31
limited to refueling. After 2000, and especially after 2006,
law enforcement increased the risks of shipping directly to
Mexico. Consequently, Central America took on new
importance as a transit and storage area, and parts of the
Caribbean were reactivated.
This can be seen in the seizure figures. In the mid-1980s,
over 75% of the cocaine seized between South America and
the United States was taken in the Caribbean, and very
little was seized in Central America. By 2010, the opposite
was true: over 80% was seized in Central America, with less
than 10% being taken in the Caribbean. The bulk of the
cocaine seized in recent years in the Caribbean has been
taken by the Dominican Republic, which is also a transit
country for the European market.
30
How is the trafficking conducted?
Despite reductions in production, the latest cocaine signa-
ture data indicates that most of the cocaine consumed in
the United States comes from Colombia.
31
The Colombian
government has been extremely successful in disassembling
the larger drug trafficking organizations, and this has
changed the nature of the market in the country. While
large groups like the Rastrojos and the Urabeños exist, they
are not powerful enough to threaten the state or eliminate
all interlopers. Rather, a free market exists in which a wide
range of players can source cocaine, and this is manifest in
the diversity of trafficking styles and techniques.
30 e Dominican Republic is by far the most frequent source of cocaine courier
ights to European destinations, and has recently been the source of some
large maritime shipments destined for Valencia, Spain.
31 United States Cocaine Signature Program
What is the nature of this market?
The history of cocaine trafficking from South America to
the United States has been well documented. The flow
peaked in the 1980s. During most of this time, Colombian
traffickers dominated the market, and they often preferred
to use the Caribbean as a transit area. Due to vigorous law
enforcement, the Colombian groups were weakened in the
1990s, and Mexican groups progressively assumed control
of most of the trafficking chain.
As a product of this shift, an ever-increasing share of the
cocaine entering the United States did so over the south-
western land border. Initially, direct shipments to Mexico
were favoured, with stopovers in Central America largely
Cocaine from South America to the United States
Figure 22: Number of primary cocaine move-
ments destined for, or interdicted in,
Central America, the Caribbean, and
Mexico, 2000-2011
Source: ONDCP
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Number of movements detected
Central America Mexico Caribbean
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
32
Focused law enforcement in Colombia has also reduced the
number of shipments departing directly from the country.
Shipments by air mostly take off just across the border, in
Venezuelan territory. Shipments by sea are increasingly
embarking from Ecuador on the Pacific and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela on the Atlantic. Until 2009, a large
share of the flights were destined for the Dominican
Republic, but much of this air traffic appears to have been
re-routed to Honduras after 2007, particularly following
the Zelaya coup in 2009.
Today, in addition to many minor sub-flows, there are three
main arteries for northward movement of cocaine:
• Pacic shing boats and other marine craft, including
semi-submersibles, particularly destined for Guatemala,
supplying cocaine to the Cartel del Pacíco.
• Atlantic go-fasts and other marine craft, including some
semi-submersibles, particularly destined for Honduras,
to supply both the Cartel del Pacíco and the Zetas.
• Aircraft, departing from the border area of the Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela, particularly destined for
Honduras, supplying both the Cartel del Pacíco and the
Zetas.
Much has been made of the use of self-propelled semi-
submersibles (SPSS), and there have indeed been some
spectacular seizures, including recent ones off the coasts of
Honduras and Guatemala. These devices began as
submersed trailers off other vessels that could be cut loose
in the event of law enforcement contact, but they have
evolved considerably since then. True submarines have also
been detected, causing considerable alarm. But while the
potential for profit is great, so are the losses when an SPSS
is detected, and the Colombian government alone has
seized at least 50 of them. In addition to the cost of the
vessel, an SPSS usually carries multiple tons of cocaine,
costing US$10 million or more in Colombia. And SPSS are
generally very slow, so while they are hard to detect, there
is more time to detect them.
First detected in 1993, seizure of these vessels appears to
have peaked between 2007 and 2009, and to have declined
since. The United States government notes a reduction of
70% in the estimated use of SPSS between 2009 and
2010.
32
It may well be that traffickers are returning to more
traditional methods of moving their drugs. Go-fast boats, a
perennial favourite, seem to be making a comeback along
both coasts.
The use of aircraft, previously largely reserved for short
hops to the Caribbean, has also increased. Light aircraft
such as the Cessna Conquest and the Beechcraft Duke seem
to be preferred, but larger aircraft have been detected. They
may make several short hops between remote areas in
Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala.
These areas are often not accessible by road, and so rely on
small airstrips or jetties for all contact with the outside
world. Using both light aircraft and go-fast boats, cocaine
can be moved northward in an endless series of combinations,
touching down in areas the police rarely visit.
Panama
It is very difficult to traffic large volumes of cocaine by land
from Colombia, due to the Darien Strip, a near-impassible
stretch of jungle between the country and Panama. To
circumvent this barrier, some traffickers make the short sea
voyage to Panama from the Golf of Uraba on the Atlantic
(about 55% of the detected shipments) or Jurado on the
Pacific (45%). Traffickers simply wait for a break in the
security patrols before making the trip, using a wide range
of sea craft. On the Pacific side, this can involve rather slow
artisanal boats. Loads are consolidated in Panama, often in
areas inaccessible by road, before being shipped further
north.
Those who ply this leg are mainly Colombians and Pana-
manians, transportistas handling the cargo of others. The
country serves as both a storage and re-shipment zone.
