The Centrality of Elites

The Centrality

of Elites

FREDO ARIAS-KING

n the 1970s, a doctoral student in the economics department at Harvard could

not understand a case study in which two aluminum factories with the same assets

produced different outputs. "The tools to understand this were completely absent in

the economics profession," he mentioned later. His professor suggested that he might

find the answer across the river at the business school, which he did. The main rea-

son for the discrepancy turned out to be the management of the enterprises.

Although it never claimed to be a science, not even a dismal one, the Sovi-

etological profession has suffered from similar shortcomings, such as an inabili-

ty to predict the imminent collapse of the USSR. Likewise, the debate on the rea-

sons for the successes and failures ^of the postcommunist transitions at the time

also seems to be deficient. As economics has, since the 1970s, learned much from

management studies, so too should our profession. Renowned management guru

Peter Drucker has noted that psychology is a central ingredient in management

studies and in the management of corporations. The personality traits of the man-

agers are routinely taken into account. Sovietology, transitology, and more specif-

ically, political science and diplomacy should consider doing what has been obvi-

ous to journalists and other casual observers of the East-Central European

transitions and emphasize more the personal background and motivations of the

leaders.' This could go a long way in explaining those transitions and the per-

formance of their governments. It could provide a framework to explain not only

what happened in the last thirteen years but also what might happen when

Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Turkrnenistan, and others begin their political and

economic transitions.

For example, can any other factor besides quality of leadership and management

explain the different performances of the transitions in Estonia and Latvia, perhaps

the two most similar countries in the region when their simultaneous transitions

began (see table 1)? Could the differences in governance and quality of govemment

in tum explain the difference in economic performance of both Baltic neighbors?

Fredo Arias-King is the founder of

Demokratizatsiya.

His books include

Svohoda-Slobo-

da: Czechoslovakia's Road to Freedom

(1990) and

Transiciones a la democracia: Las lec-

ciones de Europa del Este

(forthcoming). He is grateful to his parents, who are both psy-

chologists, and te Eugene Huskey, Peter Rutland, and Harley Balzer for very useful

comments en an earlier draft.

150

The Centrality of Elites

TABLE

1. Rankings

of Quality of Governance in Two Baltic Countries

151

Estonia

Latvia

Honestye

Institutional performanceb

Economic freedomu

Property rightsa

Quality of legal draftinga

Quality of judiciarya

"State capture" (inverted)a

FDI per-capitab

$ 1,337

$ 1,027

Human developmente

Ease of bureaucratic permitsa

Burcaucratic honestya

Country risk (inverted)r

"Transition: The First Ten Years

(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002),61-63,106; World

Development Report 1997: Private Sector Survey <www.worldbank.org>, questions 12a, 14.

°Transition Report 2000

(London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

2000), 21;

Transition Report Update: April 2001

(London: European Bank for Reconstruc-

tion and Development, 2001), 22.

°Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 <www.transparency.org>.

dGerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick,

2001 índex qf Econom-

ic Freedoni

(Washington, DC and New York: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and

Company, 2001), 18-9.

'United Nations Development Programme,

Hunían Development Report2001

<www.undp.org>,

14.

fEconomist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service <www.eiu.org>.

5Number of postcommunist countries in each study.

FIGURE 1: Economic Growth in Estonia and Latvia

120

100

o 80

u 60

rn 40

Estonia

Latvia

rn rn rn rn rn rn rn m m ó ó

rn °' rn rn rn rn rn rn °' N0 O

r- r r .-- N

152

DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

Whereas the Estonian democrats in 1992 fully committed themselves to breaking

with the past, with Soviet institutions, personnel, and economic practices, in Latvia

the democrats and the nomenklatura essentially fused into "Latvia's Way," the party

that has governed the country for most of its post-Soviet period. Are Estonia and

Latvia like the paradox of the two aluminum factories, especially since both are

perceived to have applied similar macroeconomic policies? Surprise-there really

are no tools in the economic profession (nor perhaps in transitology) to explain the

paradox, although amateur observers of the Baltic transitions can readily point out

the reasons.

