aviation
Runway Overrun During Landing
Shuttle America, Inc.
Doing Business as Delta Connection Flight 6448
Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW
Cleveland, Ohio
February 18, 2007
ACCIDENT REPORT
NTSB/AAR-08/01
PB2008-910401
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National
Tr ansportation
Safety Board
490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594
Aircraft Accident Report
Runway Overrun During Landing
Shuttle America, Inc.
Doing Business as Delta Connection Flight 6448
Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW
Cleveland, Ohio
February 18, 2007
NTSB/AAR-08/01
PB2008-910401
Notation 8002A
Adopted April 15, 2008
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National Transportation Safety Board. 2008. Runway Overrun During Landing, Shuttle America,
Inc., Doing Business as Delta Connection Flight 6448, Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, Cleveland, Ohio,
February 18, 2007. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-08/01. Washington, DC.
Abstract: This report explains the accident involving an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle
America, Inc., which was landing on runway 28 at Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland,
Ohio, during snow conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing
system antenna, and struck an airport perimeter fence. The safety issues discussed in this report focus on
(1) ight training for rejected landings in deteriorating weather conditions and maximum performance
landings on contaminated runways, (2) standard operating procedures for the go-around callout, and
(3) pilot fatigue policies. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration.
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Accident Report
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Co n t e n t s
Figures ............................................................................................................................... v
Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................................................vi
Executive Summary .................................................................................................... viii
1. Factual Information.....................................................................................................1
1.1 History of Flight .............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Injuries to Persons ........................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 Damage to Airplane ....................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Other Damage ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.5 Personnel Information ................................................................................................................... 8
1.5.1 The Captain ............................................................................................................................. 8
1.5.2 The First Ofcer .................................................................................................................... 12
1.6 Airplane Information ................................................................................................................... 14
1.7 Meteorological Information ........................................................................................................ 14
1.7.1 Airport Weather Information ............................................................................................. 14
1.7.2 National Weather Service Weather Information ............................................................. 15
1.8 Aids to Navigation ....................................................................................................................... 16
1.9 Communications ........................................................................................................................... 16
1.10 Airport Information .................................................................................................................... 16
1.10.1 Runway Safety Area .......................................................................................................... 16
1.10.2 Airport Winter Operations ................................................................................................ 18
1.11 Flight Recorders .......................................................................................................................... 20
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information .......................................................................................... 20
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information .................................................................................... 20
1.14 Fire ................................................................................................................................................ 21
1.15 Survival Aspects ......................................................................................................................... 21
1.15.1 Emergency Response ......................................................................................................... 21
1.15.2 Postaccident Communications With Dispatch ............................................................... 23
1.16 Tests and Research ...................................................................................................................... 23
1.16.1 Aircraft Performance Study .............................................................................................. 23
1.16.1.1 Calculated Ground Track ............................................................................................ 23
1.16.1.2 Braking Ability .............................................................................................................. 24
1.16.1.3 Landing Distance Assessments .................................................................................. 25
1.17 Organizational and Management Information ...................................................................... 26
1.17.1 Flight Manuals .................................................................................................................... 26
1.17.1.1 Missed Approach Procedures ..................................................................................... 26
1.17.1.2 Landing Operations ...................................................................................................... 27
1.17.1.3 Attendance Policy ......................................................................................................... 28
1.17.2 Training ................................................................................................................................ 30
1.17.2.1 Crew Resource Management Training ...................................................................... 30
1.17.2.2 Captain Awareness Training ...................................................................................... 31
1.17.3 Postaccident Actions .......................................................................................................... 31
1.17.4 Federal Aviation Administration Oversight .................................................................. 33
Contents
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1.18 Additional Information .............................................................................................................. 34
1.18.1 Survey on Fatigue and Attendance Policies ................................................................... 34
1.18.2 Aviation Safety Reporting System Fatigue-Related Reports ....................................... 35
1.18.3 Federal Aviation Administration Guidance ................................................................... 36
1.18.4 Related Accidents ............................................................................................................... 37
1.18.5 Previous Related Safety Recommendations ................................................................... 39
2. Analysis .......................................................................................................................42
2.1 General ........................................................................................................................................... 42
2.2 Accident Sequence ........................................................................................................................ 42
2.2.1 The Approach ....................................................................................................................... 42
2.2.1.1 Minimums Required for the Approach ....................................................................... 42
2.2.1.2 Runway Visual Range .................................................................................................... 44
2.2.1.3 Visual References During the Approach ..................................................................... 45
2.2.1.4 Landing Distance Assessments .................................................................................... 46
2.2.2 The Landing .......................................................................................................................... 49
2.2.2.1 Touchdown Zone ............................................................................................................ 49
2.2.2.2 Use of Reverse Thrust and Braking .............................................................................. 50
2.2.3 Runway Safety Area ............................................................................................................ 52
2.2.4 Passenger and Crew Deplaning ......................................................................................... 53
2.3 Standard Operating Procedures for the Go-Around Callout ................................................. 54
2.4 Pilot Fatigue ................................................................................................................................... 56
2.4.1 The Captain ........................................................................................................................... 56
2.4.2 The First Ofcer .................................................................................................................... 58
2.5 Pilot Attendance Policies ............................................................................................................. 59
2.5.1 Shuttle America .................................................................................................................... 59
2.5.2 Industry ................................................................................................................................. 62
3. Conclusions ................................................................................................................65
3.1 Findings .......................................................................................................................................... 65
3.2 Probable Cause .............................................................................................................................. 67
4. Recommendations .....................................................................................................68
4.1 New Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 68
4.2 Previously Issued Recommendations Classied in This Report ........................................... 69
Board Member Statement .............................................................................................70
5. Appendixes
A: Investigation and Hearing ......................................................................................73
B: Cockpit Voice Recorder ..........................................................................................74
C: Shuttle America’s Attendance Policy .................................................................174
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Fi g u r e s
Location of Airplane Before Touchdown 1. ............................................................................5
1a. Events From Touchdown to Overrun ..................................................................................6
Airplane’s Location Southwest of the Extended Runway 28 Centerline 2. .......................7
A3. ccident Airplane and Ladder Used for Deplaning .......................................................22
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Ab b r e v i A t i o n s A n d AC r o n y m s
AC advisory circular
ACARS aircraft communications addressing and reporting system
agl above ground level
AIM Aeronautical Information Manual
AMASS airport movement area safety system
ARFF aircraft rescue and reghting
ASOS automated surface observing system
ASRS aviation safety reporting system
ATCT air trafc control tower
ATIS automatic terminal information service
ATL Hartseld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport
C Celsius
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
cg center of gravity
CLE Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport
CRM crew resource management
CVR cockpit voice recorder
DA decision altitude
DH decision height
DVDR digital voice-data recorder
ESCO Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation
EMAS engineered materials arresting system
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FDR ight data recorder
Hg mercury
ILS instrument landing system
IND Indianapolis International Airport
MAC mean aerodynamic chord
MDA minimum descent altitude
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport
METAR meteorological aerodrome report
Abbreviations and Acronyms
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N
1
low pressure rotor speed
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOTAM notice to airmen
NWS National Weather Service
OpSpec operations specication
ORD O’Hare International Airport
PIC pilot-in-command
POI principal operations inspector
RSA runway safety area
RVR runway visual range
SAFO safety alert for operators
SDF Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field
SIC second-in-command
SPECI special weather observation
SRQ Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport
TAF terminal aerodrome forecast
VMC visual meteorological conditions
WSR-88D Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler
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ex e C u t i v e su m m A r y
On February 18, 2007, about 1506 eastern standard time, Delta Connection
ight 6448, an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle America, Inc., was landing
on runway 28 at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland, Ohio, during snow
conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing system
(ILS) antenna, and struck an airport perimeter fence. The airplane’s nose gear collapsed
during the overrun. Of the 2 ight crewmembers, 2 ight attendants, and 71 passengers
on board, 3 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage
from the impact forces. The ight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 121 from Hartseld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta,
Georgia. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the ight crew to execute a missed approach when
visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identiable. Contributing to the accident
were (1) the crew’s decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer
(glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the rst ofcer’s long landing on a short
contaminated runway and the crew’s failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their
maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain’s fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively
plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle America’s failure to
administer an attendance policy that permitted ight crewmembers to call in as fatigued
without fear of reprisals.
The safety issues discussed in this report focus on (1) ight training for rejected
landings in deteriorating weather conditions and maximum performance landings on
contaminated runways, (2) standard operating procedures for the go-around callout, and
(3) pilot fatigue policies. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed
to the Federal Aviation Administration.
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AIRCRAFT
Accident Report
1
FA C t u A l in F o r m A t i o n1.
History of Flight1.1
On February 18, 2007, about 1506 eastern standard time,
1
Delta Connection
ight 6448, an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle America, Inc., was landing
on runway 28 at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio, during
snow conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing
system (ILS) antenna,
2
and struck an airport perimeter fence. The airplane’s nose gear
collapsed during the overrun. Of the 2 ight crewmembers, 2 ight attendants, and
71 passengers on board, 3 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane received
substantial damage from impact forces. The ight was operating under the provisions of
14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 from Hartseld-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.
According to weather observations, 15 inches of snow was on the ground at CLE
at 0700 on February 17, 2007. Light snow fell from 0910 to 2156, with 1 inch of new snow
reported during that period. Snow began to fall again from 0541 to 1201 on February 18,
with 2 inches of new snow reported during the period, and from 1436 to 1538, with less
than 1 inch of additional snow accumulation.
On the day of the accident, the captain traveled as a nonrevenue passenger on a
ight from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky,
to ATL to report for a scheduled 2-day trip. The captain was scheduled to report to SDF at
0525, and the ight to ATL had a scheduled arrival time of 0733. The rst ight leg, from
ATL to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida, was delayed
because of weather. The ight departed ATL at 0914 and arrived at SRQ at 1042. The
second ight leg departed SRQ at 1108 and arrived at ATL at 1242. The third ight leg, the
accident ight, departed on time (with a different rst ofcer) from ATL at 1305 and had
an expected arrival time at CLE of 1451.
The accident ight was the rst one in which the captain and the rst ofcer had
own together. Shuttle America’s common practice is for the captain to be the ying pilot
for the rst ight of any crew pairing. The captain reported that he received only about
1 hour of sleep during the night before the accident and, as a result, asked the rst ofcer
to be the ying pilot for the ight. The rst ofcer reported that he would have preferred
not to be the ying pilot because he had just completed a 3-day, 6-leg trip sequence but
that he agreed to be the ying pilot because of the captain’s references to fatigue and lack
1
All times in this report are eastern standard time based on a 24-hour clock.
2
When fully operational, ILS approach systems provide arriving aircraft with vertical (glideslope) and
lateral (localizer) guidance to the runway.
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of sleep the night before. (The rst ofcer did not verbalize this preference to the captain
before the ight.)
The ight dispatcher provided the crew with a weather update about 1310, via the
airplane’s aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS), indicating
that visibility was unrestricted with no snow. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording
began about 1316:10. Shortly afterward, the captain stated, “so tired … had about an hours
sleep last night. I just tossed and turned.” The dispatcher provided the crew with another
ACARS weather update about 1407, again indicating that visibility was unrestricted with
no snow.
About 1429:19, the ight crew received automatic terminal information service
(ATIS) information Alpha,
3
which indicated that the ILS runway 24R approach was in use,
the landing runway was 24R, the glideslopes for runways 24L and 28 were “unusable due
to snow build-up,” and braking action advisories were in effect. The rst ofcer then briefed
the ILS procedure for runway 24R. About 1442:41, the crew received ATIS information
Bravo, which indicated that the ILS runway 28 approach was in use and that the landing
runway was 28. Also, this ATIS repeated that the glideslopes for runways 24L and 28 were
unusable and that braking action advisories were in effect. Neither ight crewmember
discussed the information in each ATIS broadcast about the unusable glideslopes.
The weather information in the ight crew’s preight paperwork included a notice
to airmen (NOTAM) for runways 24L and 28 that stated, “due to the effects of snow on
the glide slope minimums temporarily raised to localizer only for all category aircraft.
Glide slope remains in service. However angle may be different than published.” During
postaccident interviews, both pilots indicated that they had not read this NOTAM.
About 1450:14, the captain contacted CLE approach control, and the approach
controller provided vectors for the ILS runway 28 approach. About 1453:06, the rst ofcer
briefed the ILS procedure for that runway, stating the location of the glideslope, descent
altitude, minimum safe altitudes, and missed approach procedure. The rst ofcer did not
brief the runway length, and the captain did not request this information.
4
The approach
controller then notied the ight crew that ATIS information Charlie was current and
that the winds were from 290º at 18 knots, visibility was 1/4 mile with heavy snow, and
the runway 28 runway visual range (RVR)
5
was 6,000 feet. The captain then stated, “one-
quarter mile visibility … well we got the RVR. So we’re good there.” According to the
Jeppesen March 24, 2006, ILS approach chart for CLE runway 28, the minimums for the
precision (ILS) approach required an RVR of 2,400 feet or 1/2-mile visibility, and the
minimums for the nonprecision localizer (glideslope out) approach required an RVR of
4,000 feet or 3/4-mile visibility.
3
An ATIS is a continuous broadcast of recorded noncontrol information in selected terminal areas.
4
Title 14 CFR 91.103 and company procedures required the pilot-in-command to be familiar with the
runway lengths at airports of intended use. Company policy required pilots to review arrival data as part of the
ight release at the beginning of the ight but did not require pilots to include a runway’s length in an approach
brieng.
5
An RVR is a measurement of the visibility near a runway’s surface. This measurement represents the
horizontal distance that a pilot should be able to see down a runway from the approach end.
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About 1458:46, the approach controller informed a Jet Link ight crew that the
ight was cleared for an ILS runway 28 approach and that the glideslope was unusable.
The Shuttle America ight crew heard this transmission, and the crew began to discuss
how that ight could be cleared for an ILS approach if the glideslope were unusable. About
1459:10, the approach controller instructed the Shuttle America ight crew to descend
from 6,000 to 3,000 feet, and the captain acknowledged this instruction. Afterward, the
captain stated, “it’s not an ILS if there’s no glideslope,” to which the rst ofcer replied,
“exactly, it’s a localizer.” During postaccident interviews, both pilots stated that they
were confused by the term “unusable,” but the CVR indicated that neither pilot asked the
controller for clarication regarding the status of the glideslope.
About 1500:04, the approach controller instructed the ight crew to turn left onto
a new heading and intercept the runway 28 localizer. The captain acknowledged this
instruction. The rst ofcer then stated, “wonder why they put it on two eight without
a … glide slope if it’s … ILS.” About 1500:30, the controller instructed the crew to maintain
3,000 feet until established on the localizer and indicated that the ight was cleared for the
ILS runway 28 approach and that the glideslope was unusable. The captain acknowledged
the approach clearance and the altitude restriction but did not read back that the glideslope
was unusable.
About 1501:09, the captain contacted the tower controller, stating “localizer to two
eight.” The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 28 and reported that
the winds were from 310º at 12 knots and that the braking action was “fair.”
6
The captain
acknowledged the landing clearance.
About 1502:01, the rst ofcer stated that the glideslope had been captured.
During a postaccident interview, the rst ofcer stated that he and the captain did the
“mental math” for a 3º glideslope and that, on the basis of this calculation, they assumed
that the glideslope was functioning normally. Also, the captain stated that the cockpit
instrumentation showed the airplane on the glideslope with no warning ags. Because
the ight crewmembers assumed that the glideslope was working properly, they used
the ILS decision height (DH), which was 227 feet above ground level (agl), instead of the
localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude (MDA), which was 429 feet agl.
About 1502:25, the tower controller announced to all airplanes under his
control that the runway 28 RVR was 2,200 feet. The controller did not ask the Shuttle
America ight crew to acknowledge this information, and the crew did not provide an
acknowledgment.
About 1502:39, the captain stated, “we’re inside the [outer] marker,
[7]
we can keep
going.” The rst ofcer then briefed the procedure to go around in case it became necessary
6
Braking action is reported as good, fair, poor, or nil. According to the FAA (specically, Safety Alert
for Operators 06012), a runway with fair braking action has “noticeably degraded braking conditions”; as a
result, pilots should “expect and plan for a longer stopping distance such as might be expected on a packed
or compacted snow-covered runway.”
7
The outer marker was the nal approach x and was situated on the same line as the localizer and
runway centerline.
Factual Information
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to do so. About 1503:04, the rst ofcer stated that the localizer and the glideslope were
captured. Afterward, the tower controller announced to all airplanes under his control
that the runway 28 RVR was 2,000 feet. Again, the controller did not ask the Shuttle
America ight crew to acknowledge this information, and the crew did not provide an
acknowledgment. The captain then stated to the rst ofcer, “gotta have twenty four
[hundred feet] to shoot … the ILS.”
About 1503:54, the captain indicated that he was “gettin’ some ground contact on
the sides” but “nothing out front.” The CVR recorded the electronic callouts “approaching
minimums” about 1504:46 and “two hundred [feet agl], minimums” about 1504:53. One
second later, the captain stated, “I got the lights,” which was followed by the electronic
callout “minimums” and the rst ofcer’s statement, “and continuing.”
About 1504:58, the captain announced that the runway lights were in sight but
then stated that he could not see the runway; this statement was immediately followed
by “let’s go [around].” The rst ofcer then stated, “I got the end of the runway.” About
1505:07, the CVR recorded the 50-foot agl electronic callout followed immediately by the
captain’s statements, “you’ve got the runway?” and “yeah, there’s the runway, got it.”
During a postaccident interview, the rst ofcer stated that, when the airplane was 10 feet
agl, he momentarily lost sight of the runway because a snow squall came through and
he “could not see anything.” Flight data recorder (FDR) and CVR data showed that the
airplane was about 1,050 feet past the runway threshold when it descended to a height of
10 feet agl.
The CVR recorded the sound of the airplane touching down about 1505:29.
According to the aircraft performance study for this accident, the airplane touched down
about 2,900 feet down the 6,017-foot runway. During postaccident interviews, the captain
stated that he thought the airplane had touched down closer to the runway threshold
(somewhere between taxiway U and runway 24L),
8
and the rst ofcer stated that, during
the landing rollout, he could not see the end of the runway or any distance remaining
signs (which appeared every 1,000 feet).
FDR data showed that the ground spoilers deployed automatically and that the
thrust reversers were deployed shortly after landing (as further indicated by the captain’s
statement “two reverse” about 1505:33). Although the thrust reversers were initially
selected to the full reverse position upon landing, engine reverse thrust reached a peak of
only 65 percent N
1
(low pressure rotor speed), compared with a maximum of 70 percent
N
1
, for about 2 seconds before the commanded reverse thrust tapered off to reverse idle
during the landing rollout. In addition, FDR data showed that the rst ofcer’s initial
wheel brake application was about 20 percent of maximum and remained relatively steady
for about 8 seconds before increasing to 75 percent of maximum. Braking then increased
to about 90 percent of maximum when the captain applied his brakes. The antiskid system
did not modulate the brake pressure until the captain and the rst ofcer applied their
brakes aggressively.
8
It is about 850 feet from the runway 28 threshold to the midpoint of taxiway U; it is about 1,860 feet from
the runway 28 threshold to the midpoint of runway 24L.
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The CVR recorded the sound of numerous impacts starting about 1505:50 and a
sound similar to the airplane coming to a stop about 1505:57. The airplane came to rest
on a snow-covered grass surface located southwest of the extended runway 28 centerline.
Figure 1 shows the location of the airplane at the time of the captain’s go-around callout
and as it passed the runway threshold. Figure 1a shows the pertinent events from the
airplane’s touchdown to its overrun. Figure 2 shows the airplane in its nal resting location.
Location of Airplane Before Touchdown Figure 1.
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Events From Touchdown to OverrunFigure 1a.
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Airplane’s Location Southwest of the Extended Runway 28 Centerline Figure 2.
Source: Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
Available airport movement area safety system (AMASS)
9
video data showed that
four ights (all transport-category airplanes, including two 737s) arrived without incident
on runway 28 during the 10 minutes before the Shuttle America airplane landed. The
airplane that directly preceded the Shuttle America airplane to the runway had arrived
2 minutes earlier.
About 1506:04, the tower controller asked the ight crew about the ight’s status,
but the crew did not initially respond. About 1507:04, the tower controller asked the ight
crew again about the ight’s status, and the rst ofcer responded, “we’re off the runway
through the fence … everybody seems to be okay on board.” The controller then informed
the ight crew that emergency equipment was on the way. The ight crew later reported
to Shuttle America and the controller that braking action on the runway was nil. The CVR
recording ended at 1519:16.
9
CLE’s AMASS ground radar processor was connected to an airport surface detection equipment-3
radar located on top of the air trafc control tower.
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Injuries to Persons1.2
Injury chart. Table 1.
Injuries Flight Crew Cabin Crew Passengers Other Total
Fatal 0 0 0 0 0
Serious 0 0 0 0 0
Minor 0 0 3 0 3
None 2 2 68 0 72
Total 2 2 71 0 75
Note: Section 1.15 provides information about the passengers’ minor injuries.
Damage to Airplane1.3
The airplane’s nose landing gear, right wing leading edge, right wing leading edge
devices, and both engine nacelles received substantial damage from the impact forces.
Other Damage1.4
An ILS antenna and the airport perimeter fence were damaged.
Personnel Information1.5
The Captain1.5.1
The captain, age 31, held an airline transport pilot certicate and a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) rst-class medical certicate dated February 16, 2007, with a
limitation that required him to wear corrective lenses while exercising the privileges of
this certicate. The captain received a type rating on the ERJ-170 on June 29, 2005.
From April 2001 to May 2002, the captain worked for Atlantic Technologies, Inc.,
Huntsville, Alabama, ying the Cessna 210 while performing aerial survey work. From
May to November 2002, the captain was a contract rst ofcer ying the Sabreliner 65 and
40 for Haws Aviation in Huntsville. From December 2002 to December 2003, the captain
was a rst ofcer for Corporate Flight Management, Inc., Smyrna, Tennessee. The captain
was hired by Chautauqua Airlines in December 2003 as an Embraer ERJ-145 rst ofcer,
and he was upgraded to captain with Shuttle America in May 2005.
10
The captain was
10
Chautauqua Airlines, Shuttle America, and Republic Airlines are subsidiaries under Republic Airways
Company and share the same seniority list.
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based at Indianapolis International Airport (IND), Indianapolis, Indiana, and normally
commuted 2 hours from his home in Louisville, Kentucky, to IND.
The captain’s and Shuttle America’s ight records indicated that he had
accumulated 4,500 hours of total ying time, including 1,200 hours on the ERJ-170 and
1,100 hours as an ERJ-170 pilot-in-command (PIC). He had own 782, 142, 41, and 5 hours
in the 12 months, 90 days, 30 days, and 7 days, respectively, before the accident. (These
times include the accident ight.) The captain’s last line check occurred on December 22,
2006; his last recurrent prociency check occurred on November 30, 2006; and his last
recurrent ground training and crew resource management (CRM) training occurred on
May 12, 2006. FAA records indicated no accident or incident history or enforcement
action, and a search of records at the National Driver Register found no history of driver’s
license revocation or suspension.
The captain reported that he ew in snow conditions about 4 months each year
and that the conditions on the day of the accident were the worst winter conditions in
which he had ever own. He had previously landed at CLE but not on runway 28. The
captain also reported that he did not consider the runway 28 length or the difference in
lengths between runways 24R (the previously assigned runway) and 28 because he was
concentrating on the approach setup. In addition, the captain stated that he did not recall
whether he reviewed the landing weight for runway 28 and that he did not review the
landing distance data for the approach.
The captain was off duty (on vacation leave) during the 7 days before the accident.
On Friday, February 16, 2007, the captain was waiting in the SDF terminal for a ight (on
which he would travel via company jumpseat) to California so that he could visit his infant
son. The captain did not recall how many hours of sleep he received the night before but
did remember falling asleep in the terminal while waiting for a ight. The captain ew
from SDF to O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois, that day en route to
California. He spent the evening at a hotel in Chicago, went to sleep by 0000, and awoke
between 0630 and 0700 on Saturday, February 17. The captain spent the afternoon at ORD,
attempting to travel to California, but no jumpseats were available, so he returned to
Louisville, arriving about 1800. He reported feeling well rested that day.
The captain was not originally scheduled to work on the day of the accident (he
was scheduled to continue his vacation through the following days), but he had called
crew scheduling on the night of February 17, 2007, to request a trip. He was offered and
then accepted a 2-day trip assignment. The captain reported that he was unable to sleep
later that night, stating that he received 45 minutes to 1 hour of sleep. He went to bed at
2000 but did not fall asleep until 0000 on February 18 and then awoke at 0100. He tossed
in bed until about 0200, at which time he decided to get up and prepare for the 0525 report
time at SDF.
11
At the time of the accident, the captain had been on duty for 9 hours 40 minutes
with a total ight time of 5 hours 2 minutes. Also, the captain had been awake for all but
11
Because the captain had requested the accident trip sequence, crew scheduling allowed him to travel
(as a nonrevenue passenger) to ATL directly from SDF rather than report to IND (his home base) for the trip.
Factual Information
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Accident Report
10
about 1 hour of the previous 32 hours; he stated that his lack of sleep affected his ability
to concentrate and process information to make decisions and, as a result, was not “at the
best of [his] game.” In addition, the captain reported that, for breakfast on the day of the
accident, he ate graham crackers and drank orange juice while traveling as a nonrevenue
passenger and then drank coffee and ate peanuts and chips later on. The captain stated
that he was planning to eat lunch in ATL before the accident ight leg but was unable to
do so because of the delays from the earlier ight legs and the change in rst ofcers.
The captain stated that, when not ying, he typically went to bed between 2200 and
0000 and woke up between 0600 and 0800. The captain also reported that he had insomnia,
which began 9 months to 1 year before the accident and lasted for several days at a time,
and a 10-year chronic cough. According to his medical records, the captain met with a
physician on August 3 and August 30, 2006, about his fatigue and chronic cough. The
doctor’s notes from August 3 showed that the captain had a chest x-ray and a pulmonary
function test, which were interpreted as normal, and blood tests, which were also normal.
The doctor’s notes from August 30 indicated that the captain’s fatigue was better but
that he was occasionally having sleeping problems. The doctor instructed the captain to
follow up in 6 months (which would have been after the date of the accident). The captain
reported that he had tried over-the-counter sleeping pills (although it had been more than
6 months since he had done so) and that he had not used or been recommended to use
prescription-strength sleeping pills.
According to the captain’s attendance records from Chautauqua Airlines,
the captain had no absences from December 2003 to March 2004, 8 sick occurrences
totaling 14 sick days between April 2004 and February 2005, and no additional absences
afterward. From May to August 2005, the captain completed upgrade training for Shuttle
America with no reported sick occurrences during that time. Between September 2005
and January 2007, the captain had 11 sick occurrences totaling 26 sick days. (According
to the attendance policy for these Republic Airways Company subsidiary airlines, an
“occurrence” is a “continuous absence from scheduled duty or reporting late to work.”
The policy is further discussed in section 1.17.1.3.)
The captain’s attendance records from Shuttle America also showed that he was
unavailable for work on May 23 and July 30, 2006, resulting in two additional absence
occurrences. The captain reported that his rst unavailable attendance mark was the
result of a dispute with crew scheduling. The captain reported that his second unavailable
attendance mark happened after scheduled back-to-back trips. Specically, the captain
had own a trip on July 29, returning to IND later in the evening than scheduled, and
had to y another trip on July 30. Even though his schedule allowed for 11 hours of rest
before his scheduled report time, the captain did not receive adequate rest and called in as
fatigued. The captain stated that he had called crew scheduling several hours before the
trip “in a daze” to report his belief that it would be unsafe for him to y. The captain also
spoke with the Shuttle America chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager that day about the
company’s fatigue policy, and the chief pilot/program manager told him that fatigue calls
made outside of duty time would result in an unavailable attendance mark.
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According to the captain, during the same conversation on July 30, 2006, the chief
pilot/ERJ-170 program manager suggested that it might be possible for the captain to
combine some of the occurrences on his attendance record if he produced a medical note
covering a series of closely related sick days and the fatigue occurrence. The captain
reported that he provided a medical note
12
and followed up with a telephone call to the
chief pilot but stated that the chief pilot did not acknowledge receipt of the note or return
the call. The chief pilot remembered speaking with the captain about how to classify the
fatigue event but could not recall any other details of that conversation, and he did not
recall whether he received the captain’s medical note.
On January 16, 2007 (about 1 month before the accident), the Shuttle America
assistant chief pilot notied the captain, in writing, that his attendance had reached an
unacceptable level—nine absence occurrences (seven sick and two unavailable attendance
marks) totaling 18 days within the previous 12 months—and that future occurrences would
result in corrective action, which could include termination from the company. (According
to the company’s policy, eight absence occurrences would result in termination.) The
captain had not received previous notication from Shuttle America about his attendance.
The captain stated that, even though he was tired on the day of the accident, he did not
cancel his trip because he thought that could result in his termination.
According to the captain, he did not smoke, and he consumed an average of one
alcoholic beverage per day. The captain also stated that he did not take any prescription or
nonprescription medications during the 72 hours before the accident and did not have an
alcoholic beverage during the evening before the accident. The captain reported that his
nancial situation was poor during the year before the accident (and was gradually getting
worse) and that he and his wife had separated during the month before the accident (with
she and their infant son living in another state).
During the rst two ights of the accident trip sequence, the captain ew with a
different rst ofcer than the accident rst ofcer. The rst ofcer for the rst two ight
legs stated that the captain ew the rst leg and that he had indicated that he was “pretty
tired.”
13
The rst ofcer also stated that he was impressed with the captain’s piloting
skills. The accident rst ofcer stated that the captain seemed to be “by the book” but that
no specic conversation occurred about the need to watch each other or call out items.
This rst ofcer believed that he could provide any input to the captain.