Authorities estimate that perhaps 5% to 10% of the cocaine
entering the country is consumed locally, but although
Panama has the highest adult cocaine use prevalence in
Central America (reported to be 1.2% in 2003), this is dif-
ficult to believe given the huge volumes transiting the
country. Authorities also say as much as a third may eventu-
ally make it to Europe, often flowing via the Dominican
Republic, although local police only detected five Europe-
bound shipments in 2011. The bulk proceeds northward.
Larger shipments from the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela and Ecuador also transit Panamanian waters. Panama
routinely makes some of the largest cocaine seizures in the
world. Between 2007 and 2010, around 52 tons were seized
32 Oce of National Drug Control Policy, Cocaine Smuggling in 2010.
Washington, D.C.: Executive Oce of the President, 2012.
Figure 23: Number of primary cocaine move-
ments destined for, or interdicted in,
Honduras and the Dominican
Republic, 2000-2011
Source: ONDCP
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Number of movements detected
Dominican Republic Honduras
33
Cocaine from South America to the United States
per year– an average of a ton a week. Seizures in 2011 were
about 35 tons, but given that United States consumption
requirements are perhaps three times this, Panama’s seizures
alone continue to represent a significant source of supply
reduction. The loads also appear to have diminished in size
recently, from tons to a few hundred kilograms, perhaps
because traffickers can no longer afford losses that were
previously acceptable.
Costa Rica
The next country on the journey north is Costa Rica. The
number of direct shipments to Costa Rica has increased
remarkably in recent years, and between 2006 and 2010,
the country seized an average of 20 tons of cocaine per year,
compared to five tons between 2000 and 2005. More
recently, seizures have declined, but remain higher than
before 2006. The decline in seizures is difficult to explain,
as there does not appear to have been a commensurate
reduction in the number of direct shipments to the country.
Drugs making landfall in Costa Rica are reshipped by land,
sea, and air, with air becoming the predominant means in
recent years. There have also been significant recent seizures
(of amounts up to 300 kg) along the Panamerican Highway.
Large seizures have been made in Peñas Blancas, the main
border crossing point with Nicaragua in the northwestern
part of the country. In the south, the strategic zone of El
Golfito (the bay bordering Panama) and the border crossing
point of Paso Canoas are also used as storage points for
shipments heading north.
In addition to the northward traffic, Costa Rica has long
been a significant source of cocaine couriers on commercial
flights to Europe. This prominence seems to have decreased
in recent years, however.
Costa Rican coasts, both Pacific and Atlantic, are used by
traffickers to transport larger quantities of cocaine, through
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
)
)
)
)
)
Panama City
Colón
Chimán
Las
Perlas
Bocas
del
Toro
Isla Escudo
de Veraguas
\
\
\
Rio Belen
Rio Coclé
del Norte
Parque
Nacional Darien
Parque Nacional
Chagres
Parque Nacional
Cerro Hoya
Jurado
Colombia
Costa
Rica
Golfo
de
Uraba
Peninsula
de Asuero
San Blas
Veraguas
0 200100 km
Sea routes
B
Landing point
)
Storage point
\
City
\
Capital city
Panamerican Highway
National parks
Map 3: Cocaine trafficking routes in Panama
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region
Figure 24: Distribution of cocaine seizures in
Central America, 2000-2011
Source: UNODC Delta Database
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Tons seized
El Salvador Guatemala Belize Honduras
Costa Rica Nicaragua Panama
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
34
go-fast boats coming from Colombian sea ports, or
medium-sized boats (40 feet or less) and fishing vessels for
shorter trips. The Gulf of Punta Arenas and Puerto Quepos
on the Pacific coast are used as refueling stops for shipments
coming from Colombia and Panama. Seizures have been
made on the Atlantic coast at Puerto Limón, but they are
fewer in number than on the Pacific coast. Talamanca, a
remote area at the border with Nicaragua (and the region
where 80% of Costa Rica’s cannabis is produced
33
) is also
believed to be used for trafficking smaller quantities of
cocaine, with the involvement of indigenous communities.
33 Javier Meléndez Q., Roberto Orozco B., Sergio Moya M., Miguel López
R. Una aproximación a la problemática de la criminalidad organizada en las
comunidades del Caribe y de fronteras Nicaragua-Costa Rica-Panama, Instituto
de Estudios Etratégicos y Políticas Públicas. Costa Rica. August 2010.
Map 4: Cocaine trafficking routes in Costa Rica
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
)
)
)
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
(Colombia, Panama)
(Colombia, Panama)
(Colombia, Panama)
Liberia
San
José
Puntarenas
Paso
Canoas
Puerto
Limón
Puerto
Quepos
Peñas
Blancas
Cabo Blanco
Golfo
Dulce
Golfo de
Nicoya
Guanacaste
province
Nicaragua
Panama
Land routes
Sea routes
Air routes
B
Landing point
)
Storage point
\
City
\
Capital city
Panamerican Highway
0 10050 km
Figure 25: Cocaine seizures in Costa Rica (kg),
2000-2011
Source: Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas
5,871
1,749
2,955
4,292
4,545
7,029
23,331
32,435
16,168
20,875
11,266
9,609
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Kilograms seized
Figure 26: Means of moving cocaine into Costa
Rica (in percent of detected
incidents), 2007-2010
Source: Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas
66
32
71
78
23
59
20
17
11
9
9
6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2007 2008 2009 2010
Percent
Air Land Sea
35
Cocaine from South America to the United States
Map 5: Cocaine trafficking routes in Nicaragua
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
)
)
)
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
(Costa Rica,
Colombia, Venezuela)
Corn
Island
Cayos
Miskitos
Waspán
Walpasicsa
San
Andrés
Bluefields
Peñas Blancas
Managua
El Espino
Honduras
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Río Escondido
Río Grande
Río Wawa
Río Coco
B
Landing point
)
Storage/refueling point
\
City
\
Capital city
Air routes
Land routes
Sea routes
Fluvial routes
Panamerican Highway
0 10050 km
Nicaragua
While Nicaragua seizes impressive amounts of cocaine,
most of these seizures are made along the coasts, stretches
of which (particularly the Región Autónoma del Atlántico
Sur-RAAS/Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte-RAAN
areas) are under-developed. The country remains primarily
a re-fuelling stop, and Nicaraguan traffickers are rarely
encountered outside their home country. Coastal
communities, including indigenous groups, provide logistic
support to traffickers, one of the few sources of income in
these isolated areas. Some may have a formal arrangement
with a particular transportista network, while others may
simply be capitalizing opportunistically from their
geographic location.