The Nomenklatura Phenomenon

The mismanagement of transitions appears to be dure not to lack of technical

skills, as the IMF seems to assume, but to negative human capital and simple sab-

otage, as J. Michael Waller, Marsha.ll Goldman, Anders Aslund, and others have

insisted from the beginning. The reasons for this behavior, however, are rarely

explored. A more elaborate study needs to be conducted on the psychology of the

nomenklatura. It seems that a seque] to Michael Voslensky's classic book

Nomen-

klatura: The Soviet Ruling Class

is in order, perhaps called

Nomenklatura: A Psy-

chology of Power and Crime.

A few authors have noticed the parallels between the structure and behavior

of communist parties

in the Russian

region and those of criminal

organizations

in the United States and Palermo. To understand this phenomenon, we should note

that of the ten personality disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric Asso-

ciation (APA), the label "psychopath" or "antisocial," which is normally found in

less than 2 percent of a general population, is over-represented among convicted

criminals. The APA defines the antisocial personality disorder as

fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior ...

such as

destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing ¡Ilegal occupations. Per-

sons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are

frequently deceitful and

manipulative

in order to

gain personal

profit or pleasure.

... They may repeatedly

lie, use an alias

, con others, or malinger.... They may

have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated,

self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite

voluble and verbally facile.2

"Lack of empathy," "inflated self-appraisal," and "superficial charm" are traits seen

in the Bolshevik ethos as the "vanguard of society," their use of any means to

achieve power, their fondness for

provokatsiya

and pathological lying, their disre-

gard of basic human dignity, and their impassioned and seductive rhetoric on social

welfare, equality, and peace.

Considering that carly Bolsheviks and their cheka drew both resources and

personnel disproportionately from criminal activity, it can be speculated that per-

haps a large number of antisocials also found themselves inside the

communist

parties and their repressive apparatuses. The Bolshevik and chekist modus

operandi, their violent philosophies, and their promises of getting rich quickly

(through theft of their victims' property) perhaps encouraged continued recruit-

ment of antisocials through self-selection from the population at large.

The Centrality of Elites 153

It may not be exaggerated to assume that the same individual who finds him-

self attracted to criminality in a democratic country would in another context be

attracted to the NKVD or KGB, and in yet another to the Gestapo. The anecdotal

evidence that Benito Mussolini's fascists readily converted themselves to com-

munists immediately after his fall perhaps is indicative of this phenomenon. In

East-Central Europe, most if not all of the leaders that adopted the language of

violente tojustify authoritarian governments and interethnic or intersectarian con-

flict hail from the former communist parties or their political police structures.

They include such figures as Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia; Rakhmon Nabiev,

Immomali Rakhmonov, and Safarali Kenjaev in Tajikistan; and Franjo Tudjman

in Croatia, among others. Xenophobic leaders also include Vladimir Zhirinovsky

and Alexander Barkashov in Russia, both of whom have been suspected of hail-

ing from the former KGB (see tables 2 and 3). Organized crime has also been

widely tied to these structures.3

Of course, not all the members of the communist parties could be suspected of

suffering from antisocial personality disorder, though it would not be surprising

TABLE 2.

Some "