Four rst ofcers who were paired with the captain before the accident had
positive comments about his interpersonal and piloting skills. They stated that he was
professional, followed standard operating procedures, gave complete briengs, and
communicated with the crew. The prociency check/line check airman who performed
the captain’s simulator check in November 2006 stated that the captain performed to
standards and noted specically that he demonstrated good CRM and exercised good
12
The captain provided a copy of this medical note to the Safety Board. The note, which was dated
August 3, 2006, indicated that the captain was being treated for fatigue and a chronic cough.
13
The rst ofcer who ew the rst two ight legs with the captain also reported that he was tired because
the rst ight leg (ATL to SRQ) was scheduled to be an early ight and, before the ight, he had to commute
to ATL.
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decision-making. The prociency check/line check airman who performed the captain’s
most recent line check in December 2006 stated that the captain performed to standards,
made all of the callouts, performed all of the checklists, and maintained good overall
control of the airplane. None of the pilots who were interviewed recalled the captain
being tired or fatigued.
The First Ofcer1.5.2
The rst ofcer, age 46, held an airline transport pilot certicate and an FAA
rst-class medical certicate dated September 20, 2006, with a limitation that required
him to possess glasses that correct for near vision while exercising the privileges of this
certicate. The rst ofcer received a type rating (second-in-command [SIC] privileges
only) on the ERJ-170 on February 3, 2006.
From 1999 to 2002, the rst ofcer worked as a ight instructor for Eagle East
Aviation, North Andover, Massachusetts. From 2002 to 2005, the rst ofcer ew
Jetstream 4100 airplanes as an SIC for Atlantic Coast Airlines (which became Independence
Air) while based at Washington Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, Virginia. The rst
ofcer was hired by Shuttle America as an ERJ-170 rst ofcer in June 2005. The rst
ofcer was based at ORD and commuted there from his home in New Hampshire.
The rst ofcer’s and Shuttle America’s ight records indicated that he had
accumulated 3,900 hours of total ying time, including 1,200 hours on the ERJ-170 as an
SIC. He had own 997, 229, 96, and 30 hours in the 12 months, 90 days, 30 days, and 7 days,
respectively, before the accident.
14
(These times include the accident ight.) The rst ofcer’s
last prociency check occurred on July 24, 2006; his last recurrent ground training occurred
on June 30, 2006; and his last recurrent CRM training occurred on June 28, 2006. FAA records
indicated no accident or incident history or enforcement action, and a search of records at
the National Driver Register found no history of driver’s license revocation or suspension.
The rst ofcer had not previously landed at CLE. He had own in snow conditions
before but had not experienced a snow squall during landing until the accident ight.
From Sunday, February 11, to Wednesday, February 14, 2007, the rst ofcer ew
a 4-day, 6-leg trip sequence. His earliest ight during that trip sequence began at 1104,
and the latest ight ended by 2315; his total ight time was 18 hours 27 minutes. The rst
ofcer was off duty on Thursday, February 15. He spent the night in Chicago and went to
bed about 2200 or 2300.
On Friday, February 16, 2007, the rst ofcer awoke about 0630 or 0730 to begin a
3-day, 6-leg trip sequence. He reported for duty at ORD at 0810, traveled as a nonrevenue
14
According to 14 CFR 121.471, pilots ying domestic operations can y up to 30 hours per week and
1,000 hours per calendar year. Although the rst ofcer had own 997 hours at the time of the accident, only
those hours accumulated in January and February 2007 counted toward the calendar year limit.
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passenger aboard two ights, and was the rst ofcer of a ight that arrived at Chicago
Midway International Airport (MDW) at 1939. On Saturday, February 17, the rst ofcer
reported for duty at 0615; completed three ights, the last of which ended at ATL at 1852;
and went to bed about 2200.
On Sunday, February 18, the rst ofcer reported for duty about 0550 and
completed two ights, ending in ATL at 1049. His total ight time for the six ights was
11 hours 50 minutes. The rst ofcer was originally scheduled to y as a nonrevenue
passenger from ATL to ORD. He had been away from home for 8 days and was scheduled
to be on vacation the day after the accident. During the nal leg of the 3-day trip sequence,
crew scheduling contacted the rst ofcer via ACARS to ask if he were willing to accept
a trip from ATL to CLE that day, remain in Cleveland overnight, and return to ATL the
next day as a ying pilot. The rst ofcer agreed to y the round trip because he could
still return home during the evening of February 19 and keep his vacation schedule. He
was on the ground at ATL for 2 hours 16 minutes before the accident ight departed. At
the time of the accident, the rst ofcer had been on duty about 9 hours 15 minutes, with
a total ight time of 5 hours 30 minutes.
The rst ofcer reported that he was in good health and that he had not taken any
prescription or nonprescription medications and did not smoke or drink in the 3 days that
preceded the accident. He reported his home life and nancial situation as stable. The rst
ofcer reported that his normal bedtime was about 2200 and that his normal awakening
time (when not ying) was about 0600.
During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he did not like the way
that the rst ofcer ew the airplane during takeoff and up to cruise ight. Specically,
the captain indicated that the rst ofcer manually ew the airplane to an altitude of
about 30,000 feet
15
in a “very jerky” manner, but the captain did not mention anything to
the rst ofcer at the time. The captain did not report anything else remarkable about the
rst ofcer’s piloting skills.
The captain stated that he did not specically ask the rst ofcer if he was
uncomfortable ying the approach to landing and that the rst ofcer did not indicate that
he was uncomfortable. Three of four captains who had been previously paired with the rst
ofcer stated that he was below average in piloting skills. One of the captains stated that
the rst ofcer did a good job following standard operating procedures and performing
checklists but that he seemed to be “behind the airplane.” Another captain stated that the
rst ofcer relied too much on automation and was slow to respond to abnormalities. This
captain did state that the rst ofcer took criticism well and made efforts to improve.
The line check airman who provided the rst ofcer with some of his initial
operating experience stated that she had recommended him for further training because
he needed to perfect his visual approaches. (The rst ofcer received the recommended
training.) A prociency check/line check airman who had own with the rst ofcer
15
FDR data showed that the autopilot was engaged at 28,000 feet.
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14
several times indicated nothing remarkable about his experiences ying with the rst
ofcer and noted no deciencies in his abilities or decision-making.
Airplane Information1.6
The accident airplane was registered to Shuttle America with a registration
certicate issue date of September 30, 2005. The airplane’s estimated landing weight was
69,186 pounds, which was within the maximum landing weight of 72,310 pounds, as
indicated in Embraer’s airplane ight manual. The airplane’s landing center of gravity
(cg) was 20 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), which was within the cg limits of
7 to 27 percent MAC.
The airplane was congured with 2 cockpit ight crew seats, 1 aft-facing ight
attendant jumpseat on the forward bulkhead, 1 forward-facing ight attendant jumpseat
on the aft bulkhead, 6 rst-class passenger seats, and 64 coach-class passenger seats. The
airplane was equipped with General Electric CF34-8E5 engines. The airplane was not
equipped with autobrakes.
Meteorological Information1.7
Airport Weather Information1.7.1
CLE has an automated surface observing system (ASOS) that is maintained by the
National Weather Service (NWS). Augmentation and backup of the ASOS are provided
by NWS-certied observers in the CLE air trafc control tower (ATCT). The ASOS
records continuous information on wind speed and direction, cloud cover (in feet agl),
temperature, precipitation, and visibility (in statute miles). The ASOS transmits an ofcial
meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) each hour and special weather observations
(SPECI) as conditions warrant. (Such conditions include a wind shift, change in visibility,
and change in cloud cover or height.)
The following METAR and SPECI information was recorded surrounding the time
of the accident:
The 1436 SPECI indicated winds from 300º at 14 knots; visibility 8 miles in •
light snow; scattered clouds at 2,900 feet, ceiling broken at 3,400 feet, overcast
at 7,000 feet; temperature -6° Celsius (C); dew point -12° C; altimeter setting
30.00 inches of mercury (Hg). The SPECI remarked that snow began at 1436.
The 1451 METAR indicated winds from 290º at 18 knots; visibility 1/4 mile •
in heavy snow; scattered clouds at 1,100 feet, ceiling broken at 1,800 feet,
overcast at 4,300 feet; temperature -7º C; dew point -11º C; altimeter setting
30.01 inches of Hg.
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The 1456 SPECI indicated winds from 300º at 16 knots; visibility 1/4 mile •
in heavy snow; ceiling broken at 600 feet, broken at 1,500 feet, overcast at
4,100 feet; temperature -7º C; dew point -11º C; altimeter setting 30.01 inches
of Hg.
The 1505 5-minute observation indicated winds from 330º at 16 knots gusting •
to 22 knots; visibility 1/2 mile in moderate snow; ceiling broken at 600 feet,
broken at 1,700 feet, overcast at 3,400 feet; temperature -7º C; dew point -9º C;
altimeter setting 30.02 inches of Hg.
The 1517 SPECI indicated winds from 330º at 13 knots gusting to 16 knots; •
visibility 1/4 mile in heavy snow; ceiling broken at 300 feet, broken at
1,000 feet, overcast at 1,500 feet; temperature -8º C; dew point -11º C; altimeter
setting 30.03 inches of Hg.
RVR values are normally determined by visibility sensors that are similar to
those used in the ASOS (or by transmissometers). The RVR system measures visibility,
background luminance, and runway light intensity to determine the distance a pilot
should be able to see down the runway. The RVR sensors are located along and near the
approach end of the runway. Between 1501 and 1509, the ATCT reported the RVR for
runway 28 to be 2,400 feet or less. At 1506, the ATCT reported the RVR to be 1,400 feet.
National Weather Service Weather Information1.7.2
The ight dispatcher released the accident ight at 1144 based on the CLE terminal
aerodrome forecast (TAF) issued at 0953, which expected northwest winds of 12 knots
and marginal visual ight rules conditions (that is, a ceiling between 1,000 and 3,000 feet
and/or visibility of 3 to 5 statute miles) with light snow.
The TAF that was issued at 1226 on the day of the accident indicated the following:
from 1500, winds from 310º at 15 knots gusting to 22 knots, visibility 6 miles in light snow
showers, and ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet; temporarily between 1500 and 1900, visibility
2 miles in light snow showers and ceiling overcast at 1,200 feet.
The TAF was amended at 1444 (about 22 minutes before the accident) to indicate
the following: from 1500, winds from 310º at 15 knots, visibility 5 miles in light snow
showers, and ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet; temporarily between 1500 and 1700, visibility
1/2 mile in moderate snow showers and ceiling overcast at 800 feet.
The NWS had a Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) located
at CLE. The WSR-88D is a 10-centimeter wavelength radar that measures, among other
things, reectivity (that is, echo intensity). The base reectivity image at 1505 depicted a
band of echoes moving across the Cleveland area; these echoes were consistent with those
of moderate to heavy snow showers.
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Aids to Navigation1.8
The FAA issued a NOTAM regarding the runway 28 glideslope, stating, “due to
the effects of snow on the glide slope minimums temporarily raised to localizer only for
all category aircraft. Glide slope remains in service. However angle may be different than
published.” This NOTAM was included in the ight crew’s preight paperwork, but both
pilots indicated that they had not read the NOTAM.
No problems with any other navigational aids were reported.
Communications1.9
No technical communications problems were reported.
Airport Information1.10
CLE is located about 9 miles southwest of Cleveland at an elevation of 791 feet mean
sea level. The airport had three parallel runways, 6L/24R, 6C/24C,
16
and 6R/24L, and one
nonparallel runway, 10/28. Runway 28, the active runway for the accident ight, was
6,017 feet long and 150 feet wide. Runway 28 was equipped with an ILS and a 1,400-foot
medium intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights.
According to airport personnel, about 3 percent of the operations conducted annually at
CLE occur on runway 10/28.
The Safety Board examined the FAA’s airport certication inspection reports for
CLE for 2004 through 2006, and no uncorrected deciencies were noted.
Runway Safety Area1.10.1
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13, “Airport Design,” table 3-3, “Runway
Design Standards for Aircraft Approach Categories,” stated that the standard runway
safety area (RSA) should be a width of 500 feet (250 feet on both sides of the extended
runway centerline) and a length of 1,000 feet beyond each runway end. The runway 10
departure end had a full-width RSA that was 748 feet in length. The runway 28 departure
end had an RSA that was 60 feet long and 275 feet wide.
17
The runway 10/28 longitudinal
RSAs were measured along the extended runway centerline.
16
Runway 6C/24C had been rarely used since 2004 because of an overlapping runway safety area with
runway 6R/24L. In November 2007, runway 6C/24C was closed permanently, and work began to convert most
of the runway to a taxiway.
17
A full-width RSA did not exist beyond the runway 28 departure end threshold because of the
presence of a fence, runway edge identier lights, a localizer, a localizer building, two access roads near a
National Aeronautics and Space Administration building, numerous trees, and a terrain drop (estimated by a
September 2000 FAA document to be 670 feet from the departure end threshold).
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Runway 10/28 was originally constructed in the early 1950s and was extended
from its original length of 5,500 feet to its current length of 6,017 feet in 1958 (before the
development of the current FAA airport design standards). As a result of a regulatory
change that became effective on January 1, 1988, the FAA accepted the RSA conditions
that existed at that time for airports certicated under Part 139. After that date, however,
the FAA required that any signicant runway expansion or reconstruction include RSAs
that met standards acceptable to the FAA to the extent practicable. Runway 10/28 was
partially reconstructed four times between 1981 and 2005 (for runway rehabilitation using
a cement concrete overlay), but the runway was not expanded in size or weight-bearing
capacity. Thus, the RSAs were not required to be changed.
In accordance with FAA Order 5200.8, “Runway Safety Area Program,” the FAA
inventoried CLE’s RSA conditions in 2000. In a September 29, 2000, letter to CLE, the
FAA recognized that runway 10/28 did not conform to agency standards and detailed
some short- and long-term options to improve the RSAs as much as possible. The short-
term improvements were to relocate the localizer building and remove trees located on
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Glenn Research Center
property. The long-term improvements, characterized in the FAA’s letter as “more
complex and costly,” were to (1) coordinate and agree with NASA to relocate its two
primary entrance/exit road lanes that were within the RSA for the departure end of
runway 28 to a distance of about 300 feet from the existing runway 10 (approach end)
threshold and construct a 300-foot engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) within
the vacated area and (2) shift the runway 300 feet to the east
18
and install another EMAS at
the opposite end of the runway.
The FAA, in its September 2000 letter, asked CLE to conduct a study that evaluated
the short- and long-term options to enhance the RSAs for runway 10/28. The FAA asked
that CLE initiate the study immediately and that its recommendation be submitted to the
FAA by March 2001. In response, CLE contracted for an RSA study, and an initial draft
report was provided to the FAA in March 2004. CLE submitted revised draft reports in
September 2006 and September 2007 as a result of FAA comments.
In its October 2007 letter responding to the latest draft report, the FAA stated that
CLE needed to document why it is not practicable to improve the RSAs to meet current
standards. The FAA’s letter also stated that, although the draft report identied several
alternatives for improving the RSAs, the draft did not recommend a preferred alternative
and the implementation schedule for this alternative. The letter further stated that, even
though the FAA’s original goal was to bring all substandard RSAs into conformance
by 2007, the deadline for improving runway 10/28 at CLE as much as practicable had
been extended to September 2010. According to CLE, the deadline was changed to 2010
because the FAA and CLE had not yet nalized a solution and the FAA anticipated that
the timeline to allocate funds for and complete the project would take until 2010. In
18
FAA Order 5200.8, paragraph 4b, states, “when obtaining a standard RSA is not practicable through
traditional means (e.g. land acquisition, grading, ll, etc.), alternatives must be explored. During some types of
projects, it may be feasible to relocate, realign, shift, or change a runway in such a way that the RSA may be
obtained. It is recognized that the costs of this kind of adjustment may be justied only in an extensive project,
but the concept should be evaluated to determine if it is a practicable alternative.”
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addition, the letter stated, “since design and construction of the RSA improvements will
need to begin promptly to meet this deadline, the RSA Study should be nalized and
the preferred alternative selected as soon as possible.” CLE had not resubmitted its RSA
study to the FAA as of April 2008.
Airport Winter Operations1.10.2
CLE’s FAA-approved Airport Certication Manual, section 9, “Snow and
Ice Control,” dated November 7, 2006, stated that airport operations personnel were
responsible for maintaining all paved aireld surfaces and lighting during snow and ice
conditions, keeping all navigational aid snow clearance areas within snow depth limits
for the specic type of glideslope antenna conguration, and notifying the local airways
facilities sector ofce immediately upon engaging the snow removal plan. The manual
also included the following information:
Ice, snow, and slush shall be removed as completely as practicable from 1)
appropriate air carrier movement areas.
Upon noticing that an accumulation is taking place on the eld … Airport 2)
Operations shall issue an advisory … the advisory will include a eld
condition report … with the date and time … this will alert all concerned
parties and will provide the necessary time to make a eld inspection and
issue a NOTAM.
The determination for commencement of a snow removal operation is based 3)
upon the evaluation of the existing eld conditions, with present and forecast
weather conditions being taken into consideration. Generally, a snow
removal operation shall commence at the beginning of an accumulation of
snow on the movement surface, and prior to an accumulation of one-half
inch of slush or wet snow, or two inches of dry snow.
Friction measurement readings are conducted for touchdown, midpoint, 4)
and rollout and the results are disseminated … in the event a numeric
reading of 20
[19]
or less is veried, that runway surface will automatically
be closed to all airport operations.
FAA AC 150/5200-30A, “Airport Winter Safety and Operations,” describes
friction-measuring equipment for use on runways during winter operations and species
the conditions that are acceptable to conduct friction surveys on frozen contaminated
surfaces. The AC stated that a decelerometer was considered to be “generally reliable”
when ice or wet ice and compact snow at any depth contaminated the runway surface.
The AC also stated that it was “generally accepted” that friction surveys would be reliable
as long as the depth of dry snow did not exceed 1 inch and/or the depth of wet snow/
slush did not exceed 1/8 inch.
19
According to a representative from CLE operations, the airport surveyed all of its operators to determine
their limitations in friction-limited conditions. CLE selected a friction measurement reading of 20 because it
was more conservative than the minimums allowed by the operators. (The higher the friction measurement
reading, the greater the friction.)
Factual Information
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19
As previously stated, on the day of the accident, CLE was receiving intermittent
snowfall. The active runway was periodically alternated to allow for surface maintenance
and friction testing, as discussed in table 2 along with other relevant events. Although
runways 24L and 28 were both open at the time of the accident, runway 24L was being
used for departures, and runway 28 was being used for arrivals.
Information Regarding Runway Conditions at CLE on the Day of the AccidentTable 2.
Time Event
0819 The airport was closed because of snow accumulation and nil braking (based on runway friction
tests conducted with the use of a decelerometer).
0939 The airport was reopened, with runway 6L/24R as the active runway and runways 6R/24L and
10/28 closed. A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6L/24R had a thin cover of snow
and ice and that sand had been applied 60 feet wide. The NOTAM also included the runway
friction values for runway 6L.
1025 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6R/24L was open with a thin cover of snow and
ice and that sand had been applied 60 feet wide. The NOTAM also included the runway friction
values for runway 6R.
1112 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6R/24L had a thin cover of snow over patchy
packed snow and ice. The NOTAM also included the runway friction values for runway 6R.
1142 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6L/24R had scattered thin patches of packed
snow and ice. The NOTAM also indicated that a broom snow removal vehicle had been used
on the runway and that sand had been applied 60 feet wide. The NOTAM included the runway
friction values for runway 6L.
1309 Snow removal operations began on runway 10/28.
1347 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 10/28 had been opened with a thin cover of
packed snow and ice. The NOTAM also indicated that a broom snow removal vehicle had
been used on the runway and that sand had been applied 50 feet wide. The NOTAM further
indicated that the runway friction values for runway 28 were 38 (touchdown and midpoint) and
41(rollout).
1349 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6R/24L was closed and that snow removal
operations began on the runway.
1437 A NOTAM was issued, indicating that runway 6R/24L had been opened and was wet with
scattered thin patched melting snow and ice. The NOTAM also indicated that a broom snow
removal vehicle had been used on the runway. The NOTAM further indicated that the runway
friction values for runway 24L were 41 (touchdown), 43 (midpoint), and 44 (rollout). This NOTAM
canceled the one issued at 1349.
1440 Runway 6L/24R was closed.
1501 Flight 6448 was cleared to land on runway 28. Braking action was reported to the ight crew as
fair (based on a 1457 report from a 737 pilot).
1506 The accident occurred.
1523 Reported conditions on runway 10/28 were 1/2-inch cover of snow over scattered thin
patches of compacted snow. The reported friction values for runway 28 were 24 (touchdown),
25 (midpoint), and 30 (rollout). (The same decelerometer was used for the pre- and postaccident
runway friction tests.)
Note: There were no reports of snow being cleared from the glideslopes. The runways and taxiways have higher priority for
snow removal than glideslope antennas.
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20
Flight Recorders1.11
The airplane was equipped with two solid-state digital voice-data recorder (DVDR)
systems, which comprised a CVR and an FDR. The DVDR systems were Honeywell
DVDR-120-4x models, serial numbers 00471 (located in the aft section of the airplane)
and 00483 (located in the forward section of the airplane). The DVDRs were designed to
record 2 hours of audio data and a minimum of 25 hours of ight data.
The DVDRs were sent to the Safety Board’s laboratory for readout and evaluation.
The Board determined that the forward DVDR had stopped recording during the accident
sequence but that the aft recorder continued recording until 1519:16, when the airplane
was powered down. As a result, the CVR transcript was prepared from the information
downloaded from the aft recorder, and the FDR data cited in this report were those from
the aft recorder.
The DVDRs sustained no heat or structural damage, and the audio information
and ight data were extracted normally and without difculty. The CVR recording from
the aft recorder contained four channels (the pilot, copilot, observer, and cockpit area
microphones) of excellent-quality audio data.
20
A transcript was prepared of the entire
recording (see appendix B). The FDRs recorded the required 88 as well as other parameters.
About 27 hours of data were recorded on the aft FDR, including about 2 hours 20 minutes
of data from the accident ight.
Wreckage and Impact Information1.12
The airplane’s nose gear collapsed during the overrun, and the airplane came
to rest on a snow-covered grass surface located southwest of the extended runway 28
centerline. Witness marks included tire tracks in the soil and the snow. The airplane’s nal
resting position was along a 256º true heading.
The airplane’s brake control components were tested at the Crane Hydro-Aire
facility in Burbank, California. All components were found to be within specications.
The brake control modules passed all areas of the test procedure with no out-of-limit
conditions.
Medical and Pathological Information1.13
In accordance with 14 CFR Part 121, Appendixes I and J, Shuttle America
conducted postaccident drug and alcohol testing on the captain and the rst ofcer.
20
The Safety Board rates the audio quality of CVR recordings according to a ve-category scale:
excellent, good, fair, poor, and unusable. An excellent-quality recording is one in which virtually all of the crew
conversations can be accurately and easily understood. The transcript that was developed might indicate
only one or two words that were not intelligible. Any loss in the transcript is usually attributed to simultaneous
cockpit/radio transmissions that obscured each other.
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21
The company administered breathalyzer tests on the day of the accident at 1836 for
the captain and 1821 for the rst ofcer. Also, the company obtained urine samples on
the day of the accident at 1845 from the captain and 1830 from the rst ofcer. The
urine specimens were tested for the following major drugs of abuse: marijuana, cocaine,
phencyclidine, amphetamines, and opiates. All of the tests were negative.
Fire1.14
No in-ight or postcrash re occurred.
Survival Aspects1.15
Three passengers reported accident-related injuries. These injuries were neck,
back, spine, shoulder, and/or arm pain. Two of these passengers were transported to a
hospital after the accident, but neither was admitted.
Emergency Response1.15.1
According to the assistant re chief at the CLE airport rescue and reghting
(ARFF) station, about 1506:30, the station received a call on the crash phone from the
ATCT. The controller notied the ARFF station of “a possible alert 3”
21
and stated that he
had lost sight of a landing airplane and was no longer in communication with the pilot.
The controller also stated that he thought the airplane was off the end of runway 28. Six
ARFF vehicles staffed with a total of nine ARFF personnel responded to the call about
1507. The assistant re chief added that, upon leaving the station, the ARFF crews were
faced with “blizzard conditions and a complete whiteout” and no visibility as a result of
the falling snow and wind.
Before the ARFF vehicles and personnel arrived at the accident scene, the controller
told the ARFF commander that he was in communication with the pilot, who reported
that the airplane was off the runway and through a fence with no re and no injuries
on the airplane. The ARFF vehicles and personnel arrived on scene about 1509:25. ARFF
personnel conrmed that there was no re, and the ARFF commander spoke to the captain
to conrm that there were no injuries aboard the airplane. Afterward, the commander
directed ARFF personnel to ensure that there were no fuel leaks or sources of ignition in
the area, and they conrmed that the airplane was secure. Cleveland Fire Department
personnel arrived on scene about 1527.
The Shuttle America Corporation 170 General Operations Manual, chapter 1,
Flight Crew Duties and Responsibilities, section 10, Emergency Evacuation, dated
February 15, 2006, stated the following policy: “an actual evacuation may not be necessary.
21
An alert 3 indicates that an aircraft has been involved in an accident on or near the airport.
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The PIC’s ultimate decision to evacuate versus normal exit through the main door and
airstairs
[22]
should be made after analyzing all factors pertaining to the situation when the
aircraft has come to a complete stop.”
The captain stated that he considered an evacuation but then decided to keep
everyone on board until the buses arrived because no one was in imminent danger, ARFF
had informed him that the airplane was secure (that is, no fuel leaks or sources of ignition
were in the area), and it had been snowing heavily outside. According to the ARFF chief,
the ight crew and ARFF personnel agreed that, after shuttle buses arrived on scene, the
passengers would deplane and be transported to the ARFF station. The CLE operations
log showed that the passengers began deplaning about 1555. ARFF personnel assisted
the passengers down the station’s A-frame ladder, shown in gure 3, at the right front
door (1R) exit. The ARFF chief and a CLE operations supervisor indicated that the ladder
was open to its A-frame conguration during the deplaning. The ARFF log showed
that passenger deplaning was completed by 1630. The ight attendants and ight crew
deplaned afterward using the ladder. They were then transported to the ARFF station in
an airport vehicle.
22
Some ERJ-170 airplanes (including the accident airplane) do not have integrated airstairs. Portable
stairs are used instead.
Accident Airplane and Ladder Used for Deplaning Figure 3.
Source: Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
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23
Postaccident Communications With Dispatch1.15.2
The Safety Board reviewed a transcript of postaccident cell phone conversations
between the ight crew and dispatch (at IND). The rst ofcer made the initial contact with
dispatch and reported the accident to the dispatcher who was responsible for releasing the
ight. He briefed the ight dispatcher on the events surrounding the overrun and told her
that the ight attendants were going to deploy the 1R slide to deplane the passengers. The
dispatcher acknowledged this information but also questioned whether to use a ladder.
The captain subsequently called a dispatch coordinator, who had been advised about
the overrun, and told him that a decision had not been made regarding whether to use a
ladder or the 1R slide for deplaning. The captain stated his concern that a ladder could
result in more injuries than the slide. The captain and the dispatch coordinator agreed
that the ight crew and ARFF personnel should determine the safest way to deplane.
The dispatch coordinator indicated that the slide could be deployed but cautioned that
ARFF personnel needed to be located at the bottom of the slide because of the possibility
of injuries.
Afterward, the ight dispatcher told the captain that the chief pilot (also at IND)
did not want the slide deployed “at all cost” because he was concerned about people
getting hurt. The captain then told the dispatch coordinator that, even though ARFF
personnel wanted the slide deployed and people were concerned about using a ladder in
the snow, the chief pilot did not want the slide to be deployed. The captain then reported
that ARFF personnel were going to see if they could get a ladder to the 1R door. The
ladder was then positioned at the 1R door and used for deplaning.
Tests and Research1.16
Aircraft Performance Study1.16.1
The Safety Board performed an aircraft performance study for this accident for
which CVR, FDR, and radar data were correlated. Section 1.16.1.1 details information
about the accident airplane’s calculated ground track. Section 1.16.1.2 provides information
about the braking ability achieved by the accident airplane during the rollout and the
minimum braking ability required to safely stop the airplane. Section 1.16.1.3 discusses
the results of an arrival assessment study using an additional landing distance safety
margin of 15 percent, as recommended by the Board in Safety Recommendations A-07-57
(urgent) and -61.
Calculated Ground Track1.16.1.1
Table 3 summarizes events that occurred during the landing rollout and indicates
the runway distance remaining based on FDR, CVR, global positioning system, and
radar data and the overlay of the airplane’s calculated ground track on the CLE aerial
diagram.
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24
Landing Rollout Events and Stopping Distances Remaining on Runway 28 Table 3.
Time Event
1505:25 Main gear touchdown. Groundspeed was about 105 knots. Remaining runway distance
was about 3,100 feet.
1505:25 Ground spoiler deployment.
1505:30 Nose gear touchdown.
1505:30.5 Left and right engine thrust lever angles transitioned from the idle setting to the full reverse
thrust setting (commanded until airspeed was about 85 knots). Remaining runway distance
was about 2,200 feet.
1505:32 Left and right thrust reversers deployed.
1505:33 First ofcer applied wheel brakes to about 20 percent maximum. Remaining runway
distance was about 1,850 feet.
1505:36 Left and right engine thrust lever angles began transition from full reverse setting toward
reverse idle thrust setting.
1505:38 Left and right engines were in reverse thrust, reaching a peak value of 65 percent N
1
for
about 2 seconds (groundspeed was about 80 knots). Remaining runway distance was
about 1,100 feet.
1505:40.5 First ofcer increased wheel braking. Remaining runway distance was about 800 feet.
1505:41.5 Peak longitudinal deceleration was about 0.25 G.
a
1505:44 Captain applied wheel brakes. Remaining runway distance was about 450 feet.
1505:44.5 Left and right engine thrust lever angles were at reverse idle thrust setting (groundspeed was
about 55 knots). Remaining runway distance was about 400 feet.
