiates a foreclosure must be the
“owner of the indebtedness” or the owner “of an interest in the
indebtedness” when the foreclosure process begins. Although this under-
standing is not unreasonable, MCL 600.3208 explains how notice should
be given when a mortgage “will be foreclosed byasaleof the mortgaged
premises....”(Emphasis added.) This arguably suggests that a “fore-
closure” takes place at the time a property is sold and does not encompass
presale procedures. Under such an interpretation, defendant bank could
have commenced the process of foreclosing plaintiff’s home by publishing
notice in anticipation of the actual assignment of the mortgage.
In my judgment, the proper meaning of the term “foreclosure”
constitutes an important statutory question. I would grant leave to
appeal to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the
term “foreclosing” in MCL 600.3204(1)(d) refers generally to the proce-
dure involved in foreclosing a property or only to the actual sale of the
property.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEVEN
C
ARTER
, No. 134687; Court of Appeals No. 270195.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal. I would grant leave and reverse the Court of Appeals judgment
insofar as it remands the case to the trial court to consider sua sponte
defendant’s financial circumstances before imposing as a condition of
probation the repayment of court-appointed attorney fees. Twenty-one
years ago this Court unanimously held that MCL 771.3(6)(a) does not
require a sentencing court to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay
before imposing the repayment of attorney fees as a condition of
probation. People v Music, 428 Mich 356, 357 (1987); see also People v
Grant, 455 Mich 221 (1997); People v Hill, 430 Mich 898 (1988). The trial
court in this case conducted the sentencing proceeding under the
controlling principles of law in Music. The majority sub silentio overturns
this authority in allowing the Court of Appeals judgment to stand.
I would further grant to overrule People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240
(2004), which is inconsistent with Music, insofar as it chose a case from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to conclude
that absent any objection to the order requiring the repayment of
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attorney fees, the federal constitution compels a state court to consider a
defendant’s ability to pay without any claim of indigency by the defen-
dant. A court is compelled to inquire into ability to pay before sanctioning
a defendant by revoking probation; it need not conduct such an inquiry
sua sponte, before imposing costs. The imposition of costs is distinct from
a sanction for nonpayment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Defendant was charged with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC IV) (force or coercion) after grabbing the victim’s buttocks as she
walked out of a Church’s Chicken restaurant in Detroit. Because defen-
dant was indigent, the court appointed counsel for him. The order
appointing counsel explicitly stated that the court might require defen-
dant to pay the cost of his court-appointed attorney. After a jury trial,
defendant was convicted of CSC IV. At sentencing, the court did not
mention that defendant would be required to reimburse the county for
the cost of appointed counsel. Defendant did, nonetheless, sign a proba-
tion order acknowledging that he agreed to pay attorney fees of $730 as
a condition of his probation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, but remanded
“for the trial court to consider defendant’s attorney fees in light of his
current and future financial circumstances and for resentencing.” People
v Carter, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
July 3, 2007 (Docket No. 270195), p 1. In regard to defendant’s financial
ability to repay attorney fees, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the
issue was unpreserved, so it reviewed the claim for plain error affecting
substantial rights. The Court of Appeals held that “a court must indicate
that, in assessing attorney fees, it considered defendant’s ability to pay.
Dunbar, supra at 254-255.” Carter, supra at 7.
Defendant failed to raise the issue of his ability to pay the
assessed fees and costs at sentencing. Therefore, the court was
not required to hold a hearing. See Music, supra at 361-
362. However, in assessing attorney fees to defendant, the court
failed to indicate whether it considered defendant’s financial
circumstances. Therefore, we remand this case for the trial
court to consider these assessments in light of defendant’s
current and future financial circumstances. Dunbar, supra at
255. [Carter, supra at 7.]
The prosecution appealed. This Court directed the clerk to sched-
ule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other
peremptory action. 480 Mich 938 (2007). The order directed the
parties to submit supplemental briefs “addressing whether the con-
stitutional underpinnings of People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240
(2004), are sound.” Id.
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ICHIGAN
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant did not argue at sentencing that the court was required to
inquire into his financial ability to pay before ordering him to reimburse
the court for attorney fees. This Court reviews this unpreserved issue for
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
774 (1999); Dunbar, supra at 251.
III. ANALYSIS
A. MCL 771.3(6)(a) REQUIREMENTS
The sentencing court ordered defendant to pay the cost of his
court-appointed attorney as a condition of probation under MCL
771.3(2).
1
MCL 771.3(6)(a) discusses a sentencing court’s obligation to
consider the defendant’s ability to pay these fees:
If the court imposes costs under subsection (2) as part of a
sentence of probation, all of the following apply:
(a) The court shall not require a probationer to pay costs under
subsection (2) unless the probationer is or will be able to pay them
during the term of probation. In determining the amount and
method of payment of costs under subsection (2), the court shall
take into account the probationer’s financial resources and the
nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose, with due
regard to his or her other obligations.
1
MCL 771.3 provides, in pertinent part:
(2) As a condition of probation, the court may require the
probationer to do 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) Pay costs pursuant to subsection (5).
***
(5) If the court requires the probationer to pay costs under
subsection (2), the costs shall be limited to expenses specifically
incurred in prosecuting the defendant or providing legal assistance
to the defendant and supervision of the probationer. [Emphasis
added.]
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In Music, this Court unanimously held that MCL 771.3(6)(a)
2
does not
require “that a sentencing judge inquire, before ordering that a defen-
dant pay costs, as to the defendant’s ability to pay the costs.” Music,
supra at 357. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals holding that
the statute does not require that the sentencing court hold a hearing or
make findings on the record to determine whether a defendant, who has
not asserted an inability to pay costs, is able to make such payment. Id.
at 359. This Court also accepted the explanation by the Court of Appeals
that the statute distinguishes between the imposition of costs and the
sanctioning for the nonpayment of costs; a court may impose costs
without considering the defendant’s ability to pay, but may not enforce
payment of those costs without determining whether the defendant is
able to pay. Id. at 360. This Court concluded as follows:
[MCL 771.3(6)(a)] does not expressly state that a trial court
must conduct a hearing to determine whether a defendant has the
ability to pay costs. In the absence of a clear statement from the
Legislature, the statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation.
A probationer is free to ask the sentencing judge to reduce the
amount of restitution or costs, and it is clear that a probationer
cannot be punished for failure to pay restitution or costs that the
probationer cannot afford. Moreover, a defendant who timely
asserts an inability to pay restitution or costs must be heard. In
that situation, a sentencing judge shall determine whether the
restitution or costs are within the defendant’s means. [Music,
supra at 361-362.]
Subsequently, in People v Hill, 430 Mich 898, 899 (1988), this Court,
citing Music, explained, “Unless a defendant indicates an inability to pay,
the sentencing judge need not inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay
prior to imposing costs and restitution as conditions of probation.”
Here, the sentencing court imposed attorney fees as a condition of
defendant’s probation, as permitted by MCL 771.3(2). Defendant had
notice of the fees and an opportunity to object, but did not do so. The
petition and order appointing counsel stated, “I understand that I may be
ordered to contribute and/or reimburse the court for all or part of my
attorney and defense costs.”
3
In Dunbar, supra at 254, the defendant’s
petition and order appointing counsel similarly stated that he “may be
ordered to repay the court” for his court-appointed attorney fees. The
Dunbar panel held that this petition and order sufficiently notified the
2
At the time this Court decided Music, what is now MCL 771.3(6)(a)
was MCL 771.3(5)(a). The pertinent statutory language at the time Music
was decided was almost identical to the present language.
3
The petition and order also stated, “THE DEFENDANT SHALL
CONTRIBUTE AND/OR REIMBURSE THE COURT AT A RATE OF
1066 480 M
ICHIGAN
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defendant of the court’s decision to order the payment of attorney fees.
Id. The petition and order in the instant case, which is virtually identical
to the one at issue in Dunbar, similarly notified defendant about his
responsibility to pay the attorney fees.
Defendant also had an opportunity to object. The Dunbar panel held that
the defendant, who was given notice of the fees by the petition and order
appointing counsel, was given the opportunity to object at sentencing. Id. at
254. “In regard to defendant’s opportunity to be heard, defendant was not
prevented from objecting at sentencing and asserting his indigency.” Id.
Similarly in the instant case, defendant, who had prior notice of the fees
through the petition and order appointing counsel, had an opportunity to
object at sentencing. Further, on the day of the sentencing hearing, defen-
dant signed the probation order in which he agreed to pay $730 in attorney
fees. He could have objected to the fees at any time on the record; he also
signed the order without any protest. Thus, defendant had notice of the fees
and a meaningful opportunity to object to those fees.
Under Music, the sentencing court did not violate MCL 771.3(6)(a) by
imposing attorney fees without holding a hearing or stating on the record
that it considered defendant’s financial resources. The sentencing court
was required to consider defendant’s financial resources only if he timely
asserted an inability to pay. Because defendant had notice of the fees but
did not timely object and assert an inability to pay, MCL 771.3(6)(a) did
not require the sentencing court, before ordering defendant to pay the
cost of his court-appointed attorney, to make a finding on the record that
he was able to make such a payment. Music, supra at 357, 359-362.
4
B. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In Dunbar, supra at 252, the issue was whether a sentencing court
may constitutionally require a defendant to contribute to the cost of his
court-appointed attorney without first assessing his ability to pay.
5
The
Dunbar panel adopted the test from Alexander v Johnson, 742 F2d 117,
124 (CA 4, 1984), to determine whether a sentencing court’s procedure
passes constitutional muster. In Alexander, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed James v Strange, 407 US 128 (1972), Fuller v Oregon,
417 US 40 (1974), and Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 (1983), which all
involved challenges to the constitutionality of statutory attorney-fee
_____.” The order necessarily left blank the amount defendant would be
required to pay; the appointed attorney’s fee was not yet known because
trial had not yet commenced.
4
Defendant is free to petition the court at any time for remission of the
payment of attorney fees or any unpaid portion, if he contends that he is
unable to pay. MCL 771.3(6)(b).
5
In Dunbar, MCL 771.3 did not apply because the defendant was not
sentenced to probation. At the time Dunbar was decided, no statutory
procedure existed governing the imposition on criminal defendants of the
costs of court-appointed attorneys. Dunbar, supra at 254, 256 n 15.
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recoupment schemes. The Fourth Circuit held that the following consti-
tutional principles emerged from those cases:
From the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in James, Fuller,
and Bearden, five basic features of a constitutionally acceptable
attorney’s fees reimbursement program emerge. First, the pro-
gram under all circumstances must guarantee the indigent defen-
dant’s fundamental right to counsel without cumbersome proce-
dural obstacles designed to determine whether he is entitled to
court-appointed representation. Second, the state’s decision to
impose the burden of repayment must not be made without
providing him notice of the contemplated action and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Third, the entity deciding whether to
require repayment must take cognizance of the individual’s re-
sources, the other demands on his own and family’s finances, and
the hardships he or his family will endure if repayment is required.
The purpose of this inquiry is to assure repayment is not required
as long as he remains indigent. Fourth, the defendant accepting
court-appointed counsel cannot be exposed to more severe collec-
tion practices than the ordinary civil debtor. Fifth, the indigent
defendant ordered to repay his attorney’s fees as a condition of
work-release, parole, or probation cannot be imprisoned for failing
to extinguish his debt as long as his default is attributable to his
poverty, not his contumacy. [Alexander, supra at 124 (emphasis
added).]
After the Dunbar panel cited this test, it held that a sentencing court may
order reimbursement of a court-appointed attorney’s fees without spe-
cific findings on the record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay,
unless the defendant objects to the reimbursement amount at the time it
is ordered. Id. at 254. The panel held, however, that even if the defendant
does not object, “the court does need to provide some indication of
consideration, such as noting that it reviewed the financial and employ-
ment sections of the defendant’s presentence investigation report or,
even more generally, a statement that it considered the defendant’s
ability to pay.” Id. at 254-255.
6
In my opinion, Dunbar misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent
when it followed the Fourth Circuit. Nothing in James, Fuller,or
Bearden requires a sentencing court to state on the record that it
considered the defendant’s ability to pay when the defendant did not
timely object on indigency grounds to the reimbursement order.
James involved a constitutional challenge to a Kansas recoupment
statute. Under this statute, when the state provided counsel, the indigent
6
The Court of Appeals then held that in deciding the amount that
should be reimbursed, the court should consider the defendant’s foresee-
able ability to pay. Id. at 255.
1068 480 M
ICHIGAN
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defendant became obligated to repay the amount expended on his behalf.
James, supra at 129-130. If the sum remained unpaid after a designated
time, a judgment would be entered against the defendant for the unpaid
amount. Id. at 130. The indigent defendant was not accorded any of the
exemptions that a code of civil procedure accorded to other judgment
debtors. Id. The Supreme Court held that this provision violated equal
protection because it “strips from indigent defendants the array of
protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment
debtors....”Id. at 135.
In Fuller, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of
Oregon’s recoupment statute. The statute provided that in some cases,
defendants may be required to pay the costs of court-appointed counsel
and that the payment of such expenses could be made a condition of
probation. Fuller, supra at 43. It further provided that a defendant could
not be required to pay attorney fees if he was financially unable to pay.
7
Id. at 45. Further, a defendant ordered to pay his attorney fees could
petition the court for remission of the payment of costs,
8
and a defendant
could not be held in contempt for failure to repay if he made a good-faith
effort to make the payment.
9
Id. at 45-46. The Supreme Court summa-
rized: “a lawyer is provided at the expense of the State to all defendants
who are unable, even momentarily, to hire one, and the obligation to
repay the State accrues only to those who later acquire the means to do
so without hardship.” Id. at 46. The Court held that Oregon’s recoup-
ment statute did not infringe on a defendant’s constitutional right to
have counsel provided by the state when he is unable because of
indigency to hire a lawyer. Id. at 51. The Court rejected the defendant’s
argument that “a defendant’s knowledge that he may remain under an
obligation to repay the expenses incurred in providing him legal repre-
sentation might impel him to decline the services of an appointed
attorney and thus ‘chill’ his constitutional right to counsel.” Id. The
Court explained that Oregon’s statute in no way deprived any defendant
of legal assistance when he needed it. Id. at 52-53. The Court emphasized
the following points:
The Oregon statute is carefully designed to insure that only
those who actually become capable of repaying the State will ever
be obliged to do so. Those who remain indigent or for whom
repayment would work “manifest hardship” are forever exempt
from any obligation to repay.
***
Oregon’s recoupment statute merely provides that a convicted
person who later becomes able to pay for his counsel may be
7
This provision is similar to MCL 771.3(6)(a).
8
This provision is similar to MCL 771.3(6)(b).
9
This provision is similar to MCL 771.3(8).
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required to do so. Oregon’s legislation is tailored to impose an
obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to meet it, and
to enforce that obligation only against those who actually become
able to meet it without hardship. [Id. at 53-54.]
In Bearden, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from revoking an indigent defendant’s
probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution. In that case, the trial
court revoked the defendant’s probation and imprisoned him for failing
to pay his fine and restitution without considering his financial ability to
pay. Bearden, supra at 663. The Supreme Court held as follows:
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to
pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the
reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to
pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire
the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence
the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its
sentencing authority. If the probationer could not pay despite
sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the
court must consider alternative measures of punishment other
than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not adequate
to meet the State’s interests in punishment and deterrence may
the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona
fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer
of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his
own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary
to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. [Id. at 672-673 (emphasis added).]
Applying this holding to the facts of the case, the Bearden Court
concluded that because the trial court had not made any finding that the
defendant had not made a bona fide effort to pay the fine and restitution,
the case must be remanded for resolution of this issue. Id. at 673-674.
In regard to the relevant issue here, Supreme Court precedents
compel a sentencing court to inquire into a defendant’s financial status
and make findings on the record when the court decides to enforce
collection or sanction the defendant for failure to pay the ordered amount.
Our holding in Music, supra at 361-362, fully comports with those
authorities. The Alaska Supreme Court correctly explained that “James
and Fuller do not require a prior determination of ability to pay in a
recoupment system which treats recoupment judgment debtors like other
civil judgment debtors....”State v Albert, 899 P2d 103, 109 (Alas,
1995). See also the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of James,
Fuller, and Bearden:
[C]ommon sense dictates that a determination of ability to pay
and an inquiry into defendant’s finances is not required before a
1070 480 M
ICHIGAN
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recoupment order may be entered against an indigent defendant
as it is nearly impossible to predict ability to pay over a period of
10 years or longer. However, we hold that before enforced collec-
tion or any sanction is imposed for nonpayment, there must be an
inquiry into ability to pay. [State v Blank, 131 Wash 2d 230, 242
(1997).]
Nothing in James, Fuller, Bearden,orMusic states that a sentencing
court must state on the record that it considered the defendant’s ability
to pay when the defendant does not timely object on indigency grounds to
the order requiring him to pay attorney fees. I would overrule Dunbar’s
contrary holding.
10
Applying this conclusion to the facts of this case, I would hold that the
court satisfied its duties. It had no responsibility under the federal
constitution or our state statute to make a preemptive inquiry into
defendant’s indigency before imposing attorney fees.
Further, the probation order does not state when payment must
commence. The court has not enforced collection by revoking defendant’s
probation or imposing any other sanction. Therefore, defendant’s chal-
lenge to the reimbursement order is premature. See Dunbar, supra at 256
(“[I]n most cases, challenges to the reimbursement order will be prema-
ture if the defendant has not been required to commence repayment.”).
Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand
this case to the sentencing court to allow defendant to move to remit the
payment of attorney fees if he contends that he is unable to pay. MCL
771.3(6)(b).
10
Dunbar cited People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 242, 243 n 30 (1997), for
the proposition that the sentencing court must provide some indication
that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay before ordering payment
of attorney fees. But Grant does not support this conclusion. The issue in
Grant was “whether the trial court’s failure to make express findings
with respect to the statutory factors regarding restitution set forth
in...MCL780.767(1), (4) [the Crime Victim’s Rights Act]...waserror
that invalidates that portion of the judgment directing restitution.”
Grant, supra at 223. In Grant, supra at 224 n 4, this Court explained that
under Music, a trial court ordering restitution under the Crime Victim’s
Rights Act, like under MCL 771.3, need not make an express determina-
tion on the record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, absent a
timely objection at the time restitution is imposed. Although the Crime
Victim’s Rights Act requires the trial court “to consider” the defendant’s
ability to pay, “the statute does not require the trial judge to make a
separate factual inquiry and individual findings on the record.” Id.at
243. Nothing in Grant states that the trial court was constitutionally
required “to provide some indication of consideration” of the defendant’s
ability to pay on the record.
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S
UMMERS V
H
URLEY
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 134997; Court of Appeals No.
269824.
M
USKEGON
C
OUNTY
P
ROSECUTOR V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
,No.
135366; Court of Appeals No. 281321.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). The prosecutor, in my judgment, raises
reasonable questions concerning (a) whether the Department of Correc-
tion’s “immediate usage” method of computing good-time and special
good-time credits is in better accord with MCL 800.33 than the “earn as
you serve” method identified by the prosecutor and (b) whether an
inmate’s escape sentence properly begins before the inmate’s murder
sentence has reached its statutory maximum or before the parole board
has expressly terminated the murder sentence. However, in light of the
fact that the department’s current policies and practices have been
employed for more than a half century, and in light of the reliance
interests that have arisen in connection with these policies and practices,
I believe that further relief must come from the legislative or executive
branches of government. See People v Lively, 470 Mich 248, 259 (2004)
(M
ARKMAN
, J., concurring).
In re K
LANK
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
K
UTTKUHN
), No. 135677;
Court of Appeals No. 277826.
In re B
AKER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
G
ACH
), No. 135682;
Court of Appeals No. 277928.
Interlocutory Appeal
Leave to Appeal Denied February 8, 2008:
G
ALLIHER V
T
RINITY
H
EALTH–
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 135163; Court of Appeals
No. 267185.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). Because I cannot imagine any more “open
and obvious” condition than a pothole in a driveway during daylight
hours, I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand for
entry of an order granting summary disposition to defendant. “[P]otholes
in pavement are an ‘everyday occurrence’ that ordinarily should be
observed by a reasonably prudent person.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc,
464 Mich 512, 523 (2001).
It is hard to know whether the majority is more persuaded here by the
argument (a) that a shadow cast by a hospital on a pothole constitutes a
“special aspect,” thus removing the pothole from the realm of the “open
and obvious”; (b) that plaintiff’s testimony that she fell during “dark
evening hours” should be accorded credit despite the fact that 4:00 pm to
5:00 pm on the afternoon of March 1, 2003, the time of the accident, was
a daylight hour; (c) that plaintiff’s simultaneous arguments that there
were sunny conditions at the time of her accident, thereby creating a
shadow over the pothole, and that there were “overcast” conditions at the
time of the accident with “heavy, dense clouds and fog and scattered snow
showers,” thereby obscuring the pothole, should be accepted as legiti-
1072 480 M
ICHIGAN
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mate alternative arguments; or (d) that plaintiff’s assertion that she “did
not discover the condition” is somehow relevant to this Court’s analysis
of premises liability cases.
That any of these arguments have been found to be persuasive by this
Court evidences why Lugo has become an increasingly “dead letter,” to be
replaced by no coherent alternative rule of law.
Summary Dispositions February 19, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
H
ENRY
D
AVIS
, No. 134208. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand these cases to the Wayne
Circuit Court for entry of an amended judgment of sentence in Docket
No. 03-002568. As the prosecution concedes, the judgment of sentence
entered in that file on January 25, 2006, erroneously states that the
sentences are to run consecutively with the sentences in Docket Nos.
03-001582, 03-001583, and 03-002554, contrary to the plea agreement
provision, which was sanctioned by the circuit court, that all sentences
are to run concurrently. See PT, 6, 10-11, 22 and 23. In all other respects,
leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The
motions for miscellaneous relief are denied as moot. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 275419.
W
YATT V
O
AKWOOD
H
OSPITAL AND
M
EDICAL
C
ENTERS
, Nos. 135123, 135124,
135125. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order
of the Wayne Circuit Court denying the defendants’ motions for sum-
mary disposition because the plaintiff’s predecessor is within the class of
plaintiffs identified in this Court’s order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy
Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We remand this case to the Wayne Circuit
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the
order in Mullins. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because
we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals Nos. 263370, 263372, 263375.
J
UDD V
T
OWFIQ
, No. 135261. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
because the plaintiff falls within the class of plaintiffs entitled to relief
identified in our order in Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948
(2007). We remand this case to the Genesee Circuit Court for entry of an
order denying the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and the order in
Mullins. Court of Appeals No. 259107.
P
RIORITY
H
EALTH V
C
OMMISSIONER OF THE
O
FFICE OF
F
INANCIAL AND
I
NS
S
ERVICES
, No. 135311. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No. 278373.
P
EOPLE V
R
YAN
W
ILSON
, No. 135369. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. Court of Appeals No. 276914.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1073
P
EOPLE V
M
ORSE
, No. 135413. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Montcalm Circuit
Court for the trial court to correct the judgment of sentence by deleting
the $300 fine. The fine was clearly not a part of the sentencing
agreement, and the defendant was not offered the opportunity to
withdraw his plea after the fine was imposed as part of the sentence. In
all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded
that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 280205.
Leave to Appeal Denied February 19, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
A
LAN
W
OOD
, No. 134363; Court of Appeals No. 265841.
P
EOPLE V
H
AROLD
A
NDERSON
, No. 134384; Court of Appeals No. 265959.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
B
AILEY
, No. 134897; Court of Appeals No. 265803.
B
ANKS V
G
ENOVESE
, No. 134901; Court of Appeals No. 277322.
M
ALIK V
S
ALAMY
, No. 134979; Court of Appeals No. 264780.
P
EOPLE V
M
IELCAREK
, No. 134986; Court of Appeals No. 268894.
F
AARGSOB
LLC v HTSTS, LLC, No. 134995; Court of Appeals No.
268482.
L
AETHEM
E
QUIPMENT
C
OMPANY V
J
&
DI
MPLEMENT,
I
NC
, No. 134998; Court
of Appeals No. 266648.
S
LOTA V
S
LOTA
, No. 135062; Court of Appeals No. 269640.
P
EOPLE V
G
OLDSTICK
, No. 135064; Court of Appeals No. 267593.
P
ASSARO V
T
AGLIA,
F
ETTE,
D
UMKE &
W
HITE,
PC, No. 135067; Court of
Appeals No. 266425.
P
EOPLE V
R
ICHARD
L
AWSON
, No. 135080; Court of Appeals No. 276946.
P
EOPLE V
G
ORDON
S
TEWART
, No. 135122; Court of Appeals No. 270215.
M
C
M
ASTER V
S
ETTY
, No. 135140; Court of Appeals No. 276383.
P
EOPLE V
G
ARY
, No. 135146; Court of Appeals No. 277270.
P
EOPLE V
D
ARRYL
B
ALLARD
, No. 135147; Court of Appeals No. 268151.
P
EOPLE V
A
LTMAN
, No. 135172; Court of Appeals No. 267592.
S
ACHS V
S
INAI
H
OSPITAL OF
G
REATER
D
ETROIT
, No. 135173; Court of
Appeals No. 270321.
W
ARRING V
T
OTAL
M
ANUFACTURING
S
YSTEMS
I
NC
, No. 135187; Court of
Appeals No. 261497.
P
EOPLE V
F
RANK
B
UTZ
, No. 135190; Court of Appeals No. 275792.
1074 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
S
HAINA V
C
OMPTON
, No. 135201; Court of Appeals No. 274045.
P
EOPLE V
R
ODERICK
L
EE
, No. 135210. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278054.
P
EOPLE V
B
RANDOW
, No. 135212; Court of Appeals No. 269628.
P
EOPLE V
A
RNOLD
, No. 135215; Court of Appeals No. 271511.
P
EOPLE V
B
URK
, No. 135219; Court of Appeals No. 277500.
P
EOPLE V
T
ONY
C
OCHRANE
, No. 135243; Court of Appeals No. 267151.
P
EOPLE V
N
ICHIOW
-B
RUBAKER
, No. 135244; Court of Appeals No. 270464.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRISTOPHER
M
C
C
RAY
, No. 135252; Court of Appeals No.
271510.
P
EOPLE V
M
C
K
ALPAIN
, No. 135254; Court of Appeals No. 270209.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILBURN
, No. 135255; Court of Appeals No. 280546.
P
EOPLE V
P
ATRICK
B
ARNES
, No. 135256; Court of Appeals No. 271155.
P
EOPLE V
C
ATANZARO
, No. 135257; Court of Appeals No. 280246.
P
EOPLE V
A
RZOLA
, No. 135259; Court of Appeals No. 270901.
P
EOPLE V
C
RAPOFF
, No. 135263; Court of Appeals No. 280147.
P
EOPLE V
B
RAND
, No. 135267; Court of Appeals No. 280244.
P
EOPLE V
H
ANIBLE
, No. 135268; Court of Appeals No. 271177.
U
MBARGER V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 135278; Court of Appeals
No. 280340.
P
EOPLE V
S
HEAMEKIA
F
OSTER
, No. 135283; Court of Appeals No. 270191.
P
EOPLE V
S
TONE
, No. 135284; Court of Appeals No. 280366.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
D
AVIS
, No. 135285; Court of Appeals No. 280877.
M
C
C
ABE V
M
ILLER &
A
SSOCIATES,
LLP, No. 135290; Court of Appeals No.
275498.
T
IPPINS V
W
AYNE
C
IRCUIT
J
UDGE
, No. 135291; Court of Appeals No.
278887.
P
EOPLE V
E
ZEKIEL
D
AVIS
, No. 135292; Court of Appeals No. 273134.
P
EOPLE V
R
IZK
, No. 135293; Court of Appeals No. 269865.
P
ANHANDLE
E
ASTERN
P
IPELINE
C
OMPANY V
M
USSELMAN
, No. 135294; Court
of Appeals No. 268910.
G
ORDON V
N
UCRAFT
F
URNITURE
C
OMPANY,
I
NC
, No. 135295; Court of
Appeals No. 277331.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1075
P
EOPLE V
K
IRTDOLL
, No. 135296; Court of Appeals No. 280480.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
D
ARRYL
J
AMES
, No. 135297; Court of Appeals No.
278630.
K
IM V
D
EPARTMENT OF
L
ABOR &
E
CONOMIC
G
ROWTH
, No. 135298; Court of
Appeals No. 277254.
F
IRE &
I
CE
M
ECHANICAL,
I
NC V
B
IT
M
AT
P
RODUCTS OF
M
ICHIGAN,
I
NC
,No.
135302; Court of Appeals No. 269978.
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT V
T
HOMAS
, No. 135303; Court of Appeals No. 274529.
P
EOPLE V
C
HOZEN
G
REENE
, No. 135304; Court of Appeals No. 271792.
S
OULLIERE V
J
OHNSON
, No. 135307; Court of Appeals No. 268874.
P
EOPLE V
B
ENTLEY
, No. 135313; Court of Appeals No. 272551.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
J
ONES
, No. 135314. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 280415.
P
EOPLE V
S
HIRLEY
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135315; Court of Appeals No. 280929.
J
OHNSON V
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135319; Court of Appeals
No. 277685.
P
EOPLE V
P
URIFOY
, No. 135320; Court of Appeals No. 280446.
P
EOPLE V
C
LEO
P
OINDEXTER
, No. 135321; Court of Appeals No. 269915.
P
EOPLE V
R
AYMOND
Y
OUNG
, No. 135322; reported below: 276 Mich App
446.
P
EOPLE V
D
ANE
B
ROWN
, No. 135324; Court of Appeals No. 280604.
P
EOPLE V
F
REDERICK
J
OHNSON
, No. 135325; Court of Appeals No.
280313.
P
EOPLE V
H
ART
, No. 135326; Court of Appeals No. 270395.
P
EOPLE V
C
REEDEN
, No. 135327; Court of Appeals No. 280964.
D
ENK V
M
ARDEROSIAN
, No. 135329; Court of Appeals No. 276746.
M
ANETTA V
J
OHNSON
, No. 135330; Court of Appeals No. 265988.
P
EOPLE V
J
ESSE
F
LOWERS
, No. 135334; Court of Appeals No. 280278.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERENCE
J
OHNSON
, No. 135335; Court of Appeals No. 270444.
P
EOPLE V
W
ESLEY
N
EAL
,J
R
, No. 135337; Court of Appeals No. 272244.
P
EOPLE V
G
RAYS
, No. 135338; Court of Appeals No. 270699.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
M
OORE V
D
ELPHI
A
UTOMOTIVE
S
YSTEMS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135347; Court
of Appeals No. 278821.
1076 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
P
ELLOT
, No. 135356; Court of Appeals No. 272250.
P
EOPLE V
R
ILEY
, No. 135358; Court of Appeals No. 280478.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
B
ROWN
, No. 135359; Court of Appeals No. 276527.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
B
ROWN
, No. 135360; Court of Appeals No. 270328.
P
EOPLE V
R
USSELL
, No. 135364; Court of Appeals No. 268603.
P
EOPLE V
C
OREY
N
ELSON
, No. 135374; Court of Appeals No. 280799.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIS
, No. 135378; Court of Appeals No. 267896.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
JH
ALL
, No. 135379; Court of Appeals No. 279237.
M
OSHER,
D
OLAN,
C
ATALDO &
K
ELLY,
I
NC V
F
EINBLOOM
, No. 135381; Court of
Appeals No. 270579.
K
ETTERER V
G
REAT
A
TLANTIC &
P
ACIFIC
T
EA
C
OMPANY
/F
ARMER
J
ACK
/B
ORMAN’S,
I
NC
, No. 135385; Court of Appeals No. 278141.
P
EOPLE V
L
YON
, No. 135393; Court of Appeals No. 270476.
P
EOPLE V
K
LOCK
, No. 135400; Court of Appeals No. 273406.
P
EOPLE V
F
ILIPIAK
, No. 135408; Court of Appeals No. 271162.
S
TATE
T
REASURER V
G
ROSSNICKLE
, No. 135422; Court of Appeals No.
278820.
P
EOPLE V
B
URRELL
, No. 135430; Court of Appeals No. 280146.
P
EOPLE V
B
EER
, No. 135432; Court of Appeals No. 272941.
P
EOPLE V
M
AURICIO
, No. 135433; Court of Appeals No. 272909.
P
EOPLE V
J
ACKIE
R
AY
K
ING
, Nos. 135434, 135647; Court of Appeals Nos.
280965, 280966.
P
EOPLE V
H
UCK
, No. 135443; Court of Appeals No. 280992.
P
EOPLE V
F
LORES
, No. 135445; Court of Appeals No. 270117.
P
EOPLE V
M
ADISON
, No. 135447; Court of Appeals No. 278590.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
J
ONES
, No. 135461; Court of Appeals No. 270895.
Reconsiderations Denied February 19, 2008:
R
UMFIELD V
H
ENNEY
, No. 132755. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
944. Court of Appeals No. 260540.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant the motion for reconsideration.
D
I
V
ERGILIO V
W
EST
B
LOOMFIELD
C
HARTER
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 133174. Leave to
appeal denied at 480 Mich 949. Court of Appeals No. 261766.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1077
P
EOPLE V
D
ONTRELL
S
MITH
, No. 134009. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 920. Court of Appeals No. 273743.
S
AM’S
T
OWN AND
C
OUNTRY
M
ARKET,
I
NC V
M
IHELICH &
K
AVANAUGH,
PLC, No.
134149. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 920. Court of Appeals No.
270940.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
M
OSS
, No. 134182. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 921. Court of Appeals No. 274118.
P
EOPLE V
M
ILSTEAD
, No. 134306. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
951. Court of Appeals No. 273714.
P
EOPLE V
B
RIAN
J
ONES
, No. 134494. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1003. Court of Appeals No. 274553.
P
EOPLE V
A
MARO
, No. 134530. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 925.
Court of Appeals No. 269692.
P
EOPLE V
S
HELTON
, No. 134546. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
925. Court of Appeals No. 268078.
P
EOPLE V
C
RAWFORD
, No. 134579. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
925. Court of Appeals No. 267728.
P
EOPLE V
H
OUSTON
, No. 134618. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1004. Court of Appeals No. 275644.
C
ITY OF
M
ADISON
H
EIGHTS V
E
LGIN
S
WEEPER
C
OMPANY
, No. 134619. Leave
to appeal denied at 480 Mich 1002. Court of Appeals No. 266333.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would
grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
CNAMEE
, No. 134710. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
955. Court of Appeals No. 273736.
B
URGESS V
B
ERNHARDT
, No. 134770. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
956. Court of Appeals No. 268569.
P
EOPLE V
O
HLENDORF
, No. 134774. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
956. Court of Appeals No. 278462.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
Y
OUNG
, No. 134786. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
957. Court of Appeals No. 278889.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
C
OOPER
, No. 134789. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
957. Court of Appeals No. 276602.
P
EOPLE V
H
EMP
, No. 134794. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 957.
Court of Appeals No. 277171.
P
EOPLE V
P
ERRY
D
AVIS
, No. 134800. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1005. Court of Appeals No. 274796.
S
PENCER V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134844. Leave to appeal
denied at 480 Mich 958. Court of Appeals No. 278922.
1078 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
W
ALTONEN
, No. 134862. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
958. Court of Appeals No. 278851.
P
EOPLE V
C
ATHRON
, No. 134884. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
958. Court of Appeals No. 275974.
P
EOPLE V
D
EANGELO
J
ONES
, No. 134931. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 959. Court of Appeals No. 278624.
P
EOPLE V
S
COTT
-P
ARKIN
, No. 135002. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 959. Court of Appeals No. 279315.
In re B
ORGHESE
(B
ORGHESE V
M
ICHIGAN
C
HILDREN’S
I
NSTITUTE
), No.
135134. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 976. Court of Appeals No.
274337.
Leave to Appeal Denied February 27, 2008:
D
ETROIT
F
REE
P
RESS,
I
NC V
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
, No. 135841. The application
for leave to appeal the February 13, 2008, order of the Court of Appeals
is considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The Wayne Circuit
Court did not err in concluding that the Settlement Agreement (Deposi-
tion Exhibit 11) and the Notice of Rejection (Deposition Exhibit 10) were
“public records,” MCL 15.232(e), and subject to disclosure pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. Plaintiff
Detroit Free Press’s FOIA requests were sufficiently specific, see MCL
15.233(1) and Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 572-573 (2006), and there
is no FOIA exemption for settlement agreements. See, e.g., Coblentz,
supra at 561. Moreover, a public body may not contract away its
obligations under the FOIA. Kent Co Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v Kent Co
Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 361 (2000). In addition, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion when it dissolved the nondisclosure provision in its
previous order, and permitted, with one redaction, the disclosure of the
deposition in question.
The motion for stay is granted to the extent that the Wayne Circuit
Court’s February 5, 2008, order granting the motion to disclose is stayed
pending the return of the lower court record to that court. The motion to
seal this Court’s record is granted to the extent that this Court’s file shall
remain sealed until the release of documents as ordered by the trial court.
Court of Appeals No. 283526.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur in the decision to deny leave to appeal.
But I write separately to discuss the trial court’s decision to disclose the
deposition transcript.
Under MCR 2.411(C)(5) statements made during the course of me-
diation are confidential. In pertinent part, this rule provides:
(5) Confidentiality. Statements made during the mediation,
including statements made in written submissions, may not be
used in any other proceedings, including trial. Any communica-
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1079
tions between the parties or counsel and the mediator relating to
a mediation are confidential and shall not be disclosed without the
written consent of all parties.
Here, at numerous points during the deposition, attorney Michael
Stefani was specifically questioned about incidents that occurred during
court-ordered facilitation. Because Stefani’s detailed recounting of events
included “statements made during mediation” and “communications
between the parties or counsel,” I believe certain parts of the deposition
involved confidential communications under MCR 2.411(C)(5). But the
city of Detroit did not argue for the redaction of this testimony. Instead,
it asked the trial court to exempt the entire deposition from disclosure.
Because most of the deposition testimony does not fall within the
parameters of MCR 2.411(C)(5), the trial judge properly decided not to
exempt the entire transcript from disclosure. And because the city did not
specifically argue for redaction, I conclude that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in not ordering redaction sua sponte.
1
Summary Disposition March 5, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
M
ARK
U
NGER
, No. 135860. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the Court of
Appeals because the criteria set forth in Administrative Order No.
2004-6, Standard 4, do not apply to criminal defendants who are
represented by retained counsel, and we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration, under the proper standard, of the defen-
dant’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief (including a motion to
remand for an evidentiary hearing) and his motion to adjourn oral
argument. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 272591.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal March 7, 2008:
Z
AVRADINOS V
JTRB, I
NC
, No. 135137. We direct the clerk to schedule
oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other
peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall address the
following questions: (1) whether DeYoung v Mesler, 373 Mich 499 (1964),
correctly construed MCL 557.151 to mean that there is a statutory
presumption that property held jointly by a husband and wife is held by
them as tenants by the entirety unless the title or conveyance expressly
1
The trial court ruled that the confidentiality requirement of MCR
2.411(C)(5) is subject to the crime-fraud exception discussed in People v
Paasche, 207 Mich App 698, 705-706 (1994). I do not rely on the
crime-fraud exception to conclude that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in ordering disclosure of the deposition transcript. Hence, I
offer no opinion on the applicability of the crime-fraud exception here.
1080 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
provides otherwise, (2) if so, how the presumption of a tenancy by the
entirety may be overcome, and (3) whether a provision in the title or
conveyance specifically identifying the property owners as husband and
wife affects the determination whether the presumption of a tenancy by
the entirety has been overcome. The parties shall submit supplemental
briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing these issues. The
parties shall avoid submitting mere restatements of their application
papers. Court of Appeals No. 268570.
Summary Dispositions March 7, 2008:
D
OWNS V
K
EEBLER
and D
OWNS V
N
ORTHERN
M
ICHIGAN
H
OSPITALS
I
NC
, Nos.
132897 and 132898. By order of April 25, 2007, the application for leave
to appeal the November 28, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals was
held in abeyance for Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp (Docket No.
131879). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on
November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again
considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the order
in Mullins and our decision in Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007).
Court of Appeals Nos. 256422 and 256462.
B
URRIS V
A
LLSTATE
I
NSURANCE
C
O,
No. 132949. On January 9, 2008, the
Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the
September 21, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the
Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and reinstate the Wayne Circuit Court’s September 10, 2004, order
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part and the February
23, 2005, order for final judgment and for sanctions, because the plaintiff
did not present sufficient evidence at trial that he incurred attendant-
care expenses. The evidence failed to establish that the attendant-care
providers expected compensation for their services. Therefore, the evi-
dence failed to establish that the plaintiff “incurred” attendant-care
expenses. Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476, 484 (2003).
Court of Appeals No. 261505.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur with the order reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the trial court’s order
partially granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and the
order for final judgment and sanctions. I write separately to complete the
picture plaintiff presented in this record and to respond to the dissents’
legal arguments.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1978, plaintiff, who was then six years old, sustained severe and
permanent injuries when he was struck by a drunken driver. After the
accident, plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment, including
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1081
multiple surgeries, all of which defendant covered under its no-fault
policy. Despite plaintiff’s physical limitations, he attended college, ob-
tained employment, married, fathered a child, and performed routine
activities, including driving. After plaintiff had an unsuccessful surgery
in 2000, however, one of plaintiff’s three treating physicians prescribed
24-hour attendant care. Defendant paid plaintiff’s then-wife, Diane
Vermette, for round-the-clock attendant-care services at the rate of
$1,428 weekly. Vermette stopped furnishing attendant-care services just
one month after plaintiff’s surgery. Nevertheless, plaintiff continued to
claim attendant-care services Vermette purportedly provided. He went to
great lengths to hide his fraud from defendant. He instructed defendant
to make the benefit checks payable to Vermette in her maiden name
because plaintiff did not want defendant to know that it was paying his
spouse to care for him. Plaintiff directed defendant to send the checks to
his post office box. Plaintiff then cashed the checks, using Vermette’s
identification, and deposited the money into his bank account.
Plaintiff abused defendant’s trust in other ways. Plaintiff submitted
claims for several thousands of dollars for gym equipment and a special
bed, neither of which plaintiff had actually purchased. Defendant paid
these claims. Plaintiff also stole prescription pads from one of his treating
physicians. He forged his name for the purpose of illegally obtaining
prescription medication for which defendant paid. Plaintiff also forged a
legitimate $50 receipt from a health-care provider to claim $1,200. Be-
cause of questions related to the forged receipt and a private investiga-
tor’s observations during surveillance of plaintiff, defendant notified
plaintiff to appear for an examination under oath, as the insurance policy
provided. Plaintiff failed to appear for that examination. Defendant
suspended the payment of all personal protection insurance benefits
because of plaintiff’s fraud, his violation of the terms of the insurance
policy by failing to appear for the examination under oath, and a letter
from one of plaintiff’s doctors stating that he did not require 24-hour
care.
Plaintiff and Vermette separated in November 2001 and later di-
vorced. Plaintiff moved back to his parents’ home. Three people cared for
plaintiff while he was living at his parents’ home: Richard Burris
(plaintiff’s father), Ryan Burris (plaintiff’s brother), and Christopher
Marcott (plaintiff’s friend). All three acknowledged that they had no
record of the dates and times they allegedly cared for plaintiff and never
submitted a claim to defendant for payment of those services. Further,
none of them ever asked plaintiff for any payment for their services, and
plaintiff never promised them payment. Ryan and Christopher further
testified that they did not expect to be paid for their services. Ryan
testified that he just wanted to help his brother (“This is my brother, it’s
not about money.”), and Christopher testified that he just wanted to
“hang out” with his best friend (“[It’s] not a job, he’s my friend.”).
In 2002, plaintiff filed this first-party no-fault action, seeking pay-
ment of attendant-care benefits and unpaid medical expenses. Plaintiff
sought an award of $156,376 in attendant-care expenses (approximately
$8.50 an hour, 24 hours a day for 761 days). The primary issue at the jury
trial was whether defendant was obligated to pay for attendant-care
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services allegedly provided by Richard, Ryan, and Christopher after
plaintiff moved back into his parents’ home in December 2001. The jury
awarded plaintiff $7,610.98 in medical expenses and $78,438 in
attendant-care expenses ($26,146 for Richard, $6,536.50 for Ryan, and
$45,755.50 for Christopher).
1
The verdict was about half the amount
plaintiff sought. The jury thus rejected plaintiff’s exaggerated claims.
The trial court thereafter granted defendant’s motion for JNOV and
vacated the jury’s award of attendant-care expenses. The court ruled that
plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had incurred
such expenses:
With regard to the attendant care circumstances, I understand
that there are some cases that say that there is some leeway with
regard to family members. But in this case, they [Richard, Ryan,
and Christopher] couldn’t say what they did. They couldn’t specify
the number of hours. They couldn’t even manage to say that they
expected reimbursement. They went so far as to say they didn’t
expect to get anything. And with regard to Mr. Marcott, it’s all the
worse because he’s not a family member.
The motion is granted with regard to the attendant care
expenses awarded with regard to Richard Burris, Ryan Burris and
Christopher Marcott. These didn’t come close to being reimburs-
able. And the verdict is affirmed in all other regards.
[
2
]
The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in an
unpublished opinion per curiam.
II. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS
MCL 500.3107(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insur-
ance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges
incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accom-
modations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
[Emphasis added.]
1
The trial court entered a judgment of $133,013.28 in plaintiff’s favor.
The judgment included the jury verdict of $86,048.98, taxable costs of
$8,292.53, case-evaluation sanctions of $27,750, and accrued interest of
$10,921.77.
2
As a result of the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion for JNOV,
defendant became the prevailing party and was, therefore, entitled to an
award of case-evaluation sanctions. Accordingly, the trial court entered
an order awarding defendant a net judgment of $10,000.
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MCL 500.3110(4) provides that “[p]ersonal protection insurance
benefits payable for accidental bodily injury accrue not when the injury
occurs but as the allowable expense, work loss or survivors’ loss is
incurred.” (Emphasis added.) In Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich
33 (1990), this Court stated the elements of an “allowable expense” under
the no-fault act:
“The statute requires that three factors be met before an item
is an ‘allowable expense’: 1) the charge must be reasonable, 2) the
expense must be reasonably necessary, and 3) the expense must be
incurred. These are the standard requirements for recovery of
such expenses under all no-fault plans....”[Id. at 50, quoting
Manley v DAIIE, 425 Mich 140, 169 (1986) (B
OYLE
, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).]
The issue in the instant case is whether plaintiff incurred any
expenses for attendant-care services.
Justice W
EAVER
argues in her dissent that Proudfoot v State Farm Mut
Ins Co, 469 Mich 476 (2003), is distinguishable because there the plaintiff
sought advance payment for future expenses, rather than reimbursement
for an expense for a service that had already been provided, as in the
instant case. This factual distinction, however, is irrelevant to the
Proudfoot Court’s discussion of the meaning of the term “incur.” In
Proudfoot, supra at 484, this Court adopted the following dictionary
definition of “incur”: “[t]o become liable or subject to, [especially]
because of one’s own actions.” “Liable” means “obligated according to
law or equity: responsible.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
(1987). Thus, the definition of “incur” adopted in Proudfoot requires a
legal or equitable obligation to pay. In Proudfoot, this Court elaborated on
this definition of “incur” in a footnote:
An insured could be liable for costs by various means, including
paying for costs out of pocket or signing a contract for products or
services. Should the insured present a contract for products or
services rather than a paid bill, the insurance company may, in
order to protect itself, make its check payable to the insured and
the contractor. [Proudfoot, supra at 484 n 4.]
[
3
]
Under Proudfoot, the term “incur” does not mean that an insured
must necessarily enter contracts with the care provider to be entitled to
3
Justice W
EAVER
adopts sections of the Court of Appeals opinion that
do not mention Proudfoot. The Court of Appeals analysis was based on
Court of Appeals cases decided before Proudfoot that are now of ques-
tionable validity. Booth v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 224 Mich App 724 (1997),
and its predecessors are no longer controlling to the extent that they are
inconsistent with Proudfoot’s definition of “incur,” which requires that
the insured be liable for payment.
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reimbursement for attendant-care expenses (“liable” means “obligated
according to law or equity”). Nor does it mean that an insured must
necessarily present a formal bill establishing that the attendant-care
services were provided. It merely means that the insured must have an
obligation to pay the attendant-care-service providers for their services. I
agree with Justice K
ELLY
that in determining allowable attendant-care
expenses, there is no basis to treat family members differently than hired
attendant-care-service workers. But to incur an expense for attendant-
care services, the insured’s family members and friends, just like any
other provider, must perform the services with a reasonable expectation
of payment.
Plaintiff furnished no evidence that he was liable for any attendant-
care expenses. Plaintiff did not pay Richard, Ryan, or Christopher for
their services. Further, these three witnesses testified that they did not
expect to be paid. Plaintiff does not even argue that he was liable or
obligated in any way to pay anything to his family or friend for taking
care of him. “Where a plaintiff is unable to show that a particular,
reasonable expense has been incurred for a reasonably necessary product
or service, there can be no finding of a breach of the insurer’s duty to pay
that expense, and thus no finding of liability with regard to that
expense.” Nasser, supra at 50. Because plaintiff furnished no evidence
that he incurred charges for the assistance of his family members and
friend, the trial court properly granted JNOV on the attendant-care-
expenses portion of the jury’s verdict.
4
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Wayne Circuit
Court’s September 10, 2004, order partially granting judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and the February 23, 2005, order for final judgment
and for sanctions. I would deny the application for leave to appeal,
thereby leaving in place the Court of Appeals judgment reinstating the
jury’s award of $78,438 for expenses incurred by plaintiff for attendant-
care
4
Justice W
EAVER
presents the following hypothetical example in sup-
port of her argument that plaintiff incurred attendant-care expenses:
“[H]ad the providers requested payment, they would have been entitled
to payment from defendant for their services.” (Emphasis added.) In fact,
however, the providers did not request payment. Therefore, plaintiff was
not obligated to pay them for their services. Accordingly, defendant had
no statutory duty to pay plaintiff for expenses he did not incur.
Additionally, Justice W
EAVER
argues that defendant had an obligation
to pay Richard, Ryan, and Christopher for their services. Justice W
EAVER
overlooks that defendant pays personal protection insurance benefits to
plaintiff, not his attendant-care providers. Even under Justice W
EAVER
’s
position, the providers would not be guaranteed to receive any compen-
sation, because the jury’s verdict awarded the attendant-care expenses
solely to plaintiff. Under Justice W
EAVER
’s argument, plaintiff would
receive payment for the attendant-care services without any obligation to
forward the payment to those who performed the services.
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services. A jury found that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence establish-
ing that the plaintiff’s physician prescribed 24-hour attendant care for
plaintiff and that plaintiff in fact received attendant care from family
members and a close family friend. I agree with the Court of Appeals that,
as construed under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), plaintiff presented sufficient evi-
dence that he “incurred” expenses for the attendant-care services provided
to him. Further, I disagree with the majority’s application of the holding in
Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476 (2003), to this case given
the marked factual distinctions between this case and Proudfoot.
Plaintiff, Randy Burris, was six years old when he was struck by a car
being driven by a drunken driver. Mr. Burris was seriously injured and
suffered both orthopedic and internal injuries, including a traumatic
brain injury. He was in a coma for several months and then suffered a
stroke. His injuries have left him with significant and permanent
weakness in his left extremities such that his left arm and leg are nearly
nonfunctional. Mr. Burris has had numerous surgeries since the accident,
the most recent being a cervical spinal fusion to repair a herniated
cervical disc. Mr. Burris was unable to work after the neck surgery and
has been permanently disabled since approximately 2000.
As a result of this permanent disability, a physician prescribed 24-hour
care for Mr. Burris. Thereafter, pursuant to its duty to pay personal
protection insurance (PIP) benefits, MCL 500.3107(1), defendant, Allstate
Insurance Company, paid Mr. Burris’s wife for 24-hour attendant-care
services she provided to Mr. Burris until December 4, 2001.
1
In November 2001, Mr. Burris and his wife separated, and Mr. Burris
moved to his parents’ house. For approximately two years, while he lived
with his parents, Mr. Burris received attendant-care services from his
father and brother, Richard and Ryan Burris, respectively, and from a
close family friend, Christopher Marcott. Mr. Burris needed help with
dressing, bathing, cooking, laundry, and shopping and general supervi-
sory care to assist him because of his cognitive and physical limitations.
While Mr. Burris never received a formal bill for the provision of such
services, and while none of the care providers kept track of the exact
number of hours of care they provided, nor did they expect to be paid, Mr.
Burris presented evidence that he both required and received attendant
care from these three individuals.
2
1
In December 2001, Allstate suspended PIP payments after it deter-
mined that Mr. Burris had altered a receipt from a health-care provider
to make it appear that he was entitled to reimbursement in the amount
$1,200 instead of $50.
2
During closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff noted that Allstate
had previously paid the plaintiff’s wife $8.50 an hour for attendant-care
services and that 761 days had elapsed since the plaintiff’s family and
friend had provided attendant care. Acting on his counsel’s calculations,
plaintiff sought $156,376 from Allstate for the attendant-care services
provided to him.
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The jury, after hearing testimony from the plaintiff, his physician, and
the plaintiff’s care providers, evidently concluded that Mr. Burris had
incurred allowable expenses entitling him to PIP benefits given that the
expenses for attendant care were “reasonable” and were “reasonably
necessary,” and that such expenses were in fact “incurred.”
3
And while
there may have been some question as to the appropriateness of the
amount Mr. Burris sought, the jury nevertheless awarded him $78,438 in
attendant-care expenses, roughly half of the amount he had requested.
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) states that personal protection insurance ben-
efits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of all reasonable
charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accom-
modations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” To be
considered an “allowable expense” under § 3107, the expense must be (1)
reasonable, (2) reasonably necessary, and (3) incurred.
4
As the Court of
Appeals correctly noted, the only issue in dispute was whether the
expenses for attendant-care services were “incurred.”
Defendant argues that under Proudfoot, an expense is not “incurred”
until the recipient of such services “become[s] liable or subject to,
[especially] because of one’s own actions.” The pertinent passage from
Proudfoot, supra at 483-484 states:
MCL 500.3110(4) provides that “[p]ersonal protection insur-
ance benefits payable for accidental bodily injury accrue not when
the injury occurs but as the allowable expense, work loss or
survivors’ loss is incurred” (emphasis added).
T o “incur” means “[t]o become liable or subject to, [especially]
because of one’s own actions.”
