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mail “to the governing body at its principal office.” (§ 915, subd. (a).) If a claim is
misdirected, it is “deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section…
if it is delivered or mailed within the time prescribed for presentation,” the claim is
“actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local public
entity.” (§ 915, subds. (d)-(e).)
In practice, potential plaintiffs frequently send their claims to the wrong
public entity or the wrong recipient at public entities. The good news is “[a]ctual
receipt” is strictly construed, and it is a plaintiff’s burden to show the proper parties
had notice of the claim. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992.) An
undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute. (Ibid. [claim
directed to entity’s risk management department, rather than the entity’s “clerk,
secretary, auditor or board” did not substantially comply with the Act]; Westcon
Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramento (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 183, 201-202
(Westcon) [no substantial compliance where actual recipient communicated with the
statutorily designated recipient about the claim]; Life v. County of Los Angeles
(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 900 [no substantial compliance where claim was
presented to entity’s legal department because there was no evidence that the claim
reached the appropriate county officials or board]; Tapia v. County of San
Bernardino (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 375, 384-385 [letters by deputy sheriff’s attorney
to sheriff seeking back pay and reinstatement, rather than to county board or its
risk manager, as required by county ordinance, were insufficient]; Del Real v. City
of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [in action against police officer and city,
letter to officer’s counsel was insufficient notice to city, where it was sent to officer
personally and did not communicate intention to sue].)
Importantly, substantial compliance also does not turn on whether the public
entity has “actual knowledge of facts that might support a claim.” (DiCampli,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990.) “It is well settled that claims statutes must be satisfied
even in face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the claim. Such knowledge—standing alone—constitutes neither
substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d
at p. 455.)
DiCampli disapproved Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d
513, which found public entities had a duty to forward misdirected claims to a
proper agency. But keep in mind: If the governing body of one public entity is also
the governing body of another, a claim against the subordinate entity may
constitute substantial compliance with the claims statute vis-à-vis both. (DiCampli,