Many of these more remote areas are serviced by small
airstrips, since travel by road is impractical. These small
strips, combined with those in similar areas in Honduras,
allow cocaine to be moved northward in an almost endless
set of combinations of air, land, and sea transport. Although
most of the traffic is coastal, there does appear to be some
inland flow along the rivers, some of which transit more
than half the breadth of the isthmus.
The peripheral role Nicaragua plays in the trafficking is
reminiscent of the role formerly played by Central America
as a whole, and this has reduced the impact of the flow on
the country. Crime hardly plays a role in the political life of
Nicaragua, and its citizens are far more satisfied with their
country’s security posture than those in neighbouring
countries. Murder levels, though elevated, are stable.
El Salvador
El Salvador remains something of a puzzle. The authorities
claim that very little cocaine transits their country, because
they lack an Atlantic coast and pose few advantages over
countries further north. It is also true that El Salvador is the
most densely settled country in the region, reducing the
opportunities for clandestine airstrips and remote maritime
landings. Radar data suggest very few shipments from
South America proceed directly to El Salvador. Still, given
the fact that it borders both Honduras and Guatemala, it
seems likely that more cocaine passes through the country
than is sometimes claimed. This is suggested by the
September 2011 addition of El Salvador to the list of Major
Illicit Drug Transit countries by the United States
Government.
34
34 By Presidential Memorandum (Presidential Determination No. 2011-16)
dated 15 September 2011.
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
36
Cocaine seizures are typically among the lowest in the
region, certainly on a per capita basis. The anti-narcotics
division seized less than seven kilograms in 2011, while the
United States estimates that four tons of cocaine transited
the country that year.
35
This is a product of the fact that
large seizures are rare, and that seizures of any size are made
rarely – less than 130 seizures were made in 2010.
36
The
police report that only “ant traffic” passes through the
country, with most shipments smaller than two kilograms.
Many of these seizures are made at El Amatillo, where the
Panamerican Highway crosses from Honduras into El
Salvador, the single best-controlled border crossing in the
country. At other border points, the police admit seizures
occur only with “flagrant” violations.
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that several
prominent transportista networks have been uncovered. The
Perrones network ran cocaine from one end of the country
to the other, with separate groups handling trafficking in
the east and west of the country. Although no seizures were
ever linked back directly to Reynerio Flores, it is unlikely
he dealt in quantities of less than two kilograms.
The Texis investigation, reported by journalists from the
35 By Presidential Memorandum (Presidential Determination No. 2011-16)
dated 15 September 2011.
36 ARQ 2010
Map 6: Cocaine trafficking routes in El Salvador
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region
Golfo
de
Fonseca
Metapán
Acajutla
La Unión
El
Amatillo
San
Fernando
San Luis
La Herradura
San Salvador
Ostua
San Cristóbal
Frontera
La Hachadura
Las Chinamas
Honduras
Guatemala
Nicaragua
0 10050 km
Land routes
Sea routes
Landing point
City
Capital city
Panamerican Highway
Other routes
Figure 27: Number of cocaine hydrochloride
seizures in El Salvador, 2002-2010
Source: Annual Report Questionnaires
109
107
163
177
243
242
193
141
129
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Number of seizures
on-line periodical El Faro, revealed a route whereby cocaine
is flown to rural Honduras or Nicaragua, and then flown
deeper into Honduras. It is then driven by road to El
Salvador, where Salvadoran traffickers bring it across the
northwestern corner of the country into Guatemala. This
flow, protected by high-level corruption and without direct
connections to violence, may have been tolerated for years,
and there does not appear to be an active investigation
today.
37
Cocaine from South America to the United States
The cocaine that enters the domestic market is believed to
be the product of “in kind” payment to transportista
networks. Many seizures of small amounts of crack are
evidence of this domestic market. Police claim that there is
a cocaine shortage in El Salvador, and that cocaine actually
travels back into the country from Guatemala. This is
demonstrated by the fact that prices for cocaine are often
higher in El Salvador than in Guatemala, although there
does not appear to be systematic price data collection.
The case of Juan María Medrano Fuentes (aka “Juan
Colorado”) demonstrates that commercial air couriering
also takes place. Until 2009, he ran a network of people
travelling three or four times a week carrying “nostalgia”
items to the Salvadoran expatriate community in the
United States, such as local cheese and bread. They were
also reportedly carrying cocaine.
37
There are also patterns of violence that are difficult to
explain except in terms of the drug trade. The violence is
particularly intense in the west of the country, especially
along several transportation routes radiating from the coast
and the borders. This concentration is suspicious, especially
given that it affects some lightly populated areas with
relatively low crime rates overall.