4
A trial court may enter “a declaratory
judgment determining that an expense is both necessary and allow-
able and the amount that will be allowed [, but s]uch a declaration
does not oblige a no-fault insurer to pay for an expense until it is
actually incurred.” At the time of the judgment, plaintiff had not yet
taken action to become liable for the costs of the proposed home
modifications. Because the expenses in question were not yet “in-
curred,” the Court of Appeals erred in ordering defendant to pay the
total amount to the trial court. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
4
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (2001). An insured could
be liable for costs by various means, including paying for costs out
of pocket or signing a contract for products or services. Should the
insured present a contract for products or services rather than a
paid bill, the insurance company may, in order to protect itself,
make its check payable to the insured and the contractor.
3
See MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
4
Owens v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 444 Mich 314, 323 (1993); Davis v
Citizens Ins Co of America, 195 Mich App 323, 326 (1992).
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Defendant asserts that because Mr. Burris’s family members and Mr.
Marcott did not keep track of their hours, submit a written bill for their
services, or even expect to be paid at all, no expenses were “incurred” as
interpreted by this Court in Proudfoot. In making this argument, the
defendant relies heavily on the Webster’s II New College Dictionary
(2002) definition of “incur” as a legal obligation, and asserts that under
Proudfoot, there must be some “legal obligation to pay.” Defendant’s
assertion is that because the care providers in this case did not ask or
expect to be paid for their services, there was no “legal obligation to pay”
for such services; hence, no expenses were “incurred.”
However, when viewed in its proper context, that definition of
“incurred” has only a limited application to the facts presented in
Proudfoot. I therefore disagree with the majority’s adoption of the
defendant’s strained interpretation of Proudfoot.InProudfoot, the issue
was whether an insurer was responsible for future home modifications
desired by the plaintiff to assist her in accessing her house in a
wheelchair. This Court agreed with dissenting Court of Appeals Judge
D
ANHOF
that an insurer could not be held liable for future PIP expenses
that had not even been “incurred” yet.
The point of distinction in Proudfoot is that the plaintiff was seeking
payment in advance for a future expense, not reimbursement for an
expense for a service that had already been provided, that is, incurred.
The language cited by this Court that is critical to understanding the
context in which that case was decided states:
At the time of the judgment, plaintiff had not yet taken action
to become liable for the costs of the proposed home modifications.
Because the expenses in question were not yet “incurred,” the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering defendant to pay the total
amount to the trial court. [Proudfoot, supra at 484.]
In other words, because the plaintiff “had not yet taken action” to
install home modifications, the plaintiff was not “liable” for any costs for
which he might seek PIP coverage. Had the home modifications already
been made, the plaintiff would have been liable for such modifications
because they would have been “incurred.” Thus, the application of
Proudfoot to this case is inappropriate as there is no question that Mr.
Burris’s expenses were “incurred” because the attendant-care services
were not future expenses for which Mr. Burris sought advance payment.
The services in question had already been provided to plaintiff.
In her concurrence to the order, Justice C
ORRIGAN
insists that Proud-
foot is not distinguishable because Mr. Burris failed to establish that he
“incurred” any attendant-care expenses given that there was no expec-
tation of payment from the care providers. However, the fact is that Mr.
Burris did present evidence that he received such care, and, had the
providers requested payment, they would have been entitled to payment
from defendant for their services. Thus, the true “obligation” to pay for
attendant-care expenses belongs to defendant. Once the care was pro-
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vided, whether or not the care providers were even aware of their right to
compensation, the defendant had a statutory duty to pay for attendant-
care services.
5
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals wisely noted, the Proudfoot
definition of “incur” as to “become liable or subject to, [especially]
because of one’s own actions,” does not equate to a “legal obligation to
pay.” One can be “subject to” a claim for reimbursement simply on the
basis of the provision of a service, even without the preparation or receipt
of a formal bill establishing that the service was provided. In that regard,
I would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment and adopt that court’s
analysis as set forth below:
[T]his Court has addressed this issue, at least implicitly, on
several occasions but particularly instructive is Booth v Auto-
Owners Ins Co, 224 Mich App 724; 569 NW2d 903 (1997). In Booth,
the plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile accident and
required attendant care from her parents on a continual basis.
After the defendant insurer refused to pay the parents for the
24-hour a day attendant care that they provided, the plaintiff filed
suit. Id. at 726. The trial court granted the defendant summary
disposition, ruling that the plaintiff failed to submit evidence
establishing that she incurred expenses because her parents did
not charge her for their services. Id. at 726-727. This Court
reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the plaintiff was not
required to actually be billed by her family in order to establish
that she “incurred” the expense of their attendant care services.
Id. at 730. Further, relying on Botsford Gen Hosp v Citizens Ins
Co, 195 Mich App 127, 143; 489 NW2d 137 (1992), this Court held
that “whether the plaintiff was entitled to collect the value of the
services and the determination of the value are matters properly
left for the jury to decide.” Booth, supra.
Here, plaintiff produced evidence that his family and a friend
began providing 24-hour attendant care in December 2001, after
plaintiff was divorced and moved back into his parents’ house.
Plaintiff[’s] father, Richard Burris, plaintiff’s brother, Ryan
Burris, and plaintiff’s friend, Christopher Marcott, all testified
that plaintiff required, and they provided, significant attendant
5
MCL 500.3107(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insur-
ance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges
incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommo-
dations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
[Emphasis added.]
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care services. Dr. Maryann Guyon testified that plaintiff required
24-hour attendant care services as a result of the injuries plaintiff
suffered in the 1978 automobile accident and wrote a prescription
for the same. Defendant’s claims adjuster, Kimberly Dotson,
testified she had previously paid attendant care at $ 8.50 per hour.
Thus, unlike the factual scenario presented in Moghis v Citizens
Ins Co of America, 187 Mich App 245, 247; 466 NW2d 290 (1990),
plaintiff produced evidence that attendant care services were
actually provided to him since December 2001. Plaintiff was not
required to actually be billed by his family and friend in order to
establish that he “incurred” the expense of their attendant care
services; thus, it was for the jury to decide whether he was entitled
to collect the value of the services and to make the determination
of the value. See Booth, supra. Accordingly, the trial court’s order
granting defendant’s motion for [judgment notwithstanding the
verdict] on the ground that there was insufficient evidence pre-
sented to create an issue for the jury as to whether plaintiff
“incurred” the expense is reversed. [Burris v Allstate Ins Co,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
September 21, 2006 (Docket No. 261505), p 2.]
Thus, I dissent from the order reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and reinstating the Wayne Circuit Court’s September 10, 2004,
order partially granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the
February 23, 2005, order for final judgment and for sanctions. I would
deny the application for leave to appeal, thereby leaving in place the
Court of Appeals judgment reinstating the jury’s award of $78,438 for
expenses incurred by plaintiff for attendant-care services.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I concur in Justice W
EAVER
’s dissenting state-
ment. I write separately to note that the no-fault insurer would be liable
if attendant care were provided by a hired home-care agency. Family
attendant care is a cheaper, more informal alternative to such hired care.
The determinative question should be whether the attendant care was
provided, not whether the care was provided with the same or similar
level of formality. The majority does not conclude that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that the attendant care here was provided.
Because the care was provided, expenses were incurred—whether by the
insured or by the insurer who is ultimately responsible to pay for
attendant-care services.
R
AMANATHAN V
W
AYNE
S
TATE
U
NIVERSITY
B
OARD OF
G
OVERNORS
, No.
133170. On December 5, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the
application for leave to appeal the January 4, 2007, judgment of the Court
of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered.
MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the
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Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, the plaintiff’s sole actionable
claim, by operation of the applicable statute of limitations, is the decision
of the provost of Wayne State University to deny the plaintiff’s request
for tenure. MCL 600.5805(1); Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental
Health Services, 472 Mich 263 (2005), amended 473 Mich 1205 (2005).
The plaintiff presented no evidence that the provost harbored any
national origin or racial animus toward the plaintiff in reaching her
tenure decision. Dep’t of Civil Rights ex rel Burnside v Fashion Bug of
Detroit, 473 Mich 863 (2005). The plaintiff cannot show any relevant
connection between the identified comments of the dean of the School of
Social Work in 1993 and the provost’s tenure decision in 1995. Sniecinski
v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124 (2003). The
plaintiff has not presented a genuine issue of material fact to sustain his
claim of racial or national origin discrimination in violation of the Civil
Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. On remand, the circuit court shall only
proceed on the plaintiff’s claim that the provost, by denying tenure to the
plaintiff, unlawfully retaliated against the plaintiff for the exercise of his
rights under the Civil Rights Act. Court of Appeals No. 266238.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,andK
ELLY
, JJ. We would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in all respects.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff alleges that a
dean of the university where he taught retaliated against him for filing a
racial discrimination complaint with the university, resulting in the
denial of his tenure application. In my judgment, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate the requisite causal connection between his complaint and
the university’s denial of tenure, because plaintiff has not shown that the
dean harbored any retaliatory animus toward plaintiff. Moreover, plain-
tiff has failed to demonstrate that any alleged retaliatory motive on the
part of a dean of the university should be imputed to the ultimate
decision-maker, the university provost. For these reasons, I would reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and order summary disposition for
defendant university.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, who is of Asian-Indian descent, was hired in 1992 to teach at
Wayne State University’s School of Social Work. In the spring of 1993,
plaintiff’s work was favorably reviewed by the dean of the School of Social
Work, Leon Chestang, who gave plaintiff a “1” rating, the highest rating
possible. In October 1993, plaintiff met with the dean and expressed
concerns that another professor had made discriminatory remarks to
plaintiff regarding plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff then made an informal
complaint to the university’s Equal Opportunity Office (EOO) regarding
the alleged discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges that after this informal complaint was filed, the
dean’s attitude toward him dramatically worsened. At a faculty meeting
in the fall of 1993, the dean compared what he viewed as an outdated
concept of social work to the sitar, an Indian musical instrument that the
dean considered to be equally outdated. In December 1993, the dean
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stated in response to criticisms directed at him at a different faculty
meeting, “I don’t mind being the sacrificial lamb, I just hope I’m not
curried.”
In December 1993, the dean renewed plaintiff’s contract; the initial
renewal was for six months. Several professors testified that this six-
month period was unusually short and in violation of a union contract
with the university. In April 1994, the contract was renewed for one year.
In May 1994, plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the EOO, again
alleging racial discrimination, as well as retaliation by the dean in
response to plaintiff’s informal complaint. In September 1994, the EOO
concluded that no evidence of discrimination or retaliation existed.
On October 31, 1994, plaintiff applied for tenure. The dean recom-
mended that it be denied. The School of Social Work Promotion and
Tenure Committee recommended that the application be granted. The
University Promotion and Tenure Committee recommended that it be
denied. The university also received nine external review letters: six of
these reviewers recommended in favor of granting tenure, two of these
reviewers recommended against granting tenure, and one of the review-
ers was neutral. The ultimate decision regarding plaintiff’s tenure
application was made by the university provost. The provost received the
recommendations of the dean, the two committees, and the external
reviewers, as well as documents related to plaintiff’s application, and
undertook a de novo review of the application. On April 27, 1995, the
provost denied plaintiff’s application for tenure.
On April 8, 1998, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the dean
and defendant university, alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and
tortious interference with a contractual relationship. The trial court
granted summary disposition to defendant on the tortious interference
claim. Defendant then moved for summary disposition of the remaining
claims, arguing that those claims were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations and that plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evidence to
support his claims. The trial court granted summary disposition to
defendant.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that plaintiff had submit-
ted sufficient evidence to support both the racial discrimination and
retaliation claims. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 12, 2002
(Docket No. 227726). The Court also concluded that plaintiff’s claims
were timely under the “continuing violations” doctrine of Sumner v
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505 (1986).
Following the initial decision of the Court of Appeals, this Court
overruled Sumner in Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health
Services, 472 Mich 263 (2005). Defendant filed a new motion for sum-
mary disposition, arguing that under Garg plaintiff’s claims were time-
barred. Defendant further argued that under Garg, events occurring
outside the statute of limitations period could not be considered as
evidence to prove discrimination in regards to a timely claim. The trial
court granted summary disposition to defendant, ruling that absent
evidence of events outside the statute of limitations period, plaintiff had
not presented sufficient evidence to support his claims.
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Subsequently, this Court, on motion for reconsideration, modified
Garg by removing footnote 14.
1
473 Mich 1205 (2005). On this basis, the
trial court then granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and rein-
stated plaintiff’s case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Unpublished
opinion per curiam, issued January 4, 2007 (Docket No. 266238).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A trial court’s ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question
of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Vega v Lakeland Hospitals, 479
Mich 243, 245 (2007). A court considering a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must review the evidence “submit-
ted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551-552 (2007). “Summary disposition is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 552.
III. ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Plaintiff argues that the dean retaliated against him for making the
EOO complaint, resulting in the denial of tenure. In order to establish a
prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show
“(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was
known by the defendant; (3) that the defendant took an employ-
ment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employ-
ment action.” [Garg, supra at 273, quoting DeFlaviis v Lord &
Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436 (1997).]
In this case, plaintiff’s informal complaint to the EOO constituted a
“protected activity.” Moreover, the denial of tenure constituted an
adverse employment action. It is clear that the dean was aware of the
EOO complaint. However, even assuming that the provost was aware of
the complaint, plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because plaintiff, in my
judgment, has not shown the requisite causal connection between the
protected activity and the denial of tenure.
B. DEAN
Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient proof to demonstrate that the
dean retaliated against plaintiff for making the EOO complaint. The bulk
1
Footnote 14 stated that “acts falling outside the period of limitations”
were inadmissible evidence even “in support of a timely claim.”
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of plaintiff’s evidence concerns the dean’s alleged change in attitude
toward plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that because the dean rated plaintiff
highly before the EOO complaint but criticized plaintiff’s performance
afterwards in his recommendation against tenure, the only inference that
may be drawn is that the dean criticized plaintiff’s performance simply to
retaliate for the EOO complaint. Moreover, plaintiff also ascribes a
retaliatory motive to the shortened contract offered by the dean in
December 1993. However, this Court has stated that “[s]omething more
than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse
employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-
based retaliation is claimed.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186
(2003). In other words, the law permits a decision-maker to change his
mind about an employee’s performance, even after that employee has
submitted a complaint regarding racial discrimination. To hold otherwise
would be to inoculate an employee who makes such a complaint from ever
suffering an adverse employment action. “The fact that a plaintiff
engages in a ‘protected activity’...does not immunize him from an
otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action.” Id. at 187. West
observed that a person could demonstrate the requisite causal connection
by “present[ing] evidence that his superior expressed clear displeasure
with the protected activity engaged in by the plaintiff.” Id. at 186-
187. Thus, plaintiff could demonstrate that the dean harbored retalia-
tory animus, either by some “expression” of “clear displeasure” in
regards to the complaint or by other evidence from which a reasonable
juror could conclude that the dean was displeased by the complaint.
In this case, plaintiff attempts to forge the necessary causal connec-
tion by focusing on the dean’s comments in faculty meetings regarding a
“sitar” and “curried lamb.” Plaintiff argues that these comments consti-
tute direct evidence of discriminatory animus by the dean; alternatively,
he argues that, even if these comments are merely “stray remarks,”
Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan , 469 Mich 124, 136
(2003), they constitute circumstantial evidence of bias.
2
In my judgment, these comments neither constitute direct evidence of
discriminatory bias nor rise even to the level of “stray remarks” of bias.
This Court has stated:
Factors to consider in assessing whether statements are “stray
remarks” include: (1) whether they were made by a decision maker
or an agent within the scope of his employment, (2) whether they
were related to the decision-making process, (3) whether they were
2
It is unnecessary to determine here whether under Michigan’s
antidiscrimination laws “stray remarks” are admissible as circumstantial
evidence of discrimination or whether such remarks are inadmissible as
lacking relevance, see Krohn v Sedgwick James of Michigan, 244 Mich
App 289, 302 (2001) (concluding that “stray remarks” were properly
excluded as evidence because such remarks were “irrelevant”). This is
because, at least in my judgment, the comments in this case do not rise
to the level of reasonably suggesting discriminatory bias.
1094 480 M
ICHIGAN
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vague and ambiguous or clearly reflective of discriminatory bias,
(4) whether they were isolated or part of a pattern of biased
comments, and (5) whether they were made close in time to the
adverse employment decision. [Sniecinski, supra at 136 n 8.]
Although the dean had a role in the decision-making process of the
university, the other factors are not implicated here. The “sitar” and
“curried lamb” comments were not made in relationship to the tenure
decision; rather, these comments came in the midst of lengthy faculty
meetings on unrelated subjects and they were not directed toward
plaintiff. These comments were isolated and limited to these two meet-
ings. Moreover, they took place over a year before the ultimate tenure
decision was made. Most importantly, these comments are altogether
irrelevant in suggesting animus or bias on the part of the dean; rather,
they are mere cultural references made to elucidate general points having
nothing to do with plaintiff or his tenure, and they indicate no hostility
toward persons of Asian-Indian descent or any other ethnic heritage.
3
Accordingly, the “sitar” and “curried lamb” remarks are neither direct
nor circumstantial evidence of the dean’s alleged discriminatory bias.
Moreover, even if these comments could be reasonably construed to
indicate discriminatory animus—which I do not believe to be so—they
must still be evaluated in light of whether they suggest any retaliatory
animus on the part of the dean. That is, the only pertinent question here
is whether the dean disdained plaintiff specifically for making the EOO
complaint and responded adversely as a result. Absent such evidence—
and there is none—plaintiff’s claim of retaliation depends entirely on the
temporal connection between the EOO complaint and the dean’s change
in attitude. Consequently, plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of
retaliation.
C. PROVOST
Even if plaintiff could demonstrate that the dean intended to retaliate
against plaintiff for filing the EOO complaint, plaintiff, in my judgment,
3
One can only speculate about the ways in which employers’ vocabu-
lary will have to be sanitized in order to avoid raising inferences of
discriminatory bias to overly sensitive employees and judges. Needless to
say, references to “Chinese walls” in describing security systems, “kami-
kaze” competitive tactics, sending “smoke signals” to potential custom-
ers, “putting one’s finger in the dike” in addressing emergencies, and
avoiding “siestas” until a project has been completed, should, as a start,
be expunged from one’s vocabulary lest such references later be relied on
as evidence of civil rights violations. Particular care should also be taken
to avoid references or allusions to the cuisine, customs, cultural artifacts,
historical figures, and mythologies of particular ethnic groups and
nationalities.
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still has not submitted sufficient evidence to create a jury question
regarding causation. That is, with regard to the tenure decision, the dean
was not the ultimate decision-maker; the provost was. Thus, plaintiff
must argue either that the dean’s animus may be imputed to the provost
or that the dean’s approval was necessary for tenure to be granted,
thereby making him the de facto decision-maker.
This Court has held that a plaintiff cannot bring a valid claim of
discrimination where he has failed to “establish[] that the ultimate
decision maker harbored any racial animus toward [the plaintiff].” Dep’t
of Civil Rights ex rel Burnside v Fashion Bug, 473 Mich 863 (2005).
However, under some circumstances, courts have imputed the bias of
non-decision-makers to the ultimate decision-maker. See, e.g., Harrison v
Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 609n7(1997). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that bias may
be imputed when the “decision makers themselves, or those who provide
input into the decision, express such feelings (1) around the time of, and
(2) in reference to, the adverse employment action complained of.” Hunt
v City of Markham, 219 F3d 649, 652 (CA 7, 2000). In such circumstances,
“it may be possible to infer that the decision makers were influenced by
those feelings in making their decision.” Id. at 653. On the other hand,
discriminatory intent should not be imputed to the ultimate decision-
maker when that decision-maker consulted various persons in making
the decision, one of whom had allegedly uttered a discriminatory remark,
because generally “[s]tatements made by inferior employees are not
probative of an intent to discriminate by the decisionmaker.” Aungst v
Westinghouse Electric Corp, 937 F2d 1216, 1221 (CA 7, 1991).
Here, plaintiff has not produced evidence that the dean made any
allegedly retaliatory remarks about plaintiff to the provost “around the
time of” the tenure decision. The comments about the “sitar” and
“curried lamb” were made over a year before the provost’s decision, were
not in reference to the tenure decision, and were not made to or in the
vicinity of the provost. Moreover, defendant produced considerable evi-
dence that the provost’s decision was based not only on the dean’s
recommendation, but also on the recommendations of two separate
committees, as well as outside recommendations from solicited reviewers
and other independent materials. Hence, any retaliatory bias on the part
of the dean may not be properly imputed to the provost.
Nor is there evidence that the provost here “acts merely as a cat’s paw
for or rubber-stamps a decision, report, or recommendation actually
made by a subordinate,” or that the dean is “the actual decisionmaker or
the one principally responsible for the contested employment decision.”
Hill v Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc, 354 F3d 277, 290 (CA
4, 2004). Plaintiff asserts that because the provost could not remember a
specific faculty member who was given tenure over a dean’s recommen-
dation of denial (although the provost testified that it had occurred),
sufficient evidence has been presented that the dean was the actual
decision-maker. However, it is not defendant’s burden to produce some
statistical minimum of cases in which tenure decisions have been made
by the provost over the dean’s objections. Simply put, there is no
obligation on the part of a decision-maker to show some minimum
1096 480 M
ICHIGAN
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number of disagreements with a subordinate in order to demonstrate
that she, and not the subordinate, is, in fact, the decision-maker. Here,
the provost stands in a clearly superior decision-making position in
defendant’s hierarchy relative to the dean; it is uncontradicted that the
provost considered recommendations of persons and committees from
other than the dean, and it is uncontradicted that the provost conducted
a de novo review of each tenure application and reached an ultimate
conclusion based on all the material submitted to her. Under these
circumstances, I do not believe that plaintiff has created a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether the provost was the “actual decision-
maker” with regard to his failure to achieve tenure.
D. AMENDMENT OF GARG
Defendant also asserts that, even if plaintiff’s claims are allowed to
proceed to trial, plaintiff may not present evidence of events that
occurred outside the statute of limitations period under Garg. Unfortu-
nately, the majority simply ignores this issue. The significance of this
Court’s action in Garg in granting plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
and striking the original footnote 14 is squarely implicated in this case if
it must proceed to trial, as required by the majority. I agree with the
Court of Appeals that “the implications of Garg are unclear with respect
to the admission of evidence.” This Court should not require this trial to
proceed where the scope of admissible evidence is unclear and where this
issue has squarely been presented to this Court. It makes no sense for
this trial to proceed before its ground rules can be determined.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practical effect of the majority’s order will be: (a) to increasingly
immunize persons who have filed complaints of discrimination from
subsequent adverse employment actions and thereby encourage baseless
filings of discrimination by giving greater weight to mere temporal
relationships in assessing whether discrimination has occurred; (b) to
inject courts more deeply into the business of monitoring what is, at
most, insensitive speech rather than speech evidencing discriminatory
bias; (c) to throw into confusion the identity of the actual decision-maker
in the employment process upon whom evidence of bias must be focused;
and (d) to cast doubt upon the integrity of a growing number of
discrimination trials by failing to clarify under Garg the proper scope of
admissible evidence in such trials. The decisions of this Court have
consequences and such consequences cannot be disclaimed by the major-
ity simply because a decision is issued by order rather than by opinion.
For the reasons set forth in this statement, I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the remaining claims
against defendant.
C
OMMUNITY
R
ESOURCE
C
ONSULTANTS,
I
NC V
P
ROGRESSIVE
M
ICHIGAN
I
NSUR-
ANCE
C
OMPANY,
No. 133416. On December 5, 2007, the Court heard oral
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1097
argument on the application for leave to appeal the February 1, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application
is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Under the Michigan
no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., when defendant made partial pay-
ments and refused to pay for specific services in plaintiff’s invoices,
plaintiff could not insulate those services from the one-year-back rule,
MCL 500.3145(1), by unilaterally applying defendant’s subsequent pay-
ments to the remainder of the overdue invoices. Defendant produced
evidence that it explicitly allocated payments to specific invoices, leaving
specific portions unpaid. Plaintiff failed to meet its burden under MCR
2.116(C)(10) to produce evidence that either refuted defendant’s evidence
or demonstrated defendant’s assent to plaintiff’s accounting practice.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121 (1999). Plaintiff’s remedy for
defendant’s refusal to pay was provided by statute. A payment is overdue
“if not paid within 30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of
the fact and of the amount of loss sustained.” MCL 500.3142(2). Overdue
payments are assessed a penalty of “simple interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.” MCL 500.3142(3). Plaintiff was required to file an action for the
overdue payments within 1 year of when the losses were incurred. MCL
500.3145(1). “Incurred” means “ ‘[t]o become liable or subject to, [espe-
cially] because of one’s own actions.’ ” Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins
Co, 469 Mich 476, 484 (2003), quoting Webster’s II New College Dictio-
nary (2001). “Liable” is defined as “legally responsible[.]” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). Generally, one becomes liable for the
payment of services once those services have been rendered. “ ‘[P]laintiff
became liable for her medical expenses when she accepted medical
treatment.’ ” Bombalski v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 247 Mich App 536, 542
(2001), quoting Shanafelt v Allstate Ins Co, 217 Mich App 625, 638
(1996). As this Court explained in Proudfoot, supra at 484 n 4, “[a]n
insured could [become] liable for costs by various means, including-
. . . signing a contract for products or services.” In this case, the expenses
for services were “incurred” when the services were rendered. We
remand this case to the Ingham Circuit Court for entry of partial
summary judgment in favor of defendant, and for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order. Court of Appeals No. 269726.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent and would deny leave to appeal
because I am not persuaded that the Court of Appeals judgment in this
matter should be peremptorily reversed.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). In peremptorily reversing the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, the majority fails to address the trial court’s conclusion
regarding open accounts. The Court of Appeals noted with approval the
trial court’s determination that open accounts are commonly used in
“many commercial contexts.” That fact may constitute usage-of-trade
evidence that defendant was on notice of plaintiff’s accounting practice.
Additionally, the majority suggests that plaintiff should file a lawsuit
whenever full payment is delayed in order to protect its claim to payment.
This ignores the practical benefits of having an open account for
continuing services.
1098 480 M
ICHIGAN
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The majority resolves in a peremptory fashion the legal issue of when
losses are incurred for purposes of MCL 500.3145(1). It concludes that
losses are incurred at the time medical services are rendered. Because
this conclusion has wide-reaching effect, it should not be made in a
peremptory fashion. Rather, we should grant leave to appeal to fully
consider when losses are incurred in the context of medical services and,
more specifically, in the context of continuing medical services.
For these reasons, I dissent from the order.
K
ALLMAN V
S
UNSEEKERS
P
ROPERTY
O
WNERS
A
SSOCIATION,
LLC, No.
133923. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this
case to the Roscommon Circuit Court for further proceedings.
The Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court’s holding
regarding nuisance in fact. The trial court did not err when it concluded
that the defendant’s 184-foot dock, with six mooring sites on a piece of
property with 25 feet of lake frontage, and its use of its property as a
“keyhole” or “funnel” lot for its unlimited membership substantially
interfered with plaintiff Kallman’s use of her property, amounting to a
nuisance in fact.
The Court of Appeals properly raised sua sponte the issue of the
plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their nuisance per se claim under MCL
125.294. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters
North America Inc, 479 Mich 280, 291-294 (2007) (discussing the
importance of standing to the proper exercise of the judicial power);
People v Smith,420Mich1,11n3(1984). The plaintiffs, however, were
not required to prove standing during or prior to trial absent a challenge
by the defendant. See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 564
(1992) (noting that facts supporting standing must be produced at trial
“if controverted”). When the trial court has not made findings with
regard to standing because standing was never challenged in that court,
the proper course of action is to remand for a hearing on the issue of
standing. See Smith, supra at 28-29. On remand, the plaintiffs must
show that they have a substantial interest that would be detrimentally
affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large. Nestlé Waters,
supra at 294. Standing may be proven by showing that the “defendant’s
activities directly affected the plaintiff[s’] recreational, aesthetic, or
economic interests.” Id. at 296. Court of Appeals No. 263633.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur only in the order reversing the Court
of Appeals judgment and remanding this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
I write separately because I disagree with the order’s discussion of the
majority of four’s (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,
and M
ARKMAN
) erroneously created standing test in Lee v Macomb Co Bd
of Comm’rs,
1
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,
2
Rohde
1
Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001).
2
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608
(2004).
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1099
v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,
3
and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
v Nestlé Waters North America Inc.
4
In those cases, the majority of four
systematically dismantled Michigan’s law on standing and replaced years
of precedent with its own test that denies Michigan citizens access to the
courts.
5
On remand, I would ask the plaintiffs to show whether they have
standing under the pre-Lee prudential test for standing by showing
whether the plaintiffs can demonstrate “that the plaintiff’s substantial
interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the
citizenry at large.” House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich
547, 554 (1993).
C
AVANAGH
,J
.
I would deny leave to appeal.
M
ANESS V
C
ARLTON
P
HARMACY,
LLC, No. 134526. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate that part of the
Court of Appeals judgment holding that Krystal Kleen Cleaning Com-
pany and Vickie Asher’s motion for summary disposition should be
granted, and reinstate the July 7, 2006, order of the Monroe Circuit
Court denying Krystal Kleen and Asher’s motion for summary disposi-
tion. Although the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Krystal
Kleen and Asher are not entitled to summary disposition on the basis of
the open and obvious danger doctrine, the panel erred in holding that
these defendants are entitled to summary disposition on other grounds.
Whether the plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact
regarding her ordinary negligence claim against Krystal Kleen and Asher
was neither raised by Krystal Kleen and Asher in their motion for
summary disposition regarding the applicability of the open and obvious
danger doctrine, nor considered by the trial court. We remand this case to
the Monroe Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this order. Court of Appeals No. 271976.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal. A surveillance
video shows clearly that plaintiff was walking directly toward a “wet
floor” sign but was looking in another direction when she fell. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying summary disposition
to defendant Carleton Pharmacy, holding that the wet floor constituted
an “open and obvious” condition, plaintiff’s distraction did not nullify the
“open and obvious” nature of the condition, and there was no “special
aspect” that would render the condition unreasonably dangerous. The
Court of Appeals did not believe that the “open and obvious” doctrine
also applied to defendant contractors Krystal Kleen and Vickie Asher, but
3
Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336 (2007).
4
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North
America Inc, 479 Mich 280 (2007).
5
See my opinions chronicling the majority of four’s assault on standing
in Lee, 464 Mich at 742; Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 651; Rohde, 479 Mich
at 366; and Michigan Citizens, 479 Mich at 310.
1100 480 M
ICHIGAN
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held that summary disposition should have been granted to these parties
under a general negligence standard.
I agree with the Court of Appeals. Although the parties may not have
fully briefed the issue of general negligence, this was a general negligence
case from the start, and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that,
as a matter of law, Krystal Kleen and Asher did not breach their duty to
plaintiff. The determination by the Court of Appeals that the “wet floor”
sign made the condition of the floor “open and obvious” for Carleton
Pharmacy’s purposes necessarily demonstrates that Krystal Kleen and
Asher performed their duty to warn of the condition. Therefore, this
issue has effectively been decided, and further factual development is
unnecessary. All parties have been deposed, and a video clearly shows the
details of the incident. It is a waste of legal and judicial resources to
remand under these circumstances. There is simply no remaining genu-
ine issue of material fact.
P
EOPLE V
H
ERNANDEZ
-O
RTA,
No. 134756. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remand this case to the Clinton Circuit Court for
proceedings consistent with this order. MCL 770.16(1) does not limit
requests for DNA testing to those cases in which the biological material
itself leads to the defendant’s conviction. Rather, MCL 770.16(1) requires
simply that the biological material which the defendant seeks to be tested
has been identified during the investigation that led to his or her
conviction. The defendant in this case has presented prima facie proof
that “the evidence sought to be tested is material to the issue of” his
identity as the perpetrator under MCL 770.16(3)(a). If the DNA from
semen found in the victim’s body shortly after the assault does not match
the defendant’s DNA profile, this evidence has a tendency to show that
defendant is not the perpetrator—particularly if the DNA also does not
match that of the victim’s boyfriend, with whom the victim acknowledged
having sexual relations two days before the alleged offense. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 267971.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent. I would not remand this case and I
would deny leave to appeal because I am not persuaded that the decision
of the Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous or that defendant has
suffered any injustice in this case.
Y
OUNG
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal. Defendant filed a
petition seeking DNA testing pursuant to MCL 770.16 in October
2002. The petition was granted in part and denied in part in April
2003. The trial court granted testing of the fingernail clippings, but
unequivocally denied testing of the semen samples. In November 2003,
the laboratory reported that the fingernail specimens were insufficient
for testing. Sixteen months later, on March 22, 2005, defendant filed a
second petition for DNA testing of the semen specimens, seeking to
relitigate the identical issue that had been conclusively decided against
the defendant two years previously.
When a petition for DNA testing has been denied, the statute provides
only one avenue of recourse—an appeal to the Court of Appeals by leave
granted. See MCL 770.16(9). Defendant was required to appeal the denial
of his petition within 12 months of the entry of the denial order pursuant
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1101
to MCR 7.205(F)(3). Thus, the opportunity for the Court of Appeals to
review the trial court’s order denying the motion for testing of the semen
samples was conclusively closed after April 25, 2004.
Contrary to what occurred in this case, nothing in the statute permits
the filing of serial petitions for DNA testing as a remedy for the denial of
a previously filed petition. Because defendant has not complied with the
only remedy provided by the statute, I conclude that defendant has
waived appellate review of the issue. Additionally, I believe that permit-
ting the filing of sequential petitions erroneously permits the relitigation
of previously decided issues in contravention of our rules that preclude
serial challenges of issues previously decided.
For these reasons, I would deny leave to appeal.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice Y
OUNG
.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 7, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
F
ONZA
J
ACKSON
, No. 132060. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 268470
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would remand this case to the Wayne Circuit
Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether an appeal was
taken from the Wayne County Probate Court, Juvenile Division, order
waiving jurisdiction over defendant to the Detroit Recorder’s Court.
In 1982, at the age of 16, defendant was tried as an adult and
convicted of first-degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, and this Court denied leave to appeal. Defendant moved for
relief from judgment,
1
claiming that his counsel never appealed his
juvenile court waiver as defendant requested. The prosecutor has deter-
mined that the pertinent juvenile court records were destroyed. Thus, it
remains unclear whether an appeal of the waiver decision ever occurred.
Generally, the burden is on defendant to prove his entitlement to
relief. We would expect defendant to support his position through the
official court records. However, here, the records were destroyed. It is
difficult for defendant to meet his burden without the opportunity to
make a supplemental record. At an evidentiary hearing, defendant might
produce witnesses who could verify his position, notably his previous
attorneys.
Defendant has not shown that an appeal of the waiver decision would
have succeeded. However, if his counsel failed to file a notice of appeal
when requested to do so, defendant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. He would be entitled to a new appeal without a showing that his
appeal would have been meritorious. Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470,
477 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant
cannot be required to show that he or she was prejudiced by such a
deprivation. Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999). Thus, the fact
that defendant has not shown that an appeal of the waiver would have
been successful does not control whether he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
1
MCR 6.508.
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ICHIGAN
R
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Accordingly, I would remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine if an appeal was taken from the waiver decision.
D
OWNS V
N
ORTHERN
M
ICHIGAN
H
OSPITALS,
I
NC
, No. 132888. By order of
April 4, 2007, the application for leave to appeal the November 28, 2006,
judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance for Mullins v St
Joseph Mercy Hospital (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the
case having been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007),
the application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 253611.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order denying leave to
appeal because I agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant hospital
waived its right to contest the sufficiency of plaintiff’s notices of intent to
file suit. The letter that defendant sent to plaintiff clearly indicates that
defendant had no objections to the notices of intent, and, thus, defendant
cannot now rely on the trial court’s subsequent determination that the
notices of intent are deficient.
I write separately to express my concern regarding the practice
employed in this case by which a plaintiff purports to seek a judgment
declaring notices of intent to be sufficient. MCL 600.2912b sets forth
several different timing requirements or deadlines pertaining to notices
of intent. For instance, pursuant to § 2912b(1), a medical malpractice
plaintiff must file a notice of intent 182 days before filing a complaint. In
addition, pursuant to § 2912b(3), the 182-day requirement can be
shortened to 91 days if all the conditions set forth in § 2912b(3)(a)
through (d) are satisfied. Further, pursuant to § 2912b(5), within 56 days
after providing the notice of intent, the plaintiff must allow the defendant
access to all the medical records related to the claim. Finally, pursuant to
§ 2912b(7), the defendant must provide the plaintiff with a written
response within 154 days of receiving the notice of intent, and, pursuant
to § 2912b(8), if the defendant fails to respond within 154 days to the
notice of intent, the plaintiff can immediately file a complaint. However,
the defendant is not required to allege any deficiencies in the notice of
intent in this written response. MCL 600.2912b(7). Instead, as this Court
explained in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 66 (2002),
“nowhere does the statute provide that a defendant must object to any
deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed.”
1
Given
that § 2912b sets forth several specific timing requirements pertaining to
notices of intent, but does not set forth a timing requirement with regard
to when the defendant must object to any deficiencies in the notice of
intent, and given this Court’s decision in Roberts, I question whether a
1
“[S]tatute of limitations [is] an affirmative defense that must be
pleaded in defendants’ motion for summary disposition or first respon-
sive pleading. Once the statute of limitations is asserted as a de-
fense...thenaplaintiff is free to argue that the statute was tolled under
[MCL 600.5856(d)]. It is only at this point that a defendant is obligated
to object to the adequacy of plaintiff’s notice under § 2912b.” [Roberts,
supra at 70 n 7.]
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plaintiff can seek a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of
notices of intent, thereby requiring the defendant to object to any
deficiencies in the notices of intent before the defendant would otherwise
be required to do so under the statute.
Although it is unnecessary to answer this question in the instant case
because defendant waived any objections to the sufficiency of the notices
of intent, I nevertheless wish to express my concern about such a
procedure.
D
OWNS V
K
EEBLER
, No. 132893. By order of April 4, 2007, the applica-
tion for leave to appeal the November 28, 2006 judgment of the Court of
Appeals was held in abeyance for Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hospital
(Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having been decided
on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application is again
considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 253611.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
C
RYDERMAN V
V
ERBURG
, No. 132895. By order of April 25, 2007, the
application for leave to appeal the November 28, 2006, judgment of the
Court of Appeals was held in abeyance for Mullins v St Joseph Mercy
Hospital (Docket No. 131879). On order of the Court, the case having
been decided on November 28, 2007, 480 Mich 948 (2007), the application
is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that
the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 255045.
C
ITY OF
L
ANSING V
S
TATE OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No. 134213; reported below: 275
Mich App 423.
W
EAVER
, J. I would direct that oral argument be heard on the
application for leave to appeal.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal. Defendant
builder is attempting to construct a pipeline under several streets in
plaintiff city. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s consent to this
project was not required under MCL 247.183(2), and that Const 1963, art
7, § 29 did not necessitate a different result. City of Lansing v Michigan,
275 Mich App 423 (2007).
At issue is whether MCL 247.183(2) is consistent with the first
sentence of Const 1963, art 7, § 29. MCL 247.183(2) states that, under
the circumstances present here, a utility company “is not required to
obtain the consent” of the affected city. However, the first sentence of art
7, § 29 states that a utility does not “have the right to the use of the
highways [or] streets” of any city “without the consent” of that city. Also
relevant is the second sentence of art 7, § 29, which states that a city
possesses a right of “reasonable control” over its streets “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this constitution.”
The first sentence of the constitutional provision grants to cities the
unqualified authority to refuse consent to utility projects, whereas the
grant of “reasonable control” over city streets is qualified. This lack of
qualification in the first sentence must be considered in light of the
1104 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
express qualification in the very next sentence. Read together, the
difference between these grants of authority arguably gives rise to an
inference that a city’s right to withhold consent to a utility project cannot
be defeated by other constitutional provisions in the same fashion as a
city’s right of “reasonable control.”
When construing two constitutional provisions, this Court must give
“proper meaning and effect to both.” In re Request for Advisory Opinion,
479 Mich 1, 35 n 90 (2007). The specific right in the first sentence of art
7, § 29, to refuse consent to utility projects, fits logically within the city’s
general right in the second sentence to exercise “reasonable control” over
its streets. Therefore, to give meaning and effect to both sentences, it
may be inferred that there is some difference in terms of the Legislature’s
authority to overrule the city with regard to its exercise of the more
specific right in comparison with its exercise of the more general right.
However, the Court of Appeals renders these rights indistinguishable in
terms of the Legislature’s overruling authority, treating the specific right
to refuse consent in an identical manner as the general right of “reason-
able control.” Thus, the Court of Appeals arguably gives no effect at all to
the first sentence of art 7, § 29.
Of course, the specific right of cities to refuse consent to utility
projects may be limited by another constitutional provision. In this
regard, the Court of Appeals relied on Const 1963, art 7, § 22, which
states that a city may enact resolutions and ordinances “subject to the
constitution and law.” However, this begs the question of to which parts
of the constitution and which laws are the city’s actions properly subject.
At least arguably, the specific grant of constitutional authority to cities to
refuse consent to utility projects must control over the more general
authority granted to the Legislature in art 7, § 22. See Jones v Enertel,
467 Mich 266, 271 (2002) (“[S]pecific provisions...prevail over any
arguable inconsistency with the more general rule.”).
I am cognizant of arguments concerning the wisdom of a single
community being allowed to effectively veto a utility project designed to
benefit many communities in Michigan. However, while some may wish
to avoid facilitating such an anomalous result, the first obligation of this
Court is to faithfully maintain our constitution. Plaintiff’s arguments are
not frivolous and merit full consideration by this Court so that the rights
of cities under our constitution may be clearly understood.
P
OWELL V
D
OMINO’S
P
IZZA
I
NTERNATIONAL,
I
NC
, and M
ILLER V
D
OMINO’S
P
IZZA
I
NTERNATIONAL,
I
NC
,andB
ENNETT V
D
OMINO’S
P
IZZA
I
NTERNATIONAL,
I
NC
,
Nos. 135226, 135227, 135228; Court of Appeals Nos. 279079, 279083,
279084.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would remand to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted whether the admission of the delivery
driver’s conviction of killing in the course of dangerous driving under the
Bahamas Road Traffic Act is barred by MCL 257.731 or MRE 403. MCL
257.731 prohibits the admission in a subsequent civil action of evidence
of a conviction under the Michigan Vehicle Code or a “local ordinance
pertaining to the use of a motor vehicle.” In light of this provision’s
purpose to mitigate the “danger that the civil jury might, if permitted,
consider the criminal conviction as evidence of negligence in the civil
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1105
action,” Elliott v AJ Smith Contracting Co, Inc, 358 Mich 398, 413 (1960),
the question whether “local ordinance” encompasses ordinances from
other states or foreign countries is significant, in my judgment, and
merits further review. Moreover, the question whether the probative
value of a conviction of a nonparty, admitted against a defendant that was
unable to contest it, as here, is “substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” MRE
403, is also significant and merits further review.
T
AYLOR
, C.J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
Y
OUNT V
Y
OUNT
, No. 135663; Court of Appeals No. 278890.
In re W
ELSH
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
W
ELSH
), No. 135755;
Court of Appeals No. 277258.
In re L
AKIES
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
L
AKIES
), No. 135876;
Court of Appeals No. 279749.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 13, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
P
ERRY,
No. 136005. Court of Appeals No. 284102.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal and would reverse that part of the trial court’s order granting
defendant’s motion to exclude testimony the prosecutor sought to intro-
duce under MCL 768.27a for the same reasons stated in Justice C
ORRIG-
AN
’s dissenting statement.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order denying leave to
appeal. I would reverse that part of the trial court’s order granting
defendant’s motion to exclude testimony the prosecution sought to
introduce under MCL 768.27a. The evidence is admissible under the
plain language of the statute. Even assuming that MRE 403 applies, the
trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the proffered evidence
should be excluded, because the defendant failed to establish that the
“probative value” of the evidence “is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice....”MRE403.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would stay the trial court proceedings in
order to allow this Court more than several hours to review the
prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and to afford this Court the
opportunity to address the relationship between MRE 403 and 404 and
MCL 768.27a.
Summary Disposition March 14, 2008:
S
CHMID V
F
ARM
B
UREAU
L
IFE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY OF
M
ICHIGAN
, No.
135941. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. We further order that trial court proceedings are stayed pending
completion of this appeal. On motion of a party or on its own motion, the
Court of Appeals may modify, set aside, or place conditions on the stay if
it appears that the appeal is not being vigorously prosecuted or if other
appropriate grounds appear. Court of Appeals No. 282030.
1106 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 14, 2008:
In re B
ROWN
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
N
ICKSON
), No. 135881;
Court of Appeals No. 277791.
Appeal Dismissed March 14, 2008:
A
BAY V
D
AIMLER
C
HRYSLER
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135642. On order of the
Chief Justice, a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to
the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the
application for leave to appeal is dismissed with prejudice and without
costs. Court of Appeals No. 281924.
Summary Dispositions March 19, 2008:
R
UBY &
A
SSOCIATES,
PCvS
HORE
F
INANCIAL
S
ERVICES
, No. 134033. Pursu-
ant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate in
part the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as that court concluded
that plaintiff’s lis pendens was invalid, and we affirm the Oakland Circuit
Court’s February 10, 2005, opinion and order granting summary dispo-
sition in defendants’ favor. The circuit court correctly concluded that,
regardless of the validity of the lis pendens, any rights that plaintiff held
under the lis pendens merged into—and were extinguished by—the
quitclaim deed. Accordingly, both lower courts correctly held that,
because plaintiff failed to exercise its right of redemption, plaintiff’s
rights to the property were extinguished when the redemption period
expired and the foreclosure became final. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals
No. 266312.
M
ONA
S
HORES
B
OARD OF
E
DUCATION V
M
ONA
S
HORES
T
EACHERS
E
DUCATION
A
SSOCIATION,
MEA/NEA, No. 134350. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion
at pages 1-2. The plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory relief
concerning the validity of the early retirement provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement under the standards articulated in Nat’l Wildlife
Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 614-615 (2004), and
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America
Inc, 479 Mich 280, 295-296 (2007). We remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of the remaining issues raised by the plaintiffs
in that court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 271592.
R
ED
R
IBBON
P
ROPERTIES,
LLC, v B
RIGHTON
T
OWNSHIP,
No. 134865. Pur-
suant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse
in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the
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1107
October 28, 2004, order of the Livingston Circuit Court. We affirm the
Court of Appeals ruling that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear this
dispute, but we reverse the appeals court’s conclusion that a remand was
necessary to consider other provisions of the Land Division Act (LDA),
MCL 560.101 et seq., or to reconsider certain defendants’ equitable
claims. Under Section 227a(1) of the LDA, MCL 560.227a(1), the circuit
court properly determined that the whole of the vacated drive in question
should be vested in the rightful owners of the adjacent lots “within the
subdivision covered by the plat . . .” and that the defendants Adler
Enterprises Company, LLC, et al., do not own lots that are covered by the
plat in question. Court of Appeals No. 259563.
P
EOPLE V
A
CEVAL
, No. 135149. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration, as on leave granted, of whether the defendant was denied
the right to counsel of his choice under United States v Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 US 140 (2006), and for consideration of whether the prosecution’s
acquiescence in the presentation of perjured testimony amounts to
misconduct that deprived the defendant of due process such that retrial
should be barred. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because
we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 279017.
P
EOPLE V
R
ATLIFF
, No. 135395. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Manistee Circuit
Court and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. The trial
court’s assumption that the defendant would be required to serve
additional prison time on his parole sentence before serving the instant
sentence was not objective and verifiable, and in fact was erroneous.
Furthermore, the possibility of a current prisoner or parolee serving a
sentence in the county jail does not relate to the seriousness of the offense
or the culpability of the offender, and is not a compelling reason to deny
the defendant an intermediate sanction to which he is entitled by statute.
MCL 769.34. On remand, the trial court shall sentence the defendant
within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, or articulate on the
record a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the
sentencing guidelines range in accordance with People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247 (2003). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because
we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
No. 281107.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 19, 2008:
R
ODRIGUEZ V
ASE I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC
, No. 133686. Leave to appeal having
been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having
been considered by the Court, we vacate our order of October 12,
2007. The application for leave to appeal the March 22, 2007, judgment
of the Court of Appeals is denied, because we are no longer persuaded
that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Reported
below: 275 Mich App 8.
1108 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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C
AVANAGH
, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with
counsel of record.
R
AYBON V
DP F
OX
F
OOTBALL
H
OLDINGS,
LLC, No. 134748. A decision by
the Court of Appeals under MCR 7.215(D) not to publish its opinion is not
reviewable by application for leave to appeal to this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 268634.
G
ONZALEZ V
S
T
J
OHN
H
OSPITAL &
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 134749; reported
below: 275 Mich App 290.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I would reverse the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in defen-
dants’ favor. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that a resident
physician must be held to the standard of a specialist under MCL
600.2169(1)(a) and this Court’s decision in Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich
545 (2006).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant resident physician, Dr. Christo-
pher Vashi, negligently failed to properly diagnose and treat plaintiff’s
decedent’s acute intra-abdominal hemorrhage while the decedent was a
patient at defendant St. John Hospital. Vashi was a third-year surgical
resident who evaluated the decedent on June 7, 2003. Previously—on
April 8 and May 9, 2003—the decedent had undergone two abdominal
surgeries to treat colon cancer. He returned to the hospital on June 7
after discovering that he was bleeding from a post-surgical drainage tube.
Defendants ultimately discovered a leak in the decedent’s left iliac artery
but, despite surgical intervention to repair the leak, the decedent died on
June 8, 2003.
Plaintiff’s sole expert was a board-certified specialist in surgery.
Accordingly, the trial court granted summary disposition in defendants’
favor, holding that a resident physician is neither a specialist nor held to
the standards of a specialist. Rather, he is a general practitioner and,
therefore, to establish the relevant standard of care a plaintiff must
present the testimony of a general practitioner or someone who instructs
students in the same health profession in which the resident is licensed.
MCL 600.2169(1)(c).
The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the trial court but it reversed
on reconsideration. Gonzalez v St John Hosp & Med Ctr (On Reconsid-
eration), 275 Mich App 290 (2007). The panel concluded that, “[u]nder
Woodard’s definition of specialist, any physician who can potentially
become board-certified in a branch of medicine or surgery in which he or
she practices is defined as a ‘specialist’ for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1).”
Gonzalez, supra at 298. Accordingly, because Vashi is a physician “who
limited his training to surgery, and who could potentially become
board-certified on completion of his residency, at the time decedent died,
Vashi would be considered a ‘specialist.’ ” Id. at 298-299. The panel also
held that Woodard overruled the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals
in Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosps, 198 Mich App 31, 34 (1993), rev’d on
other grounds 448 Mich 135 (1995) (“It is clear that interns and residents
are not ‘specialists,’ and, therefore,...theapplicable standard of care for
such persons is that of the local community or similar communities.”).
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I disagree with the Court of Appeals conclusion because it misinter-
prets both Woodard and the relevant statutory language. The distinction
between specialists and general practitioners is significant because
specialists and general practitioners are subject to different standards
under Michigan’s malpractice statutes. If a defendant is a general
practitioner, a medical malpractice plaintiff must show that he “failed to
provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional
practice or care in the community in which the defendant practices or in
a similar community ....”MCL600.2912a(1)(a). If the defendant is a
specialist, a plaintiff must show that he “failed to provide the recognized
standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in
light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities
reasonably available under the circumstances....” MCL
600.2912a(1)(b).
In Woodard, we considered the definition of “specialist,” which is not
defined by the relevant statutes. We concluded:
Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (28th ed) defines a
“specialist” as “a physician whose practice is limited to a particu-
lar branch of medicine or surgery, especially one who, by virtue of
advanced training, is certified by a specialty board as being
qualified to so limit his practice.”... Boththedictionary defini-
tion of “specialist” and the plain language of § 2169(1)(a) make it
clear that a physician can be a specialist who is not board certified.
They also make it clear that a “specialist” is somebody who can
potentially become board certified. Therefore, a “specialty” is a
particular branch of medicine or surgery in which one can poten-
tially become board certified. Accordingly, if the defendant physi-
cian practices a particular branch of medicine or surgery in which
one can potentially become board certified, the plaintiff’s expert
must practice or teach the same particular branch of medicine or
surgery. [Woodard, supra at 561-562.]
Woodard addressed the meaning of “specialist” for purposes of
determining how the term applies when a defendant physician practices
in a specialty or subspecialty but is not board-certified as a specialist. Id.
at 560-562. In light of this context, the Court of Appeals applies Woodard
too broadly in this case to mean that the term “specialist” includes any
physician who practices a particular branch of medicine “in which one
can potentially become board certified.” Id. at 561-562; Gonzalez, supra
at 298-299. The more relevant definition, for our purposes, is the basic
definition of “specialist” as “a physician whose practice is limited to a
particular branch of medicine or surgery, especially one who, by virtue of
advanced training, is certified by a specialty board as being qualified to so
limit his practice.” Woodard, supra at 561, quoting Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (28th ed). A resident physician simply does not
qualify under this definition. Indeed, Dorland’s separately defines “resi-
dent” as “a graduate and licensed physician receiving training in a
specialty in a hospital.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (29th
1110 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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ed) (emphasis added). Because a resident is receiving training in a
specialty, by definition he is not yet a specialist. Further, such an
overbroad application of Woodard would largely eliminate the statutory
distinction between specialists and general practitioners altogether; any
general practitioner who has the “potential” to become board-certified
will automatically qualify as a specialist.
Therefore, I agree with the trial court that Vashi must be considered
a general practitioner because he was still a resident at the time of the
alleged malpractice. Accordingly, plaintiff was required to present an
expert on the standard of care who,
during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence
that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority of his
or her professional time to either or both of the following:
(i) Active clinical practice as a general practitioner.
(ii) Instruction of students in an accredited health professional
school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the
same health profession in which the party against whom or on
whose behalf the testimony is offered is licensed. [MCL
600.2169(1)(c).]
Because plaintiff’s expert did not meet either of these criteria, the
trial court properly granted summary disposition in defendants’ favor.