Heroes

of the Transitions

Person

Country

New task

Old job

L. Walesa

POL

President

Electrician

V. Havel

CZS-CZR

President

Playwright

M. Laar

EST

Prime Minister

Historian

L. Meri

EST

President

Cinematographer

J. Manitski

EST

Property

Commission

Manager of rock banda

V. Landsbergis

LIT

President

Musicologist

V. Vike-Freiberga

LAT

President

Professor°

G. Starovoitova

RUS

Party leader

Sociologist

L. Ponomarev

RUS

Party leader

Physicist

J. Basta

CZS-CZR

Lustration

commission

Archaeologist

A. Goncz

HUN

President Writer

J. Gauck

GDR

Lustration

commission

Lutheran minister

J. Antall

HUN

Prime Minister

Historian

L. Peterle

SVN

Prime Minister

Environmentalist

V. Adamkus

LIT

President

U.S. public servanú

F. Dimitrov

BUL

Prime Minister

Lawyer

1. Kostov

BUL

Prime Minister

Professor

T. Mazowiecki

POL

Prime Minister

Catholic intellectual

S. Grigoryants

RUS

Human rights NGO

Gulag prisoner

B. Djelic

SER

Finance Minister

Consultante

M. Panic

SER

Prime Minister

Businessman

N. Kljusev

MAC

Prime Minister

Economics professor

'In exile.

154

DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

TABLE3. Some

"Villains

of the Transitions

Person

Country

New task Old job

S. Milosevic

YUG

President

Leader in CP

A. Lukashenka

BEL

President

Soviet kolkhoz leader

L. Kravchuk

UKR

President

First sec., CP

L. Kuchma

UKR

President

Enterprise director, CP

P. Lazarenko

UKR

Prime Minister

Leader in KGB

V. Meciar

SLK

Prime Minister

Youth leader, CP

V. Chernomyrdin

RUS

Prime Minister

Soviet minister, CP

V. Zhirinovsky

RUS

Party leader

Collaborator, KGB

B. Yeltsin

RUS

President

First sec., CP

N. Nazarbaev

KAZ

President

First sec., CP

S. Niyazov

TUR

President

First sec., CP

H. Aliev

AZE

President

Politburo CP

I. Iliescu

RUM

President

Politburo CP

M. Snegur

MOL

President

First sec., CP

P. Lucinschi

MOL

President

Central Committee, CP

1. Karimov UZB

President

First sec., CP

R. Nabiev

TAJ

President

First sec., CP

1. Rakhmonov

TAJ

President

Soviet kolkhoz leader

V. Gerashchenko

RUS

Central Banker

Ye. Primakov

RUS

Prime Minister

Leader in KGB

V. Cherkessov

RUS

Super-governor

Dissident-hunter, KGB

V. Barannikov

RUS

Minister of Interior

Official in CP

V. Kebich

BEL

Prime Minister

Official in CP

Zh. Videnov

BUL

Prime Minister

Official in CP

Note.

CP = Communist Party.

if the figure exceeded the 2 pereent: found in the general population. Such parties

also attracted a range of individuals, from those longing for career advancement

(the so-called careerists), to those resisting foreign occupation, to those perhaps

genuinely supportive of the overt aims of communist power. Some communist

reformers and postcommunist leaders, such as Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia,

Mikhail Gorbachev and Vadim Ba.katin in the USSR, Stanislau Shushkevich in

Belarus, and Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland, among others, come to mind as con-

structive leaders. However, they are in a minority, and why they acted different-

ly than the majority of their former comrades defies simple explanation, though

perhaps it was because many of them were making their careers outside the party

structures (in physics like Shushkevich, or in construction like Bakatin).

What about the group comprising figures such as Alexander Kwasniewski,

Gyu1a Horn, Janez Drnovsek, Ilir Meta, Algirdas Brazauskas, and the other for-

mer communists who defeated democratic or semidemocratic governments in

the mid-1990s but did not return their countries to authoritarianism? Their "con-

version to civility" may Nave been more the result of their predecessors' dam-

The Centrality of Elites 155

aging the communist structures enough to prevent a return to the past. Their

rebirth as social democrats may have been perceived merely as the correct polit-

ical strategy

which it indeed was. The main factor differentiating this group from

those ex-communists who returned to power and reversed constitutionality and

economic reform was the actions taken by the prior democratic government.

Where democrats had forgotten to dismantle the structures they inherited, a

return to authoritarianism and a form of "crony socialism

proved to be less cost-

ly and more beneficial for the former communists

Kwasniewski and Brazauskas

did not follow the path of Heydar Aliev in Azerbaijan and of Alexander

Lukashenka in Belarus probably because they

could not.