1505:46.5 First ofcer’s wheel brake application was about 75 percent maximum. Captain’s wheel
brake application was about 90 percent maximum. Remaining runway distance was about
200 feet.
1505:48.5 Left and right engines were in reverse thrust with N
1
about 25 percent.
1505:49 Airplane departed runway. Groundspeed was about 42 knots.
a
G is a unit of measurement that is equivalent to the acceleration caused by the earth’s gravity (32.174 feet/
second
2
).
Braking Ability1.16.1.2
The Safety Board estimated the braking ability (which has been associated in this
report with the term airplane braking coefcient)
23
achieved during the airplane’s rollout.
FDR data, ERJ-170 aerodynamic data, and a General Electric CF34-8E5 engine model were
used to estimate the lift, drag, and thrust forces acting on the airplane. The aerodynamic
data were based on the airplane being congured with ap position 5, gear down, and
ground spoilers deployed. (According to Shuttle America’s ERJ-170 Pilot Operating
Handbook, the aps 5 conguration was the preferred landing setting.)
The ERJ-170 aerodynamic data and the CF34-8E5 engine model were used to
estimate the minimum braking coefcient required to safely stop the airplane using an
emergency stopping scenario and a scenario that was consistent with the performance
23
Airplane braking coefcient is dened as the ratio of the retarding force due to braking relative to
the normal force (that is, weight minus lift) acting on the airplane. The estimated airplane braking coefcient
incorporates the effects of the runway surface, runway contaminants, and the airplane braking system (such
as antiskid system efciency, tire pressure, and brake wear).
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assumptions embedded in the Embraer computerized airplane ight manual. Both
scenarios required the airplane to stop within the available landing distance from the
actual touchdown location. The emergency stopping scenario, by denition, assumed the
deployment of ground spoilers, full wheel braking, and the sustained use of maximum
reverse thrust until the airplane came to a complete stop. Landing performance numbers
from the Embraer computerized airplane ight manual assumed the deployment of ground
spoilers, use of maximum reverse thrust until the airplane decelerated to an airspeed of
60 knots, and full wheel braking.
The accident airplane’s calculated braking coefcient for a sustained 5-second
period of signicant braking application exceeded the minimum braking coefcient
needed to stop on the runway.
24
The sustained period of signicant braking application
began 6 seconds before the airplane departed the runway.
Landing Distance Assessments1.16.1.3
At the time of the accident, Shuttle America did not require landing distance
assessments based on conditions at the time of arrival,
25
even though the FAA had issued
a safety alert for operators (SAFO)
26
in August 2006 recommending that such assessments
be performed. (See section 1.18.3 for information about the SAFO and the Safety Board
recommendation that led to the issuance of the SAFO.)
The Safety Board conducted an arrival assessment study to determine landing
performance numbers for the ERJ-170 using an additional 15-percent safety margin, as
recommended by the SAFO. The Embraer computerized airplane ight manual was
used to estimate landing performance with the accident landing condition for two ap
congurations and various runway surface conditions.
The factored landing performance data—that is, the data that included an
additional 15-percent stopping distance margin—indicated that an ERJ-170 congured
with aps 5 or full aps could land on a 6,017-foot runway with a surface condition of
compact snow
27
with or without two-engine reverse thrust. If the ERJ-170 were congured
with full aps and two-engine reverse thrust, the airplane could land on a 6,017-foot
runway with at least an additional 15-percent margin for all runway surface conditions
24
The calculated braking coefcient for the accident airplane was about 0.15 during the sustained
5-second period of signicant braking. With the emergency stopping scenario, the minimum braking coefcient
required to stop the accident airplane within the available ground roll distance was 0.11. Landing performance
numbers from the Embraer computerized airplane ight manual showed that, with the actual airplane
touchdown location, a minimum braking coefcient of 0.13 would be required to stop the airplane in dry snow
depths of 1 inch or less. (Reported conditions on runway 28 were 1/2-inch cover of snow over scattered thin
patches of compacted snow.)
25
Shuttle America provided its pilots with landing performance data for dispatch (factored and unfactored
distances) in terms of maximum landing weights. Company policy required pilots to review this information as
a part of the ight release at the beginning of the ight.
26
The FAA established SAFOs in 2005 to convey “new important safety information directly to operators”
as that information became available. SAFOs are not mandatory.
27
According to the SAFO guidance, a reported braking action of fair (the accident condition) would
translate to the compact snow contaminant type.
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dened in the Embraer computerized airplane ight manual—dry, wet, compact snow,
dry snow, wet snow, slush, and standing water—except wet ice.
28
Organizational and Management Information1.17
Shuttle America received its original certication in November 1998 and operated
DeHavilland DH8 airplanes from Hartford, Connecticut. In October 2001, Shuttle America
reorganized after obtaining a code-share agreement with US Airways and began operating
its DH8 airplanes through a leasing and maintenance agreement with Allegheny Airlines.
In September 2002, Shuttle America relocated its headquarters to Fort Wayne, Indiana,
and operated the Saab SF-340. The company’s code-share agreement with US Airways
was terminated in October 2004.
In May 2005, Republic Airways Holdings, the parent company of Chautauqua
Airlines, purchased Shuttle America and received approval to operate the ERJ-170. (By
the end of 2005, Shuttle America had sold its Saab airplanes.) In August 2005, Republic
Airways Holdings received certication for a third subsidiary airline, Republic Airlines.
Shuttle America began scheduled ERJ-170 service for United Airlines in June 2005
and Delta Air Lines in September 2005. During 2006, Shuttle America relocated its
headquarters to Indianapolis. At the time of the accident, Shuttle America operated
47 ERJ-170 airplanes with up to 70 seats and employed 430 pilots.
Flight Manuals1.17.1
Missed Approach Procedures1.17.1.1
According to the Shuttle America Corporation ERJ-170 Pilot Operating Handbook,
chapter 4, Normal Procedures,
29
section 43, Go Around, sufcient visual cues must exist
for a pilot to continue an approach below the DH or the MDA.
30
The section stated that, if
visual cues were lost after the DH or MDA because of snow urries or heavy precipitation,
28
At the time of the accident, the Embraer computerized airplane ight manual reported identical landing
performance numbers for compact snow and ice runway surface conditions. The landing distance numbers for
ice were generally nonconservative, but an alternate wet ice runway surface condition option was available.
Shuttle America cited the nonconservative results for the ice runway surface condition as an obstacle in
implementing arrival assessments that were consistent with the SAFO on landing distance assessments.
Embraer subsequently updated its computerized airplane ight manual calculations for the ice runway surface
condition option.
29
The Normal Procedures information cited in this report was dated August 15, 2006.
30
DH is used for a precision (ILS) approach; MDA is used for a nonprecision localizer-only approach.
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the pilot should immediately initiate a go-around
31
and y the published missed approach
procedure as required by the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).
32
Also, chapter 4, section 37, Instrument Procedures, stated that, if the runway were
not in sight at the DH or the MDA, the monitoring pilot was to call out “minimums”
and “no contact,” and the ying pilot was to call out “go around” and execute a missed
approach.
Landing Operations1.17.1.2
The Shuttle America Corporation ERJ-170 Pilot Operating Handbook, chapter 4,
Normal Procedures, section 46, Normal Landing, stated that the key to a successful
landing was to make a stabilized approach by using a glideslope, a glidepath (vertical
guidance), and/or visual cues, which should enable the airplane to cross the landing
threshold about 50 feet above the ground (corresponding to a touchdown point of about
1,000 feet). The section added that the acceptable touchdown range was 750 to 1,250 feet
(1,000 feet ± 250 feet) from the runway threshold.
Chapter 8 of the handbook, Training Maneuvers, section 5, Flight Training
Acceptable Performance, dated March 14, 2005, stated that the airplane should touch
down smoothly at a point that is 500 to 3,000 feet beyond the runway threshold and not
exceed one-third of the runway length. This touchdown zone reference follows the
FAA-approved guidance listed in the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) and
FAA-S-8051-5D, Practical Test Standards.
The Normal Procedures section of the handbook also emphasized the importance
of establishing the desired reverse thrust as soon as possible after touchdown. The
section further stated that immediate initiation of maximum reverse thrust at main gear
touchdown was the preferred technique and that full reverse thrust would reduce the
stopping distance on very slippery runways. According to the handbook, maximum
reverse thrust should be maintained until the airspeed approached 80 knots.
In addition, the Normal Procedures section of the handbook stated that, after main
gear touchdown, a constant brake pedal pressure should be smoothly applied to achieve
the desired braking and that full brake pedal should be applied on slippery runways. The
section also stated that the antiskid system would adapt pilot-applied brake pressure to
runway conditions but that, for slippery runways, several skid cycles would occur before
the antiskid system established the correct amount of brake pressure for the most effective
braking. In addition, the section stated that pilots should not attempt to modulate, pump,
31
Shuttle America’s policy required pilots to report each go-around executed. According to company
records, from January 1, 2006, to April 22, 2007, 190 go-arounds were reported. The Shuttle America director
of safety indicated that 95 percent of go-arounds were for trafc avoidance and that the remaining 5 percent
were for other causes, such as unstabilized approaches and weather.
32
Title 14 CFR 91.175, “Takeoff and Landing Under IFR,” states that pilots are to “immediately execute
an appropriate missed approach procedure … upon arrival at the missed approach point, including a DA
[decision altitude]/DH where a DA/DH is specied and its use is required, and at any time after that until
touchdown.”
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or improve the braking by any other special technique and that they should not release
the brake pedal pressure until the airplane’s speed has been reduced to a safe taxi speed.
Chapter 7 of the handbook, Weather Operations, section 1, Contaminated Runway
Operations, dated March 14, 2005, stated that standing water, slush, snow, or ice causes
a deteriorating effect on landing performance. The section also stated that braking
effectiveness on contaminated runways is reduced because of low tire-to-runway friction.
Further, the section stated that stopping distances could increase as the contamination
depth increased. In addition, this section of the handbook noted that maximum reverse
thrust could be used to a full stop during emergencies.
The Shuttle America Corporation 170 General Operations Manual contained
guidance in two chapters on the subject of landing on a runway with braking action
reported to be less than good. Chapter 2, Flight Preparation, section 7, Lower Than
Standard Visibility Operations, dated October 15, 2006, stated the following: per 14 CFR
121.438, if the SIC has fewer than 100 hours in type under Part 121 operations
33
and the
PIC is not an appropriately qualied check pilot, the SIC may not make any landings
when the braking action on the runway to be used is reported to be less than good. (As
stated in section 1.5.2, the rst ofcer had 1,200 hours on the ERJ-170.) Chapter 7 of the
manual, Enroute Operations, section 4, Instrument Approaches, dated February 15, 2006,
stated that the captain would perform the approach and landing when reported braking
action was less than good.
Attendance Policy1.17.1.3
The Republic Airways Holdings Associate Handbook, chapter 8, Attendance/
Tardiness, dated August 1, 2006, provided the attendance policy at the Republic Airways
subsidiary airlines. According to the Shuttle America director of safety, the handbook
was provided electronically to all company employees, and a link to it appeared on the
computer screen that employees used to log onto the company’s computer system. The
handbook stated that the policy was designed to encourage good attendance and provide
a measure for fair treatment for any associate who was excessively absent or late for work.
This policy had been in effect since 2005, when Shuttle America became a subsidiary of
Republic Airways Holdings.
The handbook also stated that the airlines had a progressive (that is, graduated)
disciplinary policy that could be implemented or accelerated at any time depending on
the severity of the situation. According to the handbook, step one of the policy was a
verbal warning, step two was a written warning, step three was a nal warning and a
disciplinary suspension of 3 days without pay, and step four was termination. The
policy stated that, within a rolling 12-month period, four occurrences of absenteeism or
tardiness would result in the verbal warning, six occurrences would result in the written
warning, seven occurrences would result in the nal warning and suspension, and eight
occurrences would result in termination. (According to the handbook, an “occurrence”
33
According to the CVR, the captain did not verify that the rst ofcer had more than 100 hours in the
ERJ-170. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he assumed that the rst ofcer had at least
the required time because he had been with the company for more than 1 1/2 years.
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is a continuous absence from scheduled duty or reporting late to work.) The policy also
emphasized that the nal warning was “the last warning before termination.” Excerpts
from Shuttle America’s attendance policy appear in appendix C.
Shuttle America did not hold pilots accountable for their attendance until
January 2007 (the month before the accident). According to the chief pilot/ERJ-170
program manager, Shuttle America had grown quickly from a small to a large regional
air carrier, and the company did not implement this policy upon becoming a subsidiary
of its parent company. In January 2007, however, the company’s assistant chief pilot
issued written warnings to 70 pilots who had accrued eight or more absence occurrences
in the previous 12 months. During February 2007, the assistant chief pilot issued written
warnings to 13 additional pilots who had accrued eight or more absence occurrences in
the previous 12 months; thus, during the rst 2 months of 2007, 83 of the company’s
430 pilots (19 percent) had received such warnings. The warnings were placed in the
pilots’ mailboxes. The letters stated, “future occurrences would result in further corrective
action, which may be accelerated at any step, including termination.” The assistant chief
pilot stated that he spoke with only those pilots who called him after having received the
warning. The company’s director of safety stated that the chief pilot did not terminate
those pilots who had already accumulated eight or more absence occurrences because
he thought “it was not fair to terminate an employee who had not received previous
notication from Shuttle America about his attendance issues.”
The Republic Airways Holdings Associate Handbook did not contain any
information about a pilot calling in as fatigued or the administrative implications of such
a call. However, the Republic Airways Holdings pilot contract stated, “even though a
pilot may be legal under the FARs, he has the obligation to advise the Company that, in
his honest opinion, safety will be compromised due to fatigue if he operates as scheduled
or rescheduled. This advisement must be furnished to Crew Scheduling at the earliest
possible time to allow for the least possible disruption to service.”
According to the Shuttle America chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager, the
company’s fatigue policy is designed to assist those pilots whose fatigue is associated
with a particular schedule or from the performance of their duties. For these cases,
the company accepts fatigue as a potential consequence of the nature of the work and
reschedules affected pilots after they have had sufcient time to rest. The chief pilot/
program manager stated that the policy was not designed to protect pilots who do not use
their personal time wisely to ensure tness for ight and that pilots who do not live near
their home base must arrange their schedules so that they will be t to y. The chief pilot/
program manager stated that only fatigue calls made during a trip and while the pilot was
on duty could result in a fatigue attendance mark and that calls made outside of duty time
would result in an unavailable attendance mark.
According to the Shuttle America director of safety, a pilot who calls in sick or
fatigued is removed from duty by the scheduling department. For sick calls, a pilot receives
one absence occurrence and is paid for the missed trip if sick leave and/or vacation time
are available. For fatigue calls, the chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager talks with the
pilot and then determines the actions, if any, to be taken. If the chief pilot determines that
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the pilot’s fatigue was “company induced” (that is, caused by a demanding company
schedule), the call is classied as “fatigue” and results in no absence occurrences. If the
chief pilot determines that the pilot’s fatigue was not company induced, the call is classied
as “unavailable” and results in one to four absence occurrences depending on whether the
pilot is ying a schedule or is on reserve. Regardless of whether the call is classied as
fatigue or unavailable, the pilot is not paid for the missed time, even if sick leave and/or
vacation time are available. Company pilots expressed confusion about the fatigue policy
and the ramications of calling in as fatigued.
In addition, as a result of an administrative computer problem, from July 2005
to February 2007, Republic Airways Holdings inadvertently paid pilots for all sick,
unavailable, or fatigue hours regardless of whether the sick leave was available or the
unavailable or fatigue hours should have been compensated. As a result, the captain was
paid for the 104 sick leave hours he used (even though he had 90 sick leave hours available)
and all of the unavailable hours he accumulated during his tenure at Shuttle America.
Training1.17.2
Shuttle America provided its pilots with some training and contracted with
Chautauqua Airlines and Flight Safety International for most pilot training. Specically,
Flight Safety International provided all new hire and initial training on the ERJ-170,
Chautauqua Airlines provided recurrent ground training, Shuttle America line check
airmen provided the nal initial operating experience, and Shuttle America prociency
check airmen provided initial and recurrent simulator checks at a Flight Safety International
facility.
Crew Resource Management Training1.17.2.1
Newly hired pilots at Shuttle America received a 6-hour CRM module at the end of
the indoctrination course taught by Flight Safety International. A PowerPoint presentation
included the following topics: the captain’s authority, team building, decision behavior,
inquiry and assertion, conict resolution, workload management, and situational
awareness. The presentation pointed out that the captain had nal authority, specically
indicating that CRM is not to usurp the captain’s authority and that CRM is leadership/
following. The presentation also included 17 videos with a total time of about 2 hours.
There was no instructor guide for this training.
The CRM module during recurrent training consisted of 1 hour of videos and
a PowerPoint presentation taught by Chautauqua Airlines. The 2006 CRM module
focused on communication and reviewed the following topics: chain of command, CRM
denition, mutual respect, and teamwork. Pilots and ight attendants received recurrent
CRM training together. The PowerPoint presentation indicated that pilots should be
assertive and should communicate. Also, one video, “Approach and Landing Accidents,”
emphasized that ight crews could take action to avoid an accident, including adhering
to standard operating procedures and being comfortable with the concept of a go-around.
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The video encouraged pilots to go around if they lost visual reference and encouraged
pilots to think about how the weather and the condition of the runway would affect an
airplane’s performance. The instructor for this training stated that pilots reported that
the videos were out of date and that they wanted scenarios that represented real-life
operational experiences.
No CRM training guidance indicated which pilot was responsible for the
go-around callout or that the immediate response to this callout was the execution of a
missed approach. During postaccident interviews, Shuttle America rst ofcers stated
that they would respond to a captain’s go-around callout with an immediate missed
approach. Some company captains (including a line check airman) stated that each ight
crew should decide, at the start of a ight, how to respond to a go-around callout if one
were necessary.
During a postaccident interview, the rst ofcer stated that he did not recall taking
a CRM training course. (The rst ofcer completed initial CRM training in June 2005
and recurrent CRM training in June 2006.) Nevertheless, the rst ofcer stated that he
recognized that the captain was the leader of the ight and had nal responsibility for the
ight.
Captain Awareness Training1.17.2.2
Shuttle America began providing its captains with a 4-hour captain awareness
training course in May 2005, when the company became a subsidiary of Republic
Airways Holdings. The course content included, among other things, the captain’s roles,
responsibilities, leadership, and decision-making. In addition, during the course, pilots
were advised to contact their supervisor or chief pilot if their level of stress or fatigue was
beyond their control.
In April 2004, Chautauqua Airlines began providing this training to new captain
upgrades only. Thus, those Shuttle America captains who had upgraded at Chautauqua
Airlines before April 2004 did not receive this training, even after their transfer to Shuttle
America.
At the time of the accident, 133 of 259 Shuttle America captains (51 percent)
had received captain awareness training. The accident captain received this training in
July 2005. During a postaccident interview, he stated that the course “was not serious
captain excellence training.”
Postaccident Actions1.17.3
After the accident, Shuttle America added ve PowerPoint slides to the captain
awareness training presentation to highlight the importance of the assertiveness component
of captain leadership. One of the slides indicated that captains should “understand the
need to make immediate … decisions and how to follow through.” The assertiveness
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slides concluded with the thoughts that a captain “must exercise authority” while being
“a team player” with other ight crewmembers.
Also, on March 16, 2007, the Shuttle America chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager
issued a memorandum to ERJ-170 ight crewmembers with the subject, “Landing
Restrictions.” One of the two restrictions mentioned involved vertical guidance. The
memorandum stated, “vertical guidance must be available for all instrument approaches
when the weather is less than VMC [visual meteorological conditions] (i.e. ceilings less
than 1,000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles).” The memorandum also stated that this
information would be incorporated into the ERJ-170 Pilot Operating Handbook.
In addition, on March 28, 2007, the Shuttle America chief pilot/ERJ-170 program
manager issued a memorandum to ERJ-170 ight crewmembers with the subject, “ERJ-170
Flight Standards Information Newsletter.” The purpose of the newsletter was to review
the ERJ-170 landing procedures contained in the pilot operating handbook. The newsletter
stated that the procedures would be part of the check airmen’s points of emphasis on
line checks and prociency checkrides. Among the landing procedures discussed in the
newsletter were normal landing (touchdown range), normal landing (braking), normal
landing (reverse thrust), approach clearance, go-around, and rejected landings. Within
the discussion of each of these procedures, the appropriate pilot operating handbook
references were cited. The following additional information was discussed about each of
these procedures:
Normal Landing
There is printed material from the FAA both in the FARs and in the AIM that talks
about the touchdown zone being the rst 3,000 feet of the runway (no more than
halfway down the runway). While we understand this general guidance for all
aircraft, the fact is that the landing performance numbers … for the ERJ-170 [are]
based on a touchdown at 1,000 feet from the threshold of the runway. Touching
down 3,000 feet down on a 6,000 foot runway is at best a dangerous maneuver.
Normal Landing (Braking)
The key phrase … is “desired braking.” If you are landing at MDW, then the desired
braking is much more aggressive than if you are landing at IND on RWY 5L with
11,200 feet of runway … the pilot ying is allowed to determine the desired braking
for the landing roll, except when landing on a short or slippery runway.
Normal Landing (Reverse Thrust)
Under normal circumstances, the pilot should be able to routinely use maximum
reverse and minimum braking to bring the aircraft to a safe taxi speed.
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The key phrase … is “normal circumstances.” If you are landing at MDW and
you have slush and snow on the runway, that, by denition, is not a normal
circumstance and you are required to use the procedure for landing on a short or
slippery runway (i.e. use full brake pedal). If you are landing at IND on RWY 5L
with 11,200 feet of runway and the runway is dry, that is, by denition, considered
to be a normal circumstance.
ATC Approach Clearance
Any time a pilot hears the phrase “glideslope unusable” they need to go to the
portion of the approach chart that states “LOC (GS out)” and brief that specic
approach with the appropriate MDA.
Go-Around
There have been several accidents over the past 30 years where the pilot ying
has locked into the landing mode way too early and will not consider a go-around
regardless of the circumstances they nd themselves in as they approach the
runway threshold. Somehow, we have to counter this type of mind set. From
a Flight Standards perspective, I would expect you to execute a go-around
maneuver whenever either pilot is in doubt as to the outcome of the maneuver.
Rejected Landings
Not executing a Rejected Landing when the circumstances dictate a go-around
from the are … simply because the pilot chooses not to execute the maneuver is
unacceptable. Remember, this is not about the ego of the pilot ying the aircraft.
This is about the safety of the 70 passengers who are ying on board our aircraft.
Approach Restrictions
The rst ofcer should not be accomplishing the approach and landing in adverse
weather conditions [a reported braking action of less than good and/or a reported
crosswind component exceeding 15 knots]. This is not about the ego of the First
Ofcer. This is about the safety of the 70 passengers who are ying on board the
aircraft. With a slippery runway, if the First Ofcer makes the landing, the Captain
is blind when it comes to monitoring the use of brakes by the First Ofcer. That
is why it is important for the Captain to accomplish the approach and landing
anytime the runway is slippery (i.e. braking action less than good).
Federal Aviation Administration Oversight1.17.4
The principal operations inspector (POI) for Shuttle America was assigned to the
company in 2002. Shuttle America was the only certicate that she oversaw at the time
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of the accident. An aircrew program manager, an assistant POI, a principal maintenance
inspector, and a cabin safety inspector were also assigned to the certicate.
The POI stated that she discussed the landing distance assessment SAFO with
Shuttle America because the company was not meeting the provisions of the SAFO.
Shuttle America told her that not enough denitive information had been included
in the SAFO to enable the company to comply with it. The POI indicated that some
of the unclear areas were the following: (1) the SAFO did not dene the amount of
time before landing to assess runway contamination or braking action, (2) data about
the depth of a runway contaminant might not be available if an airport does not make
this measurement, and (3) valid data about braking action might not be available if an
airplane had not recently landed. The POI agreed with the company’s position that it
did not have to comply with the SAFO.
Additional Information1.18
Survey on Fatigue and Attendance Policies1.18.1
The Safety Board requested that the safety directors at the Air Transport
Association and Regional Airline Association ask their members to respond to a Board
survey on fatigue and attendance policies. Six of the 19 major Part 121 operators belonging
to the Air Transport Association and 10 of the 25 regional Part 121 operators belonging to
the Regional Airline Association responded to the survey. The survey’s ndings were as
follows:
Details of the operator’s fatigue policy in writing:
All of the 6 major operators •
4 of the 10 regional operators•
An attendance policy in which progressive discipline was applied automatically
for repeat users of sick leave during a given time period:
2 of the 6 major operators •
7 of the 10 regional operators •
A fatigue policy that allowed pilots to be relieved from ight duty if they reported
being too tired to y, even if their crew duty and rest times were within legal limits:
All of the 6 major operators •
9 of the 10 regional operators •
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A fatigue policy was conditional based on specic circumstances (for example, a
lengthy in-ight or ground delay or postincident anxiety):
1 of the 6 major operators •
5 of 9 regional operators (1 regional operator did not respond to this •
question)
A fatigue policy in which a fatigue call is classied as such on the pilots’ record
with the pilots relieved from duty without penalty:
All of the 6 major operators •
2 of the 10 regional operators (the other 8 regional operators classify the call •
as “unavailable,” “sick,” “not t for duty,” or another category based on the
situation)
A fatigue policy in which pilots are allowed to make up the hours that were lost
because of the event:
5 of the 6 major operators•
5 of the 10 regional operators•
Operators that perceived the number of fatigue calls received to be problematic:
None of the 6 major operators •
3 of the 10 regional operators •
Aviation Safety Reporting System Fatigue-Related Reports1.18.2
The Safety Board reviewed a sample of reports of in-ight fatigue-related incidents
provided voluntarily by Part 121 pilots to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS), which is a national repository for reports regarding aviation safety-related
issues and events.
34
These reports were submitted by pilots between January 1, 1996, and
December 31, 2006. For this timeframe, the ASRS database contained almost 5,200 reports
of incidents involving fatigue-related issues during air carrier operations. A focused query
produced more than 30 reports of incidents related to pilots calling in as fatigued or sick.
The ASRS reports described various experiences concerning air carrier programs
allowing pilots to remove themselves from ight status because of fatigue. Some of the air
carrier pilots reported using such programs successfully, whereas other pilots reported that
they hesitated to use such programs because of fear of retribution. In addition, other pilots
reported that they attempted to call in as fatigued but encountered company resistance.
34
Because ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily, the existence of reports concerning a specic topic
in the ASRS database cannot be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace
System.
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For example, a February 2006 ASRS report
35
from a captain of a regional jet stated that
she and the rst ofcer “were sort of robotic and tired” because of three consecutive early
report times, and the rst ofcer stated the following:
I even called scheduling and spoke to a supervisor [twice] asking him to
take me off the rest of the trip because I was so exhausted. He tried to work
that out, but said we were short staffed … I told him that I wouldn’t call in
fatigued because they didn’t have the stafng … in hindsight, I feel that I
should have called in fatigued instead of ghting the exhaustion.
Federal Aviation Administration Guidance1.18.3
Safety Alert for Operators 06012
On August 31, 2006, the FAA issued SAFO 06012, “Landing Performance
Assessments at the Time of Arrival (Turbojets).” This SAFO urgently recommended
that operators of turbojet airplanes develop procedures for ight crews to assess landing
performance based on the actual conditions at the time of arrival, which might differ from
the conditions presumed at time of dispatch. Those conditions include weather, runway
condition, airplane weight, and braking systems to be used. The SAFO also recommended
that, once the actual landing distance was determined, an additional safety margin of at
least 15 percent be added to that distance.
Before the issuance of SAFO 06012, the FAA had planned to issue mandatory
Operations Specication (OpSpec) N 8400.C082 to all 14 CFR Part 91 subpart K,
36
121, 125,
and 135 turbojet operators (in response to Safety Recommendation A-06-16, the intent of
which was to ensure adequate safety margins for landings on contaminated runways).
37
The OpSpec would have required (1) the use of an operationally representative air distance,
(2) the use of data that are at least as conservative as the manufacturer’s data, (3) the use
of the worst reported braking action for the runway during landing distance assessments,
and (4) the operators’ addition of an extra margin of at least 15 percent to the landing
distance calculation. The FAA had intended for operators to comply with the OpSpec by
October 2006, but the FAA encountered industry opposition to the OpSpec. As a result, on
August 31, 2006, the FAA decided not to issue the mandatory OpSpec but rather to pursue
formal rulemaking and issue the SAFO in the interim.
35
According to the report, the captain, as the nonying pilot, did not properly congure the aps for
landing. On nal approach, the ground proximity warning system annunciated a “too low aps” warning. Neither
she nor the rst ofcer had previously recognized that the aps were at the incorrect setting. The crew then
executed a missed approach. The captain reported that “a contributing factor to this event was being tired.”
36
Title 14 CFR 91 subpart K applies to fractional ownership operations.
37
Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (urgent), which was issued on January 27, 2006, asked the FAA to
“immediately prohibit all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators from using the reverse thrust credit
in landing performance calculations.” The recommendation was classied “Closed—Unacceptable Action/
Superseded” on October 4, 2007. Safety Recommendation A-07-57, which is discussed in section 1.18.5,
superseded Safety Recommendation A-06-16.
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Advisory Circular 120-71A
On February 27, 2003, the FAA issued AC 120-71A, “Standard Operating
Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers.” The AC was designed to provide advice and
recommendations about developing, implementing, and updating standard operating
procedures, which, according to the AC, “are universally recognized as basic to safe
aviation operations.” The AC addressed the go-around procedure in the context of
stabilized approaches and stated that the ying pilot should make the go-around callout.
Advisory Circular 91-79
On November 6, 2007, the FAA issued AC 91-79, “Runway Overrun Prevention.”
The AC stated the following under the heading “Failure to Assess Required Landing
Distance Based on Conditions at Time of Arrival”:
(1) Conditions at the destination airport may change between the time of
departure and the time of arrival. SOPs [standard operating procedures]
should include a procedure for assessing the required landing distance
based on the conditions that are known to exist as you near the destination.
