1194
AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS
5
Id. at 178.
6
Id. at 179.
7
Id. at 178. In Cases v. United States, 131 F. 2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), the court, upholding a similar provision of the Federal
Firearms Act, said: ‘‘Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the federal
government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as well
as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any
weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well-regulated militia.’’ See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (dic-
tum: Miller holds that the ‘‘Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and
bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia’’’).
8
Enacted measures include the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 226, 18
U.S.C. §§921–928. The Supreme Court’s dealings with these laws have all arisen
in the context of prosecutions of persons purchasing or obtaining firearms in viola-
tion of a provisions against such conduct by convicted felons. Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
9
E.g., N
ATIONAL
C
OMMISSION ON
R
EFORM OF
F
EDERAL
C
RIMINAL
L
AWS
, W
ORK
-
ING
P
APERS
1031–1058 (1970), and F
INAL
R
EPORT
246–247 (1971).
shotguns. After reciting the original provisions of the Constitution
dealing with the militia, the Court observed that ‘‘[w]ith obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effec-
tiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second
Amendment were made. It must be interpreted with that end in
view.’’
5
The significance of the militia, the Court continued, was
that it was composed of ‘‘civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.’’
It was upon this force that the States could rely for defense and
securing of the laws, on a force that ‘‘comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense,’’ who, ‘‘when
called for service . . . were expected to appear bearing arms sup-
plied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.’’
6
Therefore, ‘‘[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than 18
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice
that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or
that its use could contribute to the common defense.’’
7
Since this decision, Congress has placed greater limitations on
the receipt, possession, and transportation of firearms,
8
and pro-
posals for national registration or prohibition of firearms altogether
have been made.
9
At what point regulation or prohibition of what
classes of firearms would conflict with the Amendment, if at all,
the Miller case does little more than cast a faint degree of illumina-
tion toward an answer.