A
DAMS V
A
DAMS
, No. 135202; reported below: 276 Mich App 704.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal March 20, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
L
AMORAND,
No. 135247. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument the parties shall address: (1)
whether requiring a defendant to plead guilty in order to preserve the
right of his family members to benefit from plea bargains is coercive; (2)
whether the defendant’s claims of innocence together with the claims of
coercion, brought before sentencing, provide sufficient reasons under the
standard of review for plea withdrawal before sentencing to support a
grant of his motion; (3) whether an evidentiary hearing is required to
explore this matter; and (4) whether, if the defendant is allowed to
withdraw his plea, the prosecution will be prejudiced and, if so, in what
manner. We further order the Macomb Circuit Court, in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 2003-3, to determine no later than April 2,
2008, whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint attorney
Mitchell T. Foster, if feasible, to represent the defendant in this Court. If
the defendant is not indigent, he must retain his own counsel. Oral
argument in this case will take place in the Barry County Courthouse in
Hastings, Michigan, at 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 14, 2008. The
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1111
parties shall file supplemental briefs no later than April 30, 2008, but
they should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
Court of Appeals No. 279776.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order scheduling oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
action. I write to describe the underlying facts and issues. In this case,
defendant, his mother, stepfather, brother, and half-brother were all
charged with manufacturing marijuana, which is a felony. The prosecutor
offered to allow every one except defendant’s brother to plead guilty of
the misdemeanor offense of maintaining a drug house. No plea offer was
extended to defendant’s brother because he had already admitted manu-
facturing marijuana. A condition of the plea was that if any one of the
family members declined to accept the plea agreement, none of the other
family members would be permitted to plead.
Each of defendant’s family members accepted the offers and pleaded
guilty of maintaining a drug house. Defendant’s brother pleaded guilty of
manufacturing marijuana. At the guilty plea hearing, defendant made
the following statements in response to questions from the court:
The Court: Have there been any other promises, threats,
inducement or coercion to get you to plead guilty today?
Defendant: No.
Defendant testified that he was tendering the plea of his own free will
and choice. He testified that he understood that if the court accepted his
plea, he could not later claim the existence of other promises, threats,
inducement or coercion. Then defendant testified as follows:
The Court: Brian Lamorand, tell the Court what it is you did on
or about February 18, 2006 in the Township of Clinton. What did
you do?
Defendant: I kept my driver’s license at 35618 Rutherford
where marijuana was kept.
The Court: And the purpose of that residence at least in part
was to be maintained for the maintaining of the marijuana.
Defendant:Yes.
***
The Court: Then to the charge of maintaining a drug house,
how is it you wish to plead?
Defendant: Guilty.
Defendant and his family members were all scheduled to be sentenced
at the same hearing. At the sentencing hearing, after each of his family
members had been sentenced, defendant sought a one-week adjournment
to discuss “the condition of his plea.” One week later he moved to
1112 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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withdraw his plea, alleging that he had been coerced into accepting the
plea agreement. Defendant’s attorney summarized defendant’s argu-
ment at the hearing to withdraw defendant’s plea:
I think in all fairness that my client had a coercion in regard to
the fact that it was a take it or leave it situation in regard to all the
co-defendants and he felt that he would be doing a severe injustice
to his family if left in the position whereas he would not take the
plea and to have to have his family go through the entire process
of a trial in this matter.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v
Lamorand, unpublished order, issued September 17, 2007 (Docket No.
279776).
Defendant alleges in this Court that his guilty plea was coerced
because his family’s plea agreements were contingent on his guilty plea
to a charge of maintaining a drug house. The Court of Appeals has
observed that “a promise of leniency for a relative is not, of itself, coercive
enough to vitiate a guilty plea as a matter of law. Instead, the question in
each case is whether the inducement for the guilty plea was one which
necessarily overcame the defendant’s ability to make a voluntary deci-
sion.” People v Forrest, 45 Mich App 466, 469 (1973); see also People v
James, 52 Mich App 422 (1974), and People v Walker, 75 Mich App 552
(1977).
Federal authorities also adopt the principle that plea agreements
entered into as a result of pressure from codefendants or family members
are not inherently coercive. In Stano v Dugger, 921 F2d 1125, 1142 (CA
11, 1991), the court explained that “[u]navoidable influence or pressure
from sources such as codefendants, friends or family does not make a plea
involuntary.” In Miles v Dorsey, 61 F3d 1459, 1468 (CA 10, 1995), the
court explained:
Because almost anything lawfully within the power of a pros-
ecutor acting in good faith can be offered in exchange for a guilty
plea, we have ruled that a plea is not per se involuntary if entered
under a plea agreement that includes leniency for a third party.
Instead, a third party benefit in a plea agreement presents a factor
for the court to consider when evaluating the voluntariness of the
defendant’s plea. Because such bargaining can pose a danger of
coercion and increase the leverage possessed by prosecutors, the
government must abide by a high standard of good faith in its use
of such tactics. The government acts in good faith when it offers
leniency for an indicted third party or threatens to prosecute an
unindicted third party in exchange for a defendant’s plea when the
government has probable cause to prosecute the third party.
Consequently, so long as the government has prosecuted or threat-
ened to prosecute a defendant’s relative in good faith, the defen-
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dant’s plea, entered to obtain leniency for the relative, is not
involuntary. [Internal citations and quotations omitted.]
See also United States v Hernandez, 912 F2d 464 (CA 4, 1990) (applying
the same rationale as Miles).
The question is whether defendant’s belated allegation of coercion can
overcome his sworn testimony at the plea hearing that his plea was
voluntary and was not coerced. Courts have held that a “[d]efendant’s
claim of coercion should not be accorded greater weight than his
statement at the time of the plea.” People v Roy, 131 Mich App 611, 613
(1983); see also Blackledge v Allison, 431 US 63, 73-74 (1977) (“[T]he
representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such
a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea,
constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.
Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of ver-
ity.”). See also United States v Holland, 326 US App DC 35, 40 (1997)
(citation omitted) (explaining that a court does not need to “ ‘undertake
a special voluntariness inquiry’ ” when a plea is tied to the plea
agreement of a family member as long as the defendant’s statements on
the record indicate that the plea was voluntary).
Finally, Michigan’s governing court rule, MCR 6.310, is also relevant.
MCR 6.310(B)(1) mandates that a plea “may not be withdrawn if with-
drawal of the plea would substantially prejudice the prosecutor because of
reliance on the plea.” Accordingly, here, the prosecution argues that it will
suffer substantial prejudice because all of defendant’s family members have
already pleaded guilty to, and have been sentenced for, the reduced misde-
meanor charge of maintaining a drug house; thus, the prosecution may no
longer pursue the original felony convictions for manufacturing marijuana,
which would carry significantly greater penalties. The prosecution asserts
that it would not have offered defendant’s family members these pleas if
defendant had rejected the plea offer. The prosecution also argues that, if
defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea, the prosecution will be denied the
benefit of its bargain because the prosecution will not be able to adequately
defend against claims made by defendant that the other members of his
family, who had previously pleaded guilty, were solely responsible for the
marijuana manufacturing. Moreover, the prosecution would have to try
defendant for the felony offense of marijuana manufacturing two years after
the fact. The prosecution claims that defendant deliberately attempted to
circumvent the plea agreement offered by the prosecution to defendant and
his family and, therefore, that allowing defendant to withdraw his plea
would both prejudice the prosecution and be against the interest of justice.
In my judgment, these are the facts and issues that are relevant to the
Court’s decisional process.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal March 21, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
A
NDRE
B
OND
, No. 135402. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory
1114 480 M
ICHIGAN
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action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument the parties shall address the
interpretation and application of the “use of authority” language in the
criminal sexual conduct statutes, MCL 750.520 et seq. The parties may
file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order, but they
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae.
Other persons or groups interested in the issue presented in this case
may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Court of
Appeals No. 267679.
Summary Dispositions March 21, 2008:
M
ANZELLA V
S
TATE
F
ARM
M
UTUAL
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
, No. 133620. On
January 9, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on the application for
leave to appeal the January 4, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On
order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1).
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion, and we reinstate the Van Buren Circuit Court’s orders of March
27, 2006, and May 22, 2006, granting State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company’s motions for summary disposition. Court of Appeals
No. 271365.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal and dissent from
the peremptory order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals majority opinion, Manzella v
State Farm Mut Ins Automobile Ins Co, unpublished opinion per curiam,
issued January 4, 2007 (Docket No. 271365), as follows:
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (hereafter defendant) with regard
to plaintiffs’ claim for uninsured motorist coverage. We reverse.
This appeal is being decided without oral argument under MCR
7.214(E).
We review a grant of summary disposition de novo. Royal Prop
Group, LLC v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc, 267 Mich App 708, 713;
706 NW2d 426 (2005). Also, because the essential facts of this case
are undisputed, its resolution turns on interpretation of the
relevant insurance policy. Interpretation of an insurance policy is
likewise reviewed de novo. Id.
Because uninsured motorist coverage is not mandated by the
no-fault act, the rights afforded by such coverage are purely
contractual. Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 465-466; 703
NW2d 23 (2005). Contractual language is given its ordinary and
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1115
plain meaning. Royal Prop Group, supra at 715. However, “an
insurance contract should be read as a whole and meaning should
be given to all terms.” Id. Such a contract “must be construed so
as to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase, and a construc-
tion should be avoided that would render any part of the contract
surplusage or nugatory.” Id.
This case arose out of an automobile accident on October 4,
2003. Apparently, plaintiff Renie Manzella was driving behind a
vehicle driven by Israel Morado and owned by Fernando Miranda,
neither of whom had automobile insurance for that vehicle.
Morado drove his vehicle into the rear of another vehicle, and
Renie drove into the rear of the Morado/Miranda vehicle. Defen-
dant denied plaintiffs’ claim for uninsured motorist coverage, and
plaintiffs commenced this suit, alleging (1) claims against Morado
and Miranda based on Morado’s negligence in causing the acci-
dent, and (2) claims against defendant based on the allegation that
it was obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage. Defen-
dant denied liability on the ground that Renie’s own negligence
was more than 50 percent the cause of the accident. The trial court
granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to defen-
dant on that basis. The trial court also entered a default judgment
against Morado and Miranda, neither of whom participated in the
trial.
Plaintiffs argue that because of the default and default judg-
ment, the language of the relevant uninsured motorist policy
entitles them to coverage. Plaintiffs therefore contend that the
trial court should never have reached the issue of whether Renie
was actually more than 50 percent at fault for the accident.
The “uninsured motor vehicle” coverage portion of the relevant
insurance policy includes the following language:
“We [defendant] will pay damages for bodily injury an in-
sured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an
uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained
by an insured and caused by accident arising out of the operation,
maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. [Emphasis
in original.]”
It is not disputed that Renie is an “insured” who suffered
“bodily injury” as a result of an accident arising out of operation of
an “uninsured motor vehicle.” Moreover, the default judgment
legally entitles plaintiffs to collect damages from the owner and
driver of that uninsured motor vehicle based on the bodily injury.
It therefore appears manifest that defendant must pay damages to
plaintiffs in this case.
1116 480 M
ICHIGAN
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While conceding that the above language supports plaintiffs’
position, defendant relies on another portion of the uninsured
motor vehicle policy under a subheading titled, “Deciding Fault
and Amount” provides:
“Two questions must be decided by agreement between the
insured and us:
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the
owner or driver of the uninsured motor vehicle; and
2. If so, in what amount? [Emphasis in original.]”
This subheading then provides options “if there is no agree-
ment.” The first provides that the parties may consent to arbitra-
tion, which did not take place here. In the alternative, the insured
shall file a lawsuit against the insurer (defendant) and the owner
or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle, provide defendant with
copies of the summons and complaint, and secure a judgment in
that action. This is precisely what plaintiffs did.
Defendant points out that the contract provides that the
judgment “must be the final result of an actual trial and an appeal,
if an appeal is taken.” Defendant argues that a default judgment,
although a legal entitlement to damages, is not “the final result of
an actual trial.” We believe this is a tortured reading of the
contract. When the contract is viewed as a whole, as it must be, it
clearly refers to the distinction between litigation and settlement,
rather than how the litigation proceeds to judgment. The contract
explicitly, and in notably prominent type, precludes coverage in the
event of a settlement without defendant’s permission. Further-
more, a judgment obtained as a result of summary disposition
would, by defendant’s definition, not be “the final result of an
actual trial.” The more sensible and consistent interpretation is
that the judgment discussed in the contract may not be a consent
judgment or other agreement between the parties, and it must be
reasonably immune to being attacked or set aside. A default
judgment is a final judgment, and it appears that the time limits
within which to challenge it have long since past. See Allied
Electrical Supply Co, Inc v Tenaglia, 461 Mich 285, 288-289; 602
NW2d 572 (1999). We are satisfied that this condition in the
contract has been met.
Defendant also points out that that the contract explicitly
reserves to defendant “the right to defend on the issues of the legal
liability of and the damages owed by” the uninsured owner or
driver, and further states that defendant is “not bound by any
judgment against any person or organization obtained without
[defendant’s] written consent.” We agree with defendant that this
language does not impose an obligation to defend. However,
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1117
defendant’s construction, that it may ignore a judgment entered
by a court simply because defendant did not consent to the
judgment, also appears to be a tortured reading of the contract.
Such a construction could create an inconceivable situation
wherein defendant could defend the uninsured motorist unsuc-
cessfully and then claim not to be bound by the resulting judg-
ment. Moreover, it would render entirely nugatory the provisions
for the insured filing suit against the uninsured owner or motorist
and against defendant, in the event defendant and the insured fail
to agree on the insured’s legal entitlement to collect damages.
Rather, when this language is read in context with the rest of the
provisions, it enforces the procedure an insured must follow:
namely, joining defendant to the suit. In other words, an insured
could not simply file suit against the uninsured motorist only
without joining defendant and providing to defendant a copy of the
summons and complaint; doing so would deprive defendant of its
contractual right to defend, and defendant therefore reasonably
would not wish to be bound by such a judgment. Having been
properly joined as a party, and having elected not to defend in this
case, the language defendant relies on has no application here.
We note that plaintiffs discuss at some length dicta from
American Family Mut Ins Co v Petersen, 679 NW2d 571 (Iowa,
2004). However, because our application of Michigan case law to
the relevant contractual language is dispositive, we need not
address this foreign authority.
Reversed.
P
EOPLE V
B
ENNETT
, No. 134576. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals
for consideration as on leave granted of whether the defendant’s sentence
is invalid, see MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 314
n 6 (2004); and People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247 (2003). Court of Appeals
No. 277682.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent. I would not remand this case and I
would deny leave to appeal because I am not persuaded that the decision
of the Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous or that defendant has
suffered any injustice in this case.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would deny leave to appeal. See People v Bennett,lvden
471 Mich 877 (2004).
G
OODMAN V
D
AHRINGER
, No. 134696. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals to provide an explanation, to be filed with the clerk of this Court
within 42 days of the date of this order, of why it has jurisdiction over this
case, given its procedural history. We retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
No. 273680.
1118 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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Leave to Appeal Denied March 21, 2008:
46
TH
C
IRCUIT
T
RIAL
C
OURT V
C
RAWFORD
C
OUNTY
, Nos. 132986, 132987,
132988; reported below: 273 Mich App 342.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). The “inherent powers” doctrine provides
trial courts with the authority to bring a funding claim against the
legislative branch where “a statutory function, the overall operation of
the court, or a constitutional function is in jeopardy.” Employees & Judge
of the Second Judicial Dist Court v Hillsdale Co, 423 Mich 705, 717-719
(1985). Bringing such a claim necessarily includes employing attorneys,
and it is obvious that courts themselves have no independent means of
obtaining funds for this purpose. Therefore, counties are the only
funding source available.
I write separately only to highlight this reality, while recognizing that
the outcome in this case may appear anomalous or unfair to the
taxpayers of defendant counties who now have to pay the costs of a
lawsuit in which they have prevailed. However, once an “inherent
powers” lawsuit has been initiated by a trial court, as occurred here, I do
not see any alternative outcome.
Thus, it is to point out the obvious: where an “inherent powers” case
looms imminent, it is incumbent upon the people themselves to urge upon
their elected officials—both legislative and judicial—that they avoid litiga-
tion by making appropriate accommodations with each other. F or if this fails,
and if a lawsuit is initiated, whatever its eventual outcome, the taxpayers
will be responsible for attorney fees on both sides. That is, in the context of
an “inherent powers” dispute, there is simply no alternative to an assertion
of direct self-government for avoiding a substantial attorney-fee burden
upon the taxpayers. There is simply no alternative to the people communi-
cating to their elected officials their views about whether litigation should be
initiated by these officials ostensibly on their behalf.
The significance of this Court’s decision in the underlying case, 46th
Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co, 476 Mich 131, 149-150 (2006), is that a
very high standard must be satisfied before a trial court can prevail in an
“inherent powers” claim and compel additional funding by the county.
Presumably, this standard will deter the filing of all but the most constitu-
tionally compelling “inherent powers” lawsuits, those in which the court
simply cannot perform its most essential judicial functions. Id. at 160.
While this new and stronger standard may be of modest consolation to
the taxpayers in the three defendant counties, I believe this case, which
restores proper constitutional standards, will help taxpayers in other
counties to avoid a similar situation in the future.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
J
OSEPH
J
OHNSON
, No. 133736; Court of Appeals No. 275609.
Y
OUNG
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order and write solely to
respond to Justice K
ELLY
’s dissent. This defendant has appealed to this
Court and the Court of Appeals a number of times over the years since his
conviction. The current application for leave to appeal is from defen-
dant’s fourth motion for relief from judgment. Considering the defen-
dant’s relative youth when he committed and was convicted of assault
with intent to commit armed robbery, several justices have wondered why
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1119
defendant has been incarcerated for so long.
1
This is a humane and
understandable impulse but one that now trenches upon the discretion-
ary authority of the Department of Corrections, which alone has the
authority to determine when convicted felons will be paroled. This Court
recently requested that the prosecutor provide an explanation “as to
what has led the Department of Corrections to exercise its discretion to
keep the defendant incarcerated until now.” People v Johnson, 740 NW2d
310. As it turns out, this defendant has a lengthy and substantial record
of prison violations, including violent assaults. So that the public will be
able to assess the arguments Justice K
ELLY
makes on his behalf, I attach
hereto the summary of defendant’s prison record provided by the
prosecutor. [Attachment at the end of the order.]
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). In August 1980, defendant and an accomplice
used an air rifle to rob an ice cream vendor of a small amount of cash and
several ice cream bars. Both men were 19 years old at the time of the
crime. Defendant held the air rifle while his codefendant took the money.
No shots were fired. Both men pleaded guilty of assault with intent to rob
while armed. The codefendant received a sentence of six months in the
county jail with work release. Defendant was sentenced to a “parolable”
life sentence. He is still in prison serving that sentence 28 years later.
Since his conviction, defendant has repeatedly applied for relief in this
Court. Numerous members of this Court have expressed concern over the
sentence imposed. In 1985, Justice R
YAN
, dissenting from an order
denying leave to appeal, stated that he would direct the appointment of
counsel to enable this Court to consider whether defendant’s sentence
was “so shocking to the conscience of the Court” that relief should be
granted.
1
On defendant’s motion for reconsideration, Justices L
EVIN
and
A
RCHER
wrote that they would grant the motion.
2
Twenty years later,
Justice C
AVANAGH
echoed similar concerns in a dissenting statement of his
own.
3
He stated that he would grant leave to appeal to explore what relief
1
Justice K
ELLY
is correct that “[i]n this country, we sentence defendants
for the acts for which they have been convicted.” Post at 1121 n 9. As noted,
this defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit armed robbery.
In 1980, just like today, that crime was “punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for life, or any term of years.” MCL 750.89; People v Johnson,
130 Mich App 26, 29-30 (1983). On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld defendant’s conviction and sentence, and after remand, this Court
denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal. In this successive motion
for relief from judgment, defendant has not raised “a retroactive change in
law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment or a claim
of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion” that
would justify upsetting his conviction or sentence. MCR 6.502(G)(2).
1
People v Johnson, 422 Mich 897 (1985).
2
Id.
3
People v Johnson, 474 Mich 924 (2005).
1120 480 M
ICHIGAN
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this Court could afford defendant.
4
Both Justice M
ARKMAN
and I have
indicated that we would grant leave to appeal to further consider
defendant’s case.
5
Today, defendant again applies for leave to appeal in this Court. After
directing the prosecutor to respond, this Court denies relief. I strongly
object. Appellate counsel should be appointed for defendant and oral
argument should be heard on the application, with the parties directed to
address what, if any, relief this Court could afford defendant.
Argument on the application is particularly appropriate because numer-
ous issues exist that may entitle defendant to relief . First, although he and
his codefendant engaged in the same behavior and pleaded guilty of the
same crime, defendant remains in prison whereas his codefendant spent six
months in jail with work release. Because two such drastically different
sentences were imposed for the same behavior, serious concerns arise about
the validity of defendant’s sentence. It seems a miscarriage of justice to
sentence one man to life in prison and another to six months in jail for the
same behavior. If our system of justice is to retain its valued place in society,
people must be treated equally. That appears not to have happened here.
Another possible theory for relief is that defendant’s trial counsel may have
been ineffective in failing to obtain a proportionate sentence for his client.
Finally, defendant’s sentence may be unconstitutional in light of the
recent decision in Foster-Bey v Rubitschun.
6
There, Judge Battani held
that changes to Michigan’s parole law and polices in 1992 and 1999
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
7
As I
have noted previously, I believe that serious concerns exist regarding the
constitutionality of this state’s parole system for those sentenced to
parolable life terms before 1992.
8
This case presents an excellent oppor-
tunity for this Court to consider this jurisprudentially significant issue.
In sum, the Court should appoint counsel for defendant and hear
argument on his application so it can decide what, if any, relief is
available to defendant.
9
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Foster-Bey v Rubitschun, unpublished opinion of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued October 23, 2007 (Docket No.
05-71318).
7
US Const, art I, § 10.
8
E.g., People v Scott, 480 Mich 1019 (2008).
9
Justice Y
OUNG
responds to my statement by pointing to defendant’s
prison record. In this country, we sentence defendants for the acts for which
they have been convicted. Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider their
later behavior in prison when reviewing the appropriateness of the sentence.
The relevant question before us is whether the sentence was valid when it
was handed down. Accordingly, anything this defendant has done since
sentencing is irrelevant in deciding whether his sentence, life in prison for
stealing a small sum of money and some ice cream bars, is proper.
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1121
Date: MDOC Document Name: Exhibit page
5-12-03 Memorandum: “Johnson was found guilty of a
substance abuse misconduct, 5-12-03.”
p7
3-11-07 Administrative Hearing Report: “He had 2
yellow photo tickets that were either stolen
from the prisoner store or they were
smuggled in from a visit.”
p14
2-6-07 Prisoner Program and Work Assignment
Evaluation: “Termination required based
on Guilty finding of ticket.”
p15
1-27-07
Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence; Disobeying a Direct Order, Found Guilty
p17
11-2-06 Prisoner Program and Work Assignment
Evaluation: “Inmate Johnson, had a few
issues always missing work or leaving
early. (out of place ticket 12-30).”
p19
7-31-06 Security Reclassification Notice: “Misconduct
charges; Fighting, 5-16-06; Out of Place, 2-10-
06.”
p26
7-18-06 Notice of Intent to Classify to Segregation; “Pris
Johnson approached me and stated that he
needed to lockup for protection He said that he
owed money from gambling debts he bad in-
curred at a gambling table run by an inmate.”
p27
5-16-26 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Fighting Found Guilty
p30
1-25-06 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Out of Place Found Guilty
p37
8-6-05 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Creating a Disturbance Found Guilty
p48
11-8-04 Security Reclassification Notice: “Subject
placed in T emp Seg due to a NOI for possibly
being involved in attempted assault on another
prisoner which may have involved a weapon
p63
4-12-04 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Out of
Place F ound Guilty
p68
1-15-04 Notice of Intent to Conduct an Administrative
Hearing: Contraband
p71
1122 480 M
ICHIGAN
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6-6-03 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Out of
Place F ound Guilty
p78
5-17-03
Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Out of
Place Found Guilty
p80
4-20-03 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Substance Abuse Found Guilty
p82
9-5-01 Special Problem Offender Notice: Assaulting
an Employee or Escape Jail: “Prisoner Phillips
stated that he was assaulted by prisoner
Johnson and Johnson was found guilty of the
assault.”
p 112
8-29-01 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
saulting Resulting in Serious Physical Injury:
Found Guilty
p 113
10-27-00 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Threatening Behavior Found Guilty
p 124
4-1-00 Prisoner Program and Work Assignment
Evaluation: “Johnson has been warned several
times about loitering while Working. Johnson
cannot work without constant supervision”
p 130
1-18-00 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence Found Guilty
p 132
12-8-00 Parole Board Notice of Action- No interest p 134
12-17-99 Notice of Intent to Conduct an Administrative
Hearing Contraband: “During a complete Unit
Shakedown on 12/17/99, Prisoner Johnson
was found to have the following contraband in
his area of control: plastic spoon, bottles of
med., old store card, altered adaptor.”
p 142
4-2-98 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order Found Guilty
p 165
3-12-98 Special Problem Offender Notice: “On 7-30-
97, a major Misconduct ticket was written on
Johnson for Assault & Battery On Inmate
Hamilton.”
p 171
9-30-97 Visitor Restriction: “The decision to restrict
your visits was based on the following major
misconduct guilty findings for Substance
Abuse. 8-31-95 (alcohol), 1-14-96 (cocaine),
8-23-96 (alcohol), 7-29-97 (alcohol).”
p 178
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1123
10-28-97 Security Reclassification Notice: Misconduct
Charge, AssIt & Batt 8-11-97, Substance
abuse 8-18-97. “Demonstrate inability to be
managed with group privileges. Show that
this prisoner is a serious threat to the physi-
cal safety of staff and/or other prisoners.”
p 181
7-29-97 Major Misconduct Hearing R eport: Sub-
stance Abuse Found Guilty
p 182
7-30-97 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery Found Guilty
p 184
7-30-97 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order Found Guilty
p 189
7-31-97 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Theft: Possession of Stolen Property: Found
Guilty
p 191
5-18-97 Major Misconduct Hearing R eport: Cre-
ating a Disturbance Found Guilty
p 194
3-4-97 Prisoner Program and Work Assignment
Evaluation: “Johnson is threat to safety of
stewards in main kitchen.”
p 199
2-17-97 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: inso-
lence Found Guilty
p 200
10-19-97 Major Misconduct Hearing R eport: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 204, 216
11-25-97 Memorandum: “Prisoner Johnson was classified
to Administrative Segregation on 10-28-97 by
the Security due to an Assault & Battery On
inmate misconduct.
p 207
1-6-98 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence F ound Guilty
p 211
8-23-96 Prisoner Program and Work Assignment
Evaluation: “Laid in for Substance abuse
(alcohol while on assignment) Porter
Johnson had a problem staying on his as-
signment would be seen on galleries he
wasn’t to be on without authorization, failed
to keep showers clean at all times due to his
running around, passing items to other pris-
oner such as cigarettes. Guilty.”
p 220
8-23-96 Major Misconduct Hearing R eport: Sub-
stance Abuse Found Guilty
p 222
1124 480 M
ICHIGAN
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4-14-96 Notice of Intent to Classify to Administrative
Segregation
p 226
1-14-96 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Sub-
stance Abuse Found Guilty
p 231
10-31-00 Notice of Action/P arole Board: “No interest in
taking action”
p 233
8-31-95 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Sub-
stance Abuse Found Guilty
p 236
4-17-95 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
“observed with shank in hand, attempting to
pass to another prisoner.”
p 242
2-27-95 Security Reclassification Notice: “Misconduct
Charge, Possession of Dangerous Contraband.”
p 250
2-18-95 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Posses-
sion of Dangerous Contraband: Found Guilty
p 252
12-6-94 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
“hit prisoner in jaw.”
p 255
11-18-94 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
“Prisoner has a lengthy consistent behavior of
violent/assaultive behavior.”
p 258
7-14-94 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery F ound Guilty
p 267
2-20-94 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Posses-
sion of Forged Documents: Found Guilty
p 277
2-94 Prisoner Program and W ork Assignment Evalu-
ation: “Johnson needs to stay in his own area,
and refrain from horse playing in the kitchen.”
p 279
10-5-93 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing F ound Guilty
p 283
9-30-93 Prisoner Program and W ork Assignment Evalu-
ation: “Worker seems to want to horseplay, in-
stead of working at the proper time. Has been
verbally told about horse playing on several
occasions.”
p 287
8-16-84 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
“Reason for segregation classification;
Prevent/control prisoners unmanageable as-
saultive behavior.”
p 290
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1125
9-10-93 Security Classification Screen-Review: “History
of serious management problems indicates the
need to gradually reduce security levels.”
p 294
8-18-93 Security Classification Screen-Review: “History
of stabbing other prisoners.”
p 295
12-7-92 Program Classification Report: “Due to a
lengthy history of assaultive behavior, he is be-
ing retained at a level V security.”
p 303
7-9-91 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing F ound Guilty
p 316
4-4-91 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
Notice of Intent upheld stabbed another pris-
oner
p 323
3-18-91 Special Problem Offender Notice: “On 3-1-91
prisoner Johnson stabbed prisoner Hammond in
the chest and back while being held by prisoner
Goodman.”
p 324
7-11-90 Transfer Order: “Prisoner demonstrates the in-
ability to be managed with group privileges, is a
threat to the physical safety of staff and/or other
prisoners.”
p 328
6-1-90 Special Problem Offender Notice: “Prisoner
Neely was stabbed by prisoner Johnson. The
stabbing was done in the institutions Barber
Shop with a pair of scissors.”
p 340
6-13-90 Security Reclassification Notice: “Misconduct
charge; Assault & Battery (5-30-90); Gambling
(1-10-90).”
p 342
5-25-90 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Theft;
Possession of Stolen Property: F ound Guilty
p 343
5-25-90 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery Found Guilty: Johnson
stabbed Neely with scissors in Barber Shop
p 345
12-28-89 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Gam-
bling; P ossession of gambling paraphernalia:
Found Guilty.
p 358
8-10-89 Transfer Order: “Since arriving at TCF he has
incurred the following major misconducts: De-
struction or Misuse of State Property (8-1-88);
Possession of Money (8-24-89); Insolence (10-10-
88); Interference with Administration of Rules
(10-26-88); Theft; Possession of Stolen Property
(10-26-88); Fighting (1-11-89).”
p 367
1126 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
5-2-89 Administrative Hearing Report: Disposition of
Property “contains illegal numbers (credit num-
bers). Cover to be destroyed.”
p 374
1-24-89 Security Reclassification Notice: “Misconduct
charge; Fighting (1-11-89); Theft; Possession of
Stolen Property (10-26-89); Interference with
Admin. of Rules (10-26-88); Insolence (10-10-
88); P ossession of Money (8-24-88); Dest or Mis-
use of State Property (8-1-88).
p 377
1-5-89 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 378
12-22-88 Notice of Action/P arole Board: “The P arole
Board has reviewed your case following your
most recent interview and has no interest in
taking action at this time.”
p 380
10-15-88 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Theft;
Possession of Stolen Property: F ound Guilty
p 383
10-15-88 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inter-
ference with the Administration of rules: Found
Guilty
p 383
9-30-88 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 391
5-25-90 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Theft;
Possession of Stolen Property: F ound Guilty
p 343
8-14-88 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Posses-
sion of Money: F ound Guilty
p 394
7-5-88 Notice of Intent to Conduct an Administrative
Hearing: “Contraband in property when he
came in.”
p 397
7-17-88 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: De-
struction or misuse of property with value of $10
or more: Found Guilty
p 399
12-18-87 Transfer Order: “Johnson-El has been found
guilty of the F ollowing major misconducts: Inso-
lence (10-5-87), (10-12-87), and (11-9-87); Fight-
ing (10-7-87). Currently Johnson has 2 assault
charges pending.”
p 415
11-19-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: F ound Guilty
p 416
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1127
6-29-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 418
11-19-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: F ound Guilty
p 431
12-2-87 Administrative Hearing Report: “Johnson-El re-
ceived a ticket for Assault and a ticket for
Fighting. He has received misconducts for Inso-
lence (2); Out of Place and Fighting (2).”
p 434
10-24-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 435
10-2-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 438
9-25-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 440
7-30-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Out of
Place: F ound Guilty
p 442
9-14-87 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 444
7-1-86 Memorandum: “His adjustment at MIPC has
been less than satisfactory. Since 4-10-85
Johnson has been found guilty of Threatening
Behavior, Assault and Battery, Dangerous Con-
traband, Fighting, Disobeying a Direct Order,
Assault and Battery, Insolence, And Threaten-
ing Behavior.”
p 470
5-19-86 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Threatening Behavior, Insolence: F ound Guilty
p 475
5-1-86 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence:Found Guilty
p 477
3-4-86 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: Found Guilty
p 479
1-25-86 Michigan Intensive Program Center: Final Re-
port: “Negative Behaviors: He has incurred the
following major misconducts while at MIPC (9
months), A. 4-10-85 Inciting to Riot or Strike,
B.7-15-85 Assault and Battery (Inmate), P osses-
sion of Contraband, C. 7-20-85 Fighting, D. 8-1-
1-85 Assault and Battery (Inmate), E. 8-27-85
Disobeying a Direct Order, F. 1-18-85 Fighting.”
p 481
1128 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
8-27-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 488
1-18-86 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 503
1-5-86 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 505
8-11-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: F ound Guilty
p 509
7-20-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 511
7-15-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery, P ossession of Dangerous Con-
traband: F ound Guilty
p 513
4-10-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Incite
to Riot or Strike, Threatening Behavior: Found
Guilty
p 521
3-18-85 Transfer Recommendation & Order: “His ad-
justment in B Unit has been poor (disobeying a
direct order, insolence and assault and battery
(resident).”
p 525
2-27-85 Administrative Segregation Interview Report:
“Prisoners inability to be managed with group
privileges is a threat to the order and security of
this facility.”
p 527
3-7-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 529
2-11-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying a Direct Order, Insolence: F ound Guilty
p 542
1-17-85 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Fight-
ing: F ound Guilty
p 546
12-31-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 550
9-19-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Inso-
lence: F ound Guilty
p 558
6-5-84 Presentence Investigation Report: (Prepared for
Jackson County Circuit Court) Prison Adjust-
ment (Misconducts):
p 563-574
p 568
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1129
11-10-81 Assault 6 days detention
12-6-81 Insolence 3 days toplock
12-23-81 Destruction of State Property
Over $10.00
4 days detention
1-7-82 Insolence 3 days toplock
1-13-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 3 days detention
1-28-82 Fighting 7 days detention
2-15-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 2 days toplock
3-3-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 1 day detention
3-2-82 Insolence 2 days detention
3-3-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 2 days detention
4-3-82 Fighting 6 days detention
4-22-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 3 days detention
7-1-82 Possession of Dangerous Con-
traband
7 days detention
6-26-82 Disobeying a Direct Order 2 days detention
11-3-82 Out of Place 2 days toplock
11-24-82 P ossession of Dangerous Con-
traband
7 days detention
Substance Abuse
Possession of Gambling Para-
phernalia
11-24-82 Destruction of State Property
Over $10.00
Restitution
1-11-83 Possession of Non-Dangerous
Contraband
confiscated
1-16-83 Misuse or Destruction of State
Property
2 days detention
1-21-83 Assault and Battery 7 days detention
8-21-82 Threatening Behavior 7 days detention
8-1-83 Possession of Non-Dangerous
Contraband
confiscated
1-4-84 Possession of Non-Dangerous
Contraband
confiscated
1-6-84 Disobeying a Direct Order 5 days detention
1-18-84 Assault and Battery 7 days detention
1-18-84 Assault and Battery 7 days detention
Disobeying a Direct Order
3-12-84 Disobeying a Direct Order 8 days loss of priv.
3-14-84 Possession of Non-Dangerous
Contraband
confiscated
3-8-84 Sexual Misconduct 3 days detention
3-31-84 Destruction or Misuse of State
Property
10 days loss of priv.
5-1-84 Fighting 5 days detention
5-9-84 Assault on Staff 7 days detention
1130 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
1-18-84 Basic Information Report (Assaulting a Prison
Employee
p 564
5-30-84 Sentence Recommendation: Jackson Co 84-
33577-FH “Original Charge: Assault Prison
Employee (Two Counts) /Second Felony. Con-
viction Charge: Assault Prison Employee (48
months max.). Plea Agreement: Plead guilty
to Count I. After sentencing, Count H and the
Supplemental Information will be dismissed.
Also, no prosecution will be forthcoming on
incident No. 41-1006-84.” Defendant was sen-
tenced on 6-14-84 to 2 to 4 years
p 574
5-9-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: F ound Guilty
p 579
5-1-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Fighting: F ound Guilty
p 582
3-31-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: De-
struction or Misuse of: of Property with a
value of $10.00 or more: F ound Guilty
p 585
3-12-84 Major Misconduct Report: Assault and
Battery, Disobeying a Direct Order
p 589
3-12-84 Major Misconduct Report: P ossession of
Dangerous Contraband:
p 590
1-18-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery, Disobeying a Direct Order:
Found Guilty of both counts.
p 594
1-18-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: As-
sault and Battery: F ound Guilty
p 599
1-6-84 Major Misconduct Hearing Report: Dis-
obeying Order: Found Guilty
p 602
8-21-83 Major Misconduct Hearing Report:
Threatening Behavior: Found Guilty
p 609
11-24-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Dangerous
Contraband, Substance, Gambling P arapher-
nalia: F ound Guilty of all three counts
p 622
11-2-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Out of Place:
Found Guilty
p 625
6-26-82 Misconduct Report: Disobeying a Direct Order p 632
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1131
7-6-82 Security Reclassification: “Misconduct charge;
Dangerous Contraband
p 633
4-3-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Fighting:
Found Guilty
p 634
3-3-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Disobeying a
Direct Order, Out of Place: F ound Guilty
p 641
3-2-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Insolence:
Found Guilty
p 643
3-3-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Disobeying a
Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 645
2-15-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Disobeying a
Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 647
1-28-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Fighting:
Found Guilty
p 649
1-13-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Disobeying a
Direct Order: Found Guilty
p 651
1-7-82 Misconduct Hearing Report: Insolence:
Found Guilty
p 654
12-23-81 Misconduct Hearing Report: Destruction
of State Property: F ound Guilty
p 656
12-6-81 Misconduct Hearing Report: Insolence:
Found Guilty
p 658
11-10-81 Misconduct Hearing Report: Assault:
Found Guilty
p 665
46
TH
C
IRCUIT
T
RIAL
C
OURT V
C
RAWFORD
C
OUNTY
, Nos. 133759, 133760,
134092, 134564; reported below: 275 Mich App 82.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
C
RAWFORD
C
OUNTY V
O
TSEGO
C
OUNTY
, No. 134320; reported below: 275
Mich App 82.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
Reconsideration Granted March 21, 2008:
HA S
MITH
L
UMBER &
H
ARDWARE
C
OV
D
ECINA
, No. 128560. On reconsid-
eration, we remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court to determine
whether plaintiff H.A. Smith Lumber & Hardware Company can recover
attorney fees under its contract with defendant John Decina. Although
attorney fees were not recoverable under the Construction Lien Act (CLA),
1132 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
MCL 570.1101 et seq., as held in our decision in this case, 480 Mich 987
(2007), they may be recoverable under the contract between the
parties. Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich 987. R eported
below: 265 Mich App 380.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur in the decision to grant the motion
for reconsideration. But I dissent from the decision to remand the case
to the trial court to consider whether plaintiff H.A. Smith Lumber &
Hardware Company can recover attorney fees. I would reinstate the
award of attorney fees for the reasons stated in Justice C
AVANAGH
’s
dissenting statement in this case, 480 Mich 987, 988 (2007).
C
AVANAGH,
J. I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
W
EAVER
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would grant leave to appeal.
Summary Dispositions March 24, 2008:
In re L
AGER
E
STATE
, No. 135346. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of whether the probate
court had jurisdiction to determine the disposition of the decedent’s
General Motors personal savings plan (PSP) and, if so, whether the
respondent, as the surviving wife of the decedent, is entitled to the
proceeds of the PSP pursuant to 29 USC 1055(c). On remand, the
Court of Appeals may, while retaining jurisdiction, remand this case to
the Genesee County Probate Court for any necessary additional
proceedings or hearings. Court of Appeals No. 276843.
H
OBDY V
H
ARPER
U
NIVERSITY
H
OSPITAL
, Nos. 135352, 135353, 135354.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to Wayne
Circuit Court Docket No. 03-331642-NH and reinstate the order of the
Wayne Circuit Court denying the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition in that case because the first personal representative is
within the class of plaintiffs identified in this Court’s order in Mullins
v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007). We remand this case to
the Court of Appeals for consideration of the defendants’ other issues
that were not addressed in its opinion. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals Nos. 258114, 260666, 270471.
P
EOPLE V
D
ANNY
G
OULD
, No. 135411. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of whether the trial
court erred in scoring both offense variables 9 and 12 in connection
with the defendant’s conviction for resisting and obstructing a police
officer. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. Court of Appeals No. 280804.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1133
Leave to Appeal Denied March 24, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
M
ARSH
, No. 134065. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 272667.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFERY
B
ARNES
, No. 134491; Court of Appeals No. 266170.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
, No. 134514; Court of Appeals No. 268040.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
M
ATHIS
, No. 134623; Court of Appeals No. 268082.
P
EOPLE V
S
TEED
, No. 134648. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276005.
P
EOPLE V
D
EBERRY
, No. 134747; Court of Appeals No. 267263.
P
EOPLE V
M
ETCALF
, No. 134802. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277704.
P
EOPLE V
F
AVORS
, No. 134835. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 275048.
P
EOPLE V
H
OGAN
, No. 134859. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277727.
G
ALLANT V
G
ALLANT
, No. 134902; Court of Appeals No. 265396.
P
EOPLE V
E
RIC
F
ERGUSON
, No. 134917. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278225.
HRT E
NTERPRISES V
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
, No. 135100; Court of Appeals No.
268285.
P
EOPLE V
C
LINE
, No. 135191; reported below: 276 Mich App 634.
P
EOPLE V
G
OODELL
, No. 135200; Court of Appeals No. 268772.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
J
ENKINS
, No. 135242; Court of Appeals No. 279669.
In re T
RUITT
E
STATE
(K
IENITZ V
E
ISENZOPH
), No. 135260; Court of
Appeals No. 269807.
P
EOPLE V
K
HALIFE
, No. 135264; Court of Appeals No. 272174.
P
EOPLE V
V
ARNER
, No. 135287; Court of Appeals No. 280449.
G
UOAN V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 135289; Court of Appeals No.
277823.
T
AYLOR V
D
AVIS
, No. 135300; Court of Appeals No. 274795.
H
AMILTON V
G
ROSS
, No. 135301; Court of Appeals No. 267522.
1134 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
D
EMANN
, No. 135331; Court of Appeals No. 268657.
B
RINKLEY V
B
RINKLEY
, No. 135339; reported below: 277 Mich App 23.
C
ROMWELL V
W
EST
B
RANCH
R
EGIONAL
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 135345; Court
of Appeals No. 279755.
B
ENNETT V
L
AKE
M
ICHIGAN
P
ACKAGING
P
RODUCTS,
I
NC
, No. 135350; Court
of Appeals No. 278089.
P
EOPLE V
A
SHFORD
, No. 135361; Court of Appeals No. 271925.
P
EOPLE V
T
OLSON
, No. 135362; Court of Appeals No. 272781.
P
EOPLE V
L
OTTS
, No. 135373; Court of Appeals No. 270254.
W
ASHINGTON V
J
ACKSON
, No. 135376; Court of Appeals No. 258691.
M
C
L
EOD V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY
, No. 135380; Court of Appeals No.
280282.
L
ANPHAR V
S
HISLER
, No. 135388; Court of Appeals No. 275124.
P
EOPLE V
T
ONY
M
OORE
, No. 135390; Court of Appeals No. 270828.
C
ADLE
C
OMPANY
II, I
NC V
PM G
ROUP,
I
NC
, No. 135394; Court of Appeals
No. 275099.
P
EOPLE V
J
AQUAVIS
T
AYLOR
, No. 135396; Court of Appeals No. 271635.
P
EOPLE V
W
ARNE
, No. 135401; Court of Appeals No. 281000.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
B
ROWN
, No. 135409; Court of Appeals No. 272784.
P
EOPLE V
Z
AMORA
, No. 135414; Court of Appeals No. 280516.
P
EOPLE V
B
RADLY
M
EADOWS
, No. 135416; Court of Appeals No. 272394.
P
EOPLE V
K
ATONA
, No. 135419; Court of Appeals No. 280713.
P
EOPLE V
A
LVIN
J
ONES
, No. 135423; Court of Appeals No. 271039.
P
EOPLE V
E
DWIN
F
ORD,
III, No. 135431; Court of Appeals No. 272940.
P
EOPLE V
M
OODY
, No. 135436; Court of Appeals No. 280321.
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135437; Court of Appeals No. 271791.
M
C
M
AHON V
M
C
M
AHON
, No. 135438; Court of Appeals No. 270477.
P
EOPLE V
M
ATTOON
, No. 135442; Court of Appeals No. 272549.
P
EOPLE V
F
REDERICK
S
PENCER
, No. 135444; Court of Appeals No. 271844.
P
EOPLE V
S
HORT
, No. 135448; Court of Appeals No. 266368.
P
EOPLE V
G
IBBONS
, No. 135449. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277910.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1135
P
EOPLE V
J
ARROD
C
OLLINS
, No. 135450; Court of Appeals No. 280560.
P
EOPLE V
H
AHN
, No. 135451; Court of Appeals No. 280513.
P
EOPLE V
D
OUGLAS
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135452; Court of Appeals No. 280583.
L
A
B
ARGE V
W
ALGREEN
C
O
, No. 135456; Court of Appeals No. 281366.
P
EOPLE V
H
EATH
, Nos. 135463, 135464; Court of Appeals Nos. 270192,
270193.
P
EOPLE V
N
EWTON
, No. 135467; Court of Appeals No. 273318.
P
EOPLE V
T
YRONE
D
ORSEY
, No. 135469; Court of Appeals No. 273181.
P
EOPLE V
F
ONVILLE
, No. 135471; Court of Appeals No. 280968.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARI
H
ARVEY
, No. 135474; Court of Appeals No. 280489.
P
EOPLE V
J
AAFAR
, No. 135476; Court of Appeals No. 272586.
P
EOPLE V
C
LEMENTS
, No. 135477; Court of Appeals No. 271808.
P
EOPLE V
L
INDSEY
, No. 135478; Court of Appeals No. 268494.
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
M
OORE
, No. 135479; Court of Appeals No. 281239.
P
EOPLE V
R
OYAL
, No. 135480; Court of Appeals No. 272340.
R
EAGAN V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 135484; Court of Appeals
No. 279089.
P
EOPLE V
W
ISE
, No. 135486; Court of Appeals No. 267897.
P
EOPLE V
D
ELANO
E
VANS
, No. 135487; Court of Appeals No. 279396.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
M
AY
, No. 135489; Court of Appeals No. 270047.
P
EOPLE V
T
YRELL
R
ICHARDSON
, No. 135490; Court of Appeals No.
270606.
L
EESE V
L
EESE
, No. 135493; Court of Appeals No. 277289.
P
EOPLE V
J
OHN
S
MITH
, No. 135498; Court of Appeals No. 272821.
P
EOPLE V
F
ARROW
, No. 135499; Court of Appeals No. 272596.
R
ILEY V
S
TEELE
, No. 135502; Court of Appeals No. 279307.
Z
ANGKAS V
B
IRMINGHAM
P
UBLIC
S
CHOOLS
B
OARD OF
E
DUCATION
, No. 135503;
Court of Appeals No. 277056.
P
EOPLE V
L
ASENBY
, No. 135504; Court of Appeals No. 273753.
P
EOPLE V
R
UCKER
, No. 135505; Court of Appeals No. 280830.
C
ARUSO V
C
AMBRIDGE
I
NVESTMENT
G
ROUP,
I
NC
, No. 135508; Court of
Appeals No. 269279.
1136 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
S
WEENEY V
E
DDIE’S
I
NTERNATIONAL
T
OUCHLESS
C
AR
W
ASH
, No. 135511;
Court of Appeals No. 278586.
K
ETELHUT V
K
ETELHUT
, No. 135513; Court of Appeals No. 270733.
S
TATE
T
REASURER V
F
ERGUSON
, No. 135515; Court of Appeals No.
269669.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
J
OHNSON
, No. 135517; Court of Appeals No. 272823.
C
REHAN V
B
ANCROFT
, No. 135518; Court of Appeals No. 268027.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARTINDALE
, No. 135523; Court of Appeals No. 279210.
P
EOPLE V
C
OREY
M
C
C
ALL
, No. 135525; Court of Appeals No. 267764.
P
EOPLE V
W
EATHERSPOON
, No. 135526; Court of Appeals No. 281347.
P
EOPLE V
W
HORTON
, No. 135527; Court of Appeals No. 270607.
P
EOPLE V
J
ERALD
J
AMES
, No. 135528; Court of Appeals No. 271086.
P
EOPLE V
B
EATRICE
T
AYLOR
, No. 135531; Court of Appeals No. 273444.
P
EOPLE V
B
ELSER
, No. 135532; Court of Appeals No. 279483.
P
EOPLE V
G
IACOLONE
, No. 135537; Court of Appeals No. 277600.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARPENTER
, No. 135549; Court of Appeals No. 280930.
A
RSENAULT V
M
UNSON
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 135550; Court of Appeals
No. 278749.
K
AUFFMAN V
P
RESTON
, No. 135551; Court of Appeals No. 271327.
E
STATE
D
EVELOPMENT
C
OMPANY V
O
AKLAND
C
OUNTY
R
OAD
C
OMMISSION
, No.
135554; Court of Appeals No. 273383.
S
AGINAW
I
NTERMEDIATE
S
CHOOL
D
ISTRICT V
C
OLEMAN
C
OMMUNITY
S
CHOOLS
,
No. 135555; Court of Appeals No. 270098.
C
ITY OF
S
OUTHFIELD V
C
OVENSKY
, No. 135556; Court of Appeals No.
273101.
T
YSON
F
OODS,
I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY
, No. 135557; reported
below: 276 Mich App 678.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
C
UNNINGHAM
, No. 135561; Court of Appeals No. 270990.
P
EOPLE V
O
LSEN
, No. 135563; Court of Appeals No. 271267.
P
EOPLE V
M
AJOR
, No. 135572; Court of Appeals No. 271902.
P
EOPLE V
C
AGE
, No. 135573; Court of Appeals No. 281572.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
J
OHNSON
, No. 135574; Court of Appeals No. 281163.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRENCE
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135575; Court of Appeals No.
266084.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1137
P
EOPLE V
P
AUL
M
AY
, No. 135583; Court of Appeals No. 272990.
P
EOPLE V
F
RAILEY
, No. 135584; Court of Appeals No. 272241.
P
EOPLE V
B
OWMAN
, No. 135585; Court of Appeals No. 270443.
P
EOPLE V
P
ASSAGE
, No. 135587; reported below: 277 Mich App 175.
P
EOPLE V
R
AUSCH
, No. 135590; Court of Appeals No. 281106.
P
EOPLE V
S
HANE
S
TEELE
, No. 135593; Court of Appeals No. 280399.
P
EOPLE V
D
ION
C
UNNINGHAM
, No. 135595; Court of Appeals No. 272545.
P
EOPLE V
M
ONTREY
D
AVIS
, No. 135599; Court of Appeals No. 281042.
P
EOPLE V
F
ELICIANO
, No. 135602; Court of Appeals No. 271085.
P
EOPLE V
D
ERRICK
C
LAYTON
, No. 135605; Court of Appeals No. 273056.
S
URMAN V
S
URMAN
, No. 135607; reported below: 277 Mich App 287.
B
OLOGNA V
P
EVARNEK
, No. 135608; Court of Appeals No. 267244.
P
EOPLE V
K
EVIN
B
OND
, No. 135609; Court of Appeals No. 270091.
P
EOPLE V
C
HAD
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135616; Court of Appeals No. 270729.
P
EOPLE V
B
OTELLO
, No. 135619; Court of Appeals No. 281394.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
DJ
AMES
, No. 135620; Court of Appeals No. 281639.
P
EOPLE V
D
ELEON
-P
UENTES
, No. 135622; Court of Appeals No. 281345.
P
EOPLE V
R
OUMMEL
I
NGRAM
, No. 135623; Court of Appeals No. 273086.
P
EOPLE V
W
HETSTONE
, No. 135625; Court of Appeals No. 271838.
P
EOPLE V
W
ILLIAM
T
AYLOR
, No. 135629; Court of Appeals No. 272401.
P
EOPLE V
J
ESSE
M
OORE,
J
R
, No. 135633; Court of Appeals No. 271037.
L
JULJDJURAJ V
C
ITY OF
S
TERLING
H
EIGHTS
, No. 135636; Court of Appeals
No. 275317.
P
EOPLE V
L
AWRENCE
B
AKER,
J
R.,
No. 135639; Court of Appeals No.
267241.
P
EOPLE V
S
EARIGHT
, No. 135641; Court of Appeals No. 281536.
P
EOPLE V
B
ARLOW
, No. 135643; Court of Appeals No. 272534.
A
LTON V
A
LTON
, No. 135644; Court of Appeals No. 267802.
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
S
ANDERS
, No. 135651; Court of Appeals No. 281314.
P
EOPLE V
J
ESSIE
G
ILBERT
, No. 135653; Court of Appeals No. 281109.
P
EOPLE V
D
EMOND
M
C
D
ONALD
, No. 135655; Court of Appeals No.
281749.
1138 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
S
AVOY
, No. 135659; Court of Appeals No. 269813.
P
EOPLE V
B
UCHAN
, No. 135660; Court of Appeals No. 273904.
P
EOPLE V
F
AIRLEY
, No. 135662; Court of Appeals No. 271965.
P
EOPLE V
S
PACHER
, No. 135665; Court of Appeals No. 273408.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARQUIS
J
ENKINS
, No. 135673; Court of Appeals No. 272217.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
M
ARTINDALE
, No. 135699; Court of Appeals No. 272086.
M
ULLINS V
S
TANFORD
, No. 135700; Court of Appeals No. 275340.
P
EOPLE V
M
ORRISON
, No. 135703; Court of Appeals No. 281985.
P
EOPLE V
P
ROFFITT
, No. 135720; Court of Appeals No. 265704.