Cocaine as well as methamphetamine precursor chemicals
have been detected entering at the port of Acajutla on their
way to Guatemala, which is a short drive away through an
under-manned border crossing. This port is ideally situated
for traffickers looking to import discretely and cross an
international border quickly to evade detection. It is also
one of the more violent areas of the country, and one of the
few areas where it is alleged that certain mara members are
involved in cocaine trafficking.
Honduras
Today, Honduras represents the single most popular point
of entry for cocaine headed northward into Guatemala.
Honduras has a long history as a transit country, including
during the Civil Wars of the 1970s and 1980s, when it
represented a relatively safe means of getting cocaine to
Mexico through a dangerous region. Its use has waxed and
waned over time, but it is greater today than ever before.
Direct cocaine flows to Honduras grew significantly after
2006, and strongly increased after the 2009 coup. In
particular, air traffic from the Venezuelan/Colombian
border, much of which was previously directed to
Hispaniola, was redirected to airstrips in central Honduras.
According to the United States government, roughly 65 of
the 80 tons of cocaine transported by air toward the United
States lands in Honduras, representing 15% of United
States-bound cocaine flow.
38
Almost as much is moved to
37 See http://www.laprensagraca.com/el-salvador/judicial/78128-fgr-medrano-
enviaba-droga-via-encomienda.html
38 Oce of National Drug Control Policy, Cocaine Smuggling in 2010.
Washington, D.C.: Executive Oce of the President, 2012.
the country by sea. It takes just six hours by go-fast boat to
cross from Colombia to Honduras, and the brevity of this
route also allows the use of submarines. In the last year, at
least four submarines were detected around Honduras, and
seizures from just two of them amounted to about 14 tons
of cocaine.
Flights depart from the Venezuelan/Colombian border
heading north, before banking sharply and heading for
Honduras. Maritime shipments may unload at Puerto
Lempira, or another remote area of Honduras or northern
Nicaragua, before being flown further north in small
aircraft to other coastal areas, islands, or the provinces of
Olancho and Colón, or even into Guatemala. Once on
land, the drugs cross the border at both formal and informal
crossing points, although the formal crossings are generally
more convenient for the larger loads.
Figure 28: Clandestine airstrips detected in
Honduras, February-March 2012
Source: Armed Forces of Honduras
25
15
12
10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Olancho Colón Gracias a Dios El Paraiso
Number of airstrips
The new “plazas”
Some of the most dangerous places in Central America
lie in a swath running between the northwestern coast
of Honduras and southwestern coast of Guatemala.
ere are hundreds of informal border crossing points
between the two countries, but, due to corruption and
complicity, it appears that most cocaine crosses at the
ocial checkpoints, such as Copán Ruinas/El Florido
(CA-11). Municipalities on both sides of the border
are aicted with very high murder rates, which is pe-
culiar given that these are mostly rural areas. Given the
competition between groups allied to the Zetas and the
Cartel del Pacíco, it is highly likely that these deaths are
attributable to disputes over contraband and tracking
routes.
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
38
Map 7: Cocaine trafficking routes in Honduras
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region and national police data
*Selected among the municipalities with highest homicide rates (<100 homicides per 100,000 population)
(Venezuela)
La Ceiba
Trujillo
Catacamas
Juticalpa
Puerto
Lempira
Tegucigalpa
Corinto
El Florido
San
Fernando
San
Pedro Sula
Agua
Caliente
El Espino
El Amatillo
Nicaragua
Guatemala
El Salvador
Belize
Olancho
Colón
Gracias a Dios
Cortés
Copán
Atlántida
Air routes
Land routes
Sea routes
Landing point
Storage/refuelling point
Most violent municipios*
City
Capital city
Panamerican Highway
Other roads
Departmental border
0 10050 km
Map 8: Cocaine trafficking routes in Guatemala
Source: UNODC, elaborated from interviews in the region and national police data
*Selected among the municipalities with highest homicide rates (<100 homicides per 100,000 population)
Mexico
Honduras
Belize
El Salvador
(Colombia)
Lago de
Izabal
Río Usumacinta
Cobán
Flores
Morales
Corinto
Anguiatú
El Carmen
Guatemala City
San Marcos
El Florido
Ingenieros
La Mesilla
El Progreso
Agua Caliente
Puerto Quetzal
Gracias a Dios
Puerto
Barrios
Melchor
de
Mencos
Ciudad
Tecún Umán
San Cristóbal
Frontera
Ciudad
Pedro de Alvarado
Escuintla
Zacapa
Land routes
Air routes
Sea routes
Fluvial routes
Landing point
Storage point
City
Capital city
Most violent municipios*
Secondary road
Panamerican Highway
0 10050 km
39
Cocaine from South America to the United States
Guatemala
When it comes to Central American cocaine trafficking, all
roads lead to Guatemala.
Traditionally, the country has been divided cleanly between
supply routes to the Cartel del Pacífico, which remains close
to the Pacific coast and depart the country primarily from
San Marcos, and those that supply the other groups, which
skirt the north of the country and leave through Petén.
Three seismic shifts appear to have precipitated the present
crisis. One is downward pressure from the Mexican security
strategy, which has virtually suspended direct shipments to
Mexico and forced as much as 90% of the cocaine flow into
the bottleneck of Guatemala. The second was the breakaway
of the Zetas from its parent, the Gulf Cartel. And the third
was the massive increase in direct shipments to Honduras.