As a recommended practice, calculate and discuss the landing distance
required after receipt of the automated terminal information service (ATIS),
during the descent brieng, and prior to the top of descent. If airport and
associated runway surface conditions are forecast to worsen, develop an
alternate plan of action in the event that a missed approach or go around
becomes necessary.
(2) The unfactored landing distances in the manufacturer-supplied AFM
[airplane ight manual] reect performance in a ight test environment
that is not representative of normal ight operations. The operating
regulations require the AFM landing distances to be factored when
showing compliance with the predeparture landing distance requirements.
These factors are intended to account for pilot technique, atmospheric
and runway conditions, and other items to ensure that the ight is not
dispatched to a destination where it will be unable to land. As part of the
operator’s Safety Management System and SOP, the FAA recommends
using either factored landing distances or adding a safety margin to the
unfactored landing distances when assessing the required landing distance
at the time of arrival. This landing safety margin should not be confused
with the regulatory predeparture runway requirements.
Related Accidents1.18.4
Southwest Airlines Flight 1248
On December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines ight 1248 ran off the departure end
of runway 31C after landing at MDW during snow conditions. After overrunning the
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runway, which had a usable landing distance of 5,826 feet, the airplane rolled through
a blast fence and an airport perimeter fence and then onto an adjacent roadway, where
it struck an automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed,
one automobile occupant received serious injuries, and three other automobile occupants
received minor injuries. Eighteen of the 103 airplane occupants received minor injuries,
and the airplane was substantially damaged.
The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the
pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the
airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because
the pilots’ rst experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane’s autobrake system
distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing.
Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines’ (1) failure to provide its
pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and
procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; (2) programming and design
of its on-board performance computer, which did not present inherent assumptions
in the program critical to pilot decision-making; (3) plan to implement new autobrake
procedures without a familiarization period; and (4) failure to include a margin of safety
in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also contributing to the
accident was the pilots’ failure to divert to another airport given the reports that included
poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. Contributing to the
severity of the accident was the absence of an EMAS, which was needed because of the
limited RSA beyond the departure end of runway 31C.
38
Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712
On April 12, 2007, Pinnacle Airlines ight 4712 overran the end of the runway while
landing during snow conditions at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan. The
3 crewmembers and 49 passengers were not injured, and the airplane received substantial
damage.
At the time of the accident, snow removal operations were in progress at the
airport, and the ight crew communicated directly with airport operations regarding the
runway conditions. After landing, the airplane overran the departure end of runway 28,
which was 6,501 feet long with a 200-foot-long paved blast pad beyond the threshold.
The airplane entered a grassy snow-covered eld beyond the blast pad, and the nose
gear separated about 93 feet beyond the end of the pavement. The airplane came to rest
oriented about 20º left of the runway centerline with the right main gear sunken into the
ground at a point about 100 feet beyond the end of the pavement.
39
38
National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun and Collision, Southwest Airlines Flight 1248,
Boeing 737-74H, N471WN, Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, December 8, 2005, Aircraft
Accident Report NTSB/AAR-07/06 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2007).
39
For more information about this ongoing investigation, see DCA07FA037 at the Safety Board’s Web
site at <http://www.ntsb.gov>.
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Previous Related Safety Recommendations1.18.5
Landing Distance Assessments
40
As a result of the Southwest Airlines ight 1248 accident, the Safety Board issued
Safety Recommendation A-07-61 on October 16, 2007. Safety Recommendation A-07-61
asked the FAA to do the following:
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K
operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before
every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved
performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the
airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most
conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety
margin of 15 percent.
The Safety Board recognized that the standardized methodology recommended in
Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take time to develop. As a result, the Board also
issued Safety Recommendation A-07-57 on October 4, 2007,
41
asking the FAA to do the
following until the standardized methodology could be developed:
Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and
91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments
before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions,
and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent)
The FAA responded to Safety Recommendation A-07-57 on December 17, 2007,
and Safety Recommendation A-07-61 on January 8, 2008. For both recommendations,
the FAA stated that a survey of Part 121 operators indicated “92 percent of U.S. airline
passengers are now being carried by air carriers in full or partial compliance with the
practices recommended in SAFO 06012 [landing distance assessments with a 15-percent
safety margin].” The FAA also stated that its POIs would continue to encourage their
assigned air carriers to incorporate the elements contained in this SAFO. In addition,
the FAA stated that, on December 6, 2007, it announced the formation of an aviation
rulemaking committee to review regulations affecting certication and operation of
airplanes and airports for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways.
40
The Safety Board’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements includes the need for
landing distance assessments with an adequate safety margin for every landing. In its discussion of this issue,
the Board indicated that runway overruns have continued to occur when ight crews have not performed a
landing distance assessment before landing on a contaminated runway.
41
Safety Recommendation A-07-57 retained the previous classication of “Open—Unacceptable
Response” for Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (urgent) because the FAA had not yet required landing
distance assessments that incorporated a minimum safety margin of 15 percent.
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Runway Safety Areas
As a result of the Southwest Airlines ight 1455 accident in Burbank, California,
42
the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-03-11 and -12 to the FAA on May 6,
2003. Safety Recommendations A-03-11 and -12 asked the FAA to do the following:
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certicated airports to
upgrade all runway safety areas that could, with feasible improvements,
be made to meet the minimum standards established by Advisory
Circular 150/5300-13, “Airport Design.” The upgrades should be made
proactively, not only as part of other runway improvement projects.
(A-03-11)
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certicated airports to
install engineered materials arresting systems in each runway safety area
available for air carrier use that could not, with feasible improvements,
be made to meet the minimum standards established by Advisory
Circular 150/5300-13, “Airport Design.” The systems should be installed
proactively, not only as part of other runway improvement projects.
(A-03-12)
On January 30, 2004, these safety recommendations were classied
“Open—Acceptable Response.” On July 7, 2006, the FAA responded only to Safety
Recommendation A-03-11. The Safety Board’s February 15, 2007, response indicated that
Safety Recommendation A-03-11 remained classied “Open—Acceptable Response” and
noted that the FAA had not addressed Safety Recommendation A-03-12 in its 2006 letter.
The Board stated that, during its June 2006 public hearing on the Southwest Airlines
ight 1248 accident, the FAA’s director of airport safety and standards testied that it was
possible that the FAA would consider a runway improvement project to be completed
even with an RSA that did not meet the dimensional standards or have an EMAS installed.
The Board further stated that this testimony described an unacceptable response to Safety
Recommendation A-03-12 and requested additional information to clarify the testimony
so that the 2004 classication of this recommendation could be updated.
On November 20, 2007, the FAA responded to both safety recommendations.
With regard to Safety Recommendation A-03-11, the FAA stated that it had an ambitious
program to accelerate RSA improvements, including yearly targets to ensure completion
of all practicable RSA improvements by 2015. The FAA also stated that more than
80 percent of the RSA improvements would be completed by 2010. The FAA further
stated that it had completed 314 RSA improvements since 2000.
With regard to Safety Recommendation A-03-12, the FAA stated that, at the public
hearing for the Southwest Airlines ight 1248 accident, its director of airport safety and
standards also testied that highly constrained runways often do not have enough room
to install EMAS cost-effectively and that other alternatives would better meet the FAA’s
42
National Transportation Safety Board, Southwest Airlines Flight 1455, Boeing 737-300, N668SW,
Burbank, California, March 5, 2000, Aircraft Accident Brief NTSB/AAB-02/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002).
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goal to improve safety as much as possible for such runways. The FAA indicated that
it had issued guidance (two orders and one AC) that described the important role that
EMAS plays in improving runway safety. For example, according to the FAA, a 2004
change to AC 150/5300-13 dened those conditions in which EMAS could provide full
compliance with RSA design standards.
43
43
The FAA had previously stated that 24 EMAS beds had been installed at 19 U.S. airports and that it
expected to install another 12 EMAS beds at 7 U.S. airports during 2008.
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An A l y s i s2.
General2.1
The captain and the rst ofcer were properly certicated and qualied under
Federal regulations.
The accident airplane was properly certicated, equipped, and maintained in
accordance with Federal regulations. The recovered components showed no evidence of
any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
Although marginal visual ight rules weather conditions existed at CLE during
most of the accident ight, the weather conditions had rapidly deteriorated while the
airplane was on approach, with moderate to heavy snow reported during the approach
and at the time of the landing.
The approach and tower controllers that handled the accident ight performed
their duties properly and ensured that the ight crew had timely weather and runway
condition information. Airport personnel at CLE appropriately monitored runway
conditions and provided snow removal services in accordance with the airport’s FAA-
approved snow removal plan. The emergency response to the accident scene was timely.
This analysis discusses the accident sequence, pilot training in the areas of rejected
landings and maximum performance landings on contaminated runways, standard
operating procedures regarding the go-around callout, ight crew fatigue, and pilot
attendance and fatigue policies.
Accident Sequence2.2
The Approach2.2.1
Minimums Required for the Approach2.2.1.1
The weather information in the ight crew’s preight paperwork included a
NOTAM for runway 28 that stated, “due to the effects of snow on the glide slope minimums
temporarily raised to localizer only for all category aircraft. Glide slope remains in
service. However angle may be different than published.” As a result, for the approach to
runway 28, the ight crew was required by FAA and company guidance to use the MDA
for the nonprecision localizer (glideslope out) approach, which was 202 feet higher than
the DH for the precision (ILS) approach.
Analysis
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During postaccident interviews, both pilots indicated that they had not read the
localizer minimums NOTAM. Thus, the ight crew did not accomplish a critical part of its
preight responsibilities. About 1429:18, the ight crew received ATIS information Alpha,
which reported that the landing runway was 24R and that the glideslopes for runways 24L
and 28 were “unusable” because of snow buildup. Also, about 1442:41, the crew received
ATIS information Bravo, which reported that the landing runway was now runway 28
and repeated that the glideslopes for runways 24L and 28 were unusable. According to
the CVR, after receiving both ATIS information broadcasts, the ight crew discussed the
runways in use but did not discuss the information about the unusable glideslopes.
About 1458:46, the approach controller informed a Jet Link ight crew that the
ight was cleared for an ILS runway 28 approach and that the glideslope was unusable.
The Shuttle America ight crew heard this transmission and then began to discuss how
that ight could be cleared for an ILS approach if the glideslope were unusable.
44
For
example, the captain stated, “it’s not an ILS if there’s no glideslope,” to which the rst
ofcer replied, “exactly, it’s a localizer.” Because the accident ight crewmembers did
not respond to the glideslope information in the ATIS information broadcasts, the rst
indication of their awareness of the unusable glideslope was after they overheard the
approach clearance issued to the Jet Link ight crew.
During postaccident interviews, both pilots stated that they were confused by
the term “unusable.” However, other Shuttle America pilots who were interviewed after
the accident stated that they were familiar with the term “unusable” in reference to a
glideslope, and one check airman stated that he had used this specic term in various
simulator scenarios. Nevertheless, neither of the accident pilots asked the controller for
clarication about the status of the glideslope.
According to FAA Order 7110.65, “Air Trafc Control,” paragraph 4-8-1,
“Approach Clearance,” an airplane conducting an ILS approach when the glideslope is
reported to be out of service is to be advised of such at the time that the approach clearance
is issued. The paragraph indicated that the term “unusable” was appropriate phraseology
to use when a glideslope was out of service.
45
However, for this accident, even though the
glideslope’s angle might have been different than published because of the snow buildup,
the glideslope was still in service. The signal transmitter would have automatically shut
down if the signal were to exceed preset parameters. If the glideslope signal could be
received by an airplane, the glideslope would be considered to be safe but might not be
completely accurate if snow were surrounding the antenna. Thus, the approach controller
provided conservative guidance to the ight crewmembers when he told them, at the time
of the ILS approach clearance to runway 28, that the glideslope was unusable.
44
If the glideslope component of an ILS approach system becomes unreliable or inoperative, the
approach can still be own to the MDA published on the approach chart. According to the FAA’s Instrument
Procedures Handbook, “the name of an instrument approach, as published, is used to identify the approach,
even if a component of the approach aid is inoperative or unreliable.”
45
The FAA’s Instrument Procedures Handbook states, “the controller … must advise the aircraft at the time
an approach clearance is issued that the inoperative or unreliable approach aid component is unusable.”
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About 1501:09, the captain contacted the tower controller, stating “localizer to two
eight.” However, about 1 minute later, the rst ofcer told the captain that the glideslope
had been captured. During a postaccident interview, the rst ofcer stated that he and the
captain did the “mental math” for a 3º glideslope and that, on the basis of this calculation,
they assumed that the glideslope was functioning normally. The captain further stated
that the cockpit instrumentation showed the airplane on the glideslope with no warning
ags. Regardless, the ight crew should not have disregarded the information provided
by the controller and on the ATIS information broadcasts about the glideslope being
unusable and should have used the localizer minimums for the approach.
Because the ight crewmembers assumed that the glideslope was working
properly (the CVR recorded no additional discussion about the unusable glideslope),
they used the ILS minimums instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimums for the
approach, as indicated by the “two hundred, minimums” electronic callout recorded by
the CVR later in the approach (the DH for the ILS approach was 227 feet agl). However,
the Safety Board concludes that, because the ight crewmembers were advised that the
glideslope was unusable, they should not have executed the approach to ILS minimums;
instead, they should have set up, briefed, and accomplished the approach to localizer
(glideslope out) minimums.
It is important to note that the ight crewmembers would have been required to
execute a missed approach if they had been using the localizer (glideslope out) approach.
The MDA for the localizer (glideslope out) approach to runway 28 was 429 feet agl. No
CVR evidence or postaccident interview information indicated that either crewmember
had the runway environment in sight by that altitude.
Runway Visual Range2.2.1.2
FAA Order 7110.65, paragraph 2-9-2, Operating Procedures, states that a controller
should maintain an ATIS message that reects the most current arrival and departure
information and should ensure that pilots receive the most current pertinent information.
Paragraph 2-8-2, Arrival/Departure Runway Visibility, states that a controller should
issue the current touchdown RVR for the runway in use when prevailing visibility is 1
mile or less or the RVR indicates a reportable value (6,000 feet or less) regardless of the
prevailing visibility. About 1453:42, the approach controller notied the ight crew that
ATIS information Charlie was current, visibility was 1/4 mile with heavy snow, and the
runway 28 RVR was 6,000 feet.
46
The CVR transcript showed that the captain acknowledged
the RVR at that time by stating to the rst ofcer, “well we got the RVR. So we’re good
there.” (The ILS runway 28 approach required an RVR of 2,400 feet or 1/2-mile visibility.)
The ILS runway 28 localizer (glideslope out) approach minimums required an RVR
of 4,000 feet or 3/4-mile visibility. About 1459:30, when the airplane was at an altitude of
about 5,200 feet agl and was located 8.3 miles from the outer marker, the RVR dropped
to 4,000 feet and continued to decrease for the remainder of the ight. Because the ight
46
FAA-H-8083-15A, Instrument Flying Handbook, states the following: “RVR is horizontal visual range,
not slant visual range, and is used in lieu of prevailing visibility in determining minimums for a particular
runway.”
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crew should have accomplished the ILS runway 28 approach to localizer (glideslope out)
minimums instead of ILS minimums, the controlling RVR for the approach to runway 28
was 4,000 feet and not 2,400 feet.
The ight crew was not aware that the RVR had decreased to 4,000 feet, and
the approach controller, having already issued the 6,000-foot RVR, was not required to
provide this additional RVR information to the crew. However, if the crewmembers had
been using the localizer (glideslope out) approach and had been aware of the decrease
in RVR below the value required for the approach, they would have been required to
execute a missed approach before reaching the nal approach segment.
About 1502:25, the tower controller reported that the RVR was 2,200 feet. At
that time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,000 feet agl and was located at the
outer marker. About 1502:39, the captain told the rst ofcer, “we’re inside the [outer]
marker, we can keep going.” According to 14 CFR 121.651, if a pilot has begun the nal
approach segment of an instrument approach procedure and later receives a weather
report indicating below-minimum conditions, the pilot may continue the approach down
to published minimums. Thus, the ight crew could continue the approach, even though
the RVR was below the values required for the ILS runway 28 approach.
Visual References During the Approach2.2.1.3
When the airplane was at an altitude of about 190 feet agl [239 feet lower than
the MDA for the localizer (glideslope out) approach], the captain stated that he had the
approach lights in sight. About 4 seconds afterward, the captain stated that the runway
lights were in sight. However, when the airplane was at an altitude of 80 feet agl, the captain
indicated that he could not see the end of the runway and stated, “let’s go [around].” The
rst ofcer then stated that he had the end of the runway in sight.
According to FAA requirements (14 CFR 91.175) and company procedures, if
sufcient visual references are not distinctly visible at or below the DH or MDA, execution
of a missed approach is required. Also, the FARs clearly indicate that the PIC has nal
authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the ight. Thus, the Safety
Board concludes that, when the captain called for a go-around because he could not see the
runway environment, the rst ofcer should have immediately executed a missed approach
regardless of whether he had the runway in sight. The Safety Board further concludes that,
when the rst ofcer did not immediately execute a missed approach, as instructed, the
captain should have reasserted his go-around call or, if necessary, taken control of the
airplane. During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he thought a transfer of
control to perform a missed approach at a low altitude might have been unsafe.
When the airplane had passed through an altitude of 50 feet agl, the captain
questioned the rst ofcer about whether he actually had the runway in sight; this question
most likely indicated that the captain still did not see the runway environment. However,
less than 1 second later, the captain stated, “yeah, there’s the runway, got it.” Even though
the captain regained sight with the runway environment, the rst ofcer should have
executed the commanded missed approach before that time.
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In addition, the rst ofcer stated that, when the airplane was at an altitude of
about 10 feet agl, he momentarily lost sight of the runway. According to the rst ofcer,
a snow squall came through at that point and he “could not see anything.” The Safety
Board concludes that, because the rst ofcer lost sight of the runway just before landing,
he should have abandoned the landing attempt and immediately executed a missed
approach.
The FAA currently requires that ight training for Part 121 pilots (both PIC and
SIC) include “rejected landings that include a normal missed approach procedure after
the landing is rejected. For the purpose of this maneuver the landing should be rejected
at approximately 50 feet and approximately over the runway threshold.” However, these
training criteria are general in nature, and they do not specically require that the rejected
landings be made in changing weather environments. Thus, it is possible that pilots could
satisfy the training requirement with a rejected landing that is accomplished while the
airplane is in visual conditions.
This accident demonstrates that air carrier pilots can encounter rapidly changing
weather conditions while preparing to land. It is important that these pilots be trained to
execute missed approaches in such conditions so that the pilots are familiar with the rapid
decision-making and maneuvering required in low visibility conditions near the ground.
The Safety Board concludes that the rejected landing training currently required
by the FAA is not optimal because it does not account for the possibility that pilots may
need to reject a landing as a result of rapidly deteriorating weather conditions. Thus, the
Safety Board believes that the FAA should require Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K
operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training
for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a
rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver.
Landing Distance Assessments2.2.1.4
At the time of the accident, Shuttle America did not require landing distance
assessments based on conditions at the time of arrival. SAFO 06012, “Landing Performance
Assessments at the Time of Arrival (Turbojets),” which the FAA issued about 6 months
before the accident, had urgently recommended that operators of turbojet airplanes
develop procedures for ight crews to assess landing performance based on the actual
conditions at the time of arrival, which might differ from the presumed conditions at the
time of dispatch, and that an additional safety margin of at least 15 percent be added to
actual landing distances.
The aircraft performance study included a landing performance data calculation
that most closely matched the landing distance assessment that the ight crewmembers
might have accomplished if Shuttle America had incorporated procedures that were
consistent with SAFO 06012. This calculation was based on the reported winds, a braking
action report of fair, and the accident airplane’s aps 5 conguration. The calculation
assumed a touchdown point of 1,400 feet, the use of maximum reverse thrust until
60 knots, and full wheel braking and included an additional 15-percent stopping distance
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margin. The landing performance calculation showed that, on the basis of the conditions
that had been reported to the ight crew at the time, the airplane could have landed with
a factored touchdown point of 1,610 feet and come to a safe stop on the runway with a
ground roll distance of 3,262 feet, for a total distance of 4,872 feet. However, the airplane’s
actual touchdown point and the ight crew’s use of reverse thrust and braking were not
in accordance with the assumptions used in the landing performance calculation.
Before the issuance of SAFO 06012, the FAA had planned to issue
OpSpec N 8400.C082 to all 14 CFR Part 91 subpart K, 121, 125, and 135 turbojet operators
in response to Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (urgent); the intent of which was to ensure
adequate safety margins for landings on contaminated runways. The FAA had intended
for operators to comply with the OpSpec by October 2006 but instead encountered industry
opposition to the OpSpec. Consequently, in August 2006, the FAA decided not to issue
the mandatory OpSpec but rather to pursue formal rulemaking and issue the voluntary
SAFO in the interim.
In its nal report on the Southwest Airlines ight 1248 accident, the Safety Board
concluded, “although landing distance assessments incorporating a landing distance
safety margin are not required by regulation, they are critical to safe operation of transport-
category airplanes on contaminated runways.” As a result, on October 4 and 16, 2007, the
Board issued Safety Recommendations A-07-57 (urgent) and -61, respectively, to further
address the need for landing distance assessments.
Safety Recommendation A-07-57 asked the FAA to immediately require all
Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments
before every landing that are based on existing performance data and actual conditions
and incorporate a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. This recommendation, which
superseded Safety Recommendation A-06-16, was classied “Open—Unacceptable
Response” on October 4, 2007, because it maintained the previous classication of Safety
Recommendation A-06-16 and the FAA had not yet required landing distance assessments
that incorporated a minimum safety margin of 15 percent.
Safety Recommendation A-07-61 asked the FAA to require all Part 121, 135, and
91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every
landing that are based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance
data, actual arrival conditions, and a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability
with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available and
that include a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. The Safety Board recognized that the
standardized methodology recommended in Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take
time to develop and thus issued Safety Recommendation A-07-57 to ensure that landing
distance assessments with at least a 15-percent safety margin were being performed in the
interim.
In its December 17, 2007, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-57, the FAA
reported that, on the basis of its survey of Part 121 operators, 92 percent of U.S. air carrier
passengers were being transported by carriers that had adopted SAFO 06012 in full or in
part. However, the FAA did not indicate the percentage of Part 121 carriers that had fully
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adopted the SAFO or those parts of the SAFO that had not been adopted by other Part 121
carriers. The Safety Board is especially concerned that among those parts of the SAFO that
have not yet been adopted is the minimum 15-percent landing distance safety margin.
Also, the FAA did not provide any information regarding whether SAFO 06012 had been
adopted in full or in part by Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators. In addition, the FAA
did not describe the actions that it would take to encourage those operators that have not
complied with the SAFO (such as Shuttle America) to do so. Because all Part 121, 135, and
91 subpart K operators have not fully complied with SAFO 06012 and rulemaking that
requires arrival landing distance assessments with a 15-percent minimum safety margin
has not been implemented, Safety Recommendation A-07-57 remains classied “Open—
Unacceptable Response.”
In its January 8, 2008, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-61, the FAA
stated that, in December 2007, it had announced the formation of an aviation rulemaking
committee to review regulations affecting certication and operation of airplanes and
airports for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways. The Safety Board
recognizes that aviation rulemaking committees are part of the rulemaking process, but
these committees have historically taken a long time to complete their work, and the
FAA has not always acted in a timely manner after it receives recommendations from
the committees. Pending the prompt completion of the aviation rulemaking committee’s
work and the FAA’s timely action in response to the committee’s recommendations,
Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is classied “Open—Acceptable Response.” The Board
continues to urge the FAA to act expeditiously on Safety Recommendations A-07-57
and -61 because landing distance assessments are critical to safe landing operations on
contaminated runways.
Because landings on contaminated runways can be challenging, it is important
that pilots have all of the information necessary to make landing distance assessments,
for example, dry versus wet snow on the runway. On October 16, 2007, the Safety Board
issued Safety Recommendation A-07-62, which asked the FAA to “develop and issue
formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for the development, delivery, and
interpretation of runway surface condition reports.” The FAA indicated that the aviation
rulemaking committee would also establish standards for runway surface condition
reporting and minimum surface conditions for continued operations. (The Board is
currently evaluating the FAA’s response to this recommendation.)
Because the active runway and arrival conditions may change while a ight is
en route, preight landing assessments may not be sufcient to ensure a safe stopping
distance at the time of the ight’s arrival. Also, an additional 15-percent safety margin
would help to account for conditions that could not be completely quantied and planned
procedures that might not be accomplished. The Safety Board concludes that pilots need
to perform landing distance assessments because they account for conditions at the time
of arrival and add a safety margin of at least 15 percent to calculated landing distances
and that this accident reinforces the need for pilots to execute a landing in accordance
with the assumptions used in the assessments.
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The Safety Board recognizes that SAFO 06012 addressed the need for ight crews
to assess landing performance based on actual conditions and add a 15-percent safety
margin to actual landing distances. However, SAFOs are, by denition, advisory only,
and the recommendations asked the FAA to require arrival landing distance assessments
that included a minimum safety margin of 15 percent for all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K
operators. Such assessments would have been mandated by OpSpec N 8400.C082.
Since the time of the accident, Shuttle America has been working closely with
its aircraft performance data vendor, Embraer, and the FAA to develop an automated
airplane performance system for the ERJ-170 that includes support for landing distance
assessments based on conditions at time of arrival. According to Shuttle America, with
this system, the ight crew would request landing performance numbers (based on the
Embraer computerized airplane ight manual) by specifying the airport, runway, runway
surface condition (that is, braking action report and/or contaminant type and depth
report), temperature, pressure, wind, planned landing weight, landing ap, visibility,
anti-ice status, and stall protection ice speed. The crew’s request would then be sent via
ACARS to a ground server and be processed by the aircraft performance data vendor.
An arrival landing distance report would be sent back to the crew via ACARS, typically
within 30 seconds. The arrival landing distance report would include crew-specied input
conditions, crew-specied airplane conguration information, and calculated landing
distance data (both factored and unfactored). Shuttle America indicated that it would
use the guidance in SAFO 06012 to translate reported braking action (when available) to
contaminant type and depth and that it would not take credit for thrust reversers operating
in any landing performance calculation, including arrival assessments for contaminated
runway operations.
The automated airplane performance system for the Shuttle America ERJ-170 has
been ground tested, ight tested, and approved by the FAA for a 6-month operational trial
period beginning on February 15, 2008. During the operational trial period, the calculated
arrival landing distance data are expected to provide pilots with supplemental landing
performance information.
The Landing2.2.2
Touchdown Zone2.2.2.1
Shuttle America guidance indicated that the key to a successful landing was for
pilots to make a stabilized approach using a glideslope, a glidepath, and/or visual cues
so that the airplane crosses the landing threshold at an altitude of about 50 feet agl, which
corresponds to a touchdown point of about 1,000 feet. Shuttle America guidance also stated
that the acceptable touchdown range was 750 to 1,250 feet from the runway threshold,
and the company’s ight training acceptable performance standards indicated that the
airplane should touch down smoothly at a point that is 500 to 3,000 feet beyond the runway
threshold but not to exceed one-third of the runway length. Thus, the accident airplane
should have touched down at a point no longer than 2,006 feet down the runway.
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CVR and FDR data showed that the accident pilots made a stabilized approach and
that the airplane crossed the landing threshold at an altitude of about 40 feet agl. These
data also showed that the airplane was about 1,050 feet past the runway threshold when
the airplane’s altitude was about 10 feet agl. According to the aircraft performance study,
the airplane touched down at 2,900 feet, which was about one-half of the way down the
6,017-foot runway. (Even though the airplane crossed the landing threshold at an altitude
that was 10 feet lower than that indicated in company guidance, the airplane touched
down farther rather than closer to the threshold likely because the airplane oated for
some distance.) During postaccident interviews, the captain stated that he thought the
airplane had touched down closer to the runway threshold, and the rst ofcer stated
that, during the landing rollout, he could not see the end of the runway or any distance
remaining signs. (On the basis of the airplane’s touchdown point, airspeed at touchdown,
the airplane’s nose-high pitch attitude, the ight crew’s workload, and available visual
cues, it is unlikely that the ight crew would have seen the 3,000-foot distance remaining
sign. The Safety Board was not able to determine whether available visual cues would
have enabled the crew to see the 2,000- and 1,000-foot distance remaining signs.) The Safety
Board concludes that, on the basis of company procedures and ight training criteria, the
airplane’s touchdown at 2,900 feet down the 6,017-foot runway was an unacceptably long
landing.
Use of Reverse Thrust and Braking2.2.2.2
Shuttle America guidance emphasized the importance of establishing the desired
reverse thrust as soon as possible after touchdown. The guidance further indicated
that immediate initiation of maximum reverse thrust at main gear touchdown was the
preferred technique and that full reverse thrust would reduce the stopping distance on
very slippery runways. In addition, the guidance stated that maximum reverse thrust was
normally to be maintained until an airspeed of about 80 knots but could be used to a full
stop during emergencies.
FDR data from the accident ight indicated that reverse thrust was not commanded
until after nose gear touchdown (about 5 seconds after main gear touchdown), with the
thrust levers initially selected to the full reverse position, and that the thrust reversers
were deployed shortly afterward. However, full reverse thrust was commanded only
until the airplane had decelerated to an airspeed of about 85 knots, and engine reverse
thrust had increased only to a peak of 65 percent N
1
(compared with a maximum of
70 percent N
1
) for about 2 seconds before continuously tapering off during the landing
rollout. About 2,200 feet of runway remained when full reverse thrust was commanded,
and about 1,100 feet of runway remained when the engines reached their peak reverse
N
1
. The commanded reverse thrust reached the idle setting with about 400 feet of runway
remaining. About 4 1/2 seconds later, the airplane departed the runway with the engines
at about 25 percent N
1
.