Reconsideration Granted March 24, 2008:
In re P
ETITION OF
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER FOR
F
ORECLOSURE
(W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER V
W
ATSON
), No. 134608. On reconsideration, we modify
our order dated December 14, 2007. For the reasons stated in that order,
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Wayne Circuit Court’s
decision setting aside the foreclosure sale. But rather than reinstate the
circuit court’s order, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the remaining issues raised by the respondent in that
court but not addressed, in light of its prior disposition. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Summary Disposition entered at 480 Mich 981. Court of
Appeals No. 265426.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would deny leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in
my dissenting statement in this case, 480 Mich 981 (2007).
Reconsiderations Denied March 24, 2008:
D
ETROIT
B
UILDING
A
UTHORITY V
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
T
REASURER
, No. 129743.
Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich 897. Court of Appeals No.
253479.
F
IEGER V
C
OX
, Nos. 133961, 133962. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
874. Reported below: 274 Mich App 449.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I cannot participate in the reconsideration of the decision
regarding the motion for recusal, but reiterate my position as stated in
this Court’s September 14, 2007, order in this case, 480 Mich 874 (2007).
W
EAVER
, J. I dissent from the participation of Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and
Justices C
ORRIGAN
and Y
OUNG
for the reasons stated in my dissent from
the September 14, 2007, order in this case, 480 Mich 874 (2007).
K
ELLY
, J. I cannot participate in the reconsideration of the decision
regarding the motion for recusal, but reiterate my position as stated in
this Court’s September 14, 2007, order in this case, 480 Mich 874 (2007).
M
ARKMAN
, J. I will not participate in this case because it directly
pertains to the Attorney General’s investigation of petitioners’ financial
conduct undertaken in connection with my reelection campaign in 2004.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1139
P
EOPLE V
T
IMOTHY
M
OORE
, No. 134142. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 1036. Court of Appeals No. 267663.
A
USLANDER V
C
HERNICK
, No. 134147. Summary disposition entered at
480 Mich 910. Court of Appeals No. 274079.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant reconsideration and, on
reconsideration, would grant leave to appeal.
K
LOIAN V
V
AN
F
OSSEN
, No. 134321. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1003. Court of Appeals No. 262953.
P
EOPLE V
D
ICKSON
, No. 134386. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1003. Court of Appeals No. 272952.
P
EOPLE V
E
FFINGER
, No. 134410. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1003. Court of Appeals No. 275787.
L
EWIS V
B
RIDGMAN
P
UBLIC
S
CHOOLS
, No. 134631. Summary disposition
entered at 480 Mich 1000. Reported below: 275 Mich App 435.
P
EOPLE V
D
WAYNE
J
ONES
, No. 134695. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 1005. Court of Appeals No. 277504.
P
EOPLE V
A
MBROSE
, No. 134777. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1005. Court of Appeals No. 275571.
P
EOPLE V
S
WANSON
, No. 134919. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1008. Court of Appeals No. 270995.
P
EOPLE V
S
EID
, No. 134982. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 1009.
Court of Appeals No. 267900.
Summary Dispositions March 26, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
G
RISSOM
, No. 134733. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals is to
consider whether defendant has a reasonably likely chance of acquittal in
light of the newly discovered evidence and in light of the evidence
presented against defendant that did not involve the complainant’s
credibility. Court of Appeals No. 274148.
In re J
ACKSON
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
J
ACKSON
), No. 135918.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
vacate the November 21, 2007, and January 31, 2008, orders of the Court
of Appeals and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration of whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over
the respondent’s claim of appeal. On remand, the Court of Appeals shall
address the Macomb Circuit Court’s decision to mail notice of the
termination of the respondent’s parental rights and the advice of
appellate rights form to respondent’s attorney, rather than to respon-
dent, as required by MCR 3.977(I)(1). We do not retain jurisdiction. Court
of Appeals No. 281594.
1140 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
K
ELLY,
J. I would reverse and remand to reinstate the appeal because
MCR 3.997(I)(1) was violated.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 26, 2008:
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
RANSPORTATION V
S
EHN
F
AMILY
N
OVI
L
IMITED
P
ARTNER-
SHIP
, No. 134275; Court of Appeals No. 263934.
S
CHILS V
W
ASHTENAW
C
OUNTY
, No. 135089. As plaintiff Michael Schils
has repeatedly abused the court system, we direct the clerks of this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Washtenaw Circuit Court not to
accept any further filings in noncriminal matters arising from Schils’s
discharge from his employment with Washtenaw County unless he has
paid all necessary fees and submitted his filings in full compliance with
the court rules. Court of Appeals No. 277750.
P
EOPLE V
L
IGON
, No. 135114; Court of Appeals No. 267806.
C
AVANAGH,
J. I would grant leave to appeal.
K
ELLY,
J. I would grant leave to appeal regarding the accomplice
instruction issue, for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in
People v Young, 472 Mich 130, 144 (2005).
P
EOPLE V
O
DOM
, No. 135162; reported below: 276 Mich App 407.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
U
RSERY V
O
PTION
O
NE
M
ORTGAGE
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135164; Court of
Appeals No. 271560.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
D
E
L
EON
, No. 135234; Court of Appeals No. 269574.
P
EOPLE V
M
AC
L
EAN
, No. 135245; Court of Appeals No. 270525.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARTELL
, No. 135279; Court of Appeals No. 280902.
F
ORNER V
R
OBINSON
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 135306; Court of Appeals No.
269127.
M
ATHIS V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 135316; Court of Appeals
No. 277686.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
R
USHMORE
, No. 135317; Court of Appeals No. 269540.
P
EOPLE V
H
ATTER
, No. 135328; Court of Appeals No. 275944.
P
EOPLE V
W
ORDELL
, No. 135386; Court of Appeals No. 280683.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to decide
whether to grant, deny, or order other relief, in accordance with MCR
7.205(D)(2).
M
ULCAHY V
V
ERHINES
, No. 135510; reported below: 276 Mich App 693.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1141
Reconsideration Denied March 26, 2008:
M
C
E
LHANEY V
H
ARPER
-H
UTZEL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 130916. Leave to appeal
denied at 480 Mich 853. Reported below: 269 Mich App 488.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration.
Summary Disposition March 27, 2008:
C
EMETERY
C
OMMISSIONER V
A
LBION
M
EMORY
G
ARDENS
, No. 136037. Pur-
suant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse
the order of the Court of Appeals and we remand this case to the Court
of Appeals for entry of an order granting the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss
the claim of appeal. St. Augustine’s National Foundation has not shown
that it has standing to appeal the order entered in the circuit court
proceeding to which it was not a party. Court of Appeals No. 283984.
Summary Dispositions March 28, 2008:
M
ONA
S
HORES
B
OARD OF
E
DUCATION V
M
ONA
S
HORES
T
EACHERS
E
DUCATION
A
SSOCIATION,
MEA/NEA, No. 134350. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion
at pages 1-2. The plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory relief
concerning the validity of the early retirement provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement under the standards articulated in Nat’l Wildlife
Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 614-615 (2004), and
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America
Inc, 479 Mich 280, 295-296 (2007). We remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of the remaining issues raised by the plaintiffs
in that court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 271592.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring). I concur in the order reversing the Court of
Appeals judgment and remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the plaintiffs’ remaining issues, because I agree that the
plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory relief concerning the validity
of the early retirement provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
I write separately because I disagree with the application of the
majority of four’s (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,
and M
ARKMAN
) erroneously created standing test in Lee v Macomb Co Bd
of Comm’rs,
1
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,
2
Rohde
v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,
3
and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
1
Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001).
2
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608
(2004).
3
Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 479 Mich 336 (2007).
1142 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
v Nestlé Waters North America Inc.
4
In those cases, the majority of four
systematically dismantled Michigan’s standing law and replaced years of
precedent with its own test that denies Michigan citizens access to the
courts.
5
I would hold that the plaintiffs have standing under the pre-Lee
prudential test for standing because the plaintiffs have demonstrated
“that the plaintiff’s substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in
a manner different from the citizenry at large.” House Speaker v State
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554 (1993).
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal.
S
HEPHERD
M
ONTESSORI
C
ENTER
M
ILAN V
A
NN
A
RBOR
C
HARTER
T
OWNSHIP
.
Nos. 134739, 134978. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we vacate the May 22, 2007, judgment of the Court of
Appeals and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsid-
eration in light of Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v City of Jackson,
478 Mich 373 (2007). In particular, the Court of Appeals should recon-
sider whether the denial of the zoning variance imposed a “substantial
burden” on the plaintiff’s religious exercise, i.e., whether the denial of the
variance “coerce[s] individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs.” Id. at 401. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A
mere inconvenience or irritation” or “something that simply makes it
more difficult in some respect to practice one’s religion does not consti-
tute a ‘substantial burden.’ ” Id. In addition, we reverse the August 21,
2007, order of the Court of Appeals awarding plaintiff sanctions for a
vexatious motion for reconsideration. Given the facts and the law at issue
in this case, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in imposing such
sanctions. Reported below 275 Mich App 597.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would not remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration in light of Greater Bible Way Temple of
Jackson v City of Jackson,
1
for the reasons stated in my concurrence in
that case. Rather, I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether the
denial of a variance implicates the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act.
2
If it does, we should determine whether it imposes a
substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of its religious beliefs.
In re Z
IMMERMAN
(J
OHNSON V
B
YRON
), No. 135812. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate that portion of
the Court of Appeals judgment addressing “The Grant of Immediate
Custody to Byron [respondent],” and we remand this case to the Ottawa
4
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North
America Inc, 479 Mich 280 (2007).
5
See my opinions chronicling the majority of four’s assault on standing
in Lee, 464 Mich at 742; Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 651; Rohde, 479 Mich
at 366; and Michigan Citizens, 479 Mich at 310.
1
478 Mich 373 (2007).
2
42 USC 2000cc et seq.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1143
Circuit Court, Family Division. The Court of Appeals erred in reviewing
the circuit court’s order as one that gave respondent custody of the minor
child. Instead, the circuit court ruled that it was awarding “temporary
placement” of the child with respondent and further urged the parties to
act quickly to settle the custody issue. We affirm that ruling and direct
that court to resolve the custody dispute in an expeditious manner, if that
has not already occurred. In all other respects, the Court of Appeals
judgment is affirmed. 277 Mich App 470.
Leave to Appeal Denied March 28, 2008:
P
ULTE
L
AND
C
OMPANY,
LLCvA
LPINE
T
OWNSHIP,
No. 132315; Court of
Appeals No. 259759.
W
EAVER
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal to consider
whether there was a “taking” of property here and, if not, whether a
zoning referendum is properly reversed by a consent judgment entered
without the involvement of the local zoning commission.
Plaintiffs Margaret Brechting and Pulte Land Company entered into
a purchase agreement for property contingent on securing zoning for
residential development. Pulte applied to rezone the property, and the
township approved. However, a referendum to defeat the rezoning was
successful. Pulte then applied for a variance, which was denied, and
subsequently brought suit against the township.
The trial court approved a partial consent judgment in which the
township agreed not to oppose the relief sought by plaintiffs. The court
ruled that the agricultural zoning classification of the property consti-
tuted a “taking” and ordered a rezoning to residential development. The
Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued Septem-
ber 12, 2006 (Docket No. 259759), affirmed, but remanded for the trial
court to enjoin zoning enforcement rather than order rezoning. Judge
S
CHUETTE
in a concurrence raised concerns about the constitutionality of
employing a consent judgment to override the results of a referendum.
First, I would further consider whether the current zoning classifica-
tion constitutes a “taking.” Although plaintiff Brechting received no
offers from farmers to purchase the land, she never offered it for sale at
the market price for its classification. In addition, Pulte agreed to the
removal of the rezoning contingency from the purchase agreement with
knowledge of its current zoning status. In fact, Pulte signed the amended
purchase agreement without the zoning contingency, after the referen-
dum had defeated the rezoning, and after the township had denied a use
variance. The reasonableness of Pulte’s investment and financial expec-
tations is disputable. Moreover, the regulation applied over a large area of
land and hardly can be said to single out plaintiffs to “bear the burden for
thepublicgood....”K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental
Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 559 (2005).
If the zoning does not constitute a “taking,” the question becomes
whether the trial court overstepped its authority when it allowed the
township board to enter into a consent judgment that superseded the
1144 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
referendum. The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act, MCL 125.3101 et seq.
(formerly MCL 125.271 et seq. with regard to townships), provides for the
enactment and administration of zoning ordinances. The legislative body
of a local government, through the recommendations of its zoning
commission, has the authority to enact, amend, and enforce zoning
ordinances. MCL 125.3211; MCL 125.3305. There is nothing in the act
that clearly addresses whether a township board may unilaterally grant
relief from a zoning ordinance, in particular after the same relief has
earlier been reversed by referendum and a use variance has been denied.
An amendment of a zoning ordinance is made in the same manner as the
enactment of the original ordinance. MCL 125.3202. By entering the
consent judgment, the trial court arguably allowed the township board to
circumvent this statutory process.
The issue whether the trial court overstepped its authority in allowing
a consent judgment to be entered without the involvement of the local
zoning commission and to supersede a popular referendum raises an
important separation of powers issue. The issue whether the current
zoning classification constitutes a “taking” raises an equally important
question concerning the standards that Michigan courts are prepared to
apply in assessing seemingly ordinary local zoning decisions. For these
reasons, I would grant leave to appeal.
V
ORIS V
D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES
, No. 134465; Court of Appeals
No. 273255.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). This case has its genesis in the proceedings for
the termination of parental rights to Corbyn Voris. These proceedings
were initially filed against Corbyn’s biological parents, plaintiff Douglas
Voris and Heather Cooper. After it was determined that, at the time of
Corbyn’s birth, Heather had been married to another man, Justin
Cooper, the matter was amended to name Heather and Justin as the
parents.
Plaintiff attempted to intervene. To do so, he had to rebut the
presumption that Justin was the father. Plaintiff planned on rebutting
the presumption by eliciting from Heather testimony about their affair.
However, before the testimony could be taken, the prosecutor threatened
Heather with prosecution for adultery if she testified that she had had
sex with plaintiff while married to Justin. Accordingly, Heather invoked
her Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer plaintiff’s questions.
Plaintiff was unable to rebut the presumption. The court stated that, if
Heather had testified that plaintiff was Corbyn’s biological father,
plaintiff could have intervened.
After their parental rights to Corbyn were terminated, Heather and
Justin divorced. In the divorce case, Justin claimed that he was not
Corbyn’s father. The trial judge agreed and ruled accordingly.
Following the entry of the divorce judgment, plaintiff brought this
action under the Paternity Act
1
seeking a determination that he is
Corbyn’s father. Defendant Department of Human Services moved for
1
MCL 722.711 et seq.
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1145
summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff lacks standing. The trial
court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. While the appeal was
pending, the trial court granted summary disposition, ruling that plain-
tiff was Corbyn’s father. But, the Court of Appeals reversed that
determination, holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring the
paternity action. Plaintiff challenged that decision in this Court. A
majority of the Court has decided to deny leave to appeal.
I disagree with that decision. My reasoning is as follows: The
Paternity Act confers standing on the biological father of a child born out
of wedlock.
2
By statute, a child born out of wedlock is “a child begotten
and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the
date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be
a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that
marriage.”
3
Accordingly, a biological father has standing to establish the
paternity of a child born during a marriage where a prior determination
was made that the mother’s husband is not the father.
4
Here, there is no issue about whether plaintiff is the biological father
of Corbyn. But the Court of Appeals held that because plaintiff did not
rebut the presumption that Justin was Corbyn’s father in the termina-
tion proceedings, plaintiff cannot establish standing in the paternity
proceedings. This Court should grant leave to appeal to consider whether
the Court of Appeals made the correct decision.
No appeal was taken from the determination in the divorce proceed-
ing that plaintiff was Corbyn’s father. Hence, there was a prior court
determination that Justin is not the father. This is all that Michigan law
requires for plaintiff to establish standing under the Paternity Act. On
the other hand, in the divorce proceeding it was unnecessary for the court
to determine the identity of Corbyn’s father because Heather and
Justin’s parental rights had already been terminated. The court may not
have had jurisdiction to decide whether Justin was Corbyn’s father. I
would grant leave to appeal to fully consider the strong arguments on
both sides of this issue.
P
EOPLE V
G
ERMAIN
B
URNETT
, No. 134496. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 276407.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I join the order denying leave to appeal. I
write separately only to observe that the Attorney Grievance Commission
(AGC) may wish to investigate the conduct of defendant’s appellate counsel.
On August 4, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed defendant’s application
for leave to appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals noted on reconsidera-
tion that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file defen-
dant’s application. This finding by the Court of Appeals warrants AGC
scrutiny.
P
EOPLE V
C
ALBERT
, No. 134827; Court of Appeals No. 277832.
2
In re KH, 469 Mich 621, 631-632 (2004).
3
MCL 722.711(a).
4
In re KH, 469 Mich at 632.
1146 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). Defendant has shown that he delivered his
application for leave to appeal to the prison authorities for mailing on the
day before the deadline for filing in the Court of Appeals. The prison
authorities neglected to ensure that the Court of Appeals received it the
next day. The Court of Appeals deemed the appeal untimely and dis-
missed it. Without contest, it was because of his incarceration that
defendant was unable to ensure that the application was filed with the
Court of Appeals on time. Defendant complied with the court rules to the
best of his ability by placing the application in the hands of the prison
authorities before the time for appeal expired. For that reason, we should
determine that his application was timely filed and we should remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
W
ILSON V
E
LDON
LA
UCKER
A
SSOCIATES
, No. 135161. Costs of $250 are
assessed against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant under MCR
7.316(D)(1) for filing a vexatious appeal. The plaintiff is barred from
submitting additional filings in this Court until he offers proof that he has
paid any outstanding court-imposed sanctions. Court of Appeals No. 277274.
K
ELLY
, J. I would simply deny leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
A
PPENZELLER
, No. 135282; Court of Appeals No. 280851.
C
ORRIGAN,
J. (concurring). I join the order denying leave to appeal. I write
separately only to observe that the Attorney Grievance Commission and the
Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System may wish to investigate
defendant’s allegations in this case. In 2002, defense counsel was appointed
to represent defendant in his direct appeal. Defendant essentially alleges
that counsel abandoned him. He was unaware of counsel’s appointment;
counsel never contacted him, never pursued an appeal, and never sought to
withdraw as counsel. These allegations warrant scrutiny by the grievance
commission.
W
ILSON V
G
ENESEE
C
OUNTY
C
ONCEALED
W
EAPONS
B
OARD
, No. 135344.
Costs of $250 are assessed against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant
under MCR 7.316(D)(1) for filing a vexatious appeal. The plaintiff is barred
from submitting additional filings in this Court until he offers proof that he
has paid any outstanding court-imposed sanctions. Court of Appeals No.
281069.
K
ELLY
, J. I would simply deny leave to appeal.
Appeal Dismissed March 28, 2008:
B
ERMUDEZ V
C
APITAL
A
REA
T
RANSPORTATION
A
UTHORITY
, No. 134940. On
order of the Chief Justice, a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties
agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is
considered, and the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with
prejudice and without costs. Court of Appeals No. 276133.
Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for
Leave to Appeal April 2, 2008:
B
RACKETT V
F
OCUS
H
OPE
, No. 135375. We direct the clerk to schedule
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1147
oral argument on May 7, 2008, on whether to grant the application or
take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the
parties shall address whether plaintiff’s injury resulted from her willful
misconduct. MCL 418.305. The parties may file supplemental briefs no
later than April 29, 2008, but they should not submit mere restatements
of their application papers. Court of Appeals No. 274078.
P
EOPLE V
M
ERCER
, No. 135811. We direct the clerk to schedule oral
argument on May 7, 2008, on whether to grant the application or take
other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument the parties
shall address whether the constitutional due process standard for dis-
missal of a criminal prosecution based on prearrest delay requires a
showing by the criminal defendant of both (1) actual and substantial
prejudice due to the delay and (2) the intent by the prosecution to gain a
tactical advantage by means of the delay, and, if not, whether and how a
balancing test should be employed to consider these two factors. The
parties may file supplemental briefs no later than April 25, 2008, but they
should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae no
later than April 25, 2008. Other persons or groups interested in the
determination of the issue presented in this case may move the Court for
permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No. 281006.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 2, 2008:
S
TAPLETON V
S
TATE
F
ARM
M
UTUAL
A
UTOMOBILE
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No.
134782; Court of Appeals No. 273392.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENDRICK
R
OSS
, No. 135342; Court of Appeals No. 279291.
K
ELLY,
J. I would remand this case to the trial court for the appoint-
ment of counsel.
P
EOPLE V
E
LIZABETH
S
MITH
, No. 135407; Court of Appeals No. 281240.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
D
AVIS
, No. 135652; Court of Appeals No. 280882.
Summary Dispositions April 4, 2008:
In re K
ADZBAN
(P
EOPLE V
K
ADZBAN
), No. 134389. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the
Shiawassee County Probate Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973), to determine whether
the respondent’s appellate counsel, David Merchant and Michael Mad-
daloni, were ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the issue whether
the respondent’s conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct
was improper under People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 355 (2002). See
People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112 (2007). Although the decision in Cornell was
1148 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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issued on June 18, 2002, while the respondent’s appeal was pending in
the Court of Appeals, attorney merchant did not file a supplemental brief
on appeal and attorney Maddaloni failed to cite Cornell in defendant’s
application for leave to appeal in this Court. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
question presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 273558.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the order remanding this case
for an evidentiary hearing. I would deny the defendant’s application for
leave to appeal for the reasons stated in Justice C
ORRIGAN
’s and Justice
Y
OUNG
’s dissenting statements.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the order re-
manding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant’s
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue whether
defendant’s second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction was im-
proper under People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 355 (2002). I would deny
leave to appeal because defendant’s successive motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
Defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct for
digitally penetrating a four-year-old girl’s vagina. The trial court in-
structed the jury on the lesser offense of second-degree criminal sexual
assault (CSC II), and the jury found him guilty of that lesser offense. On
direct review, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, In re
Kadzban, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 22, 2002
(Docket No. 233391), and this Court denied leave to appeal. 468 Mich 926
(2003). Defendant filed two earlier motions for relief from judgment,
which the trial court denied. Defendant then filed the current motion for
relief from judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals
denied leave to appeal. In re Kadzban, unpublished order, entered May
18, 2007 (Docket No. 273558). Defendant now seeks leave to appeal to
this Court.
MCR 6.502(G) limits a defendant to one motion for relief from
judgment after August 1, 1995. The rule permits a subsequent motion
only where: (1) a retroactive change in law occurred after the first motion
for relief from judgment; or (2) a claim of new evidence was not
discovered before the first motion. MCR 6.502(G)(2).
This Court’s order remanding to the trial court to consider whether
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Cornell issue is
unwarranted because:
(1) Defendant has not raised this issue.
(2) Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a Cornell
issue given that Cornell did not address formally degreed lesser offenses
such as CSC II. It was not until People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112 (2007), that
this Court extended the Cornell holding to formally degreed lesser
offenses. Nyx was decided after defendant’s conviction became final and
thus does not apply retroactively in this collateral proceeding.
1
1
In Cornell, we limited the retroactive effect of our holding to cases
pending on appeal where the issue had been raised and preserved.
Cornell, supra at 367. No principled reason exists to accord a broader
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1149
(3) Even if Cornell had addressed formally degreed offenses, MCR
6.502(G)(2) would bar defendant’s successive motion because Cornell was
decided before defendant’s first motion for relief from judgment. MCR
6.502(G)(2) permits a successive motion only where the retroactive
change in law occurs after the first motion.
(4) Finally, defendant failed to raise the Cornell issue in his earlier
motions for relief from judgment. Thus, it was defendant’s own failure to
raise the issue in his first motion that has led to the application of MCR
6.502(G) barring his successive motion.
For these reasons, I would deny leave to appeal because MCR 6.502(G)
prohibits defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment.
Y
OUNG
,J.(dissenting). Because this motion is a successive motion for
relief from judgment, it is governed by MCR 6.502(G). That rule bars
successive motions for relief from judgment unless the motion qualifies
under MCR 6.502(G)(2). Under that subsection, “[a] defendant may file
a second or subsequent motion based on a retroactive change in law that
occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment or a claim of new
evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion.” MCR
6.502(G)(2). The majority has remanded for an evidentiary hearing under
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973), to determine whether respon-
dent’s appellate counsel was ineffective. I am uncertain how that hearing
will lead to information that will allow respondent to pursue a successive
motion for relief from judgment. Assuming that the court finds that
respondent’s appellate counsel was ineffective, which Justice C
ORRIGAN
correctly notes is highly unlikely, there is no reason why such ineffec-
tiveness could not have been discovered before respondent’s first motion
for relief from judgment. Therefore, the rule bars a successive motion for
relief from judgment based on the alleged ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel. Because respondent’s successive motion for relief from judgment
is barred by MCR 6.502, I would deny his application for leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARLOS
G
ONZALEZ
, No. 135133. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, vacate the defendant’s sentence for first-degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct, and remand this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for
resentencing under properly scored sentencing guidelines. People v
Kimble, 470 Mich 305 (2004); People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006). The
defendant should have been scored zero points for prior record variable 1
where there was no evidence to support a finding that he had been
convicted of one prior high-severity felony. In all other respects, leave to
appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No. 269631.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I would deny the defendant’s application for
leave to appeal because I am not persuaded that the decision of the Court
retroactive effect to Nyx than to Cornell itself, given that Nyx merely
applied the Cornell holding to formally degreed offenses. Thus, Nyx
cannot apply retroactively here because defendant’s conviction had
already become final when Nyx was decided.
1150 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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of Appeals was clearly erroneous or that defendant has suffered any
injustice in this case. Further, my reasons for a denial here are the same
as those stated in Justice C
ORRIGAN
’s dissenting statement in People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 93-95 (2006), which I joined.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(dissenting). I would deny defendant’s application for
leave to appeal. At sentencing, defendant did not challenge the court’s
determination that he had one prior conviction for a high-severity felony.
Rather, defense counsel specifically approved the court’s scoring deci-
sions and the resulting minimum guidelines range. On appeal, defendant
presents no evidence concerning the nature of the Texas conviction,
listed only as “assault threatening bodily injury,” or why that conviction
does not qualify as one for a high-severity felony. Further, if we accept
defendant’s belated, unsupported claim that he should not have received
25 points for prior record variable 1, his guidelines minimum-sentence
range changes only slightly, from 135-225 months to 126-210 months.
Significantly, his minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment falls
into the corrected, lower range. Accordingly, this case exemplifies the
waste of judicial resources occasioned by this Court’s opinion in People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006), which requires resentencing whenever
correction of a scoring error changes the guidelines minimum-sentence
range, even if the defendant’s minimum sentence falls into the corrected
range. I reiterate my dissenting position in Francisco, supra at 93-95,
that a remand is not required by MCL 769.34(10) under these circum-
stances.
In re K
YLE
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
K
YLE
), No. 135465.
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the
Wayne Circuit Court, Family Division, for a trial on the petition pursuant
to MCR 3.972 and MCL 712A.17. The circuit court is permitted to
conduct a “preliminary inquiry” off the record “[w]hen a petition is not
accompanied by a request for placement of the child and the child is not
in temporary custody.” MCR 3.962(A). The permissible actions following
a preliminary inquiry are limited to granting or denying authorization to
file the petition, or referring the matter to “alternative services.” See
MCR 3.962(B)(1)-(3). Granting permission to file the petition is merely a
determination that the petition is sufficient to be “delivered to, and
accepted by, the clerk of the court.” See MCR 3.903(A)(20) (defining
“Petition authorized to be filed”) and MCR 3.903(A)(9) (defining when a
petition is deemed “filed”). Referring the matter to “alternative services”
does not include granting the only relief sought by the petition. Although
the Court of Appeals was aware that a medical examination “was the sole
focus of the petition and the only demand sought by petitioner,” it
concluded that the circuit court was in “compliance” with MCR
3.962(B)(2) and (3) when it ordered the medical examination without a
trial on the petition. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
preliminary inquiry procedure provided authority for granting the relief
sought by the petition without a trial pursuant to MCR 3.972 and MCL
712A.17. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of Court of Appeals and
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1151
remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court, Family Division, for further
proceedings consistent with this order. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals No. 271320.
C
AVANAGH
,J
.
I would deny leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
J
ERRY
M
OORE
, No. 135576. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse that part the judgment of the
Court of Appeals finding insufficient evidence that the defendant pos-
sessed a firearm and overturning his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. The jury could reasonably infer that the
defendant exercised control over the firearm by eluding the police until
his passenger could dispose of the firearm. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464
(1989). We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order, including consideration of
other issues raised by the defendant in his appeal of right. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the
remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Court of
Appeals No. 271928.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with
the majority’s decision to reinstate defendant’s conviction of being a felon
in possession of a firearm on the basis that the evidence was sufficient
that defendant possessed a firearm. I dissent, however, from the majori-
ty’s decision to deny the part of the prosecution’s application for leave to
appeal arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case for
resentencing.
Defendant was convicted of third-degree fleeing and eluding a police
officer and felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the trial court
incorrectly stated that it had the power to impose consecutive sentences.
Defendant did not object to this statement. Despite the trial court’s
statement, it nonetheless imposed concurrent sentences that were within
the sentencing guidelines range. The Court of Appeals held that defen-
dant was entitled to resentencing because his sentence was based on
inaccurate information (i.e., the trial court’s mere belief that it could
impose consecutive sentences). This case truly presents a textbook
example of harmless error.
In my opinion, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that defendant
was entitled to resentencing because of inaccurate information. If a
sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range (as defendant’s was),
a defendant is precluded from raising on appeal an issue challenging the
accuracy of the information relied upon in sentencing unless the issue
was raised at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a
proper motion to remand. MCL 769.34(10)
1
; People v Francisco, 474 Mich
82, 88-89 (2006), citing People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311 (2004). If
1
MCL 769.34(10) provides:
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines
sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and
shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the
1152 480 M
ICHIGAN
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the sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range and the defendant
failed to previously raise the sentencing error, “the defendant cannot raise
the error on appeal except where otherwise appropriate, as in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Francisco, supra at 90 n 8.
Defendant does not dispute that the trial court sentenced defendant
within the appropriate guidelines range. Therefore, under MCL 769.34(10),
defendant could argue on appeal that his sentence was based on inaccurate
information only if he properly preserved the issue by raising the issue at
sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to
remand filed in the Court of Appeals. Defendant failed to take the statutorily
required steps to preserve this issue. Defendant did not object at sentencing
to the trial court’s statement that he was subject to consecutive sentencing.
Although defendant raised the issue in a motion for resentencing
2
in the
trial court and a motion to remand in the Court of Appeals, both motions
were late. See MCR 6.429(B)(2).
3
In fact, defendant filed these motions
after he filed his claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals. Because the
motions were untimely, defendant did not preserve the issue by raising it
in a proper motion for resentencing or a proper motion to remand. See
People v Walker, 428 Mich 261, 266 (1987) (to preserve a scoring issue for
appeal, a defendant’s motion to remand in the Court of Appeals must be
timely). Thus, defendant is precluded under MCL 769.34(10) from
challenging the accuracy of the information relied on in imposing his
sentence.
4
I would reverse the Court of Appeals holding that defendant is
entitled to resentencing.
K
ELLY
, J., would deny leave to appeal.
sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in
determining the defendant’s sentence. A party shall not raise on
appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guide-
lines or challenging the accuracy of information relied upon in
determining a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines
sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at sentencing,
in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to
remand filed in the court of appeals. [Emphasis added.]
2
Defendant actually wrote the trial judge a letter, but the trial court
treated the letter as a motion to correct the presentence investigation report.
3
MCR 6.429(B)(2) provides, “If a claim of appeal has been filed, a
motion to correct an invalid sentence may only be filed in accordance
with the procedure set forth in MCR 7.208(B) or the remand procedure
set forth in MCR 7.211(C)(1).” Both defendant’s motion for resentencing
and motion for remand were late under MCR 6.429(B)(2).
4
This case is distinguishable from Francisco.InFrancisco, supra at 89,
this Court considered the defendant’s challenge to the offense variables
because the defendant preserved the issue at sentencing. In the instant case,
defendant did not preserve the sentencing issue. Further, in Francisco, this
Court remanded for resentencing because the trial court’s scoring error
affected the guidelines range. In the instant case, the trial court’s erroneous
belief that defendant was subject to consecutive sentencing did not affect the
guidelines range.
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Leave to Appeal Denied April 4, 2008:
In re S
TIENKE
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
D
ELANO
), Nos. 136046,
136047. Court of Appeals Nos. 279185, 279212.
Summary Dispositions April 9, 2008:
G
EE V
A
RTHUR
BM
YR
I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC
, No. 133762. On January 9, 2008,
the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the
March 15, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals that res
judicata did not bar the plaintiff’s second application for attendant care
benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) de-
nied the plaintiff’s initial claim because the plaintiff failed to present proof
on a required element of that claim. This decision of the WCAC became a
final order. In his second application, the plaintiff did not claim and the
WCAC did not find that the plaintiff’s condition had changed for the worse.
As a result, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the plaintiff’s
claim of attendant care benefits “was not an issue that was, or even could
have been adjudicated in the initial proceeding.” In addition, the Court of
Appeals erred by concluding that this case is governed by Ivezaj v Federal
Mogul (On Remand), 197 Mich App 462 (1992). The record shows that the
award of attendant care benefits was based on an application by the plaintiff
and not the providers of care. First, the record shows that although the care
providers filed their applications 11 days before the hearing on the plaintiff’s
second application, defendant was not served with the care providers-
applications until November 18, 2003, two months after the magistrate’s
decision was mailed on September 11, 2003. Second, the magistrate’s award
was made retroactive to one year before plaintiff’s application was filed, not
one year before the care providers’ applications were filed. See MCL
418.381(3). And third, none of the case captions in the lower courts have
listed the care providers as parties, and the care providers did not testify at
the hearing on the plaintiff’s second application. As a result, the plaintiff’s
second claim is barred by res judicata. Court of Appeals No. 269351.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal and dissent from
the peremptory order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, Gee v Arthur B. Myr
Industries, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 15, 2007
(Docket No. 269351):
This case comes to this Court on remand from our Supreme
Court. Defendant appeals an April 12, 2005, order of the W orker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission (“WCAC”) that affirmed a
magistrate’s award of attendant care benefits. We affirm. This appeal
is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The WCAC summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
“Plaintiff initially injured his low back in the course of his
employment with defendant on August 10, 1992. Benefits for that
injury were paid voluntarily. Plaintiff filed an Application for Media-
tion or Hearing with the Bureau on March 27, 2000, claiming that he
1154 480 M
ICHIGAN
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was totally and permanently disabled due to the residuals of the low
back injury. By decision mailed July 9, 2001, Magistrate Barney found
an injury date of August 10, 1992, ongoing disability resulting
therefrom, further finding reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) to be
related to the 8/10/92 injury and awarded total and permanent
disability benefits (T&P). The magistrate also ordered ‘reasonable
medical treatment related to plaintiff’s injury.’ T estimony on this
issue of attendant care was taken at that time. However, the magis-
trate made no specific findings pertaining to attendant care.
“Both parties appealed the magistrate’s July 9, 2001 decision to
the Commission. The main issue of that appeal was attendant care.
Then-Commissioner Pryzbylo framed the arguments raised by the
parties thusly:
‘Plaintiff and defendant appeal the decision of Magistrate
Michael Barney, mailed July 9, 2001, granting plaintiff total and
permanent disability benefits for his various conditions. Both parties
present issues related to attendant care benefits. Plaintiff argues that
the magistrate erred when he failed to include a ruling on plaintiff’s
request for attendant care benefits. To rectify the alleged error,
plaintiff requests a remand that includes the opportunity to present
further proof on the issue. Defendant responds arguing that plaintiff
failed to enter any proofs of an appropriate rate for attendant care
and that the magistrate properly refused to order benefits because of
that failure.’
“Noting that the magistrate ‘did not directly rule on plaintiff’s
request for attendant care benefits,’ the Commission provided the
following rationale defending the magistrate’s treatment of this
issue:
‘We find no error in the magistrate’s procedure. Section 315
requires plaintiff to prove the reasonableness of any medical expense.
Reasonableness includes an evaluation of the dollar amount involved.
As the magistrate noted, plaintiff provided no proof of the cost.
Without that proof, the magistrate properly excluded attendant care
benefits. Recognizing his failure in proving the reasonableness of the
attendant care, plaintiff requests a remand that allows him to enter
the necessary proofs. Such remand would improperly advantage
plaintiff and disadvantage defendant. We cannot ignore the legal
consequence of plaintiff resting on his proofs at the conclusion of all
hearings.’
“Both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s
subsequent Applications for leave to appeal the Commission’s opin-
ion. [Gee v Arthur B. Myr Industries, Inc, 2005 Mich ACO 101, p 2-3
(footnotes omitted).]”
Subsequently, plaintiff, his wife, and his mother filed applications
seeking attendant care benefits. At a hearing on those applications,
plaintiff presented the testimony of a registered nurse who opined
that plaintiff needed 56 hours of attendant care per week to assist
with bathing, grooming, meal preparation, and mobility. Plaintiff
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testified that his condition had progressively deteriorated since the
initial proceedings, and that he spent virtually all of his time in the
house, and 90% of that time in his bed, due to a lack of mobility.
Plaintiff indicated that he did not want strangers in his home, and
requested that the care his mother, wife, and daughter provided be
recognized as compensable attendant care. Defendant presented the
testimony of a registered nurse who opined that plaintiff was in need
of attendant care services, but not necessarily for eight hours per day.
The magistrate concluded that, contrary to defendant’s conten-
tion, the applications for attendant care benefits were not barred by
res judicata. On the res judicata issue, the magistrate considered
Barnowsky v General Motors Corp, unpublished opinion per curiam
of the Court of Appeals, issued December 21, 2001 (Docket No.
231169), to be “instructive,” and Ivezaj v Federal Mogul Corporation
(On Remand), 197 Mich App 462, 464; 495 NW2d 800 (1992), to be
“controlling.” The magistrate concluded that plaintiff was entitled to
attendant care benefits.
Defendant appealed the magistrate’s award of attendant care
benefits to the WCAC , and argued that the petitions for attendant
care benefits were barred by res judicata. The WCAC disagreed and
concluded that the magistrate’s analysis and conclusions were proper.
Defendant sought leave to appeal to this Court, raising, among
other things, a res judicata issue. Defendant’s application for leave to
appeal was denied for lack of merit in the grounds presented.
1
Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal to our
Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court issued the following order:
“[P]ursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration,
as on leave granted, of whether the current claim for attendant care
benefits under MCL 418.315(1) is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we
are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court. [Gee v Arthur B Myr Industries, Inc., 474
Mich 1098; 711 NW2d 75 (2006).]”
The issue of whether res judicata is applicable is a question of law
that we review de novo. See Banks v LAB Lansing Body Assembly,
271 Mich App 227, 229; 720 NW2d 756 (2006). In Banks, supra at
229-230, this Court discussed res judicata as it applied to worker’s
compensation cases:
“The doctrine of res judicata applies to workers’ compensation
awards, because requiring the worker to ‘present all of his available
claims in a single proceeding is consistent with this purpose of
adjudicating the worker’s needs.’ Gose v Monroe Auto Equip Co, 409
Mich 147, 162; 294 NW2d 165 (1980). A workers’ compensation
award is generally considered an adjudication of the injured worker’s
condition at the time it is entered, and it is ‘ “conclusive of all matters
adjudicable at that time....”’Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393
Mich 368, 375-376; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), quoting 58 Am Jur,
1156 480 M
ICHIGAN
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Workmen’s Compensation, § 508. However, a claimant may later
raise a different claim or modify an existing award if the employee’s
physical condition worsens. Hlady, supra at 376. These rules presup-
pose that some claims, although originating before the final award,
are not ‘adjudicable’ or ‘available’ to the litigant in one, initial
adjudication.”
We find no error warranting reversal. First, as noted by the
magistrate and the WCAC, this Court has recognized that where a
family member of an injured employee files a claim for reimburse-
ment for nursing services provided to the injured employee in his or
her own name, and not as a subrogee of the injured employee, res
judicata is inapplicable. Ivezaj, supra at 464. In this case, plaintiff’s
wife and mother each filed her own application for attendant care
benefits. As a result, under Ivezaj, supra, we find no legal error in the
WCAC’s conclusion that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable
to the magistrate’s granting of payment for attendant care to
plaintiff’s wife and mother.
Furthermore, the holding in Ivezaj, supra, notwithstanding, we
find res judicata to be inapplicable because there has been a change in
plaintiff’s condition since the initial proceedings. As noted in Banks,
supra, a claimant may later raise a different claim or modify an
existing award if the employee’s physical condition worsens. This is
consistent with the general principle that res judicata is not a bar to
a subsequent action where facts change or new facts develop. See In
re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich App 505, 519; 571 NW2d 750
(1997), overruled in part on other grounds, 462 Mich 341 (2000).
Here, plaintiff testified that his condition had worsened since 2001,
and that was less able to care for himself than he was the last time he
testified. Therefore, due to a change in facts, specifically the worsen-
ing of plaintiff’s condition, the issue of plaintiff’s current need for
attendant care was not an issue that was, or even could have been,
adjudicated in the initial proceedings.
2
Affirmed.
1
Gee v Arthur B. Myr Industries, Inc, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered August 29, 2005 (Docket No. 262691).
2
Defendant claims that the magistrate and the WCAC erred in
relying upon Barnowsky, supra. However, because we find res
judicata to be inapplicable notwithstanding Barnowsky, supra,we
need not address this claim.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). The workers’ compensation magistrate found
that the award was based on the applications for attendant-care benefits
filed by plaintiff’s wife and mother. Not until it applied for leave in this Court
did defendant argue that the magistrate erroneously relied on these appli-
cations. Therefore, I would not reverse on this basis. I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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1157
P
EOPLE V
A
NTOINE
T
HOMAS
, No. 135195. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals and direct that court to decide whether to grant, deny, or order other
relief in accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). In its August 21, 2007, order, the
Court of Appeals “assume[ed]” that defendant’s motion for resentencing
was timely, in part, because the motion “was filed within 12 months of the
last counsel’s appointment.” Thus, the court appears to have restarted the
12-month period prescribed by MCR 7.205(F)(3) from the date of appoint-
ment in light of defendant’s otherwise untimely request for counsel under
Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605 (2005); the court similarly restarted the
12-month period from the date of appointment in Halbert. P eople v Halbert,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued August 31, 2005 (Docket
No. 244756) (granting a period of 12 months from the date of appointment
“for filing any appropriate motions in the trial court or for filing an
application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals”). Appellate counsel
filed both the motion for resentencing and an application for late appeal
within the 12-month period. Accordingly, counsel did not need to adhere to
the requirements of MCR 7.205(F)(4), which outlines exceptions to subrule
F(3) that extend the 12-month period for late appeal under certain circum-
stances. Because MCR 7.205(F)(4) was inapplicable in this case, the Court of
Appeals erred by dismissing defendant’s application for failure to meet the
requirements of this rule. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of Appeals No.
279702.
G
REENWALD V
G
REENWALD,
No. 135299. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in
part and remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for further
proceedings consistent with this order. In addition to the factual issue
identified by the Court of Appeals regarding the wrongful conduct doctrine,
an issue of material fact exists regarding whether defendant’s contact with
UBS Financial Services, Inc., was justified. This Court has held that “the
intentional and knowing inducement of a party to break his contract with
another party is a wrongful act, and actionable as such, unless reasonable
justification or excuse can be shown.” Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery, 365
Mich 415, 422 (1961) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that defendant’s contact with UBS was per se wrongful. The Court
of Appeals defined per se wrongful as “an act that is inherently wrongful or
one that is never justified under any circumstances.” Formall v Comm Nat’l
Bank, 166 Mich App 772, 780 (1988). This Court has explained that “[n]o
categorical answer can be made to the question of what will constitute
justification, and it is usually held that this question is one for the jury.”
Wilkinson v Powe, 300 Mich 275, 283 (1942), citing cases cited in 84 ALR 43,
81. Justification exists where the defendant acted on an “equal or superior
right.” See 84 ALR 43, 80; Feldman v Green, 138 Mich App 360, 378 (1984);
see also Wilkinson, supra at 283 (using “superior or absolute” right). A
question of material fact exists regarding whether defendant was justified in
contacting UBS and informing it of plaintiff’s alleged fraudulent conduct to
protect her own legal interests and/or to avoid or remedy harm to UBS.
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals judgment
holding that defendant’s conduct was per se wrongful and remand this
matter to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with
this order and with the remainder of the Court of Appeals opinion. In all
other respects, leave to appeal is denied. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court
of Appeals No. 265814.
1158 480 M
ICHIGAN
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Affirmance April 9, 2008:
B
RAVERMAN V
G
ARDEN
C
ITY
H
OSPITAL
, Nos. 134445, 134446. By order of
September 26, 2007, we granted leave to appeal the June 5, 2007,
judgment of the Court of Appeals conflict panel. Having considered the
briefs and having heard oral arguments on January 8, 2008, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals conflict panel. Plaintiff initially
contends that Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 480 Mich 948 (2007),
saves her complaint. Mullins, however, does not apply to this case
because the saving period did not expire “between the date that Omelen-
chuk [v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567 (2000)] was decided and within 182
days after Waltz [v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004)] was decided.” Mullins,
supra at 948. Nevertheless, plaintiff’s complaint, filed by the successor
personal representative within two years of his appointment, was timely
under Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29
(2003).
1
Moreover, plaintiff, as successor personal representative, may
rely on the notice of intent filed by the previous personal representative
because the office of personal representative is a “person” under MCL
600.2912b. Res judicata does not bar plaintiff’s complaint because no
lawsuit filed prior to the present case was dismissed with prejudice.
Moreover, the subsequent lawsuit was dismissed solely because the
present lawsuit was pending. Washington v Sinai Hosp, 478 Mich 412
(2007). 275 Mich App 705.
Reconsideration Denied April 9, 2008:
R
ODRIGUEZ V
ASE I
NDUSTRIES,
I
NC
, No. 133686. Leave to appeal denied
at 480 Mich 1108. Reported below: 275 Mich App 8.
C
AVANAGH
, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with
counsel of record.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 9, 2008:
M
ATHER
I
NVESTORS,
LLC v L
ARSON
, No. 131654. On order of the Court,
leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of
1
Defendants argue that Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56 (1997),
should apply. However, Lindsey relied on the Revised Probate Code, and
in particular on then-current MCL 700.179, which indicated that a
temporary personal representative who was reappointed personal repre-
sentative “shall be accountable as though he were the personal represen-
tative from the date of appointment as temporary personal representa-
tive.” Lindsey, supra at 66. After Lindsey was decided, the Revised
Probate Code was repealed and replaced by the Estates and Protected
Individuals Code. MCL 700.8102(c). The Estates and Protected Individu-
als Code does not contain a provision similar to MCL 700.179. Therefore,
the holding of Lindsey, which relied on this statutory provision, no longer
controls.
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1159
the parties having been considered by the Court, we vacate our order of
June 1, 2007. The application for leave to appeal the June 6, 2006,
judgment of the Court of Appeals is denied, because we are no longer
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Reported below: 271 Mich App 254.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting).I respectfully dissent. The deceased debtor,
Alice Maddock, owed approximately $53,000 for nursing services rendered
at plaintiff’s nursing home. While incurring this debt, Maddock transferred
approximately $63,000 worth of real estate assets and bank-account funds to
defendant, Maddock’s nephew, for no consideration, thereby leaving Mad-
dock unable to pay her bills. Plaintiff filed suit against the nephew, but failed
to join the deceased debtor’s estate, which had never been opened. The
central issue in this case is whether a plaintiff creditor seeking to recover for
a fraudulent transfer of assets must join the debtor as a defendant, or
whether the creditor may file suit solely against the transferee. In my
judgment, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), MCL 566.31 et
seq., does not require a creditor to join the debtor in a suit filed against the
transferee of a fraudulently transferred asset. Hence, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the debtor’s estate was a necessary
party. For these reasons, I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Under UFTA, a creditor must establish that “[a] transfer made...bya
debtor is fraudulent.” MCL 566.34(1). A “debtor” is “a person who is liable
on a claim.” MCL 566.31(f) (emphasis added). We have stated that “one
becomes liable for the payment of services once those services have been
rendered.” Community Resource Consultants v Progressive Michigan Ins
Co, 480 Mich 1097, 1098 (2008). Here, because Maddock incurred $53,000 in
costs for services at plaintiff’s nursing home, Maddock was “liable” for those
services, and hence Maddock qualifies as a “debtor” under UFTA.
Having established that Maddock is a “debtor,” I next consider MCL
566.38(2), which indicates against whom a judgment under UFTA may be
rendered:
[T]o the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor
under [MCL 566.37(1)(a)], the creditor may recover a judgment for
the value of the asset transferred...ortheamount necessary to
satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less. The judgment may
be entered against either of the following:
(a) The first transferee of the asset or the person for whose
benefit the transfer was made.
(b) Any subsequent transferee other than a good-faith trans-
feree who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
MCL 566.38(2)(a) thus indicates that a creditor may pursue an action under
UFTA solely against the “first transferee” of the asset. Moreover, MCL
566.31(c) defines the term “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not
the right is reduced to judgment...disputed [or] undisputed....”Be-
cause a creditor may, before the right to payment is reduced to judgment, sue
the transferee alone, these statutes indicate that a debtor is not a necessary
party in a UFT A action.
1160 480 M
ICHIGAN
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This conclusion is bolstered by MCL 566.37, which states:
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under
this act, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section 8, may
obtain 1 or more of the following:
(a) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary
to satisfy the creditor’s claim.
(b) An attachment against the asset transferred or other property
of the transferee to the extent authorized under section 4001 of the
revised judicature act of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.4001, and
applicable court rules.
(c) Subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance
with applicable court rules and statutes, 1 or more of the following:
(i) An injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property.
(ii) Appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset trans-
ferred or of other property of the transferee.
(iii) Any other relief the court determines appropriate.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the
debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the
asset transferred or its proceeds.
MCL 566.37(1) lays out the general relief that any party seeking relief under
UFTA may obtain: for example, an avoidance of the transfer, an attachment,
an injunction, or the appointment of a receiver. MCL 566.37(2) then
establishes specific relief that is only available “[i]f a creditor has obtained a
judgment on a claim against the debtor....”This phrase indicates that
the relief available under MCL 566.37(1) may be granted in the absence of
a judgment against the debtor. Once a judgment against the debtor is
secured, the creditor may then obtain the further relief of execution on the
assets. Thus, the relief available under UFT A further evidences that a
debtor is not a necessary party to a UFT A action.
The effect of the Court of Appeals decision will be to impose an
unwarranted burden on creditors who are attempting to collect legiti-
mate business debts. Given the fungibility of assets in modern commerce,
the Legislature could have reasonably chosen to loosen the requirements
for a creditor’s suit when a debtor’s assets have been fraudulently
transferred. Thus, UFTA permits a creditor who believes that a fraudu-
lent transfer has taken place to quickly obtain an attachment on the
fraudulently transferred assets, before the transferee can dispose of the
assets and further hamper the creditor’s efforts to recover. Such a
creditor may then subsequently bring a second action against the debtor
on the underlying liability in order to obtain execution on the assets
under MCL 566.37(2). This system is not overly burdensome on trans-
ferees, because if a creditor obtains an attachment under UFTA, but is
unable to subsequently secure a judgment against the debtor, the
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transferee may petition the trial court to void the attachment. Although
this system may permit a creditor to cloud a transferee’s title for some
time, such an allocation of burdens is within the purview of the
Legislature. Because the Legislature chose to allow a creditor to file a
UFTA suit solely against a transferee, the duty of this Court lies in
enforcing that legislative decision.
In my judgment, the relevant statutes clearly indicate that a debtor is
not a necessary party to a UFTA action. Accordingly, I would reverse the
contrary holding of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
P
EOPLE V
L
ANCE
H
OPKINS
, No. 134953; Court of Appeals No. 279281.
J
OHNSON V
S
MITH
, No. 135418; Court of Appeals No. 270906.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
S
EVERE
, No. 135580; Court of Appeals No. 270913.
K
ELLY
, J. I would remand this case for a hearing pursuant to People v
Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973).
Summary Dispositions April 11, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
M
C
D
ANIEL,
No. 132805. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and we remand this case to the Oakland Circuit Court. The defendant began
serving his sentence in this case no later than the date of his original
sentencing proceeding on September 26, 2003. That sentence was later
vacated as an unwarranted departure from the statutory sentencing guide-
lines. As a result, the court was required to grant the defendant credit for
time served on the void sentence the defendant was serving while his appeal
was pending, i.e., for time served between the date of the original sentencing
and the date of the resentencing. MCL 769.11a; MCL 769.34(12). On
remand, the circuit court shall determine the appropriate amount of credit
due and amend the defendant’s judgment of sentence to reflect the proper
amount of credit for time served. We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 264706.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I would grant
leave to appeal in this case. Defendant is clearly entitled to the relief
available under MCL 769.11a and MCL 769.34(12). However, I believe this
Court should address the broader sentencing questions raised in cases like
this one involving prisoners who have committed a felony while on parole.
The parole board has failed to determine how much of the remaining portion
of the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense must be
served by such a defendant. Justice M
ARKMAN
and I explained in People v
Wright
1
and People v Conway
2
that this leads to arbitrary and inconsis
1
People v Wright, 474 Mich 1138 (2006).
2
People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
1162 480 M
ICHIGAN
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tent results. These issues are complicated, and confusion about them
abounds among judges and members of the bar alike. We should take the
opportunity presented here to explore these issues.
O
RAM V
O
RAM
, No. 134670. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we reverse part III of the Court of Appeals
judgment. “[D]ismissal of a case for failure to comply with the court’s
orders is...reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Maldonado v Ford
Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 (2006). Such an abuse occurs “when the
decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of principled
outcomes.” Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158 (2007). The plaintiff
demonstrated that his attorney was unable to proceed to trial due to
illness and that the circuit court’s law clerk indicated to the attorney’s
doctor that the doctor’s presence at the November 17, 2005, hearing was
not required. In light of these facts, we conclude that dismissal of the
plaintiff’s case based on the doctor’s failure to appear at the November
17, 2005, hearing was “outside the range of principled outcomes.” We also
reverse part VIII of the Court of Appeals judgment. Case evaluation
sanctions were not properly entered because the dismissal order was not
a “verdict” as defined by MCR 2.403(O)(4). We remand this case to the
Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
order. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by
this Court. Court of Appeals No. 267077.