Suddenly, dramatically increased volumes of cocaine were
crossing the border between Honduras and Guatemala,
greatly increasing the importance of the reigning crime
families there. As discussed above, the Mendoza crime
family in the north is currently aligned to the Cartel del
Pacífico and the Lorenzanas in the south are aligned to the
Zetas, which could create considerable friction as trafficking
routes intersect. The situation is complicated by the
geography of Guatemala, which does not allow a road
directly north from the Honduran border. Between the
border and Petén lies the Parque Nacional Sierra de la
Minas and Lake Izabal. To continue northward, one must
go east or west along CA-9:
• To the west, through Cobán, Alta Verapaz
• To the east, passing close to Morales, Izabal
The Zetas worked with local allies to secure control over
Cobán, causing the President to declare a state of emergency
in 2011. This temporary pressure may have encouraged the
Zetas to try the eastern route, but this runs directly into
Mendoza territory, turning northward not far from their
family home in Morales. All this seems to have contributed
to making the border area one of the most violent areas in
the world.
Belize and the Caribbean
Belize has long been a secondary route for cocaine, and has
diminished in popularity since 2006. The country has
participated in some important seizures, but most years, the
annual take is limited to some tens of kilograms. While the
country is highly vulnerable to trafficking groups with
access to resources exceeding national GDP, northward
movement is limited essentially to one road, with bottlenecks
at Belize City and Orange Walk. It is believed that the Zetas
are active in Belize, and seizures close to the border in
Mexico indicate increased trafficking. Some of this cocaine
may be entering from Guatemala in the north of the
country, crossing at Melchor de Mencos to Belize City.
Opium poppy – Guatemala’s drug crop
While methamphetamine looms as a possible second,
at present the only drug produced in Central America
for export is opium poppy grown in western Guatemala.
e United Nations has never conducted a survey of
the extent of opium poppy cultivation in the area, but
eradication reported by the government suggest a grow-
ing problem. Between 2007 and 2011, poppy eradica-
tion in Guatemala tripled, from less than 500 hectares
eradicated in 2007 to more than 1500 hectares in 2011.
Eradication is concentrated in two departments and
four municipalities in the western part of the country:
San Marcos (Ixchiguán, Sibinal, Tajumulco) and Hue-
huetenango (Cuilco). e Cartel del Pacíco is the group
most associated with heroin tracking, and San Marcos
is home to its ally, Los Chamales.
Since 2007, Guatemala has surpassed Colombia with
regards to opium poppy eradication and is now second
only to Mexico. According to the Ministerio de Gob-
ernación, the eradication only represents 10% of the
cultivation, which would suggest a total area of cultiva-
tion of approximately 15,000 hectares, close to the estimated opium poppy-growing area in Mexico. Lack of clarity around the
cultivation area, yields, and quality makes any estimate highly dubious. It is also unclear where this output would be consumed.
In the past, opium was tracked across the border for processing, as evinced by the seizure of opium poppy capsules in transit.
But today, it seems likely that some heroin is made in Guatemala, particularly given the increased seizures of precursor chemicals.
Map 9: Opium poppy eradication in
Guatemala, 2011
Source: UNODC, elaborated with data from the Policía Nacional Civil
(Guatemala)
Huehuetenango
San Marcos
Mexico
02010 km
Opium poppy field eradication
Departmental boundary
Municipal boundary
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
40
The Caribbean used to be the primary conduit for cocaine
trafficking to the United States, and there is always the risk
that it could become so again. Enhanced monitoring of
both air and sea traffic along the United States coastline has
made this more difficult than in the past, however. The
Caribbean does play a role in trafficking to Europe, but
much of this flow is maritime, and the drugs never need
make landfall on Caribbean soil.
Hispaniola, and the Dominican Republic in particular, saw
a resurgence in popularity as transshipment points between
2006 and 2009, in the period between the implementation
of the new security strategy in Mexico and the coup in
Honduras. Opportunities in Central America, teamed with
stronger enforcement in the Dominican Republic, have
caused this flow to dwindle over the last two years. Seizure
figures were up in 2009 and 2010, but this appears to
represent a higher rate of interdiction, not a greater flow.
Dominican traffickers have long been close partners of the
Colombians in moving cocaine to the United States and in
distributing it in the northeast of the country. The
Dominican Republic is also a popular destination for
tourists from Europe and a large European expatriate
community resides there. These factors placed Dominican
traffickers in a favourable position when cocaine use in
Europe began to grow during the 2000s.
Today, the Dominican Republic is the primary source in
the region of cocaine smuggled on commercial air flights to
Europe. The number of air couriers detected on flights
from the region in one European airport database
quadrupled between 2006 and 2011.
39
This does not
necessarily indicate an increase in flow, since the amounts
trafficked by this means are small. Dominican citizens are
also the most prominent nationality in the region among
those arrested for cocaine trafficking in Europe.
Jamaica was once a key transit country for both the United
39 IDEAS database. e IDEAS database is a product of voluntary information
sharing between a number of European airports. It is not a representative
sampling of all European airports.
States and the United Kingdom but has declined
considerably in importance since its heyday. The Jamaican
example illustrates that the removal of a drug flow can be
as destabilizing as its inception. Estimates of the cocaine
flow through Jamaica dropped from 11% of the United
States supply in 2000 to 2% in 2005 and 1% in 2007.
40
This is reflected in declining seizures in Jamaica and
declining arrests and convictions of Jamaican drug traffickers
in the United States.
41
The impact of this decline in flow is
discussed in the final sections of this report.