Shuttle America guidance also stated that, after main gear touchdown, a constant
brake pedal pressure should be smoothly applied to achieve the desired braking and that
full braking should be applied on slippery runways. The guidance further stated that
pilots should not attempt to modulate, pump, or improve the braking by any other special
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technique and that they should not release the brake pedal pressure until the airplane’s
speed has been reduced to a safe taxi speed. In addition, the guidance stated that braking
effectiveness on contaminated runways is reduced because of low tire-to-runway friction
and that stopping distances could increase as the contamination depth increased.
FDR data for the accident ight showed that the rst ofcer’s initial wheel brake
application occurred with about 1,850 feet of runway remaining; this application was
about 20 percent of maximum and remained relatively steady for the next 8 seconds. The
rst ofcer’s braking application then began increasing to about 75 percent of maximum
with about 800 feet of runway remaining. The captain then began applying his brakes to
about 90 percent of maximum with about 450 feet of runway remaining.
The aircraft performance study for this accident showed that the airplane’s
calculated braking coefcient for a sustained 5-second period of signicant braking
exceeded the minimum braking coefcient needed to stop on the runway. The sustained
period of signicant braking began 6 seconds before the airplane departed the runway, and
the minimum braking coefcient was calculated using both the airplane manufacturer’s
computerized airplane ight manual landing performance methods and an emergency
stopping scenario. Thus, the airplane could have been stopped before the end of the
runway if the braking that was achieved during the sustained period of signicant braking
had also been achieved during the early portion of the landing rollout (with the use of
maximum reverse thrust at the assumed levels).
47
The results of the aircraft performance study showed that reverse idle thrust had
been commanded well before a safe stop could be ensured. Also, although FDR data
did not indicate that the brakes were excessively modulated, the data did indicate that
only light wheel braking was applied early in the landing rollout. Thus, the Safety Board
concludes that the ight crewmembers did not use reverse thrust and braking to their
maximum effectiveness; if they had done so, the airplane would likely have stopped
before the end of the runway.
There is currently no specic training requirement for Part 121 and 135 pilots
to practice maximum performance landings on contaminated runways. During line
operations, pilots are likely to encounter contaminated runway conditions, so pilot
prociency in these conditions is just as important as pilot prociency in landings with
crosswinds, powerplant failures, and zero aps, which are included in Part 121 training
requirements. Also, this accident was one of three recent Safety Board investigations in
which an air carrier airplane overran the end of a contaminated runway; Southwest
Airlines ight 1248 and Pinnacle Airlines ight 4712 are the other two investigations.
Boeing safety data showed that, between 1997 and 2006, runway overruns were the fourth-
largest cause of air carrier fatalities worldwide, resulting in 262 fatalities.
48
47
The emergency stopping scenario assumed the use of maximum reverse thrust until the airplane came
to a complete stop, and Embraer’s computerized airplane ight manual ight performance numbers assumed
the use of maximum reverse thrust until the airplane decelerated to an airspeed of 60 knots.
48
Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Worldwide Operations, 1959-2006, Aviation
Safety, Boeing Commercial Airplanes (Seattle, Washington: Boeing, 2007).
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The Safety Board concludes that specic training for pilots in applying maximum
braking and maximum reverse thrust on contaminated runways until a safe stop is ensured
would reinforce the skills needed to successfully accomplish such landings. Therefore, the
Safety Board believes that the FAA should require Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K
operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training
for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings
on contaminated runways.
Runway Safety Area2.2.3
The runway 28 departure end RSA, which was 60 feet long and 275 feet wide, was
in compliance with the January 1988 FAA regulation that accepted the RSA conditions
that existed at that time for airports certicated under Part 139. In 2000, in accordance with
FAA Order 5200.8, “Runway Safety Area Program,” the FAA inventoried the runway 28
departure end RSA and notied CLE about some short- and long-term options to enhance
the RSA. CLE was asked to immediately evaluate the options for improving the RSA
and make a recommendation by March 2001. However, even though CLE has conducted
several studies on this issue and the FAA has provided comments on CLE’s draft reports,
CLE had not yet made its recommendation for improving the runway 28 RSA. The Safety
Board concludes that the RSA for runway 28 still does not meet FAA standards.
The FAA’s goal for improving the runway 28 RSA as much as practicable had
been 2007, but the deadline for the improvement to runway 28 is now September 2010.
According to CLE, the deadline was changed to 2010 because the FAA and CLE had not
yet nalized a solution and the FAA anticipated that the timeline to allocate funds for and
complete the project would take until 2010.
One of the options for improving the runway 28 RSA was to shift runway 10/28
to the east and then construct a 300-foot EMAS at the departure end of runway 28. At
the Safety Board’s request, the EMAS manufacturer, Engineered Arresting Systems
Corporation (ESCO), calculated how far the accident airplane would have traveled into
an EMAS if one had been installed at the departure end of runway 28. These calculations
assumed that runway 10/28 would have been shifted to the east and that an arrestor bed
that was 281 feet in length would have been installed 35 feet from the departure end of
runway 28. ESCO used the airplane’s calculated groundspeed at the time that the airplane
departed the runway (42 knots), together with engineering models and assumptions, to
predict that the airplane would have traveled 127 feet into the arrestor bed before stopping
(for a total of 162 feet beyond the runway threshold).
On May 6, 2003, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-03-11, which
asked the FAA to require Part 139 certicated airports to upgrade all RSAs that could,
with feasible improvements, be made to meet the minimum standards established by
AC 150/5300-13. This recommendation had been classied “Open—Acceptable Response”
on January 30, 2004, and February 15, 2007. In its November 20, 2007, response, the FAA
stated that more than 80 percent of all RSA improvements were expected to be completed
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by the end of 2010. The FAA also stated that the remaining RSA improvement projects
had “particularly challenging” circumstances that would delay the completion of the
improvements to 2015. Safety Recommendation A-03-11 remains classied “Open—
Acceptable Response” pending the completion of improvements to bring all RSAs up to
standards wherever practical.
Safety Recommendation A-03-12, which was issued with Safety
Recommendation A-03-11, asked the FAA to require Part 139 certicated airports to
install an EMAS in each RSA that could not, with feasible improvements, be made to meet
the minimum standards established by AC 150/5300-13. This recommendation had been
classied “Open—Acceptable Response” on January 30, 2004. The FAA subsequently
stated that 24 EMAS beds had been installed at 19 U.S. airports and that it expected to
install another 12 EMAS beds at 7 U.S. airports during 2008. Runway 28 at CLE is not
among those runways expected to receive an EMAS in 2008.
In its November 20, 2007, response, the FAA stated that it would continue to
promote and fund the installation of EMAS for certain runways. The FAA also stated
that, for highly constrained runways that do not have enough room to install EMAS, other
alternatives would better meet the agency’s goal to improve runways with substandard
RSAs as much as possible. However, the FAA did not describe the alternatives that it was
considering or had approved for those runways with a substandard RSA for which an
EMAS is not a viable option.
A runway with a substandard RSA and no EMAS or alternative poses a safety
risk for airplanes that inadvertently overrun a runway. Safety Recommendation A-03-12
remains classied “Open—Acceptable Response” pending a description of those
alternatives to EMAS that the FAA has considered or approved and the installation of
an EMAS or an alternative for each runway end with an RSA that does not meet the
dimensional standards prescribed by the FAA.
Passenger and Crew Deplaning2.2.4
Shuttle America’s emergency evacuation guidance to ERJ-170 pilots stated, “an
actual evacuation may not be necessary. The PIC’s ultimate decision to evacuate … should
be made after analyzing all factors pertaining to the situation when the aircraft has come to
a complete stop.” The captain stated that he considered an evacuation but then decided to
keep everyone on board the airplane and deplane once buses arrived on scene to transport
the passengers to the ARFF station.
The captain’s decision not to evacuate the passengers was appropriate because
the crew did not see evidence of re, smoke, or major structural damage; no one was in
imminent danger; and ARFF personnel had informed him that the airplane was secure
(that is, no fuel leaks or sources of ignition were in the area). Further, because the airplane
was off the runway and no shelter was available, the passengers would have been exposed
to heavy snow conditions until the buses arrived, which occurred 50 minutes after the
accident.
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According to the transcript of postaccident conversations between the ight crew
and dispatch, the dispatcher assigned to the ight told the captain that the company’s
chief pilot (located at IND) did not want the slide deployed “at all cost” because he
was concerned about people getting hurt. However, the captain had nal authority and
responsibility for the operation and safety of the ight, and he ultimately decided to have
the passengers and crew deplane using an A-frame ladder at the 1R exit.
No one was injured during the deplaning, but the decision to use the A-frame
ladder, rather than the evacuation slide, to deplane the occupants and protect against
injuries could have actually increased the risk of injuries. In this accident, the nose
gear collapsed, which would have resulted in a very shallow slide angle at the 1R exit;
passengers were not deplaning under emergency conditions; and ARFF personnel were
available to assist passengers as they exited. The Safety Board concludes that the Shuttle
America chief pilot’s instruction not to use the slide was inappropriate because he did
not have the same knowledge as the ight crew and on-scene ARFF personnel and his
instruction restricted the options for deplaning the passengers. During the Southwest
Airlines ight 1248 runway overrun, the airplane’s nose gear had collapsed (similar to the
Shuttle America airplane). The passengers on the Southwest airplane, however, deplaned
using a slide with ARFF personnel assistance, and no injuries occurred.
In 2000, the Safety Board issued a safety study on emergency evacuations of
commercial airplanes. The study included 46 evacuations that occurred between
September 1997 and June 1999 and involved 2,651 passengers. The study compiled
general statistics on the evacuations, including the types and number of passenger injuries
sustained. Of the 46 evacuations, only one accident (American Airlines ight 1420 in
Little Rock, Arkansas) included fatalities, major structural damage, and cabin re, and
more injuries were sustained in that accident than in the other 45 evacuation cases
combined. The study found, “the majority of serious evacuation-related injuries in the
Safety Board’s study cases, excluding the Little Rock, Arkansas, accident of June 1, 1999,
occurred at airplane door and overwing exits without slides.” Also, the Board found that,
of the 12 evacuations that involved the use of an operating slide, only one serious injury
resulted.
49
Standard Operating Procedures for the Go-Around 2.3
Callout
When the airplane was at an altitude of 80 feet agl, the captain indicated that he
could not see the end of the runway and stated, “let’s go [around].” The rst ofcer then
stated that he had the end of the runway in sight and continued with the approach.
When the airplane was about 45 feet agl, the captain stated that he had regained
sight of the runway environment. Nevertheless, the rst ofcer’s response to the captain’s
49
National Transportation Safety Board, Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes, Safety Study
NTSB/SS-00/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000).
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go-around callout did not meet with the Safety Board’s expectation that the immediate
response to a go-around callout, regardless of which pilot called for the go-around, should
be the execution of a missed approach. However, no Shuttle America CRM training
guidance included this information or indicated that either pilot could call for a go-around
if necessary. Also, postaccident interviews with company pilots and check airmen indicated
varying understandings of the role of the monitoring pilot (in particular, a monitoring
captain) in initiating a go-around callout. In addition, FAA AC 120-71A, “Standard
Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers,” stated that the ying pilot (in this
case, the rst ofcer) was responsible for making the go-around callout; the guidance made
no reference that the monitoring pilot could also make this callout if necessary.
The rst ofcer would have had enough time to execute a missed approach before
the captain regained sight of the runway environment. However, the rst ofcer’s failure
to respond to the captain’s go-around command might be, in part, as a result of unclear
guidance in company procedures. Specically, Shuttle America’s ERJ-170 Pilot Operating
Handbook species that the phrase “go around” is to be stated out loud by the ying pilot
to initiate a missed approach, but the operating procedures do not provide comparable
terminology for the monitoring pilot to initiate the same action. Further, the captain’s
statement of “let’s go” did not comply with any standard terminology and might have
suggested to the rst ofcer that the captain’s command was tentative—especially given
that the captain did not subsequently insist on discontinuing the approach.
The Safety Board had previously recognized the need for standard operating
procedures for the go-around callout. On August 25, 2000, the Board issued Safety
Recommendation A-00-94 in response to its ndings from the FedEx ight 14 accident in
Newark, New Jersey.
50
Safety Recommendation A-00-94 asked the FAA to do the following:
Convene a joint government-industry task force composed, at a minimum,
of representatives of manufacturers, operators, pilot labor organizations,
and the Federal Aviation Administration to develop, within 1 year, a pilot
training tool to do the following: promote an orientation toward a proactive
go-around.
On May 15, 2002, the FAA stated that its joint government-industry task force,
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, had recommended the use of the Approach and
Landing Accident Reduction training guide, which was developed by a task force headed
by the Air Transport Association. The training guide was included as an appendix to
the FAA’s Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation 01-12. The FAA
indicated that the training guide and the FAA bulletin “explicitly promote an orientation
to a proactive go-around” through recommended ight crew training. The FAA bulletin
stated, “the unwillingness of pilots to execute a go-around and missed approach when
necessary was the cause, at least in part, of some approach and landing accidents. This
unwillingness may stem from direct or indirect pressures to sacrice safety in favor of
other considerations, such as schedules or costs.” The bulletin stressed the importance of a
50
National Transportation Safety Board, Crash During Landing, Federal Express, Inc., McDonnell
Douglas MD-11, N611FE, Newark International Airport, Newark, New Jersey, July 31, 1997, Aircraft Accident
Report NTSB/AAR-00/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000).
Analysis
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corporate safety culture promoting a proactive go-around policy. As a result of the FAA’s
actions, the Safety Board classied Safety Recommendation A-00-94 “Closed—Acceptable
Action” on October 22, 2002.
Safety Recommendation A-00-94 focused on training in executing a missed
approach after a go-around callout but did not address the need for standard operating
procedures and terminology to ensure that a proactive go-around can occur. Standard
operating procedures and terminology are essential, especially for pilots who have never
own together so that they can immediately coordinate and effectively communicate.
In fact, in its safety study of ight crew-involved, major air carrier accidents, the Safety
Board found that familiar crews made fewer serious errors than crews that had just begun
ying together and that ight crew-involved errors were more likely to occur when pilots
were ying together for the rst time,
51
as was the case with the accident ight crew. The
Safety Board concludes that the captain’s use of imprecise terminology for the go-around
callout, his failure to clearly assert the callout, and the lack of a clear company procedure
that would allow the monitoring pilot to make the callout contributed to the rst ofcer’s
failure to discontinue the approach.
It is critical to ight safety that either ight crewmember be able to call for a
go-around if either pilot believes that a landing would be unsafe. Also, although CRM
principles prescribe that some cockpit decisions can be made by crew consensus, others,
including the go-around callout, require immediate action without question because of
the airplane’s proximity to the ground. Even in those circumstances in which a go-around
might not have been necessary, it is better for pilots to exercise caution rst and discuss
the situation later rather than potentially place the ight at risk. After the accident, Shuttle
America issued guidance to its pilots, stating that a missed approach should be executed
whenever either pilot is in doubt about the outcome of the landing.
The Safety Board concludes that both ying and monitoring pilots should be able
to call for a go-around because one pilot might detect a potentially unsafe condition that
the other pilot does not detect. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should
require Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing
that either pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the callout is an
immediate missed approach.
Pilot Fatigue2.4
The Captain2.4.1
The captain was off duty and on vacation leave during the 7 days before the
accident. He was originally scheduled not to work on the day of the accident, but he had
opted to shorten his awarded vacation time and called crew scheduling the night before
51
National Transportation Safety Board, A Review of Flightcrew-Involved, Major Accidents of U.S.
Carriers, 1978 Through 1990, Safety Study NTSB/SS-94/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994).
Analysis
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the accident to request a new assignment. Crew scheduling then offered, and the captain
accepted, the 2-day trip assignment. The captain reported that he felt well rested on the
day before the accident. However, the captain reported that he was unable to sleep that
night, stating that he received only 45 minutes to 1 hour of sleep. The captain did not
advise Shuttle America of his fatigue or remove himself from duty because he thought he
would be terminated if he took this action.
52
Shuttle America’s common practice is for the captain to be the ying pilot for the
rst ight of any crew pairing, and this ight was the rst one in which the two pilots
had own together. However, because of his lack of sleep, the captain had asked the rst
ofcer to be the ying pilot.
The captain’s duty schedule on the day of the accident, although consistent with
Part 121 regulations, was demanding and might have exacerbated the effects of his sleep
deprivation. The captain reported for duty at 0525, which was earlier than his normal time
of awakening (when not ying) of between 0600 and 0800. While on duty, the captain had
limited opportunity for rest and did not get a planned eating break because of the 26- and
23-minute turnaround times between ights. The accident occurred almost 10 hours into
the captain’s duty day, at which time he had been awake for about 31 of the 32 preceding
hours. Also, the accident occurred at a time when the human body normally reaches a
physiological low level of performance and alertness.
53
Fatigue can degrade all aspects of performance, but it has been especially associated
with difculties in assimilating new information and assessing risk.
54
Also, some reports
have indicated a reduction in leadership behavior with increased fatigue.
55
In addition,
in its 1994 safety study of ight crew-involved, major air carrier accidents, the Safety
Board found that a time since awakening of 11 hours or more, especially under signicant
workload demands, could be associated with degraded performance and decision-making
in ying situations.
Although the captain recognized that he was tired, he might not have fully
recognized the extent that his performance during the ight could be impaired. Studies
52
The captain received a written warning in January 2007 about his nine unexcused absence occurrences
within the previous 12 months. One of these unexcused absence occurrences happened after the captain
attempted, unsuccessfully, to call in as fatigued. The written warning indicated that future absence occurrences
(including fatigue calls that were not considered to be “company induced”) could result in termination.
Section 2.5.1 provides additional information about this issue.
53
D.M.C. Powell, M.B. Spencer, D. Holland, E. Broadbent, and K.J. Petrie, “Pilot Fatigue in Short-Haul
Operations: Effects of Number of Sectors, Duty Length, and Time of Day,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental
Medicine, Vol. 78, No. 7 (2007): 698-701.
54
(a) W.D.S. Killgore, T.J. Balkin, and N.J. Wesensten, “Impaired Decision-Making Following 49 Hours of
Sleep Deprivation,” Journal of Sleep Research, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006): 7-13. (b) J.A. Caldwell, “Fatigue in the
Aviation Environment: An Overview of the Causes and Effects as Well as Recommended Countermeasures,”
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 68 (1997): 932-938.
55
D.R. Haslam, “The Military Performance of Soldiers in Sustained Operations,” Aviation, Space, and
Environmental Medicine, Vol. 55 (1984): 216-221.
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have shown that fatigued individuals have difculty recognizing or predicting fatigue-
related impairments in their own performance and abilities.
56
The captain’s decisions and actions before and during the accident ight showed
evidence of performance deciencies that were consistent with the known effects of
fatigue. Such evidence is as follows:
Before the ight, the captain did not adequately review the ight release •
paperwork, which would have provided him with an early warning of the
glideslope status at CLE.
The captain had not previously landed on runway 28 yet did not consider •
how the runway conditions (braking action reported to be fair) and the short
runway length (6,017 feet compared with the 9,000-foot length of the previously
assigned runway, 24R) could affect landing performance.
Although he and the rst ofcer were confused when the approach controller •
told them that the glideslope was unusable, the captain allowed the precision
approach to continue to ILS minimums.
While in deteriorating weather conditions, the captain did not take command •
and make the landing himself but instead placed this responsibility with a rst
ofcer whom he had just met and whose piloting abilities he questioned.
When he lost visibility after descending through the DH, the captain did not •
reinforce his go-around callout or respond otherwise after the rst ofcer did
not execute the missed approach, as instructed.
The captain did not continuously monitor the rst ofcer’s landing •
actions, including the touchdown point, use of thrust reverse, and braking
application.
The captain’s performance during the accident ight was inconsistent with
previous reports of his abilities. Specically, several rst ofcers who had been paired
with the captain had positive comments about his leadership and piloting skills, and
a prociency check/line check airmen stated that the captain performed to standards,
demonstrated good CRM, and exercised good decision-making. During a postaccident
interview, the captain stated that his lack of sleep affected his ability to concentrate and
process information to make decisions and that, as a result, he was not “at the best of [his]
game.” The Safety Board concludes that the captain was fatigued, which degraded his
performance during the accident ight.
The First Ofcer2.4.2
The rst ofcer had been ying a heavy schedule before the accident ight and, at
the time of the accident, had own the maximum 30 hours allowed by Federal regulations
56
C.B. Jones, J. Dorrian, S.M. Jay, N. Lamond, S. Ferguson, and D. Dawson, “Self-Awareness of
Impairment and the Decision to Drive After an Extended Period of Wakefulness,” Chronobiology International,
Vol. 23, No. 6 (2006): 1253-1263.
Analysis
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for a 7-day period. He had been away from home for 8 days and was scheduled to begin a
vacation the day after the accident. Crew scheduling contacted the rst ofcer during the
nal leg of his ight schedule to ask if he would accept the round trip from ATL to CLE,
and the rst ofcer accepted the trip because it would still allow him to keep his vacation
schedule. The rst ofcer stated that he would have preferred not to be the ying pilot for
the accident leg because he had just completed a 3-day, 6-leg trip sequence but agreed to
do so because the captain indicated that he was tired.
Similar to the captain, the rst ofcer was subject to an early awakening time and
an accident time associated with the development of fatigue. However, the rst ofcer
reported that he had no difculty sleeping. Also, his performance deciencies during
the ight were not necessarily indicative of degraded alertness because other company
pilots, including a line check airman, considered his piloting skills to be average or below
average. Further, because the rst ofcer was likely eager to complete the additional
ight after having already completed a 3-day, 6-leg trip sequence, his actions during the
approach and landing might have been unrelated to fatigue.
The Safety Board concludes that, even though the rst ofcer had been ying
a heavy schedule through the time of the accident, there was insufcient evidence to
determine whether fatigue was a factor in his performance during the ight.
Pilot Attendance Policies2.5
Shuttle America2.5.1
The attendance policy at the Republic Airways subsidiary airlines (including
Shuttle America) was included in the Republic Airways Holdings Associate Handbook.
One section of the policy focused on absenteeism and tardiness in terms of the number of
occurrences (described as “a continuous absence from scheduled duty or reporting late to
work”) that accumulated during a rolling 12-month period. According to Shuttle America
pilots who were interviewed after the accident, pilots could receive an occurrence if they
were sick, fatigued, or unavailable for duty. According to the Shuttle America director
of safety, for sick calls, a pilot would receive one absence occurrence. For fatigue calls,
the chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager would talk with the pilot and then determine
how to classify the call. If the chief pilot determined that the pilot’s fatigue was company
induced (that is, caused by a demanding company schedule), the call would be classied as
“fatigue” and result in no absence occurrences. However, if the chief pilot determined that
the pilot’s fatigue was not company induced, the call would be classied as “unavailable”
and result in one to four absence occurrences depending on whether the pilot was ying
a schedule or was on reserve (see appendix C).
The attendance policy also included a progressive discipline policy for excessive
absence occurrences, which could be implemented or accelerated at any time depending
on the severity of the situation. According to the discipline policy, the rst step was a
Analysis
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verbal warning, which would result with four occurrences of absenteeism or tardiness
during a rolling 12-month period, and the last step was termination from the company,
which would occur after eight such occurrences.
Although the attendance policy had been in effect since 2005, Shuttle America did
not hold pilots accountable for their attendance until January 2007. According to the chief
pilot/ERJ-170 program manager, Shuttle America had grown quickly from a small to a
large regional air carrier, and the company did not implement this policy upon becoming a
subsidiary of its parent company. During January and February 2007, the Shuttle America
assistant chief pilot issued written warnings to 83 of the company’s 430 pilots (19 percent)
who had accrued eight or more absence occurrences during the previous 12 months. The
warning letters stated, “future occurrences would result in further corrective action, which
may be accelerated at any step, including termination.” The future absence occurrences
could include fatigue calls made while a pilot was off duty or determined not to be
company induced.
Even though the attendance policy specied the issuance of a verbal warning
as the rst step in the progressive discipline policy (the written warning was specied
as the second step), a verbal warning had not been issued to the affected pilots. Also,
the company’s assistant chief pilot (or other pilot manager) did not speak with any of
the affected pilots in advance of the written warning to determine whether legitimate
medical issues existed. If Shuttle America had been progressively warning pilots, the
captain would have earlier recognized that the company considered his attendance record
to be problematic. Further, the company might have been able to assist the captain (by
encouraging him to obtain medical treatment) and better track medical issues in its pilot
community to ensure that no safety-of-ight issues existed.
The captain was one of the Shuttle America pilots who received a written warning
during January 2007. By that time, he had accumulated nine absence occurrences (totaling
18 days) within the previous 12 months. According to the policy, with nine absence
occurrences, the captain could have been terminated. However, the company’s director
of safety indicated that the chief pilot “felt it was not fair to terminate an employee
who had not received previous notication from Shuttle America about his attendance
issues.”
One of the captain’s nine absence occurrences happened after he attempted to
call in as fatigued on July 30, 2006. The captain reported that he completed a trip late
in the evening of July 29. Although his schedule allowed for 11 hours of rest before his
scheduled report time on July 30, the captain felt the need to call in as fatigued rather than
y the back-to-back trip. When the captain spoke with the Shuttle America chief pilot/
ERJ-170 program manager about his fatigue, the captain was advised of the company’s
fatigue policy: only fatigue calls made during a trip and while the pilot was on duty could
result in a fatigue attendance mark, and calls made outside of duty time would result in
an unavailable attendance mark.
The Republic Airways Holdings pilot contract stated, “even though a pilot
may be legal under the FARs, he has the obligation to advise the Company that, in his
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honest opinion, safety will be compromised due to fatigue if he operates as scheduled
or rescheduled.” Despite this contract wording, the captain received an unavailable
attendance mark instead of a fatigue attendance mark.
In addition, the captain stated that, during the July 30, 2006, telephone call, the
chief pilot/ERJ-170 program manager suggested that it might be possible for the captain
to combine some of his absence occurrences if he provided a medical note. The captain
reported providing the medical note and following up with a telephone call to the chief
pilot but stated that the chief pilot did not acknowledge receipt of the note or return
the call. The chief pilot remembered speaking with the captain about how to classify the
fatigue event but could not recall any other details of the conversation or whether he had
been provided with the captain’s medical note.
The Republic Airways Holdings Associate Handbook had been provided
electronically to all Shuttle America employees. However, none of the Shuttle America
pilots interviewed after the accident mentioned this handbook when asked about
the company’s attendance policy. The pilots stated that the policy was not clearly
communicated, and some of the pilots stated their confusion about the administrative
implications or consequences of calling in as fatigued. Some pilots also stated that
sick and fatigue calls from company pilots were not handled uniformly. Further, the
company’s attendance policy was not included in the Shuttle America Corporation 170
General Operations Manual, which would be the customary place for such information,
and information on the attendance policy was not formally presented during ight crew
training.
During postaccident interviews, the Shuttle America chief pilot/ERJ-170 program
manager and director of operations recognized that the attendance policy did not include
specic details about the company’s sick leave and fatigue policies. The chief pilot
indicated that the company would x this problem. As of April 2008, Shuttle America
has not made any major changes to its attendance policy but is now administering its
progressive discipline policy as written.
The Safety Board has had a longstanding concern with the impairing effects of
human fatigue on transportation safety.
57
One valuable method for attempting to limit the
effects of fatigue on pilots and discourage them from working while fatigued is company
programs that allow pilots to remove themselves from duty if they believe they are
fatigued to a degree that could compromise safety (even if they are legal to y under duty
time regulations). However, if a company fatigue policy were not administered properly
or lacked specic procedures, the result could be opposite to its intended purpose.
Specically, pilots might be hesitant or feel intimidated to call in as fatigued; as a result,
the policy could actually pressure pilots to y when tired.
The captain had previously experienced difculty when he tried to call in as
fatigued. Also, he had received a warning letter indicating that future absence occurrences
would result in further corrective action, including the possibility of termination. The
57
Reducing accidents and incidents caused by human fatigue is an issue on the Safety Board’s Most
Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list.
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captain stated that, even though he received only 1 hour of sleep the night before the
accident, he did not cancel the accident trip sequence because he thought that the company
would have red him.
The Safety Board concludes that shortcomings in Shuttle America’s attendance
policy limited its effectiveness because the specic details of the policy were not
documented in writing and were not clearly communicated to pilots, especially the
administrative implications or consequences of calling in as fatigued. The Safety Board
further concludes that Shuttle America’s failure to administer its attendance policy as
written might have discouraged some of the company’s pilots, including the accident
captain, from calling in when they were sick or fatigued because of concerns about the
possibility of termination.
It is important to note that pilots have a personal responsibility to monitor their
own tness for duty and avoid ying when they have a physical deciency that could
compromise safety.
58
On the day of this accident, the captain recognized that he was
fatigued; he warned his rst ofcers that he was tired; and, because of his fatigue, he
directed the accident rst ofcer to y the accident leg. The captain did not advise Shuttle
America of his fatigue or remove himself from duty because he thought he would be
terminated if he took this action.
59
However, the Safety Board concludes that, by not
advising the company of his fatigue or removing himself from duty, the captain placed
himself, his crew, and his passengers in a dangerous situation that could have been
avoided.
60
Industry 2.5.2
With the help of the Air Transport Association and the Regional Airline Association,
the Safety Board conducted an industry survey regarding fatigue and attendance policies,
receiving responses from 6 major and 10 regional Part 121 operators that belonged to
one of these associations. The survey responses revealed that all of the major and all but
58
Title 14 CFR 61.53 and 63.19 preclude required ight crewmembers from ight duty while they have a
known medical or physical deciency. Although the regulations do not specically cite fatigue, the FAA’s AIM
discusses fatigue as a factor that pilots should evaluate as part of determining their tness for ight.
59
The Safety Board investigated a previous accident in which a pilot’s action might have resulted from
concerns about a potential disciplinary activity. Specically, according to the Board’s report on the accident,
a Piper Apache PA-23 pilot, who was an Eastern Airlines captain commuting to his duty station, was highly
motivated to land his private airplane despite the less than minimum visibility required because of his perceived
need to report to work on time. During the landing, however, the Piper airplane struck a Pan American
Boeing 727. The Board found that the pilot had previously received a disciplinary letter because he had
reported late for an assigned ight. For more information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Piper
PA-23-150, N2185P, and Pan American World Airways Boeing 727-235, N4743, Tampa Florida, November 6,
1986, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-87/06 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1987).
