6
Competitive Activities. Consider authorizing the persons managing the LLC to
engage in activities that compete with the LLC. Without such an authorization, Section
322C.0409, Subd. 2(3) prevents persons managing the LLC from engaging in activities that are
competitive with the LLC. It is often the case that competitive activities are specifically
contemplated, particularly in the context of businesses that operate through multiple
complementary subsidiaries or utilize special purpose entities to manage projects.
Dealings with the Company. Consider whether to disclaim Section 322C.0409,
Subd. 2(2), which prohibits a person managing the LLC from dealing with the LLC as a person
with an adverse interest. This may be necessary in order to ensure that related party transactions
can be executed without violations of the duty of loyalty. For example, suppose that the majority
member of the LLC is one of three governors of the LLC. The member also happens to own a
building with commercial office space and has leased office space in the building to the LLC. In
negotiating that related party lease, the member has breached his duty of loyalty (unless it is
modified to eliminate the adverse dealings aspect).
Company Opportunities. Consider whether to disclaim the company opportunity
doctrine in the 322C Operating Agreement. Otherwise, Section 322C.0409. Subd. 2(1)(iii)
imposes the company opportunity doctrine. This would likely be contrary to the expectations of
the members, particularly with regard to real estate development.
“Other Constituency” Considerations. In 322B.663, Subd. 5 governors are
expressly permitted, in discharging their fiduciary duties, to consider the interests of
constituencies other than the LLC and its members (e.g., the interests of employees, the
economy, societal considerations, etc.). The Act does not include a similar provision, which
means that consideration of other constituencies will not be permitted unless the concept is
reflected in the 322C Operating Agreement.
Further Tailoring. The Act permits additional customization of the fiduciary
duties, including certain specifically authorized types of modifications, subject to a few limits, all
as expressed in Section 322C.0110:
The Operating Agreement . . .
CAN CANNOT
eliminate particular aspects of the duties of
loyalty and care
identify specific types or categories of conduct
that do not violate the duty of loyalty
prescribe standards by which to measure the
performance of the contractual obligation of
good faith and fair dealing
completely eliminate the fiduciary duty
authorize intentional misconduct or
knowing violations of law (these always
violate the duty of care)
eliminate the contractual obligation of
good faith and fair dealing
adopt any modification to a fiduciary duty
that is “manifestly unreasonable”
6. Consider Conflict of Interest Transactions and Cure Mechanisms.
Chapter 322B contains a curious provision, at Section 322B.666, relating to transactions
between an LLC, on the one hand, and a governor or an entity in which a governor has a material
financial interest, on the other hand. Under Chapter 322B, these transactions were “not void or