W
EAVER
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the
reversal of part VIII of the Court of Appeals judgment. I dissent from the
reversal of part III of the Court of Appeals judgment for the reasons
stated by the Court of Appeals in part III of its opinion.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in
the reversal of part VIII of the Court of Appeals judgment because the
dismissal order was not a “verdict” as defined in MCR 2.403(O)(4). I
dissent from the reversal of part III of the Court of Appeals judgment. I
would not overturn the Court of Appeals conclusion that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case where (1) plaintiff’s
counsel was unprepared for trial after numerous previous adjournments,
(2) counsel failed to comply with the court’s direct order to produce his
doctor to testify regarding counsel’s alleged incapacity, and (3) the
litigation had already been significantly delayed.
Trial courts possess inherent authority to sanction litigants and their
attorneys, including the power to dismiss a case. “This power is not
governed so much by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested
in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich
372, 376 (2006). Moreover, MCL 600.611 grants circuit courts “jurisdic-
tion and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit
courts’ jurisdiction and judgments,” and MCR 2.504(B)(1) provides that
if a plaintiff fails to comply with court rules or a court order, a defendant
may move to dismiss the action.
A court’s decision to dismiss a case is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Maldonado, supra at 388. Such an abuse occurs “when the
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1163
decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of principled
outcomes.” Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158 (2007).
In Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 506 (1995), the Court of
Appeals held that, before dismissing a case, a trial court must “carefully
evaluate all available options on the record and conclude that the
sanction of dismissal is just and proper.” Under Vicencio, a court must
evaluate (1) whether the violation was willful or accidental; (2) the
party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the
prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of
deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the
court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser
sanction would better serve the interests of justice. Id. at 507.
I find no basis for Vicencio’s qualifications on a court’s authority to
dismiss a case.
1
In any event, the Court of Appeals here adequately
articulated why the dismissal fell within the range of principled out-
comes:
We acknowledge that the trial court did not specifically exam-
ine each of [the Vicencio] factors on the record. Nevertheless, in
light of the unique facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the
court abused its discretion in failing to do so. At the time of
dismissal, there already existed a substantial history of deliberate
delay. As noted, the parties had sought to adjourn the trial date
numerous times, and it appears after a thorough review of the
record that plaintiff was attempting to intentionally stall the
proceedings so that he could gain certain advantages by driving up
fees and interest. Moreover, plaintiff had already shown a pattern
of failing to comply with court orders, most markedly by refusing
to cooperate with the receiver and by continuing to seek vexing
and increasingly cumulative discovery. Indeed, trial had been
adjourned so many times that it seemed the parties no longer
wanted to continue with this action. They had effectively fallen
into a holding pattern, and little was accomplished in terms of
actual litigation for months at a time. Any sanction less than
dismissal would not have been useful, merely prolonging the
sluggish evolution of this case and allowing the costs of litigation
to mount. Finally, we cannot omit mention of the fact that the trial
court gave plaintiff a second chance in this matter. The order of
dismissal was not issued when plaintiff’s counsel first failed to
appear on November 15, 2005, but only after plaintiff violated the
trial court’s second order by failing to proceed with trial on
1
This Court’s order does not cite or apply Vicencio. In an appropriate
case, we should consider whether to accept or reject the Vicencio
requirements.
1164 480 M
ICHIGAN
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November 17, 2005. [Oram v Oram, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 22, 2007 (Docket No.
267077), slip op at 12.]
I would not upset the Court of Appeals conclusion that the dismissal fell
within the range of principled outcomes. After an already significant history
of delay in this case, counsel failed to appear for trial and then passed on
another opportunity two days later to either (1) try the case or (2) present
his doctor to testify regarding his medical condition. Counsel instead came to
court (1) unprepared to try the case and (2) without his doctor. On these
facts, the dismissal fell within the range of principled outcomes.
It was not until after the dismissal, and on motion for reconsideration,
that counsel’s doctor provided a sworn statement that the court’s law
clerk had orally promised to call him if he needed to appear on the second
trial date. Even accepting the doctor’s uncorroborated statement, it does
not excuse counsel’s failure to comply with the court’s written order.
Moreover, no evidence of the law clerk’s alleged oral promise to call the
doctor was ever presented during the hearing preceding the dismissal.
Rather, the doctor’s sworn statement was taken only after the court had
already dismissed the case.
Accordingly, in light of the substantial history of deliberate delay and
plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to either try the case or produce his doctor, I
would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the action.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 11, 2008:
In re C
HURCH
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
C
HURCH
) No. 1, No.
135962; Court of Appeals No. 276508.
In re S
CHNEIDER
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
S
IKORA
), No. 136100;
Court of Appeals No. 278694.
M
ACOMB
T
OWNSHIP V
M
ICHAELS
, No 136134, Court of Appeals No.
284479.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 18, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
H
OULIHAN
, No. 128340. By order of December 16, 2005, the
application for leave to appeal the February 10, 2005, order of the Court
of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Simmons v
Metrish, Docket No. 03-2609, which was pending in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on remand from the United States
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Halbert v Michigan, 545 US
605 (2005). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on
February 15, 2008, Simmons v Kapture, 516 F3d 450 (CA 6, 2008), the
application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals No. 256534.
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1165
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). In December 2003, Mr. Houlihan filed a motion in
the trial court for relief from his judgment of conviction. He argued that he
was not required to show good cause for obtaining the relief because he was
indigent and had been refused a court-appointed attorney to appeal his
conviction. The trial court denied his motion, and the Court of Appeals
denied his application for leave to appeal.
1
Defendant sought relief from
the judgment in this Court. We heard argument on the application for the
purpose of determining whether the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Halbert v Michigan
2
applied retroactively to defendant’s
motion for relief from judgment.
3
Halbert held that indigent defendants
who are convicted after pleading guilty or nolo contendere are entitled to
appointed appellate counsel for first-tier review. Halbert overruled this
Court’s decisions in People v Harris
4
and People v Bulger.
5
Following argument, we held this case in abeyance pending the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Simmons v Kapture.
6
Initially, the
panel in Simmons found that the Halbert decision applied retroactively to
cases in which review is sought on a writ of habeas corpus.
7
However,
after granting rehearing en banc, the court found that Halbert did not
apply retroactively.
8
In reliance on that decision, a majority of this Court
denies leave to appeal in this case. I disagree with the denial for two
reasons.
First, the defendant in Simmons yet may file a petition for certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court. This Court should hold Mr.
Houlihan’s case in abeyance until the time for filing the petition in
Simmons has expired. If the defendant in Simmons files a petition for
certiorari, this case should be held in abeyance until the United States
Supreme Court acts on the petition. Because Halbert is an important
decision that could afford relief to many defendants, whether it applies
retroactively is a question of great significance. For that reason, there is
a strong possibility that the United States Supreme Court will be asked
to consider and will consider the Simmons case. Even if it does not, no
harm will come from holding this case in abeyance pending the final
resolution of Simmons.
1
Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued February 10, 2005
(Docket No. 256534).
2
Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605, 609-610 (2005).
3
474 Mich 866 (2005).
4
People v Harris, 470 Mich 882 (2004). I dissented from the Court’s
decision denying the appointment of appellate counsel.
5
People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495 (2000). I joined Justice C
AVANAGH
’s
opinion dissenting from the majority decision.
6
474 Mich 958 (2005).
7
474 F3d 869 (CA 6, 2007).
8
Simmons v Kapture, 516 F3d 450 (CA 6, 2008).
1166 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
My second reason for disagreeing with the denial order in this matter is
that I believe this Court should consider whether Halbert applies retroac-
tively under Michigan law. This year in Danforth v Minnesota,
9
the United
States Supreme Court held that the federal retroactivity standard “limits
the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to
relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a
state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to
provide” broader remedies for federal constitutional violations.
10
Clearly,
the remedy a state court provides for violations of the federal constitution
is a question of state law. Accordingly, regardless of whether the federal
courts apply Halbert retroactively, we can apply the rule announced in
Halbert retroactively if we so decide. We should grant leave to consider
whether Halbert applies retroactively under Michigan law.
11
Appeal Dismissed April 18, 2008:
M
C
L
AIN V
P
ORTELL
, No. 135229. On order of the Chief Justice, a
stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of
this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for
leave to appeal is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. Court of
Appeals No. 278005.
Leave to Appeal Granted April 23, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
L
INCOLN
W
ATKINS
, No. 135787. The parties shall include
among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether MCL 768.27a conflicts with
MRE 404(b) and, if it does, (2) whether the statute prevails over the court
rule, see McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15 (1999), and Const 1963, art 6,
§ 1 and § 5; (3) whether the omission of any reference to MRE 403 in MCL
768.27a (as compared to MCL 768.27b[1]), while mandating that propen-
sity evidence “is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant,”
violated defendant’s due process right to a fair trial; (4) whether the
Court should rule that propensity evidence described in MCL 768.27a is
admissible only if it is not otherwise excluded under MRE 403; and (5)
whether MCL 768.27a interferes with the judicial power to ensure that a
criminal defendant receives a fair trial, a power exclusively vested in the
courts of this state under Const 1963, art 6, § 1.
The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting
Attorneys Association of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae.
9
Danforth v Minnesota, ___ US ___; 128 S Ct 1029 (2008).
10
Id. at 1042. This holding makes great sense because, as recognized
by the Danforth Court, the federal retroactivity standard is based on an
interpretation of the federal habeas statute.
11
An April 1, 2008, report of the State Court Administrative Office
indicates that many Michigan trial courts have been applying Halbert
retroactively.
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CTIONS ON
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PPLICATIONS
1167
Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Reported below: 277 Mich App 358.
Summary Dispositions April 23, 2008:
V
AN
F
AROWE V
C
ASCADE
C
HARTER
T
OWNSHIP,
No. 135507. Pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate that
portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals stating that remand is
required “[b]ecause the trial court proceeded to resolve the case on briefs
without entertaining testimony regarding the usage and whether it falls
withintheapplicablecaselaw....”Thiswasanappeal to the circuit
court under a zoning ordinance providing for no appeal to a zoning board
of appeals from the decision of the township board, so the proper remand
for further evidentiary proceedings is to the township board, not to the
circuit court. Macenas v Village of Michiana, 433 Mich 380, 394-397
(1989); Sportsman’s Club v Exeter Twp, 217 Mich App 195, 198-201, 202
(1996). To the extent that further evidentiary hearings are necessary on
remand, such hearings must be held before the Township Board. See
Sportsman’s Club, supra at 199-200; MCL 125.290(1); MCL 125.293a(2).
In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal is denied, because
we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by
this Court. Court of Appeals No. 264189.
P
ATTERSON V
D
ELPHI
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135689. Pursuant to MCR
7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to
the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On
remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider whether the Workers’
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) majority committed
legal error by applying the wrong standard of proof and, if so, whether
this error was nonetheless harmless. MCL 418.851 provides that “[a]
claimant shall prove his or her entitlement to compensation and
benefits under this act by a preponderance of the evidence.” The Court
of Appeals shall determine whether the WCAC evaluated the evidence
from the perspective that, once a magistrate has determined that a
claimant is suffering from a work-related disability for any period, the
claimant remains entitled to workers’ compensation benefits absent
direct proof of recovery from that disability; if so, this would not
describe the correct standard of proof. Simply because a claimant
meets the burden of proof for one period does not mean that he or she
necessarily meets that burden for all periods until proven otherwise.
Rather, the claimant has the burden at all times of proving his or her
entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. Court of
Appeals No. 278823.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 23, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
C
HAHINE
, No. 133685; Court of Appeals No. 263429.
1168 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
D
AWSON V
S
ECRETARY OF
S
TATE
, No. 133761; reported below: 274 Mich
App 723.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
D
OBBELAERE V
A
UTO
-O
WNERS
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, Nos. 134600, 134601;
reported below: 275 Mich App 527.
P
EOPLE V
L
EON
J
OHNSON
, No. 135343; Court of Appeals No. 279086.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would hold this case in abeyance for Melendez-Diaz v
Massachusetts, cert gtd __ US __; 76 USLW 3496; 2008 US LEXIS 2537
(March 17, 2008).
P
EOPLE V
S
PENCER
Y
OUNG
, No. 135370; Court of Appeals No. 279222.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case to the trial court
for DNA testing.
P
EOPLE V
B
ROWNRIGG
, No. 135571; Court of Appeals No. 270303.
Reconsideration Denied April 23, 2008:
L
AKE
F
OREST
P
ARTNERS
2, I
NC V
D
EPARTMENT OF
T
REASURY
, No. 132013.
Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich 1046. Court of Appeals No.
257417.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant reconsideration.
Summary Dispositions April 25, 2008:
J
ONES V
O
LSON
, No. 132385. On December 5, 2007, the Court heard oral
argument on the application for leave to appeal the September 21, 2006,
judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application
is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
judgment of the Wexford Circuit Court granting the defendants’ motion
for summary disposition. The circuit court properly found that the
plaintiff was generally able to lead his normal life in spite of his injuries.
Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004). The plaintiff’s injuries were
substantially similar to those considered in Kreiner’s companion case,
Straub v Collette. Id. Court of Appeals No. 268929.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting). Because I continue to believe that Kreiner v
Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004), was wrongly decided, I join Justice
W
EAVER
’s dissenting statement attached to the majority’s order. I concur
with her opinion that Kreiner is a prime example of the judiciary’s gavel
being used as the legislative pen. Therefore, I would also grant leave in
this case, so as to overrule Kreiner.
However, recognizing that my objections to the legal analysis in
Kreiner are yet to be shared by a majority of this Court, I write
additionally because, even under that opinion’s flawed logic, the plaintiff
in this case, Jones, presents a valid claim. I must also note my disagree-
ment with this Court’s recently evidenced proclivity for reaching out to
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1169
overturn this state’s lower courts, especially when they diligently and
faithfully apply this Court’s binding precedent—as the Court of Appeals
did in this case.
1
APPLICATION OF KREINER
The majority opinion in Kreiner expressed several platitudes that
seem to have been ignored in the majority’s application of Kreiner to this
case. The majority order in this case reinstates the grant of defendant’s
motion for summary disposition by the circuit court, which held that
Jones’s injury does not meet the statutory threshold of a “serious
impairment of [a] body function,” MCL 500.3135 (1), (7). The majority
order simplistically states the basis for its holding: Jones’s “injuries were
substantially similar to those considered in Kreiner’s companion case,
Straub v Collette.” The order contains no further discussion or analysis
supporting or explaining its conclusion. Under a fair reading of Kreiner,
the legal and factual assertions of this short analysis are unsupportable.
First, the order’s legal proposition seems to contradict Kreiner’s own
language. Simply comparing a previous plaintiff’s injuries to a subse-
quent plaintiff’s injuries is not consistent with Kreiner’s requirement of
a case-by-case analysis, Kreiner, supra at 134:
[I]n order to determine whether one has suffered a “serious
impairment of body function,” the totality of the circumstances
must be considered, and the ultimate question that must be
answered is whether the impairment “affects the person’s general
ability to conduct the course of his or her normal life.”
19
____________________________________________________________
19
We agree with the dissent that the “serious impairment of
body function” inquiry must “proceed[] on a case-by-case basis
because the statute requires inherently fact-specific and circum-
stantial determinations.”...Whether an impairment that pre-
cludes a person from throwing a ninety-five miles-an-hour fastball
is a “serious impairment of body function” may depend on whether
the person is a professional baseball player or an accountant who
likes to play catch with his son every once in a while.
____________________________________________________________
The majority order here seems to ignore the above footnote by holding
that because Jones’s injuries are substantially similar to the plaintiff’s in
1
Indeed, the Court of Appeals in this case expressly applied Kreiner.I
do not accept that the Court of Appeals is so inept as to misconstrue
Kreiner’s thorough, 26-page opinion such that peremptory reversal by a
one-paragraph order suffices. In short, if Kreiner is so easily misunder-
stood, its precepts must deserve revision or clearer articulation. Yet, the
majority order offers no further guidance on how to apply it.
1170 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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Straub, Jones’s injuries are insufficient. Essentially, the order holds that
if the injury suffered by the “accountant who likes to play catch with his
son every once in a while” is insufficient, then “the professional baseball
player” who suffers the same injury is likewise precluded from recovering
noneconomic damages. Id. This is incorrect because, even assuming that
Jones’s injuries were identical to Straub’s, Jones is entitled to an
individual case-by-case evaluation of his injuries as they relate to his
normal life, assuming Jones and Straub have different normal lives. Any
other holding makes the above passage from Kreiner meaningless.
Accordingly, despite my continued objection to Kreiner, if that opinion
must be applied by the lower courts, I would not change its holding
through peremptory order by presupposing that Jones’s and Straub’s
normal lives were identically affected by their injuries.
Second, the order’s one-sentence analysis erroneously contends that
Jones’s injuries “were substantially similar to” Straub’s. This is patently
incorrect.
As described in Kreiner, Straub
injured three fingers on his nondominant hand when his motorcycle
collided with an automobile on September 19, 1999. He suffered a
broken bone in his little finger and injured tendons in his ring and
middle fingers. Straub underwent outpatient surgery on September
23, 1999, to repair the tendons. No medical treatment was required
for the broken bone. He wore a cast for about one month following
surgery to assist the healing of the tendons. He also took prescription
pain medication for about two weeks following the surgery and
completed a physical therapy program.
About two months following the surgery, Straub’s doctor
noted that Straub’s injuries were healing nicely. Around the
same time, Straub returned to work ...,initially working [part
time], but returning to full-time work about three weeks later,
on December 14, 1999....[H]etestified that until late Decem-
ber 1999, he had difficulty doing household chores, such as
washing dishes, doing yard work, and making property repairs.
He was also unable to operate his archery shop during the
hunting season in the fall of 1999. Operating his shop required
him to repair bows, make arrows, and process deer meat. In
mid-January 2000, however, he was able to resume playing bass
guitar in a band that performed on weekends. By the time of
Straub’s deposition, he could perform all the activities in which
he had engaged before the accident, although he was still unable
to completely straighten his middle finger. He was also still
unable to completely close his left hand, which decreased his
grip strength. [Kreiner, supra at 122-123.]
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Jones’s injuries are demonstrably different from Straub’s. They
lasted longer, were qualitatively different, and were physically different.
2
In August 2003, Jones was injured in a car accident that was caused
by defendant, Olson. After the accident, Jones was taken to a hospital
when he complained of neck and back pain, among several other
less-severe injuries. He was released from the hospital after 9 to 10 hours.
Eventually, Jones was diagnosed with having fractured vertebra in his
neck (at C7), for which he was fitted with a “C-collar” for two months.
Also, MRI scans revealed disc bulges in his neck at C6-7 and C5-6 levels.
The neck and back injuries were caused by him hitting his head on the
window pylon in his car.
Jones continued seeing a neurologist through January 2004 for treat-
ment of his neck and back injuries. As of November 2003, he was complain-
ing of persistent pain in his neck with radiating numbness into his shoulders
and arms. By January 2004, he reported continued neck and back pain with
decreased rotation and movement of both, but denied radiating numbness.
From January 2004 to February 2004, he underwent physical therapy, with
good results. From the accident until February 12, 2004, he had not been
medically released to return to work, which entailed pouring and setting up
cement walls. On February 12, he was released to restart work for only three
hours a day for two days a week. This limited schedule was increased to full
time within two to four weeks after the initial work restart date (approxi-
mately early April 2004).
During the entire six months Jones was off work, he was unable to do
several activities that he normally did in his pre-accident life.
3
Those
activities included hunting, snowmobiling, playing softball, doing yard
work, and taking long walks with his girlfriend (which he commonly did
four or five nights a week). Also, during the first two months after the
accident, Jones was unable to be intimate with his girlfriend, dress
himself, feed himself, drive a car, or take his son to school. Since early or
mid-March 2004, when he regained full-time work status, Jones has
resumed all pre-accident work activities and pre-accident normal life
activities.
A review of these facts demonstrates that Jones’s injury is different
from Straub’s. In sum, Straub broke his little finger and injured two
others, which caused him to be unable to work and do home maintenance
for slightly over two months. Whereas, Jones broke his neck and strained
his back, which rendered him almost completely dependent on his family
for two months and unable to work or enjoy recreational activities for a
total of six months. The only thing remotely similar, much less “substan-
tially similar,” regarding Straub’s and Jones’s injuries is that they were
2
While I agree with Justice W
EAVER
’s recitation of the facts regarding
Jones’s injuries, they bear reiterating to note their differences from
Straub’s injuries.
3
Despite discussions of whether Jones’s current employer had work for
him during this entire 6-month period, the fact remains that Jones was
indisputably, medically unable to perform his profession for any employer
during the entire period.
1172 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
both caused by a car accident. Other than that, they are factually distin-
guishable, which is of great legal import in Kreiner’s case-by-case analysis.
Finally, if the two cases encompassed in Kreiner are usable by way of
comparison, it is unclear why Straub’s injuries are applicable here, while
Kreiner’s are not. Moreover, the order does not explain whether only
Straub’s injuries can be used in such a comparative analysis. I would not
leave the lower courts with such little guidance. Nonetheless, assuming
that there is some basis for only comparing Jones’s injuries with
Straub’s, Jones’s injury meets Kreiner’s threshold test.
Therefore, while retaining my continued disagreement with Kreiner,
I would not disturb the Court of Appeals holding that Jones’s claim meets
the statutory threshold of a “serious impairment of [a] body function,” as
defined by the majority in Kreiner and the editors of Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). Kreiner, supra at 130.
I dissent.
W
EAVER
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice C
AVANAGH
.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). Every law-abiding car owner in Michigan who
has obediently, as required by law, purchased no-fault automobile insur-
ance with the expectation of being able to recover damages for serious
impairment of bodily function in the unfortunate event of serious injury
should know about this case.
By importing the concept of permanency of injury into MCL 500.3135—a
concept that is nowhere referenced in the text of the statute—the majority
of four (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
),
in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004), actively and judicially legislated
a permanency and temporal requirement to recover noneconomic damages
in automobile accident cases. The Kreiner interpretation of MCL 500.3135 is
an unrestrained misuse and abuse of the power of interpretation masquer-
ading as an exercise in following the Legislature’s intent.
I dissent from the majority of four’s reversal of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in this case because the majority’s analysis and
application of Kreiner v Fischer continues the misinterpretation of MCL
500.3135. Although the Court of Appeals reached the right result, I
would grant leave to appeal to correct the majority’s misinterpretation of
MCL 500.3135 in Kreiner.
I. FACTS OF JONES v OLSON
On August 1, 2003, the plaintiff, Douglas Jones, was westbound on
M-115 when the defendant, Kathleen Olson, pulled out directly in front
of the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendant’s car hit the front right side of the
plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff sustained injuries and complained of head
and neck pain. The plaintiff was taken to Mercy Hospital after the
accident. Doctors diagnosed the plaintiff with a fractured vertebrae in his
neck and fitted him with a C-collar. The plaintiff was released after 9 to
10 hours and was advised to consult a neurologist.
The plaintiff continued to complain of persistent neck and shoulder
pain and numbness in his shoulders and arms. A magnetic resonance
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1173
imaging report of the plaintiff’s spine showed disc bulges at the C6-7 and
C5-6 levels. The plaintiff continued to see his neurologist and underwent
physical therapy sessions through February 2004. In March 2004, the
plaintiff returned to work full-time where he helped pour and set cement
walls.
The plaintiff testified that during the months that he was unable to
work, he was also unable to hunt, go snowmobiling, play softball, do yard
work, or take long walks with his girlfriend—activities he enjoyed before
the accident. Further, the plaintiff stated that for the first few months
after the accident, he had difficulty dressing and feeding himself. He also
required the help of his mother, grandmother, and girlfriend to prepare
his son for school in the mornings. Plaintiff testified that he was able to
return to work and resume all normal activities in March 2004.
The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff noneconomic damages. The
plaintiff filed suit for damages with the Wexford Circuit Court. The
defendant moved for summary disposition, asserting that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
he suffered a serious impairment of bodily function. The circuit court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and the plain-
tiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and
remanded the case for trial. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued
September 21, 2006 (Docket No. 268929).
The majority of four now reverses the Court of Appeals judgment by
order, stating that the plaintiff’s injuries in this case are substantially
similar to the injuries considered in Kreiner’s companion case, Straub v
Collette.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation and
application of MCL 500.3135 in this case, just as I did in Kreiner when
joining Justice C
AVANAGH
’s dissent. 471 Mich at 139.
II. MCL 500.3135 AND KREINER v FISCHER
MCL 500.3135 states in pertinent part:
(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic
loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.
***
(7) As used in this section, “serious impairment of body
function” means an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function that affects the person’s general ability to
lead his or her normal life.
In Kreiner v Fischer the majority incorrectly interpreted MCL
500.3135 and created a test for determining when a person injured in an
1174 480 M
ICHIGAN
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automobile accident can recover noneconomic damages. The majority
outlined a seemingly reasonable three-part test:
1. Determine that there is no factual dispute concerning the nature
and extent of the person’s injuries; or, if there is a factual dispute, that it
is not material to the determination whether the person has suffered a
serious impairment of bodily function. See Kreiner at 131, 132.
2. If a court can decide the issue as a matter of law, the court must next
determine if an important bodily function of the plaintiff has been impaired.
See Kreiner at 132. The injury must be objectively manifested. Id.
3. If a court finds an objectively manifested impairment of an
important bodily function, the court must then determine whether the
impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal
life. Id. A “multifaceted inquiry” into the plaintiff’s lifestyle before and
after the accident will determine whether the plaintiff’s “general ability”
to lead his or her life has been affected.
The majority’s interpretation and application of MCL 500.3135 in
Kreiner is flawed. The first two prongs in the majority’s judicially created
test are reasonable and derive from the language of MCL 500.3135. How-
ever, the third prong of the test, the determination of whether someone’s
“general ability” to lead his or her life has been affected, is flawed. The
majority of four interpreted the phrase “general ability” in MCL 500.3135 to
mean that a plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages for serious
impairment of bodily function unless the impairment affects his or her life
for an undefined and extended period of time—a requirement never men-
tioned in the text of MCL 500.3135.
The Kreiner majority invoked selective dictionary definitions to
outline a test to determine when a person’s “general ability” to lead his
or her life is affected. The Kreiner majority stated:
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) defines “gen-
eral” as “considering or dealing with broad, universal, or important
aspects.” “In general” is defined as “with respect to the entirety; as a
whole.” Id. “Generally” is defined as “with respect to the larger part;
for the most part.” Id. Webster’s New International Dictionary
defines “general” as “the whole; the total; that which comprehends or
relates to all, or the chief part; a general proposition, fact, principle,
etc.;—opposed to particular; that is, opposed to special.” Accordingly,
determining whether a plaintiff is “generally able” to lead his normal
life requires considering whether the plaintiff is, “for the most part”
able to lead his normal life. [Kreiner, supra, 471 Mich at 130.]
In reaching the conclusion that a plaintiff’s “general ability” to lead
his or her life is affected only if he or she is unable to “for the most part”
lead a normal life, the Kreiner majority selectively chose one definition of
“general” among the many definitions available. More importantly, the
Kreiner majority exalted the chosen definition as the only possible
definition to determine what “general ability” under MCL 500.3135
means; according to the Kreiner analysis, the Legislature could not have
meant “general ability” to mean anything other than “for the most part.”
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Such an interpretation is faulty and unreasonable. The Kreiner
majority did not consider, nor did it discuss, other definitions of
“general,” and the consequences of applying those definitions in
interpreting MCL 500.3135. For example, the American Heritage
Dictionary (2004) defines “general,” among other things, as “not
limited in scope, area, or application; not limited to or dealing with one
class of things; diversified.” Under this definition, MCL 500.3135 can
be interpreted to mean that a person’s “general ability” to lead his or
her life is affected if any part of the life is affected, without limitations
in scope, area, or application. This interpretation is diametrically
opposed to the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of “general ability,”
and yet it derives from the same source: a dictionary definition of the
word “general.”
The above example illustrates the Kreiner majority’s error in using a
selective dictionary definition as the be-all-and-end-all source for deter-
mining what a particular word means within a statute. A dictionary is
defined, among other things, as “a reference book containing an alpha-
betical list of words, with information given for each word, usually
including meanings, pronunciation, and etymology; a glossary.” Ameri-
can Heritage Dictionary (2004). A dictionary is meant to be a reference,
not an exhaustive source for all etymological information.
In the legal context, using a dictionary to unwaveringly determine the
legislative intent behind a statute is nothing more than barely hidden
judicial activism. Instead of determining the true intent behind a statute,
a majority of the Court can now simply agree upon a single dictionary
definition, taken from among many dictionary definitions, as the control-
ling definition for the statute. Worse, given the expansive nature of
dictionary definitions where all possible, sometimes contradictory, defi-
nitions are listed, a majority can pick and choose a definition that is most
appealing to the majority’s own point of view, even if a chosen definition
defies common sense.
For all intents and purposes, the Kreiner majority held that unless a
person “for the most part” can no longer live his or her life, he or she
cannot recover noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135. The only
way a person can no longer “for the most part” live his or her life is if the
“overall or broad ability” to “conduct the course of his life” is affected.
While paying lip service to the contrary, the Kreiner majority faction in
essence held that a plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages for
serious impairment of bodily function unless the impairment affects his
or her life ad infinitum.
As Justice C
AVANAGH
correctly stated in his dissent in Kreiner,
“nothing in the plain text of MCL 500.3135(7) suggests that the
Legislature intended temporal limitations or permanency be consid-
ered when making the ‘serious impairment of body function’ deter-
mination.” Kreiner v Fischer, supra at 149. By importing the concept
of permanency of injury into MCL 500.3135—a concept that is
nowhere referenced in the statute—the Kreiner majority actively and
judicially legislated an additional requirement for obtaining noneco-
nomic damages in automobile accident cases.
1176 480 M
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III. CONCLUSION
The majority’s brief order relying on the faulty analysis in Kreiner in
this case merely states that the plaintiff’s injuries are “substantially
similar to those considered in Kreiner’s companion case, Straub v
Collette.” Regardless of whether the injuries are the same in kind or
different, the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his life after the accident
was affected. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life was put entirely
on hold for the first two months after the accident, and returned only
gradually over the following four months. Plaintiff’s lifestyle before
the injury was dramatically different from his lifestyle for the six
months after the accident. F ollowing the Kreiner Court’s dictate that
an injury need not be permanent to constitute a serious impairment,
we hold that where, as here, an injury entirely disrupts a person’s
ability to lead his normal life, the fact that the person eventually
recovers does not preclude recovery for that injury. [Jones v Olson,
supra, slip op at 2.]
Additionally, it is irrelevant whether the facts of the present case are
similar to the facts in Straub v Collette, because the majority’s analysis of
MCL 500.3135 in Kreiner is flawed and should be revisited. The Kreiner
majority judicially created a new requirement for recovery of noneco-
nomic damages that is not found in the text of the MCL 500.3135.
I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in this case because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and
application of Kreiner v Fischer. Although the Court of Appeals correctly
determined that the plaintiff’s general ability to conduct the course of his
normal life has been affected as a result of his injuries, as required to recover
noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135, I would grant leave to appeal
to reconsider the majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.3135 in Kreiner v
Fischer.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
W
ILLER V
T
ITAN
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY
, No. 133596. On March 6, 2008, the
Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the
February 23, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the W ayne Circuit Court, and we
remand this case to that court for entry of an order granting summary
disposition to the defendant. On this record there is no genuine issue of
material fact in dispute that the plaintiff failed to show that the causal
connection between her injuries and her scraping the windshield of her
vehicle was anything beyond “incidental, fortuitous or ‘but for’ ” such that
the injuries arose out of the “ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(1).
The stay of trial court proceedings, ordered on February 6, 2008, is dissolved.
Court of Appeals No. 273805.
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M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). I concur with the order reversing the
judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for the entry of an
order of summary disposition in defendant’s favor. However, because I
disagree with the majority’s application of MCL 500.3105(1), I write
separately to explain my rationale.
While scraping ice and snow off the windshield of her car on a March
evening in 2005, plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of ice beside her car and
suffered injuries. Her car was insured with defendant, and she filed a claim
for first-party no-fault benefits. This claim was denied, and the instant
lawsuit was filed. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that
plaintiff had not been “maintaining” her vehicle under MCL 500.3105(1) at
the time of her injury, and that there was an insufficient connection between
plaintiff’s scraping the windshield and her injury. The trial court denied this
motion. Defendant then filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal
with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied. Unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered F ebruary 23, 2007 (Docket No. 273805). Defen-
dant then appealed to this Court, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred
under both MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL 500.3106(1). We ordered oral
argument on whether to grant defendant’s application.
The majority concludes that summary disposition is appropriate here
because no reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff can satisfy MCL
500.3105(1). I respectfully disagree. Section 3105(1) states:
Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay
benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor
vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.
The majority focuses on the requirement that an injury must “arise out
of” the maintenance of the vehicle. When construing the meaning of this
phrase in § 3105, this Court has stated: “Without a relation that is more
than ‘but for,’ incidental, or fortuitous, there can be no recovery.”
Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 660 (1986). This Court more
recently interpreted the same phrase in the context of scoring a defen-
dant’s offense variables:
[W]e have previously defined “arising out of” to suggest a
causal connection between two events of a sort that is more than
incidental. We continue to believe that this sets forth the most
reasonable definition of “arising out of.” Something that “aris[es]
out of,” or springs from or results from something else, has a
connective relationship, a cause and effect relationship, of more
than an incidental sort with the event out of which it has arisen.
[People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 101 (2006).]
Thus, the phrase “arising out of” requires a plaintiff to show that the
injury “sprang from” or “resulted from” the maintenance of the vehicle.
In my judgment, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to survive
defendant’s motion for summary disposition based on § 3105(1). Plaintiff
1178 480 M
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was scraping her windshield when she fell. In my judgment, a reasonable
juror could conclude that the fall “sprang from” some movement by
plaintiff pursuant to her act of scraping the windshield. Accordingly, a
reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff’s slip on the ice “arose out
of” the maintenance of her vehicle. Therefore, summary disposition for
defendant based on § 3105(1) is inappropriate.
However, defendant also argues that, even if plaintiff meets the
requirements of MCL 500.3105(1), MCL 500.3106(1) presents an addi-
tional statutory hurdle that plaintiff must satisfy in order to survive
summary disposition. That provision states:
Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor
vehicle unless any of the following occur:
(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unrea-
sonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was a direct
result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted
on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or
property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the
loading or unloading process.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was sus-
tained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting
from the vehicle.
Because § 3106(1) states than an injury generally does not “arise out of”
the maintenance of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle “unless” one of
the three exceptions is satisfied, § 3106(1) indicates that, in every case
involving a parked vehicle, a plaintiff must demonstrate that one of the
three listed exceptions is satisfied.
However, this Court previously has not required plaintiffs in parked-
vehicle cases to satisfy § 3106(1) if § 3105(1) is satisfied. In Miller v
Auto-Owners Ins, 411 Mich 633, 641 (1981), this Court opined that “[t]he
policies underlying § 3105(1) and § 3106...arecomplementary rather
than conflicting.” Accordingly, “[c]ompensation is...required by the
no-fault act without regard to whether [the plaintiff’s] vehicle might be
considered ‘parked’ at the time of injury.” Id. In other words, under
Miller, a plaintiff who satisfies § 3105(1) in a parked-vehicle case is not
also obligated to satisfy § 3106(1).
Miller’s interpretation of the interplay between § 3105(1) and § 3106(1)
is, in my view, clearly erroneous. Section 3105(1) permits recovery only if the
insured vehicle is being used “as a motor vehicle.” Section 3106(1) states
that a parked vehicle is not being used “as a motor vehicle” unless one of the
three exceptions is applicable. Accordingly, every plaintiff in a parked-vehicle
case must satisfy § 3106(1) in order to recover.
Because Miller was wrongly decided, it must be determined whether
it should be overruled by considering “the effect on reliance interests and
whether overruling would work an undue hardship because of that
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reliance.” Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 466 (2000). To make this
determination, Robinson requires consideration of “whether the previous
decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to
everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just read-
justments, but practical real-world dislocations.” Id. Miller is not “so
embedded,” in my judgment. In Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of
America, 454 Mich 626, 635 (1997), we stated that “where a [plaintiff]
suffers an injury in an event related to a parked motor vehicle,” such a
plaintiff must “establish[] that he falls into one of the three exceptions to
the parking exclusion in subsection 3106(1).” Moreover, we reiterated the
requirement that a plaintiff in a parked-vehicle case must satisfy §
3106(1) in McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214, 217n3(1998),
and in Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 697 (2004). Accordingly, this
Court has called into question the continuing validity of Miller for over
10 years. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that Miller is “so
embedded” in Michigan law that overruling it will produce “real-world
dislocations.” Nor do I discern any “reliance” interests upon Miller that
would counsel against it being overruled.
The continued co-existence of McKenzie and Miller causes confusion
insofar as litigants can plausibly argue that, under McKenzie, § 3106
applies in cases involving dual-use vehicles, while under Miller, § 3106
does not apply if a single-use vehicle is involved. See Kennedy v Farm
Bureau Ins Co, memorandum of law of the Monroe Circuit Court, issued
January 13, 2006 (Docket No. LC-05-019503-NF). Such a distinction is
unwarranted by the language of the statute, which nowhere distin-
guishes between single- and dual-use vehicles. This Court has stated that
“it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for
guidance in directing his actions.” Robinson, supra at 467. By contra-
vening the language of § 3105 and § 3106, Miller undercut the reliance
that average citizens are entitled to place on the law enacted by their
elected representatives.
It is apparent from the record that plaintiff here is unable to satisfy
any of the three exceptions in § 3106(1). Her vehicle was not “parked in
such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which
occurred.” MCL 500.3106(1)(a). She was not injured by “physical contact
with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equip-
ment was being operated or used,” or during the “loading or unloading
process.” MCL 500.3106(1)(b). Finally, her injury did not occur while she
was “occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.” MCL
500.3106(1)(c). Accordingly, plaintiff’s action must be dismissed.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice M
ARKMAN
.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would deny leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the peremptory order of the
majority of four (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,and
M
ARKMAN
) reversing the judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court and
remanding this case to that court for the entry of an order granting
summary disposition to the defendant.
I would deny leave to appeal because the plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence to survive the defendant’s motion for summary
1180 480 M
ICHIGAN
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disposition.
1
Specifically, I would deny leave to appeal because I agree
with the ruling by the Wayne Circuit Court that a juror could conclude
that when the plaintiff fell while she was scraping snow and ice off of her
vehicle’s windshield, the plaintiff was engaged in “maintenance” of her
motor vehicle as contemplated under MCL 500.3105(1) and Miller v
Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633 (1981).
I further note that despite the fact that plaintiff’s vehicle was parked
at the time she was engaged in its maintenance, this Court has upheld
recovery under such circumstances despite the fact that one of the three
parked-vehicle exceptions was not at issue.
2
Specifically, in Miller, supra
at 641, this Court held that “[c]ompensation is...required by the
no-fault act without regard to whether [the plaintiff’s] vehicle might be
considered parked at the time of injury.” It defies common sense to expect
one to perform maintenance on one’s vehicle while the vehicle is not
parked. Clearly one cannot be expected to scrape the windshield of one’s
vehicle while sitting behind the wheel and driving the vehicle down the
road. Any reasonable person would conclude that in order to safely
perform vehicle maintenance, one must do so while the vehicle is parked.
While Justice M
ARKMAN
, with Justice C
ORRIGAN
concurring, asserts in his
concurrence that Miller was wrongly decided, Miller has been in effect for 27
years—time enough to become “so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental,
to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just read-
justments, but real-world dislocations.” Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439,
466 (2000).
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying the
defendant’s motion for summary disposition and plaintiff should have
been allowed to present her case to a jury.
I would not peremptorily reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
would deny leave to appeal.
1
Justice M
ARKMAN
, joined by Justice C
ORRIGAN
, concurs with this
conclusion, but then joins in the order for peremptory reversal and
remand claiming that Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633 (1981),
was wrongly decided.
2
Under MCL 500.3106(1) accidental bodily injury does not arise out of
the maintenance of a parked vehicle unless:
(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unrea-
sonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was a direct
result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on
the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or
property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading
or unloading process.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was sustained
by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the
vehicle.
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1181
M
INTER V
C
ITY OF
G
RAND
R
APIDS
, No. 133988. On January 9, 2008, the
Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the
April 12, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and we
reinstate the judgment of the Kent Circuit Court granting the defendants’
motion for summary disposition. Although the Court of Appeals majority
correctly affirmed the Kent Circuit Court’s order granting the defendants’
motion for summary disposition regarding the plaintiff’s broken toe and
cervical strain, the majority erred in reversing the circuit court’s order
granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition regarding the
plaintiff’s closed head injury and scar. Reported below: 275 Mich App 220.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would deny leave to appeal.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority of four’s (Chief
Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
’s) reversal of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in the Court
of Appeals dissent and reinstatement of the trial court’s grant of
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, because the Court of
Appeals majority and dissenting analyses and application of Kreiner v
Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004), continue the misinterpretation of MCL
500.3135 brought about by the majority of four’s opinion in Kreiner.
Although the Court of Appeals majority may have reached the correct
result, I would grant leave to appeal to reconsider and correct the
majority’s misinterpretation of MCL 500.3135 in Kreiner.
By importing the concept of permanency of injury into MCL 500.3135—a
concept that is nowhere referenced in the text of the statute—the majority
of four, in Kreiner, actively and judicially legislated a permanency and
temporal requirement to recover noneconomic damages in automobile
accident cases.
1
The Kreiner interpretation of MCL 500.3135 is an
unrestrained misuse and abuse of the power of interpretation, masquer-
ading as an exercise in following the Legislature’s intent, which needs to
be corrected to comport with the actual text of MCL 500.3135.
K
ELLY
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal in this case
because I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the Court of Appeals
dissenting opinion.
I am troubled by the analysis of the issue of serious impairment of
body function in that opinion. The statutory definition of serious impair-
ment of body function requires us to examine the effect of an impairment
on a person’s “general ability to lead hisorhernormal life.”
1
The
definition requires us to begin by looking at what plaintiff did before her
accident. Instead, the Court of Appeals dissent begins by looking at what
plaintiff did not do. It describes plaintiff as an elderly woman who, before
her accident, received Social Security disability benefits, needed help
from family members with household chores, and did not drive a car. In
short, plaintiff did not work, did not engage in housework, and did not
1
For further analysis of the problems created by the majority of four’s
Kreiner opinion, see my dissent in Jones v Olson, 480 Mich ___, ___ (2008).
1
MCL 500.3135(7).
1182 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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drive. After the accident, she continued to receive Social Security
disability benefits, continued to need help from her family members, and
continued not to drive. Thus, she does not work, does not engage in
housework, and does not drive. The before-and-after-accident compari-
son compares negatives and tells us nothing about how the accident
affected plaintiff’s life.
We should be careful not to punish this or any injured person for not
being young, healthy, self-sufficient, employed, and a driver before
suffering injury in an accident. The statute does not speak in terms of “a”
model normal life. Yet, the Court of Appeals dissent concluded that
plaintiff failed to establish that her impairment “interfered with her
general ability to lead a normal life.” The dissent’s approach and its
conclusion are contrary to the statutory language. This Court should not
unthinkingly endorse them.
In addition, the Court of Appeals split three ways on the issue
whether the scar on plaintiff’s face constituted permanent serious
disfigurement. At oral argument, even defendants’ attorney urged the
Court to grant leave to consider the various approaches the Court of
Appeals has taken on this issue. Yet, without the benefit of briefing or any
serious discussion of the issue, the majority endorses the objective
approach of the Court of Appeals dissent.
It is unclear to me why this approach is better than the others. A facial
scar can cause significant embarrassment to the person bearing it. And,
as the lead Court of Appeals opinion suggests, it may disrupt the person’s
ability to communicate. While the record is not well developed on this
point, plaintiff did suggest in her deposition that she had trouble
frowning. This Court should consider whether facial scars should be
evaluated in a more nuanced and dynamic framework.
For the reasons stated above, I would grant leave to appeal in this
case.
P
EOPLE V
K
INNISON
, No. 134706. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals.
That court shall consider whether either of appellate counsel’s two stated
reasons for failing to timely file defendant’s motion for resentencing and
his delayed application for leave to appeal entitled defendant to have his
April 10, 2007, application for leave to appeal considered under the
standard applicable for direct appeals. Defendant’s application should be
considered under the standard for direct appeals if the Court of Appeals
concludes either that the delay was caused by a trial court error and/or by
counsel’s reasonable conclusions regarding the filing period, or because
counsel behaved unreasonably and, therefore, rendered ineffective assis-
tance. See Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000); Peguero v United
States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999). We do not retain jurisdiction. Court of
Appeals No. 277280.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration of the defendant’s April 10, 2007, application
for leave to appeal under the standard applicable to direct appeals
because we believe that the defendant was deprived of his direct appeal as
a result of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
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1183
H
ALL V
M
ERCY
M
EMORIAL
H
OSPITAL
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135705. Pursuant
to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. As opined by the dissenting judge in
the Court of Appeals, a remand for consideration of Kirkaldy v Rim, 478
Mich 581 (2007), is unnecessary. We remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. The motion for stay is
granted. Trial court proceedings are stayed pending the completion of
this appeal. Court of Appeals No. 276814.
K
ELLY
, J. I agree that a remand to the trial court for consideration of
Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007), is unnecessary, but would not
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. Rather, I would simply deny leave in all other respects and
remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of its order denying
the defendant doctor’s motion for summary disposition. Court of Appeals
No. 276814.
C
AVANAGH
,J
.
I join the statement of Justice K
ELLY
.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 25, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
H
ULBERT
, No. 134834. We are not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court, except that this
Court agrees with the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals that there
is no need for the resentencing to be before a different judge. Court of
Appeals No. 276435.
C
AVANAGH
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
In re C
HURCH
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
C
HURCH
)N
O
.2,No.
136184; Court of Appeals No. 279652.
Reconsideration Granted April 25, 2008:
O
DOM V
W
AYNE
C
OUNTY
, No. 133433. The motions for leave to file briefs
amicus curiae are granted. The motion for reconsideration of this Court’s
January 11, 2008, order is considered, and it is granted. We vacate our
order dated January 11, 2008. On reconsideration, the application for
leave to appeal the February 1, 2007, judgment of the Court of Appeals is
granted. The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1)
what is the proper interpretation of MCL 691.1407(3) (“[MCL
691.1407(2)] does not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed before
July 7, 1986.”); (2) can intentional torts claims be brought under MCL
691.1407(2); and (3) for an intentional tort claim, what must a plaintiff
plead to avoid governmental immunity?
The Michigan Municipal League, the Michigan Municipal League
Liability & Property Pool, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office, and the
Michigan Association of Police Organizations are invited to file additional
briefs amicus curiae. The Attorney General is invited to file a brief
amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination
of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to
file briefs amicus curiae. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich 1015. Court
of Appeals No. 270501.
1184 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
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Summary Dispositions April 25, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
C
ARICO
, No. 135559. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. The defendant was entitled to an appeal
by right from the March 13, 2007, order denying resentencing. See MCR
7.202(6)(b)(iv). The motion to remand is denied as moot. Court of Appeals
No. 277973.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 28, 2008:
P
EOPLE V
J
ACK
D
AVID
, No. 133629; Court of Appeals No. 275515.
P
EOPLE V
H
AWTHORNE
, No. 133729; Court of Appeals No. 265473.
H
URLEY
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER V
T
HAMES
, No. 133814; Court of Appeals No.
273267.
B
ROWN
-B
EY V
D
EPARTMENT OF
C
ORRECTIONS
, No. 134012; Court of Ap-
peals No. 277003.
P
EOPLE V
Y
OSHEYAH
T
HOMAS
, No. 134148. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 272334.
P
EOPLE V
R
USHIN
, No. 134163; Court of Appeals No. 277213.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
P
RICE
, No. 134175. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 273419.
P
EOPLE V
R
OOT
, No. 134177. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 274274.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENDRICK
L
EE
, No. 134200; Court of Appeals No. 277005.
G
OMERY V
C
REST
F
INANCIAL,
I
NC
, No. 134547; Court of Appeals No.
264906.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARSWELL
, No. 134578; Court of Appeals No. 268081.
P
EOPLE V
S
LOTKOWSKI
, No. 134607; Court of Appeals No. 275350.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
In re P
APAZIAN
E
STATE
(P
APAZIAN V
P
APAZIAN
), No. 134653; Court of
Appeals No. 273795.
P
EOPLE V
M
ARIO
L
EE
, No. 134915; Court of Appeals No. 268053.
P
EOPLE V
A
RNOLD
M
OORE
, No. 134943; Court of Appeals No. 270835.
P
EOPLE V
D
IAZ
, No. 135237; Court of Appeals No. 280753.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENDELL
R
OBERTS
, No. 135238. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279410.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1185
P
EOPLE V
A
GUIRRE
, No. 135258. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276102.
P
EOPLE V
A
LLEN
R
ODGERS
, No. 135312; Court of Appeals No. 277478.
P
EOPLE V
B
ASAT
, No. 135323. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277082.
P
EOPLE V
H
ORACE
W
ALLACE
, No. 135336. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279946.
P
EOPLE V
G
EORGE
S
TEWART
, No. 135348. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279131.
P
EOPLE V
A
TA
, No. 135357. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278924.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMAAL
D
OUGLAS
, No. 135365. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279280.
P
EOPLE V
D
RAUGHN
, No. 135367; Court of Appeals No. 279041.
P
EOPLE V
H
UERTA
-R
ODRIGUEZ
, No. 135368. The defendant’s motion for
relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals
No. 280243.
P
EOPLE V
C
HERRY
, No. 135371. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277287.
P
EOPLE V
H
INDS
, No. 135372. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 278367.
P
EOPLE V
C
HRIST
, No. 135392. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 280999.
P
EOPLE V
L
AIDLAW
, No. 135397. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277725.
P
EOPLE V
P
OOLE
, No. 135398. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 276973.
P
EOPLE V
M
CKAY
, No. 135399. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277907.
P
EOPLE V
K
APLAN
, No. 135403. The defendant’s motion for relief from
judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). Court of Appeals No. 279114.
1186 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
I
NDIA
P
ORTER
, No. 135404. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 279449.
P
EOPLE V
A
RCHIE
E
VANS
, No. 135410. The defendant has failed to meet
the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Court of Appeals No. 278106.
P
EOPLE V
W
EBB
, No. 135412. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 280142.
P
EOPLE V
M
ANKOFF
, No. 135415; Court of Appeals No. 280511.
P
EOPLE V
P
ETTY
, No. 135428. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277027.
P
EOPLE V
K
ENNETH
B
ROWN
, No. 135429. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279881.
P
EOPLE V
P
OTTS
, No. 135446; Court of Appeals No. 270685.
P
EOPLE V
M
ICHAEL
E
ARL
Y
OUNG
, No. 135457. The defendant has failed to
meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 279393.
P
EOPLE V
G
ULLEY
, No. 135468; Court of Appeals No. 276266.
P
EOPLE V
B
UIE
, No. 135472; Court of Appeals No. 270414.
P
EOPLE V
M
OULTRIE
, No. 135473. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 277425.
P
EOPLE V
F
ULLER
, No. 135475. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 279220.
P
EOPLE V
K
IMBROUGH
, No. 135481. The defendant has failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court
of Appeals No. 279443.
P
ETERSEN V
R
IVERVIEW
P
OLICE
D
EPARTMENT
, No. 135482; Court of Ap-
peals No. 276558.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
L
AWSON
, No. 135491; Court of Appeals No. 280869.
P
EOPLE V
H
YROSHA
W
ILSON
, No. 135501; Court of Appeals No. 271738.
B
ECK V
TGM B
ROADBAND
C
ABLE
S
ERVICES
, No. 135521; Court of Appeals
No. 277384.
P
EOPLE V
V
ANRENSELAAR
, No. 135530; Court of Appeals No. 279667.
P
EOPLE V
D
URAN
, No. 135543; Court of Appeals No. 273061.
P
EOPLE V
S
ODERBERG
, No. 135553; Court of Appeals No. 281776.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1187
P
EOPLE V
O
CHOA
-R
ODRIGUEZ
, No. 135565; Court of Appeals No. 271212.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
T
AYLOR
, No. 135582; Court of Appeals No. 272132.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARL
W
RIGHT,
J
R
, No. 135591; Court of Appeals No. 273148.
C
ARLESS V
P
AROLE
B
OARD
, No. 135600; Court of Appeals No. 270616.
P
EOPLE V
F
LENNOY
, No. 135603; Court of Appeals No. 266547.
P
EOPLE V
P
ENIGAR
, No. 135604; Court of Appeals No. 281369.
P
EOPLE V
P
FENNINGER
, No. 135611; Court of Appeals No. 272711.
10&S
COTIA
P
LAZA,
LLCvG
RINDERZ
O
AK
P
ARK
, No. 135612; Court of
Appeals No. 276787.
P
EOPLE V
W
HITMAN
, No. 135617; Court of Appeals No. 271930.
P
EOPLE V
R
EGINALD
G
ILLAM
, No. 135624; Court of Appeals No. 270760.
P
EOPLE V
W
AIRE
, No. 135626; Court of Appeals No. 281632.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
F
OSTER
, No. 135628; Court of Appeals No. 272366.
P
EOPLE V
L
EWIS
H
ARRIS
, No. 135630; Court of Appeals No. 271929.
G
UARDIAN
A
LARM
C
OMPANY OF
M
ICHIGAN V
M
AY
, No. 135635; Court of
Appeals No. 269901.
P
EOPLE V
A
ARON
M
ITCHELL
, No. 135654; Court of Appeals No. 269141.
P
EOPLE V
D
ESHAWN
H
OWARD
, No. 135661; Court of Appeals No. 272248.
P
EOPLE V
O
MECINSKYJ
, No. 135664; Court of Appeals No. 271184.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMAL
T
HOMAS
, No. 135668; Court of Appeals No. 270679.
P
EOPLE V
N
ATHANIEL
G
ILBERT
, No. 135672; Court of Appeals No. 273644.
G
ROSS V
L
ANDIN
, No. 135674; Court of Appeals No. 275077.
Y
ALDO V
Y
ALDO
, No. 135675; Court of Appeals No. 277694.
P
EOPLE V
M
ELTON
, No. 135676; Court of Appeals No. 272308.
W
ASHINGTON
M
UTUAL
B
ANK,
FA v C
OMMUNITY
S
HORES
B
ANK
, No. 135678;
Court of Appeals No. 274959.