In any case

that

conversion

to civility"

may have been relative. Witness the

allegations that Brazauskas conspired with Russian elements to cut off the gas

supply to his own country right before the 1992 elections to embarrass his con-

tender, President Vytautas Landsbergis

or that Kwasniewski refounded his com-

munist party with KGB funds. Extraconstitutional acts of this magnitude simply

are not associated with noncommunist governments and forces.

The lack of emphasis on elite psychology in our field perhaps explains Richard

Pipes's adage that

Sovietology is the only profession where the more one stud-

ies, the less one understands

U.S. president Ronald Reagan's rookie perception

of Soviet elite psychology was more correct in the end than practically anything

Sovietology had produced until then

Reagan seemed to vindicate the truism that

communist leaders understand and respect those who

get tough

with them and

disdain those who attempt appeasement

This personality trait also can be leen in

what has been defined as the "psychic masochist," a person who is "painfully sub-

missive lo a `stronger

person, and as painfully brutal and arrogant towards a

1weaker.

4 Although communism and fascism are often interpreted as opposite

ideologies, perhaps they should begin to be interpreted as the same

psychology.5

Transitology's Red Herrings

Following the transitions more in terms of the professional backgrounds of the

actual leaders could also help shed light on two ongoing debates in transitology:

the merits of shock therapy versus gradualism, and the merits of presidential ver-

sus parliamentary systems. For over a decade now, scholars have argued the

kto

vinovat

(who is to blame) of Russia's perceived failure in economic reform, and

the main culprit is generally seen as the "big bang" or shock therapy model of

stabilization and liberalization that in theory began in 1992.

However, what if Russia's economic reforms and shock therapy had been man-

aged instead by noncommunist yet competent forces, say, a Russian equivalent

of Mart Laar or Ivan Kostov? Would the outcome have been different than that

produced by the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (CPSU regional first secretary), the

government of Yegor Gaidar (editor of the journal

Kommunist),

and the central

bank of Viktor Gerashchenko (Soviet central banker)? If Yevgeny Primakov's

renamed First Directorate of the KGB had not siphoned off the government's gold

and hard currency reserves to Luxembourg in 1990-9 1, would the rutile have col-

lapsed as dramatically?

156

DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

As in Russia, the Mexican financial crisis of late 1994 has often been blamed

on the "free-market policies" or the "neoliberalism" of President Carlos Salinas.

But instead of blaming some econornic model, why not simply emphasize Sali-

nas's background in the dictatorial structures and his family's history of thievery,

or in other words, that "his privatization strategy consisted in giving away state

assets to his personal friends, thereby creating sub-optimal market conditions"?

Or that "he played with macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate in

order to keep his kleptokratic party in power."e Although journalists routinely

describe events this way, the IMF never does, and usually academics don't either.

In fact, the IMF held up Salinas's m.acroeconomic reforms as the "poster child."

To begin with, scholars should perhaps abandon the tired dichotomy between

capitalism and socialism, or between right and left, and concentrate more on the

dichotomy between well-managed economic freedom and crony capitalism. The

debate about the perceived failure of Russia could take on new meaning if we

were to search for answers less in the theoretical underpinnings of shock thera-

py and more in Gerashchenko's purposeful mismanagement of the central bank,

in Chernomyrdin's multibillion dol]lar corruption, and in Gaidar's reluctante to

liberalize trade or allow foreign banking (not to mention in Yeltsin's personnel

policies). The most powerful indicator of good management in the region is

whether or not the managers participated in the communist structures of the past.