Both the Dutch Caribbean and the French Caribbean have
become important conduits for cocaine destined for
Europe. During the early 2000s, huge numbers of couriers
40 Statement of the Donnie Marshall, Administrator, United States Drug
Enforcement Administration before the United States Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, 15 May 2001; National Drug Intelligence
Centre, National Drug reat Assessment 2006. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Justice, 2006; National Drug Intelligence Centre, National
Drug reat Assessment 2007 Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice,
2007; National Drug Intelligence Centre, National Drug reat Assessment
2009. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2009.
41 In 2000, the United States federal authorities convicted 79 Jamaicans for
cocaine tracking. In 2008, they arrested just 35. In 2010, not one was
arrested.
Figure 29: Kilograms of cocaine seized in the
Dominican Republic, 2000-2010
Source: UNODC Delta
1,307
1,908
2,293
730
2,232
2,246
5,092
3,786
2,691
4,652
4,850
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Kilograms seized
Figure 30: Breakdown of the origin of detected
cocaine shipments on commercial
flights to selected European airports
from Central America and the Carib-
bean in 2011
Source: IDEAS database
Dominican
Rep, 110
French
Caribbean,
21
Mexico, 21
Other, 9
Costa Rica,
5
Figure 31: Kilograms of cocaine seized in
Jamaica, 1992-2011
Source: UNODC Delta
690
83
179
570
254
415
1,143
2,455
1,656
2,948
3,725
1,586
1,736
142
109
98
266
2
176
552
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Kilograms seized
41
Cocaine from South America to the United States
landed at Schiphol airport, overwhelming the capacity of
the Dutch legal system to process them. Recognizing that
the couriers were much less important to the traffickers
than the drugs, the Dutch began seizing the drugs from all
suspected couriers and sent them home with blacklisted
passports. The intervention worked, and the airflow
diminished remarkably.
42
The French Caribbean only really became an issue after
Francophone West Africa became part of the cocaine
trafficking chain. France itself consumes relatively little
cocaine, so it did not become an important port of entry
until cocaine landed in West Africa, and the main
commercial air routes happened to be linked to France.
Today, the French overseas departments are some of the
main sources of air couriers detected in Europe. Located in
South America but with cultural connections to Europe,
“the Guyanas” (Guyana, French Guiana, and Suriname) are
also important in the European flow, but much less so to
the United States.
Who are the traffickers?
Most of those arrested for drug trafficking in Central
America are citizens of the country in which they were
arrested. Globally, this is not always the case, and suggests
that each country has its own network of traffickers and
transportistas, carrying the drug from one border to another.
But the type of people involved in trafficking varies sharply
between countries. As the drugs move northward, the range
of alternative routes narrows, and the competition becomes
more fierce. As a result, Honduran and Guatemalan groups
compete to control territory, while those further south are
primarily transportistas and their foes.
In Guatemala and Honduras, the territorial nature of drug
trafficking has given special importance to land ownership,
and many large landholders, including commercial farmers
and ranchers, are prominent among the traffickers. Planta-
tions and ranches provide ground for clandestine landing
strips and cocaine storage facilities. They also provide sites
for training and deploying armed groups, and plausible
cover for large groups of men operating in remote areas of
these countries. Guatemalan landholders have long
employed “private security companies” to oversee their
agricultural labourers, so the sight of armed men in pick-up
trucks is not unusual. Profits from drug trafficking can be
passed off as the proceeds of productive farms and ranches.
These groups are also more likely to invest in buying polit-
ical influence beyond paying off the local border guards.
Outside of Guatemala and Honduras, most of those
involved in the cocaine trade appear to be transportistas or
tumbadores. In Panama, the tumbador problem is particularly
42 For a more detailed discussion of this intervention, see Chapter 7 of World
Bank and UNODC, Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs and
Policy Options in the Caribbean. Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2007.
acute, but it is also an issue in Honduras and Guatemala.
Tumbadores tend to strike when the drugs are on land,
especially in the urban areas they dominate.
Panama
Transportista groups in Panama are primarily comprised of
Panamanian and Colombian nationals. In addition to
cocaine lost to the state, these transportistas also lose an
unknown share to tumbadores. There are perhaps 40 to 50
tumbador factions (though some sources place the number
much higher), each with about a dozen men. Some
charismatic leaders have managed to unify several gangs
into larger units, but more often these groups are locked in
conflict over trafficking areas.
One of the most notorious tumbador groups is under the
leadership of “Cholo Chorrillo” (“El Cholo”), who managed
to merge three juvenile local gangs into one organization,
dedicated to drug theft and extortion from other trafficking
groups.
43
Much of the violence in Panama City is caused by
a conflict between two opposing tumbador groups from
different areas of the city – one led by a famous tumbador
called “Moi” and the other one by his rival “Matagato”.
Costa Rica and Nicaragua
Most of the cocaine touching Costa Rica and Nicaragua
tends to do so along the periphery, so domestic groups are
not a big issue. In Costa Rica, several transportistas from
Guatemala and Nicaragua have been recently arrested at
border points with Nicaragua, in particular in Peñas Blancas
on the Panamerican Highway, carrying consignments of
several hundred kilograms. All evidence suggests, though,
that transportation along the southern portions of the
Panamerican Highway is a relatively minor trafficking
route.
It would require an attenuated definition of “organization”
to include the many people who provide support to the
traffickers along the coasts. Many of these communities are
43 e groups were Bagdad from Chorrillo; El Pentágono from Santa Ana; and
“El MOM (Matar or Morir)” from Curundú.
Figure 32: Number of arrests for drug trafficking
in Costa Rica, 2006-2011
Source: Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas
1,205
994
1,027
1,345
1,518
1,647
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of arrests
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
42
indigenous, and are simply providing food and fuel to some
well-heeled visitors. But there are others who are fully
cognizant of what is going on, and provide both security
and information to the transportistas. They may even
provide offloading and storage services if required.