F
ISHER V
C
ORNELL
E
NGINEERING
, No. 135681; Court of Appeals No.
270252.
P
EOPLE V
A
LBERT
, No. 135684; Court of Appeals No. 281538.
P
EOPLE V
P
OYNTER
, No. 135687; Court of Appeals No. 272160.
P
EOPLE V
B
ELLAMY
, No. 135690; Court of Appeals No. 268462.
P
EOPLE V
H
ERNANDEZ
-D
IAZ
, No. 135691; Court of Appeals No. 273180.
P
EOPLE V
H
ILLS
, No. 135693; Court of Appeals No. 269504.
1188 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
J
OLIET
N
ELSON,
J
R
, No. 135694; Court of Appeals No. 280685.
P
EOPLE V
W
ADE
, No. 135695; Court of Appeals No. 280709.
P
EOPLE V
C
URTIS
B
AKER
, No. 135696; Court of Appeals No. 273006.
P
EOPLE V
S
EARCY
, Nos. 135697, 135698; Court of Appeals Nos. 282489,
282491.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006).
P
EOPLE V
D
ENT
, No. 135701; Court of Appeals No. 282039.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. did not participate for the reasons she stated in People v
Parsons, 728 NW2d 62 (2007).
P
EOPLE V
C
LAUDIO
, No. 135711; Court of Appeals No. 273007.
P
EOPLE V
B
OXLEY
, No. 135713; Court of Appeals No. 281756.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
K
NAPPENBERGER
, No. 135715; Court of Appeals No. 270572.
P
EOPLE V
T
YRONE
C
OOPER
, No. 135716; Court of Appeals No. 272071.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
R
OSS
, No. 135719; Court of Appeals No. 281562.
P
EOPLE V
L
EONARD
B
AKER
, No. 135721; Court of Appeals No. 272246.
P
EOPLE V
C
RIMES
, No. 135723; Court of Appeals No. 270212.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDY
A
NDERSON
, No. 135724; Court of Appeals No. 272307.
P
EOPLE V
T
OPLIN
, No. 135729; Court of Appeals No. 273370.
P
EOPLE V
O
STRANDER
, No. 135732; Court of Appeals No. 281830.
P
EOPLE V
C
INTRON
, No. 135737; Court of Appeals No. 271995.
R
EID V
W
ILLIAMSTOWN
T
OWNSHIP
, No. 135740; Court of Appeals No.
271284.
P
EOPLE V
W
ENTWORTH
, No. 135741; Court of Appeals No. 281611.
P
EOPLE V
C
ARLOS
S
IMMONS
, No. 135747; Court of Appeals No. 272630.
F
RANKLIN
P
ROPERTIES
LTDvM
OLYBDENUM
U
NLIMITED
C
OMPANY
, No.
135748; Court of Appeals No. 278669.
P
EOPLE V
W
ISE
, No. 135749; Court of Appeals No. 277915.
P
EOPLE V
R
OOSEVELT
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135751; Court of Appeals No.
280481.
P
EOPLE V
J
EFFREY
M
C
C
RAY
, No. 135753; Court of Appeals No. 278592.
P
EOPLE V
B
ULEY
, No. 135757; Court of Appeals No. 271801.
P
EOPLE V
A
MEIR
H
ARRIS
, No. 135758; Court of Appeals No. 273685.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal to consider
defendant’s claim that his convictions for possession of a firearm during
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1189
the commission of a felony and for felon in possession violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
P
EOPLE V
A
NDRE
S
IMMONS
, No. 135759; Court of Appeals No. 269555.
P
EOPLE V
E
RIC
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135768; Court of Appeals No. 273942.
P
EOPLE V
C
ALVIN
, No. 135771; Court of Appeals No. 274240.
P
EOPLE V
D
UNMIRE
, No. 135774; Court of Appeals No. 272737.
P
EOPLE V
K
NAJDEK
, No. 135775; Court of Appeals No. 273909.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
B
ELL
, No. 135776; Court of Appeals No. 269716.
P
EOPLE V
M
ORITZ
, No. 135777; Court of Appeals No. 275210.
P
EOPLE V
P
OUNCY
, No. 135780; Court of Appeals No. 270604.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
R
EYNOLDS
, No. 135784; Court of Appeals No. 281721.
P
EOPLE V
T
EMPLETON
, No. 135785; Court of Appeals No. 271082.
P
EOPLE V
R
OZIER
, No. 135792; Court of Appeals No. 281637.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARLES
M
EADOWS
, No. 135796; Court of Appeals No. 278299.
P
EOPLE V
C
HAMPION
, No. 135797; Court of Appeals No. 280931.
P
EOPLE V
L
OVE
, No. 135799; Court of Appeals No. 272631.
P
EOPLE V
V
AUGHN
L
EE
, No. 135800; Court of Appeals No. 273825.
P
EOPLE V
Q
UILL
, No. 135803; Court of Appeals No. 281543.
P
EOPLE V
R
IGEL
, No. 135804; Court of Appeals No. 273235.
P
EOPLE V
R
IGGINS
, No. 135805; Court of Appeals No. 272070.
P
EOPLE V
L
A
P
LANTE
, No. 135809; Court of Appeals No. 282025.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
C
OCHRANE
, No. 135810; Court of Appeals No. 269470.
P
EOPLE V
S
EAN
W
ILSON
, No. 135814; Court of Appeals No. 279559.
P
EOPLE V
C
HEESE
, No. 135815; Court of Appeals No. 272311.
P
EOPLE V
I
VY
, No. 135816; Court of Appeals No. 271789.
P
EOPLE V
M
AURICE
W
ILLIAMS
, No. 135819; Court of Appeals No. 281535.
K
ELLY
,J
.
I would grant leave to appeal for the reasons stated in my
dissent from the denial order of People v Regains, 477 Mich 1038 (2007).
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
D
WAYNE
J
AMES
, No. 135822; Court of Appeals No.
270194.
P
EOPLE V
N
GUYEN
, No. 135823; Court of Appeals No. 269409.
P
EOPLE V
A
SLANI
, No. 135824; Court of Appeals No. 280905.
G
RISWOLD V
G
ENESYS
R
EGIONAL
M
EDICAL
C
ENTER
, No. 135829; Court of
Appeals No. 275223.
1190 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
C
ORIELLE
J
OHNSON
, No. 135831; Court of Appeals No. 267822.
P
EOPLE V
A
NTHONY
L
EE
, No. 135832; Court of Appeals No. 282576.
P
EOPLE V
G
REGORY
H
AMILTON
, No. 135840; Court of Appeals No. 275479.
P
EOPLE V
K
IM
H
ARVEY
, No. 135844; Court of Appeals No. 274216.
P
EOPLE V
H
ENDERSON
, No. 135855; Court of Appeals No. 279861.
P
EOPLE V
A
DRIAN
L
EWIS
, No. 135857; Court of Appeals No. 273739.
P
EOPLE V
K
IBBY
, No. 135858; Court of Appeals No. 281987.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
T
ERRANCE
S
TEWART
, No. 135867; Court of Appeals No. 274618.
P
EOPLE V
H
ERBERT
A
LLEN
, No. 135868; Court of Appeals No. 282401.
P
EOPLE V
E
LIE
, No. 135873; Court of Appeals No. 275081.
P
EOPLE V
N
EWELL
, No. 135874; Court of Appeals No. 282151.
P
EOPLE V
P
OUNDERS
, No. 135878; Court of Appeals No. 272039.
P
EOPLE V
C
HARVAT
, No. 135884; Court of Appeals No. 271754.
P
EOPLE V
R
ONALD
R
OSS
, No. 135886; Court of Appeals No. 281563.
C
OTTER V
W
ISNER
, No. 135887; Court of Appeals No. 278280.
M
C
C
OY V
L
AMOTTE
C
OACHLIGHT
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135889; Court of
Appeals No. 272440.
L
EWIS
-C
LARK V
G
LAZIER
, No. 135892; Court of Appeals No. 273716.
Reconsideration Granted April 28, 2008:
In re H
ROBA
T
RUST
(H
ROBA V
H
ROBA
), No. 135277. The motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s February 6, 2008, order is granted. On
reconsideration, we modify our order dated February 6, 2008. For the
reasons stated in that order, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
Oakland County Probate Court’s judgment on res judicata grounds. But
rather than reinstate the probate court’s judgment, we remand this case
to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the remaining issues not
addressed by that court during its initial review of this case. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich
1059. Court of Appeals No. 266783.
Reconsiderations Denied April 28, 2008:
J
ORDAN V
M
ERCY
M
EMORIAL
H
OSPITAL
, No. 131670. Summary disposition
entered at 480 Mich 979. Court of Appeals No. 259224.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1191
P
EOPLE V
F
ONZA
J
ACKSON
, No. 132060. Leave to appeal denied at 480
Mich 1102. Court of Appeals No. 268470.
K
ELLY
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would
remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether an appeal was taken from the Wayne County
Probate Court Juvenile Division order waiving jurisdiction over defen-
dant to the Detroit R ecorder’s Court, for the reasons set forth in my
dissenting statement in this case, 480 Mich 1102 (2008).
B
ERO
M
OTORS,
I
NC V
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION
, No. 132540. Leave
to appeal denied at 480 Mich 1053. Court of Appeals No. 257675.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in Justice C
ORRIGAN
’s
dissenting statement in this case, 480 Mich 1053 (2008).
In re B
ALDWIN
T
RUST
(S
HOAFF V
W
OODS
), Nos. 133622, 133623. Summary
disposition entered at 480 Mich 915. Reported below: 274 Mich App 387.
M
ARTIN V
SMG, No. 134358. Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich
1043. Court of Appeals No. 273528.
S
TRUCK V
K
USMIERZ
, No. 135138. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1060. Court of Appeals No. 276219.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration,
would remand this case to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted for
that court to determine whether a person suffering from a post-traumatic
stress disorder is suffering from an “objectively manifested” impairment
of an important bodily function under MCL 500.3135(7).
D
ENK V
M
ARDEROSIAN
, No. 135329. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1076. Court of Appeals No. 276746.
Leave to Appeal Granted April 30, 2008:
S
CIOTTI V
36
TH
D
ISTRICT
C
OURT
, No. 134328. The parties shall include
among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the plaintiff produced viable
statistical evidence of racial discrimination in support of each of his
claims; (2) whether the courts below erred in treating the plaintiff’s
distinct claims of discrimination in hiring/promotion as a single course of
conduct; (3) whether and to what extent the plaintiff and each successful
applicant was qualified or not qualified for each distinct position, and
whether the evidence in each circumstance was sufficient to demonstrate
that, more likely than not, the failure to promote the plaintiff included an
element of purposeful racial discrimination; (4) whether the defendant
provided a race-neutral reason for each decision; and (5) whether there is
a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that, more likely than not, each
decision was a pretext for racial discrimination.
The Michigan Association for Justice and Michigan Defense Trial
Counsel, Inc., are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or
groups interested in the determination of the questions presented in this
case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
Court of Appeals No. 266160.
1192 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
EOPLE V
B
ORGNE
, No. 134967. The parties shall address: (1) whether
the defendant’s constitutional rights under Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610,
619 (1976), were violated, (2) whether the claim of error under Doyle was
properly preserved at trial, (3) the resulting appropriate standard of
review on appeal, and (4) whether any error was harmless under the
applicable standard of review.
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae.
Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Court of Appeals No. 269572.
G
ENERAL
M
OTORS
C
ORPORATION V
A
LUMI
-B
UNK,
I
NC
, No. 135117. The
parties shall address: (1) whether there is an exception to the economic loss
doctrine–which provides that parties to a purely commercial dispute are
limited to the remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et
seq.; see Neibarger v Universal Cooperatives, Inc, 439 Mich 512, 520, 528
(1992)–for claims of fraud in the inducement, see Huron Tool & Engineer-
ing Co v Precision Consulting Services, Inc, 209 Mich App 365 (1995); and,
if so, (2) whether the fraud claims in this case are sufficiently distinguishable
from the contract claims for purposes of applying the fraudulent inducement
exception. Court of Appeals No.270430.
P
EOPLE V
H
AROLD
S
HAFIER,
III, No. 135435. The parties shall address: (1)
whether the defendant’s constitutional rights under Doyle v Ohio, 426
US 610, 619 (1976), were violated, (2) whether the claim of error under
Doyle was properly preserved at trial, (3) the resulting appropriate
standard of review on appeal, and (4) whether any error was harmless
under the applicable standard of review.
We further order the Allegan Circuit Court, in accordance with Admin-
istrative Order No. 2003-3, to determine whether the defendant is indigent
and, if so, to appoint counsel to represent the defendant in this Court.
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae.
Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Reported below: 277 Mich App 137.
Leave to Appeal Denied April 30, 2008:
K
ORPAL V
S
HAHEEN
, No. 133717; Court of Appeals No. 266418.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
, and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would reverse the portion of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals that dismissed with prejudice the
plaintiffs’ additional claims regarding the chest x-rays, because the
dismissal should have been without prejudice. See Kirkaldy v Rim, 478
Mich 581 (2007). We would remand this case to the trial court for entry
of an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ additional claims without prejudice.
C
OATES V
B
ASTIAN
B
ROTHERS,
I
NC
, No. 135011; reported below: 276 Mich
App 498.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
, and K
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1193
W
AYLAND V
N
EW
L
IGHT
N
URSING
H
OME
C
ORPORATION
, No. 135152; Court
of Appeals No. 271821.
A
DAMUS V
B
IGGER
, No. 135351; Court of Appeals No. 278724.
S
MITH V
C
APITAL
A
REA
T
RANSPORTATION
A
UTHORITY
, No. 135536; Court of
Appeals No. 277422.
P
EOPLE V
D
AVID
H
ALL
, No. 135807; Court of Appeals No. 271409.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the defendant’s conviction, for the reasons stated in the Court
of Appeals dissenting opinion.
Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave
to Appeal May 2, 2008:
In re R
AYMOND
E
STATE
(M
ORSE V
S
HARKEY
), No. 134461. We direct the
clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or
take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall submit
supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing:
(1) whether the will’s language is sufficient to convey the possibility that
the class of “brother[s] and sisters that survive me” might have no
members; (2) whether the language “or to the survivor or survivors
thereof” creates an alternative devise to the descendants of predeceased
siblings of the testator (or Claude Raymond) which only takes effect if all
of the testator’s (or Claude Raymond’s) siblings predecease the testator;
(3) what significance, if any, should be attributed to the placement of the
language “share and share alike” in the middle of the pertinent clause,
rather than at the end; and (4) what effect, if any, the antilapse statute
(MCL 700.2603) should have on the construction of the will language at
issue. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their applica-
tion papers. Reported below: 276 Mich App 22.
Leave to Appeal Granted May 2, 2008:
B
UDGET
R
ENT
-A
-
C
AR
S
YSTEM,
I
NC V
C
ITY OF
D
ETROIT
, No. 133887. The
parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether claimant
Mark Hurt’s bodily injury arose out of the “ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle,” under MCL
500.3105(1); (2) whether Hurt’s bodily injury was accidental, under MCL
500.3105(4); (3) the impact, if any, of § 22 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act, a model act on which Michigan’s no-fault law
is based, which states: “A person intentionally causing or attempting to
cause injury to himself or another person is disqualified from ...benefits
for injury arising from his acts,” and “[a] person intentionally causes or
attempts to cause injury if he acts or fails to act for the purpose of causing
injury or with knowledge that injury is substantially certain to follow”;
and (4) whether the following Court of Appeals opinions correctly
interpret MCL 500.3105(4): Amerisure Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 262
Mich App 10, 19 (2004); Miller v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 218 Mich App
221, 226 (1996); Bronson Methodist Hosp v Forshee, 198 Mich App 617,
1194 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
630 (1993); and Frechen v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 119 Mich App 578,
582 (1982). Specifically, with regard to issue (4), the parties shall address
whether establishing that an injury was suffered or caused intentionally
under § 3105(4) requires a determination that the person subjectively
intended the injury or, instead, requires an objective analysis of whether
the person acted with knowledge “that bodily injury [wa]s substantially
certain to be caused by his act or omission.” Court of Appeals No. 271703.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring). In addition to the issues listed in the
majority’s order, I would direct the parties to address the effect, if any, of
the “absurd results” rule on this case. See Cameron v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 476 Mich 55 (2006); People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147 (1999).
T
OMECEK V
B
AVAS
, No. 134665. The parties shall include among the
issues to be briefed: (1) whether an action under the Land Division Act,
MCL 560.101 et seq., can be used to burden existing, substantive property
rights; (2) whether this Court should recognize an easement by necessity
for utilities; and (3) whether an easement by necessity may be recognized
when purchasers had notice of a restrictive covenant barring any such
easement in the absence of certain conditions.
Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Reported below: 276 Mich App 252.
P
EOPLE V
S
HAHIDEH
, No. 135495. The parties shall include among the
issues to be briefed: (a) whether MCL 768.20a governs a request by an
incarcerated defendant for an independent psychiatric evaluation to deter-
mine whether an insanity defense may be available where no notice of
intention to assert an insanity defense has been filed; (b) if the statute
governs, whether the subsections of MCL 768.20a are to be construed
seriatim, such that an independent psychiatric evaluation may not be
requested under subsection 3 without first complying with subsections 1 and
2; and, (c) if the statute does not apply, whether the defendant’s constitu-
tional rights were violated by the trial court’s decision to deny access to the
defendant for an independent psychiatric evaluation while he was in jail.
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal
Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae.
Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues
presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae. Reported below: 277 Mich App 111.
Leave to Appeal Denied May 2, 2008:
H
ILL V
C
ITY OF
W
ARREN
, No, 134720; reported below: 276 Mich App 299.
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
(concurring). I concur in the order denying leave to appeal,
but I write to point out an error in a portion of the Court of Appeals opinion
interpreting the class-certification requirements of MCR 3.501(B).
MCR 3.501(B)(1)(a) requires that a motion for class certification must
be filed “within 91 days after the filing of a complaint that includes class
action allegations.” Here, plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint on May
2, 2000, and an amended class-action complaint on June 14, 2000. Plain-
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1195
tiffs filed a motion for class certification on June 26, 2000, well within the
91-day requirement of MCR 3.501(B)(1)(a). The trial court denied that
motion, setting off a string of appellate challenges that have continued
for over seven years.
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal the trial court’s order denying class
certification, which the Court of Appeals denied.
1
Plaintiffs then filed a
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted rehearing,
reversing and remanding to the circuit court for entry of an order
granting class certification.
2
This Court held the case in abeyance
pending the Court’s consideration and release of its opinion in Pohutski
v City of Allen Park (Docket No. 116949), and Jones v City of Farmington
Hills (Docket No. 117935).
3
Upon the release of Pohutski, 465 Mich 675
(2002), this Court vacated the Court of Appeals order and remanded this
case to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration.
4
The Court of
Appeals again reversed the circuit court’s denial of class certification.
5
Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court. We reversed the
Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings,
holding that “[t]he Macomb Circuit Court’s denial of class certification is
not clearly erroneous.”
6
On remand to the trial court, plaintiffs filed a “renewed” motion for
class certification, some four years after plaintiffs filed their original
complaint. The trial court granted the motion, stating that it was
treating the motion as a motion for reconsideration of its original ruling.
On reconsideration, the trial court held that “after much careful consid-
eration of the record and pleadings filed since the court’s initial decision
denying class certification,” it was “persuaded that the commonalities in
the case outweigh the causation and damages issues to be resolved.”
Defendants again filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal,
which the Court of Appeals denied for failure to persuade that court of
the need for immediate review.
7
This Court remanded to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted to consider whether
Pohutski, affected the class-certification issue.
8
On remand, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion.
9
1
Hill v City of Warren, unpublished order, entered December 1, 2000
(Docket No. 229242).
2
Hill v City of Warren, unpublished order, entered January 29, 2001
(Docket No. 229292).
3
Hill v City of Warren, 641 NW2d 857 (2002).
4
Hill v City of Warren, 466 Mich 871 (2002).
5
Hill v City of Warren, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 4, 2003 (Docket No. 229292).
6
Hill v City of Warren, 469 Mich 964 (2003).
7
Hill v City of Warren, unpublished order, entered April 11, 2005
(Docket No. 259706).
8
Hill v City of Warren, 474 Mich 916 (2005).
9
Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 299 (2007).
1196 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of plaintiffs’
“renewed” motion for class certification, in part, on its misinterpretation
of MCR 3.501. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs complied with
MCR 3.501, comparing a motion for certification to a motion for decer-
tification and noting:
There is no time limitation on a motion for decertification, and
indeed a party could theoretically file municipal motions, subject to
the prohibition against groundless motions found in MCR 2.114. The
plain language of the court rule mandates that a motion for certifi-
cation be brought within 91 days of the complaint; it does not forbid
subsequent motions or mandate any particular timing requirements
for bringing them. [Emphasis in original; citation omitted.]
[
10
]
The Court of Appeals interpretation of MCR 3.501 is not supported by
the rule’s plain language. MCR 3.501(B)(1)(a) provides:
Within 91 days after the filing of a complaint that includes class
action allegations, the plaintiff must move for certification that the
action may be maintained as a class action.
Neither this provision nor any of the remaining provisions of MCR 3.501
provides any textual support for the Court of Appeals conclusion that a
plaintiff may file multiple class-certification motions without any time
limits. Instead, MCR 3.501(B)(1)(b) and (3)(a) contemplate only one class
certification motion. In outlining the procedures for certification of class
actions, MCR 3.501(B)(1)(b) states that “[t]he time for filing the motion may
be extended by order on stipulation of the parties or on motion for cause
shown.” (Emphasis added.) MCR 3.501(B)(3)(a) states that “[e]xcept on
motion for good cause, the court shall not proceed with consideration of the
motion to certify....”This Court has previously explained that the word
“the” indicates the singular, whereas “a” connotes an indefinite or general
article. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 461-462 (2000) (distinguishing
“the proximate cause” from “a proximate cause”). MCR 3.501(B)(1)(b) could
have provided that “the time for filing a motion may be extended by order
on stipulation of the parties or on motion for cause shown.” MCR
3.501(B)(3)(a) could have provided that “the court shall not proceed with
consideration of a motion for certification.” Both provisions, however, did
not so provide. Absent a provision in MCR 3.501 indicating otherwise, we
interpret “the motion to certify” and “the time for filing the motion” as
allowing one motion for class certification.
Moreover, multiple class-certification motions are not contemplated.
MCR 3.501 provides specific procedures when a party cannot proceed
with a class-certification motion within the first 91 days. As noted above,
MCR 3.501(B)(1)(b) provides that the time for filing the class-
certification motion may be extended by order on stipulation of the
parties or on motion for cause shown. And MCR 3.501(B)(3)(b) provides
that “[t]he court may allow the action to be maintained as a class action,
may deny the motion, or may order that a ruling be postponed pending
discovery or other preliminary procedures.” The court rule does not offer
10
Id. at 306.
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1197
other expansive options. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in
construing MCR 3.501 to authorize multiple motions for class certifica-
tion.
11
The Court of Appeals, however, also relied on MCR 2.119(F)(1), which
provides that “[u]nless another rule provides a different procedure for
reconsideration of a decision (see, e.g., MCR 2.604[A], 2.612), a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration of the decision on a motion must be served
and filed not later than 14 days after entry of an order disposing of the
motion.” MCR 2.604(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Except as provided in subrule (B), an order or other form of
decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims, or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties, does not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order is subject to
revision before entry of final judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Under MCR 2.604(A), a trial court has the power to revisit its prior
rulings unless it has entered a final judgment that adjudicates all the
claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties. Here, plaintiffs filed their
motion for class certification within 91 days of filing their class-action
complaint. While the trial court initially denied plaintiffs’ motion, that
denial was not a final judgment on all the claims, rights, and liabilities of
the parties. Therefore, the trial court did not err in reconsidering its prior
ruling on plaintiffs’ class-certification motion under MCR 2.604(A). On
that basis, I concur in the order denying leave to appeal.
P
EOPLE V
L
IGHT
, No. 135332. We take this opportunity to emphasize
that it is improper for a prosecutor to make a personal attack on defense
counsel, suggesting to jurors in closing argument that counsel is inten-
tionally trying to mislead them. Although such conduct may not require
reversal in a given case, it is still improper and unbecoming of a
representative of the state. Court of Appeals No. 270211.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur with the order denying leave to
appeal. I write separately because I disagree with the order’s implication
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument by
suggesting that defense counsel was intentionally trying to mislead the
jury. The Court of Appeals considered and properly rejected defendant’s
argument that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper:
Defendant claims that the prosecutor made several improper
remarks during the rebuttal argument. First, defendant takes
issue with the prosecutor’s comment that defense counsel clouded
up the facts and muddied the waters, and the prosecutor was going
to cleanse the water for the jury. The next comment at issue is the
prosecutor’s reference to the defense as a cockroach defense.
11
The Court of Appeals also erred in stating that MCR 3.501 could
allow a party to file multiple motions for class decertification. Nothing in
the rule lends support to such an interpretation.
1198 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Viewing these remarks in context, the prosecutor was fairly
responding to defense counsel’s closing argument. Defense counsel
spent considerable time talking about the collection of the evi-
dence at the scene as a “shoddy investigation,” especially because
the evidence technicians did not collect any of the blood around the
body, just assuming that the blood was all Healey’s, therefore
losing any evidence of the killer. In addition, because there was no
finding of defendant’s blood near the body, the testimony was
consistent with defendant’s story.
In response, the prosecutor complimented defense counsel’s
argument and made the comment about cleansing the water to the
jury to indicate that he planned to respond to the argument with
a clear summary of the evidence that was presented to support the
prosecution’s case. During the prosecution’s explanation of the
evidence, he [the prosecutor] used an analogy of the defense
mechanisms different animals in the animal kingdom use to
survive and compared the defense argument to the way an octopus
squirts a big cloud of dark ink to make it difficult to see. Then, the
prosecutor continued that a variation would be the cockroach
defense, where the facts can be contaminated by crawling around
all over them until there’s reasonable doubt. [People v Light,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
August 28, 2007 (Docket No. 270211), slip op at 5.]
I agree with the Court of Appeals analysis. Although a prosecutor
generally may not suggest that defense counsel is intentionally attempt-
ing to mislead the jury, the prosecutor’s comments must be considered in
light of defense counsel’s arguments. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572,
592-593 (2001). A prosecutor may permissibly suggest that defense
counsel was trying to distract the jury from the truth when the remarks
are made in rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument. Id. Specifically, such
remarks are not improper when made in response to defense counsel’s
argument that the police conducted a sloppy investigation. People v
Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608 (1996). Further, “[a] prosecutor need
not limit her arguments to ‘the blandest possible terms.’ ” People v
Williams, 265 Mich App 68, 71 (2005), aff’d 475 Mich 101 (2006).
Here, to illustrate his point that defense counsel was attempting to
“muddy[] the waters” in order to create a reasonable doubt, the prosecu-
tor used an analogy of the defense mechanisms that animals use to
survive. The prosecutor explained that an octopus squirts a cloud of ink
to make it difficult to see what is behind the cloud. He then stated that
a variation would be the “cockroach defense,” where the facts can be
contaminated by crawling all over them to create a reasonable doubt.
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s comments. Although
the prosecutor’s suggestion that defense counsel was attempting to
“cloud up” or “contaminate” the facts would, by itself, be improper, it was
not improper in the context of defense counsel’s argument. As the Court
of Appeals explained, the prosecutor’s statements were made in direct
response to defense counsel’s closing argument, by which defense counsel
A
CTIONS ON
A
PPLICATIONS
1199
tried to create a reasonable doubt by characterizing the collection of
evidence at the scene as being the result of a “shoddy investigation.” The
prosecutor told the jury that he would “cleanse the water” for them and
provide a clear summary of the evidence. The prosecutor’s statements
were reasonable, given that they were in response to defense counsel’s
closing argument attacking the competence of the investigation. Kenne-
brew, supra at 608.
Y
OUNG
, J. I would deny leave to appeal without the further statement
found in the majority’s order.
S
MALL V
W
YSONG
, Nos. 135512, 135538; Courts of Appeals No. 275332.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I
would deny leave to appeal with regard to the characterization by the
Court of Appeals of plaintiff’s two other claims, I believe that the court
erred in characterizing as an ordinary-negligence claim plaintiff’s claim
that an x-ray should have been conducted following her appendectomy
and before her incision was closed. Because this seems to me a matter
significantly beyond common knowledge, Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nurs-
ing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411 (2004), I believe that this claim sounds in
medical malpractice.
Y
OUNG
,J.(dissenting). For the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals
dissenting opinion, I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment in part
and affirm the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff’s complaint sounded in
medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice Y
OUNG
.
In re O’B
ERRY
(D
EPARTMENT OF
H
UMAN
S
ERVICES V
O’B
ERRY
), No. 136224;
Court of Appeals No. 279493.
Reconsiderations Denied May 2, 2008:
R
AMANATHAN V
W
AYNE
S
TATE
U
NIVERSITY
B
OARD OF
G
OVERNORS
, No.
133170. Summary disposition entered at 480 Mich 1090. Court of
Appeals No. 266238.
W
EAVER
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(dissenting). F or the reasons stated in my previous state-
ment, 480 Mich 1090, 1091 (2008), I would grant defendant’s motion for
reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and dismiss the remaining claims against defendant.
P
EOPLE V
J
AMES
P
ERRY
, No. 136005. Leave to appeal denied at 480 Mich
1106. Court of Appeals No. 284102.
W
EAVER
and C
ORRIGAN
, JJ. We would grant the motion for reconsidera-
tion.
M
ARKMAN
, J. I would grant the motion for reconsideration and hold
this case in abeyance for People v Watkins (Docket No. 135787), 480 Mich
1167 (2008), in which this Court has granted leave to appeal to consider
constitutional and other issues pertaining to MCL 768.27a.
1200 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
SPECIAL ORDERS
In this section are orders of the Court (other than
grants and denials of leave to appeal from the Court of
Appeals) of general interest to the bench and bar of the
state.
Reconsideration Denied September 10, 2007:
G
RIEVANCE
A
DMINISTRATOR V
T
ROMBLEY
, No. 133099.
Rehearings Denied September 18, 2007:
T
HE
G
REATER
W
AY
B
IBLE
W
AY
T
EMPLE OF
J
ACKSON V
C
ITY OF
J
ACKSON
.
Reported at 478 Mich 373.
G
OLDSTONE V
B
LOOMFIELD
T
OWNSHIP
P
UBLIC
L
IBRARY
. Reported at 479
Mich 554.
C
AVANAGH
,W
EAVER
,andK
ELLY
, JJ. We would grant rehearing.
Order Entered September 18, 2007:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
7.215
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 7.215 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter also will be
considered at a public hearing. The notices and agendas for public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
7.215. O
PINIONS,
O
RDERS,
J
UDGMENTS, AND
F
INAL
P
ROCESS FROM
C
OURT OF
A
PPEALS.
(A)-(I) [Unchanged.]
(J) Resolution of Conflicts in Court of Appeals Decisions.
(1) [Unchanged.]
(2) Conflicting Opinion. If a A panel that follows a prior published
decision only because it is required to do so by subrule (1), and if the
ultimate disposition of the case is thereby affected, the panel must so
indicate in the text of its opinion, citing this rule and explaining its
disagreement with the prior decision and the disposition it would have
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1201
reached had it not been required to follow the prior published decision.
The panel’s opinion must be published in the official reports of opinions
of the Court of Appeals.
(3) Convening of Special Panel.
(a) Poll of Judges. Except as provided in subrule (3)(b), within 28 days
after release of the opinion indicating disagreement with a prior decision
as provided in subrule (2), the chief judge must poll the judges of the
Court of Appeals to determine whether the particular question is both
outcome determinative and warrants convening a special panel should be
convened to rehear the case for the purpose of resolving the conflict that
would have been created but for the provisions of subrule (1). Special
panels may be convened to consider outcome-determinative questions
only.
(b)-(c) [Unchanged.]
(4)-(7) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The September 18, 2007, proposed amendment of
MCR 7.215 reflects revisions recommended by the Michigan Court of
Appeals. The amendment would shift responsibility for making an
“outcome-determinative” assessment from the entire bench to the panel
deciding the case in which the conflict is raised. The amendment would
also require the panel to state the disposition it would have reached had
it not been required to follow the prior published decision.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by January 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2006-06. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Motion for Clarification Denied September 18, 2007:
P
EREZ V
F
ORD
M
OTOR
C
OMPANY
, No. 131655; Court of Appeals No.
249737 (on remand).
Rehearings Denied September 28, 2007:
T
RENTADUE V
B
UCKLER
A
UTOMATIC
L
AWN
S
PRINKLER
C
OMPANY
. Reported at
479 Mich 378.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant rehearing.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from the majority of four’s decision
to deny plaintiffs’ motion for a rehearing and repeat the concluding
paragraph of my dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case, issued
July 25, 2007:
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that with the
enactment of the Revised Judicature Act, the Legislature sought to
1202 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
abrogate the discovery rule, I would affirm the Court of Appeals
decision applying the common-law discovery rule and tolling the
period of limitations where plaintiff could not have reasonably
discovered the elements of a wrongful death cause of action within
the limitations period. [Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn
Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378, 407 (2007) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting).]
Clearly, the majority of four’s decision in this case reaches an absurd
and unjust result, and lacks common sense.
M
ICHIGAN
C
ITIZENS FOR
W
ATER
C
ONSERVATION V
N
ESTLÉ
W
ATERS
N
ORTH
A
MERICA
I
NC
. Reported at 479 Mich 280.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant rehearing.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I would grant plaintiffs’ motion for reconsid-
eration and reverse the holding
1
of the majority of four (Chief Justice
T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,Y
OUNG
,andM
ARKMAN
) that plaintiffs do not
have standing to bring a claim under the Michigan environmental
protection act
2
with respect to the Osprey Lake Impoundment and
wetlands 112, 115, and 301.
Further, I would grant plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration to
consider whether the majority of four’s holding violated plaintiffs’ right
“to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” a right
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
3
The importance of this issue stems not only from the instant case, but
also from various other holdings by the same majority denying citizens
protection of the laws and access to the Michigan court system, even
when legal rights may have been violated. See Kreiner v Fischer, 471
Mich 109 (2004) (reducing no-fault insurance rights); Maldonado v Ford
Motor Co, 476 Mich 372 (2006) (preventing trial by jury); Bierlein v
Schneider, 478 Mich 893 (2007) (preventing an injured child from
utilizing an existing Michigan court rule to collect a settlement); and
Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378 (2007)
(eliminating the common-law discovery rule, thereby depriving a plaintiff
of an opportunity to file a good-faith claim and of access to courts).
In re C
ERTIFIED
Q
UESTION FROM THE
F
OURTEENTH
C
OURT OF
A
PPEALS
D
ISTRICT OF
T
EXAS
(M
ILLER
vF
ORD
M
OTOR
C
OMPANY
). Reported at 479 Mich
498.
C
AVANAGH
and K
ELLY,
JJ. We would grant rehearing.
1
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North
America Inc, 479 Mich 280 (2007).
2
MCL 324.1701 et seq.
3
US Const, Am I forbids Congress, in pertinent part, from passing laws
abridging “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” The First Amendment
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mills v
Alabama, 384 US 214, 218 (1966).
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1203
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I dissent from this Court’s decision to deny
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. I would grant the motion for
reconsideration and vacate the Court’s decision answering a certified
question from the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas.
This Court’s decision to answer the certified question in this case
should be vacated because MCR 7.305(B), the Michigan court rule
allowing the Court to answer certified questions from other courts, goes
beyond this court’s constitutional authority to answer certified ques-
tions.
1
Further, the majority’s decision to answer the certified question in
this case is unprecedented and unnecessary.
2
Rehearing Denied October 5, 2007:
P
EOPLE V
N
YX.
Reported at 479 Mich 112.
C
ORRIGAN
,J.(concurring). I concur in the denial of the motion for
rehearing, but I write separately to clarify that double jeopardy principles
do not bar the prosecutor from charging defendant with and retrying him
for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant may be retried for
that offense because he successfully appealed his conviction and the
reversal was not based on insufficient evidence to support the guilty
verdict. See Burks v United States, 437 US 1 (1978); Tibbs v Florida, 457
US 31 (1982); Lockhart v Nelson, 488 US 33 (1988).
W
EAVER
, J. I join the statement of Justice C
ORRIGAN
.
Y
OUNG
,J.(concurring). I join in Justice C
ORRIGAN
’s concurrence in the
denial of the appellant’s motion for rehearing, as it is unnecessary for this
Court to provide further explication on what is a bedrock double jeopardy
principle. See United States v Ball, 163 US 662 (1896); Stroud v United
States, 251 US 15 (1919); Louisiana ex rel Francis v Resweber, 329 US 459
1
See In re Certified Question (Miller v Ford Motor Co), 479 Mich 498, 548
(2007) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting); see also Proposed Amendment of MCR
7.305, 462 Mich 1208 (2000) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting); In re Certified
Question (Wayne Co v Philip Morris Inc), 622 NW2d 518 (2001) (W
EAVER
,J.,
dissenting); In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes Special Projects
Procurement, Marketing & Consulting Corp v Continental Biomass Indus-
tries, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 134 (2003) (W
EAVER
, J., concurring in the result
only); In re Certified Questions (Melson v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc), 472
Mich 1225 (2005) (W
EAVER
, J., concurring); In re Certified Question (Bankey
v Storer Broadcasting Co), 432 Mich 438, 467-471 (1989) (opinion by L
EVIN
,
J.).
2
See In re Certified Question (Miller v Ford Motor Co), supra at 553
(2007) (W
EAVER
, J., dissenting); see also Berg, Cherry picking: In deciding
a certified question from Texas, the MSC took the law it liked, and left the
rest, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, August 20, 2007,p1;21MichLW1129;
<http://www.milawyersweekly.com/subscriber/archives_FTS.cfm?page=
mi/07/8200770.htm&recID=414432&QueryText=asbestos> (accessed
September 17, 2007).
1204 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(1947); Green v United States, 355 US 184 (1957); United States v Tateo,
377 US 463 (1964); United States v Ewell, 383 US 116 (1966); United
States v Scott, 437 US 82 (1978); Tibbs v Florida, 457 US 31 (1982);
Justices of Boston Muni Court v Lydon, 466 US 294 (1984); Montana v
Hall, 481 US 400 (1987); Lockhart v Nelson, 488 US 33 (1988); Monge v
California, 524 US 721 (1998).
Orders Entered October 16, 2007:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
2.119, 7.204,
AND
7.205
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is
considering amendments of Rules 2.119, 7.204, and 7.205 of the Michigan
Court Rules. This proposal is a republication of proposed amendments
initially published November 7, 2006, in this file, and reflects significant
changes from the original proposal. Before determining whether the
proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or rejected, this
notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity to comment
on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The
Court welcomes the views of all. This matter also will be considered at a
public hearing. The notices and agendas for public hearings are posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.119. M
OTION
P
RACTICE.
(A)-(E) [Unchanged.]
(F) Motions for Rehearing or Reconsideration.
(1) Unless another rule provides a different procedure for reconsid-
eration of a decision (see, e.g., MCR 2.604[A], 2.612), a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration of the decision on a motion must be served
and filed not later than 14 21 days after entry of an order disposing of
deciding the motion.
(2)-(3) [Unchanged.]
(G) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
7.204. F
ILING
A
PPEAL OF
R
IGHT;
A
PPEARANCE.
(A) Time Requirements. The time limit for an appeal of right is
jurisdictional. See MCR 7.203(A). The provisions of MCR 1.108 regarding
computation of time apply. For purposes of subrules (A)(1) and (A)(2),
“entry” means the date a judgment or order is signed, or the date that
data entry of the judgment or order is accomplished in the issuing
tribunal’s register of actions.
(1) An appeal of right in a civil action must be taken within
(a) [Unchanged.]
(b) 21 days after the entry of an order denying deciding a motion for
new trial, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration, or a motion for other
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1205
postjudgmentrelief from the order or judgment appealed, if the motion
was filed within the initial 21-day appeal period or within further time
the trial court may have allowed during that 21-day period;
(c)-(d) [Unchanged.]
If a party in a civil action is entitled to the appointment of an attorney
and requests the appointment within 14 days after the final judgment or
order, the 14-day period for the taking of an appeal or the filing of a
postjudgment motion begins to run from the entry of an order appointing
or denying the appointment of an attorney. If a timely postjudgment
motion is filed before a request for appellate counsel, the party may
request counsel within 14 days after the decision on the motion.
(2) An appeal of right in a criminal case must be taken
(a) [Unchanged.]
(b) within 42 days after entry of an order denying a timely motion for
the appointment of a lawyer pursuant to MCR 6.425(F)(G)(1);
(c) [Unchanged.]
(d) within 42 days after the entry of an order denying a motion for a
new trial, for judgmentdirected verdict of acquittal, or for resentencing to
correct an invalid sentence, if the motion was filed within the time
provided by in MCR 6.419(B), 6.429(B)(1), or 6.431(A)(1), as the case may
be.
A motion for rehearing or reconsideration of a motion mentioned in
subrules (A)(1)(b) or (A)(2)(d) does not extend the time for filing a claim
of appeal, unless the motion for rehearing or reconsideration was itself
filed within the 21- or 42-day period.
(3) [Unchanged.]
(B)-(H) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
7.205. A
PPLICATION FOR
L
EAVE TO
A
PPEAL.
(A) Time Requirements. An application for leave to appeal must be
filed within
(1) 21 days after entry of the judgment or order to be appealed from
or within other time as allowed by law or rule.; or
(2) 21 days after entry of an order deciding a motion for new trial, a
motion for rehearing or reconsideration, or a motion for other relief from
the order or judgment appealed, if the motion was filed within the initial
21-day appeal period.
For purposes of this rule subrules (A)(1) and (A)(2), “entry” means
the date a judgment or order is signed, or the date that data entry of the
judgment or order is accomplished in the issuing tribunal’s register of
actions.
(B)–(E) [Unchanged.]
(F) Late Appeal.
(1)–(2) [Unchanged.]
(3) Except as provided in subrule (F)(4), leave to appeal may not be
granted if an application for leave to appeal is filed more than 12 months
after the later of:
(a) [Unchanged.]
1206 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(b) entry of the order or judgment to be appealed from, but if a motion
for new trial, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration, or a motion for
other postjudgmentrelief from the order or judgment appealed was filed
within the initial 21-day appeal period or within further time the trial
court may have allowed during that 21-day period, then the 12 months
are counted from the entry of the order denying deciding the motion.
(4) The limitation provided in subrule (F)(3) does not apply to an
application for leave to appeal by a criminal defendant if the defendant
files an application for leave to appeal within 21 days after the trial court
decides a motion for a new trial, for directed verdict of acquittal, to
withdraw a plea, or to correct an invalid sentence, if the motion was filed
within the 6-month period prescribed time provided in MCR 6.310(C),
6.419(B), 6.429(B), and 6.431(A), or if
(a)–(c) [Unchanged.]
A motion for rehearing or reconsideration of a motion mentioned in
subrule (F)(4) does not extend the time for filing an application for leave
to appeal, unless the motion for rehearing or reconsideration was itself
filed within 21 days after the trial court decides the motion mentioned in
subrule (F)(4), and the application for leave to appeal is filed within 21
days after the court decides the motion for rehearing or reconsideration.
A defendant who seeks to rely on one of the exceptions in subrule
(F)(4) must file with the application for leave to appeal an affidavit
stating the relevant docket entries, a copy of the register of actions of the
lower court, tribunal, or agency, or other documentation showing that the
application is filed within the time allowed.
(5) [Unchanged.]
(G) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The proposed amendments of MCR 7.204 and MCR
7.205 would clarify that a party who seeks to appeal to the Court of
Appeals has 21 days after the entry of an order deciding a motion for new
trial, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration, or a motion for other
relief from the order or judgment appealed to file a claim of appeal or an
application for leave to appeal, if the motion is filed within the initial
21-day appeal period. For consistency, the time limit for filing a motion
for rehearing or reconsideration under MCR 2.119(F)(1) would be in-
creased from 14 to 21 days, and the phrase “or within further time the
trial court may have allowed during that 21-day period” was stricken
from MCR 7.204(A)(1)(b) and MCR 7.205(F)(3)(b).
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by February 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2005-36. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1207
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
3.204
AND
3.212
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is
considering an amendment of Rules 3.204 and 3.212 of the Michigan
Court Rules. Before determining whether the proposal should be
adopted, changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to
afford interested persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the
merits of the proposal, or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes
the views of all. This matter will be considered at a public hearing. The
notices and agendas for public hearings are posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
3.204. P
ROCEEDINGS
A
FFECTING
M
INORS
C
HILDREN.
(A) Unless otherwise provided by statute, original actions under MCL
722.21 et seq. that are not ancillary to any other action must be filed in
the circuit court for the county in which the minor resides.
(B) If an action is pending in circuit court for the support or custody
of a minor, or for visitation with a minor, Unless the court orders
otherwise for good cause, if a circuit court action involving child support,
custody, or parenting time is pending, or if the circuit court has
continuing jurisdiction over such matters because of a prior action:, a
subsequent action for support, custody, or visitation with regard to that
minor must be initiated as an ancillary proceeding.
(1) A new action concerning support, custody, or parenting time of the
same child must be filed as a motion or supplemental complaint in the
earlier action. The new action shall be filed as a motion if the relief
sought would have been available in the original cause of action. If the
relief sought was not available in the original action, the new action must
be filed as a supplemental complaint.
(2) A new action for the support, custody, or parenting time of a
different child of the same parents must be filed as a supplemental
complaint in the earlier action if the court has jurisdiction and the new
action is not an action for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance.
(3) A new action for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance
that also involves the support, custody, or parenting time of that child
must be filed in the same county if the circuit court for that county has
jurisdiction over the new action and the new case must be assigned to the
same judge to whom the previous action was assigned.
(4) A party may file a supplemental pleading required by this subrule
without first seeking and obtaining permission from the court. The
supplemental pleading must be served as provided in MCR 3.203(A)(2),
and an answer must be filed within the time allowed by MCR 2.108.
(B) When more than one circuit court action involving support,
custody, or parenting time of a child is pending, or more than one circuit
court has continuing jurisdiction over those matters because of prior
1208 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
actions, an original or supplemental complaint for the support, custody,
or parenting time of a different child of the same parents must be filed in
whichever circuit court has jurisdiction to decide the new action. If more
than one of the previously involved circuit courts would have jurisdiction
to decide the new action, or if the action might be filed in more than one
county within a circuit:
(1) The new action must be filed in the same county as a prior action
involving the parents’ separate maintenance, divorce, or annulment.
(2) If no prior action involves separate maintenance, divorce, or
annulment, the new action must be filed:
(a) in the county whose circuit court has issued a judgment affecting
the majority of the parents’ children in common, or
(b) if no circuit court for a county has issued a judgment affecting a
majority of the parents’ children in common, then in the county whose
circuit court has issued the most recent judgment affecting a child of the
same parents.
(C) The court may consolidate actions administratively without
holding a consolidation hearing when:
(1) the cases involve different children of the same parents but all
other parties are the same, or
(2) more than one action involves the same child and parents.
(CD) If a new action for support is filed in a circuit court in which a
party has an existing or pending support obligation, the new case must be
assigned to the same judge to whom the other case is assigned, pursuant
to MCR 8.111(D).
(DE) In a case involving a dispute regarding the custody of a minor
child, the court may, on motion of a party or on its own initiative, for good
cause shown, appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child and
assess the costs and reasonable fees against the parties involved in full or
in part.
R
ULE
3.212. P
OSTJUDGMENT
T
RANSFER OF
D
OMESTIC
R
ELATIONS
C
ASES
.
(A) Motion.
(1) A party, court-ordered custodian, or friend of the court may move
for the postjudgment transfer of a domestic relations action in accordance
with this rule, or the court may transfer such an action on its own
motion. A transfer includes a change of venue and a transfer of all friend
of the court responsibilities. The court may enter a consent order
transferring a postjudgment domestic relations action, provided the
conditions under subrule (B) are met.
(2) The postjudgment transfer of an action initiated pursuant to MCL
780.151 et seq., is controlled by MCR 3.214.
(B) Conditions.
(1) A motion filed by a party or court-ordered custodian may be
granted only if all of the following conditions are met:
(a) the transfer of the action is requested on the basis of the residence
and convenience of the parties, or other good cause consistent with the
best interests of the minor child;
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1209
(b) neither party nor the court-ordered custodian has resided in the
county of current jurisdiction for at least 6 months prior to the filing of
the motion;
(c) at least one party or the court-ordered custodian has resided in the
county to which the transfer is requested for at least 6 months prior to
the filing of the motion; and
(d) the county to which the transfer is requested is not contiguous to
the county of current jurisdiction.
(2) When the court or the friend of the court initiates a transfer, the
conditions stated in subrule (B)(1) do not apply.
(C) Unless the court orders otherwise for good cause, if a friend of the
court becomes aware of a more recent final judgment involving the same
parties issued in a different county, the friend of the court must initiate
a transfer of the older case to the county in which the new judgment was
entered if neither of the parents, any of their children who are affected by
the judgment in the older case, nor another party resides in the county in
which the older case was filed.
(CD) Transfer Order.
(1) The court ordering a postjudgment transfer must enter all
necessary orders pertaining to the certification and transfer of the action.
The transferring court must send to the receiving court all court files and
friend of the court files, ledgers, records, and documents that pertain to
the action. Such materials may be used in the receiving jurisdiction in the
same manner as in the transferring jurisdiction.
(2) The court may order that any past-due fees and costs be paid to the
transferring friend of the court office at the time of transfer.
(3) The court may order that one or both of the parties or the
court-ordered custodian pay the cost of the transfer.
(DE) Filing Fee. An order transferring a case under this rule must
provide that the party who moved for the transfer pay the statutory filing
fee applicable to the court to which the action is transferred, except
where MCR 2.002 applies. If the parties stipulate to the transfer of a case,
they must share equally the cost of transfer unless the court orders
otherwise. In either event, the transferring court must submit the filing
fee to the court to which the action is transferred, at the time of transfer.
If the court or the friend of the court initiates the transfer, the statutory
filing fee is waived.
(EF) Physical Transfer of Files. Court and friend of the court files
must be transferred by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, or by another secure method of transfer.
(G) Upon completion of the transfer, the transferee friend of the court
must review the case and determine whether the case contains orders
specific to the transferring court or county. The friend of the court must
take such action as is necessary, which may include obtaining ex parte
orders to transfer court- or county-specific actions to the transferee
court.
Staff Comment: The proposed amendments of MCR 3.204 would
consolidate multiple actions involving more than one child of the same
parents in a single action so that all issues between the parents can be
1210 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
determined in a single action. The proposed amendments would also
require multiple cases involving children of the same parents to be filed
in the same county when possible to allow a single judge to consider all
support, custody, and parenting time matters involving the same family.
The proposed amendments of MCR 3.212 would require the friend of
the court to transfer cases to allow a court to consolidate multiple cases
involving different children of the same parents in a single court so that
all issues between the parents could be determined in a single action. The
proposed amendments also would allow the transferee friend of the court
to take ex parte action to obtain orders to change county-specific orders
to the transferee county or circuit.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by February 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, Ml 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2006-04. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
2.306
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 2.306 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The schedule and agendas for public hearings are posted on the
Court’s website, www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probably adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.306. D
EPOSITIONS ON
O
RAL
E
XAMINATION
.
(A)-(C) [Unchanged.]
(D) Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination.
(1) Any objection during a deposition must be stated concisely and in
a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.
(2) If the court finds that any impediment, delay, or other conduct has
frustrated the fair examination of the deponent, it may impose on the
person or persons responsible an appropriate sanction, including the
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by any party as a result
thereof.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1211
(1)(3) At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a
party or of the deponent and on a showing that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in a manner unreasonably to annoy, embarrass,
or oppress the deponent or party, or that the matter inquired about is
privileged, a court in which the action is pending or the court in the
county or district where the deposition is being taken may order the
person conducting the examination to cease taking the deposition, or may
limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in
MCR 2.302(C). If the order entered terminates the examination, it may
resume only on order of the court in which the action is pending.
(2)(4) On demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the
deposition must be suspended for the time necessary to move for an
order. MCR 2.313(A)(5) applies to the award of expenses incurred in
relation to the motion.
(3)(5) If a party knows before the time scheduled for the taking of a
deposition that he or she will assert that the matter to be inquired about
is privileged, the party must move to prevent the taking of the deposition
before its occurrence or be subject to costs under subrule (G).
(4)(6) A party who has a privilege regarding part or all of the
testimony of a deponent must either assert the privilege at the depostion
or lose the privilege as to that testimony for purposes of the action. A
party who claims a privilege at a deposition may not at the trial offer the
testimony of the deponent pertaining to the evidence objected to at the
deposition. A party who asserts a privilege regarding medical information
is subject to the provisions of MCR 2.314(B).
(E)-(G) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: This proposal would require objections to be concise,
nonargumentative, and nonsuggestive, and would allow a court to impose
sanctions against an attorney who fails to comply with the requirement.
The proposed changes are similar to language contained in FR Civ P
30(d)(1).
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on this proposal may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by February 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 38909, or [email protected]. All
comments will be posted on the Court’s website. When filing a comment,
please refer to ADM File No. 2007-09.
Leave to Appeal from the Attorney Discipline Board Denied October 29,
2007:
G
RIEVANCE
A
DMINISTRATOR V
B
UTCHER
, No. 134460.
Order Entered October 31, 2007:
1212 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
2.510
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering
amendments of Rule 2.510 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before deter-
mining whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adop-
tion, or rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the
opportunity to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to
suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter
also will be considered at a public hearing. The notices and agendas for
public hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.510. J
UROR
P
ERSONAL
H
ISTORY
Q
UESTIONNAIRE.
(A)–(D) [Unchanged.]
(E) Special Provision Pursuant to MCL 600.1324. If a city located in
more than one county is entirely within a single district of the district
court, jurors shall be selected for district court attendance from a list that
includes the names and addresses of jurors from the entire city, regard-
less of the county in which the juror resides or the county where the cause
of action arose.