60
In its investigation of the FedEx ight 1478 accident, the Safety Board found that, even though the
company had a policy allowing pilots to remove themselves from a ight schedule because of fatigue, both
pilots involved in the accident indicated that they had never turned down a trip because of fatigue. The
Board determined that both pilots’ fatigue contributed to the cause of the accident. For more information, see
National Transportation Safety Board, Collision With Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478,
Boeing 727-232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/02
(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2004).
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one of the regional operators had a fatigue policy in which pilots were allowed to call in
as fatigued, even when they were within the legal ight and duty time limitations. The
survey also revealed that most of the regional operators employed a progressive discipline
policy for excessive absenteeism, which is consistent with industry practices for regional
operations.
The survey showed that the way in which the major and regional operators
administered their fatigue policies differed. For example, for all of the major operators, a
fatigue call is classied as such for administrative purposes on a pilot’s record; however,
only 20 percent of the regional operators indicated that they classied a fatigue call in that
manner. Also, for regional operators, the administrative implications of a fatigue call are
more likely to depend on specic circumstances or the timing of the call (while on duty or
off duty) compared with major operators, and regional airline pilots are less likely than
major airline pilots to be afforded an opportunity to make up the lost hours. Further, all of
the major operators had specic details of their fatigue policy documented in writing, but
most of the regional operators did not.
To further understand issues associated with operator fatigue policies, the
Safety Board reviewed a sample of more than 30 ASRS reports of in-ight incidents that
were provided voluntarily by air carrier ight crewmembers from January 1, 1996, to
December 31, 2006. These reports showed a range of experiences with company fatigue
programs allowing pilots to remove themselves from ight duty because of fatigue.
Specically, some air carrier pilots reported using a fatigue program successfully, some
pilots reported a hesitation to use the program because of a fear of retribution, and
some pilots reported attempting to call in as fatigued but instead encountered company
resistance.
Although fatigue policies that allow pilots to remove themselves from duty
because of fatigue appear to be widespread in the aviation industry, these policies vary
in the amount of specic details included, and not all of the policies appear to be equally
successful at preventing fatigued pilots from ying. In some cases, the administration of
such policies and any associated disciplinary actions could intimidate or discourage pilots
from using the policy despite their fatigue.
61
It is important for air carriers to have a detailed, written policy that allows pilots to
call in as fatigued when necessary. It is also important for pilots to make personal decisions
about their tness for duty without fear of company reprisals. The Safety Board concludes
that a fatigue policy that allows ight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of
reprisals would be an effective method for countering fatigue during ight operations.
Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA, in cooperation with pilot unions,
the Regional Airline Association, and the Air Transport Association, should develop a
specic, standardized policy for Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators that would
61
As part of its current investigation of the Pinnacle Airlines ight 4712 accident, the Safety Board
interviewed the accident captain (who was also a check airman). This captain stated that, even though the
company had a policy that allowed pilots to remove themselves from trips because of fatigue, he had never
called in as fatigued. Further, the captain stated that the company initiated a “fact-nding mission” whenever
a pilot called in as fatigued.
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allow ight crewmembers to decline assignments or remove themselves from duty if they
were impaired by a lack of sleep. The Safety Board further believes that, once the fatigue
policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19 has been developed, the FAA should
require Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and provide,
in writing, details of the policy to their ight crewmembers, including the administrative
implications of fatigue calls.
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Co n C l u s i o n s3.
Findings3.1
The captain and the rst ofcer were properly certicated and qualied under 1.
Federal regulations.
The accident airplane was properly certicated, equipped, and maintained in 2.
accordance with Federal regulations. The recovered components showed no
evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
Although marginal visual ight rules weather conditions existed at Cleveland 3.
Hopkins International Airport during most of the accident ight, the weather
conditions had rapidly deteriorated while the airplane was on approach, with
moderate to heavy snow reported during the approach and at the time of the
landing.
The approach and tower controllers that handled the accident ight performed their 4.
duties properly and ensured that the ight crew had timely weather and runway
condition information. Airport personnel at Cleveland Hopkins International
Airport appropriately monitored runway conditions and provided snow removal
services in accordance with the airport’s Federal Aviation Administration-
approved snow removal plan. The emergency response to the accident scene was
timely.
Because the ight crewmembers were advised that the glideslope was unusable, 5.
they should not have executed the approach to instrument landing system
minimums; instead, they should have set up, briefed, and accomplished the
approach to localizer (glideslope out) minimums.
When the captain called for a go-around because he could not see the runway 6.
environment, the rst ofcer should have immediately executed a missed
approach regardless of whether he had the runway in sight.
When the rst ofcer did not immediately execute a missed approach, as instructed, 7.
the captain should have reasserted his go-around call or, if necessary, taken control
of the airplane.
Because the rst ofcer lost sight of the runway just before landing, he should have 8.
abandoned the landing attempt and immediately executed a missed approach.
The rejected landing training currently required by the Federal Aviation 9.
Administration is not optimal because it does not account for the possibility that
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66
pilots may need to reject a landing as a result of rapidly deteriorating weather
conditions.
Pilots need to perform landing distance assessments because they account for 10.
conditions at the time of arrival and add a safety margin of at least 15 percent to
calculated landing distances, and this accident reinforces the need for pilots to
execute a landing in accordance with the assumptions used in the assessments.
On the basis of company procedures and ight training criteria, the airplane’s 11.
touchdown at 2,900 feet down the 6,017-foot runway was an unacceptably long
landing.
The ight crewmembers did not use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum 12.
effectiveness; if they had done so, the airplane would likely have stopped before
the end of the runway.
Specic training for pilots in applying maximum braking and maximum reverse 13.
thrust on contaminated runways until a safe stop is ensured would reinforce the
skills needed to successfully accomplish such landings.
The runway safety area for Cleveland Hopkins International Airport runway 28 14.
still does not meet Federal Aviation Administration standards.
The Shuttle America chief pilot’s instruction not to use the slide was inappropriate 15.
because he did not have the same knowledge as the ight crew and on-scene
airport rescue and reghting personnel and his instruction restricted the options
for deplaning the passengers.
The captain’s use of imprecise terminology for the go-around callout, his failure 16.
to clearly assert the callout, and the lack of a clear company procedure that would
allow the monitoring pilot to make the callout contributed to the rst ofcer’s
failure to discontinue the approach.
Both ying and monitoring pilots should be able to call for a go-around because 17.
one pilot might detect a potentially unsafe condition that the other pilot does not
detect.
The captain was fatigued, which degraded his performance during the accident 18.
ight.
Even though the rst ofcer had been ying a heavy schedule through the time of 19.
the accident, there was insufcient evidence to determine whether fatigue was a
factor in his performance during the ight.
Shortcomings in Shuttle America’s attendance policy limited its effectiveness 20.
because the specic details of the policy were not documented in writing and were
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67
not clearly communicated to pilots, especially the administrative implications or
consequences of calling in as fatigued.
Shuttle America’s failure to administer its attendance policy as written might 21.
have discouraged some of the company’s pilots, including the accident captain,
from calling in when they were sick or fatigued because of concerns about the
possibility of termination.
By not advising the company of his fatigue or removing himself from duty, the 22.
captain placed himself, his crew, and his passengers in a dangerous situation that
could have been avoided.
A fatigue policy that allows ight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without 23.
fear of reprisals would be an effective method for countering fatigue during ight
operations.
Probable Cause3.2
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the ight crew to execute a missed approach when
visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identiable. Contributing to the accident
were (1) the crew’s decision to descend to the instrument landing system decision height
instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the rst ofcer’s
long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew’s failure to use reverse thrust
and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain’s fatigue, which affected
his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle
America’s failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted ight crewmembers
to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals.
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re C o m m e n d A t i o n s4.
New Recommendations4.1
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety
Board makes the following recommendations:
--To the Federal Aviation Administration:
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91
subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and
recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making
for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in
visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver. (A-08-16)
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91
subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and
recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots
in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated
runways. (A-08-17)
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91
subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing that either
pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the callout
is an immediate missed approach. (A-08-18)
In cooperation with pilot unions, the Regional Airline Association, and
the Air Transport Association, develop a specic, standardized policy
for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K
operators that would allow ight crewmembers to decline assignments
or remove themselves from duty if they were impaired by a lack of
sleep. (A-08-19)
Once the fatigue policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19
has been developed, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135,
and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and provide, in
writing, details of the policy to their ight crewmembers, including the
administrative implications of fatigue calls. (A-08-20)
Recommendations
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Previously Issued Recommendations Classied in This 4.2
Report
Safety Recommendations A-03-11 and -12 are classied “Open—Acceptable
Response” in section 2.2.3 of this report.
Safety Recommendation A-07-57 (urgent) is classied “Open—Unacceptable
Response” and Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is classied “Open—Acceptable
Response” in section 2.2.1.4 of this report.
Member Higgins led the following concurring statement on April 21, 2008, and
was joined by Members Hersman and Chealander.
BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mark V. Rosenker Deborah A. P. Hersman
Chairman Member
Robert L. Sumwalt Kathryn O’Leary Higgins
Vice Chairman Member
Steven R. Chealander
Member
Adopted: April 15, 2008
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Notation 8002
Member Kathryn O’Leary Higgins, Concurring:
I concur with nearly all of this report documenting the runway overrun of Shuttle
America at Cleveland Airport last February. I support the recommendations we made to
the FAA to work with industry and labor to develop non-punitive procedures for
reporting fatigue. I am disappointed, however, that we did not take the opportunity to go
further and support fatigue risk management initiatives that have shown promise in the
rail and marine industries and that are being undertaken in parts of the aviation
community. I understand staff and Board Member concerns that a recommendation
urging the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation community to develop
fatigue risk management programs may be premature, but I do not agree.
To date our recommendations on fatigue have focused almost exclusively on
scheduling practices, hours of service and duty time. That is appropriate when the
accident related fatigue is work related. In this case the captain suffered from insomnia
for at least a year before the accident that apparently was brought on by issues in his
personal life. His insomnia led to several absences. The captain reported his inability to
sleep to the chief pilot and was told to see a doctor and get documentation to confirm his
problem. He saw his physician twice in the six months before the accident and provided
the requested documentation to the chief pilot. He was offered no assistance by the
company and was warned, along with other pilots, that further absences would jeopardize
his job. On the day of the accident he had been awake for about 31 of the previous 32
hours. He knew he was too tired to fly the last leg of the trip and turned the controls over
to the first officer. His fatigue contributed to the accident, putting 75 passengers and
crew at risk.
While I strongly support our recommendations to develop and implement non-
punitive reporting procedures, I believe we missed an opportunity to deal with the larger
fatigue related issues identified in this accident. The captain’s fatigue was not the result
of irresponsible scheduling practices. He requested the trip after several days of vacation.
Our recommendations that focus on scheduling and work policies will do nothing to
address crew fatigue that occurs for other reasons. But that fatigue is no less a safety
risk, placing crew and passengers in a “dangerous situation that could have been avoided”
(conclusion 22). The gaps that currently exist in our usually redundant system will
continue unless we pursue a different strategy.
The limited research I have done suggests that implementing fatigue risk
management as part of a safety management system offers a promising approach. Work
on this approach for aviation has been done in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The
railroad and marine industries have also tested the concept of fatigue risk management
for crews. The Flight Safety Foundation, in their testimony before the House Aviation
Subcommittee last June, made the case for taking a comprehensive approach to managing
fatigue in the aviation industry: “The Flight Safety Foundation believes the best way to
reduce fatigue among today’s aviation workforce is through a non-prescriptive program
bo A r d me m b e r st A t e m e n t
Board Member Statement
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2
which monitors fatigue. A system which goes beyond traditional flight- and duty-time
regulations and incorporates a fatigue risk management system (FRMS) is essential for
reducing the level of fatigue…. An effective FRMS would include a fatigue risk
management policy, education and awareness training programs, a crew fatigue-reporting
mechanism with associated feedback, procedures and measures for monitoring fatigue
levels, procedures for reporting, investigating, and recording incidents in which fatigue
played a role, and processes for evaluating information on fatigue levels and fatigue-
related incidents, implementing interventions and evaluating their effects.”
Fatigue has been on the Safety Board’s Most Wanted List for 18 years. The
Safety Board has been recognized for our leadership on this issue. Our recommendations
have made a difference. But, as the staff have told me, we are not likely to get any more
changes when it comes to hours of service. We need a different approach. We need new
ideas. I believe fatigue risk management offers a promising new approach to this vexing
issue. I hope the staff will look into the work that has been done on fatigue management
in this country and elsewhere and come back to the Board with their views. I am pleased
that the FAA is holding a forum in late spring 2008 on fatigue in aviation and I’m
delighted that the Board will be represented. But the Safety Board should not take a back
seat on this issue. We must lead and I pledge to do all I can to ensure that we do.
Kathryn O’Leary Higgins
April 21, 2008
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Ap p e n d i x e s5.
Ap p e n d i x A
in v e s t i g A t i o n A n d He A r i n g
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board was notied of this accident on
February 18, 2007. The investigation was initially assigned to the Safety Board’s Central
Region. Responsibility for the investigation was then transferred to Board headquarters,
where another accident involving a runway overrun during snow conditions (Southwest
ight 1248 at Chicago Midway International Airport) was already under investigation.
The following investigative teams were formed: Operations, Human Performance,
Air Trafc Control, Meteorology, Aircraft Performance, and Survival Factors. Specialists
were assigned to conduct the readout of the digital voice-data recorders at the Safety
Board’s laboratory in Washington, D.C.
Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration, Shuttle
America, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and Embraer Aircraft Holding,
Inc. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Centro de Investigaçáo e Prevençáo de Acidentes Aeronauticos (the Safety
Board’s counterpart agency in Brazil) participated in the investigation as the representative
of the State of Design and Manufacture.
Public Hearing
No public hearing was held for this accident.
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Ap p e n d i x b
Co C k p i t vo i C e re C o r d e r
The following is the transcript from the cockpit voice recorder of the aft Honeywell
DVDR-120-4x model digital voice-data recorder, serial number 00471, installed on an
Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, which overran the end of the runway during snow conditions
at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport on February 18, 2007.
Transcript of a Honeywell DVDR-120-4x solid-state, digital, two hour high-quality
cockpit voice recorder, serial number 00471, installed on a Shuttle America EMB-
170 N862RW, which was involved in a runway 28 overrun at Cleveland-Hopkins
International Airport in Cleveland, Ohio.
LEGEND
CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT Flight crew hot microphone voice or sound source
RDO Radio transmissions from accident aircraft, N862RW
GND Radio transmission from Atlanta ground controller
RMP Radio transmission from Atlanta ramp control
TWRA Radio transmission from Atlanta tower controller
DEP Radio transmission from Atlanta departure controller
CTRA Radio transmission from Atlanta center controllers
CTRI Radio transmission from Indianapolis center controllers
CLEOP Radio transmission from Cleveland Shuttle America operations
APR1 Radio transmission from 1
st
Cleveland approach controller
APR2 Radio transmission from 2
nd
Cleveland approach controller
TWRC Radio transmission from Cleveland Airport tower controller
CF Cell Phone sound or source
-1 Voice identified as Captain
-2 Voice identified as First Officer
-3 Voice identified as aircraft mechanical voice
-4 Voice identified as Ground Crewman
-5 Voice identified as female Flight Attendant
CHI07MA072
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-6 Voice identified as male Flight Attendant
-? Voice unidentified
* Unintelligible word
# Expletive
@ Non-pertinent word
( ) Questionable insertion
[ ] Editorial insertion
Note 1: Times are expressed in eastern standard time (EST).
Note 2: Generally, only radio transmissions to and from the accident aircraft were
transcribed.
Note 3: Words shown with excess vowels, letters, or drawn out syllables are a
phonetic representation of the words as spoken.
Note 4: A non-pertinent word, where noted, refers to a word not directly related to
the operation, control or condition of the aircraft.
CHI07MA072
CVR Factual Report, Page 12-8
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:16:09.7
BEGINNING of RECORDING
BEGINNING of TRANSCRIPT
13:16:13.5
HOT-2 wonder if they give us a heading * out of here? they usually do.
they are going to do that today.
13:16:17.3
HOT-1 yeah.
13:16:18.6
HOT-2 send 'em the ATIS.
13:16:32.7
HOT-2 must be, are you excited about the Colts?
13:16:35.7
HOT-1 uh, no. I don't watch football.
13:16:37.9
HOT-2 no?
13:16:38.6
HOT-1 naw.
13:16:53.7
HOT-2 oh boy, I almost told them not to pick up a trip.
I wanted to go home you know.... I've been gone
like eight days.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:17:02.1
INT-4 flight deck, ground.
13:17:03.1
INT-1 hey, how's it going?
13:17:04.0
INT-4 just fine, we're ready to go.
13:17:05.1
INT-1 all right, I'm gonna release the brakes. we'll give 'em
a call.
13:17:10.5
HOT-1 which transition is this again?
13:17:13.3
HOT-2 what's VVX?
13:17:13.8
HOT-1 God, I forgot.
13:17:14.9
HOT-2 VXV, shoot, all right.
13:17:17.3
RDO-2 ramp, Shuttlecraft six four, four, eight at the gate
Bravo seventeen. uuh, Summit three departure.
ready to push.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:17:27.8
GND ** Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight at seventeen?
13:17:32.0
RDO-2 that's correct. Shuttlecraft forty-eight seventeen,
Summit three.
13:17:36.9
GND ** tail south.
13:17:38.4
RDO-2 tail south, sixty-four forty-eight.
13:17:40.1
HOT-2 ** we're cleared to push, tail south.
13:17:42.2
INT-1 roger, brakes released, tail south.
13:17:46.9
HOT-1 *, so tired.
13:17:50.2
HOT-2 yeah, I know, I've had.... done two or three in a row.... early shows.
13:17:55.9
HOT-1 had about an hours sleep last night. I just tossed and turned.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:17:59.5
INT-4 * you're cleared to start.
13:18:01.4
INT-1 * thanks.
13:18:02.0
HOT-1 cleared to spin one please sir.
13:18:06.3
HOT-2 tried to get uh, sleeping pills from a friend of mine, mild ones,
when I have an early show 'bout ten o'clock.
13:18:14.6
HOT-1 oh yeah.
13:18:15.4
HOT-2 ... put you right to sleep.
13:18:36.6
INT-4 set the brakes please. you have a safe one.
13:18:38.9
INT-1 all right, the brakes are set. you're cleared to
disconnect. thanks guys.
13:18:42.0
INT-4 see ya.
13:18:47.2
HOT-1 [sound of cough and sneeze] *.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:18:54.4
HOT-2 * goes World. do you know @? he works for World.
13:18:59.6
HOT-1 * think I've met him.
13:19:14.4
HOT-2 wave off?
13:19:15.2
HOT-1 yeah.
13:19:23.2
HOT-1 after start.
13:19:30.9
HOT-2 after start, flight controls, verified checked.
13:19:33.2
HOT-2 EICAS checks, *** on.
13:19:34.9
HOT-1 complete.
13:19:35.2
HOT-1 ** complete, thanks.
13:19:38.1
RDO-2 ramp, sixty-four forty-eight's ready to taxi from uh,
Bravo seventeen.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:19:43.0
RMP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, left side point niner.
good day.
13:19:46.9
RDO-2 left side, point niner, sixty-four forty-eight.
13:19:49.5
HOT-1 take that out.
13:19:50.8
HOT-2 that garbage or is it ****?
13:20:06.5
HOT-1 garbage *****. like an actual passenger's bag.
13:20:10.7
HOT-2 yeah.
13:20:55.2
HOT-2 ** two north.
13:20:58.8
HOT-1 I think so.
13:21:00.5
HOT-1 where the hell the numbers go?
13:21:05.2
HOT-2 *****.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:21:07.2
RDO-2 ground, sixty-four forty-eight uh, three north, Victor.
13:21:12.8
GND Shuttlecraft six four four eight, Atlanta ground, runway
two two six left, taxi via Foxtrot.
13:21:16.5
RDO-2 two six left via Foxtrot, sixty-four forty-eight.
13:21:19.3
HOT-1 Foxtrot, two six left.
13:21:22.0
HOT-? who is this?
13:21:23.8
HOT-2 clear on the right.
13:21:28.5
HOT-? God.
13:21:35.2
INT-2 why were you laughing over the PA?
13:21:37.4
INT-5 what?
13:21:37.6
INT-2 why were you laughing over the PA?
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:21:39.1
INT-5 why was I laughing over the PA? oh, @, @ was sticking his tongue out an me.
13:21:44.8
INT-2 ** I just talked to * * I caught you snickering.
13:21:48.9
INT-5 he was making funny faces so I started laughing.
13:21:53.1
INT-2 that's gonna go in my report.
13:21:54.7
INT-5 you're gonna do what?
13:21:56.4
INT-2 that's gonna go on my report.
13:21:57.7
INT-5 oh, it is?
13:21:58.3
INT-2 yeah.
13:21:59.0
INT-5 that's good to know.... 'cause since you can't tell time and
I'd be worried about you *** report.... it was sometime in the
afternoon around the eighteenth.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:22:10.9
INT-2 I don't read and write that well either so it's, probably gonna
be pretty much illegible. they usually throw it away 'cause I turn it in in *.
13:22:17.6
INT-5 *** your turtle ran away. ******.
13:22:25.1
INT-2 yep, embarrassing.
13:22:26.9
INT-5 yeah, probably.
13:22:28.6
INT-2 all right, we'll get out of here in a minute.
13:22:30.5
INT-5 excellent.
13:22:31.2
INT-2 all right, bye.
13:22:31.6
INT-5 bye.
13:22:34.7
HOT-1 new frequency?
13:22:38.7
HOT-2 yeah, we're up on tower now.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:22:40.9
HOT-2 yeah, it's * three zero one seven now on the meters.
13:22:48.9
HOT-1 one seven?
13:22:49.7
HOT-2 yeah.
13:23:01.3
HOT-1 looks like we're gonna get right out of here.
13:23:03.3
HOT-2 yeah.
13:23:05.4
HOT-2 spin two?
13:23:06.5
HOT-1 sure, please sir.
13:23:15.1
HOT-2 that's where we're parking.
13:24:08.6
HOT-2 *** table, 'kay two six left, ten thousand. first fix is,
SNUFFY, a thousand feet. V nav?
13:24:19.4
HOT-1 yep.
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:24:20.6
HOT-2 ICAS verified checked.
13:24:21.6
HOT-1 checked.
13:24:22.0
HOT-2 flaps verified two.
13:24:24.1
HOT-1 two.
13:24:24.6
HOT-2 brake temperature green. pitch trim verified,
three point five and green.
13:24:27.9
HOT-1 three five green.
13:24:28.6
HOT-2 takeoff data one thirty-six, one forty-one, one forty-four,
one ninety-four, flex thirty-six.
13:24:34.0
HOT-1 one thirty-six, one forty-one, one forty-four, one ninety-four,
flex thirty-six, which is up to... do you want to flex at all?
13:24:40.4
HOT-2 yeah, that's fine.
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:24:41.2
HOT-1 I don't care.
13:24:42.5
HOT-2 takeoff briefing complete. taxi check is complete.
13:24:44.9
HOT-1 thank you. they'll give us that, friggin right turn at the marker.
13:24:49.9
HOT-2 yeah.
13:24:51.2
HOT-1 which, half the time I don't even get that little middle marker symbol.
13:25:01.8
HOT-2 yeah I know, I don't get it half the time either. I turn the marker beacon
on and hope to hear it.
13:25:06.2
HOT-1 yeah.
13:25:20.8
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
13:25:37.3
HOT-1 I didn't say anything to them. I didn't know if you want to or not,
the passengers. I didn't realize how short on time we were.
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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13:25:46.5
HOT-1 aw.... *, I don't, it's up to you. I don't care. it's uh, nineteen
degrees and overcast. it's snowing there.
13:25:55.5
HOT-2 nineteen degrees and overcast. it's kinda late now, isn't it?
13:25:59.1
HOT-1 it doesn't matter. I don't care.
13:26:01.8
HOT-2 naw.
13:26:04.8
HOT-1 [sound of cough and sneeze]
13:26:07.3
HOT-2 all right....
13:26:09.7
HOT-2 actually you know what, I will talk to 'em.
13:26:11.5
HOT-1 two six left is loaded. I got one.
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13:26:14.8
PA-2 ladies and gentlemen, it looks like we're number three for departure.
I'd like to say welcome aboard Delta flight number uh, sixty-four forty-eight
to Cleveland. hour and twenty-one minute flight. thirty-five thousand feet.
**, Cleveland’s weather is nineteen degrees, overcast skies, uuum,
looks like we'll be number three. welcome aboard flight number
six four four eight, to Cleveland.
13:26:54.5
PA-2 ladies and gentlemen, we're now number two. flight attendants
please prepare the cabin for takeoff, thank you.
13:27:18.8
HOT-1 this is uh, tower?
13:27:20.6
HOT-2 yeah, tower departure on one.
13:27:42.2
HOT-1 let's see, we did the taxi, right?
13:27:43.9
HOT-2 yeah, complete.
13:28:14.2
TWRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight I want you to hold
short of two six left. that RJ in between the parallels
got a flow time he's gotta meet or they are gonna put a
big delay on him.
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13:28:22.1
RDO-2 short of two six left, sixty-four forty-eight.
13:28:25.0
HOT-1 that's Eagle *** they're giving everybody else
big delays.
13:28:27.2
HOT-2 yeah.
13:28:42.3
HOT-1 we should get on the radios. this is so typical.
always waiting on Eagle.
13:28:47.3
HOT-2 yeah.
13:28:58.0
HOT-2 you ever flown with... oh, you're at Indy. I don't know
if he's at Indy or not, this guy named @ something.
he's in my training class. F/O from Trans States.
13:29:08.9
HOT-1 that doesn't sound familiar.
13:29:10.7
HOT-2 I think he may actually be out of Columbus.
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13:29:43.5
TWRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, runway two six left,
taxi into position and hold.
13:29:47.6
HOT-2 two six left, position and hold, Shuttlecraft
sixty-four forty-eight.
13:29:51.8
HOT-2 position and hold. flight attendants notified.
13:29:54.1
HOT-1 right.
13:29:54.6
HOT-2 takeoff min fuel quantity verified. nine thousand
four hundred eighty-five required. ** ten thousand
six ten on board.
13:30:00.9
HOT-1 nine four eighty-five required, ten six ten's aboard.
13:30:03.9
HOT-2 TA/RA takeoff config.
13:30:06.6
HOT-3 takeoff okay.
13:30:07.7
HOT-2 checked. before takeoff checklist is complete. clear on final.
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13:30:35.7
HOT-1 you got the brakes?
13:30:36.9
HOT-2 my brakes, my controls.
13:30:37.4
HOT-1 your controls.
13:30:43.5
HOT-1 [sound of several coughs]
13:30:56.9
TWRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, the wind is three two
zero at one seven, at the middle marker turn right
heading runway two eight five, runway two six left,
cleared for takeoff.
13:31:05.4
RDO-2 two eight five at the marker two six left, cleared
takeoff, Shuttlecraft six-four forty-eight.
13:31:09.3
HOT-1 you have two eighty-five.
13:31:12.3
HOT-2 TOGA.
13:31:13.4
HOT-1 TOGA set.
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13:31:20.1
HOT-1 eighty knots.
13:31:21.2
HOT-2 checked.
13:31:35.2
HOT-1 V one.
13:31:37.0
HOT-1 rotate.
13:31:43.1
HOT-1 positive rate.
13:31:43.9
HOT-2 gear up.
13:31:44.3
HOT-1 gear up.
13:31:58.5
HOT-2 heading.
13:31:59.8
HOT-1 heading.
13:32:08.4
HOT-1 flight level change speed two ten.
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13:32:10.3
HOT-2 V nav?
13:32:12.3
HOT-1 V nav, **.
13:32:23.0
TWRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, heading two eight
five. contact Atlanta departure.
13:32:26.4
RDO-1 two eighty-five, departure good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-
four forty-eight.
13:32:29.1
TWRA so long.
13:32:32.6
RDO-1 departure, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight's three
thousand.
13:32:35.1
HOT-2 flaps one.
13:32:35.6
DEP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, Atlanta departure,
verify climbing to ten.
13:32:35.8
HOT-1 flaps one.
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13:32:38.9
RDO-1 affirm, climbing to one zero thousand, Shuttlecraft
sixty-four forty-eight.
13:32:41.9
DEP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight. you are radar
contact. cleared direct SNUFY, join the Summit three.
13:32:43.0
HOT-2 flaps up.
13:32:46.2
RDO-1 direct SNUFY, join the Summit three, Shuttlecraft
sixty-four forty-eight.
13:32:50.9
HOT-1 all right, flaps up and direct SNUFY.
13:32:54.6
HOT-2 SNUFY.
13:33:48.3
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
13:34:35.2
DEP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, traffic eleven o'clock
five miles southeast bound, eleven thousand E one
forty-five.
13:34:40.5
HOT-2 got it.
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13:34:41.9
RDO-1 in sight, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
13:35:01.1
HOT-3 traffic, traffic.
13:35:04.1
HOT [sound similar to altitude alerter]
13:35:05.7
HOT-2 nine thousand for ten thousand.
13:35:06.9
HOT-1 nine thousand for ten thousand.
13:35:38.1
HOT-1 she put us on time, **.
13:35:39.6
HOT-2 cool.
13:35:53.4
HOT-2 nice of her.
13:35:54.8
HOT-1 yeah it was.
13:36:23.9
DEP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, climb maintain one
four thousand.
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13:36:28.3
RDO-1 one four thousand, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
13:36:31.4
HOT-2 one four thousand set. flight level change.
13:37:16.4
DEP Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Atlanta
center one three three point one.