Cocaine trafficking arrests in Costa Rica have increased
significantly in recent years. The majority of those arrested
for cocaine trafficking were Costa Rican, but only just. A
significant number of Mexicans and Colombians were
detected. For example, in January 2011, Costa Rican
authorities dismantled an organization of five Colombians
and one Costa Rican in charge of coordinating maritime
shipments of cocaine from Colombia and Ecuador to Gua-
temala and Mexico. In February 2011, three Mexicans were
arrested in El Guarco (south of San José) with more than
300 kg of cocaine.
El Salvador
Much has been made of the ongoing activities of the
Perrones transportista network, a group that the state claims
to have dismantled some time ago. In 2007 and 2008, a
number of high profile members were targeted, including
dozens of police officers from the Anti-Narcotics Division.
The arrest of the putative leader of the Perrones, Reynerio
de Jesús Flores Lazo, in 2009 was considered by many to be
the decisive blow to the organization, but others contend
that it continues to operate in the country. The investigation
of the Cartel de Texis uncovered high-level corruption, and
opens the possibility that there are other such networks
operating undetected in the country.
But there have been no claims that territory-dominating
groups are present in El Salvador. There have been claims
of mara involvement in moving some medium sized
shipments in the southwest of the country, but all other
known groups are mere transportistas. As a result, El
Salvador’s sustained high levels of violence cannot easily be
tied to transnational drug trafficking.
Honduras
In Honduras, several territorial groups are working for
Colombian (in Atlántida) and Mexican (in Olancho, La
Ceiba, and Copán) drug trafficking organizations. Some
tumbador-style groups, known as “los grillos,” have also been
reported in the country, in particular in the area of La
Ceiba.
As in Guatemala, land-owners and “rancheros” are involved
in trafficking activities, particularly in border areas that
they control. Some municipalities in the northwest part of
the country (in Copán, Ocotepeque, Santa Bárbara) are
completely under the control of complex networks of
mayors, businessmen and land owners (“los señores”)
dedicated to cocaine trafficking. “El Chapo” Guzmán has
also been reported to be travelling to this part of the country
(Copán), so groups here may be connected to the Cartel del
Pacífico, but the violence in this area suggests that control
is contested.
Guatemala
Traditionally, much of Guatemala has been governed
locally, with few services provided by the central state. In its
place, large landholders and other local authorities saw to
the provision of basic civic services and were allowed to
operate with relatively little interference. When civil war
broke out in the 1960s, the situation changed, with the
military eventually extending state authority to every corner
of the country and every aspect of political and economic
life.
In the more remote areas of the country, the liaison between
the military units and local community was a civilian offi-
cial known as a “Military Commissioner”. Drawn from the
local community, these Commissioners wielded tremen-
dous power, acting as the eyes, ears, and right hand of the
military commanders. Large-scale cocaine trafficking began
to pass through Guatemala in the 1980s, at the peak of
military control. The Commissioners were clearly complicit
in that traffic.
Under the peace accords, the military was downsized
considerably, and the more remote areas reverted back to
their traditional ways. Many retired officers began to focus
on business interests they had developed during the war.
These officials had strong ties to the government and their
former colleagues in the military, allowing them to operate
with impunity. And the former Commissioners, who
continued to wield power in their home areas, read like a
who’s who list of drug trafficking: Juancho León, Waldemar
Lorenzana, and Juan “Chamale” Ortiz.
44
44 Espach, R., J. Melendez Quinonez, D. Haering, and M. Castillo Giron,
Criminal Organizations and Illicit Tracking in Guatemala’s Border
Communities. Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, December 2011, p. 12.
Figure 33: Nationalities of people arrested for
cocaine trafficking in Costa Rica in
2010
Source: Instituto Costarricense sobre drogas
Costa Rica
56%
Mexico
13%
Nicaragua
10%
Other
10%
Colombia
7%
Guatemala
3%
Panama
1%
43
Cocaine from South America to the United States
Belize and the Caribbean
Belize has been cited many times as a possible refuge for
Guatemalan traffickers on the run, and some have been
apprehended there. Still, the navigable territory for drug
trafficking is limited. The country is, however, a site for
money laundering and, as it has not ratified the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, the import of precursor
chemicals.
In the Caribbean, Dominican traffickers appear to be the
single most active national group. There are significant
Dominican communities in Spain and the Northeastern
United States, and a good number of Dominicans have
been arrested in both countries for drug trafficking.
Jamaican traffickers used to be much more prominent than
they are today.
How big is the flow?
The United States has recently generated detailed estimates
of the amount of cocaine that transited the landmass of
each Central American country in 2010.
45
Cocaine proceeds
by air and sea, and the amount making final landfall grows
as the flow moves northward. The exceptions are El Salvador
and Belize, which, according to the United States, are
mainly circumvented because the northward land flow
proceeds through Honduras and Guatemala. According to
these estimates, 330 tons of cocaine left Guatemala and
entered Mexico in 2010, with 267 tons of this having
previously transited Honduras, and so on down the line.
Converted to wholesale values at local prices, the values of
these flows range from more than US$4 billion in Guatemala
to just US$60 million in El Salvador. Relative to the local
economy, this flow represents a remarkable 14% of the
GDP of Nicaragua, while representing a rather small
amount relative to the sizes of the economies of Panama
and El Salvador.