Staff Comment: The proposed amendment of MCR 2.510 would
require that, in a district-court district comprised of a city located in two
or more counties, jurors must be selected for district court attendance
regardless of the county in which the juror resides or the county where
the cause of action arose, pursuant to MCL 600.1324.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by February 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2007-21. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Order Entered November 2, 2007:
In re T
RUDEL
, No. 121995. The motion for entry of a default judgment
is considered pursuant to MCR 3.101(S), and it is granted. A default
judgment in the amount of $15,241.66 is granted against the garnishee.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting). I would deny the Judicial Tenure Commis-
sion’s motion for the Supreme Court to enter a default judgment against
the garnishee defendant, California Charley’s Corporation. The respon-
dent, Judge Trudel, is the apparent sole shareholder of that corporation,
and there is no constitutional authority to assess costs against the
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1213
respondent. Therefore, there is no corresponding authority to enter a
default judgment against the garnishee defendant. Thus, the commis-
sion’s motion should be denied.
See my statement concurring in the September 22, 2006, order in this
matter denying appointment of a receiver and relief from orders. 477
Mich 1202, 1203 (2006). In that statement, I objected to the commission’s
attempt to have the Supreme Court order the assessment and collection
of costs against the respondent because there is no constitutional
authority for the Supreme Court to assess costs against a judge as a
respondent in a matter involving the Judicial Tenure Commission.
Subsection 2 of Const 1963, art 6, § 30 establishes the Supreme
Court’s limited authority to discipline and provides that “the supreme
court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a
judge....”AsIstatedinmyconcurrence in In re Noecker, 472 Mich 1,
18-19 (2005), “[n]othing in this constitutional provision gives this Court
any authority to discipline the judge by assessing the judge the costs of
the Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings against him or her.”
While under Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) the Supreme Court also has the
authority to “make rules implementing this section [concerning the
Judicial Tenure Commission],”
1
the Supreme Court cannot create Judi-
cial Tenure Commission rules that authorize the Judicial Tenure Com-
mission to recommend to the Supreme Court something that the Su-
preme Court does not have constitutional authority to do. The rule-
making authority available to the Supreme Court is limited to making
rules “implementing this section.” And, because “this section” provides
that “the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary,
retire or remove a judge,” this Court only has the authority to make rules
implementing the section in connection with the censure, suspension
with or without salary, or retirement or removal of a judge. Assessment
and collection of costs is not included in this authority to discipline a
judge. As the Supreme Court does not have authority to assess and collect
costs granted to it by the Michigan Constitution, there is no correspond-
ing rule-making authority to provide for the Judicial Tenure Commission
to recommend to the Supreme Court the assessment and collection of
costs against a respondent judge. This Court may not delegate authority
that it lacks in the first place.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting). I would deny the motion for entry of a default
judgment because it appears that the interrogatories that serve as the
basis for the default judgment were not served within the time permitted
by MCR 3.101(L)(1).
Order Entered November 20, 2007:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
2.203
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
1
While not pertinent to the matter now before us, the Supreme Court
also has the authority to make rules “providing for confidentiality and
privilege of proceedings.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2).
1214 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
amendment of Rule 2.203 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter also will be
considered at a public hearing. The notices and agendas for public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.203. J
OINDER OF
C
LAIMS,
C
OUNTERCLAIMS, AND
C
ROSS
-C
LAIMS.
(A) Compulsory Joinder of claims and counterclaims. In a pleading
that states a claim against an opposing party, the A pleader must join in
a complaint or counterclaim every claim that the pleader has against that
opposing party at the time of serving the pleading, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not
be stated if at the time the action was commenced, the claim was the
subject of another pending action.
(B)-(F) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The current Michigan Court Rules contain a compul-
sory joinder provision, which generally requires that all claims arising
from the same transaction or occurrence be combined, and a permissive
counterclaim provision, which allows, but does not require, parties to
bring a counterclaim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain
opposite provisions; i.e., a compulsory counterclaim provision at FR Civ
P 13, and a permissive claim joinder provision at FR Civ P 18. This
proposal would require the compulsory joinder of counterclaims, similar
to the federal rules.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by March 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2005-25. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Leave to Appeal From the Attorney Discipline Board Denied November 29,
2007:
G
RIEVANCE
A
DMINISTRATOR V
D
IB
, No. 134180.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1215
Order Entered December 4, 2007:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
9.208
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 9.208 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The schedule and agendas for public hearings are posted on the
Court’s website, www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
9.208. E
VIDENCE.
(A)-(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) Discovery.
(1) Pretrial or discovery proceedings are not permitted, except as
follows:
(a) At least 21 days before a scheduled public hearing,
(i) the parties shall provide to one another, in writing, the names and
addresses of all persons whom they intend to call at the hearing, and a
copy of all statements and affidavits given by those persons, and any
material in their possession that they intend to introduce as evidence at
the hearing,; and
(ii) the commission shall make available to the respondent for
inspection or copying all exculpatory material in its possession, as well as
any other material in its possession that it intends to introduce as
evidence at the hearing.
(b) The parties shall give supplemental notice to one another within 5
days after any additional witness or material has been identified and at
least 10 days before a scheduled hearing.
(2) A deposition may be taken of a witness who is living outside the
state or who is physically unable to attend a hearing.
(3) The commission or the master may order a prehearing conference
to obtain admissions or otherwise narrow the issues presented by the
pleadings.
If a party fails to comply with subrules (C)(1) or (2), the master may,
on motion and showing of material prejudice as a result of the failure,
impose one or more of the sanctions set forth in MCR 2.313(B)(2)(a)-(c).
Staff Comment: This proposal would require all parties to a Judicial
Tenure Commission proceeding that is scheduled for a public hearing to
1216 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
exchange material in their possession that they intend to introduce as
evidence at the hearing. Currently, this requirement applies only to the
Judicial Tenure Commission. The proposal also would require the parties
to give supplemental notice of any additional material at least 10 days
before a scheduled hearing.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by April 1, 2008, at P.O.
ments will be posted on the Court’s website. When filing a comment,
please refer to ADM File No. 2007-36.
Order Entered December 5, 2007:
In re A
NONYMOUS
J
UDGE V
J
UDICIAL
T
ENURE
C
OMMISSION
, No. 134505. The
motion to seal the file is granted, in order to preserve the confidentiality
of Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings provided by MCR 9.221. The
complaint for superintending control is considered, and relief is denied,
because the Court is not persuaded that it should grant the requested
relief.
K
ELLY
,J.(concurring). I concur in the decision to deny the relief
sought in the belief, shared I think by others on the Court, that the
Judicial Tenure Commission will act on plaintiff’s requests for disquali-
fication before taking any other formal action in this matter.
Order Entered December 21, 2007:
P
ROPOSED
N
EW
R
ULE
8.126
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of
the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering adoption of
proposed new Rule 8.126 of the Michigan Court Rules, as well as
proposed amendments of Rule 9.108 of the Michigan Court Rules and
Rule 15 of the Rules Concerning the State Bar of Michigan. Before
determining whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before
adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the
opportunity to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to
suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter
also will be considered at a public hearing held by the Court before a final
decision is made. The schedule and agendas for public hearings are
posted on the Court’s website, www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1217
[MCR 8.126 is a proposed new rule; proposed revisions of existing
MCR 9.108 and Rule 15 of the Rules Concerning the State Bar of
Michigan are indicated in underlining and in strikeover.]
R
ULE
8.126. T
EMPORARY
A
DMISSION TO THE
B
AR.
(A) Temporary Admission. Any person who is licensed to practice law
in another state or territory, or in the District of Columbia, of the United
States of America, or in any foreign country, and who is not disbarred or
suspended in any jurisdiction, and who is eligible to practice in at least
one jurisdiction, may be permitted to appear and practice in a specific
case in a court or before an administrative tribunal or agency in this state
when associated with and on motion of an active member of the State Bar
of Michigan who appears of record in the case. An out-of-state attorney
may appear and practice under this rule in no more than three cases in
a 365-day period. Permission to appear and practice is within the
discretion of the court or administrative tribunal or agency, and may be
revoked at any time for misconduct. For purposes of this rule, an
out-of-state attorney is one who is licensed to practice law in another
state or territory, or in the District of Columbia, of the United States of
America, or in a foreign country.
(1) Procedure.
(a) Motion. The Michigan attorney with whom the out-of-state
attorney is associated shall file an appearance and a motion that seeks
permission for the appearance by the out-of-state attorney with the court
or administrative tribunal or agency. The motion shall be supported by an
affidavit of the out-of-state attorney seeking temporary admission, which
shall verify (1) the jurisdictions in which the attorney is or has been
licensed or has sought licensure; (2) that the attorney is not disbarred or
suspended in any jurisdiction, and is not the subject of any pending
disciplinary actions, and that the attorney is licensed and is in good
standing in all jurisdictions where licensed; and (3) that he or she is
familiar with the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. The out-of-
state attorney shall attach to the affidavit a certificate of good standing
from each jurisdiction in which the attorney is licensed. The motion shall
include an attestation of the Michigan attorney that the attorney has
read the out-of-state attorney’s affidavit, has made a reasonable inquiry
concerning the averments made therein, and believes the out-of-state
attorney’s representations are true. The out-of-state attorney shall also
sign the motion.
(b) The Michigan attorney shall send a copy of the motion and
supporting affidavit to the Attorney Grievance Commission. Within
seven days after receipt of the copy of the motion, the Attorney Grievance
Commission must notify the court or administrative tribunal or agency if
the out-of-state attorney has been granted permission to appear tempo-
rarily in Michigan within the past 365 days, and, if so, the number of such
appearances.
(c) Order, Fee. If the court or administrative tribunal grants permis-
sion to appear, it shall enter an order, a copy of which it must send to the
Michigan attorney. The Michigan attorney in turn shall send a copy of the
order to the Attorney Grievance Commission. The order shall state that
1218 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
the appearance by the out-of-state attorney is effective on the date the
attorney pays a fee equal to the discipline and client-protection portions
of a SBM member’s annual dues. The fee may be waived if the client is
indigent. The fee shall be paid to the State Bar of Michigan for the
exclusive use of the Attorney Grievance Commission.
(d) By seeking permission to appear under this rule, an out-of-state
attorney consents to the jurisdiction of Michigan’s attorney disciplinary
system.
R
ULE
9.108. A
TTORNEY
G
RIEVANCE
C
OMMISSION.
(A) Authority of Commission. The Attorney Grievance Commission is
the prosecution arm of the Supreme Court for discharge of its constitu-
tional responsibility to supervise and discipline Michigan attorneys and
those temporarily admitted to practice under MCR 8.126.
(B)-(D) [Unchanged.]
(E) Powers and Duties. The commission has the power and duty to:
(1)-(7) [Unchanged.]
(8) compile and maintain a list of out-of-state attorneys who have
been admitted to practice temporarily under MCR 8.126 and the dates
those attorneys were admitted, and
(8)(9) perform other duties provided in these rules.
R
ULE
15. A
DMISSION TO THE
B
AR.
Sec. 1 [Unchanged.]
Sec. 2 Foreign Attorney; Temporary Permission. Any person who is
duly licensed to practice law in another state or territory, or in the
District of Columbia, of the United States of America, or in any foreign
country, may be temporarily admitted under MCR 8.126permitted to
engage in the trial of a specific case in a court or before an administrative
tribunal or agency in this Sstate when associated with and on motion of
an active member of the State Bar of Michigan who appears of record in
the case. Such temporary permission may be revoked by the court or
administrative tribunal or agency summarily at any time for misconduct.
Sec. 3 [Unchanged.]
Staff comment: This proposal would allow an out-of-state attorney to
be authorized to appear temporarily (also known as pro hac vice
appearance) in no more than three cases within a 365-day period. The
rule would impose a fee equal to the discipline and client-protection fund
portions of a bar member’s annual dues (currently $135) for each
appearance, because misconduct will subject the out-of-state attorney to
disciplinary action in Michigan. The Attorney Grievance Commission
would keep a record of all such temporary appearances ordered by
Michigan courts, and would be entitled to receipt of the fee paid in
applying for the temporary admission.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by April 1, 2008, at P.O.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1219
a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2004-08. Your comments and
the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Leave to Appeal from the Attorney Discipline Board Denied January 8,
2008:
G
RIEVANCE
A
DMINISTRATOR V
W
EIDEMAN
, No. 135090.
Superintending Control Denied January 22, 2008:
In re B
ELLVILLE
, No. 135249.
In re B
ROGUE
, No. 135269.
Orders Entered January 23, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
2.603
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 2.603 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The notices and agendas for public hearings are posted on the
Court’s website, www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.603. D
EFAULT AND
D
EFAULT
J
UDGMENT.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Default Judgment.
(1) [Unchanged.]
(2) Default Judgment Entered by Clerk. On request of the plaintiff
supported by an affidavit as to the amount due, the clerk may sign and
enter a default judgment for that amount and costs against the defen-
dant, if
(a) the plaintiff’s claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for
a sum that can by computation be made certain;
(b) the default was entered because the defendant failed to appear;
and
(c) the defaulted defendant is not an infant or incompetent person.
1220 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
The clerk may not enter or record a default judgment based on a note
or other written evidence of indebtedness negotiable instrument until the
note or writing negotiable instrument is filed with the clerk for cancel-
lation, except by special order of the court.
(3)-(4) [Unchanged.]
(C)-(E) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: This proposal would require that only negotiable
instruments be filed with the clerk for cancellation when applying for a
default judgment.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on this proposal may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by May 1, 2008, at P.O.
ments will be posted on the Court’s website. When filing a comment,
please refer to ADM File No. 2006-10.
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENTS OF
R
ULES
2.614, 7.101, 7.209,
AND
7.302
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of the Court, this is to advise that the
Court is considering amendments of Rules 2.614, 7.101, 7.209, and 7.302
of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determining whether the proposal
should be adopted, changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is
given to afford interested persons the opportunity to comment on the
form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The Court
welcomes the views of all. This matter will be considered at a public
hearing by the Court before a final decision is made. The notices and
agendas for public hearings are posted on the Court’s website,
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its current form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.614. S
TAY OF
P
ROCEEDINGS TO
E
NFORCE
J
UDGMENT.
(A)-(C) [Unchanged.]
(D) Stay on Appeal. Stay on appeal is governed by MCR 7.101(H),
7.209, and 7.302(G). If a party appeals a trial court’s denial of the party’s
claim of governmental immunity, the party’s appeal operates as an
automatic stay of proceedings until the issue of the party’s status is
finally decided.
(E)-(G) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
7.101. P
ROCEDURE
G
ENERALLY
[A
PPEALS TO
C
IRCUIT
C
OURT
].
(A)-(G) [Unchanged.]
(H) Stay of Proceedings.
(1) Civil Actions.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1221
(a) Unless otherwise provided by rule or ordered by the trial court, an
execution may not issue and proceedings may not be taken to enforce an
order or judgment until the expiration of the time for taking an appeal
under subrule (B).
(b) An appeal does not stay execution unless
(i) the appellant files a stay bond to the opposing party as provided by
this rule or by law; or
(ii) the appellant is exempted by law from filing a bond or is excused
from filing a bond under MCL 600.2605 or MCR 3.604(L) and the trial
court grants a stay on motion.; or
(iii) a party appeals a trial court’s denial of the party’s claim of
governmental immunity, and the appeal is pending.
(c) The stay bond must be set by the trial court in an amount adequate
to protect the opposing party. If the appeal is by a person against whom
a money judgment has been entered, it must be not less than 11/4 times
the amount of the judgment. The bond must:
(i) recite the names and designations of the parties and the judge in
the trial court, identify the parties for whom and against whom judgment
was entered, and state the amount recovered;
(ii) contain the conditions that the appellant
(A) will diligently prosecute the appeal to a decision and, if a judgment
is rendered against him or her, will pay the amount of the judgment,
including costs and interest;
(B) will pay the amount of the judgment, if any, rendered against him
or her in the trial court, including costs and interest, if the appeal is
dismissed;
(C) will pay any costs assessed against him or her in the circuit court;
and
(D) will perform any other act prescribed in the statute authorizing
appeal; and
(iii) be executed by the appellant with one or more sufficient sureties
as required by MCR 3.604.
If the appeal is from a judgment for the possession of land, the bond must
include the conditions provided in MCR 4.201(N)(4).
(d) Unless otherwise provided in this rule, the filing of a bond stays all
further proceedings in the trial court under the order or judgment
appealed from. If an execution has issued, it is suspended by giving notice
of the bond to the officer holding the execution.
(2) Probate Proceedings.
(a) The probate court has continuing jurisdiction to decide other
matters arising out of a proceeding in which an appeal is filed.
(b) A stay in an appeal from the probate court is governed by MCL
600.867 and MCR 5.802(C).
(3) Civil Infractions. An appeal bond and stay in a civil infraction
proceeding is governed by MCR 4.101(G).
(4) Criminal Cases. Unless a bond pending appeal is filed with the trial
court, a criminal judgment may be executed immediately even though the
time for taking an appeal has not elapsed. The granting of bond and the
1222 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
amount of it are within the discretion of the trial court, subject to the
applicable laws and rules on bonds pending appeals in criminal cases.
(5) Request for Stay Filed in Circuit Court. If a request for a stay
pending appeal is filed in the circuit court, the court may condition a stay
on the filing of a new or higher bond than otherwise required by these
rules with appropriate conditions and sureties satisfactory to the court.
(I)-(P) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
7.209. B
OND;
S
TAY OF
P
ROCEEDINGS.
(A) Effect of Appeal; Prerequisites.
(1) Except for an automatic stay pursuant to MCR 2.614(D),anAn
appeal does not stay the effect or enforceability of a judgment or order of
a trial court unless the trial court or the Court of Appeals otherwise
orders. An automatic stay under MCR 2.614(D) operates to stay proceed-
ings in a case in which a party has appealed a trial court’s denial of the
party’s claim of governmental immunity.
(2) A motion for bond or for a stay pending appeal may not be filed in
the Court of Appeals unless such a motion was decided by the trial court.
(3) A motion for bond or a stay pending appeal filed in the Court of
Appeals must include a copy of the trial court’s opinion and order, and a
copy of the transcript of the hearing on the motion in the trial court.
(B)-(D) [Unchanged.]
(E) Stay of Proceedings by Trial Court.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law or rule, the trial court may
order a stay of proceedings, with or without a bond as justice requires.
(a) When the stay is sought before an appeal is filed and a bond is
required, the party seeking the stay shall file a bond, with the party in
whose favor the judgment or order was entered as the obligee, by which
the party promises to
(i) perform and satisfy the judgment or order stayed if it is not set
aside or reversed; and
(ii) prosecute to completion any appeal subsequently taken from the
judgment or order stayed and perform and satisfy the judgment or order
entered by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
(b) If a stay is sought after an appeal is filed, any bond must meet the
requirements set forth in subrule 7.209(F).
(2) If a stay bond filed under this subrule substantially meets the
requirements of subrule (F), it will be a sufficient bond to stay proceed-
ings pending disposition of an appeal subsequently filed.
(3) The stay order must conform to any condition expressly required
by the statute authorizing review.
(4) If a government party files a claim of appeal from an order
described in MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v), the trial court shall stay proceedings
regarding that party shall be stayed during the pendency of the appeal,
unless the court of Appeals directs otherwise.
(F)-(I) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
7.302. A
PPLICATION FOR
L
EAVE TO
A
PPEAL.
(A)-(G) [Unchanged.]
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1223
(H) Stay of Proceedings. MCR 7.209 applies to appeals to the Supreme
Court. When a stay bond has been filed on appeal to the Court of Appeals
under MCR 7.209 or a stay has been entered or takes effect pursuant to
MCR 7.209(E)(4), it operates to stay proceedings pending disposition of
the appeal in the Supreme Court unless otherwise ordered by the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.
Staff Comment: This proposal would impose an automatic stay in a
case in which a party files a claim of appeal of a denial by the trial court
of the party’s claim of governmental immunity. Under this proposal, no
order would be necessary for the stay to operate.
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the bench and
bar and is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by May 1, 2008, at P.O.
ments will be posted on the Court’s §website. When filing a comment,
please refer to ADM File No. 2006-11.
Order Entered January 29, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
2.504
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 2.504 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The notices and agendas for public hearings are posted on the
Court’s website, www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.504. D
ISMISSAL OF
A
CTIONS.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect.
(1) If the plaintiff a partyfails to comply with these rules or a court
order, upon motion by an opposing party, or sua sponte, the court may
enter a default against the noncomplying party or a dismissal of the
noncomplying party’s action or claims.a defendant may move for dis-
missal of an action or a claim against that defendant.
(2) In an action, claim, or hearing tried without a jury, after the
presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence the defendant, or the court on its
1224 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
own initiative, without waiving the defendant’s right to offer evidence if
the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that on
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court
may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff,
or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence. If
the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court
shall make findings as provided in MCR 2.517.
(3) Unless the court otherwise specifies in its order for dismissal, a
dismissal under this subrule or a dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to join a party
under MCR 2.205, operates as an adjudication on the merits.
(C)-(E) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: This proposed amendment would allow a court, on
motion of any party or sua sponte, to enter a default or dismiss a party’s
action or claim for failure to comply with the rules or a court order. The
current rule allows such actions by the court only if the plaintiff makes
such a motion. The proposed amendment would also allow the court to
dismiss on its own initiative an action in which the plaintiff, on the law
and the facts presented, is not entitled to relief, and would make the rule
applicable to claims and hearings in addition to actions. The rule
currently allows only the defendant to make such a motion.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on this proposal may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by May 1, 2008, at P.O.
a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2006-32. Your comments and
the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Order Entered February 5, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
6.201
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES.
On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 6.201 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing. The notices and agendas for public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1225
R
ULE
6.201. D
ISCOVERY
.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Discovery of Information Known to the Prosecuting Attorney.
Upon request, theThe prosecuting attorney must provide each defen-
dant:
(1) any exculpatory information or evidence known to the prosecuting
attorney; and
(2) upon request,
(a) any police report and interrogation records concerning the case,
except so much of a report as concerns a continuing investigation;
(3) (b)any written or recorded statements by a defendant, codefen-
dant, or accomplice pertaining to the case, even if that person is not a
prospective witness at trial;
(4) (c)any affidavit, warrant, and return pertaining to a search or
seizure in connection with the case; and
(5) (d)any plea agreement, grant of immunity, or other agreement for
testimony in connection with the case.
(C)-(J) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The proposed amendment of MCR 6.201(B)(1) would
eliminate the requirement that the prosecuting attorney provide the
defendant with any exculpatory information or evidence known to the
prosecuting attorney only upon request. This proposal also clarifies that
the prosecuting attorney is required to provide such information or
evidence regardless of whether it is requested by the defendant. The
Court would appreciate specific comments on whether a court rule
requiring the prosecuting attorney to provide the defendant with excul-
patory information or evidence is necessary, in light of the prosecuting
attorney’s constitutional obligation to do so under Brady v Maryland,
373 US 83 (1963), and, if so, whether the proposed amendment of MCR
6.201(B)(1) is consistent with the requirements of Brady.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by May 1, 2008, at P.O.
a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2007-38. Your comments and
the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
7.202
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES.
On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 7.202 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The notices and agendas for public hearings are posted on the
Court’s website at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
1226 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
7.202. D
EFINITIONS
.
For purposes of this subchapter:
(1)-(5) [Unchanged.]
(6) “final judgment” or “final order” means:
(a) In a civil case,
(i) the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties, including such an
order entered after reversal of an earlier final judgment or order,
(ii) an order designated as final under MCR 2.604(B),
(iii) in a domestic relations action, a postjudgment order affecting the
custody of a minor,
(iv) a postjudgment order awarding or denying attorney fees and costs
under MCR 2.403, 2.405, 2.625 or other law or court rule,
(v) An order denying governmental immunity to a governmental
party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee under MCR
2.116(C)(7) or an order denying summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) in which a defendant raises a claim of governmental
immunity;
(b) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: This proposed amendment would clarify that motions
for summary disposition that involve claims of governmental immunity
based on MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10) that are denied are appealable by
right in the Court of Appeals. This proposed language is designed to
address the jurisdictional issue that arose in the cases of Newton v
Michigan State Police, 263 Mich App 251 (2004), and Walsh v Taylor, 263
Mich App 618 (2004).
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on this proposal may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by June 1, 2008, at P.O.
a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2006-09. Your comments will be
posted, along with the comments of others, at www.courts.mi.
gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Order Entered February 6, 2008:
In re T
HE
H
ONORABLE
N
ORENE
SR
EDMOND
, No. 134481. On order of the
court, the Judicial Tenure Commission has issued a decision and recom-
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1227
mendation for discipline, and the Honorable Norene S. Redmond has
consented to the commission’s finding of fact and its recommendation for
discipline.
As we conduct our de novo review of this matter, we are mindful of the
standards set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (2000):
[E]verything else being equal:
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more
serious than an isolated instance of misconduct;
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the
same misconduct off the bench;
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration
of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only
to the appearance of propriety;
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the actual administra-
tion of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than
misconduct that does;
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than
misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated;
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice
system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal contro-
versy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more
serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;
(7) misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice
on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic back-
ground, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of
justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the
basis of a class of citizenship.
The JTC should consider these and other appropriate stan-
dards that it may develop in its expertise, when it offers its
recommendations.
In this case those standards are being applied to the following findings
of the Judicial Tenure Commission, which we adopt as our own:
1. Respondent is, and at all material times was, a judge, of the
38th District Court in Eastpointe, Michigan. With respect to
Grievance No. 06—16451, Respondent was sitting as a judge of the
41A District Court (Shelby Township) acting pursuant to Joint
Local Administrative Order D37 2005—01J. As a judge, she is
subject to all the duties and responsibilities imposed on her by the
Michigan Supreme Court, and is subject to the standards for
discipline set forth in MCR 9.104 and MCR 9.205.
Grievance No. 2006-16451
1228 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
2. On January 14, 2006, Jeannine Somberg’s 16-year-old son,
Nicholas, called 911 and reported that his mother hit him with a
belt. The Shelby Township Police responded and noticed Nicholas
had a red welt on his left arm. Nicholas refused to sign a
statement.
3. Ms. Somberg, who was outside when the police arrived, was
uncooperative with one of the officer’s attempts to have her go
inside. When the officer tried to arrest her, she ran into the house
and locked herself and her 12-year-old autistic son in the bath-
room. She eventually exited the bathroom. The Shelby Township
officers arrested her for domestic violence and for resisting arrest
and obstruction of justice. The misdemeanor domestic violence
charge carried a maximum sentence of 93 days and the felony
resisting arrest and obstruction of justice charge carried a maxi-
mum of two years prison.
4. The following day, Sunday, January 15, 2006, Respondent
presided over a bond hearing for Ms. Somberg, who was unrepre-
sented. Respondent set bond at $5,000.00/10%. Ms. Somberg, who
had been transferred within the Macomb County Jail complex,
awaited release upon her parents’ payment of $500.
5. After the bond hearing, there was a disturbance in the
adjacent hallway. Ms. Somberg’s 16-year-old son Nicholas referred
to Respondent as an “asshole” out of the presence of Respondent
and his mother. A law enforcement official relayed the incident to
Respondent, who promptly went back on the record, approxi-
mately 15 minutes after the bond hearing had ended. Respondent
then raised Ms. Somberg’s bond to $25,000.00 cash/surety without
knowledge or presence of Ms. Somberg, and without citing MCR
6.106(H)(2)(a):
“THE COURT: This is the matter of Jeannine Lucido Somberg.
Miss. [sic] Somberg had been before me this morning on a
domestic violence case, involving her son, her 16 year old [sic] son
who was in the courtroom along with family members. I took the
appropriate information set a conditional bond, and given the
nature of what she told me, regarding a special needs son, I set the
bond at $5,000.00, 10 percent.”
“Upon the bond being set, in the hallway, it came to my
attention that there was an incident involving the sheriff’s depart-
ment and Shelby Township Police Officers, in which the alleged
victim in this matter, was threatening in his manner and tone,
along with other family members, and the 16 year old — was it the
— the 16 year old [sic] proceeded to call me an asshole, in the
officer’s presence, which then was brought to my attention as well.
And given the circumstances in this matter, and given the possible
violent, and assaultive nature, not only of the alleged victim, the
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1229
family and the Defendant, the bond will be $25,000.00 cash surety
only. All other terms and conditions apply.”
[5a]. Respondent initially set bond for Ms. Somberg in the
amount of $5,000.00/10%. Minutes after Ms. Somberg had been
removed, Ms. Somberg’s 16-year-old son Nicholas was overheard
in the hallway referring to Respondent as an “asshole” by county
officials, who reported the incident to Respondent. Respondent
went on the record 15 minutes after the bond hearing had
concluded and increased Ms. Somberg’s bond to $25,000.00 cash or
surety, referring to the “asshole” comment. Ms. Somberg’s parents
had already gone to pay the original $500.00 bond to get her
released, learned it had been changed to a $25,000.00 cash bond
and returned to court. Approximately half an hour later, Respon-
dent went on the record again with Ms. Somberg’s parents and son
present. Nicholas Somberg acknowledged he was the one at fault,
and repeatedly asked to be punished instead of his mother, either
by being jailed or placed in juvenile detention until Tuesday.
Respondent castigated him for his behavior but did not lower the
bond or reinstate the original bond.
[5b]. Respondent asserted her decision to increase the bond
was to “protect” the family from potential domestic violence. She
had, however, already issued a no contact except for mental health
order between Ms. Somberg and Nicholas.
6. At trial, a jury found Ms. Somberg not guilty of the under-
lying charge of domestic violence, but guilty of resisting and
obstructing.
Grievance No. 2006-16509
7. James Braun was charged with two felonies: embezzlement
from a vulnerable adult and larceny in a building, along with Isaac
Lovell. The men had taken about $800 in cash from the premises
and had given an inflated estimate for a painting job to a
90-year-old woman. The woman paid them approximately
$3,000.00, which was excessive for the amount of work done.
8. The maximum sentence for the embezzlement count is 5
years and/or $10,000.00. The maximum sentence for the larceny
count is a maximum of four years and/or $5,000.00.
9. On June 29, 2005, Respondent arraigned James Braun in
38th District Court.
10. There were television cameras in the courtroom.
11. Mr. Braun’s attorney, George Michaels, pointed out that
Mr. Braun had no prior adult or juvenile criminal record, no
history of substance abuse or addiction, had recently moved with
his parents and wife to Ortonville, Michigan, and would likely be
sentenced to probation. He accordingly asked for a low bond to be
1230 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
set. Mr. Braun provided Respondent with his recently obtained
Michigan telephone number, but had not yet changed his driver’s
license from Florida to Michigan.
12. Eastpointe Police Department Detective Neil Childs stated
that the Police Department felt anyone who would take advantage
of a 90-year-old is a threat to the public, that the Police Depart-
ment did not believe that Mr. Braun had ties to the area because he
gave the police officers a North Fort Myers, Florida address and
that Ortonville is not considered close, and that the vehicle Mr.
Braun was riding in with the co-Defendant had work orders from
Delaware. Detective Childs asked for the highest possible bond
that the Court felt was appropriate.
13. Respondent set bond for Mr. Braun at $750,000.00.
14. After the matter went to Circuit Court, the embezzlement-
from-a-vulnerable-adult and larceny-in-a-building charges against
Mr. Braun were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement. He pled no
contest to a charge of false pretenses and was sentenced to one
year probation with credit for 12 days served.
15. Isaac Lovell was charged with two felonies: embezzlement
from a vulnerable adult and larceny in a building, along with
James Braun. The men had taken about $800 in cash from the
premises, and had given an inflated estimate for a painting job to
a 90-year-old woman. The woman paid them approximately
$3,000.00, which was excessive for the amount of work done.
16. The maximum sentence for the embezzlement count is 5
years and/or $10,000.00. The maximum sentence for the larceny
count is a maximum sentence of four years and/or $5,000.00.
17. On June 29, 2005, Respondent arraigned Isaac Lovell. Mr.
Lovell’s attorney, Michael J. Dennis, pointed out that Mr. Lovell
had a minimal prior criminal history, was married, had an 11-
month-old child, and had recently established ties with the com-
munity of Ortonville, Michigan, having purchased a mobile home
where he and his family lived in a trailer park in a mobile home he
had purchased.
18. Eastpointe Police Department Detective Neil Childs
pointed out that Mr. Lovell’s criminal history dated back to 1996 in
Florida for driving while license suspended, 1998 (Osceola County)
for domestic violence battery, 2001 (Pinellas Park Police) for
driving while license suspended, an obstruction charge for failing
to appear on the driving while license suspended, 2004 for driving
while license suspended in Orange County, and 2004 driving under
the influence and driving while license suspended. On behalf of the
Eastpointe Police Department, Detective Childs said that they had
to assure the alleged victim that she and the other residents of the
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1231
state that they will be protected [sic]. Detective Childs pointed out
that Mr. Lovell have [sic] given an out-of-state address to the
officers. Detective Childs expressed concerns about Mr. Lovell’s
ties to the area and whether or not he would return to court.
Detective Childs also pointed out that Mr. Lovell appeared in the
NABI (“National Association of Bunco Investigators”) book, by
name, picture, and date of birth as a “traveler” who has had
contact with this type of activity at some point in his past.
19. Respondent set bond for Mr. Lovell at $1,000,000.00.
[19a]. Respondent’s comment, in response to Mr. Braun’s
attorney’s observation that considering all the circumstances his
client would undoubtedly get probation, to the effect that it was a
shame if convicted that that was the case, contributed to the
appearance that the grossly excessive bails she set for Mr. Braun
($750,000) and Mr. Lovell ($1,000,000) were intended to be puni-
tive.
20. After the matter went to circuit court, the embezzlement-
from-a-vulnerable-adult and larceny-in-a-building charges against
Mr. Lovell were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement. He pled no
contest to a charge of false pretenses and was sentenced to one
year probation with credit for 12 days served.
Grievance Nos. 2006-16771 and 2007-16812
21. Carmen Granata, a 23-year-old veterinarian technician,
was cited on November 5, 2006, for violating the city noise
ordinance.
22. Ms. Granata admitted hosting a large party. After attend-
ing a concert some of the guests returned. Neighbors called the
police to complain about the noise. The police initially did not
observe any violations but advised Ms. Granata about the com-
plaints. Some time around 4:00 a.m., one of the guests went
outside to use a cell phone, and yelled or spoke loudly. The police,
who were waiting in a car down the street, approached and
ticketed Ms. Granata.
23. On November 21, 2006, Ms. Granata appeared before
Respondent in pro per. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor noise
violation. Ms. Granata had no prior criminal record. The maxi-
mum penalty for the ordinance violation was 90 days and/or
$500.00.
24. During the hearing, Respondent read a petition from
certain of Ms. Granata’s neighbors who complained about the
parties and the number of guests who frequented Ms. Granata’s
house, allegedly causing disturbances. Respondent did not disclose
1232 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
that she knew some of the neighbors. Respondent also read
favorable letters from certain of Ms. Granata’s neighbors into the
record.
25. Respondent allowed three of Ms. Granata’s neighbors who
had signed the petition, Jeffrey and Melissa Walsh, and Richard
Jordan to speak out about their past experiences with Ms. Gra-
nata. Respondent does not contest that Richard Jordan was
himself arrested in front of Ms. Granata’s house for disorderly
conduct and resisting arrest the night she was ticketed. Neither
Mr. Jordan nor law enforcement officials disclosed this fact to
Respondent on the record.
26. Respondent referred to Ms. Granata’s neighbors as “the
people who built this damn city” and agreed with one of them, “I
wouldn’t be scared of them either. They’re just punks.” Respon-
dent repeatedly referred to Ms. Granata’s residence as a “flop-
house” and how she would be “livid” by the alleged activity.
27. Respondent imposed a sentence upon Ms. Granata which
included fines and costs and two years reporting probation with
the first 30 days served in the Macomb County Jail, and several
other strict terms, including, but not limited to, reporting twice
monthly, daily preliminary breath tests at the police department
and 38th District Court, subjection to home visits, 100 hours of
community service, no parties unless approved by the neighbors
who signed the petition, and no one to spend the night at her home
except Ms. Granata and her brother who reside there.
[27a]. Notwithstanding the petition signed by some of the
defendant’s neighbors complaining about parties at her house and
the loud and occasionally gross behavior by some of the guests,
Respondent repeatedly permitted neighbors who were present to
interrupt and further challenge the 23-year-old unrepresented
defendant. Respondent failed to maintain appropriate decorum,
engaged in similar conduct by echoing some of the neighbors’
comments and complaints regarding alleged incidents not part of
the noise violation charge to which the defendant had pled guilty,
contributing to the appearance that Respondent was motivated by
personal ire and to seek public approbation in sentencing Ms.
Granata as she did.
28. On November 28, 2006, Respondent granted Ms. Granata’s
Ex-Parte Emergency Motion for Work Release. On December 4,
2006, Respondent denied Ms. Granata’s motion to set aside the
plea.
The standards set forth in Brown are also being applied to the
following conclusions of the Judicial Tenure Commission, which we adopt
as our own:
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1233
Respondent’s conduct, as drawn from the stipulated and found
facts, constitutes:
a. Misconduct in office as defined by the Michigan Constitution
of 1963, as amended, Article VI, § 30 and MCR 9.205;
b. Conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice,
as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended,
Article VI, § 30, and MCR 9.205;
c. Failure to establish, maintain, enforce and personally ob-
serve high standards of conduct so that the integrity and indepen-
dence of the judiciary may be preserved, contrary to the Michigan
Code of Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”), Canon 1;
d. Failure to bear in mind that the judicial system is for the
benefit of the litigant and the public, not the judiciary, contrary to
MCJC, Canon 1;
e. Conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impro-
priety, thereby eroding public confidence in the judiciary, in
violation of MCJC, Canon 2A;
f. Failure to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself
at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
contrary to MCJC, Canon 2B;
g. Allowing family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment, in violation of MCJC, Canon 2C;
h. Failure to be patient, dignified, and courteous to those being
dealt with in an official capacity, contrary to MCJC, Canon 3A(3);
i. Failure to adopt the usual and accepted methods of doing
justice; failure to avoid the imposition of humiliating acts or
discipline, not authorized by law in sentencing; and failure to
endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment,
contrary to MCJC, Canon 3A(9);
j. Demonstrating a severe attitude toward witnesses, tending to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the
truth, and failure to avoid a controversial manner or tone in address-
ing litigants or witnesses, in violation of MCJC, Canon 3A(8);
k. Setting grossly excessive bail amounts and failing to appro-
priately and reasonably consider the provisions of MCR 6.106
regarding bond;
l. Setting harsh and excessive bail, and inflicting unusual
punishment, contrary to Michigan Const. 1963, Art. I, § 16.
m. Setting harsh and excessive bail and inflicting unusual
sentence, in violation of U.S. Const. Am. VIII: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, no cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”
1234 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
n. Persistent failure to treat persons fairly and courteously,
contrary to MCR 9.205(B)(1)(c);
o. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in
violation of MCR 9.104(1);
p. Conduct that exposes the legal profession or courts to
obloquy, contempt, censure or reproach, contrary to MCR 9.104(2);
q. Conduct contrary to justice, in violation of MCR 9.104(A)(3);
and
r. Conduct that violates the standards or rules of professional
responsibility adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court, contrary
to MCR 9.104(4).
After reviewing the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commis-
sion, the respondent’s consent, the standards set forth in Brown, and the
above findings and conclusions, we order that the Honorable Norene S.
Redmond be publicly censured. This order stands as our public censure.
W
EAVER
,J
.
(concurring). I concur in the order of this Court agreeing
with the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission that the
respondent, the Honorable Norene S. Redmond, be publicly censured on
the basis of the findings of fact to which the respondent stipulated.
I write separately to note that the commission’s recommendation
includes findings based on facts to which the respondent did not
stipulate. Specifically, paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement states:
3. The parties stipulate that a set of stipulated facts (“Stipu-
lated Facts”) shall be presented to the Commission, which shall be
the sole factual basis for the Commission’s decision and recom-
mendation in this matter.
Because the commission exceeded the scope of the agreement to which
the respondent stipulated by basing its recommendation on additional
facts not included in the original stipulation, the respondent would likely
be relieved from her corresponding promise to accept public censure.
However, because the respondent has not challenged the inclusion of
additional facts beyond the facts to which she stipulated, I concur in the
order of public censure.
C
ORRIGAN
, J. I join the statement of Justice W
EAVER
.
Orders Entered March 18, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
6.302
AND
6.310
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is
considering amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.310 of the Michigan Court
Rules. Before determining whether the proposal should be adopted,
changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to afford
interested persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits
of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views
of all. This matter also will be considered at a public hearing. The notices
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1235
and agendas for public hearings are posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
6.302 P
LEAS OF
G
UILTY AND
N
OLO
C
ONTENDERE
.
(A)-(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) A Voluntary Plea.
(1) The court shall not participate in discussions between the pros-
ecutor and the defendant’s lawyer or the defendant, if the defendant is
proceeding pro se, concerning a plea agreement.
(1) (2) The court must ask the prosecutor and the defendant’s lawyer
or the defendant, if proceeding pro se, whether they have made a plea
agreement.
(2) (3) If there is a plea agreement, the court must ask the prosecutor
or the defendant’s lawyer what the terms of the agreement are and
confirm the terms of the agreement with the other lawyer and the
defendant. A plea agreement may include an agreement on a specific
sentence disposition or sentencing range, including an agreement on the
applicability of a particular sentencing provision or factor of the sentenc-
ing guidelines.
(3) (4) If there is a plea agreement and its terms provide for the
defendant’s plea to be made in exchange for a specific sentence disposi-
tion or sentencing range, or a prosecutorial sentence recommendation,
the court may
(a) reject the agreement; or
(b) accept the agreement after having considered the presentence
report, in which event it must sentence the defendant to the sentence
agreed to where the agreement is for a specific sentence disposition or
sentencing range or recommended by the prosecutor; or
(c) accept the agreement without having considered the presentence
report; or
(d) take the plea agreement under advisement.
If the court accepts the agreement without having considered the
presentence report or takes the plea agreement under advisement, and
the agreement includes a sentence recommendation by the prosecutor, it
must explain to the defendant that the court is not bound to follow the
prosecutor’s sentence disposition or recommendation agreed to by the
prosecutor, and that if the court chooses not to follow it, the defendant
will be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement.
(4) (5) [Renumbered but otherwise unchanged.]
(D)-(F) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
6.310. W
ITHDRAWAL OR
V
ACATION OF
P
LEA.
(A) [Unchanged.]
1236 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(B) Withdrawal After Acceptance but Before Sentence. After accep-
tance but before sentence,
(1) [Unchanged.]
(2) the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea if
(a) the plea involves a prosecutorial sentence recommendation or an
agreement for a specific sentence disposition or sentencing range, and the
court states that it is unable to follow the agreement or recommendation;
the trial court shall then state the sentence it intends to impose, and
provide the defendant the opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea. ; or
(b) the plea involves a statement by the court that it will sentence to
a specified term or within a specified range, and the court states that it
is unable to sentence as stated; the trial court shall provide the defendant
the opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea, but shall not state the
sentence it intends to impose.
(C)-(E) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The proposed amendments of MCR 6.302 and MCR
6.310 would make the rules consistent with the federal rules, which
preclude judicial involvement in negotiating plea agreements and limit
the ability of defendants to withdraw guilty pleas.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by July 1, 2008, at P.O.
a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2006-16. Your comments and
the comments of others will be posted at the following address:
www.courts.mi.gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Orders Entered March 25, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
4.201
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
.On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 4.201 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determin-
ing whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter also will be
considered at a public hearing. The notices and schedules of public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
4.201. S
UMMARY
P
ROCEEDINGS TO
R
ECOVER
P
OSSESSION OF
P
REMISES
.
(A)-(F) [Unchanged.]
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1237
(G) Claims and Counterclaims.
(1) Joinder.
(a) A party may join:
(i) A money claim or counterclaim described by MCL 600.5739. A
money claim must be separately stated in the complaint. A money
counterclaim must be labeled and separately stated in a written answer.
(ii) A claim or counterclaim for equitable relief.
(b) If personal jurisdiction over the defendant was not obtained
Unless service of process under MCR 2.105 was made on the defendant,
a money claim must be
(i) dismissed without prejudice if the defendant does not answer or
appear, or
(ii) adjourned until personal jurisdiction over the defendant is ob-
tained service of process is complete if the defendant does not appear or
file an answer to the complaint.
(c) A court with a territorial jurisdiction which has a population of
more than 1,000,000 may provide, by local rule, that a money claim or
counterclaim must be tried separately from a claim for possession unless
joinder is allowed by leave of the court pursuant to subrule (G)(1)(e).
(d) If trial of a money claim or counterclaim
(i) might substantially delay trial of the possession claim, or
(ii) requires that the premises be returned before damages can be
determined, the court must adjourn the trial of the money claim or
counterclaim to a date no later than 28 days after the time expires for
issuing an order of eviction. A party may file and serve supplemental
pleadings no later than 7 days before trial, except by leave of the court.
(e) If adjudication of a money counterclaim will affect the amount the
defendant must pay to prevent issuance of an order of eviction, that
counterclaim must be tried at the same time as the claim for possession,
subrules (G)(1)(c) and (d) notwithstanding, unless it appears to the court
that the counterclaim is without merit.
(2) Removal.
(a) A summary proceedings action need not be removed from the court
in which it is filed because an equitable defense or counterclaim is
interposed.
(b) If a money claim or counterclaim exceeding the court’s jurisdiction
is introduced, the court, on motion of either party or on its own initiative,
shall order removal of that portion of the action to the circuit court, if the
money claim or counterclaim is sufficiently shown to exceed the court’s
jurisdictional limit.
(H)-(O) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The proposed amendment of MCR 4.201(G)(1)(b)
would clarify that service of process for purposes of a money claim is
sufficient if completed pursuant to MCR 2.105; otherwise, if the defen-
dant does not appear or file an answer to the complaint, a money claim
must be dismissed without prejudice, or adjourned until service of
process is complete.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
1238 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and to
the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on this proposal may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by July 1, 2008, at P.O . Box
and the comments of others will be posted at www.courts.mi.gov
/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Order Entered April 1, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
3.901, P
ROPOSED
A
DOPTION OF
N
EW
R
ULE
3.930
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES
. On order of the Court, this is to advise
that the Court is considering an amendment of Rule 3.901 and the
adoption of Rule 3.930 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determining
whether the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or
rejected, this notice is given to afford interested persons the opportunity
to comment on the form or the merits of the proposal or to suggest
alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all. This matter will be
considered at a public hearing by the Court before a final decision is
made. The notices and agendas for public hearings are posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of these proposals does not mean that the Court will issue
an order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the
proposal in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
3.901. A
PPLICABILITY OF
R
ULES
.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Application. Unless the context otherwise indicates:
(1) MCR 3.901- 3.928 3.930, 3.980, and 3.991-3.993 apply to delin-
quency proceedings and child protective proceedings.
(2)–(5) [Unchanged.]
Rule 3.930 Receipt and Return or Disposal of Exhibits in Juvenile
Proceedings.
(A)Receipt of Exhibits. Exhibits introduced into evidence at or during
court proceedings shall be received and maintained as provided by
Michigan Supreme Court trial court case file management standards.
(B)Return or Disposal of Exhibits. At the conclusion of a trial or
hearing, exhibits may be retrieved by the parties submitting them except
that any weapons and drugs shall be returned to the confiscating agency
for proper disposition. If the exhibits are not retrieved by the parties
within 56 days after the conclusion of the trial or hearing, the court may
properly dispose of the exhibits without notice to the parties.
(C) Confidentiality. If the court retains an exhibit after a hearing or
trial and the exhibit is confidential as provided by MCR 3.903(A)(3), the
court must continue to maintain the exhibit in a confidential manner.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1239
Staff Comment: The proposal would allow the court to return or
destroy exhibits within 56 days of the completion of the trial or hearing.
In addition, the admission of an exhibit into evidence would not change
the confidential nature of that exhibit, and the court would be required
to maintain confidential exhibits in accordance with MCR 3.903(A)(3).
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2007-28. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at: www.courts.mi.gov
/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Order Entered April 8, 2008:
Proposed Amendment of Rules 2.107 and 2.117 of the Michigan Court
Rules. On order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is
considering amendments of Rules 2.107 and 2.117 of the Michigan Court
Rules. Before determining whether the proposal should be adopted,
changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to afford
interested persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits
of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views
of all. This matter also will be considered at a public hearing. The notices
and agendas for public hearings are posted at www.courts.mi.gov
/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.107. S
ERVICE AND
F
ILING OF
P
LEADINGS AND
O
THER
P
APERS
.
(A)-(B) [Unchanged.]
(C) Manner of Service. Service of a copy of a paper on an attorney
must be made by delivery or by mailing to the attorney at his or her last
known business address or, if the attorney does not have a business
address, then to his or her last known residence address. Service on a
party must be made by delivery or by mailing to the party at the address
stated in the party’s pleadings.
(1) Delivery to Attorney. Delivery of a copy to an attorney within this
rule means
(a) handing it to the attorney personally;
(b) leaving it at the attorney’s office with the person in charge or, if no
one is in charge or present, by leaving it in a conspicuous place; or
1240 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(c) if the office is closed or the attorney has no office, by leaving it at
the attorney’s usual residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing there.
(2) Delivery to Party. Delivery of a copy to a party within this rule
means
(a) handing it to the party personally; or
(b) leaving it at the party’s usual residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion residing there.
(3) Mailing. Mailing a copy under this rule means enclosing it in a
sealed envelope with first class postage fully prepaid, addressed to the
person to be served, and depositing the envelope and its contents in the
United States mail. Service by mail is complete at the time of mailing.
(4) E-mail. Some or all of the parties may agree to service by e-mail by
filing a stipulation in that case. E-mail service shall be subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The stipulation for service by e-mail shall set forth the e-mail
addresses of the parties or attorneys that agree to e-mail service, which
shall include the same e-mail address currently on file with the State Bar
of Michigan. If an attorney is not a member of the State Bar of Michigan,
the e-mail address shall be the e-mail address currently on file with the
appropriate registering agency in the state of the attorney’s admission.
(b) The parties shall set forth in the stipulation all limitations and
conditions concerning e-mail service, including but not limited to:
(i) the maximum size of the document that may be attached to an
e-mail;
(ii) designation of exhibits as separate documents;
(iii) the obligation (if any) to furnish paper copies of e-mailed
documents; and
(iv) the names and e-mail addresses of other individuals in the office
of an attorney of record designated to receive e-mail service on behalf of
a party.
(c) Documents served by e-mail must be in PDF format or other
format that prevents the alteration of the document contents.
(d) A paper served by e-mail that an attorney is required to sign may
include the attorney’s actual signature or a signature block with the
name of the signatory accompanied by “s/” or “/s/.” That designation
shall constitute a signature for all purposes, including those contem-
plated by MCR 2.114(C) and (D).
(e) Each e-mail that transmits a document shall include a subject line
that identifies the case by court, party name, case number, and the title
or legal description of the document(s) being sent.
(f) An e-mail transmission sent after 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time shall be
deemed to be served on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday. Service by e-mail under this subrule is treated as service by
delivery under MCR 2.107(C)(1).
(g) A party may withdraw from a stipulation for service by e-mail if
that party notifies the other party or parties in writing at least 28 days in
advance of the withdrawal.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1241
(h) Service by e-mail is complete upon transmission, unless the party
making service learns that the attempted service did not reach the e-mail
address of the intended recipient.
(i) The e-mail sender shall maintain an archived record of sent items
that shall not be purged until the conclusion of the case, including the
disposition of all appeals.
(5) Electronic Service. Notwithstanding any other provision of these
rules or law, by administrative order of the trial court, the court may
electronically serve a party with any required notice or document, unless
the party or the party’s attorney has notified the court in writing that he
or she elects for good cause not to receive service in such a manner. For
purposes of this subrule:
(a) electronic service includes e-mail or facsimile service.
(b) good cause includes the fact that the attorney or party does not
have ready access to a facsimile machine or e-mail communication.
(D)-(G) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
2.117. A
PPEARANCES
.
(A) Appearance by Party.
(1) A party may appear in an action by filing a notice to that effect or
by physically appearing before the court for that purpose. In the latter
event, the party must promptly file a written appearance and serve it on
all persons entitled to service. The party’s address and telephone number
must be included in the appearance. If the court has adopted an
administrative order pursuant to MCR 2.107(C)(5), and if a party has not
notified the court in writing that the party elects for good cause not to
receive service electronically, the written appearance of the party or the
first responsive pleading filed with the court shall include the party’s
e-mail address and facsimile number to which court-issued notices or
documents in the case may be forwarded to comply with service require-
ments.
(2) Filing an appearance without taking any other action toward
prosecution or defense of the action neither confers nor enlarges the
jurisdiction of the court over the party. An appearance entitles a party to
receive copies of all pleadings and papers as provided by MCR 2.107(A).
In all other respects, the party is treated as if the appearance had not
been filed.
(B) Appearance by Attorney.
(1) In General. An attorney may appear by an act indicating that the
attorney represents a party in the action. An appearance by an attorney
for a party is deemed an appearance by the party. Unless a particular rule
indicates otherwise, any act required to be performed by a party may be
performed by the attorney representing the party.
(2) Notice of Appearance.
(a) If an appearance is made in a manner not involving the filing of a
paper with the court, the attorney must promptly file a written appear-
ance and serve it on the parties entitled to service. The attorney’s address
and telephone number must be included in the appearance.
1242 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(b) If an attorney files an appearance, but takes no other action
toward prosecution or defense of the action, the appearance entitles the
attorney to service of pleadings and papers as provided by MCR 2.107(A).
(c) If the court has adopted an administrative order pursuant to MCR
2.107(C)(5), and if an attorney for a party has not notified the court in
writing that the attorney elects for good cause not to receive service
electronically, the written appearance of the attorney or the first respon-
sive pleading filed with the court shall include the attorney’s e-mail
address and facsimile number to which court-issued notices or documents
in the case may be forwarded to comply with service requirements.
(3) Appearance by Law Firm.
(a) A pleading, appearance, motion, or other paper filed by a law firm
on behalf of a client is deemed the appearance of the individual attorney
first filing a paper in the action. All notices required by these rules may
be served on that individual. That attorney’s appearance continues until
an order of substitution or withdrawal is entered. This subrule is not
intended to prohibit other attorneys in the law firm from appearing in
the action on behalf of the party.
(b) The appearance of an attorney is deemed to be the appearance of
every member of the law firm. Any attorney in the firm may be required
by the court to conduct a court ordered conference or trial.
(C) [Unchanged.]