In principie, there is nothing wrong with shock therapy. To the contrary, it can

bring prosperity when properly managed, as was seen in Poland, the Czech

Republic, and Estonia. In any case, using labels to classify the different economic

models in the region can be problernatic and misleading. That is because hardly

any of the economic transitions carne from the orthodox application of market

economics or of any one theoreticall model, but from a mixture of orthodox and

unorthodox elements, the combinat:ion of which depended on the will and crite-

ria of management. An example is Estonia's unorthodox yet commonsense poli-

cy of bankrupting mafia-ridden banks-which conrradicted advice from the

IMF-or the Czech and Polish policies of capping wages to control wage-push

inflation at the beginning of their stabilization periods. Estonia's fair and efficient

privatization, hailed by the World Bank and others as the best in the region, was

the work of Jaan Manitski, the former manager of the Swedish rock sensation

ABBA, not some "expert" from the former communist structures (they were too

busy participating in Russia's privatization). As is seen in management studies,

there is no real cookie-cutter approach to good management and no theories that

are always relevant. Some basic principies, good will, common cense, and the

character of the manager are more iimportant.

Obviously, theoretical economic models do matter, as evinced by Poland's

slightly superior performance with shock therapy vis-á-vis the gradualism

implemented by Hungary's "cabinet of historians and engineers." But both

nonetheless are broadly considered successful. Russia's reform (through an

impressive stretch of the imagination) was also classified as "shock therapy," and

Ukraine's as "gradualist," yet both are considered unsuccessful (the latter more

than the former). The question is: What if the theoretical economic model

The Centrality of Elites 157

(between shock therapy and gradualism) ends up mattering less than who actu-

ally administers it? If Kwasniewski had hijacked Poland's revolution in 1989 and

launched shock therapy, would Poland have witnessed its present miracle or

would it instead resemble Romania?

As in economics, what if the political system also mattered less than who fills

the top offices? There was a raging debate on whether presidential or parliamen-

tary systems conduced to more functioning government and democracy.1 Where-

as some have noticed more repression and authoritarian behavior in presidential

systems, and at first glance this seems true, notice what happens when we factor

in the background of the leaders, as table 4 demonstrates. In the case of East-Cen-

tral Europe, it appears that the form of government is less relevant than who ends

up filling those offices. Except for Levon Ter-Petrossian of Armenia (who used

fraud in his 1996 election), and Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia (who was

accused of acting eccentrically and undemocratically),8 there appears to be a cor-

relation that has little to do with whether a system is presidential or parliamen-

tary. Would things have improved in Moldova if Mircea Snegur's title were

"prime minister" instead?

TABLE

4. First Postcommunist Leaders

Eventually considered "authoritarian" or excessive violators of laws

or human rights; backgrounds in Communist system

Leaders in mostly

Yeltsin

Nabiev

presidential system

Iliescu

Kravchuk

Karimov

Milosevic

Niyazov

Snegur

Akaev

Tudjman

Ter-Petrossian Nazarbaev

Gamsakhurdia

Berisha

Leaders in mostly

Meciar

parliamentary system

Kebich

Not considered authoritarian or excessive violators of law

not from Communist system

Leaders in mostly

Havel ('89-'92)

presidential system

Izetbegovic

Elchibey

Leaders in mostly

Klaus

Dimitrov

parliamentary system

Laar

Peterle

Antall

Kljusev

Landsbergis

Godmanis

Mazowiecki

158 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

A theory of elites and of management may not explain why democracy comes

to a country or not, but it could shed more light on why a postcommunist country

has a successful democratic or market transition or not. Theories of path depen-

dence, civic culture, institutional design, bureaucratic politics paradigm, geography,

and so on, can go far in telling us why Uzbekistan's frail civil society has main-

tained Karimov in power rather than a figure such as Abdurahim Polat. But they

cannot explain why Azerbaijan returned to dictatorship. That reason can be found

specifically in the democratic leader Abulfaz Elchibey"s refusal to call for new par-

liamentary elections, dissolve the secret police, and shatter the old command econ-

omy and its networks, the way Havel and Laar did. In other words, Elchibey's poor

management eventually destroyed him, despite his good intentions.