Implications for responses
The discussion above has highlighted several points about
the mechanics of the cocaine flow that are relevant when
formulating policy:
• ough diminishing, the value of this ow is still very
large in proportion to the economies of the countries
through which it ows. For example, the wholesale val-
ue of the cocaine passing through Guatemala, if sold on
local markets, would be over US$4 billion, more than
the US$3 billion the entire region spent on the ght
against crime in 2010. Not all of this accrues to traf-
ckers in Central America, but if even one-tenth of the
local wholesale value remained in the region, the impact
would be enormous. Disproportionate economic power
gives trackers great leverage in both sowing corruption
and fomenting violence.
45 Oce of National Drug Control Policy, Cocaine Smuggling in 2010.
Washington, D.C.: Executive Oce of the President, 2012.
Figure 34: Tons of cocaine transiting the land-
mass of Central American countries
in 2010
Source: ONDCP
330
267
140
128
80
10
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Belize
El Salvador
Tons of cocaine transiting
Figure 35: Value of cocaine transiting Central
American countries (US$ millions),
2010
Source: Elaborated from ONDCP and UNODC data
4,046
1,949
910
896
200
74
60
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Belize
El Salvador
US$ millions
Figure 36: Share of GDP represented by value of
cocaine transiting each country, 2010
Source: Elaborated from ONDCP and UNODC data
14
13
10
5
3
1
<1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Nicaragua
Honduras
Guatemala
Belize
Costa Rica
Panama
El Salvador
Percent of GDP
TransnaTional organized Crime in CenTral ameriCa and The Caribbean
44
• e ow is uid, adapting with ease to any blockages
encountered. is is illustrated by the extremely rapid
manner in which trackers took advantage of the post-
coup chaos in Honduras, re-routing their shipments vir-
tually overnight to take advantage of the opportunity.
ey predictably take the path of least resistance, and
local allies appear to be easily replaced.
• Despite the ability of trackers to adapt to sudden
changes, shifts in the ow can be devastating for the
transit areas, both those abandoned and those newly in-
volved. Violent contests for access to cocaine revenues
are predictable whenever tracking patterns change,
whatever the reason for the change.
• Much of the ow, particularly in the southern states of
Central America, proceeds by air and sea between areas
not connected by road to the major population cent-
ers. On the one hand, this is a good thing – the use
of remote stopover points minimizes the impact of the
drug ow on the countries aected. On the other, this
technique makes enforcement challenging, because law
enforcement agencies rarely visit the areas where the
drugs are transiting.
The discussion above highlights the fact that two issues
often amalgamated – the cocaine flow and organized crime
related violence – are distinct, and need to be addressed
separately. At the same time, the two problems are
sufficiently interrelated that each policy line needs to take
into account the other. In particular, interventions that
affect cocaine trafficking can produce negative outcomes in
terms of violence. These outcomes need to be planned for
and buffered by all available means.
The problem today is that the flow has become concentrated
in the countries least capable of dealing with its presence.
Unless these areas become inhospitable, the traffickers will
become entrenched, using their economic weight to deeply
infiltrate communities and government structures. This
slow incursion is less dramatic than the violence associated
with enforcement, but it is far more devastating in the long
term. Cocaine trafficking is not a problem that can be
solved through passivity.
The countries of Central America do not have the resources
to deal with this problem on their own, and they should not
be expected to do so. The flow originates and terminates
outside the region. The international community should
provide these countries its full support in dealing with what
is truly a transnational problem.
Methamphetamine
Cocaine is the primary focus of virtually every
drug tracking organization in Central America,
but given the inuence of the Cartel del Pacíco in
San Marcos and the south of Guatemala, it is not
surprising that methamphetamine has become
an issue. e supply of methamphetamine to
the United States has long been a specialty of the
“Sinaloa Cartel” and its successors, although this
dominance was interrupted when it lost the port
of Lázaro Cárdenas to former ally La Familia and
its splinter, the Knights Templar (Los Caballeros
Templarios). Since then, there has been increasing
transshipment of precursor chemicals and meth-
amphetamine to Mexico from Guatemala.
More recently, large volumes of precursor chemi-
cals have been found owing the opposite di-
rection, suggesting that methamphetamine
manufacture has been relocated to Guatemala. A
number of labs have been discovered in San Mar-
cos and near the Mexican border, and hundreds
of thousands of liters of precursor chemicals have
been seized, especially in Puerto Barrios, in the
territory of the Mendoza family, a Cartel del Pací-
co ally. Major seizures of precursor chemicals
have also been made in El Salvador, Honduras,
Belize, and Nicaragua.
Precursor chemical seizures in Guatemala in 2012
Date Barrels Chemical Location Origin
2 Jan
160
(33,264 L)
Dimethyl-
maleate
Puerto Barrios,
Izabal
China
3 Jan
65
(13,513 L)
Acetone
La Libertad,
Petén
5 Jan
761
(158,212 L)
Unspecified
Puerto Barrios,
Izabal
China
10 Jan
320
(66,736 L)
Marked as
noniphenol
Puerto Barrios,
Izabal
Shanghai,
China
11 Jan
320
(66,736 L)
Marked as
noniphenol
Puerto Barrios,
Izabal
Shanghai,
China
16 Jan
66
(13,720 L)
Methylamine Guatemala City
17 Jan
131
(27,240 L)
Methylamine Guatemala City
17 Jan
240
(49,900 L)
Monomethyl-
amine, ethyl
phenyl acetate
Puerto Barrios,
Izabal
8 Feb
80
(16,353 L)
Unspecified
El Caco, Puerto
Barrios, Izabal
April 80,000 L Unspecified
En route to Hon-
duras
China
Source: National Police of Guatemala