Staff comment: The proposed amendments would allow a court to
enter an order authorizing electronic service of notices and documents
unless the party or attorney files written notice with the court that he or
she for good cause elects not to receive service electronically. Good cause
is defined to include the fact that a party or attorney does not have ready
access to a facsimile machine or e-mail communication. Electronic service
would include service by facsimile or e-mail.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2007-30. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at www.courts.mi.gov
/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Orders Entered April 25, 2008:
E
STATE OF
B
UCKNER V
C
ITY OF
L
ANSING
, No. 133772. On order of the
Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral
argument of the parties having been considered by the Court, we reverse
in part the March 15, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR
7.302(G)(1). Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, MCL
691.1401 et seq., governmental agencies are entitled to immunity “for all
tort liability whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1243
governmental function.” Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich
143, 156 (2000) (emphasis in original). However, the Legislature has
provided six specific exceptions to this general immunity; at issue here is
the highway exception to immunity, MCL 691.1402(1). A governmental
agency with jurisdiction over a highway has the duty to “maintain the
highway in reasonable repair.” MCL 691.1402(1); Nawrocki, supra at
160. The term “highway” includes “sidewalks.” MCL 691.1401(e). In
order to show that a governmental agency failed to “maintain [a]
highway in reasonable repair,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
“defect” exists in the highway. Nawrocki, supra at 158; Haliw v City of
Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309n9(2001). Because the accumulation, by
itself, of ice and snow on a sidewalk, regardless of whether it accumulated
through natural causes or otherwise, does not constitute a “defect” in the
sidewalk, plaintiffs have not shown that defendant violated its duty to
“maintain” the sidewalk “in reasonable repair.” Thus, there is no need
for this Court to address the issue of proximate causation. Accordingly,
MCL 691.1402(1) bars plaintiffs’ suit. We remand this case to the Ingham
Circuit Court for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this order. Reported below: 274 Mich App 672.
M
ARKMAN
,J.(concurring).
I concur with the order. I write separately only to respond to several
arguments in Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent, which have the potential to
mislead future litigants and which seek to replace the policy determina-
tions of the Legislature, as explained in Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd
Comm, 463 Mich 143 (2000), with those of Justice W
EAVER
.
The central proposition of Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent is that, under
MCL 691.1402(1), municipalities have a “statutory duty to maintain [a]
highway ‘in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit
for travel.’ ” Post at 1246. However, Nawrocki (a decision in which
Justice W
EAVER
joined) quite clearly explains that the duty established
under the first sentence of MCL 691.1402(1) is limited to keeping the
highway “in reasonable repair”:
The first sentence of the statutory clause, crucial in determin-
ing the scope of the highway exception, describes the basic duty
imposed on all governmental agencies, including the state, having
jurisdiction over any highway: “[to] maintain the highway in
reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for
public travel.” This sentence establishes the duty to keep the
highway in reasonable repair. The phrase “so that it is reasonably
safe and convenient for public travel” refers to the duty to
maintain and repair. The plain language of this phrase thus states
the desired outcome of reasonably repairing and maintaining the
highway; it does not establish a second duty to keep the highway
“reasonably safe.” [Nawrocki, supra at 160.]
1244 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
Nawrocki thus clearly asserts that the duty of a municipality under
MCL 691.1402(1) is limited to maintaining highways in “reasonable
repair.”
1
Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent then goes to extraordinary lengths to distin-
guish Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297 (2001), noting that Haliw
involved a natural accumulation of snow, unlike the instant case.
2
However, the only relevant consideration for deciding the instant case is
that a municipality’s duty is limited to “maintaining the [sidewalk] in
reasonable repair,” and under that language plaintiff must show some
defect in the sidewalk. The fact that Haliw involved a natural accumu-
lation of snow, and the instant case does not, is utterly irrelevant and
beside the point.
After distinguishing Haliw on the facts, Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent then
relies on several cases to support its contention that a plaintiff may
recover for an injury that arises from an unnatural accumulation of ice
and snow. What Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent fails to acknowledge is that two
of these cases—Kowalczyk v Bailey, 379 Mich 568 (1967), and Johnson v
City of Marquette, 154 Mich 50 (1908)—did not involve the application of
the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., which
was enacted in 1964. Although the third case cited by the dissent,
Hampton v Master Products, Inc, 84 Mich App 767 (1978), did refer to the
GTLA, Hampton relied on Kowalczyk, a pre-GTLA case, to conclude that
an unnatural accumulation could permit recovery. Accordingly, Justice
W
EAVER
’s reliance on these cases is misplaced because all of them have
been superseded with the 1964 enactment of the GTLA, which was the
subject of thorough interpretation in Nawrocki.
Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent rightly notes that the facts of this case are
extremely tragic. However, the question before this Court is not how to
ensure that plaintiffs obtain a recovery; rather, we must determine
whether, under the laws of our state, a recovery has been authorized
against a municipality under the present circumstances. For under our
laws, “[i]t is well settled” that a municipality is generally “immune from
tort liability while engaging in a governmental function unless an
1
Nawrocki further clarified a municipality’s duty: “ ‘The duty to repair
would generally limit the government’s liability to cases in which there
are defects.’ ” Nawrocki, supra at 177 n 32 (citation omitted). This Court
has repeatedly equated the duty to “repair” with a duty to fix “defects.”
Nawrocki, supra at 158; Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309 n 9
(2001); see also Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 429n1(2005) (“The
plain meaning of ‘reasonable repair’ as used in MCL 554.139(1)(b)
requires repair of a defect in the premises. Accumulation of snow and ice
is not a defect in the premises.”).
2
Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent also expends a great deal of effort distin-
guishing MacLachlan v Capital Area Transp Auth, 474 Mich 1059 (2006).
Given that the majority’s order never cites MacLachlan, I am unsure why
Justice W
EAVER
believes it necessary to do so. The order is a simple and
straightforward application of Nawrocki.
S
PECIAL
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RDERS
1245
exception [in the GTLA] applies.” Haliw, supra at 302; see also MCL
691.1407(1). Consequently, to conclude that defendant is not liable for
damages under the GTLA is, as in every other such case, not the
equivalent of this Court lauding defendant’s performance of its municipal
responsibilities or approving its sense of public priorities.
To reach its result, Justice W
EAVER
’s dissent transforms Nawrocki,
irrelevantly distinguishes Haliw, and relies upon opinions long since
superseded by new statutes. Most significantly, it accords unnatural
meanings to the words of the law. Although I too have harbored concerns
about the impact of our state’s governmental immunity law, see, e.g.,
Reid v Detroit, 474 Mich 1116 (2006); Ewing v Detroit, 468 Mich 886
(2003), any solution must lie in legislative amendment, not in the
revision of statutory law by this Court.
C
AVANAGH
,J.(dissenting).
I would affirm the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that denied summary disposition for defendant city of Lansing. I also
concur with part III(C) of Justice W
EAVER
’s dissenting statement.
W
EAVER
,J.(dissenting).
I dissent from the order reversing the Court of Appeals judgment
affirming the trial court’s denial of summary disposition for the defen-
dant, the city of Lansing. Because both lower courts properly concluded
that a question of fact exists regarding whether the city created an
unnatural accumulation of snow and ice, the plaintiffs should be permit-
ted to present that question of fact to a jury.
The majority of four (Chief Justice T
AYLOR
and Justices C
ORRIGAN
,
Y
OUNG
, and M
ARKMAN
) has now decided that, despite the statutory
mandate requiring governmental entities to maintain highways (includ-
ing sidewalks) in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and
fit for travel, the city’s creation of an unnatural accumulation of snow
and ice “does not constitute a ‘defect’ in the sidewalk” and therefore, the
plaintiffs have failed to establish that the city violated its duty to
maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair. However, while the majority
does not view an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice to be a
“structural defect,” the statutory duty to maintain a highway “in
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” is
not limited to a duty to repair “structural defects.” Because both the
statute and prior cases interpreting the duty to repair a highway indicate
that an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice is a “defect” that a
governmental entity has an obligation to address given its duty to
maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably
safe and fit for travel, and because a question of fact exists regarding
whether the city created an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice, I
dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming
the circuit court’s denial of the city’s motion for summary disposition.
Further, the majority of four’s completely incorrect extension of
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm
1
by a one-page order, instead of by a
1
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143 (2000).
1246 480 M
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full opinion, appears to be an attempt by the majority to conceal its latest
example of judicial activism by unrestrained statutory interpretation.
I. FACTS
On January 29, 2005, at approximately 6:45 p.m., Chantell Buckner
(then age seven), Lanecia Wright (then age 14), and LaQuata Wright
(then age 13) were walking from their home on Saginaw Street to a
nearby McDonald’s Restaurant located at the north corner of Saginaw
and Larch streets.
2
The three girls had been walking on the sidewalk on
the north side of Saginaw Street, in a westbound direction facing
oncoming traffic. However, when they reached the intersection of Sagi-
naw and Prudden streets, the sidewalk became impassable because of a
large, unnatural accumulation of snow and ice that had been plowed off
Saginaw Street and piled onto the sidewalk by the city of Lansing.
The city of Lansing’s public service department had a policy of not
clearing the north sidewalk along Saginaw Street to discourage pedestri-
ans from walking on the north sidewalk.
3
When the north sidewalk of Saginaw Street became impassable
because of the snow and ice piled onto it, the girls decided to walk in the
roadway along the north curb of Saginaw Street. As the girls walked
alongside the curb, a car headed east toward the girls struck Chantell
Buckner and LaQuata Wright. Both girls suffered massive injuries, and
Chantell died as a result of her injuries.
4
After the accident, it became evident that the city’s decision not to
clear the sidewalk likely stemmed from the fact that the sidewalk itself,
irrespective of snow and ice, was defective in that it had never been
completed after a construction project in 1998. When the city con-
structed Prudden Street in 1998, it damaged the existing sidewalk along
2
By January 29, 2005, the city had received approximately 26.5 inches
of snow since January 1, 2005. The average temperature for the two
weeks before January 29 was below freezing. The largest snowfall
occurred one week before the accident at issue here when, on January 22,
the city received 12.6 inches of snow in one day.
3
During a February 3, 2005, Lansing City Council meeting, a city
employee of the public service department stated that the “sidewalk gets
plowed occasionally but there is discretion given to the employee, but the
general practice during heavy snow fall is to only plow the South side of
that particular road.” See also Sidewalk Near Site of Fatality to Close,
Lansing State Journal, Feb. 1, 2005, at 1A and City Considers Extending
Sidewalk Near Hit-and-Run, Lansing State Journal, Feb. 11, 2005, at 1A.
4
The car’s driver was defendant Luther Wampler (now deceased), who
was allegedly intoxicated at the time his car collided with the girls. He
was subsequently charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated,
MCL 257.625, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, MCL
257.618.
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Saginaw Street such that the north sidewalk of Saginaw between
Prudden and Larch streets was defective.
5
This portion of the sidewalk
(where the snow was piled up so as to make it impassable for the girls)
remained in disrepair until after January 2005, i.e., after the accident.
The plaintiffs’ original complaint against the city alleged failure to
maintain, clear, shovel, or remove the unnatural accumulation of snow
and ice from the north sidewalk. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that
the city was liable under the highway exception to governmental immu-
nity for injuries that resulted because of the city’s failure to clear the
unnatural accumulation of snow and ice from the north sidewalk of
Saginaw Street.
6
The city subsequently brought a motion for summary disposition
asserting that under the law of natural accumulations, an actual defect in
the sidewalk surface must exist.
7
The plaintiffs then filed an amended
complaint alleging that the sidewalk underneath the snow and ice was
itself defective and that this defect caused the girls’ injuries or death. The
city also filed a motion for summary disposition with regard to the
plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
The circuit court denied both of the city’s motions for summary
disposition, stating with respect to the first complaint:
5
A city employee admitted that it had been an unwritten policy of the
city not to plow the north sidewalk for over 20 years. Thus, apparently
even before the Prudden Street installation, the city had not plowed the
area in question.
6
MCL 691.1402(1) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in section 2a, each governmental
agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the
highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury
or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a
governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for
travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the
governmental agency.
MCL 691.1401 defines “governmental agency” and “highway” as:
(d) “Governmental agency” means the state or a political
subdivision. [A city is a political subdivision.]
(e) “Highway” means a public highway, road, or street that is
open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways,
crosswalks, and culverts on the highway. The term highway does
not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.
7
Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297 (2001).
1248 480 M
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Plaintiff’s contention is that there was an unnatural accumula-
tion that occurred and the unnatural accumulation doctrine is still
good law and distinguishes itself from the MacLachlan
[
8
]
case and
the Court concurs. I was affirmed, so that I know the case. I know
it well. I do believe that doctrine is still good law. The unnatural
accumulation was not argued in front of the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, which clearly makes the facts in the Court’s
opinion distinguishable. Therefore, based on the oral argument
and the Plaintiff’s response, Defendant’s Motion is denied.
The city appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s denial of the city’s motion for summary disposition with respect
to the plaintiffs’ first complaint on the basis that the “City could be found
liable for creating an unnatural accumulation of snow that caused the
accident, notwithstanding the provisions of the governmental tort liabil-
ity act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq.”
9
The city again appealed, and the plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal. This
Court granted leave and requested that the parties consider
(1) whether the children’s decision to risk walking in the street
prevents the plaintiffs from establishing proximate causation; (2)
whether the city of Lansing is entitled to governmental immunity
because the injuries did not occur on the sidewalk that the city
allegedly failed to maintain, i.e., the injuries were not the direct
result of the allegedly unmaintained condition; and (3) whether
the statutory duty to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair,”
MCL 691.1402(1), imposes obligations relating only to structural-
type defects, or whether it includes a duty not to place temporary
obstacles on a highway that render it impassable. [Buckner Estate
v City of Lansing, 480 Mich 895 (2007).]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the applicability of the governmental immunity
statute, a question of law, de novo.
10
An appellate court also reviews de
8
MacLachlan v Capital Area Transportation Auth, 474 Mich 1059
(2006).
9
Buckner v City of Lansing, 274 Mich App 672, 673 (2007). The Court of
Appeals reversed the circuit court’s denial of the city’s motion for summary
disposition with regard to the second complaint on the basis that “plaintiffs
came forward with insufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact
regarding whether the alleged defect in the city’s sidewalk proximately
caused the accident at issue.” Id.
10
Ostroth v Warren Regency GP, LLC, 474 Mich 36, 40(2006).
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novo a lower court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposi-
tion.
11
III. ANALYSIS
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA)
12
“provides broad immu-
nity from tort liability to governmental agencies whenever they are
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”
13
The
city of Lansing is a governmental agency that is immune from tort
liability for its negligence while engaged in a governmental activity,
unless one of the five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity
applies.
14
The exception at issue here is the highway exception, MCL
691.1402:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 2a, each govern-
mental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain
the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury
or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a
governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for
travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the
governmental agency.... The dutyofthe state and the county
road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the
liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the
highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include side-
walks, trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of
the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
...
MCL 691.1401 defines “governmental agency” and “highway” as:
(d) “Governmental agency” means the state or a political
subdivision.
(e) “Highway” means a public highway, road, or street that is
open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways,
11
Cowles v Bank West, 476 Mich 1, 13 (2006).
12
MCL 691.1401 et seq.
13
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 595
(1984).
14
The five statutory exceptions are: (1) the highway exception, MCL
691.1402; (2) the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; (3) the public-
building exception, MCL 691.1406; (4) the proprietary-function excep-
tion, MCL 691.1413; and (5) the governmental-hospital exception, MCL
691.1407(4).
1250 480 M
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crosswalks, and culverts on the highway. The term highway does
not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.
Inserting the definitions into § 1402, the highway exception to
governmental immunity provides: “Each governmental agency [which
includes cities] having jurisdiction over a highway [which includes
sidewalks] shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who sustains
bodilyinjury...byreasonoffailure of a governmental agency to keep a
highway...inreasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and
fit for travel may recover...damages.” Pared down even further for
purposes of this case, the plaintiffs’ position is that pursuant to MCL
691.1402, the city, having jurisdiction over the sidewalk in question, has
a duty to “maintain the [sidewalk] in reasonable repair so that it is
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” Further, the personal
injuries sustained by the girls in this case occurred “by reason of failure
of [the city]” “to keep [the sidewalk] in reasonable repair and in a
condition reasonably safe and fit for public travel.”
A. Nawrocki Only Concerns Defects in “the improved portion of the
highway designed for vehicular travel.”
In Nawrocki, this Court was only concerned with an injury that
occurred on an improved portion of the highway. This Court did not
address a city’s duty to maintain sidewalks “in reasonable repair and in
a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.”
15
The plaintiff, Rachel
15
MCL 691.1402(1). Justice M
ARKMAN
insists, ante at 1244, that our
decision in Nawrocki limited the duty to keep a highway “in reasonable
repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel” only
to keep a highway that is designed for vehicular travel “in reasonable
repair.” That statement is correct, and I joined the majority’s decision in
that respect. However, the discussion of duty in Nawrocki was limited to
the facts presented in that case, which specifically concerned an injury
sustained as a result of a county’s failure to maintain a highway designed
for vehicular travel.
The present case is distinguishable not only because it concerned a
city’s failure to maintain a sidewalk, but also because it concerned a city’s
duty with respect to the creation of an unnatural accumulation of snow
on a city sidewalk.AswenotedinNawrocki, supra at 176, the duty of the
state and county road commissions to keep a highway “in reasonable
repair” “is significantly limited, extending ‘only to the improved portion
of the highway designed for vehicular travel.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
The reason this duty is limited in such fashion is that the state and
county governmental agencies do not have as broad adutyasother
governmental agencies (that broader duty extending not just to highways
designed for vehicular travel, but also to bridges, sidewalks, trailways,
crosswalks, and culverts, MCL 691.1401[e]) because the fourth sentence
of MCL 690.1402(1) limits the state and the counties to a duty to repair
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Nawrocki, after getting out of a truck from the passenger side and
walking to the end of the truck to step off the curb and onto the street,
seriously injured her ankle when she stepped into cracked and broken
pavement in the roadway. This Court held that the county had a duty to
protect pedestrians from dangerous or defective conditions in the im-
proved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, even when
the injury did not arise as the result of a vehicular accident. This Court
went on to hold:
[T]he location of an alleged dangerous or defective condition, as
narrowly defined in the fourth sentence of the statutory clause,is
the critical factor in determining whether a plaintiff is successful
in pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity under the
highway exception.
***
While it is true that the second sentence of MCL 691.1402(1);
MSA 3.996(102) (1) generally allows “any person” to recover
damages from a governmental agency with highway jurisdiction,
the fourth sentence of the statutory clause specifically limits the
state and county road commissions’ duty, and resultant liability for
breach of this duty, “only to the improved portion of the highway
designed for vehicular travel.” The plain language of this sentence,
though limiting the duty and resultant liability, does not expressly
exclude any particular class of injured traveler from recovering
damages under the highway exception. Thus, we believe that
pedestrians who sue the state or a county road commission are not
automatically and entirely excluded, as a class, from the protec-
tions of the statutory clause.
[
16
]
The italicized language above establishes that this Court viewed the
limited duty for the “improved portion of the highway” as applicable only
to the state and to counties. Accordingly, the broader duty applicable to
governmental agencies in general, as set forth in the first sentence of
MCL 691.1402(1), is still intact. In other words, even after Nawrocki,
cities still have a “duty to maintain the highway [including sidewalks] in
reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public
travel.”
17
And an individual who is injured as a result of the govern-
and maintain highways designed for vehicular travel. In that respect,
state and county governmental agencies have no duty to maintain a
sidewalk “in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and conve-
nient for public travel.” MCL 690.1402(1).
16
Nawrocki, supra at 168-170 (emphasis added).
17
MCL 691.1402(1).
1252 480 M
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ment’s failure “to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover
the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.”
18
The majority’s order improperly extends the limited holding in
Nawrocki to this case, in which a defect in the improved portion of the
highway is not even at issue. Nawrocki does not stand for the proposition
that in order for a plaintiff to properly allege a claim of negligence against
a city for failure to maintain a sidewalk in reasonable repair, the plaintiff
must first show there was a defect in the sidewalk itself. There is simply
no language in the statute, or in Nawrocki, supporting that conclusion. In
fact, a footnote in that case exposes the error in the majority’s strained
interpretation of the holding in Nawrocki:
We acknowledge that repairing and maintaining the improved
portion of the highway in a condition reasonably safe and conve-
nient for public travel represents a higher duty of care on the part
of government than repairing and maintaining it for vehicular
travel.
[
19
]
The reference to “public travel” is a reference to travel on surfaces
other than roadways designed for “vehicular travel,” that is, sidewalks,
bridges, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts. Because this Court did not
extend its holding to require that a plaintiff alleging a city’s failure to
maintain a sidewalk in reasonable repair must show an actual defect in
“bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the high-
way,”
20
Nawrocki is inapplicable to this case, which concerns the unnatu-
ral accumulation of snow and ice on a city sidewalk.
Moreover, the majority of four’s completely incorrect extension of
Nawrocki in a one-page order, as opposed to a full opinion, appears to be
an attempt by the majority to conceal another example of judicial
activism by unrestrained statutory interpretation.
B. Haliw Only Addresses the Natural Accumulation of Snow and Ice;
MacLachlan Does Not Address the Unnatural Accumulation of Snow and
Ice
Unlike Nawrocki, Haliw did concern the accumulation of snow and
ice, but the question was whether a natural accumulation of snow and ice
alone rose to the level of creating a defect upon which liability could rest.
The plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice created by a depression in a city
sidewalk. Water had pooled in the depression and subsequently hardened
into ice. There were no other rough edges or defects in the depression and
the ice that formed was level with the sidewalk. It was on the basis of
these precise facts that this Court concluded that the “accumulation” of
ice was “natural” and that because the hole, by itself, did not contribute
to the plaintiff’s injury, the city was not liable.
18
Id.
19
Nawrocki, supra at 172 n 28 (emphasis added).
20
MCL 691.1401(e).
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Specifically, this Court held that “an independent defect, other than
the accumulation of ice or snow, must be at least a proximate cause of a
plaintiff’s injury in order for the plaintiff to recover under the statute.”
21
Thus, Haliw established only that a plaintiff cannot recover on a claim
against a governmental agency where the sole proximate cause of the slip
and fall is the natural accumulation of ice or snow:
[W]e reject the proposition that the presence of ice alone, which
naturally accumulates and which is the sole proximate cause of a
slip and fall, satisfies the remaining elements of the negligence
analysis employed in actions against governmental agencies. In
the absence of a persistent defect in the highway (i.e., a sidewalk),
rendering it unsafe for public travel at all times, and which
combines with the natural accumulation of ice or snow to proxi-
mately cause injury, a plaintiff cannot prevail against an otherwise
immune municipality.
[
22
]
Importantly, in MacLachlan, this Court was faced with a case where
there was a question of fact concerning whether the snow and ice on a
roadway were the result of a natural or unnatural accumulation. The
plaintiff was getting off a bus when he came face-to-face with a “wall of
snow and ice” created when the city of Lansing plowed the street and had
not yet cleared the snow and ice pushed to the side of the road. As the
plaintiff walked alongside the wall in an attempt to find an opening so
that he could get to the sidewalk, he was hit by a car. The circuit court
granted summary disposition to the city, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the circuit court’s order, concluding that there was a question of
fact regarding whether the snow pushed off to the side was the result of
a natural or unnatural accumulation of snow and ice. In particular, the
Court discussed the distinction between natural versus unnatural accu-
mulations of snow and ice:
Under the long-recognized “natural accumulation” doctrine,
“ ‘a governmental agency’s failure to remove the natural accumu-
lations of ice and snow on a public highway does not signal
negligence of that public authority.’ ” When, however, the accumu-
lation of ice and snow is the result of unnatural causes, the
municipality may be liable.
If there is any question regarding whether the condition was
natural or unnatural, determination of this question of fact is
within the province of a jury. Here, however, there is no dispute
that the wall of ice and snow was created by the plowing efforts of
the City of Lansing. Thus, reasonable minds could not differ on the
fact that the snow wall was an unnatural accumulation.
21
Haliw, supra at 309 n 9.
22
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
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We recognize that a city should not be punished merely for
removing snow from the roadway. However, a municipality can be
held liable if in clearing ice and snow it “introduced a new element
of danger not previously present, or created an obstacle to travel,
such as a snow bank, that exceeds the inconvenience posed by a
natural accumulation.” Here it is alleged that a wall of snow and
ice, three-to-four-feet high and created by the defendant city,
caused an unusual obstacle that increased the hazard to decedent.
A jury may conclude that the city’s act of piling ice and snow so
high that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to traverse,
introduced a new element of danger that exceeded the inconve-
nience posed by a natural accumulation. Plaintiff through his
expert presented evidence that the city had adequate time to
remove the snow wall from the bus stop and that it would not have
been an unreasonable burden in light of the potential risk for the
city to leave or create an opening in the piled snow to allow access
to the sidewalk in an area designated as a bus stop. We accordingly
conclude that plaintiff has created a justiciable question of fact
relative to the alleged unnatural accumulation of ice and snow in
the form of a snow wall and in avoidance of governmental
immunity.
[
23
]
In so holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a city could be
“held liable if, in clearing ice and snow, it ‘introduced a new element of
danger not previously present, or created an obstacle to travel, such as a
snow bank, that exceeds the inconvenience posed by a natural accumu-
lation.’ ”
24
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However,
the Court’s order did not address the issue of natural versus unnatural
accumulation of snow and ice; instead it merely stated that “[t]here was
no defect in the roadway rendering it unsafe for public travel at all
times.”
25
Thus, this Court’s order did not address a key underlying issue
in the case: whether the plaintiff’s injuries occurred as a result of the
defendant city’s failure to remove an unnatural accumulation of snow
and ice from the roadway. All that this Court’s order in MacLachlan
makes clear is that there was no defect in the highway rendering it unsafe
for public travel. This Court did not speak definitively to the issue of
unnatural accumulation of snow and ice after Nawrocki and Haliw.
23
MacLachlan v Capital Area Trans Auth, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 20, 2005 (Docket No.
252221), pp 5-6 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
24
Id., citing Skogman v Chippewa Co Rd Comm, 221 Mich App 351,
354 (1997).
25
MacLachlan, 474 Mich at 1059.
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In summary, after Nawrocki, it appears clear that this Court has
limited state and county liability under the highway exception to defects
that appear in the improved portion of the roadway. This case does not
concern a defect in the improved portion of the roadway. The question
here is whether, given the city’s duty to maintain sidewalks in reasonable
repair, the city could be held liable for intentionally creating an unnatural
accumulation of snow and ice so as to make the sidewalk impassable.
Thus, Nawrocki is not applicable to this case. Haliw establishes that a
governmental entity is not liable for a natural accumulation of snow or
ice, and while there was a question of fact in MacLachlan concerning
whether the snow and ice at issue were the result of a natural or
unnatural accumulation, this Court’s order in that case does not estab-
lish that a governmental entity will not be liable for an unnatural
accumulation of snow and ice.
C. Cities Have a Duty to Maintain Sidewalks in Reasonable Repair
In Jones v Enertel, Inc,
26
this Court unanimously affirmed the
statutory duty set forth in MCL 691.1402 requiring cities to maintain
sidewalks in reasonable repair:
MCL 691.1402(1), part of the governmental tort liability act
(GTLA), imposes a general duty on municipalities to keep “a
highway,” including a sidewalk on the highway, under its jurisdic-
tion in reasonable repair:
“Except as otherwise provided in section 2a[2] each govern-
mental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain
the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury or
damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmen-
tal agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may
recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental
agency. [Emphasis added.]”
The emphasized language places a duty on municipalities to
maintain their sidewalks on public highways in reasonable repair.
This means that municipalities have an obligation, if necessary, to
actively perform repair work to keep such sidewalks in reasonable
repair. This is a greater duty than the duty a premises possessor
owes to invitees under common-law premises liability principles.
The basic duty owed to an invitee by a premises possessor is “to
exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreason-
able risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.”
Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
Accordingly, as we discussed in Lugo, this duty does not generally
require a premises possessor to remove open and obvious condi-
tions because, absent special aspects, such conditions are not
26
Jones v Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266 (2002).
1256 480 M
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unreasonably dangerous precisely because they are open and
obvious. However, such reasoning cannot be applied to the statu-
tory duty of a municipality to maintain sidewalks on public
highways because the statute requires the sidewalks to be kept in
“reasonable repair.” The statutory language does not allow a
municipality to forego such repairs because the defective condition
of a sidewalk is open and obvious. Accordingly, we conclude that
the open and obvious doctrine of common-law premises liability
cannot bar a claim against a municipality under MCL
691.1402(1).
[
27
]
The question in this case is whether the statutory duty to “maintain
the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel” includes a duty not to place temporary
obstacles on a highway that render it impassable. The plain language of
the statute requires a city to “maintain the highway [including side-
walks] in reasonable repair.” The statute further provides that if an
individual is injured “by reason of failure of a governmental agency to
keep a highway [including sidewalks] under its jurisdiction in reasonable
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel,” the injured
party can recover damages from the governmental agency.
28
If a sidewalk
is made impassable because of an intentional act by the city, the city has
not fulfilled its duty. The goal of the legislative directive to maintain
highways in reasonable repair is to make highways, including sidewalks,
“reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.”
29
If a city intention-
ally makes a sidewalk impassable by creating an obstacle of unnatural
accumulated snow and ice, it has failed to “maintain the highway in
reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public
travel.” And if plaintiffs can establish that the injuries sustained by the
girls occurred because the city failed to keep the sidewalk in “reasonable
repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel,” plaintiffs can
recover damages from the city.
30
Moreover, Michigan courts have previously held that a city can be held
liable if, in the process of clearing snow and ice, the city “introduced a
new element of danger not previously present, or created an obstacle to
travel, such as a snow bank, that exceeds the inconvenience posed by a
natural accumulation.”
31
In fact, in Kowalczyk v Bailey,
32
this Court
specifically held that cities can be held statutorily liable “for injuries
caused by their negligent failure to remove obstructions in their streets
after notice thereof.”
27
Jones, supra at 268-269 (emphasis added).
28
MCL 691.1402(1)
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Skogman, supra at 354 (emphasis added).
32
Kowalczyk v Bailey, 379 Mich 568, 572 (1967).
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Kowalczyk was cited by the Court of Appeals in a case concerning the
village of Yale’s duty to remove snow from a sidewalk, Hampton v Master
Products, Inc.
33
The plaintiff, Dolly Hampton, was injured after she
slipped on a snow bank formed on a sidewalk in the village of Yale. The
plaintiff alleged that the village had neglected its duty to keep the
sidewalks in a condition safe for public travel. The plaintiff introduced
photographic exhibits into evidence depicting that “the snow bank was
much higher than any snow surrounding it” and there was also testi-
mony “that the village had plowed the street adjacent to the sidewalk.”
34
On the basis of this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]
jury could reasonably infer from this that the village was responsible for
the unnatural accumulation of snow.”
35
Specifically, the Court noted
This unnatural accumulation created an obstruction on the
sidewalk which should have been removed so that the village could
fulfill its duty of keeping the highways “reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel.” MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
The village was liable for injuries caused by its negligent failure to
remove the obstruction after it had notice thereof. Kowalczyk v
Bailey, 379 Mich 568; 153 NW2d 660 (1967).
***
In this case, the testimony revealed that the drift had been
present two days and that the city had plowed the streets. The jury
could reasonably have inferred that the defendant Village of Yale
had caused the drift to be placed across the sidewalk through the
use of its snowplows. A jury could deem the agents of Yale
responsible for producing the drift where it was as high as it
was.
[
36
]
33
Hampton v Master Products, Inc, 84 Mich App 767 (1978). Justice
M
ARKMAN
, ante at 1245, questions my reliance on cases that preceded the
enactment of the GTLA; however, the fact that there are pre-GTLA cases
establishing a duty by cities to maintain sidewalks in a condition that is
safe for public travel and that a post-GTLA case cites pre-GTLA cases
provides even stronger evidence that the enactment of the GTLA in no
way abrogated the existing duty of a city to maintain a sidewalk in a
condition that is safe for public travel. Had such duty been abrogated, the
Hampton Court would not have cited a pre-GTLA case that made
reference to the continued existence of such a duty.
34
Id. at 772.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 772-773.
1258 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
For the past 100 years, Michigan courts have held that a jury should
be allowed to consider whether a city was liable when there is a question
about the accumulation of snow and ice on a highway or sidewalk. For
example, in Johnson v City of Marquette,
37
the plaintiff’s wife was killed
after the horse-drawn sleigh in which she was riding was overtaken by a
runaway team of horses. In that it was proper for a jury to consider
whether the city was negligent in failing to remove snow from the street
crossing in question, the Court stated:
We do not think it open to serious question that there was
evidence in this case that at this crossing there was an unnatural
accumulation of snow and ice, occasioned by shoveling from the
railroad track, so as to produce a hump on either side of the track
of several inches in depth; thus increasing the height of the bank
on either side. We think it was at least a question for the jury as to
whether this left the highway in a condition reasonably safe and fit
for travel. It is true that the natural accumulations of snow and ice
and the natural results of traveling on the same do not of
themselves make a case of faulty highway which justifies a jury in
finding a municipality in fault. But that is not this case, as the
evidence was ample to show that snow was thrown and piled on
this highway in such a manner as to make an unnatural hump or
ridge on either side of the track.
[
38
]
Of note in Johnson is the fact that the decedent’s cause of death was
not due to the fact that the sleigh in which she was riding came into
contact with the unnatural accumulation of snow and ice. Instead, the
decedent was trampled to death after the driver of another horse-drawn
sleigh lost control of the team when he came upon the unnatural “hump”
of snow and ice in the roadway. Again, this Court held that it was proper
for the jury to consider whether the decedent’s death was proximately
caused by the city’s negligence:
The question of whether there is sufficient causal connection
between the defective highway and the injuries to the plaintiff’s
intestate to justify the court in submitting this case to the jury has
been sufficiently discussed in dealing with the question of proxi-
mate cause. If it is open to the jury to find that the driver would
not have lost the control of the team but for the defect in the
highway, then the connection between the wrong and the injury is
sufficient to justify a recovery.
[
39
]
37
Johnson v City of Marquette, 154 Mich 50 (1908).
38
Id. at 53.
39
Id. at 57.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1259
To summarize, Michigan courts have previously held that cities have
a duty under MCL 691.1402 to remove unnatural accumulations of snow
and ice that create obstructions on highways and sidewalks. Courts have
also recognized that if there is a question of fact concerning whether the
snow and ice are the result of a natural or unnatural accumulation, juries
should be permitted to weigh the evidence and determine whether the
governmental entity is liable for failing to remove an unnatural accumu-
lation of snow that proximately causes a plaintiff’s injuries.
Applying the law to the facts in this case, neither the Court of Appeals
nor the circuit court erred in denying the city’s motion for summary
disposition. Here, the city was aware that the sidewalk in question was
defective and admitted to intentionally piling up plowed snow and ice
onto the defective north sidewalk to encourage pedestrians to use the
south sidewalk. Consequently, there is a question of fact regarding
whether the accumulation of snow and ice was natural or unnatural. The
city was aware of the risk that pedestrians (including children) would
walk on the road because of unplowed sidewalks. In fact, the city had
both an ordinance and a recently adopted city resolution calling for all
citizens to clear the sidewalks in front of their property in order to make
the sidewalks passable and to prevent pedestrians from walking on the
street. Given the city’s duty to maintain the sidewalk in reasonable
repair “and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel,” a jury
should have been allowed to consider whether the city was negligent in
failing to remove the snow and ice from the sidewalk.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this tragic case, the majority of four has summarily dispensed with
the plaintiffs’ claim against the city on the basis that the accumulation of
snow and ice was not a “defect.” In addition, the majority of four’s
incorrect extension of Nawrocki in a one-page order, instead of in a full
opinion, appears to be an attempt by the majority to conceal its latest
example of judicial activism by unrestrained statutory interpretation. I
would find that both lower courts properly concluded that a question of
fact exists regarding whether the city created an unnatural accumulation
of snow and ice. Accordingly, the plaintiffs should be permitted to bring
that question of fact before a jury.
The statutory duty to maintain the highway “in reasonable repair and
in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” is not limited to a duty
to repair “structural defects.” Because both the statute and prior cases
interpreting the highway-repair duty can be interpreted so as to find that
an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice is a “defect” that a govern-
mental entity has an obligation to address given its duty to maintain the
sidewalk in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit
for travel, and because a question of fact exists with regard to whether
the city created an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice, I dissent and
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the circuit
court’s denial of the city’s motion for summary disposition.
K
ELLY
,J.(dissenting).
1260 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
I would affirm the lower courts’ denials of defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. As I noted in my dissent in Nawrocki v Macomb Co
Rd Comm,
1
the second sentence of the highway exception
2
imposes liability on a government agency having jurisdiction over
a highway for failure “to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in
reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for
travel....”Thus, liability not only extends to highways in a
state of disrepair, but to those in a condition not reasonably safe
and fit for travel.
[
3
]
The city of Lansing in this case plowed snow over a city sidewalk,
impeding foot travel on it. Hence, a question of fact exists whether the
city failed to keep the sidewalk in a condition reasonably safe and fit for
travel. Therefore, I concur with part III(C) of Justice W
EAVER
’s dissenting
statement.
Orders Entered April 29, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
2.301, 2.302, 2.401
AND
2.506
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES.
On order of the Court, this is to advise that the
Court is considering amendment of Rules 2.301, 2.302, 2.401, and 2.506 of
the Michigan Court Rules. Before determining whether the proposal should
be adopted, changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to
afford interested persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the
merits of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the
views of all. This matter will be considered at a public hearing by the Court
before a final decision is made. The notices and agendas for public hearings
are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of these proposals does not mean that the Court will issue
an order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the
proposals in their present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
2.301 C
OMPLETION OF
D
ISCOVERY.
(A) In circuit and probate court, the time for completion of discovery
shall be set by an order entered under MCR 2.401(B)(2)(a), and issues
relating to the discovery, preservation, and claims of privilege with
respect to electronically stored information shall be dealt with by an
order entered under 2.401(B)(2)(c).
(B)-(C) [unchanged.]
R
ULE
2.302 G
ENERAL
R
ULES
G
OVERNING
D
ISCOVERY
.
(A) [Unchanged.]
1
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143 (2000).
2
MCL 691.1402(1).
3
Nawrocki, 463 Mich at 192 (K
ELLY
, J. dissenting).
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1261
(B )Scope of Discovery.
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of another party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of books,
documents, or other tangible things, or electronically stored information
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of a discover-
able matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(2)-(4) [Unchanged.]
(5) Electronically Stored Information. A party must preserve infor-
mation, including electronically stored information, that the party
knows, or reasonably should know, may lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. A party who wishes to destroy such information may apply
to the court for leave to do so upon good cause shown.
(6) Limitation of Discovery of Electronic Materials. A party need not
provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party
from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of MCR
2.302(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
(7) Information Inadvertently Produced. If information that is subject
to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material is
produced in discovery, the party making the claim may notify any party
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the
information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly
present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the
claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being
notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party
must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
(C)-(H) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
2.401 P
RETRIAL
P
ROCEDURES;
C
ONFERENCES;
S
CHEDULING
O
RDERS.
(A) [Unchanged.]
(B) Early Scheduling Conference and Order.
(1) Early Scheduling Conference. The court may direct that an early
scheduling conference be held. In addition to those considerations
enumerated in subrule (C)(1), during this conference the court should
consider:
(a) whether jurisdiction and venue are proper or whether the case is
frivolous,
(b) whether to refer the case to an alternative dispute resolution
procedure under MCR 2.410, and
1262 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
(c) the complexity of a particular case and enter a scheduling order
setting time limitations for the processing of the case and establishing
dates when future actions should begin or be completed in the case., and
(d) discovery, preservation, and claims of privilege of electronically
stored information.
(2) Scheduling Order.
(a) At an early scheduling conference under subrule (B)(1), a pretrial
conference under subrule (C), or at such other time as the court
concludes that such an order would facilitate the progress of the case, the
court shall establish times for events the court deems appropriate,
including
(i) the initiation or completion of an ADR process,
(ii) the amendment of pleadings, adding of parties, or filing of
motions,
(iii) the completion of discovery,
(iv) the exchange of witness lists under subrule (I), and
(v) the scheduling of a pretrial conference, a settlement conference, or
trial.
More than one such order may be entered in a case.
(b) The scheduling of events under this subrule shall take into
consideration the nature and complexity of the case, including the issues
involved, the number and location of parties and potential witnesses,
including experts, the extent of expected and necessary discovery, and the
availability of reasonably certain trial dates.
(c) The scheduling order also may include provisions concerning
discovery of electronically stored information, any agreements the par-
ties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material after production, preserving discoverable informa-
tion, and the form in which electronically stored information shall be
produced.
(c)(d) Whenever reasonably practical, the scheduling of events under
this subrule shall be made after meaningful consultation with all counsel
of record.
(i) If a scheduling order is entered under this subrule in a manner that
does not permit meaningful advance consultation with counsel, within 14
days after entry of the order, a party may file and serve a written request
for amendment of the order detailing the reasons why the order should be
amended.
(ii) Upon receiving such a written request, the court shall reconsider
the order in light of the objections raised by the parties. Whether the
reconsideration occurs at a conference or in some other manner, the court
must either enter a new scheduling order or notify the parties in writing
that the court declines to amend the order. The court must schedule a
conference, enter the new order, or send the written notice, within 14
days after receiving the request.
(iii) The submission of a request pursuant to this subrule, or the
failure to submit such a request, does not preclude a party from filing a
motion to modify a scheduling order.
(C)-(I) [Unchanged.]
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1263
R
ULE
2.506 S
UBPOENA;
O
RDER TO
A
TTEND.
(A) Attendance of Party or Witness.
(1) The court in which a matter is pending may by order or subpoena
command a party or witness to appear for the purpose of testifying in
open court on a date and time certain and from time to time and day to
day thereafter until excused by the court, and to produce notes, records,
documents, photographs, or other portable tangible things as specified.
(2) A subpoena may specify the form or forms in which electronically
stored information is to be produced subject to objection. If the subpoena
does not so specify, the person responding to the subpoena must produce
the information in a form or forms in which the person ordinarily
maintains it, or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. A person
producing electronically stored information need only produce the same
information in one form.
(3) A person responding to a subpoena need not provide discovery of
electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies
as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. In a
hearing or submission under subrule (H), the person responding to the
subpoena must show that the information sought is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the
court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the request-
ing party shows good cause, considering the limitations of MCR 2.302(C).
The court may specify conditions for such discovery.
(2) (4) The court may require a party and a representative of an
insurance carrier for a party with information and authority adequate for
responsible and effective participation in settlement discussions to be
present or immediately available at trial.
(3) (5) A subpoena may be issued only in accordance with this rule or
MCR 2.305, 2.621(C), 9.112(D), 9.115(I)(1), or 9.212.
(B)-(I) [Unchanged.]
C
ORRIGAN
,J
.
(concurring). I concur in publishing for comment pro-
posed amendments to MCR 2.301, 2.302, 2.401, and 2.506. These amend-
ments, submitted by the State Bar of Michigan, would update the civil
discovery rules to account for the exchange of electronically stored
information. I write separately because I am concerned about certain
aspects of MCR 2.401(B)(1) and (2)(c). I believe that we should ultimately
strive to eliminate the court from routine participation in cases involving
electronic discovery. I recognize that we are living in times of transition.
Nevertheless, such discovery of electronically stored information should
eventually occur without the need for court involvement. I thus invite the
bench and bar to submit any proposals suggesting alternative language
that would assist us to routinize the production of electronically stored
information upon receipt of a discovery request without the necessity of
court involvement.
Staff comment: This proposal, submitted by the State Bar of Michi-
gan, would amend Michigan’s discovery rules concerning electronically
stored information, and would make the rules consistent with the federal
rules.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
1264 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 1, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2007-24. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at: www.courts.mi.
gov/supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
Orders Entered May 6, 2008:
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULE
6
OF THE
B
OARD OF
L
AW
E
XAMINERS.
On
order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is considering an
amendment of Rule 6 of the Rules for the Board of Law Examiners.
Before determining whether the proposal should be adopted, changed
before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to afford interested
persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits of the
proposal, or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views of all.
This matter also will be considered by the Court at a public administra-
tive hearing. The schedules and agendas for such hearings are posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
Please note that if this matter proceeds in the ordinary course by
publication followed by consideration at a public hearing to be held later
this year, and if the Court adopts this proposal, the fee increase would be
effective for applicants taking the February 2009 bar examination.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
6. F
EES
.
The fees are: an application for examination, $340 $300 and an
additional fee for the late filing of an application or transfer of an
application for examination, $100; an application for reexaminationre-
examination, $240 $200; an application for recertification, $200; an
application for admission without examination, $600 plus the requisite
fee for the National Conference of Bar Examiners’ report. Checks must
be payable to the State of Michigan.
Staff comment: The proposed order increases the fees for application
for the bar examination from $300 to $340, and for reexamination from
$200 to $240. The proposed increase in fees would allow for the imple-
mentation of the change in policy regarding grading Michigan bar
examinations that is reflected in the attached notice.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 31, 2008, at
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1265
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, Ml 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2008-20. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at
www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
P
ROPOSED
A
MENDMENT OF
R
ULES
3.903
AND
3.920
OF THE
M
ICHIGAN
C
OURT
R
ULES.
On order of the Court, this is to advise that the Court is
considering an amendment of Rule 3.903 and 3.920 of the Michigan Court
Rules. Before determining whether the proposal should be adopted,
changed before adoption, or rejected, this notice is given to afford
interested persons the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits
of the proposal or to suggest alternatives. The Court welcomes the views
of all. This matter will be considered at a public hearing by the Court
before a final decision is made. The notices and agendas for public
hearings are posted at www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt.
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the Court will issue an
order on the subject, nor does it imply probable adoption of the proposal
in its present form.
[The present language would be amended as indicated below:]
R
ULE
3.903. D
EFINITIONS
.
(A) General Definitions. When used in this subchapter, unless the
context otherwise indicates:
(1)–(2) [Unchanged.]
(3) “Confidential file” means
(a) [Unchanged.]
(b) the contents of a social file maintained by the court, including
materials such as
(i)–(v) [Unchanged.](vi)victim statements.;
(vii) information regarding the identity or location of a foster parent,
preadoptive parent, or relative caregiver.
(4)–(26) [Unchanged.]
(B)–(E) [Unchanged.]
R
ULE
3.920. S
ERVICE OF
P
ROCESS
.
(A)–(G) [Unchanged.]
(H)Proof of Service.
(1)–(3) [Unchanged.]
(4)Content. The proof of service must identify the papers served. A
proof of service for papers served on a foster parent, preadoptive parent,
or relative caregiver shall be maintained in the confidential social file as
identified in MCR 3.903(A)(3)(b)(vii).
(5) [Unchanged.]
Staff Comment: The proposal would clarify that information regard-
ing the identity or location of a foster parent, preadoptive parent, or
relative caregiver is part of the confidential file and, therefore, a proof of
1266 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
service that includes identifying or location information regarding those
parties must also be maintained in the confidential file.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and
to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications
specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on these proposals may be sent to the
Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by August 31, 2008, at
P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or [email protected]. When
filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2008-22. Your comments
and the comments of others will be posted at: www.courts.mi.gov./
supremecourt/resources/administrative/index.htm.
S
PECIAL
O
RDERS
1267
INDEX-DIGEST
INDEX–DIGEST
ADDITIONS—See
T
AXATION
2
AUTOMOBILES—See
N
EGLIGENCE
2
BURDEN OF PROOF—See
C
RIMINAL
L
AW
1
CHARITABLE EXEMPTION—See
T
AXATION
1
CHILDREN—See
E
VIDENCE
1
COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
AND INSURANCE SERVICES—See
I
NSURANCE
2
COMMON-WORK-AREA DOCTRINE—See
N
EGLIGENCE
1
CONSTRUCTION SITES—See
N
EGLIGENCE
1
CONTRACTS
R
IGHTS OF
F
IRST
R
EFUSAL
1. In re Egbert R Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19.
CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS PERIODS—See
I
NSURANCE
1
1379
CRIMINAL LAW
R
EPORTS OF
C
RIMES
1. The prosecution is not required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime sought to be reported
was attempted or committed in order to obtain a con-
viction for the offense of preventing or attempting to
prevent through the unlawful use of physical force a
person from reporting a crime attempted or committed
(MCL 750.483a[1][b]). People v Holley, 480 Mich 222.
DYING DECLARATIONS—See
E
VIDENCE
1
ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER—See
I
NSURANCE
1
EVIDENCE
H
EARSAY
1. A statement is admissible under the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavail-
able as a witness and made the statement concerning
the cause or circumstances of what he or she believed to
be impending death while believing that his or her death
was imminent; the declarant’s age alone does not pre-
clude the admission of a dying declaration, and a child
may have the capacity to be conscious of his or her own
impending death for purposes of the exception; whether
a child was conscious of his or her impending death
must be determined on a case-by-case basis (MRE
804[b][2]). People v Stamper, 480 Mich 1.
2. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule does
not require that a startling event or condition be estab-
lished solely with evidence independent of an out-of-
court statement before the out-of-court statement that
relates to the startling event or condition may be
admitted, and a court may consider the statement itself,
along with other evidence, in determining whether the
startling event or condition has been established (MRE
104[a], 803[2], 1101[b][1]). People v Barrett, 480 Mich
125.
EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION—See
E
VIDENCE
2
1380 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
GENERAL CONTRACTORS—See
N
EGLIGENCE
1
GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES—See
G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY
1
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
G
OVERNMENTAL
E
MPLOYEES
1. A governmental employee whose gross negligence while
acting in the course of employment causes personal
injury may be liable from loss-of-consortium damages if
the plaintiff can satisfy all the requirements set forth in
the gross-negligence exception to the governmental im-
munity of employees (MCL 691.1407[2][c]). Wesche v
Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75.
M
OTOR
-V
EHICLE
E
XCEPTION
2. The motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity
does not waive immunity for a claim of loss of consor-
tium (MCL 691.1405). Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm,
480 Mich 75.
3. The wrongful-death statute does not expand the waiver of
immunity set forth in the motor-vehicle exception to
governmental immunity to include liability for loss-of-
consortium claims (MCL 600.2922[1], 691.1405). Wesche v
Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE—See
G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY
1
HEARSAY—See
E
VIDENCE
1, 2
INDEPENDENT PROOF OF STARTLING EVENT OR
CONDITION—See
E
VIDENCE
2
INSURANCE
L
IMITATION OF
A
CTIONS
1. An express contractual limitations period in an optional
insurance contract, such as a policy for underinsured
motorist coverage, is not automatically tolled by the
filing of a claim unless the contract so provides, but
traditional contract doctrines such as waiver and estop-
I
NDEX
-D
IGEST
1381
pel can apply when the facts support them. McDonald v
Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191.
M
EDICAL
C
OVERAGE
2. An independent review organization’s recommendation
under the Patient’s Right to Independent Review Act
concerning whether the Commissioner of the Office of
Financial and Insurance Services should uphold or reverse
a health carrier’s adverse determination concerning cov-
erage is not binding on the commissioner (MCL 550.1911).
Ross v Blue Care Network, 480 Mich 153.
INTERFERENCE WITH REPORTS OF CRIMES—See
C
RIMINAL
L
AW
1
IRREVOCABILITY—See
S
TATUTES
1
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY—See
N
EGLIGENCE
2
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS—See
I
NSURANCE
1
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM—See
G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY
1, 2, 3
MEDICAL COVERAGE—See
I
NSURANCE
2
MOTOR-VEHICLE EXCEPTION—See
G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY
2, 3
NEGLIGENCE
C
ONSTRUCTION
S
ITES
1. Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105.
J
OINT AND
S
EVERAL
L
IABILITY
2. The common-law setoff rule, which permits an injured
party to pursue multiple tortfeasors jointly and sever-
ally and recover separate judgments but allows only a
single compensation for a single injury, remains the law in
Michigan for vehicle-owner vicarious-liability cases, in
which an automobile owner is entirely liable for the
negligence of a driver who uses the automobile with the
1382 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
owner’s permission (MCL 257.401[1], 600.2957[1],
600.6304[1]). Kaiser v Allen, 480 Mich 31.
OPTIONS—See
C
ONTRACTS
1
PATIENT’S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW
ACT—See
I
NSURANCE
2
PROPERTY—See
C
ONTRACTS
1
PROPERTY TAX—See
T
AXATION
1
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS—See
C
RIMINAL
L
AW
1
PUBLIC-SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS—See
T
AXATION
2
PUBLIC UTILITIES—See
T
AXATION
2
REAL PROPERTY—See
T
AXATION
2
REPORTS OF CRIMES—See
C
RIMINAL
L
AW
1
RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL—See
C
ONTRACTS
1
SETOFF RULE—See
N
EGLIGENCE
2
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—See
C
ONTRACTS
1
STATUTES
U
NIFORM
T
RANSFER TO
M
INORS
A
CT
1. Transfers made pursuant to the Uniform Transfer to
I
NDEX
-D
IGEST
1383
Minors Act are irrevocable, and the custodial property
placed in such an account is indefeasibly vested in the
minor (MCL 554.521 et seq.). People v Couzens, 480 Mich
240.
TAXABLE VALUE—See
T
AXATION
2
TAXATION
P
ROPERTY
T
AX
1. A nonprofit charitable institution that claims a tax
exemption for property owned and occupied by the
institution while occupied by that institution solely for
charitable purposes for which the institution was incor-
porated must, at a minimum, have a regular physical
presence on the property; an institution that leases the
property to others for their own personal use and has no
regular physical presence on the property does not
occupy the property for purposes of the exemption (MCL
211.7o[1]). Liberty Hill Housing Corp v City of Livonia,
480 Mich 44.
R
EAL
P
ROPERTY
2. Public-service improvements consisting of public infra-
structure located on utility easements or land that
ultimately becomes public do not constitute “additions”
to property within the meaning of that term in the
constitution as amended by Proposal A in 1994; the
statutory provision defining “additions” as including
public-service improvements is unconstitutional (Const
1963, art 9, § 3; MCL 211.34d[1][b][viii]). Toll North-
ville Ltd v Northville Twp, 480 Mich 6.
TOLLING—See
I
NSURANCE
1
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS—See
I
NSURANCE
1
UNIFORM TRANSFER TO MINORS ACT—See
S
TATUTES
1
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF VEHICLE OWNERS—See
N
EGLIGENCE
2
1384 480 M
ICHIGAN
R
EPORTS
WRONGFUL-DEATH ACTIONS
G
OVERNMENTAL
I
MMUNITY
3
I
NDEX
-D
IGEST
1385