13:37:21.4
RDO-1 thirty-three point one good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
13:37:31.2
RDO-1 center good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight at eleven thousand climbing one four thousand.
13:37:35.6
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Atlanta center roger,
climb maintain flight level two three zero.
13:37:40.2
RDO-1 climbing two three zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
13:37:45.2
HOT-2 two three oh, set.
13:37:46.2
HOT-1 two three oh, set.
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13:38:14.5
HOT-1 wow, she lied about ten whole minutes.
13:38:17.2
HOT-2 I know.
13:38:22.5
HOT-2 is that @?
13:38:28.9
HOT-1 I've had her fudge you know four or five minutes
before but not ten.
13:38:36.5
HOT-1 oh well, I'll take it.
13:38:46.9
HOT-1 she wants me.
13:38:51.2
HOT-2 have you ever met her?
13:38:52.7
HOT-1 no.
13:38:53.3
HOT-1 no, I'm talking about that, that girl on the radio.
13:38:55.8
HOT-2 aah.
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13:38:56.1
HOT-1 she sounded kinda cute. I've been burnt like that
before though. sounds can be deceiving.
13:39:03.3
HOT-2 yeah.
13:40:51.4
HOT-2 eighteen thousand standard.
13:40:53.9
HOT-1 standard.
13:41:23.7
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Atlanta
center one two five point niner two.
13:41:28.5
RDO-1 two five niner two good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
13:41:39.0
RDO-1 center, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, two zero zero
climbing two three oh.
13:41:42.8
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, Atlanta center, climb
and maintain flight level two five zero.
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13:41:47.3
RDO-1 climb maintain two five zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
13:41:50.3
HOT-2 two five zero set.
13:41:51.6
HOT-1 two five zero set.
13:43:01.6
HOT-2 Holiday Inn Select.
13:43:28.0
HOT-1 I think I remember this place.
13:43:30.1
HOT-2 yeah, is it nice?
13:43:31.4
HOT-1 yeah.... and there's a, there used to be this
little hot blond that worked, worked behind the
counter with a big rack that everybody talked about.
13:43:40.1
HOT-2 is that right?
13:43:40.6
HOT-1 yeah.
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13:43:52.7
HOT [sound similar to altitude alerter]
13:43:54.2
HOT-2 twenty-four for twenty-five.
13:43:55.2
HOT-1 twenty-four for twenty-five.
13:44:01.8
CAM [sound similar to flight attendant call chime]
13:44:03.1
INT-2 hello.
13:44:03.9
INT-6 hey.
13:44:04.6
INT-2 what's up?
13:44:05.2
INT-6 I called and, crap, hang on....
13:44:06.6
CTRA Shuttlecraft uh, sixty-four forty-eight, climb and
maintain flight level three three zero and out of two
seven zero in four minutes.
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13:44:14.7
RDO-1 three three zero and out of two seven zero in four
minutes, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
13:44:19.0
HOT-1 three three zero?
13:44:20.2
HOT-2 three three zero set.
13:44:24.7
INT [discussion over the interphone between Captain
and Flight Attendant about room accommodations for the layover]
13:45:41.1
HOT-2 autopilot on please. thanks.
13:45:42.9
HOT-1 autopilot on.
13:45:53.7
HOT-1 your ACARS message from....
13:46:01.7
HOT-2 Atlanta to CLF?
13:46:04.6
HOT-1 huh?
13:46:18.0
HOT-2 Cleveland.
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13:47:42.4
HOT-1 wonder if there is a.... CLF? no.
13:47:50.5
HOT-2 there's no such place.
13:47:51.9
HOT-1 that's good.
13:50:02.9
HOT-2 any good rumors about the company? the Delta thing true?
13:50:07.4
HOT-1 what's that?
13:50:08.3
HOT-2 thirty-five one seventy-fives.
13:50:10.2
HOT-1 I don't know. I haven't heard anything. I bought
a bunch of stock hoping that something else would
come out and it's gonna skyrocket but....
13:50:20.4
HOT-2 it's gone up recently, hasn't it?
13:50:21.9
HOT-1 it, it's fluctuated a good bit. I'm making about uh,
I don't know about a hundred dollars a day sometimes
on it. it fluctuates so much, I just buy it low and sell it high
and then re-buy it again after it falls.
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13:50:35.0
HOT-2 is that right?
13:50:35.7
HOT-1 yeah.
13:50:36.3
HOT-2 you doing well on it?
13:50:37.2
HOT-1 * not doing too bad. it's uh, the most reliable stock
I've found so far 'cause it, it's constantly goes up and
down. it uh, was over nineteen....
13:50:46.5
HOT [sound similar to altitude alerter]
13:50:47.7
HOT-1 ... ago but now it's down to eighteen.
13:50:50.0
HOT-2 thirty-two for thirty-three.
13:50:51.1
HOT-1 thirty-two for thirty-three. I'm out of money or
I'd buy as much as I could right now.
13:50:55.6
HOT-2 how much you buy at a time?
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13:51:01.7
HOT-1 I only got enough money to work with about
five hundred shares so.
13:51:06.1
HOT-2 that's not bad.
13:51:06.9
HOT-1 yeah, well, once it gets, once I think it hits the low spot for
the day I'll buy as much as I can then it goes up, it goes up
thirty cents, I make two or three hundred dollars.
13:51:18.1
HOT-2 yeah.
13:51:18.8
HOT-1 I turn around and I sell it. and then uh, it'll drop back down I buy it back up
again. so, every time I buy another ten or fifteen shares....
the value of my stock keeps going up.... over the past month and a half,
I've probably made, I don't know, close to two grand, off....
13:51:41.1
HOT-2 wow.
13:51:41.7
HOT-1 ... just doing that.
13:51:43.2
HOT-2 really.
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13:51:43.7
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight it's gonna be a couple
minutes before I have higher. traffic for you, two
o'clock two zero miles miles southwest above you at
flight level three four zero is a seven thirty seven.
13:51:53.0
RDO-1 roger, looking, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
13:51:56.8
HOT-1 if I had a lot more money I could make substantial
cash just playing this game.
13:52:04.1
HOT-2 *.
13:52:04.2
HOT-1 I don't have enough money, involved....
13:52:17.9
HOT-2 you go through a broker or you just do it on your own?
13:52:20.8
HOT-1 I just do it on my own which.... I've had to learn the hard
way. I started with ten grand, and I whittled that to about four.
13:52:28.5
HOT-2 oh #.
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13:52:29.4
HOT-1 yeah it hurt. and now, starting to figure stuff out a little bit.
gradually working it back up. I had to stop uh, going for the
major payoffs, I just....
13:52:44.7
HOT-2 yeah.
13:52:45.5
HOT-1 as long as I make twenty bucks, I'm happy. I could
make twenty bucks about five times a day, doing all right.
13:52:55.1
HOT-2 yep.... do you have the frequencies and gates on this?
I don't have it in my book....
13:53:05.1
HOT-1 uum.
13:53:05.4
HOT-2 kinda weird.
13:53:07.4
HOT-1 might be new.... I don't have all my uh….
13:53:14.4
HOT-2 #.
13:53:15.6
HOT-1 I don't have all my stuff in, my book yet.
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13:53:18.6
HOT-2 is it on here?
13:53:21.7
HOT-2 Cleveland gate D, D two? that sound right?
13:53:28.4
HOT-1 I've been in here before.
13:53:29.6
HOT-2 ops is one twenty-nine five five.
13:53:31.7
HOT-1 gate B two?
13:53:32.7
HOT-2 yeah, what it says B two, right?
13:53:34.9
HOT-1 yep, two nine five five.
13:53:37.0
HOT-2 two nine five five, yeah.
13:53:38.6
HOT-1 sweet.
13:53:50.9
HOT-1 yeah.
13:53:51.4
HOT-2 that's why the rich keep getting richer you know….
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13:53:53.4
HOT-1 yeah.
13:53:54.0
HOT-2 'cause they have the money to throw around.
13:53:56.9
HOT-1 yeah.... I wish I'd been a little smarter about it to begin with though.
13:54:01.2
HOT-2 yeah, everybody loses, learns a lesson.
13:54:06.1
HOT-1 uh, you know @.
13:54:07.6
HOT-2 oh yeah. good friends with @.
13:54:09.1
HOT-1 are you?
13:54:09.7
HOT-2 he made a # load of money on the market.
13:54:11.6
HOT-1 yeah, I, I was talking to him about it. he got me interested
in it again. [sound of cough] he was telling me he just read
some books on it and in his first year, he took two thousand
dollars and turned it into a hundred grand.
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13:54:24.3
HOT-2 yeah, he told me the same thing. he read books on it.
but he's read about thirty books. you know that. he set me
down, I was in Chicago ***. where would I go. I even forget
what it was now. but it's like a seminar on some kind of investing he does.
13:54:26.3
HOT-1 wow.
13:54:39.7
HOT-1 yeah.
13:54:40.3
HOT-2 and I do, the seminar's in downtown Chicago and I
happened to be there, and I went down to the seminar.
and it was kind of like, he said I know it's kind of tricky to
learn and stuff, but.... yeah, he does pretty good.
13:55:04.4
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, climb and maintain
flight level three four zero.
13:55:08.4
RDO-1 climbing three four zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
13:55:10.5
HOT-2 three four zero set.
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13:55:11.1
CTRA and Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Atlanta
center one three four point zero seven.
13:55:11.7
HOT-1 set.
13:55:15.8
HOT [sound similar to altitude alert signal]
13:55:16.5
RDO-1 thirty-four oh seven good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
13:55:19.5
HOT-1 thirty-three thirty-four.
13:55:20.6
HOT-2 thirty-three thirty-four.
13:55:34.3
HOT-2 so this won't let you go up to seven eight 'til
you're at cruise? is that why it's still seven four?
13:55:38.9
HOT-1 yeah, it's still in the climb. you can change it in
there and it will change on there.
13:55:47.6
RDO-1 center, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight's thirty-three
three climbing three four oh.
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13:55:51.7
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Atlanta center roger,
climb and maintain flight level three five zero.
13:55:56.3
RDO-1 climbing three five zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
13:55:58.5
HOT-2 three five zero set.
13:55:59.9
HOT-1 set.
13:56:00.3
HOT-2 did @ tell you what he paid in taxes the first year
he made some money.
13:56:03.2
HOT-1 yeah like wrote a check for like thirty grand or something.
it's more than he made... working as a....
13:56:08.9
HOT-2 thirty forty grand I think he *.
13:56:10.8
HOT-1 ah... more than he made working as a paramedic.
13:56:15.8
HOT-2 yeah... yeah... is that the same time he got divorced?
I can't remember.
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13:56:32.5
HOT-1 I don't know.
13:56:39.0
HOT-2 shoot, I should, I don't have the money right now but,
could do that too.... ****.
13:56:44.4
HOT-? [sound similar to altitude alerter]
13:56:47.0
HOT-2 does @ buy and sell the stock thirty-four for thirty-five?
13:56:49.0
HOT-1 I don't know if he does or not. thirty-four for thirty-five.
13:56:51.7
HOT-2 he's into uh, what's he into?
13:56:53.5
HOT-1 told me he's into options.
13:56:55.7
HOT-2 yeah options, that's what it was.
13:56:56.4
HOT-2 that's what it was. yeah, that's what I went to the
seminar, the seminar... oh, God... real tricky. if this
happens, this happens and it's all these....
13:56:57.0
HOT-1 I don't even understand what that's about.
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13:57:38.4
HOT-2 yeah he was, I just tried to call him the other night
when I was in uh.... Albuquerque and talked to him
about being like Captain *** you know what dude?
I'd wait.... wait for the like the one-seventy or one thirty-five.
13:57:53.4
HOT-1 that what he heard?
13:57:55.2
HOT-2 he told me there would be a lot of one seventy-fives at Delta.
13:57:59.3
HOT-1 * is he... I had a, a PC with him in a month ago and
he's like, the Frontier things a done deal. I can't believe
they haven't announced it yet. and it's still another month
or two before they finally announced it.
13:58:11.7
HOT-2 yeah.
13:58:12.2
HOT-1 they knew what was going on.
13:58:14.0
HOT-2 I met a guy, before I started this, like I said I've gone for
eight days. it's four days on, a day off of this three day.
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13:58:19.7
HOT-1 uh huh.
13:58:20.5
HOT-2 I was down in the cafeteria and I met this Captain.
I don't know where, ** Chicago, maybe Indy based.
and he said uh, he just flew with the FO *. 'cause
you know this is weird. I just got my schedule to
pickup planes in Brazil. and they said they haven't
mentioned it yet ** Delta look at my schedule.
it says thirty-five one seventy-five. he said it was
seventy-six seats, no first class.
13:58:44.5
HOT-1 wow. I wonder why?
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13:58:49.7
HOT-2 I heard they were gonna do from like Chicago to LA....
and I flew with a couple of guys that go pick up the
planes an... you know @? he told me he goes like,
he told me, lad I tell you I went down to get the last plane.
I said goodbye to him like thank God for everything.
I probably won't see you again for a long time. and he
said, oh no, the second quarter of next year which is,
you know now, or coming up, he said you might as well
just get an apartment here. he said what do you mean?
he said Delta called ** conference call and said how fast
can you make these things. about two a month and they
said well can you make them any faster. and they said
well, we do have a hanger or something we could do
some stuff to help move it along. we could probably get
three a month. they said we would like to put an order in
for.... I heard forty-eight back then.
13:59:38.7
HOT-1 wow.
13:59:39.4
HOT-2 he said forty-eight but, the rumor lately is thirty-five,
one seventy-fives.
14:01:34.8
CTRA Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight contact Indianapolis
center on one three four point two two.
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14:01:40.1
RDO-1 three four two, two good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:01:48.9
RDO-1 center good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight, three five oh.
14:01:53.6
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, Indy center roger.
14:03:23.2
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, turn ten degrees left,
vector traffic.
14:03:28.0
RDO-1 ten left, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:03:31.2
HOT-2 ten degrees left.
14:06:35.7
HOT-2 I'm gonna lose my headset.
14:06:37.7
HOT-1 *.
14:08:50.3
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight cleared direct
Tiverton.
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14:08:54.7
HOT-2 yeah.
14:08:55.4
RDO-1 direct Tiverton, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight,
thanks.
14:09:01.3
HOT-2 Tiverton, like it?
14:13:07.3
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Indy center
one two four, correction, one one niner point five two.
14:13:15.2
RDO-1 nineteen fifty-two, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:13:22.6
RDO-1 Indy center good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight three five oh.
14:13:27.0
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Indy center, roger.
14:20:39.1
PA-5 ladies and gentlemen, the Captain has turned
off the fasten seatbelt sign *******. for your convenience
there are lavatories located in the front and rear of the aircraft.
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14:22:50.9
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight descend and
maintain flight level three four zero.
14:22:55.0
RDO-1 three four zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:22:58.8
HOT-2 three four zero set.
14:23:04.0
HOT-1 [sound similar to altitude alerter]
14:24:26.5
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Indy center
one two five point zero seven.
14:24:31.3
RDO-1 twenty-five oh seven, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:24:37.9
RDO-1 Indy center good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight three four oh.
14:24:43.2
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Indy center, roger.
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14:28:25.0
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, cross three five miles
south of Tiverton at and maintain flight level two four
zero.
14:28:34.7
RDO-1 thirty-five south of Tiverton at two four zero,
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:29:04.6
HOT-2 two four zero set.
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14:29:18.6
ATIS Cleveland-Hopkins Airport arrival Information Alpha.
one eight five eight Zulu special. wind three one zero
at one four, gusts two one. visibility one zero. ceiling
two thousand niner hundred broken. temperature
minus six, dew point minus one three. altimeter two
niner, niner, niner. ILS runway two four right approach
in use. landing runway two four right. departure ATIS
frequency one three two point three seven five.
runway six center, two four center closed. runway one
zero two eight closed. taxiway Alpha (Golf one), Zulu
closed. taxiway Juliet between taxiway Sierra and
Whiskey snow bank taxi caution advised. south cargo
ramp closed. precision approach path indicator two
four left precision approach path indicator two eight,
out of.... service. runway two four left and two eight
glideslope’s unusable due to snow build-up. braking
action advisories are in effect. bird activity in the
vicinity of the airport, caution advised. pilots read
back all runway assignments. read back all runway
hold short instructions. pavement failure at
intersection of Juliet and Whiskey. advise on initial
contact you have information Alpha.
14:29:51.0
HOT-2 #.
14:29:52.5
HOT-1 what's up?
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14:29:53.6
HOT-2 two four right.
14:29:56.5
HOT-1 oh, you know on this too, if you arm the V nav,
it'll descend by itself.
14:30:00.7
HOT-2 yeah, yeah.
14:32:35.1
HOT [sound similar to vertical track alert]
14:33:16.4
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Indy center
one three two point eight two, thirty-two, eighty-two.
14:33:22.0
RDO-1 thirty-two eighty-two, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:33:34.7
RDO-1 Indy, good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight,
three four oh, crossing thirty-five this side of Tiverton
at two four oh.
14:33:42.1
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, Indy center roger.
14:33:46.0
HOT-2 how come it's not heading down?
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14:33:47.4
HOT-1 it's not armed. you're still in the manual mode.
14:33:50.5
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight uh, descend and
maintain flight level two three zero with the same
restriction.
14:33:56.6
HOT-2 uuh.
14:33:57.4
RDO-1 same restriction down to two three zero for
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:34:02.1
HOT-2 did he say down to two three zero?
14:34:03.7
HOT-1 yeah two three zero's the new, same restriction.
**, hit uh, V nav and it should *** there goes the change, FMS ***.
14:34:26.1
HOT-1 what the hell is it doin'?
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14:34:30.2
HOT-1 * it's trying to slow to seven six.
14:34:50.8
HOT-? [sound of two chimes]
14:34:53.7
HOT [sound similar to flight attendant chime]
14:34:55.3
INT-1 why don't you leave those people alone?
14:34:56.8
INT-5 excuse me?
14:34:57.3
INT-1 why don't you leave those people alone?
14:34:58.7
INT-5 can't you leave me alone? you're always hollering.
14:34:59.7
INT-1 they're probably trying to sleep.
14:35:01.9
INT-1 I'm just trying to do my jobby job.
14:35:03.8
INT-5 since when?
14:35:07.5
INT1 If you pay attention once in a while.
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14:35:09.3
INT-5 I'm sorry.
14:35:10.7
INT-1 um, what do you got in the way of specials?
14:35:13.9
INT-5 uh, one wheelchair.
14:35:15.6
INT-1 is that it?
14:35:16.3
INT-5 I guess so.
14:35:17.9
INT-1 all right, we'll be there in about uh, thirty minutes.
14:35:22.0
INT-5 thirty?
14:35:24.1
INT-1 thirty-six to be exact. oh and we're staying, I don't
know if he told you we're staying at the Holiday Inn select.
14:35:27.8
INT-5 cool.
14:35:28.6
INT-1 I remember now, that's a pretty cool hotel.
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14:35:31.4
INT-5 hmm.
14:35:32.1
INT-1 that's a pretty cool hotel.
14:35:34.1
INT-5 awesome.
14:35:35.1
INT-1 sweet, okay.
14:35:36.2
INT-5 all righty, bye.
14:36:21.8
HOT-2 the Mexican drug lords are going to like uh,
National Parks, United States. mostly California
and they dr, and they grow marijuana right in their own # back yard.
14:36:33.1
HOT-1 nice.
14:36:34.0
HOT-2 unbelievable.
14:36:51.3
HOT-2 I'll brief if you want.
14:36:53.3
HOT-1 all right, go for it.
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14:36:55.4
HOT-2 * controls….
14:36:59.1
HOT-2 twenty-six * with two three zero.
14:37:01.4
HOT-1 roger.
14:37:03.8
HOT-2 ** two four right. six may, two thousand five.
one eleven point five, five set both sides are IPVY,
** two thirty-seven. glide slopes * at twenty-seven hundred.
is nine eighty seven on the baro. ** seven eighty. **
to the east, thirty-one hundred to the west. **
twenty-two hundred. two and half we have. ***
if we go missed it's climb to thirty-one hundred
then climbing right turn to three thousand direct
to the Dryer VOR and hold. it'll be a teardrop entry.
we'll get off at uh, I don't know, Golf.
14:37:39.8
HOT-1 uuh, two four right.
14:37:43.1
HOT-2 Kilo.
14:37:43.9
HOT-1 November, Papa.
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14:37:46.2
HOT-2 am I looking at the wrong one?
14:37:48.8
HOT-1 Golf's the parallel, I think.
14:37:53.6
HOT-2 aw yeah, November.
14:37:55.3
HOT-1 that's a long taxi.
14:38:02.0
HOT-2 any questions?
14:38:03.0
HOT-1 nope.
14:38:17.7
HOT [sound similar to altitude alerter]
14:38:19.3
HOT-1 twenty-four for twenty-three.
14:38:21.5
HOT-2 twenty-four for twenty-three.
14:38:29.0
HOT-? ****.
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14:38:35.3
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Indy center
one two four point four five.
14:38:40.0
RDO-1 two four point four five, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-
four forty-eight.
14:38:49.9
RDO-1 center, good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight two three oh.
14:38:54.2
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, descend and
maintain one five thousand. Cleveland altimeter three
zero zero two.
14:39:01.5
RDO-1 down to one five thousand and three zero, zero two,
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:39:06.9
HOT-2 fifteen thousand.
14:39:09.3
HOT-1 fifteen seen.
14:39:22.6
HOT-2 no ramp frequency here I don't think, huh?
oh, wait a second. they contact you one twenty-seventeen.
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14:39:32.5
HOT-1 where do you see that?
14:39:37.9
HOT-2 arrival operation from concourse C oh, and all
aircraft movements from the south side of concourse B,
contact ramp one twenty nine seven.
14:39:45.4
HOT-1 oh, okay.
14:39:46.7
HOT-1 I guess that will be the tower.
14:39:48.8
HOT-2 huh.
14:39:49.2
HOT-1 that'll be the ground probably.
14:39:50.7
HOT-2 yeah.
14:41:34.5
HOT-2 #. the # Mexican drug lords, man. they're taking
over the uh, Colombia drug lords and they uh,
lately they have been, telling people, showing
people how serious they are. they cut your head
off and leave it, the last time I went to a discotheque.
rolled five heads onto the dance floor.
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14:41:46.3
HOT-1 yeah.
14:41:56.5
HOT-1 damn.
14:41:58.6
HOT-2 they mean business.
14:42:02.2
HOT-1 cripes, that's here in the U.S.?
14:42:04.3
HOT-2 no, in Mexico.
14:42:05.1
HOT-1 oh, okay.
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14:42:40.9
ATIS Cleveland-Hopkins Airport arrival Information Bravo.
one eight five eight Zulu special. wind three one zero
at one four, gusts two one. visibility one zero. ceiling
two thousand niner hundred broken. temperature
minus six, dew point minus one three. altimeter two
niner, niner, niner. ILS runway two eight approach in
use. landing runway two eight. departure ATIS
frequency one three two point three seven five.
runway six center, two four center closed. taxiway
Alpha closed. taxiway Juliet between taxiway Sierra
and Whiskey snowbank taxi caution advised. south
cargo ramp closed. precision approach path indicator
two four left precision approach path indicator two
eight, out of.... service. runway two four left and two
eight glideslope’s unusable due to snow build-up.
braking action advisories are in effect. bird activity in
the vicinity of the airport, caution advised. pilots read
back all runway assignments. read back all runway
hold short instructions. pavement failure at
intersection of Juliet and Whiskey. advise on initial
contact you have information Bravo.
14:42:40.8
HOT-2 'k, is it two nine, nine, nine, two triple nine?
14:42:44.2
HOT-1 he gave us three double oh two, is the last he gave us.
14:42:49.8
HOT-2 uh, descent checklist.
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14:42:51.5
HOT-1 all right.
14:43:00.7
HOT-1 shoulder harness verified on.
14:43:02.0
HOT-2 on.
14:43:02.2
HOT-1 * belt is on, altimeter's verified. thirty oh two set here.
14:43:05.3
HOT-2 thirty oh two set.
14:43:06.6
HOT-1 landing data is set, EICAS is checked, approach briefing.
14:43:09.7
HOT-2 complete.
14:43:10.1
HOT-1 descent checklist complete.
14:43:27.8
HOT [sound similar to altitude alerter]
14:43:30.0
HOT-2 sixteen for fifteen.
14:43:31.5
HOT-1 sixteen, fifteen.
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14:43:49.6
HOT-1 you take one for for a second and I'll call in range.
14:43:50.7
HOT-2 I have one.
14:43:57.6
RDO-1 Cleveland ops, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight's in
range.
14:44:36.5
RDO-1 Cleveland ops, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:44:57.0
RDO-1 [sound of cough] Cleveland ops, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight's in range.
14:45:04.1
CLEOP **shuttle, sixty-four forty-eight, you copy?
14:45:07.6
RDO-1 * in range. 'bout uh, twenty out. need one wheelchair
please.
14:45:30.0
RDO-1 you copy that for sixty-four forty-eight?
14:45:50.4
HOT-2 # man.
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14:45:52.5
HOT-1 all right, I'm back on one. I gave up. jerk.
14:45:54.7
HOT-2 no changes.
14:45:58.6
HOT-1 he, he answered me after I called him like three t....
he finally said, copy that for sixty-four forty-eight.
but he didn't give me a gate, he wouldn't answer the wheelchair.
14:46:08.7
HOT-2 oh, God.
14:46:09.4
HOT-1 he just never answered me back.
14:46:11.8
HOT-1 like... jerk.
14:46:39.5
HOT-1 I'll be off again.
14:46:40.9
HOT-2 got one.
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14:46:43.4
PA-1 yeah, folks from the flight deck, currently about uh,
hundred and twenty miles southwest of the airport.
gonna have have you on the ground here in about
twenty minutes. current weather is mostly cloudy.
twenty-one degrees. winds picked up here a little bit.
it's uh, gusting about twenty-five miles an hour on the ground.
expect it to be a little bumpy as we get lower. 'preciate
having you on board today. like to see you aboard on
another Delta connection flight operated by Shuttle America.
like to ask the flight attendants please prepare the cabin for arrival.
14:47:09.1
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
14:47:13.3
PA-1 they're parking at terminal uh, B, gate two. Bravo two's our gate.
14:47:18.7
HOT-1 all right, back on one.
14:47:21.6
HOT-2 no changes.
14:47:30.8
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
14:47:32.4
HOT-2 @ has a partner though that does his investing.
14:47:35.5
HOT-1 does he?
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14:47:36.2
HOT-2 yeah. guy that's pretty sharp that watches it you know with him or, more full time.
14:47:44.8
HOT-1 yeah....
14:47:58.7
HOT-2 I don't know if he's done what I asked him if the other
day if the other day how he's gonna invest it if he
makes a hundred thousand like he did....
14:48:06.6
HOT-1 yeah.
14:48:07.3
HOT-2 before.
14:48:11.0
HOT-1 ** all of his stuff paid for and....
14:48:13.2
HOT-2 yeah.
14:48:13.8
HOT-1 *** he said like his car, motorcycle, his house....
14:48:18.3
HOT-2 is that right?
14:48:19.2
HOT-1 so he said.
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14:48:19.8
HOT-2 I know he's got some toys.
14:48:21.4
HOT-1 yeah.
14:48:21.8
HOT-2 ... a motorcycle an....
14:48:24.1
HOT-1 [sound of cough] he said all that stuff's paid for
and he just works here for basically the benefit,
the medical and stuff. he said uh, I think he told
me as soon as he clears, I think he said ten thousand
a month income, he was going to quit altogether.
[sound of several coughs]
14:48:44.5
HOT-2 I would too.
14:48:46.0
HOT-2 he made a lot of money working here last year.
14:48:48.8
HOT-1 what's that, he did?
14:48:51.1
HOT-2 yeah he did.
14:48:55.7
HOT-1 I was surprised how much I made. it's like uh,
must have picked up a whole butt load of overtime.
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14:49:02.0
HOT-2 yeah.
14:49:02.6
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, Cleveland one three
four point niner.
14:49:06.3
RDO-1 three four niner, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
14:49:21.3
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, cross KEATN at one
zero thousand, two five zero knots. altimeter three
zero, zero, eight.
14:49:27.3
RDO-1 KEATN at two fifty at ten, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
14:49:31.8
CTRI and roger, the Cleveland altimeter, I think I just gave it
wrong twice. it's three zero, zero, zero for everybody
landing Cleveland.
14:49:39.5
HOT-2 did he say three zero, zero?
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14:49:41.3
HOT-1 yep.
14:49:43.8
HOT-2 ten thousand set.
14:49:44.8
HOT-1 ten thousand.
14:49:52.0
HOT-? oops.
14:49:53.1
CTRI Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, contact Cleveland
approach, one two four point zero.
14:49:57.7
RDO-1 two four point zero, good day. Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:50:02.7
HOT-1 [sound of several coughs]
14:50:10.2
HOT-1 was it Alpha, weather?
14:50:11.9
HOT-2 uuh, yeah.
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14:50:14.1
RDO-1 approach good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight's fifteen thousand descending ten thousand at
KEATN, Alpha.
14:50:19.7
APR1 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Cleveland approach,
depart KEATN heading three five zero vectors ILS
runway two eight approach. Cleveland altimeter two
niner, niner, niner.
14:50:27.7
RDO-1 two niner, niner, niner KEATN uh, heading....
14:50:31.4
HOT-1 what was it?
14:50:32.1
HOT-2 three five zero.
14:50:32.1
RDO-1 three five zero for two eight, Shuttlecraft sixty-four
forty-eight.
14:50:36.8
HOT-2 two eight now. take your.…
14:50:41.4
HOT-1 that sucks.
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14:50:42.9
HOT-2 yeah, I almost put that in at first and then I....
14:50:47.9
HOT-2 aw #, we're not gonna make KEATN by then.
14:50:56.6
HOT-1 KEATN by ten in two minutes.
14:50:57.7
HOT-2 *.