Poor management can explain why Estonia and Latvia performed dissimilar-

ly, despite applying roughly the same macroeconornic reforms. The same good

will and naiveté (poor management) displayed by genuine Latvian democrats

such as Dainis Ivans when inviting the nomenklatura to participate in senior gov-

ernment posts in 1991-92 also afflicted the Rumanian poets who overthrew

Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989, only to witness the hijacking of their revolution by

Ceausescu's cronies. Elite decisions can even explai.n the sullying of the Czech

miracle. The corruption and eventual poor performance of the Czech economic

reform has been blamed on the lack of regulation and "insider dealing" in the

way state assets were privatized. Some authors have pinned the blame specifi-

cally on Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimír Dlouhy-perhaps coinciden-

tally, the one former communist that Klaus allowed in a senior post in his gov-

ernment.9 Although the voucher system has structural flaws, there is no reason

why that system, if well managed, could not have proven workable, as Manits-

ki (the rocker) demonstrated later in Estonia. As in Greek mythology, the per-

sonal flaws of the heroes in transitology have serious repercussions that no

"political science fiction"10 theories can explain.

Lessons for the Future

When facing the next postcommunist transition, the Western governments and

transitologists should learn from management studies and look at the background

of the managers. If Cuba or North Korea produces a "hijacked transition" and an

Ion Iliescu-type government, it will very likely make a difference if the pressure

is kept on (by local democrats as well as by the West) until they produce a Wale-

sa, a Havel, or a Dimitrov.

Why is this important? For one, billions of dollars could be saved. Countries

ruled by new dernocratic elites simnply did not produce multibillion dollar fortunes

for their political leaders the way Viktor Chernornyrdin's government did in Rus-

sia, Heydar Aliev's does in Azerbaijan, or Leonid Kravchuk's did in Ukraine. Sec-

ond, Che West would not be blamed consistently for the shortcomings of the transi-

tions. In the region, democratic forces are not associated with anti-Western rhetoric

or paranoid accusations. That was largely the domain of former communists.

Third, lives could be saved. As mentioned earlier, virtually all the violence in

the region was provoked by individuals and structures associated with the previ-

The Centrality of Elites 159

ous regime. The theory that "ancient hatreds" explains the violence has been dis-

puted by numerous scholars, who maintain that perhaps communist structures and

personnel needed a new way to repress and divide their opponents.

With some exceptions (i.e., Russia), the West should consider simply allowing

regimes to go bankrupt when one of their almost inevitable financia], crises occurs.

Western governments should also be more active in working with the democratic

forces in countries suffering from a hijacked transition, to case Iliescu- or

Kravchuk-type regimes out of office. Western intelligence agencies should also

assist in locating government funds looted at the end of a communist regime and

condition aid on recovering such funds, thereby strengthening the hand of the

democratic forces to act and to overcome entrenched special interests. This would

be a far cry from Strobe Talbott's policy during the Clinton administration of com-

pulsively assisting the former communists while ignoring simple requests from

genuine democrats such as Galina Starovoitova.11

Some positive signals in this direction are already emerging, such as NATO's

and the EU's unusually direct advice to the Slovak electorate on its chances at

membership if Vladimír Meciar were to be elected to power once again. The IMF

also recently took its first baby steps toward monitoring and punishing corrup-

tion in its client governments-something real bankers have been doing routine-

ly for centuries with their corporate borrowers.

In this vein, the West should also encourage lustration, or the easing of the

communist nomenklatura from positions in critical governmental and state

structures during a transition, to weaken the criminal networks and give the

democratic forces a chance to consolidate. It seems that the de facto lustration

of Estonia worked better than the more controversial de jure Czech lustration.

Spain, by the way, shares this with the successful East European transitions.

Prime Minister Felipe González, on his victory in 1982, fired from the govern-

ment forty thousand holdovers of the Franco nomenklatura and replaced them

with members of his party and other formerly unaligned elements. He not only

reinvented Spain, but he effectively decapitated the extraconstitutional struc-

tures that could have sabotaged his transition. González ruled for fourteen

years, but, as in the Czech Republic and Estonia, the renamed party of the

nomenklatura never returned to power in Spain.12 The United States also prac-

ticed a rarely noticed form of lustration. The Fourteenth Amendment of the

Constitution prohibits Confederate collaborators from participating in govern-

ment and other areas of public life. Germany carried out its denazification and

Japan its (more limited) cleansing after World War II. Could this be one of the

reasons why all these countries are considered successful democracies and

economies?

Conclusion

A recent major study of corporate America, which looked at the most dramatic

turnarounds among

Fortune

500 companies in the past four decades, concluded

that a change of management was the critical first step in the turnaround of trou-

bled industries. The study found that personnel change occurred before a new cor-

160 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

porate strategy was even discussecL13 The greatest turnarounds in East-Central

Europe were no different.

NOTES

1. Excellent academic work en Russian elites has been done by Virginie Colloudoun.

See, for example, her "Elite Groups in Russia,"

Demokratizatsiya 6, no.

3 (1998): 535-

49.

2. American Psychiatric Association,

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders,

4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 646-47.

3. See for example, J. Michael Waller, "Organized Crime and the Russian State,"

Demokratizatsiya 2,

no. 3 (1994): 364-83; and Louise Shelley, "Organized Crime and Cor-

ruption in Ukraine: Impediments to the Development of a Free-Market Economy,"

Demokratizatsiya

6, no. 4 (1998): 648--63.

4. Edmund Bergler,

The Superego

(New York: Grune and Stratton, 1952), 57.

5. Adolf Hitler shed light on this when he once famously remarked that converted com-

munists make excellent Nazis, whereas social democrats are "hopeless."

6. One exception is Peter Rutland's paper "Tequila-Vodka: What Can We Learn from

the Mexico-Russia Comparison," presented at the Annual Conference of the American

Political Science Association, Boston, August 2002.

7. See for example, Donald L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems"; Seymour

Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture"; and Juan J. Linz, "The Virtues of Par-

liamentarism," alI in

Journal ofDernocracy

1, no. 4 (1990): 73-9 1; and Juan J. Linz, "The

Perils of Presidentialism,"

Journal of Democracy

1, no. 1 (1990): 51-69.

8. Interestingly, however, Ter-Petrossian's father was a leading Bolshevik who was the

founder of the communist parties of Lebanon and Syria. Gamsakhurdia spent years in

Soviet mental institutions, which may Nave contributed to his eccentric personality.

9. See, for example, Petr Vancura, "Czech Republic," in

Nations in Transit 2001: Civil

Society, Dentocracy and Markets in East-Central Europe and the Newly Independent

States,

ed. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer (Washington,

D.C.: Freedom House, 2001), 167.

10. The term is from MIT's political, scientist Stephen Van Evera.

11. See Fredo Arias-King, "Is It Power or Principie? A Footnote on the Talbott Doc-

trine,"

Demokratizatsiya

8, no. 2 (2000): 260-69.

12. It is necessary here to note that, unlike in several other postcommunist countries, in

the Czech Republic the Social Democratic Party has its origins in and leadership mostly

from the former dissidents, and from some liberal communists who participated in the

Prague Spring and were later purged after 1968. The renarned party of the nomenklatura

is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. In Estonia, likewise, sume dissidents

and liberal communists formed the centrist and leftist parties that have governed alterna-

tively with Laar's party, Isamaa (later Isamaaliit). The renamed party of the nomenklatu-

ra, unlike in Lithuania, did not prosper politically in Estonia. One lesson for future Cuban

and North Korean democrats: Form a true social-democratic party from among the dissi-

dent ranks to frustrate the nomenklatura's attempt to monopolize the left.

13. Jim Collins, "Leve) 5 Leadership: The Triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve,"

Harvard Business Review,

January 2001, 71.