14:51:03.0
HOT-2 ‘k, T program. I-P-X-T, I-P-X-T.
14:51:18.0
HOT-2 preview two-eighty.
14:51:25.6
HOT-? [sound similar to altitude alerter]
14:51:28.5
HOT-2 eleven thousand for ten thousand.
14:51:30.4
HOT-1 eleven for ten.
14:52:07.7
HOT-2 descend to a thousand twenty now.
14:52:37.0
HOT-2 you got a heading.... three-fifty.
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14:53:06.0
HOT-2 'kay, let's see. okay we got PARMA and OPTOO.
'kay uh, one ten point seven, * ten point seven, I-
P-X-P. two eighty inbound. glideslope’s at
PARMA at twenty-six fifty-eight. descent altitudes
a thousand twenty in the baro. touchdown is
seven ninety-one. minimum safe is thirty-one
hundred to the east, twenty-seven to the west. if
we have to go missed, climb to fourteen hundred
feet, then climbing left turn to three thousand to
the Dryer VOR and hold, teardrop. two and a half
we have. PAPI on the right hand side. we'll get
off at uh, I don't know, all the way down at Delta, I
guess.
14:53:41.6
APR1 *attention all aircraft, new ATIS Charlie, current wind,
two niner zero at one eight. visibility one quarter with
heavy snow. ceiling.... I'm sorry it's uh one thousand
one hundred scattered. ceiling's one thousand eight
hundred broken, four thousand three hundred
overcast. temperature's seven, minus seven. dew
point minus one, one. altimeter two niner, niner, niner.
runway two eight RVR, six thousand.
14:53:57.0
HOT-1 dude, one quarter mile visibility.
14:53:59.6
HOT-2 I thought he did too.
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14:54:02.4
HOT-1 well we got the RVR. so we're good there.
14:54:07.6
HOT-2 man..... San Antonio's gonna be eighty degrees
and sunny.
14:54:14.0
HOT-1 yeah. there's half naked women everywhere.
14:54:18.2
CLEOP sixty-four forty-eight, you copy?
14:54:20.6
HOT-2 I heard that the La Quin... the La Quinta hotel is
pretty.... good pool that....
14:54:26.5
HOT-1 aw, I've never been there.
14:54:27.9
HOT-2 you've never been there? I was there once.
14:54:34.3
APR1 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, descend and
maintain seven thousand.
14:54:37.0
RDO-1 seven thousand, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
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14:54:40.0
HOT-2 seven thousand set.
14:54:41.3
HOT-1 seven set.
14:54:42.1
HOT-2 ten thousand two-fifty manual.
14:54:43.3
HOT-1 roger that.
14:54:43.6
PA-1 [sound of chime] flight attendants prepare for
approach and landing.
14:54:54.8
HOT-1 aah, you have to do one of them dashboard
approaches now.
14:54:58.1
HOT-2 what's that?
14:54:59.2
HOT-1 you have to do one of them there dashboard
approaches down to….
14:55:03.9
HOT-2 down to the mins?
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14:55:04.9
HOT-1 yeah.
14:55:06.4
HOT-2 sounds like it doesn't it?
14:55:08.0
HOT-1 six thousand RVR. screw that, I'm going home.
14:55:29.2
HOT-2 what's, actuate vectors again?
14:55:33.3
HOT-1 what is it?
14:55:35.3
HOT-2 yeah, does it accept vectors?
14:55:36.9
HOT-1 yeah, it's just gonna give you PARMA to the
runway.
14:55:52.0
HOT-? *.
14:55:52.6
HOT [sound similar to altitude alert]
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14:56:26.4
APR1 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight turn right heading
zero four zero.
14:56:30.0
RDO-1 zero four zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:56:33.7
HOT-2 zero four zero.
14:56:36.5
HOT-1 "royer."
14:57:40.1
APR Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight turn right heading
zero seven zero. descend and maintain six thousand.
14:57:44.9
RDO-1 zero seven zero, down to six thousand, Shuttlecraft
sixty-four forty-six.
14:57:48.4
HOT-2 zero seven zero down to six thousand.
14:57:49.8
APR1 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, when able, maintain
one eight zero knots and contact Cleveland approach
one, one, niner point six two.
14:57:56.6
CAM [sound similar to altitude alerter]
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14:57:57.7
RDO-1 we'll slow to one eighty when able and uh, nineteen
sixty -two, good day, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:58:02.8
APR1 good day sir.
14:58:05.2
HOT-2 seven for six.
14:58:06.6
HOT-1 seven for six.
14:58:21.7
RDO-1 approach, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight six five
leveling six thousand.
14:58:26.1
APR1 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Cleveland approach
roger, fly heading zero one zero.
14:58:30.4
RDO-1 zero one zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:58:34.3
HOT-? now.
14:58:41.6
HOT-2 flaps one.
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14:58:42.8
APR2 Jetlink twenty two thirty-five, six miles from PARMA....
14:58:45.2
HOT-1 flaps one.
14:58:45.8
APR2 ... maintain three thousand 'til established on the
localizer. cleared ILS runway two eight approach.
glideslope unusable.
14:58:50.2
HOT-2 what? glideslope unusable. can't be a quarter
mile visibility. what the heck's going on here?
14:58:56.9
HOT-1 glideslope’s unusable.
14:59:00.9
HOT-2 what the?
14:59:10.1
APR2 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight descend and
maintain three thousand.
14:59:13.2
RDO-1 three thousand, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:59:15.2
HOT-2 three thousand set.
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14:59:17.0
HOT-1 three set.
14:59:19.0
HOT-2 flaps two.
14:59:25.8
HOT-1 flaps two. it's not an ILS if the glideslope is
unusable.
14:59:29.4
HOT-2 how can it be quarter mile visibility?
14:59:31.1
HOT-2 should I ** put the flaps two down yet?
14:59:34.6
HOT-1 what's that?
14:59:35.4
HOT-2 I shouldn't have flaps two yet.
14:59:36.8
APR2 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight turn left heading three
five zero.
14:59:41.2
RDO-1 left three five zero, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
14:59:46.6
HOT-1 it's not an ILS if there's no glideslope.
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14:59:48.8
HOT-2 exactly, it's a localizer.
14:59:50.8
HOT-1 yeah.
14:59:58.5
HOT-2 localizer.
15:00:02.1
HOT-1 we can still shoot it?
15:00:03.8
APR2 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, turn left heading
three zero zero. intercept the runway two eight
localizer.
15:00:08.4
RDO-1 three zero zero intercept two eight localizer,
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
15:00:11.3
HOT-2 three zero, zero to intercept.
15:00:16.5
HOT-1 roger.
15:00:20.5
HOT-2 flaps three.
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15:00:22.3
HOT-1 flaps three.
15:00:25.4
HOT-2 wonder why they put it on two eight without a
local, glide slope if it's uh...?
15:00:28.5
HOT-1 I don't know.
15:00:29.8
HOT-2 ILS....
15:00:29.9
APR2 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, seven miles from
PARMA. maintain three thousand 'til established on
the localizer. cleared ILS runway two eight approach,
glideslope unusable.
15:00:40.4
HOT-1 what 'til established, three thousand?
15:00:41.7
HOT-2 three thousand.
15:00:42.7
RDO-1 three thousand 'til established, cleared ILS two eight,
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
15:00:48.8
HOT-1 [sound of coughs]
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15:00:52.2
APR2 Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, maintain one eight
zero knots 'til PARMA. contact tower now one two
four point five.
15:00:58.8
RDO-1 one eighty 'til PARMA and twenty-four five good day,
Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
15:01:02.1
APR2 good day.
15:01:03.5
HOT-1 [sound of coughs]
15:01:08.9
RDO-1 tower good afternoon, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight
uh um, localizer to two eight.
15:01:15.1
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Cleveland tower,
runway two eight, cleared to land. wind three one
zero at one two. braking action reported fair.
15:01:22.8
RDO-1 cleared to land two eight, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-
eight.
15:01:26.2
HOT-1 this is just, feels wrong.
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15:01:28.3
HOT-2 yeah, something's # up.
15:01:29.4
HOT-2 so while we're eight miles from the runway so
eight tenths * twenty-four hundred.
15:01:31.9
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
15:01:33.8
CAM [sound of tone similar to altitude alerter]
15:01:34.8
HOT-2 twenty-four hundred plus eight hundred, thirty-two
hundred so we should be about thirty-two hundred
feet.
15:01:38.8
HOT-1 we need to go down a lot faster.
15:01:42.6
HOT-2 flaps three.
15:01:44.1
HOT-1 we're already at three.
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15:01:44.9
HOT-2 all right, you know what, gear down, landing
checklist.
15:01:47.6
HOT-1 gear down.
15:01:48.2
CAM [sound similar to landing gear being operated]
15:01:50.1
HOT-1 [sound of multiple coughs]
15:01:51.1
CAM [sound of two hi-lo chimes]
15:01:56.7
HOT-1 I got ground contact.
15:01:59.6
HOT-1 okay, they're just....
15:02:01.0
HOT-2 glideslope capture.
15:02:02.7
HOT-1 yeah.
15:02:05.8
HOT-1 uuh.
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15:02:07.8
HOT-1 flight attendants notified EICAS check. landing
gear verified down three green.
15:02:10.5
HOT-2 down three green, flaps five, set V approach.
below the line.
15:02:16.6
HOT-? oops.
15:02:22.9
HOT-1 flaps verified five.
15:02:24.3
HOT-2 five.
15:02:25.0
HOT-1 landing checklist complete.
15:02:25.0
TWRC runway two eight RVR is two thousand two hundred.
15:02:29.7
HOT-1 are we inside the marker?
15:02:31.5
HOT-2 uuuh, yep.
15:02:32.1
HOT-1 yep.
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15:02:35.4
HOT-2 what'd he say it'd up to, anyway?
15:02:39.1
HOT-1 we're inside the marker, we can keep going.
15:02:41.8
HOT-1 this is # up.
15:02:45.9
HOT-2 if we have to go around, go around TOGA. flaps
two, positive rate, gear up. heading or FMS nav.
tell tower, flaps one, flaps up.
15:02:54.6
HOT-1 I'm gonna go ahead and.... tell 'em I missed up
here.
15:03:01.6
HOT-1 [sound of several coughs]
15:03:03.8
HOT-2 localizer's captured, glideslope's captured.
15:03:12.6
TWRC and runway two eight RVR now is two thousand.
15:03:16.4
HOT-2 Jesus....
15:03:17.7
HOT-1 gotta be fun.
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15:03:28.1
HOT-1 gotta have twenty four to shoot, the fricken ILS.
15:03:35.0
HOT-1 thousand feet.
15:03:41.3
HOT-1 we're cleared to land.
15:03:46.5
HOT-1 [sound of multiple coughs]
15:03:54.2
HOT-1 gettin' some ground contact on the sides. nothing
out front.
15:04:04.6
HOT-1 sound of multiple coughs]
15:04:29.1
HOT-1 five hundred bug, sinking five hundred.
15:04:40.4
HOT-1 why the hell is it turning?
15:04:43.0
HOT-2 the winds.
15:04:44.4
HOT-1 shifting?
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15:04:46.4
HOT-2 yeah.
15:04:46.4
HOT-3 approaching minimums.
15:04:48.8
HOT-1 [sound of cough]
15:04:49.1
HOT-2 Jesus.
15:04:52.6
HOT-3 two hundred, minimums....
15:04:53.6
HOT-1 I got the lights....
15:04:54.5
HOT-3 . ..minimums.
15:04:54.7
HOT-2 ..and continuing.
15:04:57.6
HOT-1 runway lights are in sight.
15:05:04.8
HOT-1 I can't see the runway dude, let's go.
15:05:06.3
HOT-2 I got the end of the runway.
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15:05:07.1
HOT-3 fifty....
15:05:07.4
HOT-1 you've got the runway?
15:05:08.0
HOT-1 yeah, there's the runway, got it.
15:05:08.9
HOT-3 forty. auto-pilot, auto-pilot.
15:05:12.7
HOT-3 thirty.
15:05:12.8
HOT-1 holy #.
15:05:14.7
HOT-3 ten.
15:05:19.3
HOT-2 oh # dude.
15:05:24.7
HOT-1 oh #.
15:05:28.9
CAM [sound of touchdown]
15:05:32.7
HOT-1 two reverse.
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15:05:39.1
HOT-1 oh #.
15:05:40.8
HOT-2 #.
15:05:42.4
HOT-2 oh #... no... [sound of gasp]
15:05:46.3
HOT-2 [sound of groan]... #.
15:05:50.3
CAM [sound of numerous impacts and rumbling noise
for seven seconds]
15:05:51.7
CAM-3 landing gear.
15:05:54.6
CAM [sound of numerous chimes start and continue for
fifty seconds]
15:05:56.7
CAM [sound similar to aircraft coming to a stop]
15:05:57.7
HOT-2 #.
15:06:01.9
HOT-2 #.
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15:06:03.7
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, say status.
15:06:09.3
CAM-? #.
15:06:22.7
CAM-2 #.
15:06:29.8
CAM-2 oh #.
15:06:34.6
CAM-2 * get ahold of anybody?
15:06:43.7
CAM-2 #.
15:06:51.9
CAM-? **.
15:06:51.9
CAM-1 everybody okay?
15:06:52.5
CAM-? yeah.
15:06:57.3
CAM-1 see if you can call and get some*.
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:07:01.3
RDO-2 tower, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
15:07:03.6
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, say your status.
15:07:06.2
RDO-2 yeah, we're off the runway through the fence uh,
everybody seems to be okay on board.
15:07:10.7
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight roger. equipment's
on the way.
15:07:14.3
RDO-2 thank you.
15:09:02.6
CAM-2 yes, everybody's okay, right?
15:09:03.9
CAM-? yes.
15:09:04.1
CAM-2 everybody's okay. I'm calling the company now.
15:09:08.3
CAM-1 you wanna tell them braking action is nil?
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:09:09.7
CAM-2 braking action is no, none at all.
15:09:27.8
CAM-2 [one side of a cell phone conversation between
First Officer and company official] man, I can't
believe we had the runway at the very last second
* runway , the lights and went in and then I landed
*** blowing. then I landed and put the brakes on
and saw the end of the fence and said what? put
the brakes ** turn to.... [cell phone conversation
continues]
15:09:41.1
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, tower.
15:09:52.9
CAM-2 full b, uh full right? full, seventy.
15:10:05.9
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, tower.
15:10:10.2
RDO-1 go ahead.
15:10:11.1
TWRC do you know the uh, number of persons on board?
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:10:15.4
RDO-1 seventy plus four crew.
15:10:17.7
TWRC seventy plus four crew, thank you.
15:10:19.4
RDO-1 and the braking action is nil.
15:10:21.7
TWRC got that.
15:10:22.8
CF-2 **** everybody's o, everybody's okay, uh they got
equipment coming on board, ** we went, ** the last
second, landed, it's really windy, high snow, no
braking action. we went right through a fence. **
landing gear's broken, I know that.... everybody's
good, everybody's fine... uuh we were on two eight.
they it changed two eight, from two four left. the glide
slope was working, the glide slope was working, came
in....
15:10:58.1
CF-2 and uh, real windy, like I said, the last second we got
the runway, landed. *** no braking action at all. slip,
slip, slip, slip, turn plan to the end. we couldn't we
went off the embankment through a fence and on to a
side road. the uh NASA, hold on, the NASA or
NTSB's here. hold on just a second....
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
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15:11:15.1
CAM [sound of two chimes]
15:11:17.7
CAM-2 who are you guys, NASA?
15:11:19.7
CF-2 ...yeah, NASA's here already. 'cause they were sitting
at the end of the runway watching **. And they said
we came out of nowhere. they couldn't see us or
anything.... nobody's hurt.... yeah...
15:11:45.7
CF-2 *****.... okay.
15:12:00.1
CAM-1 are they gonna, they trying to deplane us do you know?
15:12:02.4
CAM-? ** I have not idea.
15:12:04.6
CAM-2 we get to get a hold of *, we have to get a hold of
the people and find out what they want us to do.
15:12:08.4
RDO-1 and tower, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.
15:12:10.6
CAM-2 *****.
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:12:11.2
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, go ahead.
15:12:12.5
CAM-? *****.
15:12:13.4
RDO-1 know if you have any transportation for passengers
headed this way?
15:12:16.2
CF-2 …* it's just a freak thing **** the runway, *** the
runway. and I landed* kinda windy, I was trying to like
** centerline. couldn't see the centerline. soon as I
landed I put the brakes on, no brakes at all. just
slip, slip, slip, slip, oh oh, my God **** runway.
***freaking out, I knew we crash **....
15:12:18.0
TWRC I just know the uh, vehicles are out there. stand by, I'll
see what they got.
15:12:23.6
CAM [sound of two chimes]
15:12:43.9
CF-2 ... yeah everybody’s okay. nobody's hurt.... I don't
know. ***.... how long ago ****? ten minutes ago, five
minutes ago?
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TIME (EST) TIME (EST)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:12:56.8
CAM-1 five minutes ago.
15:12:57.7
CF-2 …five minutes ago, yeah.... yeah.... okay.... ***....
yeah.
15:13:26.7
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, they're working on
getting the vehicles out there for the uh, passengers.
they should be there shortly.
15:13:33.0
RDO-1 okay, thanks a lot.
15:13:35.6
CAM-? They’re working on some transportation to get
everybody off the airplane.
15:13:39.7
TWRC and can you say what you're uh, tail number is?
15:13:42.4
RDO-1 say again?
15:13:43.3
TWRC what's the uh, N number?
15:13:44.7
RDO-1 eight six two Romeo Whiskey.
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:13:46.7
TWRC eight six two Romeo Whiskey, thanks.
15:13:59.8
RDO-1 and uh, we would like some medical assistance just in
case out here.
15:14:04.7
PA-5 ladies and gentlemen right now the Captain is uh,
in communication with the airport ***** how long it's
going to be but they're working on it right now. ******
so if anyone needs to be checked out or just wants to
be checked real quick both of those um, should be
coming soon but we're not sure just when.
15:14:08.9
TWRC and the vehicles are out there. they, should have that
capability.
15:14:43.5
PA-5 is there anyone here who would like to see
a paramedic?.... okay thank you.
15:14:44.7
CF-2 ***** said not good on the landing. and then when we
landed it was like none. as soon as we touched down
**** and all of a sudden I see the runway pushed the
brakes more and more and more and ***** try to steer
it ****. I just kept sliding and sliding and sliding **
right, down an bank and right into a fence *** hear the
bang....
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:15:08.1
CAM [several unintelligible comments between crewmembers]
15:15:21.8
CAM-? oh God.... #.
15:15:34.0
CF-2 …yes....*******....
15:15:43.3
CAM-1 I think we should have went around.
they said, they said the braking action was fair.
15:15:49.9
CF-2 they said the braking was fair? **** not good…
15:15:54.1
CAM-1 no, we wouldn't have landed then.
15:15:56.6
CF-2 they said braking was fair.
15:16:00.2
CAM-? everybody all right inside?
15:16:02.1
CAM-1 nobody wants ***.
15:16:02.9
CF2 ***** runway ***.... all right....
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& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
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15:16:13.1
CAM [several unintelligible comments from outside the cockpit]
15:16:23.6
CAM-1 you want us to just blow the slides?
15:16:25.8
CAM-? *.
15:16:26.4
CAM-1 blow the slides?
15:16:27.8
CAM-? *.
15:16:29.0
CAM-? uh, probably better do it out the back.
15:16:33.0
CAM-? is it?
15:16:34.8
CAM-? I'm just worried about the ***.
15:16:37.2
CAM-? how about the other side. we got ****.
15:16:44.8
CAM-2 the fence *****.
15:16:48.9
CAM [knocking sound]
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15:16:50.8
CAM [sound similar to cockpit window being opened]
15:16:52.7
CAM-? can you blow that door ***side?
15:16:54.3
CAM-? yep.
15:16:55.2
CF-2 **** the slide now one the.... yeah ** want 'em to do
that? Hold on, hold on ***. only way to get our ** a
fence on the side of the plane *****....
15:16:58.7
CAM [sound of two chimes]
15:17:39.0
TWRC Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, I have another
question.
15:17:42.3
RDO-1 go ahead.
15:17:43.1
TWRC what was your departure point?
15:17:45.1
RDO-1 Atlanta.
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15:17:46.0
TWRC thank you.
15:17:49.8
CF-2 ... no, just one....
15:18:22.2
CF-2 ... yeah * fire trucks here *******.
15:18:30.9
CAM-? you all alright?
15:18:32.5
CAM-1 yeah, I don't think anybody wants any assistance **.
15:18:48.8
CF-2 yeah, I think my body's in shock ***. hold on, ****.
15:18:59.8
CAM-? we've asked, nobody needs any ***.
15:19:04.1
CF-2 ... ****....
15:19:16.3
END of TRANSCRIPT
END of RECORDING
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174
Ap p e n d i x C
sH u t t l e Am e r i C A ’s At t e n d A n C e po l i C y
8-1
Associate Handbook
Chapter 8 Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
Chautautauqua Airlines
Republic Airlines
Shuttle America
Chapter 8
Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
This policy supersedes and replaces all prior absence or attendance / tardiness poli-
cies and procedures. The following guidelines, in this section, may not
be applicable
to all associates. Associates are to refer to their Collective Bargaining Agreement
where applicable.
A. Introduction / Statement of Policy:
We believe our associates are committed to coming to work on a regular schedule and
on time. It is each associate's responsibility to report to work on time each day and to
work the full scheduled workday or shift. We also recognize that associates experi-
ence sickness on occasion or are late to work for reasons beyond their control.
Tracking attendance, absences or tardiness is not intended to reflect negatively on any
associate. Absences / tardiness are noted only to ensure that in rare instances of
excessive absenteeism from the job associates are treated impartially and with fair-
ness. For this reason, we have an Attendance and Tardiness Policy. The program is
designed to encourage good attendance and provide a measure for fair treatment for
any associate who is absent or late for work excessively.
In addition, this policy is designed to educate associates regarding their continuing
obligation to report for and complete their scheduled shift and to return to work as
expeditiously as possible after an absence. All associates are expected to return to
active status after any absence or leave as soon as they are capable of resuming their
job duties - even in the event they can return to work for a remaining portion of their
scheduled shift. Associates are required to personally contact
their Supervisor or,
where applicable, Crew Scheduling (Flight Crew Members) as soon as possible
regarding their absence or tardiness. If the associate's Supervisor is unavailable, they
should contact their Supervisor's Manager.
Attendance / tardiness records are not part of an associate's personnel record unless
disciplinary action is necessary. The actual attendance record will be maintained by
each associate's immediate Supervisor / Manager.
Any Associate that abuses or takes advantage of "playing the system" of this policy
could be subject to corrective action up to and including termination. Some examples
of "playing the system" are calling in sick prior to a vacation or holiday or swap day, a
pattern of sick days during the week, taking days off under the guise of illness or not
receiving an approved vacation then calling in sick. This includes a pattern of atten-
dance issues as soon as an occurrence has dropped off.
REV. 11, 01 AUG 2006
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Accident Report
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8-2
Associate Handbook
Chapter 8 Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
Chautautauqua Airlines
Republic Airlines
Shuttle America
B. Occurrences of Absenteeism / Tardiness:
The focus of this program shall be frequency of "occurrences" of absenteeism / tardi-
ness based on a cumulative occurrence system. An occurrence shall be a continuous
absence from scheduled duty or reporting late to work. Occurrences of absenteeism /
tardiness will vary in duration according to the nature of the event, and may range from
6 minutes (tardiness) to several weeks or more for a single event within a rolling
twelve-month period. (Example: Reporting late for a scheduled duty REV. 5, 3 MAR
2003shift or an entire day's absence for a cold is one occurrence. Three consecutive
day's absence due to having the flu shall be one occurrence or event).
Occurrences of Absenteeism / Tardiness
Occurrences for absenteeism / tardiness shall occur and accumulate, within an active
rolling twelve - month period, when the following occurs:
Tardiness / Lateness - 1 occurrence
:An associate reports more than 5 minutes late
but less than 2 hours for a scheduled duty shift or fails to complete the scheduled shift.
Absenteeism / Sick Call - 1 occurrence
: An associate is absent from scheduled work
(more than 2 hours) or scheduled duty shift. Associate fails to return to work from vaca-
tion or leave on the day and time set for return. A Pilot or Flight Attendant that is absent
for a scheduled duty assignment, incurs a missed trip event or reports to the Company
that he/she is unavailable during a scheduled day of reserve prior to contact by the
Company.
No Call / No Show - 4 occurrences
: An associate fails to return to work from vacation
or leave on the day and time set for return (fails to call or show) or associate fails to
show or call for scheduled duty shift. Two (2) consecutive days without authorization
or no call / no show notification to management will be considered a voluntary termina-
tion. The only exception for an associate unable to "no call / no show" is if they are
personally hospitalized.
REV. 11, 01 AUG 2006
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Accident Report
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8-3
Associate Handbook
Chapter 8 Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
Chautautauqua Airlines
Republic Airlines
Shuttle America
C. Absences / Tardiness Non - Chargeable under this Policy:
Republic Airways recognizes that some reasons for absence are appropriately
excluded from being counted towards disciplinary action. Therefore, absences for the
following reasons shall not be counted, provided proper documentation is produced
and approved in advance of the event, as occurrences of absenteeism / tardiness:
• Funeral / Bereavement Leave- limits and procedures as stated in Associate
Handbook.
• Jury Duty.
• Court Subpoena - civil or criminal cases in which associate is not a named party.
• Approved Military Leave.
• Workers' Compensation injuries or illnesses which has been filed and approved.
• Approved Family Medical Leave (FMLA).
• Approved Short Term Disability.
• Approved Vacation Leave or time off (paid or unpaid).
• Lack of work or emergency closing or layoff.
Note: Days missed or tardiness / late arrivals for a scheduled shift due to
previous overtime, road trips, scheduled training classes, weather
conditions or individual or facility / business conditions will be
handled on an individual basis as approved by the Supervisor or
Manager of the Department. Serious illness or injury may also be
excluded; depending on the circumstances and as approved by the
Supervisor or Manager of the Department with copies to the Vice
President of the Department and the Human Resources Director.
D. Progressive Policy
The disciplinary process is progressive in nature but may be implemented or
accelerated at any step, including termination, depending upon the severity of the sit-
uation. Example: In the case of a no call - no show and an associate's failure to prop-
erly notify their Supervisor / Manager of absence pursuant to this policy for a period of
two or more days, termination will be warranted on the first offense or considered a vol-
untary quit.
REV. 11, 01 AUG 2006
Appendixes
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AIRCRAFT
Accident Report
177
8-4
Associate Handbook
Chapter 8 Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
Chautautauqua Airlines
Republic Airlines
Shuttle America
E. Excessive Events of Absenteeism / Tardiness - Corrective
Action:
Time Period Number of Occurrences
Within Previous 4 6 7 8
12 Months Verbal Written Final/Suspension Termination
Step #1- Verbal Warning: After the accumulation of 4 occurrences
of tardiness/
absenteeism as defined in this policy within an active rolling twelve-month period, the
associate will be notified by their Supervisor / Manager that their attendance is a prob-
lem that needs their corrective attention. In addition, during this discussion, the Atten-
dance / Tardiness Policy will be reviewed, and a copy provided to the associate, to
ensure the associate understands the policy and the disciplinary steps that will be
taken if absences / tardiness continue. The associate is to sign that they have received
a copy of our Attendance Policy. This First Warning and signature of receipt of this pol-
icy will be forwarded to the Human Resources Department and placed in their person-
nel file.
Step #2 - Written Warning; After accumulating 6 occurrences of tardiness
/ absen-
teeism within an active rolling twelve-month period from the date of the action, a disci-
plinary letter will be issued to the associate that their attendance is at an unacceptable
level and that it requires their immediate attention to correct it. This letter will warn of
further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment if absences
or tardiness continue. This Written Warning Letter will be placed in their personnel file.
If associate completes 6 months of perfect attendance after receiving a written warning
they will have 1 occurrence removed from their record.
Step #3 - Final Warning/Suspension: when an associate incurs 7 occurrences
of
tardiness/absenteeism in an active rolling twelve-month period from the date of the
action. The associate will be issued a final written warning letter that their tardiness or
attendance continues to be at an unacceptable level which will include a disciplinary
suspension of three unpaid days off
as determined by Management. The associate
must realize that this is the last
warning before termination. This Final Warning Letter
will be placed in their personnel file.
Step #4 - Discharge or Termination: If the associate has failed to correct their absen-
teeism / tardiness after receiving a first written warning, a second written warning, and
a final warning of termination with suspension, the associate will be subject to termina-
tion of employment with Republic Airways, Inc. or if the associate accumulates 8
occurrences.
F. Absence / Tardy Notification
Associates must personally (not spouses, relatives or others) contact their
immediateSupervisor or their Supervisor's Manager or where applicable Crew
Scheduling prior to the beginning of your scheduled shift if it will be necessary for the
associate to be absent or late to work. Upon returning to their scheduled shift, associ-
ates are required to report to their immediate Supervisor (with their time card - where
applicable) to discuss their absence / tardiness with their Manager. If the associate
knows in advance that they will be absent, notification to their Manager should be
made as far in advance as possible.
REV. 11, 01 AUG 2006
Appendixes
National Transportation Safety Board
AIRCRAFT
Accident Report
178
8-5
Associate Handbook
Chapter 8 Attendance/Tardiness
Section 1 Policy
Chautautauqua Airlines
Republic Airlines
Shuttle America
G. Management Guidelines
Associate disciplinary actions should be administered by the appropriate Super-
visor / Manager within five (five) working days after the associate returns to work
unless unusual circumstance or other business demands prevail. Any level of disci-
pline shall be reviewed and approved by the appropriate Supervisor's Manager prior to
communications with the associate. Management has the discretion to suspend (with
or without pay) pending investigation of the associate before termination.
Note: The appropriate Vice President of the Department must approve all
terminations prior to notification with the associate by any
Supervisor or Manager. In advance, the Human Resource Director
should be notified of any termination.
REV. 11, 01 AUG 2006
